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Dartmouth Model United Nations April 5 - 7, 2019

UNSC CTC

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Dartmouth Model United Nations Conference 14th Annual Conference – April 5 – 7, 2019

Dartmouth College – Rockefeller Center – Hanover, NH 03755 E-mail: dartmun@dartmouth.edu - http://sites.dartmouth.edu/modelun

December 5, 2018 Dear Delegates: On behalf of the entire Dartmouth Model United Nations staff, I would like to welcome and thank you for registering for the fourteenth annual Dartmouth Model United Nations conference this April 2019. We have been working relentlessly since the end of last year’s conference to provide a better and more worthwhile Model U.N. experience for this spring’s delegates. DartMUN is a unique conference. We pair world-class delegations and dais staff members in smaller, more-interactive environments to facilitate an enriching experience for delegates of all skill levels. We believe DartMUN’s active, small committees ensure delegates feel comfortable immersing themselves in a competitive but supportive environment that encourages trial by error and participation. Furthermore, DartMUN’s well-trained staff is excited to work with your delegates this winter in committee to equip the next generation of college students with the skills to tackle complex global problems. This being said, Model United Nations is only meaningful when delegates are thoroughly prepared. To aid in your research preparation, your committee staff has spent hours researching, writing, and editing this Background Guide. The Background Guide serves as an introduction to your respective committee and an overview of the topics that you will be debating over the course of the conference. The Background Guide is intended to be a starting point for your research and is not, in itself, an adequate exposure to the complexities of your committee’s topics. To be prepared, each delegate should do further research and focus on processing information through the lens of their respective country or position. If you are having trouble digesting all the information, the Background Guide contains relevant discussion questions that break down the topics. Also, as questions or ideas arise, do not be shy in contacting your committee staff via e-mail. Committee staff are knowledgeable and can help you better understand a particular topic or how your country fits into a larger international debate. More often than not, discussing the problem with another person can open up more paradigms and viewpoints that may guide you throughout the brainstorming process. As in years past, all delegates are expected to write a brief position paper before the conference to synthesize all of their preparatory research and analysis. Please see the position paper guidelines on the conference website for specific information about content, format, etc. Committee staff will collect position papers at the beginning of the first committee session on Friday evening. Bring a hard copy because delegates who do not submit position papers will not be eligible for awards. I look forward to meeting you this coming spring. Sincerely, Lauren Bishop Secretary-General DartMUN XIV

Lauren Bishop Secretary-General

Shelley Wang

Director-General

Mila Escadajillo Chief of Staff

Brandon Zhou Charge d’Affaires

Clayton Jacques

Undersecretary-General of General Assembly

Daniel Bring

Undersecretary-General of Special Committees

Nishanth Chalasani

Undersecretary-General of Current Crises

Samuel Zarkower

Undersecretary-General of Future and Historical Crises

Bill Kosmidis

Undersecretary-General of Ad-Hoc

Alec Rossi

Director of Finance and Public Relations

Bethany David

Director of Technology

Shawdi Mehrvarzan Deputy Chief of Staff

DartMUN is a student-run, non-profit, all volunteer organization sponsored by

the Rockefeller Center for Public Policy.

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Dartmouth Model United Nations Conference 14th Annual Conference – April 5 – 7, 2019

Dartmouth College – Rockefeller Center – Hanover, NH 03755 E-mail: dartmun@dartmouth.edu - http://sites.dartmouth.edu/modelun

Dear Delegates, I am so excited to welcome you all to the 14th DartMUN Conference and the Special Committee on Somalia. DartMUN XIV is shaping up to be the best conference yet, and with your hard work, this committee will be the highlight of the conference. It is my hope that you will be encouraged to delve deeply into the real-world issues faced by those in other countries. Over the weekend, I will have the honor of getting to know all of you, and I’d like to take a moment to introduce myself. I am Elsa Ericksen, I’m a ’22 here at Dartmouth College, and I plan to major in Government and possibly minor in Spanish. I’m from Washington (the state, not D.C.), and my high school didn’t have MUN, so this is my first conference and I’m very excited. Don’t worry, though, I did four years of FFA (bonus points if you know what that is), so I have plenty of experience with parli-pro. This background guide is designed to be a starting point for your research, but by no means should it be the end. In order to get the most out of this committee, I encourage you to search out many different sources that offer different perspectives on the issues that will be discussed. As I learned from my first term at Dartmouth, Google Scholar is an amazing resource, but it can be overwhelming at times. If you run into any problems and have questions, concerns, or just want to get a second opinion, feel free to reach out to me. My e-mail is elsa.a.ericksen.22@dartmouth.edu. Good luck with your research, and I look forward to meeting and getting to know you at DartMUN this year! Sincerely, Elsa Ericksen

Lauren Bishop Secretary-General

Shelley Wang

Director-General

Mila Escadajillo Chief of Staff

Brandon Zhou Charge d’Affaires

Clayton Jacques

Undersecretary-General of General Assembly

Daniel Bring

Undersecretary-General of Special Committees

Nishanth Chalasani

Undersecretary-General of Current Crises

Samuel Zarkower

Undersecretary-General of Future and Historical Crises

Bill Kosmidis

Undersecretary-General of Ad-Hoc

Alec Rossi

Director of Finance and Public Relations

Bethany David

Director of Technology

Shawdi Mehrvarzan Deputy Chief of Staff

DartMUN is a student-run, non-profit, all volunteer organization sponsored by

the Rockefeller Center for Public Policy.

UNSC CTC DartMUN XIV

Topic A: Regulations on the

Treatment of Violent Non-

State Actors

Background The rise of local groups opposing

domestic legislations/customs has always

been the primary cause of major conflicts and

revolutions in any major historical event.

When the nature of opposition escapes

peaceful protests, i.e. becomes violent, it’s

essential that these VNSAs (Violent non-

state actors) are brought under control for an

effective functioning, or resolution, of the

problems at the first place. VNSAs currently

range from large terrorist organizations like

ISIS and Al-Qaeda to small insurgencies

operating in sub-Saharan Africa.1

The UN Security Council Counter-

Terrorism Committee (UNSC CTC) was

formed by Resolution 13732 after the 9/11

attacks in the United States, after which it has

1 “Fighting Irregular Fighters.” US Army War College, US Army War College, ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/issues/Winter_2013/6_Bunker.pdf .

2 “UN/S RES 1373.” A/RES/61/295 - F, undocs.org/S/RES/1373(2001). https://undocs.org/S/RES/1373(2001)

dealt with member-specific case studies of

terrorism’s proliferation within countries and

across international borders.3 As a subsidiary

body of the UNSC, it can suggest the use of

military and other counter-terrorism

strategies in accordance to the level of threat

possessed. These suggestions can be legal or

military regulations of VNSAs; coherent

standards over of international and domestic

laws; formation of unilateral or multilateral

agreements between parties in dispute.4

Looking at the various kinds of, and

situation specific, VSNAs around the globe,

the UNSC CTC at DartMUN will attempt to

foster better international solutions for

dealing with the treatment, in combat and

captivity, of VNSAs.

Recent History As stated above, the CTC was formed

in the wake of the September 11th terrorist

attacks, and since the beginning of the US-led

War on Terror, increasing attention has been

3 “Counter-Terrorism Committee - United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee.” United Nations, United Nations, www.un.org/sc/ctc/. 4 “Humanitarian Intervention.” Oxford Public International Law, 6 June 2017, opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e306.

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paid to VNSAs, and their treatment as

combatants and prisoners.

In the Second Chechen War, from

1999 to 2000, the military of the Russian

Federation carried out large-scale operations

to crush separatists in the country’s Muslim-

majority Chechnya region.5 These operations

allegedly involved the use of munitions

outlawed by the Geneva Convention and the

mass killing of civilians in the Russian

campaign to destroy Chechen resistance.6

Subsequent trials of Chechen leaders rejected

the laws of trying enemy combatants,

viewing them instead as criminals; however,

this matter is complicated as well, because

Chechen leaders are also accused of

committing war crimes.7

Though the most intense fighting of

the Second Chechen War ended in 2002, a

counter-insurgency has lingered in the region

5 Pike, John. “Military.” Global Security, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/chechnya2.htm. 6 “Revealed: Russia's Worst War Crime in Chechnya.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 5 Mar. 2000, www.theguardian.com/world/2000/mar/05/russia.chechnya. 7 “Second Chechen War Crimes and Terrorism.” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, 1 Jan. 2019, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Chechen_War_crimes_and_terrorism#Trials_of_Chechen_fighters.

since.8 This example is very important to

considering the right of a nation to employ

measures against VNSAs within its own

borders. The European Court of Human

Rights agreed to hear cases brought against

the Russian Federation by Chechen civilians,

and in many of these cases, ruled in favor of

the Chechen plaintiffs. These legal rulings

have found the Russian government

complicit in the killings and torture of

Chechen civilians.9 Thusly, there is legal

precedent, in some international

jurisdictions, to condemn acts of collateral

violence against civilians in the course of

counter-terrorist operations.

Perhaps the most well-known cases

about the treatment of VNSAs have come out

of United States counter-terrorism operations

in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay. The revealing

of horrific torture and abuse of detainees by

American guards within Abu Ghraib prison

8 History, Feature. “Feature History - Chechen Wars (2/2).” YouTube, YouTube, 26 Jan. 2018, www.youtube.com/watch?v=ap0BiR3NF6w. 9 Echr. HUDOC - European Court of Human Rights, hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22dmdocnumber%22:[%22812996%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-79109%22]}.; “Second Chechen War Crimes and Terrorism.” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, 1 Jan. 2019, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Chechen_War_crimes_and_terrorism#European_Court_of_Human_Rights.

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in Iraq following the 2003 US-led invasion

stunned the world.10 The prisoner detention

center at the US naval base in Guantanamo

Bay, Cuba, has also provoked major

international condemnation for the alleged

use of torture or so-called “Enhanced

Interrogation Techniques.”11 The

controversy over these cases was heightened

by the fact that while denying authorization

for more extreme cases of torture, such as

those in Abu Ghraib, the US government

used legal arguments to remove constraints

on the treatment and torture of VNSAs.12

The UN has been officially opposed

to torture since the adoption of the

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,

Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or

Punishment in 1984. The US and the Russian

Federation are both among the parties of the

treaty. The European Convention on Human

Rights adopted in 1950, and expanded to

include the prevention of torture in 1987, has

10 “Abu Ghraib Torture and Prisoner Abuse.” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, 8 Jan. 2019, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Ghraib_torture_and_prisoner_abuse. (Warning: extremely disturbing images). 11 “Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp.” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, 15 Jan. 2019, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guantanamo_Bay_detention_camp. 12https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/ref/international/24MEMO-GUIDE.html? (URL only).

also been an influential document,

particularly through the aforementioned

apparatus of the European Court of Human

Rights.13

While the US has faced no sanctions

for its treatment of detainees, it has faced

widespread criticisms and a 2012 ruling from

the European Court of Human Rights that

condemned CIA activities in the War on

Terror as “torture.”14 Additionally, the US

has provoked international consternation

over its use of drone strikes within other

countries in attacks against VNSAs that often

claim civilian lives. It has been estimated that

over 1,600 civilians have been killed in over

5,800 strikes in recent years.15 While these

strikes have certainly achieved many military

objectives, they have also incurred high

collateral damages and a definite human cost.

Thusly, an ethical question is posed to

delegates over the objectives of counter-

13 “European Convention on Human Rights.” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, 28 Dec. 2018, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Convention_on_Human_Rights. 14 “Torture and the United States.” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, 12 Jan. 2019, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Torture_and_the_United_States#torture_abroad. 15 “Drone Warfare.” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war.

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terrorism and its human cost. How can

VNSAs be fought without hurting civilians

and inflicting unnecessary harm and

suffering? What can the international

community and the UNSC CTC do to balance

these issues?

Current Issues As of December 2018, five major

wars—those in excess of 10,000 deaths per

year—are being fought around the world.16

All of them involve VNSAs.17 In these

conflicts, fought in Syria, Iraq, Yemen,

Afghanistan, and Mexico, the primary

military objective of the internationally-

recognized governments is the defeat of

VNSAs. These conflicts, which have raged

since 1978 at the earliest (in Afghanistan) and

the latest since 2011 (in Syria and Yemen),

have made the treatment of VNSAs a

contemporary international issue that is often

at the forefront of discussions over global

security.

Recent questions over the military-

strategic nature of counter-terrorism, given

the difficulties and complications of the War

16 “List of Ongoing Armed Conflicts.” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, 17 Jan. 2019,

on Terror, have also joined the conversations

over the ethics and treatment of VNSAs.

Delegates are suggested to weigh these two

aspects of counter-terrorism in posing

solutions for the present predicament.

Potential Solutions For this topic, we encourage a general

approach to the questions at hand. Discussion

should be focused on broad, UNSC-wide

applications of strategy and international law.

Topic B presents a more specific case study

on counter-terrorism.

Delegates should consider how

multilateral treaties govern the ways

countries should regard domestic and

international laws, particularly with respect

to the Vienna Convention on the Law of

Treaties (VCLT). This will foster

implementation of laws that already resolve

various problems but are not brought into

effect due to no-coherence between states

and other relevant counter-terrorism bodies

and frameworks.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ongoing_armed_conflicts. 17 Ibid.

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Delegates could investigate a

military-strategic review of the methodology

of counter-terrorism operations—when, how,

to what extent—by member states, or by the

United Nations as a whole, considering issues

under the responsibility to protect customary

international law, and the UN Charter.

Creativity and cooperation is

encouraged between delegates once the

conference begins. We look forward to

seeing what ideas you all will put forward for

such a challenging topic.

Questions to Consider 1. Should there be restrictions on

counter-terrorism measures?

2. What’s the practical difference

between VNSAs and terrorists?

3. Do all war crimes exist in counter-

terrorism operations?

4. Does it infringe on a country’s

sovereignty to regulate its ability to

protect itself from terrorism?

5. Do terrorists have the same human

rights and protections under

international law as regular soldiers

do?

6. Is conflict between military-strategic

objectives and universal human rights

inevitable?

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Topic B: Counterterrorism in Somalia

Background Somalia is a country in Eastern Africa

that is considered one of the most

impoverished nations in the world. After the

British withdrew in 1960, Somalia struggled

to establish a stable government, resulting in

a coup in 1969 led by Mohamed SIAD Barre.

However, that regime collapsed in 1991, and

Somalia entered a civil war, with the northern

clans declaring a separate Republic of

Somaliland (which is not recognized

internationally). Since 2000, various

transitional governments have been

implemented, including the Transitional

National Government and the Transitional

Federal Government, both of which sought to

establish a representative system of

government.18

However, an alliance of sharia courts

(the Islamic Courts Union or ICU) took

control of the capital, Mogadishu, in 2006,

18 “The World Factbook: Somalia.” Central Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, 1 Feb. 2018, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html.

which prompted Ethiopia to invade Somalia

and oust the ICU (Ethiopia is predominantly

Christian and feared that jihadi violence

would spread).19 While Somalia was able to

establish its own representative government

in 2012, it still suffers from many factors.

Agriculture comprises the largest portion of

Somalia’s economy, but the government in

unable to collect domestic revenue and

external debt is at 77% of the GDP of

Somalia. 68.3% of the population has not

seen an improvement in drinking water

sources, and the life expectancy is slightly

above 50 years. Despite this, Somalia has a

high fertility rate (about 6 children per

woman), and 60% of the population is under

the age of 25.

However, there is a severe lack of

educational or job opportunities for young

people, creating a demographic susceptible to

extremism. Furthermore, civil war, drought,

floods, and food shortage forced over a

million Somalis to flee their homes, making

Somalia the third highest source of refugees

in the world.20 These factors have all

19 “Al-Shabab.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab. 20 “The World Factbook: Somalia.” Central Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, 1

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contributed to the rise of terrorism in

Somalia.

Al-Shabaab in Somalia Al-Shabaab is the current extremist

group that has taken hold in war-torn

Somalia. Many believe that al-Shabaab’s

roots can be traced back to the group al-

Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI), which rose out of the

turmoil caused by the government collapse in

1991. The younger members of AIAI, who

wanted to establish fundamental Islamic rule

in Somalia, split from the AIAI in the early

2000s and joined forces with the ICU.

Scholars also attribute the 2006 Ethiopian

invasion with the further radicalization of al-

Shabaab, citing the fact that al-Shabaab’s

membership grew from approximately four

hundred to the thousands between the years

of 2006 and 2008, and this was also the

period during which the group established

ties to al-Qaeda.

Funding of al-Shabaab

Al-Shabaab gets funding from a

number of sources. This includes other

Feb. 2018, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html. 21 “Al-Shabab.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab.

terrorist groups, charities, piracy, and

kidnapping. Furthermore, Eritrea, Iran, Saudi

Arabi, Syria, Qatar, and Yemen are all

suspected to provide funds to al-Shabaab.

The group also makes an estimated $10

million on the trade of charcoal even though

the UN placed a ban on Somali charcoal in

2012. They also make tens of millions of

dollars smuggling sugar to Kenya, and

Kenyan forces have been implemented in the

situation since 2015.21 Most concerning is the

fact that al-Shabaab is also securing funding

through foreign aid that is meant to help

impoverished Somalis (see image). This

poses a significant challenge to providing

humanitarian aid in Somalia.22

Recent Attacks

Attacks by al-Shabaab have been

increasing in recent years. A report by the UN

over the time span from January 1st, 2016 to

October 14th, 2017 found that al-Shabaab was

responsible for more than 60% of the 2,078

conflict-related civilian deaths. The deadliest

incident occurred on October 14th, 2017,

when two bomb blasts in Mogadishu killed at

22 Kiley, Sam. “Funding Al-Shabaab: How Aid Money Ends up in Terrorists' Hands.” CNN, Cable News Network, 12 Feb. 2018, www.cnn.com/2018/02/12/africa/somalia-al-shabaab-foreign-aid-intl/index.html.

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least 512 people and injured 357. The Somali

government attributed the attack to al-

Shabaab.23 On November 9th, 2018, suicide

bombers and gunmen targeted a hotel in

Mogadishu, and 39 people were killed and 40

injured (death toll as of Nov. 10, 2018).24 Al-

Shabaab started launching attacks outside of

Somalia within the last decade, claiming

responsibility for the 2010 suicide bombing

that killed 74 in Uganda, as well two attacks

in Kenya: the 2013 Nairobi shopping mall

attack that killed 67 and the 2015 attack on a

university in Garissa that left 148 dead.

The United Nations in Somalia The UN has been involved in Somalia

since the government collapsed in 1991. The

UN Assistance Mission in Somalia

(UNSOM) is focused on helping Somalia

maintain its emerging federal process and

achieve stability in the regions of security,

economy, and governance.25

23 “Somalia Conflict.” OHCHR , www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22520&LangID=E. 24 “Death Toll from Somalia Hotel Attack Rises to 39.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 10 Nov. 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-blast/death-toll-from-somalia-hotel-attack-rises-to-39-idUSKCN1NF08F.

AMISOM

In 2007, the UN Security Council

started a peacekeeping force in Somalia, led

by the African Union (the peacekeeping force

in Somalia is known by its acronym,

AMISOM). Today AMISOM has some

22,000 troops from various countries in the

African Union, with Uganda supplying the

most troops.26 AMISOM receives funding

from both the United Nations and the

European Union. However, most nations

agree that if Somalia is going to have a

sustainable future AMISOM cannot remain

involved permanently, and Security Council

resolution 2372 (2017) had requested that the

Mission reduce its troop levels, increase its

police contingent and conduct offensive

operations against Al-Shabaab. The hope is

that Somalia will be able to transition from

dependence on AMISOM to establishing

their own military force to combat al-

Shabaab. Critics worry that a premature

withdrawal of AMISOM would be disastrous

and allow al-Shabaab to regain ground.27

25 “UNSOM | Department of Political Affairs.” United Nations, United Nations, www.un.org/undpa/en/africa/somalia. 26 “Al-Shabab.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab. 27 “Military, Political Strategy Vital to Addressing Terrorist Threat in Somalia, Special Representative Tells Security Council | Meetings Coverage and Press

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Some proposed plans have included the full

withdrawal of all foreign troops by the year

2020, after 1,000 troops were withdrawn in

2017.28

Development Aid

The United Nations also believes that

providing support for development in

Somalia is a key aspect of fighting

extremism. Somalia suffers greatly due to a

lack of opportunity for its youth: 60% of

children don’t even attend primary school,

and Somalia has one of the world’s highest

rates of youth unemployment. This leaves

youth vulnerable to being recruited by

extremist groups such as al-Shabaab because

they often have no other means of income.29

The UN is seeking $1.6 billion in order to

help Somalia cope with humanitarian

crises.30

Questions to Consider 1. How can the international community

assist Somalia as it transitions to

democracy and attempts to defeat al-

Shabaab?

2. What steps can Somalia take itself to

defeat al-Shabaab?

3. Is economic development also a key

part of the fight against terrorism?

Releases.” United Nations, United Nations, www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13175.doc.htm. 28 “UN Extends Somalia Peacekeeping Mission.” Alaraby, The New Arab, 16 May 2018, www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2018/5/16/un-extends-somalia-peacekeeping-mission. 29 “The World Factbook: Somalia.” Central Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, 1

Feb. 2018, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html. 30 Besheer, Margaret. “UN: Al-Shabab in Decline, But Still a Threat.” VOA, VOA, 24 Jan. 2018, www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-in-decline-but-still-threat-united-nations-says/4222544.html.