Palestinians After Reconciliation

Khalil ShikakiPalestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research

June2014

Data

Poll conducted between 5 and 7 June 2014

Representative sample of 1270 respondents

In the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem

Face to face interviews

Margin of error is 3%

Implications for the peace process

Majority in sees reconciliation not closing door to negotiations

Majority wants conciliation government to accept international conditions

Majority believes Hamas indirectly accepts international conditions when joining the PLO

Disarming factions in the Gaza Strip

Reconciliation Aftermath: implications for the peace process

Reconciliation Aftermath: implications for the peace process–

Disarm factions in Gaza

Reconciliation Aftermath: implications for the peace process–

Disarm factions in Gaza

Implications for the two-state solution

West Bankers support two-state solution, not Gazans

All view it as impractical

All reject one-state solution

Reconciliation Aftermath: implications for two-state solution

Implications for Palestinian options

Majority supports joining international organizations

Majority supports non violence

Majority opposes return to armed intifada

Majority opposes dissolution of the PA

Reconciliation Aftermath: implications for Palestinian options

Implications for Plan B– Going international

An overwhelming majority favors going to the ICC even if leads to PA collapse

Majority opposes UNSC imposing borders on two sides

Majority opposes UN trusteeship on WBGS

Majority does not believe the international community will impose sanctions on Israel even if occupation lasts much longer

Reconciliation Aftermath: implications for Plan B– going

international