david bloor - popper's mistification of objetive knowledge

Popper's Mystification of Objective KnowledgeObjective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach by K. R. PopperReview by: David BloorScience Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Jan., 1974), pp. 65-76Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/284538 .

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Science Studies, 4 (I974), 65-76

Essay Review

POPPER'S MYSTIFICATION OF OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE

David Bloor Science Studies Unit, Edinburgh University

K. R. Popper, Objective Knowledge: an Evolutionary Approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press, I972. x+38o. ?4.50 hardback, ?I.50 paper.

For Popper, science is the very epitome of objective knowledge. The central papers of his latest book argue and elaborate this theme. He says: All work in science is work directed towards the growth of objective knowledge. We are workers who are adding to the growth of objective knowledge as masons work on a cathedral. (p. 12 I)1

I will first make some preliminary points about the word 'objective'. This will give substance to issues which are in danger of becoming too rarefied. Second, I will outline Popper's account of objectivity. Third, I will argue that despite the value of what he says, his approach is seriously misleading. I will propose a formula for systematically transforming Popper's theses and exposing what is important in them. This 'transformative method' points the way towards an entirely different conception of what makes knowledge objective.

What does it mean to use the word 'objective' as it appears in the quotation above? Popper, himself, does not linger over this issue because he does not believe that questions about words are important (e.g. p. 3Io). However, re- flection on our common-sense thinking reminds us that we make important use of a family of distinctions: between knowledge and belief; truth and error; what is real and what is imagined; between what is known in general compared with what some individual knows; between what is the case and what someone feels about it, etc. These I will refer to collectively as 'objectivity distinctions', and they may be said to hinge on the use of 'objectivity concepts'. What is 'objective' is characterized by the first half of each distinction, what is 'subjective' by the latter half.

These distinctions and concepts embody a basically materialistic picture of man. They portray him as both interacting with, and vet set over against, his environment-an environment which is stable enough to learn about and

1 All page references refer to the work under review, unless otherwise stated, and all italics are in the original.



66 David Bloor

independent enough to be mistaken and mischaracterized. Objectivity distinctions do this job by signalizing the separateness of the knower and the known. They hold open the possibility of disparity and divergence between a conception of the world and what the world is really like.

What Popper offers in Objective Knowledge is partly a codification of the common-sense deployment of objectivity concepts, a codification organized around his well known conception of science as a fallible enterprise of conjectures and refutations. But his book is more than a codification. It is also a theory about the underlying reality-the ontology-which he believes is implied by, and is necessary for, the use of objectivity concepts. The fact that what he offers is a theory is of the utmost importance. It means that the use of these distinctions might be fully acknowledged by those who nevertheless disagree with Popper's account of them. What, then, is Popper's theory of objectivity?

Popper's whole account of objective knowledge hangs on the framework of a pluralistic philosophy which postulates the existence of three distinctly different kinds of thing-'three worlds'. He says: In this pluralistic philosophy the world consists of at least three ontologically distinct sub-worlds; or, as I shall say, there are three worlds: the first is the physical world or the world of physical states; the second is the mental world or the world of mental states; and the third is the world of intelligibles, or of ideas in the objective sense; it is the world of possible objects of thought, the world of theories in themselves, and their logical relations; of arguments in themselves; and of problem situations in themselves (p. 154).

The first two 'worlds', the physical and the mental, are frequently distin- guished both in common-sense and in philosophy. But what is this 'third world' of objects of thought, logical relations and 'arguments in themselves'?

What Popper is saying is that it is both possible and important to adopt a certain perspective on thinking, and especially on scientific thinking. This perspective is one which concentrates exclusively on evaluating what is said and done according to a variety of impersonal criteria. For example: such an approach bids us to concentrate on establishing the truth or falsity of what is asserted, and the validity or invalidity of any arguments used. What men say and write must be checked for consistency and scrutinized for its relevance to important scientific problems. What Popper calls the 'objective approach' enjoins us to attend to what men say, not to why they say it. The outcome of their intellectual endeavours, and not their motives, should be our prime concern. The reasons which might compel assent to a proposition are to take precedence over the inclinations which may in fact cause belief. The associations that people merely happen to make between ideas are less important than the logical relations of entailment that may connect the propositional content of their thoughts.

The qualities of truth, validity and relevance which the objective approach highlights seem to Popper to define a realm of entities which have a quasi- independent existence. Propositions, theories, arguments, reasons, and so on, seem to constitute an important and distinct kind of thing. Justice must be



Essay Review 67

done to them by acknowledging them as a 'third world'. In particular they must not be confused with the other two worlds. There is little chance of con- fusing them with physical objects or states, but there is an ever-present tendency to assimilate them to subjective, psychological states such as beliefs, associations, means of persuasion, etc.

How well motivated are the distinctions which Popper draws with his 'three world' picture? In many respects they are, surely, of central importance for any theory of knowledge. This is because they turn out to be precisely the common-sense objectivity distinctions that I outlined above. The common- sense concept of 'idea', for example, is just that of an 'idea in the objective sense' to which Popper refers. That is: the word 'idea' is so used that it can be said that someone is thinking about (or ignoring) the same idea as someone else, that he agrees or disagrees with it, and so on. Ideas, for most purposes, are intersubjective. They are public property, and are not locked in the private closets of people's minds.2 Popper sometimes speaks of the third world as being made up of the 'content' of subjective states of belief, where the subjective states themselves belong to the second, or psychological, world. This is perfectly acceptable. It is a way of indicating that the meaning of an individual's thoughts and utterances can be treated for many purposes without considering their origin. They can be written down, repeated and operated on regardless of the circumstances that may have surrounded their birth.

So Popper's distinctions are valuable and plausible. But it is obvious that they are common-sense distinctions. This makes it puzzling to read Popper's bold assertion that: ... scientific knowledge simply is not knowledge in the sense of -the ordinary usage of -the words 'I know'. (p. i o8) Popper presumably believes that ordinary usage, in contrast to scientific usage, does not properly draw such distinctions as that between knowledge and belief. (Although he says in the preface that common-sense is essentially self-critical, like science.) Our initial glance at objectivity distinctions suggested that this was not so: that the confusion of knowledge and belief is not in fact part of common usage. But whatever the ground of Popper's separation of a scientific from a common sense of 'I know', the possible effect of it is clear. It serves to cut us off from those linguistic intuitions which would normally guide our reflections on knowledge. This leaves the way open for having our thinking restructured for us by the imagery of the three worlds.

2 Popper does not fall into the trap of Ryle and Strawson, who assume that the public' character of mentalistic concepts refutes the belief in the mind-body dualism. A dualistic conception of the mind as a special, non-material substance can quite easily accommodate this fact. The mind simply has to be seen as akin to the theoretical entities of science, like atoms or electro-magnetic fields. They are unobservables which explain the observable. A modified, but essentially traditional, dualism can evade the modern objections to it, just as atomism evaded the philosophical criticisms which were once so popular. The parallel is investigated in my 'Is the official theory of mind absurd?', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 21 (I970), I67-83, and 'Explanation and Analysis in Strawson's Persons', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 48 (May I970), 2-9.



68 David Bloor

How literally does Popper intend his reader to take the metaphysical picture of the three worlds? In some respects he is clearly hesitant. We are told not to take the word 'world' too seriously, and that the 'worlds' could be counted up in somewhat different ways. When arguing for the autonomy of the third world he usually speaks of its 'more or less' or 'partial' autonomy (e.g. p. I07). Unfortunately there is no clear indication of what these qualifications amount to. The overall impression is that Popper intends his picture to be taken very seriously. This comes over in the general confidence of his presentations, and in the detailed way in which he elaborates the mechanics of his world picture. His discussion of the autonomy of the third world and its interactions with physical and psychological states will illustrate this.

The issue of the 'autonomy' of the third world is that of establishing that knowledge is quite different from mere subjective belief, that it has its own nature and mode of being. For, as Popper says: The idea of autonomy is central to my theory of the third world... (p. 118) The argument for seeing matters this way uses a number of revealing analogies, mostly of a biological kind. Thus: ...,the third world is a natural product of the human animal, comparable to a spider's web. (p. I I2) On other occasions the world of knowledge is likened to the beaver's dam, or the wasp's nest, or a building. The point of these analogies is that they allow a naturalistic conception of knowledge as being man-made, but they indicate that, once produced, it is independent of its maker. Knowledge, like a cathedral, possesses properties that can be studied without regard to its origin. It can pose problems different from those that prompted, or were encountered in, its construction. Above all, it is capable of interacting back on its builder and his successors in ways which could not have been foreseen. The 'object-like' character that knowledge has for Popper comes out very clearly when he says: ... the human mind can see a physical body in the literal sense of 'see' in which the eyes participate in the process, It can also 'see' or 'grasp' an arithmetical or a geometrical object; a number, or a geometrical figure. But although in this sense 'see' or 'grasp' is used in a metaphorical way, it nevertheless denotes a real relationship between the mind and its intelligible object, the arithmetical or geometrical object; and the relationship is closely analogous to 'seeing' in the literal sense. (p. 155) Referring to the 'intelligible objects' mentioned above he says: . .. we operate with these objects almost as if they were physical objects. (p. I63) Except to those prejudiced against metaphor, this is a clear and powerful way of formulating a theory. It admirably conveys the almost tangible character of that 'real relationship' which, for Popper, obtains between the subjective world of the mind and the objective world of knowledge.3

3 Some philosophers do have a methodological prejudice against metaphor, the use of which they are prone to identify with philosophical confusion. The result is that they



Essay Review 69

This 'real relationship' is further illuminated by what Popper calls the 'causal interactions' and the 'feedback' between the different worlds. (It is the uninhibited use of this sort of language that shows how serious Popper is about his three worlds. One does not without qualification enquire into the causal links between things that one does not believe in.)

The three worlds are so related that -the first two can interact, and that the last two can interact. Thus ithe second world, the world of subjective or personal experiences, interacts with each of the other two worlds. The first world and the third world cannot interact, save through the intervention of the second world, the world of subjective or personal experiences. (p. 155)

The vision is compelling and the reiterated terminology infectious. Perhaps this should occasion no surprise. What Popper is doing is replaying, in modem dress, an old drama. His picture of three worlds resonates with the myths and imagery of Judaeo-Christian theology. Man is a creature midway between the material and the spiritual, an admixture of clay and God. For Popper a personal God has been replaced by an impersonal Science, the world of spirit by the world of knowledge.

If its theological overtones explain the power of Popper's vision, other historical links afford a clue to the responses that might be made to it. Popper positions his theory of the third world in the tradition of Plato's theory of Forms and Hegel's theory of Objective and Absolute Spirit. Plato, he says, probably discovered the third world (p. I22). Only, instead of the rich and dynamic content envisaged by Popper, Plato's version was inhabited by a limited number of static concepts, like number or equality. Arguments, criticisms, problems and conjectures were overlooked. In this respect Hegel was nearer to Popper's heart (p. 125). He had a strong sense of the ever-moving and progressing character of man's history and achievements, of his institutions, art, religion and philosophy. For Hegel these things are partial embodiments of, and pointers to, a non-material reality which is working out its dialectical purpose in the world. Of course, there is much in the work of these two thinkers with which Popper disassociates himself: for example, Hegel seems to treat the contents of his third world as if they were ideas in the mind of a super-consciousness. Nevertheless, the affinities are revealing.

The brief account given so far hardly does justice to the valuable pattern of relationships which emerge in Popper's book. Is there any way in which these patterns can be preserved without the metaphysical apparatus of the three worlds? The fact that some of the central distinctions have been taken over from common usage strongly suggests that this ought to be possible. The distinctions should be detachable from Popper's theory because their unself- conscious employment predated that account. The Hegelian overtones of Popper's theory hints how this might be done systematically.

never come to terns with the procedures of science. See my 'The Dialectics of Metaphor', Inquiry, 14 (X97), 43-44, and 'Are Philosophers Averse to Science?' in D. 0. Edge and J. N. Wolfe (eds.), Meaning and Control (London: Tavistock, x973), I-I7.



70 David Bloor

There are a variety of responses that can be made to metaphysical systems which seem to bring news of mysterious realms and uncommon types of thing. One is to erect a stringent standard of meaning and to declare their propositions meaningless. This response is characteristically empiricist and inherently conservative. It results in the loss of any insights that might have been retrieved from the novel perspective of the system.

An alternative response is that of the 'transformative method'. This was developed by Feuerbach (who used it to interpret Christianity), but its most famous application was by Marx to Hegel.4 The method is based on the assumption that metaphysical systems are not empty fantasies, but are about something real-namely, the social relations between men. It further assumes that such systems disguise, displace and invert what they perceive; that they make a mystery out of what might be said more plainly. By adopting a single, systematic principle of interpretation-equating the metaphysical with the social-the valuable structure of the system can be preserved and the mystifying form of its presentation decoded.

The conjectural rule of transformation or interpretation to be applied to Popper is:

For 'Third World' read 'Social World'. This formula is 'reductionist' because it cuts down the number of independ-

ent kinds of thing by equating one realm, the third world, with another, more earthy, sphere. But it is probably less reductionist than the simpler expedient of merely translating Popper's claims into ordinary language, as was done above with some of his distinctions. Here it is too easy to lose the very thing that is worth preserving; viz., structure. This is because recasting into ordinary language can proceed in a piecemeal, unsystematic way. The more systematic transformative method, as will be seen, keeps structure prominently to the fore. Even so its application is hazardous. Only general guidelines are provided and every interpretation is a conjecture. (In this respect the transformative method is itself in accord with the Popperian methodology for achieving understanding; e.g. p. 176.)

The proposed transformation leaves the basic threefold structure of Popper's theory intact. The individual is still a being poised between two worlds, only now it is the natural and the social worlds. The manifest differences between the physical, the psychological and the social parallel the ontological cleavages between Popper's three worlds. The causal and feedback relations are also unchanged. Society acts on men, but collective purposes impinge on nature only through the agency of individuals. There can be no unmediated commerce between a society and nature. Similarly the social world is a human product (like the third world) and yet it is set over against the individual, and interacts back on him. Society is even open to the same sort of misunderstandings, and evokes the same sort of analogies, as Popper's third world. The mistake of

4For a detailed and fascinating account of Marx's use of the transformative method see S. Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (Cambridge: CUP, 1970).



Essay Review 71

assimilating the third to the second world is transformed into the more recog- nizable syndrome of being blind to social processes. Many people mischaracter- ize social processes: possessing no concept of 'norm', for instance, they see only individual decisions and choices. At the other extreme are people who sense the constraining character of social reality and are moved to say that social facts are things-just as Popper was moved so to describe his third world. The basic structure and relationships are thus 'invariant' under the proposed transformation .5

Once equipped with the rule for transformation it is possible to go through Popper's theses one after the other turning them from claims whose import and basis is obscure into propositions which are both clear and arguable. Consider, for instance, his important thesis concerning the relative priority of objective and subjective approaches to human thinking. He says: An objectivist epistemology which studies the third world can help to throw an immense amount of light upon the second world of subjective consciousness, especially upon the subjective thought processes of scientists; but the converse is not true. (p. I12) The claim is that an individual's subjective acts of understanding are 'largely anchored in the third world', and that almost everything of importance that can be said about such acts 'consist4s] in pointing out ... relations to third world objects' (p. I63).

Uhder transformation, this thesis becomes the claim that an individual's subjective acts of thought are anchored in the social world, and that almost everything of importance that can be said consists in pointing out their rela- tion to the social world: In short, Popper is saying in his language that psychology owes more to sociology than vice versa.

Whatever the fate of this claim when examined in detail, it is at least a clear thesis for which reasons can be adduced. An argument in its favour might begin with the observation that people see the world in terms of socially-given categories. Consider the sorts of thing that people think about (which is one of the factors that governs the ideas that are in their heads). They think about objects like computers or oracles, about substances like oxygen or phlogiston, and about states like being infected by a virus or being ritually unclean. Clearly peoples' habitual categories of thought vary from culture to culture. To these categories they apply socially-varying standards, of efficiency, cogency and satisfactoriness. The ideas that are in people's minds are in the currency of their time and place. People will differ in their judgments, depending on their intelligence, temperament and experience, but the terms in which they think do not emanate from their subjective psyches. They come from the

5 Even the theological overtones of Popper's theory transform in a revealing way. To say that Popper treats knowledge in a way which is structurally akin to how others treat God turns into the thesis that society plays a role like God's. This is precisely Durkheim's theory of religion (see E. Durkheim, Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. J. W. Swain [London: Allen and Unwin, 1915]). A. MacIntyre states the point neatly: 'What the members of a society worship is the ensemble of their own social relationships in a disguised form', Marxism and Christianity (London: Duckworth, I 969), 3.



72 David Bloor

public domain into their heads during socialization. The understanding of the thinking processess should tread the same path from the outside of the individual to the inside.6

Another example of the transformative method turning an opaque thesis into a clear one is provided by its effect on Popper's claim that objective knowledge is 'knowledge without a knowing subject' (the title of one of his chapters). If the third world is the social world, then objective knowledge refers to something like the state of a discipline, or a part of culture, at any given time. It refers to the standards, conventions, accepted procedures, para- digmatic results and models to which some group subs6fidb.Objective knowledge is the property of a collectivity and hence not the content of any individual physicist however brilliant and pre-eminent. Physics is what physicists (as a group) know. Since the class of physicists is not itself a physicist, physics as such is knowledge without a knowing subject. (Examination of Popper's three examples of knowledge in the objective sense, given on page IIO, confirms this interpretation of objective knowledge as 'the state of a discipline'.)

It is even possible to resolve apparent anomalies and sources of puzzlement in Popper's thesis by the transformative method. Some of Popper's readers who accept his idea that science is objective knowledge may be puzzled by his in- clusion in the third world of works of art, poems, music, etc. Is it just an arbitrary matter what Popper includes under the heading of 'objective'? Or does it depend on esoteric debates about whether poetry has its own form of truth, or whether pictures and music convey propositions? No: Popper is being straightforward and consistent in including them in the third world-although he does not fully explain why. It becomes clear when the thesis is transformed. Works of art are part of a culture. They embody and celebrate, challenge or negate the norms of a group. Art is not pure subjectivity. It also has a place in the wider society, which takes it up and uses it in its own way. Art's in- evitable possession of a social meaning ensures that it must have a place in the third world. All socially meaningful and socially-structured activities should be included amongst the 'objects' of the third world. If anything, Popper should increase the already variegated content of his metaphysical realm, thus making it even more like Hegel's.

Does the transformative method simply take everything that Popper says and produce a counterpart in social terms? If it did there would seem to be little point in the exercise. It would be merely swapping one terminology for another. In fact everything does not transform mechanically. The discipline imposed by the transformation throws into relief points against which objections can be raised.

The first point that does not transform satisfactorily is Popper's rendering 6 Psychologists do not in practice need anyone to remind them of this. Their own

tradition is amply rich enough to make the point. For example, F. C. Bartlett's classic work, Remembering (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1932) studied the influence of culture in structuring the memory image. See also, M. Sherif, The Psychology of Social Norms (New York: Harper, 1936).



Essay Review 73

of the demarcation between subjective and objective ways of studying knowledge. The distinction as such is preserved, but not Popper's conception of it. He groups together as equally 'subjective' both individualistic psychology and sociology. The way that I am here suggesting that Popper should be read in- volves taking 'objective' to refer to social and structural factors such as customs, institutions and norms. A 'subjective' approach would be one which did not concern itself with structural factors but only with the intrinsic qualities of individuals. Clearly, Popper's advocacy of an objective method-as here under- stood-should not be combined with a condemnation of both psychology and sociology. He should only object to psychology. In direct terms the criticism is that Popper never bothers to distinguish between the different approaches that he lumps together for condemnation as 'subjective'. Indeed, he never really characterizes the enemy in any detail at all. It is a vague bogy. Both psychology and sociology are represented in extremely weak terms as being concerned with things like the feelings which surround someone's creative acts or discoveries (e.g. p. z66). This characterization does justice to neither discipline.

Another point which does not 'transform' properly arises out of Popper's useful discussion of what he calls 'situational logic' (p. 178). He argues that the proper way to understand, say, Galileo's theory of the tides, and indeed the work of any scientist, is to position it in the context of problems and assumptions as they appeared to the actor. Galileo rejected a theory of tides which im- plicated the moon because lunar influence smacked of astrology-a tradition of thought to which he was opposed. Once the problem situation (as it appeared to Galileo), and the background assumptions, have been articulated, then the theory becomes fully intelligible. Because Popper includes problems and background assumptions amongst the objects of the third world, he counts this approach as a triumph of the objective method. It is clear that 'situational logic' readily transforms into the sociological rule-of-thumb that to understand an action one must begin by taking the actor's point of view. To do this one must understand the norms, categories and habits of the group into which he has been socialized. These provide the backbone for any explanation or account of behaviour. Surely, sociologists are no strangers to this approach: though they talk of 'situational logic' but of 'the actor's perception of the situation', and not of 'the objective method' but of 'the subjective method'.7

Popper is not, however, an entirely consistent advocate of 'situational logic'. It is once again the transformed version of his theory which permits a firmer

7 See for example S. B. Barnes, 'On the Reception of Scientific Beliefs' in Barry Barnes (ed.), Sociology of Science: Selected Readings (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), and 'Sociological Explanation and Natural Science,' Arch. Europ. Sociol., xiii (1972) 373-93. Barry Barnes has raised the question of why Popper speaks of the third world and not of the third worlds. Galileo's rejection of astrology is a part of the third world, but what about the astrologer's assumptions? Popper might reply by including them all together in one unitary world, arguing that this world consists of sub-worlds or clusters of assumptions, problems, etc. In this way he would come to reflect the fact that complex societies are made up of different sub-cultures. This would help articulate Popper's picture, whilst bringing it closer to a sociological perspective in a natural and easy way. A map of the third world would begin to assume the pattern and colouration of a map of society.



74 David Bloor

hold on the argument than does his own three-world picture. Popper says that he thinks truth is a question of whether a theory corresponds to the real facts, but he then conflates this point with the quite different issue of the circumstances under which men alter their views about reality. Thus:

Our man-made theories may clash with these real facts, and so, in our search for truth, we may have to adjust our theories or to give them up. (p. 329) The question of whether we have to adjust and relinquish our theories has nothing to do with whether they clash with reality. What matters is whether they are believed to clash. They may clash without the clash being perceived, and they may be perceived to clash when they do not. Popper is right about what 'truth' means: when we say that a proposition is true we mean that it corresponds with reality. But that is a purely formal observation about the idea of truth. In order to give it content, specific claims must be advanced and allowed to stand in for the true and the real. Neither science nor common life can be conducted with abstract formulas. The same goes for the rest of the objectivity distinctions mentioned earlier. They derive from a general model, or picture, of what it is to know and learn. This provides a background against which particular agreements and disagreements can be seen. Objectivity distinctions trade on a notion of truth and reality as such, but their use does not depend on our actually having access to these commodities. The base line against which theories are tested are the currently accepted beliefs of a social group, or what have been called 'cognitive norms'.

Popper himself used to believe exactly this. In a profound chapter of his Logic of Scientific Discovery8 he explains that the empirical base of science consists of a set of statements which have been accepted as 'conventions' (for the time being) by a 'decision' of the scientific community. His picture of decisions and conventions is designed to replace the empiricist account in which the basis of science is observation yielding observation-statements of complete or near certainty. For Popper observation is merely one of the causal factors motivating the decisions to accept certain 'basic-statements'.9

The transformative method thus helps to keep Popper's philosophy on the course set by his early work. It helps root out the confusion between the absolute and perceived falsity of a theory. It is the latter which is the real motor of scientific charge.

So far my suggested way of reading Popper's account of knowledge has

8 K. R. Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery (rev. edn., London: Hutchinson, I968), 105, o09.

9 Popper's theory of the empirical base, although far more subtle and penetrating than the three-worlds view, shows the same desire to avoid confrontation with the real social processes of science. At the point where his theory of the empirical base makes contact with sociology Popper resorts to fictions like group 'decisions'. These 'decisions' have the same status as the social 'contracts' of seventeenth century political theorists. This poses an important problem: why do people go to such great lengths to avoid facing social reality? Why do they prefer to construct a myth rather than conduct an empirical enquiry?



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been shown to have three characteristics: (i) the essential pattern and structure of Popper's ideas can be fully retrieved but in a non-mysterious form; (ii) problematic features of his views can be accounted for; and (iii) errors can be highlighted and corrected. In conclusion, I will offer a few general reasons for preferring the social perspective to the three-worlds metaphysic. I will also mention some typical objections that might be made to the transformed version of Popper's thesis, and offer suggestions to overcome them.

The central worry for any reader of Popper's book is: What exactly is the third world? What mode of being does it have? To say that it just is the world of propositions, theories and problems leaves the issue obscure, because an account is needed of what sort of entity these are. Popper explains that his theory is different from Plato's or Hegel's, and he asserts that his third world really exists-but he never explains how the trick is done. Equating the third world with the social world at least provides a point of entry into these problems.

Could the transformation ever really provide an adequately detailed account of the content of the third world? How can sociology account for meaning, for logical validity, or for the truth and falsity of theories? Take each point in turn. If Wittgenstein is correct then in general the meaning of a word just is the use to which it is put.10 To talk of the meaning of a symbol is to talk of its role and employment and place in the life of a social group. Language is a form of behaviour, as is criticism and argument.

What about logic and validity? Again Wittgenstein has shown how to ground these in social life. To appraise an argument for validity is to apply the standards of a social group. It cannot be other, or more, than this because we have access to no other standards. But don't these standards reflect some external and more enduring truth-something built into the fabric of the universe, as it were? It is quite possible to see matters like this, just as one can see the ethical practices of a group as a more-or-less adequate embodiment of some privileged 'absolute' system. But as an explanation of human behaviour this does not have much to recommend it. It brings little illumination and much theoretical trouble. The feeling that logic constitutes a separate order of being, or that it is, in some mysterious way, built into the nature of things, is just one more example of reading social practices into the world. To externalize them in this way is a means of making it feel as if the cosmic order sanctions one's practices: always a comforting feeling, but not ore conducive to critical thought. Reasoning logically is like behaving morally. It means conforming to norms of correct procedure.11

What about truth: surely that depends on the natural, not the social, order? 10 See Philosophical Investigations, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), para. 43. 11 Wittgenstein's account of the compulsive character of logic is to be found in his

Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (Oxford: Blackwell, I964). For an exposition of his theory, and a discussion of its frequently unperceived sociological character, see my 'Wittgenstein and Mannheim on the Sociology of Mathematics', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 4 (i973), 173-91. Wittgenstein, the man, was no ally of the sociology of knowledge. But this does not stop it being right to use some of his arguments, even to support causes which he would oppose.



76 David Bloor

For truth as such the answer is 'yes': but I have already argued that judgments of what is true (that is, perceived truth) depend on both the natural and the social order. The natural order provides the external stimulus, and the social order the terms of the response. Social organization can indeed ensure that a given theory is perceived as true. Evans-Pritchard showed as much when he examined the way in which Zande society is organized around the premise that the natural world is replete with the forces of witchcraft.12 Philosophers as well as anthropologists have increasingly investigated the social processes whereby theories are sustained and anomalies absorbed. Conversely, of course, other systems of norms can be imagined which would maximize the perception of falsity. Popper advocates a competitive, individualistic social structure for science precisely because it would do just that. Popper does not, of course, claim that such a system will prove or establish the falsity of more theories than would other systems. Indeed he has always argued that proofs and justifications, even of the falsity of theories, cannot in principle be provided by science. Social organization, then, is the crucial variable determining the perception of the truth and falsity of any given theory."3

If these arguments are accepted, then it can be claimed that the objectivity of knowledge resides in its being the set of accepted beliefs of a social group. This is why and how it transcends the individual and constrains him. This is why it seems stable and enduring and external to him, and why it appears to constitute a third world with its own nature. The authority of truth is the authority of society.

This shift in ontology is more than a mere matter of theoretical preference. It has practical implications. To adopt the transformed version of Popper's theory is to connect his epistemology with processes that are real and accessible to investigation. It permits the resources of an empirical and theoretical research tradition to be brought to bear on the third world. By identifying it with society, an opportunity is provided for detecting new problems, reformu- lating old ones and developing new theories. By contrast, the opaque ontology of the so-called 'objective approach' paralyses the imagination and stultifies research.

12 E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937).

13 Before a theory could be proved false a basic statement which contradicted it would have to be proved true. Popper clearly states (e.g. Logic, p. 47) that there are no ultimate statements in science which cannot in principle be refuted, including reports of observations and experiments. All statements have the status of conjectures. It is precisely because of this fact that Popper's epistemology has totally to dispense with justification.



david bloor - popper's mistification of objetive knowledge

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