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Avar Blitzkrieg , Slavic and Bulgar Raiders,and Roman Special Ops:

Mobile Warriors in the 6th-Century Balkans

Florin Curta

“But archers of the present… are excellent horsemen and are able without difficulty toshoot their bows to either side while riding at full speed, and to shoot an opponent, whether

in pursuit or in flight.”1 Thus wrote Procopius of Caesarea in the mid-6

th century, cont-

rasting the weakness of the Homeric archers with the mounted and armored archers of his

own lifetime. Many have taken this to be the description of an ideal dual-purpose horse-

man, without noting that Procopius’ real intention at this point may have been a veiled cri -tique of the mounted archers’ prominence in 6

th-century warfare.

2 There is now general

agreement among military historians that a major change took place in Roman battlefield

tactics when the cavalry replaced the infantry as the main offensive tactical arm of the Ro-

man army. While the change has been previously dated to the 4th

century, an attentive

reading of Procopius of Caesarea, Agathias, or Theophylact Simocatta shows that it was in

the 6th

century that the cavalry replaced the infantry as the main operational force.3 More-

over, the ability of the 6th

-century Roman cavalrymen to employ bows, lances, and, if

necessary, swords for hand-to-hand combat, as well as to dismount and fight on foot, has

encouraged many to take Procopius’ remarks at face value.4 Such developments have so far

been discussed in relation to the Gothic wars in Italy.5 The situation in the contemporary

1 Procopius of Caesarea, Wars I 1.12 and 14, ed. J. Haury (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1914),

6; English translation by H. B. Dewing (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, 2014), 4.

2 Ilkka Syvänne, The Age of Hippotoxotai. Art of War in Roman Military Revival and Disaster (491 – 636)

(Tampere: Tampere University Press, 2004), 44 – 5; Anthony Kaldellis, Procopius of Caesarea. Tyranny,

History, and Philosophy at the End of Antiquity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004),

22 – 4.

3 Hugh Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe AD 350 – 425 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 105 – 6;

John F. Haldon, Warfare, State, and Society in the Byzantine World , 565 – 1204 (London: University

College of London Press, 1999), 190 – 217. The victories the Romans obtained in 533 against the

Vandals at Tricamerum and Ad Decimum were achieved by cavalrymen alone.

4 Gilbert Dagron, “Modèles de combattants et technologie militaire dans le Stratégikon de Maurice,” in

L’armée romaine et les barbares du IIIe au VIIe siècl e, eds. Françoise Vallet and Michel Kazanski (St.

Germain-des-Près: Association Française d'Archéologie Mérovingienne et Musée des Antiquités Nationales, 1993), 279 – 84, at 281 – 2; Haldon, Warfare, 195.

5 E.g., Philip Rance, “Narses and the battle of Tagin ae (Busta Gallorum) 552: Procopius and sixth-

century warfare,” Historia 54 (2005): 424 – 72.

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Florin Curta70

Balkans was fundamentally different for at least two reasons. First, unlike Italy, the goal of

the Roman armies operating in the Balkans was not to conquer or reconquer any territory

which was not already under Roman rule. Second, shifting the emphasis from infantry to

cavalry and turning cavalrymen into highly versatile warriors on horse-back was a response

to the kind of warfare waged upon Romans, ever since the early 5 th century, by their

nomadic neighbors — Huns, Bulgars, and Avars.6 The primary area of contact with those

nomads has always been the Balkan region. The purpose of this paper is to shed some light

on the mobile military forces operating in that region during the 6th

century, whether

Roman or barbarian. I will first discuss the dramatic changes in military tactics introduced

by the Avars, with a special emphasis on the mobility and versatility of mounted archers

and lancers. I will then contrast the Avar heavy cavalry, which secured qagan Bayan’s vic -

tories in the late 6th

and early 7th

century, with the lightly armed Bulgar and Slavic raiders

led by a number of leaders, whose ephemeral power was entirely based on their military

skills. The mobility of the Avar troops was associated with a form of social and political

organization very different from that of the Bulgar and Slavic marauders. I will then turn to

the “Roman response” and analyze Emperor Maurice’s campaigns against A-vars and Slavs

in order to highlight the importance of the mobile “special-ops” in the Ro-man generalstrategy in the Balkans.

Following the fall of Sirmium in 582, the new qagan of the Avars, perhaps in an attempt

to consolidate his position internally, launched a campaign along the Danube.7 The first

target of the attack was Singidunum, which the Avars took by surprise, as some of its in-

habitants were still outside the city walls working in the fields. Despite the heavy fighting

by the city gates, the Avars managed to take the city, which they thoroughly plundered.8 In

quick succession, two more cities fell into the hands of the Avars — Viminacium next to the

mouth of the Morava, and Augusta, at the mouth of the Ogost. Theophylact Simocatta, our

main source for the events of 584, claims that “immediately” ( parautika) after that, the qa-

gan made his appearance on the Black Sea coast, under the walls of Anchialos, at a distance

of 575 km from Viminacium, as the crow flies.9 Given that under normal circumstances

cavalry forces could cover between 64 and 80 km per day, the entire campaign may havelasted no more than a couple of weeks.10

It is important to note that the Avars appear to

6 Haldon, Warfare, 195; Philip Rance, “Drungus, drouggos, and drouggisti: a Gallicism and continuity in

late Roman cavalry tactics,” Phoenix 58 (2004): 96 – 130, at 125.

7 For the chronology of the Avar rulers, see Teréz Olajos, “La chronologie de la dynastie avare de Baïan,”

Revue des études byzantines 34 (1976): 151 – 8. Bayan, the only qagan known by name, must have died

shortly after the conquest of Sirmium. He was succeeded by his son.

8 Theophylact Simocatta, History I 4.1 – 3, eds. Carl de Boor and Peter Wirth (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner,

1972), 46 – 7; English translation from Michael and Mary Whitby, The History of Theophylact Simocatta

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 25.

9 Theophylact Simocatta, History I 4.4, 47. That this was a definitely an amazing military feat results

from the fact that from Augusta to Anchialos, the qagan’s army had to cross the Stara Planina range ofmountains.

10 Syvänne, Age of Hippotoxotai, 101. The speed of infantry troops on the move varied between 11 and 32

km per day.

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Avar Blietzkrieg , Slavic and Bulgar Raiders 71

have left untouched a number of important towns along the Danube, such as Bononia and

Ratiaria. If one can trust Theophylact’s testimony on this issue, it seems that the goal of theAvar campaign was more to surprise the Romans than to sack as many cities as possible.

Theophylact claims that the Avars remained in Anchialos for three months, but according

to John of Ephesus the qagan quickly returned to Sirmium when learning about the app-

roach of the Kök Turk s from the east.11

As Emperor Maurice’s two envoys reached them inthe winter, the return of the Avars must have been just as swift as their campaign along the

Danube and then, across the mountains, into eastern Thrace. There were probably no ox-

driven wagons carrying the booty back to Sirmium, or else the army would have been en-

cumbered and not really in a position to cover the distance in such a short period of time.

One year later, “the Chagan’s men ravaged all the environs of Scythia and Mysia, andcaptured many cities, Rateria [Ratiaria], Bononia, Aquis, Dorostolon, Zaldapa, Pannasa,

Marcianopolis, and Tropaion.”12 Again, the distance between Aquis (modern-day Prahovo,

near Negotin, in Serbia) and Tropaion (present-day Adamclisi in southern Dobrudja, Ro-

mania) is over 400 km. The speed of the conquest – to which Theophylact referred as “thesuddenness of the invasion (tes athroas epiphoiteseos)”13 – betrays the use of exclusively

cavalry forces. This time, however, the Avars wintered on Roman soil, for the operations began in 586 where they had stopped at the end of 585. Cornered by Comentiolus’ troopsnear Sabulente Canalis, the qagan managed to avoid a direct confrontation with the Roman

troops, took an alternative route and sacked Mesembria on the Black Sea coast.14

The Avars

then moved quickly to the west and attacked without success Beroe (Stara Zagora), Diocle-

tianopolis (Hisar), Philippopolis (Plovdiv), and Adrianople (Edirne). Theophylact insists

that the attack on Beroe was “at the cost of a very great waste of time,” and that the qagan“willingly abandoned the fight” at Philippopolis, seeing that the siege would have takenmuch too long for his plans.

15

11 Theophylact Simocatta, History I 4.6, 47 John of Ephesus, Historia ecclesiastica VI 49, ed. E. I. Brooks

(Louvain: Secretariat du Corpus SCO, 1935), 260. For the Kök Turks, see Denis Sinor, “The es -

tablishment and dissolution of the Türk empire,” in The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia , ed.

Denis Sinor (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 285 – 316. See also Walter

Pohl, Die Awaren. Ein Steppenvolk in Mitteleuropa, 567 – 822 n. Chr. (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2002), 79 –

80.

12 Theophylact Simocatta, History I 8.10, 54; English translation from Whitby, 31. According to Pohl, Die

Awaren, 87, Apiaria (now Rakhovo near Ruse, Bulgaria) must have also fallen during this same cam-

paign, and not in 586 as implied by Theophylact’s account.

13 Theophylact Simocatta, History I 8.11, 54; English translation from Whitby, 31.

14 Theophylact Simocatta, History II 12.6, 94; English translation from Whitby, 60. According to Michael

Wendel, “Der Kriegszug der Awaren im Jahr 586/587 n. Chr. durch Nordthrakien,” in Pontos Euxeinos.

Beiträge zur Archäologie und Geschichte des antiken Schwarzmeer - und Balkanraumes. Manfred Op-

permann zum 65. Geburtstag , eds.Sven Conrad, R. Einick e, A. E. Furtwängler, H. Löhr and A. Slawisch

(Langenweissbach: Beier & Beran, 2006), 447 –60, at 454, the analysis of Theophylact’s ac-count of the

586/7 war in Thrace suggests that the Avar army moved freely back and forth across the Stara Planina

range covering more than 1,000 km in a single campaign season.

15 Theophylact Simocatta, History II 16.12 – 17.4, 103; English translation from Whitby, 66 – 7.

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Florin Curta72

The extraordinary mobility of the Avar mounted warriors results also from the events of

592. While Emperor Maurice appointed Priscus as commander over the army operating in

the Balkans, the Avars crossed the Sava River at Sirmium. “And so the Chagan marshaled adetachment of his force, and ordered it to hasten ahead and give the Romans a frightening

encounter with authority.”16 It took five days for the Avar horsemen to cover the over 300

km-long distance between Sirmium (Sremska Mitrovica, in northern Serbia) and Bononia

(Vidin, in northwestern Bulgaria), where the nearest Roman troops had been stationed.17

When negotiations with Priscus failed, the qagan dispatched his forces to Dalmatia, in

which they were able to sack forty forts and to take Bonkeis (an otherwise unknown city).18

Although not explicitly mentioned, it is likely that the Avar forces consisted primarily, if

not exclusively, of horsemen. Even more impressive in terms of tactical mobility is the

campaign of 597. The Avars moved swiftly along the Lower Danube and into “ThracianMysia” and suddenly appeared under the walls of Tomis (present-day Constan!a).19

Feeling

threatened by a pincer movement of Comentiolus’ troops who arrived in Nicopolis ad Ist -

rum (Nikiup, northern Bulgaria), the qagan moved back to the Lower Danube to meet the

Romans near Iatrus (present-day Krivina, near Cenovo in northern Bulgaria). Following the

debacle of the Roman army on the banks of the river Iantra, the Avars moved quickly to thesouth to block the passes across the Stara Planina range, and then crossed the mountains

pursuing Comentiolus all the way to Drizipera (modern Büyükkar"#t"ran, between Lülebur -gaz and Çorlu, in European Turkey), more than 300 km to the southeast.20

Theophylact Simocatta’s account of the Balkan war thus leaves one with the impressionthat the Avars waged a Blitzkrieg , in that their goal was to concentrate overwhelming force

at high speed and constant motion in order to keep the enemy off-balance and to make it

difficult for the Romans to organize an adequate response at any given point, before the

Avar horsemen would move somewhere else. The psychological effect of this strategy may

explain why cavalry troops could so easily take a number of important cities and forts both

along the Danube and in Thrace (e.g., Drizipera) without getting bogged down in long-

16 Theophylact Simocatta, History VI 4.6, 226; English translation from Whitby, 163. Theophylact relied

at this point on an official report of the campaign, which Haussig rightly called Feldzugs-journal. This

was most probably the source of the information about the time the Avar horsemen took to reach Bono-

nia. See Hans Wilhelm Haussig, “Theophylakts Exkurs über die skythischen Völker,” Byzantion 23

(1953): 275 – 462, at 296.

17 See István Bóna, “Die Awarenfeldzüge und der Untergang der byzantinischen Provinzen an der Unteren

Donau,” in Kontakte zwischen Iran, Byzanz und der Steppe im 6. – 7. Jahrhundert , ed. Csanád Bálint

(Budapest: Institut für Archäologie der Ungarischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2000), 163– 84, at

166.

18 Theophylact Simocatta, History VII 12.1, 265; English translation from Whitby, 195.

19 Theophylact Simocatta, History VII 13.1, 267; English translation from Whitby, 196. See $ukasz Ró-

%ycki, “Roman– Avar relations from the perspective of the military campaign of 597 and the siege of To-

mi,” in Barbarians at the Gates. A Monograph Based on Material from the VI International Study Ses-

sion on the History of Peoples on the Baltic Sea, Wolin, 5 – 7 August 2011, eds. Maciej Franz and

Zbigniew Pilarczyk (Toru&: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszalek, 2013), 115– 33.

20 Theophylact Simocatta, History VII 14.8 and 11, 270; English translation from Whitby, 199.

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drawn sieges. Fundamental for the understanding of the Avar strategy is also the fact that

none of those cities and forts was actually occupied in the aftermath of their conquest.

Captives were either ransomed for money or moved inside the qaganate, as in the case of

the famous Sermesianoi (former inhabitants of Sirmium) mentioned in the Miracles of St.

Demetrius.21 In fact, after the fall of Sirmium (the value of which appears to have been

more symbolic than practical to both Avars and Romans), the Avars were not any more

interested in conquering or even claiming any piece of the imperial territory.22

The main

reason for the qagan waging war on the Empire in the Balkans appears to have been to keep

the “prestige economy” going, as this was the only way for him to acquire large amounts ofRoman gold – either as stipends (which reached 120,000 solidi per year at the end of the

century) or as gifts – to be redistributed among the members of the Avar elite (and army), in

order to secure their loyalty.23

Who exactly were the Avar elite horsemen? Although his account is rich in detail about

the movements of the Avar armies in the Balkans, Theophylact Simocatta has nothing to

say about individual warriors or groups of warriors.24

The late 6th

- or early 7th

-century

military treatise known as the Strategikon describes the Avar horsemen as “doubly armed;

lances slung over their shoulders and hanging bows in their hands, they make use of both asneed requires.”25

The horses of the “illustrious men” wore iron or felt protection.26 As a

matter of fact, a great number of animals – stallions and mares – are said to have fol-lowed

the mounted Avar warriors, and they were used as reserve horses for increased mobility and

speed, as well as for food (meat, blood, and milk).27

Those were relatively large animals,

21 Miracles of St. Demetrius II 5, ed. Paul Lemerle (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scienti-fique,

19779), 222 –34. See Michel Pillon, “L'exode des Sermésiens et les grandes migrations des Ro-mains de

Pannonie dans les Balkans durant le Haut Moyen Age“, Etudes Balkaniques 38 no. 3 (2002): 103 – 41.

22 Walter Pohl, “Ergebnisse und Probleme der Awarenforschung,” Mitteilungen des Instituts für Öster -

reichische Geschichtsforschung 96 (1988): 247 – 74, at 264.

23 Walter Pohl, “Historische Überlegungen zum awarisch- byzantinischen Austausch,” A Wosinsky Mór

Múzeum Evkönyve 15 (1990): 91 –6, at 94; Walter Pohl, “Zur Dynamik barbarischer Gesellschaften: das

Beispiel der Awaren,” Klio 73 (1991): 595 –600; Walter Pohl, “Krieg, Raub und Handel in der awa-

rischen Gesellschaft,” in Reitervölker aus dem Osten. Hunnen + Awaren. Burgenländische Landesaus-

stellung 1996. Schloß Halbturn, 26. April -31. Oktober 1996 , eds. Falko Daim, Karl Kaus and Péter

Tomka (Eisenstadt: Amt der Burgenländischen Landesregierung, 1996), 348– 9.

24 The names of two commanders of Avar cavalry troops appear in Theophylact’s work— Samur and Ap-

sich ( History VI 4.11 and VIII 5.5 – 6 and 13, 227 and 292 – 3). Samur commanded 8,000 horsemen,

while Apsich was “dispatched with soldiers to destroy the nation of the Antes, which was in fact allied

to the Romans.” Nothing else is known about the two commanders.

25 Strategikon XI 2, ed. George T. Dennis (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der

Wissenschaften, 1981), 362; English translation from George T. Dennis (transl.), Maurice’s Strategikon.

Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), 116.

26 Strategikon XI 2, 362.

27 Strategikon XI 2, 363. The reserve horses are specifically mentioned as being kept next to the battle

field or tied together to protect the rear of the battle line ( Strategikon XI 2, 362 and 364). Moreover, the

unknown author of the Strategikon notes that since the Avars depended upon their horses, they were

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Florin Curta74

with a mean estimated withers height of just under 1.40 m.28

Horse skeletons buried either

separately or together with males (presumably their owners) are commonly of animals

sacrificed at an adult age, which strongly suggests that those horses have been used in

combat for some time.29

Horse skeletons are often associated with stirrups and lance

heads.30 Although taking the archaeological record as a mirror of social reality is an app-

roach fraught with problems, there is no point in denying the military posturing of those

who were buried together with their horses, stirrups, and lances. In addition to lance heads,

Early Avar-age horse or horseman burials also produced swords, armor plates, bone rein-

forcement plates for composite bows, arrow heads, and battle axes. Such weapons appear to

have been associated more often than not with a group of “professional” warriors, whowere often accompanied in death by their warhorses. It is perhaps not too far-fetched to see

this group of warriors as the shock force of the Avar army, the mobility of which appears so

prominently in Theophylact Simocatta’s account of the Balkan wars in the late 6th

century.

If we are to trust the Strategikon on this point, in addition to high mobility, the Avar

horsemen had a remarkable ability to switch quickly between different weapons – lance,

bow, and sword – while in combat. Such ability must have been developed through long and

meticulous training of both men and horses, the quality of which must have been on a par

particularly vulnerable to shortage of fodder (Strategikon XI 2, 364). For reliance on reserve horses as

the key to understanding the greater mobility of the Avar troops during the Balkan campaigns, see Sy-

vänne, Age of Hippotoxotai, 358.

28 There is absolutely no basis for the widespread stereotype according to which the Avars rode ponies

(Syvänne, Age of Hippotoxotai, 360).

29 István Takács, Tamás Somhegyi, and László Bartosiewicz, “Avar kori lovakról Vörs -Papkert B temet!

leletei alapján,” Somogyi Múzeumok Közleményei 11 (1995): 173 –81, at 184. As László Bartosiewicz,

“Animal remains from the Avar period cemetery of Budakalász-Dunapart,” Acta Archaeologica Acade-

miae Scientiarum Hungaricae 47 (1995): 241 – 55, at 244 points out, foal skeletons are very rare in Hun-

gary during the Avar age. For the mean estimated withers height of Early Avar horses, see István Ta -

kács and László Bartosiewicz, “Lócsontváz leletek Vörs-Papkert avar kori lel!helyér!l,” A Herman Ot-

to Múzeum Évkönyve 30 – 31 (1993 – 1994): 597 –604; István Vörös, “A békéssámsoni kora avar kori sír

lova,” Móra Ferenc Múzeum Évkönyve. Studia Archaeologica 4 (1998): 373 – 6; Gabriel T. Rustoiu and

Marius Ciut", “Mormântul de c"l"re# avar recent descoperit la Unirea-Vere$mort (jud. Alba),” Apulum

45 (2008): 71 – 98, at 95.

30 Florin Curta, “The earliest Avar -age stirrups, or the ‘stirrup controversy’ revisited,” in The Other Eu-

rope in the Middle Ages. Avars, Bulgars, Khazars, and Cumans , ed. Florin Curta (Leiden /Boston: Brill,

2008), 297 – 326, at 312 – 3. Lances and spears appear more often with males buried with horses or in

horse burials. In fact, more than half of the known Avar-age lances are associated with horses. The vast

majority of those lances are dated to the Early Avar age. See Gergely Csiky, “Armament and so-ciety in

the mirror of the Avar archaeology. The Transdanubia- phenomenon revisited,” in Proceedings of the 1st

International Conference Interethnic Relations in Transylvania. Militaria Mediaevalia in Central and

South Eastern Europe, Sibiu, October 14th – 17th, 2010, ed. Ioan Marian %iplic (Si- biu: “Lucian Blaga”

University Publishing House, 2011), 9 – 34, at 15.

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with that recommended by the author of the Strategikon for Roman cavalrymen.31

That

much results from what is known about the highly disciplined troops the qagan led into

several campaigns across the Balkans, even though not much can actually be said about

training or the general lifestyle of the Avar horsemen. That larger sections of the Avar

mounted army were led by specifically designated generals, whose names were also known

to their Roman adversaries, suggests a strongly hierarchical organization of the Avar ar-

my.32

A different picture emerges from the examination of the sources mentioning raids and

invasions by people alternatively called “Huns” or “Bulgars.” 33 Although not specifically

mentioned as horsemen, their devastations are always directly or indirectly attributed to the

great mobility of their troops. For example, in 499, the Bulgars crossed the Danube and

quickly reached Thrace, where they defeated a large Roman army on the banks of the river

Tzurta.34

In a panegyric written in 507 for Theoderic the Great, Magnus Felix Ennodius

gives an indirect explanation for the remarkable speed of the Bulgar raids: the Bulgars use

their horses not only for riding, but also for food, as they drink mare milk.35

The Bulgar

raiders returned to the Balkans in 502, when no army was available any more to resist

them.36 A third Bulgar raid into Thrace was intercepted in 530 by magister militum per Illyricum Mundo.

37 According to John Malalas, Mundo even managed to capture the “king”

of the Bulgars, no doubt the warlord responsible for the raid.38

Subsequent Bulgar raids

were intercepted before crossing the Stara Planina range into Thrace. In 535, the magister

militum praesentalis Sitta crushed a Bulgar raiding army on the banks of the river Iantra.39

Four years later, two Roman generals attempted to stop a raid organized by two Hunnic

“kinglets” into Scythia Minor and Moesia. They were defeated and killed in the process,

31 Strategikon I 2, 76 –84. For a discussion of this section of the treatise, see Syvänne, Age of Hippo-

toxotai, 43 – 7.

32 According to the author of the Strategikon, the military success of the Avars could be explained in terms

of the despotic power the qagan exercised over his subjects (Strategikon XI 2, 360).

33 Khristo Dimitrov, “Khuno- b!lgari i onoguriguri v stepite na severnoto Chernomorie prez VI vek,” in

B•lgarite v Severnoto Prichernomorie. Izsledvaniia i materiali , ed. Pet!r Todorov (Veliko T!rno-vo:

Universitetsko izdatelstvo “Sv. sv. Kiril i Metodii”, 1996), 43– 8.

34 Marcellinus Comes, Chronicle, ed. Theodor Mommsen (Berlin: Weidmann, 1894), 94; Brian Croke,

Count Marcellinus and his Chronicle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 69.

35 Ennodius, Panegyric 5, ed. Friedrich Vogel, MGH Auctores antiquissimi 7 (Berlin: Weidmann, 1885),

205 – 6.

36 Marcellinus Comes, Chronicle, 96; Croke, Count Marcellinus, 70.

37 Marcellinus Comes, Chronicle, 103. For Mundo’s appointment as magister militum per Illyricum, see

Samu Szádeczky-Kardoss, “Geschichte des Attila-Abkömmlings Mundo und ihre Chronologie bei

Theophanes,” Acta classica Universitatis Scientiarum Debreceniensis 10 – 11 (1974 – 1975): 165 – 74, at

169; Brian Croke, “Mundo the Gepid. From freebooter to Roman general,” Chiron 12 (1982): 125 – 35,

at 132.

38 John Malalas, Chronographia, ed. Ludwig Dindorf (Bonn: E. Weber, 1831), 451; Croke, Count

Marcellinus, 70 – 1.

39 Marcellinus Comes, Chronicle, 104.

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Florin Curta76

and the Huns crossed the mountains into Thrace, which they thoroughly plundered. They

were finally intercepted by another Roman army led, among others, by the magister militum

per Illyricum Askum, who managed to kill the two “kinglets.” Meanwhile, however, adifferent Hunnic raiding party ambushed the victorious Romans, and two of their generals

were taken captive.40

According to Procopius, in 539 or 540 “a mighty Hunnic army” crossed the Danube anddevastated the Balkan provinces, taking 32 forts in Illyricum and reaching all the way to the

Long Walls erected by Emperor Anastasius in the hinterland of Constantinople. Some of

them are even said to have crossed the Dardanelles and devastated the coast in Asia Minor.

In another invasion, the Huns “plundered Illyricum and Thessaly and attempted to stormthe wall at Thermopylae; and since the guards on the walls defended them valiantly, they

sought out the ways around and unexpectedly found the path which leads up the mountain

which rises there.” As a consequence, they devastated Achaia, but could not reach Pelo-

ponnesos, no doubt because of being stopped at the wall across the Isthmus of Corinth.41

The Long Walls; Thermopylae; and Peloponnesos — those are place names rarely, if ever

associated with raids across the 6th

-century Danube frontier of the Empire. The geographic

reach of the 539 invasion is enormous and even a very critical approach to Procopius’account will have to begin with the incontrovertible fact that the Huns covered very large

distances within a relatively short period of time. The implication is that the raiders were

horsemen.42

The same is true for the 12,000 Kutrigurs who in 551 came under different commanders

(one of whom was named Chinialon) all the way from the “western side of the MaeoticLake” to provide military assistance to the Gepids at war with the Lombards. 43

They would

later cross the Danube with Gepid assistance and plunder the Balkan provinces of the

Empire. This raid is in sharp contrast to the 2,000 “Huns” who came to the Danube frontier

40 John Malalas, Chronographia, 437. For the year 539 as the date of those events, see Veselin Beshevliev,

Die protobulgarische Periode der bulgarischen Geschichte (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1981), 82.

41 Procopius of Caesarea, Wars II 4.9 – 11, 288 –9. The mention of “another invasion” has led Ewald Kis-

linger, “Ein Angriff zu viel,” Byzantinische Zeitschrift 91 (1998): 49 – 58, at 55 – 6 to the conclusion that

Procopius was confused or deliberately invented a second invasion, which in fact never took place. The

scenario of the 539 invasion is suspiciously similar to that of the Kutrigur invasion of 558/9.

42 Vasil Giuzelev, “Voennoto izkustvo na prab!lgarite (IV–VII v.),” in Trinadeset veka v mir i bran, ed.

Boris Khristov (Sofia: Voennoe izdatelstvo, 1978), 26 – 34, at 31.

43 Procopius of Caesarea, Wars VIII 18.14 – 15; English translation by Henry B. Dewing (Cambridge: Har-

vard University Press, 1962), 239. Chinialon must have been a paramount commander, for he is men-

tioned again as receiving the envoys from Emperor Justinian announcing the Utigur attacks on the Kut-

rigur lands (Wars VIII 19.3). See Denis Chernienko, “The rulers of Euro pean nomads and the early me-

diaeval Byzantine historiography,” Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 58 (2005): 171

–8, at 177. For the location of the Kutrigur lands, see Irina E. Ermolova, “Kochevniki evropeiskikh ste-

pei epokhi Velikogo pereseleniia narodov,” in Velikoe pereselenie narodov. Etnopoliticheskie i social'-

nye aspekty, eds. V. P. Bulanova, Anton A. Gorskii and I. E. Ermolova (Moscow: Institut rossiiskoi

istorii RAN, 1999), 222 – 311, at 262 –4; Oleksyi V. Komar, “Kutrigury i utigury v severnom Pri-

chernomor'e,” Sugdeiskii sbornik 1 (2004): 169 – 200, at 170.

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shortly after 551 to request asylum in the Empire in the aftermath of the Utigur attack on

the Kutrigur lands. According to Procopius, they were bringing with them their wives and

children and one of their leaders was Sinnion, a veteran of Belisarius’ expedition to VandalAfrica.

44 The contrast between Chinialon and Sinnion’s Kutrigurs is not just one between

warriors and an entire people, but also one between different degrees of mobility, even

though it is quite possible that the Kutrigur refugees reached the Danube on horseback or in

wagons. That the names of the Kutrigur warlords were known to Procopius is perhaps a

consequence of that contrast, given that some Kutrigurs were friends, others were foes. The

latter is clearly the case of Zabergan, the Kutrigur leader who emerged in the years

immediately following the Utigur attack on the Kutrigur lands. In the winter of 558, he

crossed the frozen Danube into Scythia Minor and Moesia Inferior with a large army, which

he then divided into three sections. One of them moved rapidly into Greece reaching as far

south as Thermopylae, while the other two raided the Thracian Chersonesus and the out-

skirts of Constantinople.45

Again, the extraordinary distances covered in a relatively short period of time by Za-

bergan’s Kutrigurs suggest that they were all mounted warriors. In fact, 2,000 “Huns” said

to have advanced on the Roman camp at Chiton came at a gallop.46 It is the mobility ofthose warriors that made them so difficult to defeat that Emperor Justinian had to appoint

the retired Belisarius as commander of a small army, whose task was to push the Kutrigurs

away from the Long Walls and the vicinity of the Capital. However, unlike Chinialon’sKutrigurs, Zabergan’s warriors did not come all the way from the “western side of theMaeotic Lake,” which at any rate must have been in Utigur hands by 558. According toAgathias, prior to the invasion of 558, the “Hunnic tribes” had moved south from theirabodes and “had encamped not far from the banks of the Danube.”47

In other words, Zaber-

gan’s Kutrigurs were raiders from the vicinity, and not an expeditionary corps like the12,000 warriors who had arrived in the Lower Danube region seven years earlier.

If so, there are no material culture remains that could be associated with the presence of

the Huns, Bulgars, or Kutrigurs on the left bank of the Lower Danube. All secondary

inhumations in prehistoric barrows have been found in the steppe lands to the east from theriver Bug.48

The analysis of the associated grave goods has demonstrated that with few ex-

44 Procopius of Caesarea, Wars VIII 19.6 – 7; English translation by Dewing, 245. For Sinnion as partici-

pating in Belisarius’ expedition to Vandal Africa, see Wars III 11.12. The Kutrigur refugees were even-

tually settled in Thrace.

45 Agathias, Histories V 11 – 12, ed. Rudolf Keydell (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1967), 176 – 9. For Agathi-as’

account of the Kutrigur invasion of 558, see Georgi Bakalov, “Les ouvrages d'Agathias de Myrenée

comme source de l'histoire des territoires balkaniques pendant la première moitié du VI -e siècle,” E-

tudes Balkaniques 10 nos. 2 – 3 (1974): 196 – 207.

46 Agathias, Histories V 16.1 – 20.4, 183 – 9.

47 Agathias, Histories V 11.5, 177, English version from J. D. Frendo (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter,

1975), 146. See Costel Chiriac, “Unele observa!ii asupra informa!iilor literaristorice bizantine privitoarela regiunea Dun"rii de Jos în secolele V–X,” Arheologia Moldovei 20 (1997): 107 – 26, at 115.

48 Such burials have been attributed to the Bulgars (including Kutrigurs and Utigurs) by Rasho Rashev,

Prab•lgarite prez V– VII vek (Veliko T"rnovo: Faber, 2000), 41– 3.

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Florin Curta78

ceptions, most burial assemblages in that region must be dated to the second half of the 6th

and the early 7th

century.49

In other words, those graves coincide in time with the Avar

conquest of the steppe lands north of the Black Sea and post-date the Hunnic, Bulgar, and

Kutrigur raids and invasions into the Balkans. Only in a few cases were the human remains

buried together with horses or parts of a horse body. In Dymovka, there was only one horse

skull next to two human skeletons.50

In Sivashs’ke, buried above the human skeleton werethe skull and legs of a horse.

51 In Portove and in one of the two graves excavated in

Vynohradnoe, the whole skeleton of a horse was buried in a special niche next to the human

skeleton.52

In Kovalivka and Sivashivka, the horse skeleton was placed on top of the human

burial.53

That those were graves of warriors results from the deposition of weapons – arrow

heads, bone reinforcement plates for composite bows, and swords. Conspicuously absent

are the lance heads and stirrups so typical for contemporary burial assemblages in the

Middle Danube region under Avar control. With one possible exception (Portove), all

stirrups found in Eastern Europe are of a 7th

-, not late 6th

-century date.54

There is, therefore,

no evidence of a heavy cavalry similar to that of the Avars. Given that at the battle of

Chiton in 559, Belisarius’ goal was to crowd the Kutrigurs on in themselves so that they

would not be able either to maneuver their horses or to use their bows, it is likely that theHuns, the Bulgars, and the Kutrigurs were primarily bowmen.

55 Once inside the territory of

the empire, their goal was simply to plunder and to get large numbers of captives to be

ransomed at the end of the raid. This may explain both the lack of any coordination

between different raiding parties in 539 and the ephemeral nature of the power exercised by

their military commanders. Warlords such as Chinialon, Sinnion and Zabergan were

49 Florin Curta, “The north-western region of the Black Sea during the 6th and early 7th century AD,” An-

cient West & East 7 (2008): 149 – 85, at 151 – 63.

50 Aleksandr I. Aibabin, “Pogrebenie khazarskogo voina,” Sovetskaia arkheologiia (1985), no. 3: 191 –

205, at 197 – 8.

51 Oleksyi V. Komar, Anatolii I. Kubyshev, and Ruslan S. Orlov, “Pogrebeniia kochevnikov VI– VII vv. iz

severo-zapadnogo Priazov’ia,” in Stepi Evropy v epokhu srednovekov’ia, ed. A. V. Evgelevskii, vol. 5

(Donetsk: Izdatel’stvo Doneckogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 2006), 245– 374, at 309 – 10; 310 fig.

29. The limbs and skull of a horse have also been found in Bilozirka (Aibabin, “Pogrebenie,” 197).

52 Rashev, Prab!lgarite, 24 and 137 fig. 31.1 –23; R. S. Orlov and Iuri Ia. Rassamakin, “Novye pamiatniki

VI –VII vv. iz Priazov’ia,” in Materialy I tys. n. e. po arkheologii i istorii Ukrainy i Vengrii , eds. István

Erdélyi et al. (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1996), 102– 16, at 103 – 13; 104 fig. 1; 105 fig. 2.

53 G. T. Kovpanenko, E. P. Buniatin, and N. A. Gavriliuk, “Raskopki kurganov u s. Kovalevka,” in Kur-

gany na iuzhnom Buge, eds. V. F. Gening, G. T. Kovpanenko, and A. I. Terenozhkin (Kiev: Nau-kova

Dumka, 1978), 7, 48 –9, 53, and 55; 5 fig. 1; Komar, Kuibyshev, and Orlov, “Pogrebeniia kochev-

nikov,” 245– 51; 248 fig. 3.

54 Florin Curta, “Horsemen in forts or peasants in villages? Remarks on the archaeology of warfare in the

6th to 7th century Balkans,” in War and Warfare in Late Antiquity: Current Perspectives , eds. Luke

Lavan and Alexander Sarantis (Late Antique Archaeology 8) (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2013), 809 – 52, at

815 and 817 – 8.

55 Peter Bystrický, “Slovanské a bulharské vpády na Balkán do roku 559,” Historický "asopis 51 no. 3,

(2003): 385 – 402, at 397 –8; Syvänne, Age of Hippotoxotai, 443.

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distinguished by name from unnamed “kinglets” only because of their special status— former ally and refugee in the case of Sinnion, or enemy in the case of Chinialon and

Zabergan.

The case of the “Slavs” (Sclavenes and Antes) may not be very different. According to

Procopius, the first attack of the Antes, “who dwell close to the Sclaveni,” took place in518. The raid was intercepted by Germanus, magister militum per Thraciam, and the Antes

were defeated.56

At some point between 533 and 545, the Antes crossed the Danube again

and raided Thrace.57

The first Sclavene raid took place in 545, when the marauders were

intercepted by the Herulian mercenaries under the command of Narses.58

Three years later,

another raid reached as far as Dyrrachium, in Epirus Nova. Those were most likely Scla-

vene horsemen, for Procopius calls them an “army” ( strateuma).59

This is further confirmed

by the speed at which they moved over more than 400 km separating the Lower Danube

from the coast of the Ionian Sea. It seems to have been a large army, as the military com-

manders of Illyricum followed it at a distance with a force of 15,000 (horse) men, without

getting too close or engaging in any battle.60

In 549, another group of 3,000 Sclavene war-

riors crossed the Danube and immediately after that the Stara Planina range in the direction

of the Maritsa River, which they also crossed with no difficulty. 61 They then split into twogroups, one headed to Thrace, the other to Illyricum. The former group defeated the cavalry

troops stationed at Tzurullum (present-day Çorlu) and captured their commander, Asbadus,whom they executed on the spot. The easiness with which the Sclavene horsemen appear to

have won against the elite cavalry cohorts in Tzurullum strongly suggests that, like the

Huns and the Bulgars, they relied on speed and stratagems (such as the “feigned retreat”), but it remains unclear with what kind of weapons they engaged their adversaries, either ja-

velins or bow and arrow.

It was a stratagem that allowed them to take the city of Topeiros (near present-day

Xanthi, in northern Greece).62

According to Procopius, the inhabitants of the city, who were

desperately defending the ramparts after the massacre of the garrison, were overwhelmed

56 Procopius of Caesarea, Wars VII 40.5 – 6, English translation by Dewing, 459.

57 Procopius of Caesarea, Wars VII 14.11; English translation by Dewing, 407.

58 Procopius of Caesarea, Wars VII 13.24; English translation by Dewing, 407. For the force of Herules,

which Narses recruited from Singidunum, see Alexander Sarantis, “The Justinianic Herules: from allied

barbarians to Roman provincials,” in Neglected Barbarians, ed. Florin Curta (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011),

361 – 402, at 385.

59 Procopius of Caesarea, Wars VII 29.1; English translation by Dewing, 436. Strateuma is used many ti-

mes in the Wars for cavalry troops, e.g., I 12.6, I 21.15, II 4.4, and III 18.13. See also Sergei A. Ivanov,

L. A. Gindin, and V. L. Cymburskii, “Prokopii Kesariiskii,” in Svod drevneishikh pis'mennykh izvestii o

slavianakh, eds. L. A. Gindin, Sergei A. Ivanov and Gennadii G. Litavrin (Moscow: Nauka, 1991),

170 – 249, at 234.

60 Tibor Živkovi!, “O plemenskom ustrojstvu i vojnoj snazi podunavskih Slovena u VI i VII veku,” Zbor-

nik radova Vizantološkog Instituta 35 (1996): 95 – 117, at 108.

61 Procopius, Wars VII 38.1; English translation by Dewing, 455. The Sclavenes of 549 were also a stra-

teuma, i.e., horsemen.

62 Dimitri Kasapidi, “Topeiros-Xantheia,” Vyzantinos Domos 5 – 6 (1991): 85 – 96.

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Florin Curta80

by “the multitude of their [the Sclavenes’] missiles.”63 It remains unclear whether the mis-

siles in question were arrows or javelins. In the summer of 550, as Roman troops were

gathering in Serdica under the command of Germanus in order to be sent to Italy against

Totila, a great throng of Sclavenes, “such as never before was known” crossed the Danubeand easily came close to Naissus (present-day Niš).64 Procopius calls them a “throng” (ho-

milos), but also an “army” ( stratos), and claims that the raiders’ goal was nothing less than

taking Thessalonica.65

Their intentions blocked by Germanus’ troops, they crossed themountains into Dalmatia, a sign that the marauders were on horseback. They then spent the

winter of 550 in Dalmatia, “as if in their own land.” In the sprin g of 551, they crossed the

mountains back to the east, and joined another group of Sclavenes, which had just crossed

the Danube. As in 549, they all divided themselves into three groups operating separately.

One of them was headed to Constantinople, and mauled a Roman army under the imperial

eunuch Scholastikos near Adrianople, “five days’ journey distant from Byzantium.” 66 The

Sclavenes are said to have been encumbered with “booty which surpassed all reckoning,consisting of men and animals and valuables of every description.”67

This strongly suggests

that some of the valuables in questions were transported on wagons or carts, which consi-

derably slowed down the ability of the marauders to move fast and to strike unexpectedly atvarious locations. In the ensuing battle, the Romans were “decisively vanquished,”68

but it

remains unclear whether the Sclavenes fought on horseback or perhaps dismounted and

engaged the enemy on foot. At any rate, following the battle, they do not seem to have been

encumbered by their booty any more, as they raided the hinterland of Adrianople, up to the

Long Walls, with impunity. They were intercepted by other troops (perhaps from the field

army stationed in Constantinople), defeated and slain, but the survivors were able to return

to the Danube together with the remaining booty.69

The year 551 was not yet over, when a

great throng of Sclavenes descended upon Illyricum. An army sent against them under the

command of Germanus’ sons cautiously followed the marauders, without however engag -

ing into any confrontation. The Sclavenes were thus able to return to the Danube with all

63 Procopius, Wars VII 38.17; English translation by Dewing, 456. See Petr V. Shuvalov, “Oruzhie ran -

nikh slavian,” in Kul’turnye transformacii i vzaimovliianiia v Dneprovskom regione na iskhode rimsko-

go vremeni i v rannem Srednevekov’e. Doklady nauchnoi konferencii, posviashchennoi 60 -letiiu so dnia

rozhdeniia E.A. Goriunova (Sankt-Peterburg, 14 – 17 noiabria 2000 g.), eds. Valentina M. Go-riunova

and Ol‘ga A. Shcheglova (St. Petersburg: Peterburgskoe vostokovedenie, 2004), 254 – 64, at 256.

Živkovi!, “O plemenskom ustrojstvu,” 108 n. 62 and Syvänne, Age of Hippotoxotai, 503 believe those

were arrows.

64 Procopius, Wars VII 40.1; English translation by Dewing, 459.

65 Sergei A. Ivanov, “Prokopii Kesariiskii o voennoi organizacii slavian,” in Slaviane i ikh sosedi. Gre-

cheskii i slavianskii mir v srednie veka i rannee novoe vremia. Sbornik statei k 70-letiiu akademika Gen-

nadiia Grigorievicha Litavrina, eds. Boris N. Flor ‘ia, E. M. Lomize and N. S. Zakhar ‘ina (Mos-cow:

Indrik, 1996), 9 – 22.





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their plunder. The Romans could not stop them, for the Gepids apparently took the Scla-

venes “under their protection and ferried them across” at the price of one solidus per head.70

Although not specifically mentioned as such, the Sclavenes of 551 may have also been

mounted warriors.

The same is probably true about the 100,000 Sclavene warriors who, according to Me-

nander the Guardsman, “devastated Thrace and many other areas” in 578. 71 In 581, “the

accursed people of the Slavs” set out and plundered all of Greece, the region around Thes -

salonica, and Thrace, taking many towns and castles, laying waste, burning, pillaging, and

seizing the whole country.72

That those Slavs must have also been horsemen results not

only from the great distance at which they operated, away from the Lower Danube frontier

of the Empire, but also from the fact that, according to John of Ephesus, over the course of

the following years, they came to possess “herds of horses and a lot of weapons, and learn-

ed to make war better than the Romans.”73 Some of them, 5,000 in number according to the

author of the first collection of homilies in the Miracles of St. Demetrius, attacked Thessa-

lonica by surpr ise; they were “the flower of the Sclavene nation,” which strongly suggests“professional” warriors who must have learned how to make war “better than the Romans”

long before the raid of 581.74 Just what is meant by “professional” in this case results fromthe examination of the account of the siege of Thessalonica in September 586 by an army

of 100,000 Sclavenes and other barbarians obeying the orders of the qagan of the Avars.75

Unlike the Sclavenes who took Topeiros in 549, those who besieged Thessalonica in 586

had all the necessary gear: “they prepared siege machines, iron battering rams, catapults forthrowing stones of enormous size, and so-called tortoises onto which, along with the cata-

pults, they placed dry skins, again having contrived that they might not be harmed by fire or

boiling pitch. They nailed the bloodied hides of newly slain oxen and camels onto these

machines and thus brought them up near to the wall. From the third day and thereafter, they

hurled stones or rather mountains as they were in size and the archers shot further, imitating

the winter snowflakes, with the result that no one on the wall was able to emerge without

danger and thus to see something outside. The tortoises were joined to the wall outside and

without restrain were digging up the foundations with levers and axheads. I think that these

70 Procopius, Wars VIII 25.1 – 5; English translation by Dewing, 520.

71 Menander the Guardsman, fr. 20.2, ed. R. C. Blockley (Liverpool: F. Cairns, 1985), 191.

72 John of Ephesus, Historia ecclesiastica VI 6.25; English translation by E. I. Brooks (Louvain: Ex Offici-

na Orientalia et Scientifica, 1936), 248. See Valentin Alexei Constantinov, “Ioan din Efes !i realit"#ile

istorice din Peninsula Balcanic" în secolul al VI-lea,” Mousaios 6 (2001): 75 – 87, at 79.

73 John of Ephesus, Historia ecclesiastica VI 6.25; English translation by Brooks, 249.

74 Miracles of St. Demetrius I 12.108, 126. Sonia Zogovi$, “Razvitie voennoi organizacii u slavian v VI–

VIII vv.,” in Obshchestvo, ekonomika, kul ‘ tura i isskusstvo slavian, ed. Valentin V. Sedov (Moscow:

Institut Arkheologii RAN, 1998), 5 –12, at 9 reads “the flower of the Slavonic nation” as an early

attestation of the Slavic druzhina (retinue of warriors), which is simply stretching the evidence of the

text to fit preconceived notions about the early Slavic military organization.

75 Miracles of St. Demetrius I 13, 133 –8. See Theodoros Korres, “Some remar ks on the first major at-

tempts of the Avaroslavs to capture Thessaloniki (597 and 614),” Byzantina 19 (1998): 171 – 85, at 174 –

6 (with the wrong date for the attack).

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Florin Curta82

numbered more than 1,000.”76 The first warrior who scaled the walls of the city, only to be

struck down by St. Demetrius himself was one of the “entire wild Slavic breed [who] bowed down to the qagan.”77

Michael the Syrian, in a passage undoubtedly lifted from the now lost portion of John of

Ephesus’s History of the Church, records another attack of the Sclavenes on Corinth, but

calls their leader a qagan and has him carrying off on a cart the great ciborium from the city

cathedral, in order to live under it as under a tent.78

The passage has been discussed in terms

of its relevance for Slavic raids into Greece, but no commentator seems to have so far noted

that the ciborium was carried off on a cart, an indication that the Slavic marauders had

either come equipped with the means of transportation necessary for the large amounts of

booty that they were planning to acquire, or they have found those means locally. A few

years later, a different group of Sclavenes led by a certain warlord named Ardagastus was

raiding the hinterland of Adrianople, only to be defeated by the imperial bodyguards under

the command of Comentiolus. What made Ardagastus an easy prey for the Romans was

apparently the fact that, like the Sclavene “qagan” from Corinth, he “had in train… a mostdistinguished haul of prisoners and splendid booty.” 79

Defeated by Comentiolus’ troops, he

managed to escape to the lands across the Danube, where Priscus would hunt him down afew years later. Judging from the evidence of Theophylact Simocatta, Ardagastus was a

particularly successful warlord, with a “territory” of his own, to which he would gatherwarriors from afar for raids across the Danube into the Balkan provinces of the Empire. He

was perceived as a real threat to Roman interests, which is why in 593, his was the first

“territory” to be attacked by Priscus’ troops. He had apparently begun to build a name forhimself, when Priscus’ expedition put an end to his career. Though he survived the Roman

aggression, Ardagastus most likely fell back into social oblivion, for he does not appear

again in Theophylact’s narrative.80

Even though in 585, the Sclavene raiders led by Ardagastus had been beaten near Adria -

nopolis, three years later another group of Sclavenes raided Thrace.81

As late as 593, while

the Roman armies were operating deep into the Sclavene territory on the other side of the

76 Miracles of St. Demetrius I 14.139, 148 –9; English translation from Korres, “Some remarks,” 174. The

thirteenth homily of Book I of the Miracles of St. Demetrius contains the first detailed description of a

tetragonal stone thrower (trebuchet). See Syvänne, Age of Hippotoxotai, 498.

77 Miracles of St. Demetrius I 13.117 and 120, 134 – 5; English translation from Tibor Živkovi!, Forging

Unity. The South Slavs Between East and West: 550 – 1150 (Belgrade: Institute of History, 2008), 21.

78 Michael the Syrian, Chronicon, ed. Jean B. Chabot (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1899), 361 – 3. See Lubor

Niederle, “Michal Syrský a d"jiny balkánských Slovan# v VI. století,” in Sborník prací historických k

žé. narozeninám Jaroslava Golla, eds. Gustav Friedrich and Kamil Krofta (Prague: Náklad Hist. klubu,

1906), 48 –54; Ioannis Karagiannopoulos, “To kiborio tes Ekklesias tes Korinthou,” Lakonikai spoudai

10 (1990): 79 – 85.

79 Theophylact Simocatta, History I 7.4, 52; English translation from Whitby, 29.

80 Florin Curta, The Making of the Slavs. History and Archaeology of the Lower Danube Region, c. 500 – 700 (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, 52) (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge Univer-

sity Press, 2001), 329.

81 Theophylact Simocatta, History III 4.7, 116; English translation from Whitby, 77.

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river Danube, there were still marauding parties in the Balkans. One of them ambushed a

Roman convoy going to Constantinople with a great number of Sclavenes captured north of

the Danube. Only the intervention of Roman infantry troops stationed in the environs saved

the convoy and its commander from being completely annihilated. Judging from the em-

phasis Theophylact places on the role of the infantry and the fact that the Sclavenes attack-

ed the convoy while its members were “encamped carelessly and at ease, and horses weregrazing the grass,” the marauders seem to have been on horseback.82

One year later, the

advanced guard of the Roman army marching to the Danube under the command of general

Peter encountered at Marcianopolis another raiding group of 600 Sclavenes. Like Ardagas-

tus in 585, the returning marauders were highly vulnerable because they carried with them

“a great haul of Romans” and a large number of wagons in which they had loaded the booty.

83 This considerably slowed down their movements. When intercepted by the Ro-

mans, they circled the wagons as a barricade to meet the threat. The Roman cavalrymen

approached the barricade, without daring to come to grips, “since they were afraid of the javelins which the barbarians were sending from the barricade against their horses.”84

They

were ordered to dismount and storm the wagon barricade. Though the Sclavenes fought

fiercely, the Roman cavalrymen now fighting on foot finally broke through the barricadeand slaughtered all raiders. Since there is no mention of Sclavene horses, and the marauders

are specifically said to have targeted Zaldapa, Aquis, and Scopi – all in the vicinity of the

Marcianopolis, and not too far from the Danube frontier of the Empire – it is quite possible

that the Sclavenes of 594, unlike those of previous expeditions which reached far south into

Thrace and Greece, were on foot, not on horseback. This hypothesis is further substantiated

by the mention of the javelins they threw at the Roman horses. According to the author of

the Strategikon, who may have well been a participant in Maurice’s campaigns against theSlavs north of the river Danube, the javelin (akontion) was the favorite weapon of the

Sclavene foot warrior, along with the bow and the poisoned arrows. He even recommends

that the Roman light infantry be equipped with short javelins like those used by the Scla-

venes.85

The Sclavenes of the Strategikon lived primarily in the woods and in marshy areas,

and horses are mentioned in relation to them only as preferred booty, and not as securingtheir success in war. In other words, the Sclavenes appeared to the author of the Strategikon

primarily as an enemy fighting on foot.86

At a quick glimpse, this particular view is further

confirmed by the archaeological evidence. There are no stirrups and no bridle bits on any

6th

- to 7th

-century site in Walachia, Moldavia, and Moldova. Out of two lance-heads so far

82 Theophylact Simocatta, History VI 8.4 – 7, 234 – 5; English translation from Whitby, 170 – 1.

83 Theophylact Simocatta, History VII 2.2, 247; English translation from Whitby, 180.

84 Theophylact Simocatta, History VII 2.5, 247; English translation from Whitby, 180 – 1.

85 Strategikon XI 4, 374; XII B 5, 422. See Giorgios Kardaras, “He polemike techne ton proimon Slabon

(ST‘-Z‘ ai.),” Symmeikta 18 (2008): 185 – 205, at 192. By contrast, there are no Hunnic or Bulgar wea-

pons mentioned in the Strategikon as worth adopting or imitating. For Bulgar belts mentioned in papyri,

see Johannes Diethart and Ewald Kislinger, “‘Bulgaren’ und ‘Hunnen’ in Ägypten,” in Die Awaren am

Rand der byzantinischen Welt. Studien zu Diplomatie, Handel und Technologietransfer im Frühmittel -

alter , ed. Falko Daim (Innsbruck: Wagner, 2000), 9 – 14.

86 Syvänne, Age of Hippotoxotai, 392.

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Florin Curta84

known from those regions, one is most likely of an earlier (4th

-century) date.87

There are no

swords, battle axes, or reinforcement plates for composite bows. The only weapons found

on 6th

-century sites north of the Lower Danube are arrow heads.88

However, there were

horses in or around those sites, as demonstrated by the presence of equines in faunal

assemblages, albeit in small percentages.89

Why did the author of the Strategikon choose to ignore the possibility of Sclavenes

fighting on horseback? It has been suggested that he had been a participant in Emperor

Maurice’s war against the Sclavenes north of the river Danube in the 590s.90 On the other

hand, historians have long recognized that for his account of that war, Theophylact Simo-

catta employed an official report or bulletin, perhaps written by a participant in those same

campaigns in which the author of the Strategikon gained his rich field experience.91

This

would explain the remarkable similarity between the actions and decisions taken by Priscus

and Peter, on one hand, and, on the other hand, the recommendations the author of the

87 Vlad Zirra and Gheorghe Cazimir, “Unele rezultate ale s!p!turilor arheologice de pe Cîmpul lui Boja

din cartierul Militari,” Cercet•ri arheologice în Bucureti 1 (1963): 56 – 71, at 63; Margareta Constan-tiniu, “S!p!turile de la Str!ule"ti-M!ic!ne"ti. A"ezarea feudal! II,” Cercet•ri arheologice în Bucureti 2

(1965): 174 – 89, at 182.

88 Dinu V. Rosetti, “Siedlungen der Kaiserzeit und der Völkerwanderungszeit bei Bukarest,” Germania 18

(1934): 206 –13, at 210 and 212 fig. 7.4; V. Leahu, “Raport asupra s!p!turilor arheologice efectuate în

1960 la C!#elu Nou,” Cercet•ri arheologice în Bucureti 1 (1963): 34 – 43, at 37 – 8 and 39 fig. 25; Dan

Gh. Teodor, “$antierul arheologic Suceava,” Materiale i cercet•ri arheologice 9 (1979): 373 – 99, at

375 and 377; Suzana Dolinescu-Ferche, “Ciurel, habitat des VI–VIIe siècles d. n. è.,” Dacia 23 (1979):

179 – 230, at 198 – 200 and 213 – 5; 205 fig. 22.15; Suzana Dolinescu-Ferche and Margareta Constantiniu,

“Un établissement du VIe siècle à Bucarest,” Dacia 25 (1981): 289 – 329, at 322 fig. 18.9; Dan Gh.

Teodor, Continuitatea popula!iei autohtone la est de Carpa!i. Aez•rile din secolele VI– XI e. n. de la

Dodeti-Vaslui (Ia"i: Junimea, 1984), 23– 4; 29 fig. 6.7; Dan Gh. Teodor, Civiliza!ia romanic• la est de

Carpa!i în secolele V–VII (aezarea de la Botoana-Suceava) (Bucharest: Editura Academiei RSR,

1984), 31 – 2 and 38 – 9; 97 fig. 18.3, 4; 98 fig. 19.2; Suzana Dolinescu-Ferche, “Contributions archéolo-

giques sur la continuité daco-romaine. Dulceanca, deuxième habitat du VI–e siècle d. n. è.,” Dacia 30

(1986): 121 – 54, at 121 and 123; fig. 22.21, 22; Mioara Turcu and Radu Ciuceanu, “S!p!turi arheologice

pe dealul V!c!re"ti,” Cercet•ri arheologice în Bucureti 4 (1992): 196 – 204, at 199 – 200; Ioan Mitrea,

Comunit•!i s•teti la est de Carpa!i în epoca migra!iilor. Aezarea de la Davideni din secolele V– VIII

(Piatra Neam#: Muzeul de Istorie, 2001), 50– 2, 79 – 80, and 91; 323 fig. 63.1, 7, 8.

89 I. A. Rafalovich, “Raskopki ranneslavianskogo poseleniia VI–VII vv. n. e. u sela Selishte,” in Arkheo-

logicheskie issledovaniia v Moldavii v 1968 – 1969 gg., eds. I. A. Rafalovich et al. (Kishinew: Shtiinca,

1972), 122 – 42, at 122 – 8; Suzana Dolinescu-Ferche, Aez•rile din secolele III i VI în sud -vestul

Munteniei. Cercet•rile de la Dulceanca (Bucharest: Editura Academiei RSR, 1974), 67, 85 – 7, and 90;

Dolinescu-Ferche, “Ciurel,” 216; Dolinescu-Ferche, “Contributions archéologiques,” 151; Sergiu

Haimovici, “Studiul materialului osteologic descoperit în dou! a"ez!ri subcarpatice datînd din secolele

V –VII e. n.: Davideni "i $tefan cel Mare (jud. Bac!u),” Carpica 18 – 19 (1986 – 1987): 251 – 60, at 252;

Mitrea, Comunit•!i s•teti, 229.

90 Curta, Making of the Slavs, 50.

91 Curta, Making of the Slavs, 56 and 59.

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Strategikon has for any general battling the Sclavenes. There is, however, a conspicuous

contrast between Theophylact Simocatta and the Strategikon. While the latter completely

ignores the Sclavene cavalry, the former knew about its existence and use. For example,

when in 594, general Peter sent twenty men across the river Danube to reconnoiter, they

were all captured by Sclavene horsemen. The soldiers who were sent after them defeated

the Sclavene warriors led by a warlord named Peiragastus, managed to kill him, but were

unable to pursue the enemy, “because of their lack of horse.” This implies that Peiragastus’warriors were on horseback.

92 When hunted down by Priscus’ men in 593, Ardagastus, the

Sclavene warlord defeated in 585 near Adrianople, escaped on “an unsaddled mare” whichhe dismounted when engaging in hand-to-hand combat with his pursuers, before taking to

flight and swimming across a river into the “rough country.”93 A possible explanation for

the contradiction between Theophylact Simocatta and the Strategikon may result from an

examination of Procopius of Caesarea’s work. Despite labeling various raiding Sclavenegroups with a word he more often than not employed for cavalry troops, Procopius shared

with the author of the Strategikon the idea that the Sclavenes only fought on foot: “Whenthey enter battle, the majority of them go against their enemy on foot carrying little shields

and javelins in their hands, but they never wear corselets. Indeed, some of them do not weareven a shirt or a cloak, but gathering their trews up as far as to their private parts they enter

into battle with their opponents.”94 That almost the same is said about the barbarian soldiers

fighting in Belisarius’ army suggests that responsible for Procopius’ inconsistencies was hisdesire to portray the Sclavenes as quintessential barbarians.

95 They had no knowledge of

horse riding, no armor, and no sophisticated weapons. Until their conquest of Topeiros,

they had no use of their prisoners, whom they killed in the most atrocious way, behaving

more like beasts than like humans.96

Their many raids and victories against Roman armies

may thus have appeared as extraordinary to Procopius’ audience, the members of which

shared his stereotypical views about barbarians.97

Procopius most certainly had the oppor-

tunity to see Sclavenes on horseback in Italy, for in 539 or 540 he was sent to Auximum,

where Sclavene mercenaries were employed by Belisarius to capture some Ostrogoths from

the besieged city.

98

As Michel Kazanski has noted, Procopius’ mention of mounted troopsof Huns, Sclavenes, and Antes in relation with the Gothic war in Italy suggests that in the

92 Theophylact Simocatta, History VII 4.11 and 5.5, 252 and 253; English translation from Whitby, 184

and 185.

93 Theophylact Simocatta, History VI 7.2 – 4, 409; English translation from Whitby, 168 – 9.

94 Procopius, Wars VII 14.25 –26; English translation by Dewing, 271. Franziska E. Schlosser, “The Slavs

in sixth-century Byzantine sources,” Byzantinoslavica 61 (2003): 75 – 82, at 78, naively takes all this at

face value.

95 Procopius, Wars II 21.6; English translation by Dewing, 117: “Not one of them had a cloak or any other

outer garment to cover the shoulders, but they were sauntering about clad in linen tunics and trousers.”

96 George P. Majeska, “The Byzantines on the Slavs: on the problem of ethnic stereotyping,” Acta Byzan-

tina Fennica 9 (1997): 70 – 86, at 79.

97 Majeska, “Byzantines on the Slavs,” 80; Živkovi!, Forging Unity, 51 – 2 and 55.

98 Procopius of Caesarea, Wars VI 26.16 –22; Ivanov, Gindin, and Cymburskii, “Prokopii Kesariiskii,”

171.

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Florin Curta86

eyes of Belisarius (as well of his secretary) they were preferred to others because of their

skills in waging a guerilla-type of warfare and in conducting commando-type operations.99

Belisarius may not have been the only one to understand that well the way in which the

Huns, the Antes, and the Sclavenes waged war. It has been suggested that the raids which

Chilbudius, the magister militum per Thraciam, conducted in the lands north of the river

Danube in the early 530s were most likely a guerilla-type of operations, the goal of which,

according to Procopius, was to strike terror among barbarians and to prevent them from

crossing the Danube into the Balkan provinces of the Empire.100

Similarly, Emperor Mau-

rice’s campaigns against the Sclavenes north of the Danube took the form of special opera-

tions. Before even crossing the river in 593, Priscus had learned that Ardagastus was

gathering warriors for a new raid into the Balkans. His troops, therefore, entered first Arda-

gastus’ “territory.” Given that the attack took place “in the middle of the night” and that Ar -dagastus appears to have been a high-value target, this was a manhunt performed by special

operation forces.101

Those were mounted, highly mobile troops which were capable of pur-

suing Ardagastus through the dark in unfamiliar territory, and of engaging in hand-to-hand

combat with him or any of his followers. They failed to kill Ardagastus, but the shock

effect of the operation and the devastation of Ardagastus’ territory effectively put an end tohis political and military career.

Another group of special forces under brigadier Alexander crossed the river Helibacia

and came upon a group of Sclavene scouts from Musocius’ “territory.” That Alexander’smen were specially trained results from the fact that they attempted, albeit unsuccessfully,

to pursue the Sclavenes into the “nearby marshes and the savage woodland.”102 Judging

from what followed, Alexander’s men were on foot, not on horseback. The same is true forthe 200 soldiers which Alexander commanded in the special operation meant to capture the

150 canoes the Sclavene “king” Musocius had sent to rescue the refugees from Ardagastus’“territory.”103

The 3,000 men Priscus sent with the canoes to attack Musocius’ village werealso on foot.

104 Again, the attack took place in the middle of the night.

105 The infantry

99 Michel Kazanski, “O ranneslavianskoi konnice,” Stratum+ (2005 – 2009), no. 5: 457 – 71, at 457 – 62

(Kazanski writes of a “partisan war,” no doubt with his Russian -speaking audience in mind). For

Sclavene horsemen in Italy, see Procopius of Caesarea, Wars V 27.1; John L. Teall, “The barbarians

in Justinian‘s armies,” Speculum 40 (1965): 294 –322, at 302; Zogovi!, “Razvitie voennoi

organizacii,” 8.

100 Procopius of Caesarea, Wars VII 14.2 –4; English translation by Dewing, 407; Syvänne, Age of Hip-

potoxotai, 289 and 394. Chilbudius is specifically said to have gone, “as was his custom, with a small

force” against the Sclavenes in the lands north of the river Danube.

101 Theophylact Simocatta, History VI 7.1 – 4, 232; English translation from Whitby, 168 – 9.

102 Theophylact Simocatta, History VI 8.9 – 10, 235 – 6; English translation from Whitby, 171.

103 Concern with increased mobility may explain Priscus’ decision to execute all prisoners of war (see

Strategikon XI 4, 386).

104 The author of the Strategikon recommends the use of one or two squadrons (banda), i.e., 400 to 800

men, for the attack on a Sclavene village. He even insists that it was not wise to detach more squad-

rons, even if the settlement happened to be a large one, thus implying that 400 to 800 men were a

sufficiently large force to overcome any possible resistance (Strategikon XI 4, 384). The force that

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forces under the command of Gentzon saved the day, when upon returning from their

assault on Musocius, the Roman troops were ambushed by the Sclavenes. The 20 scouts,

whom Peter sent in 594 on the other side of an unknown river north of the Danube to

reconnoiter in Sclavene territory were also on foot. They were apparently trained to travel

by night and to sleep during the day, which is how they were detected by Sclavene horse-

men.106

By contrast, the troops with which Godwin in 602, “destroyed ho rdes of [Sclavene]

enemies in the jaws of the sword, secured a large body of captives, and acquired great

glory” may have been of cavalrymen, judging by the fact that they needed special ferry-

boats for the crossing of the Danube.107

Like the special operation forces of 593, Godwin’smen must have relied on their mobility to spread terror throughout the lands of the Scla-

venes.

Campaigning against the Sclavenes north of the river Danube has provided sufficient

training for Roman soldiers to apply their newly acquired skills on other fronts. In 599,

after repelling several Avar assaults on the bridgehead established by Priscus opposite Vi-

minacium, on the left bank of the river Danube, the Romans drove their enemies into a

nearby swamp, where many Avars drowned, including the sons of the qagans.108

This was a

battle most likely won by infantrymen, who are otherwise specifically said to have aban-doned the bow and the arrow in favor of javelins, thus effectively approaching the military

model of the Sclavene warriors presented by the author of the Strategikon. His recommen-

dations for cavalry troops fighting against the Avars include a number of clear examples of

such emulation:

“The horses, especially those of the officers and the other special troops, in particular

those in the front ranks of the battle line, should have protective pieces of iron armor about

their heads and breast plates of iron or felt, or else breast and neck coverings such as the

Avars use. The saddles should have large and thick cloths; the bridle should be of good

quality; attached to the saddles should be two iron stirrups, a lasso with thong, hobble, a

saddle bag large enough to hold three or four days’ rations for the soldier when needed.There should be four tassels on the back strap, one on top of the head, and one under the

chin. The men’s clothing, especially their tunics, whether made of linen, goat’s hair, orrough wool, should be broad and full, cut according to the Avar pattern, so they can be

fastened to cover the knees while riding and give a neat appearance.”109

Priscus sent against Musocius’ village was between three and seven times larger. Ignorant of this par -

ticular passage in Theophylact Simocatta, Syvänne, Age of Hippotoxotai, 391 with n. 4 draws the

wrong conclusion that “the Romans did not need to possess superior numbers when they faced mili-

tarily poor organized settlements that they had surprised.”

105 Theophylact Simocatta, History VI 9.12, 238; English translation from Whitby, 173.

106 Theophylact Simocatta, History VII 4.8 and 10 – 11, 252; English translation from Whitby, 184.

107 Theophylact Simocatta, History VIII 5.12, 293; English translation from Whitby, 217.

108 Theophylact Simocatta, History VIII 3.6 – 7, 287; English translation from Whitby, 212.

109 Strategikon I 2, 80; English translation by Dennis, 13.

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Florin Curta88

This is in fact the chapter of the Strategikon, in which its author insists that Roman ca-

valrymen employ a number of devices, all of which are said to be of Avar origin: cavalry

lances, “with leather thongs in the middle of the shaft and with pennons”; round neck pieces “with linen fringes outside and wool inside”; horse armor; long and broad tunics;and tents, “which combine practicality with good appearance.”110 Apparently in an attempt

to emulate Avar tactics, during training and drilling every Roman cavalryman was expected

to “fire one or two arrows rapidly and put the strung bow in its case, […] and then grab thespear which he has been carrying on his back. With the strung bow in its case, he should

hold the spear in his hand, then quickly replace it on his back, and grab the bow.” 111 Such

training seems to have been most appropriate for the type of warfare that the Avars favored:

“They prefer battles fought at long range, ambushes, encircling their adversaries, simulatedretreats and sudden returns, and wedge-shaped formations, that is in scattered groups.”112

In addition to imitating the tactics of their adversaries, the Romans were also able to put

them to work for their own interests. In 578, Emperor Tiberius II ordered the quaestor exer-

citus John, who was at the same time the commander of the Danube fleet, to transport

60,000 Avar horsemen on ships along the Danube, from Pannonia to Scythia Minor.113

The

expedition targeted the Sclavenes in the lands north of the river Danube. The Avar horse-men landed in eastern Walachia or southern Moldavia, and immediately proceeded to set

fire to the Sclavene villages and to destroy the fields. The combined effect of overwhelming

force and surprise explains why no Sclavenes “dared to face” the Avars, and instead tookrefuge into the nearby woods. The idea behind this operation was not only to increase

mobility by means of water transportation, but also to make the moves invisible to the Scla-

venes.114

In 578, the Avars performed for the Romans the same military mission as the

special operation forces would undertake during Emperor Maurice’s campaigns against theSclavenes in the 590s. Similarly, the Huns, the Sclavenes, and the Antes were recruited for

the war in Italy as mounted warriors for special operations against the Goths. “For these barbarians,” Procopius explains, “excel all others in their ability to fight on roughground.”115

From a Balkan perspective, the transformation of the Roman army in the 6

th

century,uneven and gradual as it may have been, required a number of adaptations that were meant

to increase the mobility of tactical units and to enhance their capability to face multiple

challenges from enemies who were just as preoccupied with swiftly moving across large

distances. How those adaptations were developed in combination with the strong reliance,

110 Strategikon I 2, 78; English translation by Dennis, 12 – 3.

111 Strategikon I 1, 77; English translation by Dennis, 11.

112 Strategikon XI 2, 365; English translation by Dennis, 117; Syvänne, Age of Hippotoxotai, 359.

113 Menander the Guardsman, fr. 21, 192 and 194. For the probable location of the landing of the Avar

horsemen, see Costel Chiriac, “Expedi!ia avar" din 578–579 #i eviden!a numismatic",” Arheologia

Moldovei 16 (1993): 191 – 203, at 198 – 9.

114 Contra: Eugen S. Teodor, “Epoca roman" târzie #i cronologia atacurilor transdanubiene. Analiza

componentelor etnice #i geografice (partea a doua, de la 565 la 626),” Muzeul Na•ional 15 (2003): 3 –

36, at 6.

115 Procopius, Wars VII 22.3; English translation by Dewing, 342 and 344.

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ever since the days of Emperor Justinian, on a dense network of hilltop sites, how effective

they were in circumstances conspicuously marked by an acute lack of adequate troops, and

how they may modify current models of warfare in the early Middle Ages await further

investigation. But it seems clear that the exigencies of maintaining imperial control over the

Balkan Peninsula have forged a version of mobile warrior that would bequeath to the

Byzantine period a number of key warfare concepts. Through 6th

-century confrontations

with Huns, Bulgars, Sclavenes, Antes, and Avars, the shift from infantry to cavalry and the

use of unconventional warfare were twinned, each central to shaping a new concept of Ro-

man battlefield tactics.

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