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David Hales (University of Bologna) University of Bologna, Italy www.davidhales.com WARNING! Superficial sociological interpretation followed by simplistic computer simulation

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Page 1: David Hales (University of Bologna) University of Bologna, Italy WARNING! Superficial sociological interpretation followed by simplistic

David Hales (University of Bologna)

University of Bologna, Italywww.davidhales.com

WARNING!Superficial sociological interpretation

followed by simplistic computer simulation

Page 2: David Hales (University of Bologna) University of Bologna, Italy WARNING! Superficial sociological interpretation followed by simplistic

David Hales (University of Bologna)

University of Bologna, Italywww.davidhales.com

The Rise of the Neo-Tribes

Some say that…. Increasingly, in post-industrial societies, old social identities are breaking down People structure interaction around superficial and ephemeral

symbols and “brands” Postmodern culture is seen as broken into transitory and

superficial groups – neo-tribes Corporations use “tribal marketing” to create them “Without the rigidity of the forms of organization with which we are

familiar, it refers to a certain ambience, a state of mind, and is preferably to be expressed through lifestyles that favour appearance and form.” (Maffesoli 1996:98)

Page 3: David Hales (University of Bologna) University of Bologna, Italy WARNING! Superficial sociological interpretation followed by simplistic

David Hales (University of Bologna)

University of Bologna, Italywww.davidhales.com

Superficial Link

Interestingly, there is a rise of a certain kind of technology Computers on the internet form ephemeral teams to service user

needs P2P systems like kazaa, bittorrent, skype We find that simple rules of superficial attachment based on “tags”

can support high levels of cooperation and trust But our early models produced highly disconnected “tribes” We introduce a simple enhancement that gives small-world fully

connected “tribes” Our aim is to actually create functional P2P systems over the

internet rather than understand human systems Since P2P are a new kind of social system, by creating them we

change social realities rather than trying to reflect them.

Page 4: David Hales (University of Bologna) University of Bologna, Italy WARNING! Superficial sociological interpretation followed by simplistic

SLAC and SLACER:

Socially inspired copy & rewire algorithms for trust and

cooperation in P2PDavid Hales, Stefano Arteconi, Ozalp Babaoglu

University of Bologna, Italy

3rd ESSA Conference, Koblenz, Sept. 2005

Page 5: David Hales (University of Bologna) University of Bologna, Italy WARNING! Superficial sociological interpretation followed by simplistic

David Hales (University of Bologna)

University of Bologna, Italywww.davidhales.com

Self-Organising Cooperation in Peer-to-Peer Systems

• Algorithm based on social simulation models of “tags”• Introduced by Holland early 1990’s• Developed recently by Riolo; Hales; Edmonds.

• Tags are observable “markings”, labels or social cues, attached to agents

(e.g. hairstyle, dress, accent)• In an evolutionary algorithm tags evolved just like any other artificial gene

in the “genotype”• They are displayed directly in the “phenotype”• When agents bias interactions towards those with similar tags,

even selfish evolution selects for cooperative and altruistic behaviour

Evolution for Cooperation

Page 6: David Hales (University of Bologna) University of Bologna, Italy WARNING! Superficial sociological interpretation followed by simplistic

David Hales (University of Bologna)

University of Bologna, Italywww.davidhales.com

Evolution for Cooperation

We translated the tag algorithm into a network

• nodes move to find “better” neighbors• producing a kind of evolution in the network• “bad guys” become isolated

Results in a “duplicate and re-wire” rule

• Producing a kind of “group selection” between clusters• a functional reason for temporal structures found in the

“natural” networks?

Self-Organising Cooperation in Peer-to-Peer Systems

Page 7: David Hales (University of Bologna) University of Bologna, Italy WARNING! Superficial sociological interpretation followed by simplistic

David Hales (University of Bologna)

University of Bologna, Italywww.davidhales.com

SLAC Algorithm

Basic Algorithm

• Periodically do• Each node compare “utility” with a random node• if the other node has higher utility

• copy that node’s strategy and links (reproduction)

• mutate (with a small probability):

change strategy (behavior)

change neighborhood (links)• fi

• od

Self-Organising Cooperation in Peer-to-Peer Systems

Page 8: David Hales (University of Bologna) University of Bologna, Italy WARNING! Superficial sociological interpretation followed by simplistic

David Hales (University of Bologna)

University of Bologna, Italywww.davidhales.com

SLAC algorithm

B

F

G

A

E

D

C B

A

F

G

E

D

C

Fu > Au

Before After

Where Au = average utility of node A

A copies F neighbours & strategy

In his case mutation has not changed anything

Self-Organising Cooperation in Peer-to-Peer Systems“Reproduction” = copying a more successful node

Page 9: David Hales (University of Bologna) University of Bologna, Italy WARNING! Superficial sociological interpretation followed by simplistic

David Hales (University of Bologna)

University of Bologna, Italywww.davidhales.com

SLAC algorithm

B

A

F

G

E

D

C

E

D

C

A

G

B

F

Before After

Mutation applied to F’s neighbourhood

F is wired to a randomly selected node (B)

Self-Organising Cooperation in Peer-to-Peer Systems“Mutation of the neighbourhood” = random movement in the net

Page 10: David Hales (University of Bologna) University of Bologna, Italy WARNING! Superficial sociological interpretation followed by simplistic

David Hales (University of Bologna)

University of Bologna, Italywww.davidhales.com

SLAC Applied to the PD

Applied to a simulated Prisoner’s Dilemma Scenario:

• Where selfish behavior produces poor performance – Nash Eq.• Nodes store a pure strategy, either cooperate or defect

• Play the single round PD with randomly selected neighbours• Using their strategy

• We take average payoff as the node utility• Mutation of strategy: flip strategy• Nodes randomly selected to play a random neighbours some

number of times each period

Self-Organising Cooperation in Peer-to-Peer Systems

Page 11: David Hales (University of Bologna) University of Bologna, Italy WARNING! Superficial sociological interpretation followed by simplistic

David Hales (University of Bologna)

University of Bologna, Italywww.davidhales.com

Tag MF = 10

0

100

200

300

400

4000 8000 12000 16000 20000

Nodes

Cycles to 99% Coop

Cycles to High Cooperation

Page 12: David Hales (University of Bologna) University of Bologna, Italy WARNING! Superficial sociological interpretation followed by simplistic

David Hales (University of Bologna)

University of Bologna, Italywww.davidhales.com

SLAC Applied to PD

Neighbour MF = 10

0102030405060708090

100

0 100 200 300 400 500

Cycles

Cooperative nodes %

Typical Individual Run

Page 13: David Hales (University of Bologna) University of Bologna, Italy WARNING! Superficial sociological interpretation followed by simplistic

David Hales (University of Bologna)

University of Bologna, Italywww.davidhales.com

How Does SLAC Work?

Shared tags

Mutation of tag

Copy tag and strategy

Game Interactions

Clusters

Page 14: David Hales (University of Bologna) University of Bologna, Italy WARNING! Superficial sociological interpretation followed by simplistic

David Hales (University of Bologna)

University of Bologna, Italywww.davidhales.com

SLAC Applied to File Sharing P2P

Applied to a simulated P2P File Sharing Scenario:

• Simplified form of that given by Q. Sun & H. Garcia-Molina 2004

• Nodes control how much capacity devoted to generating or answering queries based on P = [0..1]

• P =1.0 selfish (only generates queries)• P =0.0 altruist (only answers queries)

• We take as node utility the number of hits

• Mutation of strategy: change P randomly

• Flood fill query method, TTL’s etc

Self-Organising Cooperation in Peer-to-Peer Systems

Page 15: David Hales (University of Bologna) University of Bologna, Italy WARNING! Superficial sociological interpretation followed by simplistic

David Hales (University of Bologna)

University of Bologna, Italywww.davidhales.com

SLAC Applied to P2P File Sharing

Self-Organising Cooperation in Peer-to-Peer SystemsSome simulation results

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

0 20 40 60 80 100

cycles

average per node

queries (nq) hits (nh)

A typical run for a 104 node network

Selfishness reduces

Average performance increases

Page 16: David Hales (University of Bologna) University of Bologna, Italy WARNING! Superficial sociological interpretation followed by simplistic

David Hales (University of Bologna)

University of Bologna, Italywww.davidhales.com

SLAC Applied to P2P File Sharing

Self-Organising Cooperation in Peer-to-Peer SystemsSome simulation results

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1 10 100 1000

nodes

average per node

queries (nq) hits (nh)

100 1000 10000 100000

Results showing number of queries (nq) and number of hits (nh) (averaged over cycle 40..50) for different network sizes

with10 individual runs for each network size

Page 17: David Hales (University of Bologna) University of Bologna, Italy WARNING! Superficial sociological interpretation followed by simplistic

David Hales (University of Bologna)

University of Bologna, Italywww.davidhales.com

SLAC to SLACER

• SLAC is OK for some tasks – as we have seen• But produces disconnected components• This is no good when we want• An “Artificial Friendship Network” to span the network• Connected – such that all nodes are linked with short path• Chains of trust between all nodes – preferably short also• To achieve this we modify SLAC and introduce SLACER

Page 18: David Hales (University of Bologna) University of Bologna, Italy WARNING! Superficial sociological interpretation followed by simplistic

David Hales (University of Bologna)

University of Bologna, Italywww.davidhales.com

SLACER algorithm

Basic Algorithm

• Periodically do• Each node compare “utility” with a random node• if the other node has higher utility

• copy that node’s strategy and links, probabilistically retaining

some existing links

• mutate (with a small probability):

change strategy (behavior)

change neighborhood (links), probabilistically retaining some

existing links• fi

• od

Page 19: David Hales (University of Bologna) University of Bologna, Italy WARNING! Superficial sociological interpretation followed by simplistic

David Hales (University of Bologna)

University of Bologna, Italywww.davidhales.com

SLAC to SLACER

SLAC SLACER

Page 20: David Hales (University of Bologna) University of Bologna, Italy WARNING! Superficial sociological interpretation followed by simplistic

David Hales (University of Bologna)

University of Bologna, Italywww.davidhales.com

SLACER – Rome Results

Page 21: David Hales (University of Bologna) University of Bologna, Italy WARNING! Superficial sociological interpretation followed by simplistic

David Hales (University of Bologna)

University of Bologna, Italywww.davidhales.com

SLACER – Future Applications

• By establishing a fully connected “Artificial Social Network” (ASN)• This can be used as input to existing P2P applications• Specifically those that assume or require trusted social networks

as input• Currently harvested from e-mail contacts or “buddy lists” in chat

applications• Example: Collective spam filtering:• J. S. Kong, P. O. Boykin, B. Rezei, N. Sarshar, and V.

Roychowdhury, “Let you cyberalter ego share information and manage spam,” 2005. Available as pre-print: http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/physics/0504026.

Page 22: David Hales (University of Bologna) University of Bologna, Italy WARNING! Superficial sociological interpretation followed by simplistic

David Hales (University of Bologna)

University of Bologna, Italywww.davidhales.com

SLACER – Some Results

Page 23: David Hales (University of Bologna) University of Bologna, Italy WARNING! Superficial sociological interpretation followed by simplistic

David Hales (University of Bologna)

University of Bologna, Italywww.davidhales.com

Conclusion

• Simple copy and rewire algorithm• No need for centralized trust or enforcement mechanism• No need for knowledge of past interactions• Process cooperative behavior even when nodes behave in an

egotistical way, locally and greedy optimizing• Works through a kind of “group selection” – “tribal selection”• Can produce trusted and cooperative Artificial Social Networks• Could be applied to existing protocols with minor modification• Available on open source P2P simulation platform Peersim.

Page 24: David Hales (University of Bologna) University of Bologna, Italy WARNING! Superficial sociological interpretation followed by simplistic

David Hales (University of Bologna)

University of Bologna, Italywww.davidhales.com

Related Publications

References• Hales (2004) “From Selfish Nodes to Cooperative Networks”,

Fourth IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (p2p2004), IEEE Press

• Hales & Edmonds (2005) “Applying a socially-inspired technique (tags) to improve cooperation in P2P Networks”, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part A

• Hales & Arteconi (submitted) Artificial Friends: Self-Organizing Artificial Social Networks for Trust and Cooperation – IEEE Int. Systems.

Self-Organising Cooperation in Peer-to-Peer Systems

www.davidhales.com peersim.sourceforge.net

Page 25: David Hales (University of Bologna) University of Bologna, Italy WARNING! Superficial sociological interpretation followed by simplistic

David Hales (University of Bologna)

University of Bologna, Italywww.davidhales.com

SLAC and SLACER

Fini