DANTO AND THE ESSENCE OF ART (Part One) In “Everyday Use,” Walker engages her reader in a discussion of description. Extending beyond her

metaphor of memory, she invites her reader to consider what constitutes a work of art: its definition as well

as its function. In The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, Arthur Danto sets forth a fully articulated

theory of art. Stated formally, the theory maintains that something X is a work of art if and only if: (a) X has

a subject (i.e., X is about something); (b) X projects some attitude or point-of-view about what it is about

(this may be described as a matter of X having a style); (c) X is rhetorically elliptical (generally, a

metaphorical ellipsis); (d) X engages audience participation in the ellipsis by getting them to fill-in what is

missing (an operation which can also be called interpretation); (e) X requires an art-historical context for

interpretation (which context is generally specified as a background of historically situated theory). This

theory of art is an attempt to capture the essential nature of art.

Danto establishes each of the five necessary conditions for art status in his theory by means of what has

been called his “visually-indistinguishable-pairs arguments.” In each case, he imagines at least a pair of

indiscernible items—for example, an artwork and a mere real thing—where we are prone to agree that,

despite the perceptual indiscernibility of the pairs in question, there nevertheless

remains an ontological distinction to be drawn between them. Consider the famous

example of Warhol’s depiction of a soup can: next to a display in a grocery store, it is

a mere advertisement, while in a museum, it is considered a work of art. The same

holds true for a number of artists’ work in the 20th century, including Christo and

Lichtenstein. Consider Duchamp’s Fountain and a urinal: to all appearances identical,

yet one is an artwork and the other is not.

How is this possible for an object to be art in one context while a mere thing in another? Is Woody a

mere play thing while in Andy’s bedroom in Pixar’s Toy Story II, yet a “collectible” work of art if on display

in a museum, placed alongside Jesse the Yodeling Cowgirl, Bull’s-eye, and Stinky Pete? Is Woody both

“art” and a “collectible” at the same time? What would have to be the case for this to be possible? The task

of theory then becomes illumination of the distinction in question by means of producing the best

explanation of why, for example, one of a pair of

indiscernible objects is an artwork, while the other is a

mere real thing. Art theory must explain how the relevant

distinction is possible. For Danto, then, the philosophy of

art begins when we can imagine two indiscernible objects,

to all appearances identical, and consider why one is

considered a work of art while the other is not.

Danto’s philosophy of art is put in place through a series of arguments. It would be helpful to keep the

first paragraph of this handout in mind when delineating these. The first condition of the theory—that

artworks are about something—derives from contrasts between artworks and indiscernible real things.

Think, for example, of the contrast between ready-mades such as Duchamp’s In Advance of A Broken Arm

and the everyday snow shovels that are its counterparts. Or Warhol’s Brillo Box as opposed to the boxes of

soap pads piled in the storerooms of the neighborhood grocery. Furthermore, if such

actual examples do not suffice, one can readily imagine

a painter of the 1950s who covers a canvas with red

paint and declares the result Untitled, thereby intending

to exemplify the theory that artworks just are real

things. And yet, there does seem to be a difference

between a work such as this by an artist and an indiscernible red canvas—

an exact counterpart of the artist’s production—that got that way simply

because some children accidentally toppled some cans of red paint on it.

So what is the difference between such artworks and their indiscernible counterparts, between Warhol’s

Brillo Box and Proctor and Gamble’s, and between red canvasses made under the influence of the artworld’s

theories and red canvases produced by carelessness? Danto argues that in each case the difference is that the

artwork is about something, whereas the real object counterpart is what it is and nothing else. It is not about

anything at all.

A red canvas by the artist envisioned above is about art. It says something—namely, that artworks

really are real objects. This is an argument: an assertion. In a sense, such an object is actually a refutation of

the theory that it is meant to exemplify. For though it serves as a vehicle for publicizing the theory that

artworks are nothing but real things, it is not a mere real thing. It has a semantic/rhetorical component. It

sends a message: that artworks really are real things. But the messenger is not a mere real thing in so far as it

is an instrument of intentional communication. It is about something (here, the nature of art itself). The red

canvas made red by the reckless children, on the other hand, is a mere real thing: it asserts/argues nothing.

The aboutness condition of Danto’s philosophy of art – that artworks have a subject, that they have a

semantic/rhetorical component – is generated by considering the contrast between an artwork and its

indiscernible, merely real counterpart, and by asking for the grounds that make that contrast possible.

Similarly, the fourth condition of the theory – that artworks have interpretations – is also motivated by the

contrast between items we are convinced are artworks and their mere real-thing counterparts.

Perhaps the fact that the first and fourth conditions of Danto’s philosophy of art are generated by the

same sorts of contrasting indiscernibles – artworks versus mere real things – makes their somewhat

complementary relationship unsurprising. For the fourth condition of the theory complements the first

condition in the sense that insofar as artworks have subjects, then it seems natural to suppose that a proper

appreciation of them will involve grasping the subject of the artwork. In other words, what is the assertion

being made, and how is it interpreted?

Danto’s emphasis on the interpretation in artworks has important ramifications for his philosophy of art.

For given the essential interpretive address of artworks to viewers, Danto construes the aesthetic appreciation

to be, in large measure, cognitive; that is, it is a matter of responding appropriately to art by making

interpretations. This, of course, is at odds with many of the most deeply entrenched conceptions of aesthetic

appreciation – a tradition that most frequently characterizes aesthetic appreciation in noncognitive terms,

such as disinterested pleasure, emotional responsiveness, or feelings of release.

Complicating Danto’s theory is the fact that artworks have subjects capable of interpretation, though

necessary features of artworks hardly serve to separate them from many other things. For instance, all

representations have subjects, and therefore interpretations, but not all representations are artworks. The

stick-figures that differentiate the men’s restrooms from the women’s restrooms have subjects and (minimal)

interpretation, but they are not artworks. So, more than the first and fourth of Danto’s arguments are

required to discern art from mere real things.

In order to elaborate his theory in such a way that artworks can be distinguished from the mere

representations with which artworks share certain necessary conditions (aboutness and interpretability),

Danto introduces another set of indiscernibles for consideration: artworks that are representations versus

mere representations that are indiscernible from the artworks in question. For example, think about one of

Eric Loran’s diagrammatic analyses of a painting by Cezanne (a) and Roy Lichtenstein’s appropriation of it,

Portrait of Madame Cezanne (b).

original by Cezanne (a) by Eric Loran (b) by Roy Lichtenstein

The Loran diagram is a mere representation, an attempt to instruct us in the principles of Cezanne’s art.

Lichtenstein’s painting is something else again, an elliptical statement about Cezanne’s art, one that argues

that for Cezanne painting is essentially diagrammatic. The subjects of Loran’s diagram and Lichtenstein’s

painting differ: Loren’s diagram is about a certain work by Cezanne, whereas Lichtenstein’s painting is

about Cezanne’s vision. The method of address of the Loran diagram is straightforward; the address of

Lichtenstein’s Portrait of Madame Cezanne is indirect and rhetorical—which, for Danto, means that it has to

be filled-in by the spectator in the manner of a rhetorical question. Or, in other words, Lichtenstein’s

painting requires an interpretation by the spectator.

Moreover, the rhetorical structure that Danto believes is generally in operation in artworks is metaphor.

A metaphor is a rhetorical trope that invites the audience to interpret it by means of exploring a target term

in light of a source term (e.g., Ahab’s “chest” and “heart” in light of “a mortar” and “a shell”); the number

of correspondences that an audience may find between the target term and the source term is indefinite; the

audience proceeds by, often playfully, testing correlations between the source domain and the target domain

of the trope.

Similarly, artworks invite interpretations, their embedded metaphors engaging the spectator’s cognitive

play. The metaphor projected by Warhol’s Brillo Box is that artworks are real things. In literature, the

characters project metaphors – they provide source domains and the reader is the target domain. That is, for

example, when reading Moby Dick, I may embrace the metaphorical structure that I am Ahab (or Starbuck or

Ishmael), and explore it in a way that leads to self-discovery.

To understand an artwork is to grasp the metaphor that is always there. The semantic (meaning-making)

component of an artwork is an underlying metaphor or set of metaphors. The metaphorical dimension of an

artwork is its transfigurative dimension – the target term of the metaphor is seen in the light of the source

term, and the target term is thereby transfigured. In the greatest works of narrative/literary art, the audience

is transfigured when we see ourselves in light of characters like Oedipus or Hamlet, Meursault or Ahab.

Art is rhetorical; metaphor is a rhetorical trope. In fact, metaphor is the key rhetorical trope with respect

to art because art involves our seeing something in a certain light. The hypothesis that art is a matter of

rhetorical ellipsis, notably metaphorical ellipsis, moreover, reinforces the notion that art involves

interpretation by further specifying the nature of the relevant interpretation—that is: filling-in rhetorical

ellipses (…) by identifying and exploring the metaphors in the words and descriptions.

DANTO AND THE ESSENCE OF ART (Part Two)

Danto’s second theory states that artworks have points-of-view. Artworks are not only about

something; they project a certain point-of-view about whatever they are about. Whereas mere

representations such as Loran’ diagram aspire to transparency, artworks express ideas and attitudes toward

whatever they represent. They are referentially opaque.

Loran’s diagram attempts to illustrate the actual abstract structure of Cezanne’s paintings.

Lichtenstein’s painting provides a way of thinking about Cezanne’s project – that he, Cezanne, saw even his

wife as a matrix of geometrical forms. In the case of Lichtenstein’s Portrait of Madame Cezanne, the object

of Lichtenstein’s concern is Cezanne about whose work Lichtenstein expresses a point-of-view. As an artist

Lichtenstein strives to lead the audience to see Cezanne in the same way he does. The Artist transforms the

audience into one which sees in a certain light: the light of the artist. For Danto, the condition of artwork

expressing a point of view may be compared to a rhetorical theme statement. What is the argument of the

artist, and how does the artist create such an argument?

Art is a matter of rhetorical ellipsis. Artworks use elliptical metaphors rhetorically which function to

enable the audience to see one thing in the light of something else. This metaphorical vision, in turn, can be

said to embody a point-of-view or a way of seeing. For Danto, the metaphors with which an artist chooses to

address a given subject matter are deeply connected to the way in which the artist sees the world. In this

respect, art always possesses a style in the sense that “style is the man himself.” Style is the embodiment of

a point of view.

Whereas mere representations strive toward an ideal of transparency, artworks are opaque. Whatever

they are about is embedded within the context of an artistic vision (also referred to as a style or point-of-

view). Generally, the vehicle of this point-of-view is metaphorical; metaphor can serve as the vehicle for

points-of-view because of the way in which it focuses attention only on certain aspects of its target.

Metaphorical ellipsis, then, encourages the audience to explore the content of the artwork from a certain

standpoint. It encourages the audience to take on that standpoint which, of course, is the standpoint of the

artist to whatever the artwork is about. Art, at least momentarily, transforms the spectator into one who sees

the subject of the artwork from the point-of-view of the artist or under the same metaphor that the artist does.

Audiences, in embracing the artist’s metaphorical vehicles—the embodiment of the artist’s point-of-view—

entertain and explore alternative ways of seeing the world.

The notions that artworks are metaphors and that they embody ways of seeing the world compliment

Danto’s claims that artworks possess aboutness, and they therefore elicit interpretations. Responding to

artworks involves interpreting their underlying metaphor(s). Insofar as artworks are ways of seeing, they are

about a certain way of taking whatever they are about. Such points-of-view, then, invite interpretation while

compounding the way in which artworks are about things—for the way they are about whatever they are

about is part and parcel of what they are about. The medium, therefore, is part of the message.

But for Danto there is one further necessary condition for something to be a work of art. An artwork

requires a background of art history in order to be the artwork that it is. This background is basically one of

art theory, i.e., of historically situated art theories. These theories need not be true, but they must be

available and pertinent to the artists in question.

For example, in order to be works of art, as well as in order to be the works of art that they were,

Conceptual Artworks depended upon the existence of artworld theories that encouraged the idea that

artworks themselves were basically theoretical statements about art. Conceptual Art could not have existed

in the court of Louis XIV because that time period lacked the appropriate kind of theory. Conceptual Art

depended upon the fact that supporting artworld theories had emerged by the late 1960s, which theories

made conceptual art possible. In earlier historical eras, Conceptual Art would have been neither intelligible

nor possible (for it would not even have been intelligible to its producers who themselves would have lacked

the necessary conceptual framework for producing it).

Arguing that artworks require a historical context seems at odds with the rest of Danto’s philosophy

of art. Inasmuch as artworks possess aboutness, they “say” something, but what they say depends on the

historical circumstances in which they are articulated. What the artist can be saying depends, to an important

degree, on the background of art theories and art history available to his audience.

Thus, it is possible to summarize Danto’s philosophy of art as a tidy package of interrelated

commitments: artworks are about subjects which the works express points-of-view about through metaphors,

and these points-of-view, given rhetorical ellipsis, invite interpretations, which are constrained historically.

-- adapted from “Essence, Expression, and History: Arthur Danto’s Philosophy of Art,” by Carroll

Review Questions: 1) At its simplest level, what is a metaphor? What are the two parts of a metaphorical expression, and what does such an expression ask us to do? Use your own example to illustrate. 2) What is the subject and what is the metaphor of a novel? 3) Consider the denotation of transfigure: “to transform into something more beautiful or elevated.” How may art transfigure its audience? 4) In what way is art rhetorical?