dangerous dyads bargaining in the shadow of power

Dangerous Dyads

Bargaining in the Shadow of Power

Part I. The Puzzle of Dyadic Interaction

A. Why do some pairs of states have dramatically different relationships?

ConflictHostile statementsHostile nonviolent actionsUse, threat, display of forceWar

Positive statementsDiplomatic

recognitionIntercultural

exchangesAlliancesTradeAid

Vs.

B. Example: Six Dyad-Years• US-Iraq 1987: US forgives Iraqi attack

on USS Stark, aids Iraq• US-Iran 1987: US destroys Iranian oil

platforms, ships• Iran-Iraq 1987: Bloody war continues

B. Example: Six Dyad-Years

US-Iraq 2003: War US-Iran 2003: No War Iran-Iraq 2003: No War

Why the differences? No single state has become more or less warlike….but the dyads have!

C. Forms of Cooperation

1. Between Cooperation and Conflict: Bargaining

a. Formal Bargaining: Treaties, etc.

b. Tacit Bargaining: Reciprocal Action

c. Arbitration: Third-party resolution

d. Mediation: Third-party support

2. Alliances: Only 25% reliable at first glance….

War occurs… Allied

Not Allied

Intervene, YES

25%

2%

Intervene, NO

75%

98%

From Leeds, Long, and Mitchell (2000):

…but examining the fine print reveals a different story!

3. Behavior: ConvergenceExample: Mutual Tariff

Reduction

D. Forms of Conflict

1. War – Standard definition is 1000 battle-deaths

2. Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) – use, threat, or display of force

E. Are Conflict and Cooperation Opposites?

1. The Continuum View

2. High-Conflict Events

3. High-Cooperation Events

Are these mutually exclusive with the conflict list?

3. Sometimes Conflict and Cooperation Co-Exist

Part II. The Spiral to War

InteractionSalienceIssues

Conflict-Producing

Factors

BargainingConflict

CooperationCooperation-

ProducingFactors

Outcomes

A Model of Dyadic Interaction

Part II. The Spiral to War


Conflict-Producing

Factors

BargainingConflict

Cooperation


A. Political Relevance

1. Interactiona. Ability to communicateb. Ability to act

Interaction

c. Measures of Interaction

i. Contiguity – Countries that border each other (or narrow body of water)

(Countries surrounded by blue are contiguous to Red)

Interaction

ii. Major power status

State-level finding: Major powers do more of everything – conflict and cooperation

Result = Dyadic effect: If at least one dyad member is major power, increased levels of cooperation and conflict

Interaction

iii. Politically-Relevant International Environments

(PRIE), 1816-2001Criteria Dyad-

Years% of Dyad-Years

% of Wars

% of MIDs

All Dyads 675,015

100% 100% 100%

Land Contiguity 19,723 2.9% 65.9%

50.3%

Land/Sea Contiguity

32,881 4.9% 75.8%

63.7%

Either is major power

71,770 10.6%

51.6%

45.8%

PRIE (Any of these)

86,393 12.8%

94.5%

85.2%

A. Political Relevance

2. Issue Saliencea. Priority relative to other

concernsb. Determines amount of

power appliedc. Low salience = inaction


B. What leads to dyadic conflict?

Conflict-Producing

Factors

1. Opportunity: Contiguity and Proximity

Conflict-Producing

Factors

Proximity: Loss of Strength Gradient

Conflict-Producing

Factors

Resources that can be applied to a conflict decay at distance

Shift in gradient due to technology or development

Wealthy/Advanced State

Poor State

2. Dyadic Balance of PowerConflict-

ProducingFactors

a. Disparity = Peace

b. Parity = War Risk

c. Transitions: Dangerous?Conflict-

ProducingFactors

3. Issue Type: TerritoryConflict-

ProducingFactors

4. Rivalry: Shadow of the Past

Conflict-Producing

Factors

a. Repeated disputes Future disputesb. Easier for diversionary war

c. Question: Is rivalry the cause of conflict?

Conflict-Producing

Factors

i. Rivals fight more wars – or do states likely to fight become rivals?

ii. Repeated crises Use of more aggressive bargaining strategiesiii. Rivals use more forceful strategies – against non-rivals!

iv. Rivals Learn Over Time

5. Arms Racesa. Rivalry +

Arms Race = Risk of War?

b. Most arms races difficult to demonstrate:

Conflict-Producing

Factors

Can You Pick Out the 3 Arms Races?

Canada-Mexico

US-USSR Israel-Syria

Australia-NZ

India-Pakistan

Belgium-Netherlands

Part III. Pathways to Peace


Conflict-Producing

Factors

BargainingConflict


ProducingFactors

Outcomes


Part III. Pathways to Peace

BargainingConflict


ProducingFactors


A. What Leads to Cooperation?

Cooperation-Producing

Factors

1. Joint Democracy

a. Effects of Joint Democracy:i. The “Democratic Peace:” Virtually no wars

between democracies• Alleged Exceptions: US-UK 1812 (UK not democracy), UK-

Germany WW1 (Germany not democracy), Finland-UK WW2 (no real combat), Peru-Ecuador (few casualties), India-Pakistan (civilians left out of the loop)

ii. Fewer MIDs (1/3 to 2/3 reduction)• Shift to covert from overt when force is used• MIDs less likely to escalate to higher levels of violence• Increased reliance on mediation, arbitration

iii. Increased common interests (alliances, UN votes, IOs, etc)

iv. Increased Trade – Why should this be?


Factors

v. Formal AgreementsCooperation-

ProducingFactors

b. Institutional Explanation


Factors

c. Norms Explanation


Factors

2. Shared Interests

Power Transition Theory: Mutual Satisfaction = Peace

Side A Side B Outcome

Satisfied Satisfied Peace

Satisfied Dissatisfied

Conflict

Dissatisfied

Dissatisfied

Peace or Intense Conflict


Factors

Evidence for Peace Through Shared

Interests Alliance

portfolios: Similarity generally reduces conflict– Better predictor

than dyadic alliance!

UN Votes: Similar votes = closer economic ties


Factors

3. Similar Institutions

Even after controlling for democracy / autocracy, similar government mechanisms (executive-legislative relations, etc) increase cooperation / reduce conflict.4. Advanced Economies


Factors

Joint advanced economies trade, cooperate, ally more / fight less with each other than other dyads

5. Economic Interdependence

a. Mutual gains from tradei. Short explanation: Trade is voluntaryii. Absolute and Comparative Advantage


Factors

Absolute Advantage

USA Colombia

MissilesOR

20 5

Coffee 10 200

Given 100 resources, what can each country produce?

• Production possibilities without trade

• Trade allows specialization. US buys Coffee at < 10 resources. Colombia buys Missiles at < 20 resources.

• Example: Coffee = 1, Missiles = 10. US trades 5 missiles (50 resources) for 50 coffee (50 resources)

• Result: Both sides can achieve levels of consumption outside of the original production possibilities!

200

20

Missiles

Coffee

10

10010

Comparative Advantage

USA

Britain

Wheat

OR100 20

Cars 10 5

Given 100 resources, what can each country produce? • US has absolute advantage in both

goods – 5 to 1 in wheat, 2 to 1 in cars -- so has comparative advantage (bigger relative advantage) in wheat

• UK has comparative advantage (smaller relative disadvantage) in cars (½ as productive rather than 20% as productive)

• UK buys wheat at < 5 resources, US buys cars at < 10 resources

• Example: Wheat = 1.5, Cars = 9. US sells 24 wheat (36 resources), buys 4 cars (36 resources)

50

10

100Wheat

Cars5



b. Reinforces democratic peace:


Factors



b. Reinforces democratic peacec. Allies trade more than enemies…but

sometimes trade continues during war!


Factors

Part IV. Winners and Losers: Predicting Outcomes


Conflict-Producing

Factors

BargainingConflict


ProducingFactors

Outcomes


Part IV. Winners and Losers: Predicting Outcomes

BargainingConflict

CooperationOutcomes


A. The Logic of Game Theory

1. Game theory = formal way to represent strategic interaction

BargainingConflict

Cooperation

2. Assumptions of Game Theory

a. Rational choice, unrestricted preferences

i. Connected preferences – Some outcomes preferred over others by the player (subjective utility)

ii. Transitive preferences – If a player prefers outcome A to outcome B, and also prefers outcome B to outcome C, then the player must prefer outcome A to outcome C.

iii. Choice – Pick the option believed to lead to preferred outcome

BargainingConflict

Cooperation

b. Elements of a game

i. Players – In IR, this means statesii. Strategies – The choices players haveiii. Outcomes – The results of the players’ choicesiv. Payoffs – How much each player values each

Outcome

BargainingConflict

Cooperation

Player 2

Player1

Strategy A Strategy B

Strategy A

Outcome 1Player 1 Payoff, Player 2 Payoff


Strategy B



c. Where do payoffs come from?

Realism: Power and security (relative gains concerns)

Liberalism: “There’s no accounting for taste” – but money often used (emphasis on absolute gains)

Radicalism: Distribution of wealth (relative economic gains) key

Constructivism: Skeptical of rationalism, but payoffs socially constructed, just like the game.

BargainingConflict

Cooperation

3. Making Predictions: Solving a Game

a. Goal = Find an equilibrium (stable behavior, unlikely to change without change in conditions)

b. Basic tool = Nash Equilibrium Neither player could do any better by unilaterally changing its strategy choice

How to solve a simple 2x2game

Player 2

Player1


Strategy A 2,3 3,4

Strategy B 0,0 4,2

BargainingConflict

Cooperation

Player 2

Player1


Strategy A 2,3 3,4

Strategy B 0,5 4,2

c. Limitation: No Equilibrium

Not every game has a Nash Equilibrium. Prediction = no stable pure strategy, stability only results from “mixing” strategies (probabilistic prediction)

Example:

BargainingConflict

Cooperation

Player 2

Player1


Strategy A 2,5 3,4

Strategy B 0,4 4,5

d. Limitation: Multiple Equilibria

Some games have multiple Nash Equilibria. Prediction = either equilibrium can result

Example:

BargainingConflict

Cooperation

4. Games Nations Play

a. Prisoners’ Dilemma: Used to model “Security Dilemmas” -- Efforts to increase own security make others less secure (arms races, etc.)

b. Both players end up worse, even though each plays rationally!

Player 2

Player1

Remain Silent Confess

Remain Silent

Misdemeanor, Misdemeanor Life, Walk Free

Confess Walk Free, Life Felony, Felony

BargainingConflict

Cooperation


b. Chickeni. Equilibria: Someone swerves – but who?ii. Used to model nuclear crisesiii. Credible commitment – throw away the steering

wheel!

Player 2

Player1

Swerve Drive Straight

Swerve Status Quo, Status Quo Wimp, Cool

Drive Straight

Cool, Wimp DEAD, DEAD

BargainingConflict

Cooperation


c. “Battle of the Sexes”i. Equilibria: Both do better than nothing, but someone benefits

moreii. Used to model environmental cooperation, border

demarcation, etc.iii. Incentive to deceive – Convince other player you would prefer

no agreement to getting your wayPlayer 2

Player1

Tearjerker Action

Tearjerker 2, 1 0,0

Action 0,0 1, 2

BargainingConflict

Cooperation

5. Is There Hope for Cooperation in a Rationalist

World?a. Realists and some Radicals argue that

Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) represents the international system “Tragedy of (Great Power) Politics” or “class war”

i. BUT: Tournament of Strategies showed that when playing repeated PD the best strategy is not “Always Defect” – it’s “Tit-for-Tat!”ii. Tit-for-Tat = Cooperate, then Reciprocate: Allows cooperation even in the most hostile circumstances BUT also risks escalation

b. Liberalism argues that few interactions are true PDs and that those that are should be approached with TFT

c. Social Constructivism argues that people create these structures, so they can transform them

BargainingConflict

Cooperation

6. Conclusions from Game Theory

a. Anarchy need not war. Cooperation can evolve even in a world full of PD players!

b. Institutions and “tying hands” can allow credible commitment, allowing cooperation. Cooperative “win-win” strategies (maximize joint payoffs) include:

i. Commit to silence in PD (join a gang that punishes squealers)

ii. Commit to “no play” in Chickeniii. Commit to take turns in Battle of the Sexes,

PD, or Chicken

BargainingConflict

Cooperation

7.Weaknesses of Game Theory

a. Does not independently account for preferences – intuition and other theories do a lot of “work” for game theory

b. Realistic games tend to have an infinite number of possible Nash Equilibria limitations on predictive power

c. Assumes structure of game is “fixed”d. Assumes common knowledge of

rationality – may be problematic (Princess Bride)

BargainingConflict

Cooperation

B. Empirical Outcomes of Dyadic Bargaining

1. Who gets more?a. More powerb. Cost Tolerance: Willing to take lossesc. Salience ● Power predicts better than Power

aloned. “Tied Hands” and Costly Signals: Ability to

convince opponent that further concessions are impossible / unacceptable

2. Will bargaining fail?a. Zones of Agreement: Area of mutually

acceptable outcomes (better than no agreement – which often means war -- for both sides)

b. Expected costs of failure: What happens if there is no agreement?

c. “Shadow of the Future” – Bargaining over future bargaining power (i.e. territory) is most difficult

Outcomes

C. Outcomes of Conflicta. Economic conflict (tariffs)

increased political conflict (and vice versa)

b. Dyadic war is rare and getting rarer:

i. 197 sovereign states 19,306 dyads. Formula = [n(n-1)]/2

ii. Nearly 1 million “dyad-years” over the past two centuries

iii. Less than 1 war per 1,000 opportunities since 1816. 2004-2012 = only 1 interstate war-year out of more than 150,000 dyad-years (Russia vs. Georgia)

Outcomes

c. Who Wins Wars?

i. Total victory uncommon (2/3 end by negotiation)

ii. 59% of wars won by initially stronger side -- BUT: initiators of wars victorious 68% of the time, yet only stronger 59% of the time

iii. Implication: “Which side started it?” better predicts victory than military power, though advantage declines over time

iv. Extension: Democracies win more often, though advantage declines over time (they lose long wars)

Outcomes

3. Outcomes of Cooperation

a. Some evidence that political cooperation economic cooperation (US/USSR)

b. Mediation and Arbitration appear unreliable BUT selection bias probably responsible (they get the tough cases)

c. Foreign aid increases dyadic trade gains increased interdependence

Outcomes

Review: Back to the Model


Conflict-Producing

Factors

BargainingConflict


ProducingFactors

Outcomes

Part V: Deterrence – or Destruction?

Will nuclear weapons save us from war?

A. Historical Background1. Ancient Greece:

The Melian Dialogue

“The strong do what they will and the weak do what they must.”

Athens demands submission by Melians, even though Melos is insignificant

Why fight a war over something so small?

Melians: It may be your interest to be our masters, but how can it be ours to be your slaves?

Athenians: To you the gain will be that by submission you will avert the worst; and we shall be all the richer for your preservation.

Melians: But must we be your enemies? Will you not receive us as friends if we are neutral and remain at peace with you?

Athenians: No, your enmity is not half so mischievous to us as your friendship; for the one is in the eyes of our subjects an argument of our power, the other of our weakness.

2. Masada

Jewish revolt against Rome

Last 1000 holdouts on fortress of Masada

b. Masada

Jewish revolt against Rome

Last 1000 holdouts on fortress of Masada

Rome imports 15,000 laborers from around empire, spends a year building ramp

Why?

3. 1919-1938: Intra-War Deterrence Fails

Giulio Douhet: Opening hours of any major war destruction of cities with explosives, gas, incendiaries panic and social collapse– 1922, 1932-4: Attempts to ban

bombers Despite fear of bombers,

Britain actually initiated city warfare in World War II!– Deterrence failed…– Mass killing / city destruction

generally didn’t have the expected effect on civilian morale

B. Nuclear Deterrence Strategies

1. Massive Retaliation: Depended on atomic superiority

2. Mutually-Assured Destruction: “Tripwires”

3. Flexible Response: Credibility at every level

4. Proportional Deterrence: Enter the French….

5. Warfighting: Soviet and US Hard-liners’ doctrine

C. Requirements

1. Clarity: Threat must be understoodFailures: Soviet “dead hand,” Iraqi invasion of Kuwait

2. Credibility: Opponent must believe threat will be carried out if line is crossed

Failures: Nuclear threats over Berlin Wall, Vietnam

3. Cost: Threat must be great enough to outweigh benefits of crossing the line

Failures: Sanctions on China, Chemical weapons in Iran-Iraq war

4. Restraint: Opponent must believe threat will NOT be carried out if line is NOT crossed

Failures: WMD Inspections before current Iraq conflict, Hitler declares war on America

5. Rationality: Opponent must weigh costs and benefitsPossible failures: Paraguayan War, Nuclear war termination

No [adequate] attention has been paid to a proposal, extremely important from the military and political point of view, to create a fully automated retaliatory strike system that would be activated from the top command levels in a moment of a crisis.

-- Soviet Central Committee, 1985

The “Dead Hand” System:

Underground command post If communications fail AND nuclear

explosions detected by sensors… Rocket is launched with internal radio Radio broadcasts launch orders / codes to

Soviet ICBMs Thus, even if all Soviet leaders killed and

communications disrupted, Soviet missiles will annihilate the USA

Problem: They didn’t TELL us about it!

Iraq Invades Kuwait, 1990

All evidence suggests that Saddam did not expect opposition from the US – misinterpreted generic statement that US doesn’t take a position on the border disputes of other nations as permission to invade

C. Requirements









Examples: US Nuclear Threats

Year Issue Threat US Nuclear Position

Result

1945

Iran Truman: “We're going to drop it on you.”

Monopoly USSR Withdraws

1955

Quemoy/ Matsu

Eisenhower: “Atomic bombs can be used... as you would use a bullet.”

Dominance

PRC ceases shelling

1961

Berlin Kennedy: “One chance in five of a nuclear exchange”

Superiority

Draw – USSR builds Wall

1969

Vietnam

Kissinger: “USA will take measures of the gravest consequence.”

Advantage

No Effect

C. Requirements









Sanctions on the PRC US Demand: Stop anti-democracy crackdown (i.e.

Don’t preserve Communist government authority) Sanctions:

– Ban on arms sales– Ban on direct high-level military contacts– Ban on some government financing– suspension of export licenses for satellites contracted to

be launched in China– suspension of export licenses for crime control and

detection instruments and equipment– denial of export licenses for any goods or technology

used in nuclear production, if the President finds that such products could be diverted to the research or development of a nuclear explosive device

Outcome: China ignores sanctions, most of which are lifted within a year or two

Iraq Violates the Geneva Protocol, 1982-1983

Iran-Iraq war is intense and bloody Iraq begins using tear gas, then

blister agents, then nerve gas West is silent because Iran is

considered the greater threat Iran retaliates, but lacked enough

chemical weapons to do serious damage

C. Requirements









D. Types of Deterrence

1. General Deterrence: You won’t dare attack me because you know I’m armed and ready

2. Immediate Deterrence: I’m warning you right now – attack and I’ll shoot!

3. Extended Deterrence: Don’t attack my friend either -- or I’ll shoot

4. Existential Deterrence: I don’t have a gun but I could go buy one if needed

E. Dilemmas of Deterrence1. Security Dilemma: Increased costs and

credibility also mean decreased restraint

2. Vulnerability Dilemma: If you don’t attempt to counter deterrent threat, maybe you intend to strike first… (Soviet silos)

3. Rational Irrationality: Fait accompli and “The threat that leaves something to chance:” Rationality decreases credibility, but irrationality decreases restraint

F. Does deterrence work?

1. Inherent uncertainty: If opponent does nothing, is deterrence working?

2. General deterrence creates bias: unstated threats may deter. Perhaps having to state a threat means it is unlikely to succeed…

3. Some evidence supports extended immediate deterrence

Part VI: Unanswered Puzzles of Dyadic Relations

Do IGOs promote dyadic peace? Do alliances create peace between

dyads, or do they raise the specter of war?

What bargaining strategy best avoids war and produces cooperation?

A. Do Joint IGOs produce dyadic peace?

A. Do Joint IGOs produce dyadic peace?

1. Unexplained finding: Same IGOs = increased war risk

2. Possible reasonsa. Coincidence (IGOs not associated with war)b. Similar interests (IGOs and war have common

causes)c. Interaction (IGOs cause war)d. Levels of Analysis (Improperly Aggregating to

System Level)e. Differences between IGOs (Let’s study this more)

i. Universal: No effectii. Limited-purpose: Depends

– Regional Political or Social = Increased war risk– Regional Military or Economic = Decreased war risk

3. Another puzzle: Same IGOs = decreased MIDs!

4. IGOs can produce convergence

B. Alliances

1. Statistical evidence: disputed. After controlling for contiguity, alliances seem to make war less likely between the allies

2. Why might allies be more likely to fight each other?

Alliances and PreferencesAllies: Nowhere to go but down

Nonaligned: Equal chance of increased conflict and increased cooperation

Rivals: If not already fighting, nowhere to go but up

3. When have allies fought each other?

4. How do most alliances end?

5. When are alliances broken?

C. Which bargaining strategies promote peace?

1. Known hazards – Bully and Fighta. Bully: one OR both sides respond to

concessions by increasing demands (i.e. appeasement fails)

b. Fight: Reciprocal escalation (BOTH sides respond to conflict with higher level of conflict)

2. Appeasement also fails – Of six known cases in crises, five were diplomatic defeats for appeaser and one led to war

3. Reciprocity: A Strategy for Cooperation?

Yes – But ALSO a recipe for conflict spirals!

D. The Fundamental Puzzle: Vicious Circle or Virtuous

Circle? Most conflict-producing factors

reinforce each other

The Vicious Circle



reinforce each other So do most cooperation-producing

factors

The Virtuous Circle



reinforce each other So do most cooperation-producing

factors Which of these two feedback loops is

more powerful in the long run?

dangerous dyads bargaining in the shadow of power

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