current ssd programs

CONTENTS

PageSection A. Strategic Weapon Systems

A1. Fleet Ballistic Missile Test and Evaluation (J. P. Gibson) ......... 388A2. The Fleet Ballistic Missile Accuracy Evaluation Program

(D. R. Coleman, L. S. Simkins).................................................. 393A3. Test Range Systems Development and Testing

(R. G. Buckman, Jr., J. R. Vetter) .............................................. 398Section B. Tactical Systems

B1. Tomahawk Cruise Missile Test and Evaluation (D. J. Carter) .. 402B2. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Tactical Control System

(P. D. Worley) ............................................................................... 403B3. The Joint Countermine Advanced Concept Technology

Demonstration (A. G. Arnold) ................................................... 407Section C. Undersea Systems Programs (D. L. Geffert) ............................... 410Section D. Ballistic Missile Defense

D1. Technical Support for the Ballistic Missile DefenseOrganization (J. C. Brown, G. R. Bartnick) .............................. 413

Section E. Civilian ProgramsE1. Commercial Vehicle Operations Program (K. E. Richeson) ..... 415

Current SSD Programs

SECTION A. STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS

A1. Fleet Ballistic Missile Test and EvaluationJohn P. Gibson

NOTE: The items shown in blue below are linked to the respective pages. Click on the title.

INTRODUCTION The Navy’s Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) Strategic

Weapon System (SWS) is recognized today as theprincipal component of the U.S. nuclear strategicdeterrent. The submarine-launched ballistic missile(SLBM) on its nuclear-powered submarine platform

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provides a mobile, long-patrol duration, covert, andinvulnerable strategic deterrent force (Fig. A1-1). TheFBM system has evolved through several generationsof missiles and weapons systems deployed on five class-es of submarines. The original fleet of 41 SSBNs has

HNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 19, NUMBER 4 (1998)

been replaced with 18 newer Ohio Class TridentSSBNs. Table A1-1 provides the specifications of thesix generations of FBMs beginning in 1960. Each gen-eration has been succeeded quickly by a more ad-vanced version, resulting in a mixture of deployedsystems for the Navy to sustain and manage. Theincreasingly complex features of each new FBM/SWShave provided unique challenges in the design andimplementation of the test and evaluation program

Figure A1-1. A Trident II (D5) SLBM broaches and ignites duringa Demonstration and Shakedown Operation off the coast ofFlorida.

CURRENT SSD PROGRAMS

required to validate its capabilities and produce thehigh level of credibility essential to its national deter-rent mission.

APL has assisted the Navy Strategic Systems Pro-grams (SSP), since the inception of the FBM Program,in defining and conducting a continuing test and eval-uation effort for each generation of SWS. APL has alsoassisted the U.K. Royal Navy with evaluations of theirFBM fleet, starting with the U.K. Polaris program inthe mid-1960s, and continuing through the currentdeployment of the U.K. Trident SSBN fleet. The re-sults of the U.S. SWS evaluations are provided to theNavy technical and Fleet Commands, which thenpresent them to the U.S. Strategic Command(USSTRATCOM) for strategic targeting require-ments. This article describes the current, ongoing ef-forts of the Strategic Systems Department (SSD) insupport of this national priority program.

TEST PROGRAMS Because of the vital importance of the FBM Pro-

gram to the national nuclear deterrent force, and therequirement for annual performance estimates, an on-going test and evaluation approach has been estab-lished to monitor these systems throughout their de-ployed life. APL has assisted SSP in structuring acomprehensive test program and is the principal agentfor the continuing evaluation of the FBM weaponsystem for the Navy. The three primary test programsof the FBM SWS evaluation are (1) Demonstrationand Shakedown Operations (DASOs)—testing that isconducted before strategic deployment, (2) patrol—recurring tests conducted during each strategic deter-rent patrol, and (3) Commander-in-Chief (CINC)Evaluation Tests (CETs) or Follow-on CETs (FCETs)—

JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 19, NUMBER 4 (1998) 389

Table A1-1. Specifications of six generations of SLBMs.

SLBM

Feature Polaris A1 Polaris A2 Polaris A3 Poseidon C3 Trident C4 Trident D5

Year deployed 1960 1962 1964 1971 1979 1990Length (ft) 28.5 31.0 32.3 34.0 34.0 44.6Diameter (in.) 54 54 54 74 74 83Weight (lb) 28,000 32,500 35,700 64,000 73,000 130,000Range (nmi) 1200 1500 2500 2500 4000 4000Payload 1 RB 1 RB 3 RBs MIRVs MIRVs MIRVsGuidance Inertial Inertial Inertial Inertial1 Inertial1 Inertial1

stellar stellar stellarPropulsion

stages 2 2 2 2 1 bus 3 1 bus 3 1 bus

Note: RB = reentry body; MIRVs = multiple independent reentry vehicles.

J. P. GIBSON

end-to-end weapon system tests, including missileflights, conducted with randomly selected SSBNsperiodically throughout the life of the system.

The effective implementation of a comprehensivetest and evaluation program is highly dependent oninvolvement during the earliest design and develop-ment phases of the system. To ensure availability of therequired test data for the deployed system, identifica-tion and integration of necessary instrumentation,testing concepts, and special test procedures must beaccomplished during the weapon system design.

SSD has played an important role in defining eval-uation and data requirements for each generation ofthe FBM SWS. Novel system test concepts have beendevised, and sensors and instrumentation have beenconceived, built, and utilized in this continuing eval-uation effort. Recent APL-developed innovations in-clude the introduction of electronic log-keeping devic-es and a versatile, onboard ship-control trainingcapability (see the article by Biegel et al., this issue).Recurring test and evaluation tasks include the designof individual flight test mission trajectories consistentwith current FBM employment concepts, productionand maintenance of test procedures unique to each testprogram and SSBN class, and specialized training ses-sions for SSBN crews.

The contributions of SSD to the continuing FBMSWS test and evaluation effort are summarized in Fig.A1-2 and discussed in other articles in this issue. Toperform these tasks, SSD has maintained a permanentfield office at Cape Canaveral, Florida, since 1959,provides an on-site representative to the staff of theCommanders of the Atlantic and Pacific SubmarineForces for required liaison with the operational forces,and maintains a dedicated data processing and anal-ysis facility. The following sections describe the basiccomponents of the FBM SWS test and evaluationprogram.

Demonstration and Shakedown Operations DASO exercises are conducted by each U.S. and

U.K. SSBN prior to strategic deployment after eithernew construction or a shipyard overhaul period. Thisis the first time that the new or upgraded weaponsystem undergoes full, comprehensive system tests andculminates in a test of the entire system, includingmissile launch. Interspersed throughout the docksideand at-sea operations are a series of activities and sim-ulated countdowns (many with inserted casualties) toprovide realistic training. Objectives of this programare to (1) certify the readiness of the SSBN weapon

390 JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 19, NUMBER 4 (1998)

Trident I (C4)missile

Trident II (D5)missile

Missiles

Buoyant CableCommunications

System

GPS translator•Real-time range safety•Precision trajectory reconstruction

Launcher/ship Navigation

MCC

DRN

DRS

Sonar

Sensorinstallations

Requirements

USSTRATCOM

Trident SWS technicalobjective and guidelines

document

Trident SWS datarequirements

Integrated testplan

•DASO•Patrol•CET/FCET

Data requirements

•Instrumentation requirements•Analysis plans•Data processing plan•Novel test concepts

Flight test missionplanning

•Trajectories•DASO/CET

SLBM systemsevaluation

SLBM accuracyevaluation

Range systemsevaluation

CINCEVALreport

Unit reports•DASO•CET/FCET

Ship controltraining

Trident sonarevaluation

Crossflow instrumentation

SLBM dataprocessing

program

Electroniclogs

SWSprocedures

•Patrol evaluation•SSP contractors

Figure A1-2. SSD contributes to the continuing Navy Fleet Ballistic Missile Strategic Weapon System test and evaluation programs.(SSD-developed hardware, green; documents/reports, blue; programs, red. MCC = master control console, DRS = Data RecordingSystem, DRN = DASO Reference Navigator, CINCEVAL = Commander-in-Chief Evaluation.)

system and its crew for strategic deployment, (2) eval-uate the technical performance of the weapon systemwhile in an operational environment, identifying ma-terial and procedural deficiencies, and (3) provide dataused to derive current reliability and accuracy mea-sures of performance for the deploying weapon system.

APL participates in DASOs by providing a teamof up to 14 professional staff members, supported byadditional administrative and data processing person-nel, at the DASO field site in Cape Canaveral. APLalso provides field technical support to the SSPWeapons Evaluation Branch Team tasked to conductand evaluate each DASO. The DASO simulates allphases of a typical strategic patrol to validate proce-dures and evolutions that will be conducted duringdeployment. In addition, SSP-approved special testsare scheduled and performed, as appropriate, to eval-uate new capabilities and new equipment, or as diag-nostic investigations.

SSD develops, conducts, and evaluates some ofthese special tests, such as the submarine crossflowevaluation depicted in Fig. A1-3. The crossflow instru-mentation measures, records, and provides real-timedisplay of the speed of water across the submergedSSBN missile deck during FBM launch operations or


special at-sea tests. This instrumentation allows SSDto evaluate the dynamics of FBM underwater flightthroughout the SSBN speed/depth launch envelope.During DASOs, SSD field-test teams evaluate all as-pects of the performance for each weapon subsystem(navigation, fire-control, missile, launcher, and ship)and provide the Navy with a technical report docu-menting the results of that evaluation. This report isgenerated within 2 weeks of completing each DASOand is used to support the Navy’s certification fordeployment.

PatrolEach SSBN and weapon system may be deployed for

a decade or more. The continuous monitoring of eachSSBN identifies hull-unique problems as well as Fleettrends that may evolve or change with time and affordsa current, cumulative weapon system performance es-timate, which is critical to maintaining the credibilityof this strategic deterrent system. The objectives ofpatrol evaluations are to (1) provide FBM weaponsystem performance information in the actual patrolenvironment for use in deriving USSTRATCOM per-formance planning factors, (2) provide Navy Fleet

JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 19, NUMBER 4 (1998) 391

Aft-deck probe Deck probe Hull penetrator

Hull penetrator

Sail probe

Remote speeddisplay

(maneuvering) Equipment stackRemote speed

display(control)

Figure A1-3. APL-developed crossflow instrumentation (see Fig. A1-2) is used during a DASO to measure, record, and display real-timewater speed across the SSBN missile deck during an SLBM launch.

J. P. GIBSON

Operational Commanders and SSP with an indepen-dent system evaluation of each SSBN and its weaponsystem while on strategic deterrent patrol, and (3)provide individual SSBN crews with an analysis of theperformance of their weapon system during patrol.

While on patrol, the submarine regularly conductstests that activate the weapon system in a mannersimilar to an actual countdown to launch (but withappropriate safeguards in place). In addition, tests thatmonitor the health of each subsystem along with rou-tine maintenance are conducted regularly. Data fromall of these sources, both electronically recorded andmanually logged, are sent to APL after each patrol.Engineers and analysts review raw and processed datato identify equipment problems, faults, and other ab-normal conditions and to initialize simulations used inthe patrol evaluations.

SSD has developed a set of electronic data-loggingdevices for SSBN crews. These electronic logs are re-placing the traditional paper ones and will increaseefficiency in documenting and evaluating patrol activ-ities. Electronic data from the individual navigation,fire-control, launcher, and control and monitoring pan-el logs are transferred to the Electronic Weapons Log(EWL) base station at the end of each watchstander’sshift. The EWL base station maintains the historical logrecord onboard the SSBN and allows the crew to usethese files for analysis. EWL data are copied to compactdisc and transferred to APL at the end of each patrolor upkeep cycle. After the patrol data package is re-viewed, patrol and upkeep quicklook reports are pro-duced to provide an overview of in-port and underwayactivities and problems that may need attention beforethe next patrol. A more detailed patrol summary reportgives a synopsis of each subsystem’s performancethroughout the period and provides the data from whichhull-unique or class performance trends are examined.

Certain patrols are evaluated randomly in greaterdepth, consistent with the need to obtain informationto form credible annual estimates of weapon systemperformance. APL engineers meet with the crew toreview the evaluation and confirm interpretation andunderstanding of the logged activities. After this re-view, a final patrol report is published and distributedto SSP and its contractors, the Operational Command-ers, and the submarine crew. The data and evaluationsfrom these patrols contribute to the APL annual weap-on system performance estimates that are used byUSSTRATCOM to prepare strategic targeting.

CET/FCETThe CET/FCET is the continuing operational test

program conducted annually with randomly selectedSSBNs. The results of these tests, which include thelaunch of multiple test-configured FBMs, provide the

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basis for the annual performance estimates of the FBMSWS. The objectives of this program are to (1) deter-mine operationally representative weapon system per-formance characteristics for targeting purposes, (2)ensure that planning factors do not significantlychange with time, (3) determine the adequacy of tac-tical procedures, and (4) provide diagnostic informa-tion that may lead to system improvements.

Without advance notice, a selected SSBN is re-called from patrol for a CET. Two or more missiles,selected randomly from the onboard complement oftactical missiles, are converted to a test configurationalongside the wharf at the normal refit site. Followingthis evolution, the submarine proceeds to a launcharea and resumes operations as if on a strategic deter-rent patrol. The USSTRATCOM transmits an exer-cise launch message at random via the strategic com-munications links. When the message is received, thesubmarine, using tactical procedures, launches thedesignated CET missiles at the tactical firing rate. Dataobtained from instrumentation onboard the SSBN,from a launch area support ship, and from downrangesupport sites (on ship, aircraft, and land) provide theinformation necessary for SSD engineers to assess totalweapon system performance in this near-tactical end-to-end test.

An APL representative meets the submarine whenit returns from the exercise to review the operationwith the crew, inspect the condition of the weaponsystem, and provide a quicklook report to the Navy onthe overall operation. A team of APL engineers con-ducts a subsequent detailed evaluation of all the datafrom the exercise, and a report covering the entire testoperation, including missile performance during flightand reentry, is provided to the Navy.

The evaluations that APL performs for these threemajor test programs (DASO, patrol, and CET/FCET)provide the complete data set necessary to derive cur-rent weapon system planning estimates that are pre-pared annually for the CINC evaluation reports. Theseannual reports are prepared for the cognizant CINC ofeach SWS in accordance with evaluation guidancespecified by USSTRATCOM. For the FBM Program,APL has prepared them for the CINCs of the Atlanticand Pacific Fleets since 1966. The CINC evaluationreports are forwarded by those commands toUSSTRATCOM for use in the annual strategic target-ing laydown. They provide estimates of weapon systemprelaunch, in-flight, and reentry reliability, accuracy,reaction time, launch interval, and missile perfor-mance capabilities. A detailed discussion of the valid-ity of the test program and the sources of demonstratedperformance data used in developing the estimates isalso provided, as required by USSTRATCOM.

These APL-generated reports provide an annualassessment of the complete FBM SWS for the nation’s

NS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 19, NUMBER 4 (1998)

strategic planning processes. Future generations of theFBM SWS will most likely be developed in an entirelydifferent manner than earlier generations, i.e., theirdevelopment will be more evolutionary and involveless whole-system replacement. Furthermore, thecomplexity and cost of these advanced strategic weap-ons will undoubtedly limit the number of full-scaletests that can be conducted. The ability to test anddemonstrate system capability to potential adversaries

JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 19, NUMBER 4 (1


will nevertheless remain a crucial element in the cred-ibility of these strategic deterrent systems. Therefore,the Laboratory must continue to develop and imple-ment improvements to its test and evaluation ap-proaches. The challenge will be to execute this con-tinuing, nationally important task efficiently andcost-effectively while maintaining the credibility thathas been the hallmark of APL’s contributions to theFBM Program.

A2. The Fleet Ballistic Missile Accuracy Evaluation ProgramDean R. Coleman and Lee S. Simkins

THE AUTHOR

JOHN P. GIBSON is a member of APL’s Principal Professional Staff. Hereceived a B.S. degree in aerospace engineering from the Pennsylvania StateUniversity in 1964, and an M.S. degree in aerospace engineering from DrexelUniversity in 1967. Since joining APL in 1967, he has worked in the StrategicSystems Department. Mr. Gibson has served as Program Manager for theTrident I (C4) Strategic Weapon System Evaluation and as Program AreaManager for the Strategic and Tactical Systems Programs. His e-mail address [email protected].

BACKGROUNDIn the early 1970s the Navy was asked to respond

to a DoD request to produce a development plan fora future highly accurate FBM Strategic Weapon Sys-tem (SWS). The Trident I SWS, then in development,as well as its predecessors (Polaris and Poseidon), weredesigned to meet accuracy goals that were well withinthe existing state-of-the-art. The observed system ac-curacy for each generation of FBM met those goals butwas not thoroughly explainable. As a result, insightwas lacking into the technical limitations on the in-cremental improvement in accuracy that might ulti-mately be achieved in an advanced system (Trident II).In order to plan a set of design options with confident,quantifiable accuracy improvements, the Navy neededan improved technology base. In 1975, Strategic Sys-tems Programs (SSP) initiated an Improved AccuracyProgram to gain the understanding and tools necessaryto validate the accuracy of the design options as wellas the instrumentation needed to evaluate a new high-accuracy system.

SSD played a leading role in the Improved Accu-racy Program over its 8-year course, fulfilling a systemevaluation task for the Navy in helping to achieve the

9

accuracy technology base for Trident II. Advancedinstrumentation, data processing, and error estima-tion techniques were developed by SSD together withother members of the Navy/contractor team and wereused to gain insight into the sources of inaccuracyduring flight tests of the Trident I weapon system,which provided the springboard for Trident II devel-opment concepts.

An SSD system-level accuracy model validationeffort, in conjunction with subsystem-level investiga-tions by hardware contractors, led to high-fidelity an-alytical accuracy models that were used in Trident IItrade-off studies. SSD long emphasized to the Navy theimportance of accuracy instrumentation, in particular,to enable errors to be sufficiently visible so thattest results could be extrapolated to untested, tacticalconditions.

APL was asked to determine the instrumentationand evaluation concepts that would be needed forTrident II to ensure a high-confidence accuracy eval-uation capability. Through a joint effort between APL’sSpace Department and SSD, the Accuracy EvaluationSystem for Trident II was defined by early 1982. A

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mailto:[email protected]

D. R. COLEMAN AND L. S. SIMKINS

satellite-based instrumentation system known as SA-TRACK had been conceived by APL in the early1970s and proven in Trident I applications. It wouldbecome the backbone of SSD’s evaluation capabilityfor the advanced Fleet Ballistic Missile StrategicWeapon System.

TRIDENT II AND ADVANCEDSYSTEMS

The stringent Trident II accuracy performance ob-jectives motivated the development of demandingperformance evaluation criteria and objectives. TheNavy’s desire to understand the system’s performancewith high confidence was translated into several spe-cific accuracy evaluation objectives. These had signif-icant implications with respect to analysis methodol-ogy, instrumentation, and modeling and simulation.

The Accuracy Evaluation System study outlinedthe process for attacking the accuracy evaluation prob-lem. First, the evaluation objectives required that sys-tem performance be estimated. It would no longer besufficient to use model validation approaches whereintest data were used to validate or invalidate contractor-supplied performance models. Without a methodologythat provided direct estimates of parameter values,knowing that a model was to some degree invalidbegged the question: If the current model is invalid,then what is the better model? Thus, model parameterestimation was established as the fundamental ap-proach, and the method of “maximum likelihood” wasadopted as the preferred methodology for identifyingaccuracy parameters from test data.

The requirement to estimate performance did notend there, however. Quantified confidence was alsonecessary. There had to be a procedure by which theuncertainty with which we observe performance aswell as the finitude of test programs was translatedinto specified confidence (or uncertainty) in the ac-curacy parameters being estimated. Information the-ory provided the basis for developing algorithms thatcould quantify the confidence with which accuracywould be estimated. Next, performance was requiredto be known, and not just at the system level. Theaccuracy evaluation system had to be able to isolatefaults and estimate performance of the subsystems orthe various phases of the weapon system. This re-quired that instrumentation and measurements bemade not only at termination (e.g., reentry vehicleimpact or airburst) but also during tactical patrol andat every phase of a full system test (prelaunch, pow-ered flight, reentry body deployment, free-fall, andreentry). Figure A2-1 depicts the current Trident IIflight test instrumentation suite.

Since the number of allowable tests used for thedetermination of estimates was specified at fairly

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low-to-modest levels (about 10 to 20 tests), the instru-mentation had to be of sufficient quality to provide thehigh-confidence estimate; thus, a high-level goal wasestablished to maximize information from the expen-sive and limited flight test samples. In addition, theevaluation objectives required that we be able to ex-trapolate to untested conditions, that is, to predicttactical performance, with high quantified confidence,from test data.

The need to predict tactical accuracy from test datahad a profound impact on how the modeling was per-formed. Accuracy contributions had to be modeled ata fundamental level, independent of the test environ-ment. For instance, inertial guidance errors would becharacterized and modeled in detail at the hardwarecomponent level, i.e., complete mathematical descrip-tions (including cross-coupling and higher-orderterms) of the input/output characteristics of the indi-vidual gyro and accelerometer hardware, componentmisalignments, etc. The structure of these detailederror models was derived from physics, first principles,or contractor component and subsystem tests. Howev-er, the values of the parameters would be derived fromdemonstrated operational test data.

In some cases, it was impractical or unnecessary torequire modeling at such a level or to restrict datasources to flight tests. Additional sources of “demon-strated” data to supplement the flight testing weredevised. For example, a novel approach for gatheringrepresentative navigation data, called the NavigationAccuracy Test, was developed by SSD to be conductedperiodically during strategic deterrent patrols. Proce-dures and instrumentation were developed so thatnavigation contributions to system inaccuracy couldbe ascertained from simulated system countdownsduring tactical alert periods; a missile did not need tobe launched in order to understand a ship’s navigationperformance. This approach would provide significantinsight and more data samples than would have beenavailable if the evaluation were limited solely to themissile flight test program.

Data from each accuracy test were analyzed usingsome variant of a Kalman filter. Within the filters arethe detailed models of both the system and instru-mentation for each subsystem. Figure A2-2 depictsnotationally how this analysis is accomplished. Givena particular test or scenario (say, a flight test) mea-surement data are collected on the various sub-systems. Using rigorous methods, these data are com-bined with prior information generally developed andmaintained by contractors responsible for variousparts of the system under test. This prior informationis necessary for single test processing, given theincomplete observability of error sources.

The outputs of the filter provide a basis for under-standing particular realizations of system and subsystem



Figure A2-1. Current Trident II (D5) accuracy instrumentation suite. Measurements are made at every phase of a full-system test.(GPS = Global Positioning System, ALMET = Air-Launchable Meteorological System.)

Figure A2-2. Strategic Weapon System accuracy evaluation concept. u = model parameter, u = estimate of parameters derived fromtests, Pu = estimation error covariance matrix, zk

j = measurement k from test j.

Deployment Free-fall

Reentry body Instrumented (US) Noninstrumented (US and UK)

Telemetry andSATRACK data

recorder

Powered flight

Telemetry andSATRACK data

recorder

Support ship

Prelaunch

SSBN •GPS navigation •Strapdown Inertial System •Acoustic System

Missile •GPS translator •Strapdown Inertial System

Velocity and PositionReference System

Reentry

Impact

ALMETradiosondeobservation

Portable Impact Location System

System andmeasurement

process

u

Scenario 1

u

Scenario N

N

•••

•••

u

<

u

<

Performancemeasure

estimate andconfidence

interval

Scenario(s)(environment,

trajectory)

TestingPer-test

processingCumulative

identificationModel confidence evaluation

and tactical predictions

P u~

zk, k = 0, 1, . . . , n(1)1

zk, k = 0, 1, . . . , n(1)System andmeasurement

process

Kalmanfilter

Kalmanfilter

Performancemeasurefunction

Modelindentifier

System modelsimulation

covariance/Monte Carlo

behavior. Analysis results provide insight into thesources and causes of inaccuracy (Fig. A2-3). Theresults of multiple tests (the outputs of the Kalmanfilters) serve as input to the cumulative parameter

JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 19, NUMBER 4

estimation process; however, all prior informationrelative to the error models is removed so thatthe estimated accuracy is derived solely from thetest data.

(1998) 395

D. R. COLEMAN AND L. S. SIMKINS

This process solves the highly nonlinear equationsfor the means, variances, and Markov parameters thatcharacterize the overall system accuracy performance.In addition, uncertainties in the parameter estimatesare calculated so that we have a quantitative measureof our confidence in the solution. The ultimate desiredproduct is a performance prediction for the systemunder tactical, not test, conditions. Here we rely onmodels of the tactical gravity and weather environ-ment developed from data and instrumentation. Thesemodels, along with deterministic simulations of thesystem, are then used to “propagate” the fundamentalmodel parameter estimates and uncertainties to thedomain of interest—system accuracy at the target.

TECHNOLOGY ADVANCEMENTSThe development, maintenance, and evolution of

the Trident II Accuracy Evaluation System providedconsiderable technical challenges in terms of method-ology, numerical methods, mathematical modeling, al-gorithms, software, and instrumentation. Noteworthydevelopments include constrained numerical optimi-zation algorithms; efficient gradient approximationtechniques; large-scale, efficient, and numerically sta-ble filtering algorithms; high-fidelity models and sim-ulations of inertial guidance, navigation systems, andgravity; the use of the Global Positioning System(GPS) for precision tracking; development of GPStranslator concepts and hardware; advancements inGPS signal tracking and receiver technology; model-ing and development of precision acoustic referencesystems; and target pattern optimization. Many of

Figure A2-3. Reconstruction of sources of missile impact missdistance error. 1 = initial conditions, 2 = guidance, 3 = stellarresidual, 4 = deployment, 5 = reentry body measured impact, 6 =total uncertainty.

Dow

nran

ge (

ft)

Crossrange (ft)

1

23

4

5

6

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these developments have been extended to otherweapon systems and programs, including the AirForce’s Peacekeeper ICBM, the Army/Ballistic MissileDefense Organization (BMDO) Exo-atmospheric Re-entry Interceptor System, and the ongoing test andevaluation of the BMDO exo-atmospheric kill vehicle.

PRINCIPAL ACHIEVEMENTSThe Trident II Accuracy Evaluation Program has

contributed to the success of the SWS in severalimportant ways.

Instrumentation Requirements andTest Planning

While in the early development phase, models andsimulations of accuracy evaluation processes supportedrigorous quantitative trade-off studies designed to sup-port management decisions about instrumentation andtest program requirements.

Accuracy UnderstandingAnalysis has provided unprecedented understand-

ing of and confidence in system performance. Theanalytical accuracy model has been refined to wherecurrent performance is faithfully predicted and isknown to be a fraction of the original objective. Biaseshave been isolated and estimated. System use is en-hanced by virtue of our understanding system perfor-mance as a function of the tactical operational andenvironmental parameters. Anomalous test perfor-mance has been more easily detected, and causativefactors have been isolated.

System ImprovementsImproved models and understanding of accuracy

provide improved system performance by way of em-bedded system software. The calculation of systemgains used when processing guidance stellar sightingsor reentry body fuze information relies on an accuratecharacterization of system performance. The calibra-tion of reentry body release parameters has been im-proved by knowledge gained from onboard inertialinstrumentation. Accuracy enhancement potentialthrough modified operational scenarios has been dem-onstrated to be viable.

Accommodation of Testing CutbacksProper instrumentation and a rigorous analytical

approach required less testing to achieve the desiredinitial confidence. In addition, follow-on testing of thedeployed system was reduced without significant riskas a result of near-optimal use of the limited flight testassets.


FUTURE DIRECTIONSIn the last several years, there has been considerable

interest in a GPS/Inertial Navigation System as bothinstrumentation and as a candidate tactical missile orreentry body guidance system. Several special tests ofmissiles and reentry bodies have been conducted withvarious combinations of inertial systems (space-stableand strapdown), GPS receivers, and GPS translators, aswell as various RF/antenna designs. Technologies havebeen developed to enhance and extend signal-trackingcapabilities further, including during periods aroundonset of plasma blackout and recovery following black-out. Interest in achieving even greater accuracy hasbeen facilitated by the detailed understanding of Tri-dent II performance. Special tests have demonstratedthat accuracy can be achieved to support potential newand extremely demanding tactical strike scenarios. So-phisticated tools for exploring optimal target patterninghave been developed to support these studies.

Future FBM systems may look very different frompresent systems. Current modeling and simulation



efforts are drawing upon Trident II experience to pre-dict and trade off system design options. Techniquesfor properly merging ground test (e.g., centrifuge test)data with flight data are being developed in responseto the changing test and evaluation environment,where there is much emphasis on affordability and costreduction. Technology and hardware that support pre-cision intercept system evaluation have been demon-strated, extracting from Trident II technology andextending it through independent research and devel-opment projects.

The success of the Trident II system and the Ac-curacy Evaluation Program is due, in large measure, toSSP leadership. SSP’s desire to mitigate risks in thedevelopment and maintenance of a high-accuracy stra-tegic deterrent created a vision for an evaluation ap-proach developed as an integrated part of the system.Instrumentation, analytic methods, and modeling andsimulation were exploited to optimize the procurementand use of limited and expensive flight test assets. Theprogram has been, and continues to be, successful inmeeting its objectives.

LEE S. SIMKINS is a member of APL’s Principal Professional Staff. He receiveda B.S. in aerospace engineering from the University of Michigan in 1972 and anM.S. in mechanical engineering from the University of Maryland in 1977. Sincejoining the Laboratory in 1972, he has worked in the Strategic SystemsDepartment. Mr. Simkins is the Supervisor of the System Development, Test,and Evaluation Branch. For most of his career at APL, he has contributed to thedevelopment, implementation, and use of system identification and estimationmethodologies that allow the evaluation of submarine navigation, missileguidance, and other military systems. Those efforts have made extensive use ofthe Global Positioning System as well as other instrumentation consisting oftelemetry, inertial systems, and external reference information. His e-mailaddress is [email protected].

THE AUTHORS

DEAN R. COLEMAN is manager of the SLBM Accuracy Evaluation Programwithin APL’s Strategic Systems Department. He received his B.S. in mathemat-ics from the University of Maryland in 1970 and M.S. degrees from The JohnsHopkins University in 1972 and 1985 in numerical science and technicalmanagement, respectively. Mr. Coleman has over 30 years’ experience in testand evaluation of the Navy’s Fleet Ballistic Missile weapon systems. His workhas included complex system modeling and simulation as well as evaluationmethodology development. Since 1980, he has focused on system accuracyevaluation, where he coordinated APL’s SLBM Improved Accuracy ProgramAnalysis Plan and led the Laboratory’s efforts to apply this methodology initiallyto evaluate Trident I and subsequently to evaluate the high-accuracy Trident IIweapon system. His e-mail address is [email protected].

998) 397



A3. Test Range Systems Development and TestingR. Gilbert Buckman, Jr., and Jerome R. Vetter

INTRODUCTIONThe SSD Range Systems Program provides an in-

dependent evaluation of all Navy Strategic SystemsPrograms (SSP)–sponsored test instrumentation sys-tems required to support the Fleet Ballistic Missile(FBM) Flight Test Program. This work also includesevaluating all SSP contractor-developed range instru-mentation and software systems necessary to supportthe program. APL acts as SSP’s independent systemstest agent for the development, validation, and con-tinuing support of instrumentation systems in thefollowing areas: flight test range safety; real-time track-ing systems; range command, control, and communi-cations systems; telemetry; reentry body impact loca-tion and scoring systems; meteorological support; and

submarine position and voverview of range instrumused to support Trident FBin Fig. A3-1.

Recent system developed the Demonstration a(DASO) Reference NaviCable Communications receive/transmit amplifier,tem (GPS) Air-LaunchablSystem, and the Portable tem (PURS). These instruthe launch, midrange, or FBM flight test. The SSD

398 JO

elocity determination. Anentation systems currently

M flight testing is presented

ment activities have includ-nd Shakedown Operationgator, the SSBN BuoyantSystem (BCS), the BCS the Global Positioning Sys-e Meteorological (ALMET)Underwater Reference Sys-mentation systems support

terminal impact areas of an Range Systems launch area

Launcharea

JDMTA/DRSS•Telemetry•TGRS•Command destruct

GPS

SATRACKTGRS

Midrange

P3 aircraft•Telemetry•Diagnostic optics•Position Impact Location System data collection•Meteorological data

Position ImpactLocation System

sonobuoys

Terminalarea

Puerto Rico•PATS telemetry•Wideband radar

Launch area support ship•FTSS III•Mobile optics van

SSBN position/velocityvia mobile array

Mobile instrumented ship•PATS•Optics•X-band CW radar•Wideband radar

Figure A3-1. Trident flight test instrumentation. The current suite of range instrumentation used to support the Trident FBM Flight TestProgram is segmented into three phases of flight: launch, midrange, and terminal. The Navy P3 Orion aircraft, now used in the terminalarea, will be replaced by a Navy ship-of-opportunity with an improved, portable instrumentation suite to collect telemetry, optics, radar,weather, and reentry body impact scoring data. (JDMTA/DRSS = Jonathan Dickinson Missile Tracking Annex/Down-Range SupportSite; PATS = Phased Array Telemetry System; TGRS = translated GPS Range System; CW = continuous wave; FTSS = Flight TestSupport System; GPS = Global Positioning System.)


and terminal area instrumentation projects are shownin Figs. A3-2 and A3-3, respectively, and are discussedin the following subsections.

The development, evaluation, and validation ofprototypes for each of these systems were initiated andmatured by SSD, and then transferred to the Navy foroperational use. Recent evaluation activities haveincluded verification and validation of the real-timetracking and telemetry systems for the Navy’s third-generation Flight Test Support System (FTSS III) andthe validation of a GPS–sonobuoy Portable ImpactLocation System for reentry body impact accuracydetermination.

LAUNCH AREA INSTRUMENTATION

Submarine Communications SystemThe BCS provides a modified, towed buoyant cable

antenna that allows two-way voice and digital datacommunications between a submerged submarineand either a surface support ship or an aircraft. Itwas designed to overcome limitations of the existing



radio-frequency and underwater acoustic communica-tions systems. The acoustic systems often limited thestandoff range between the launch area support ship(LASS) and the submerged submarine. Connectivityat launch depth is required to coordinate DASOand Follow-on Commander-in-Chief Evaluation Test(FCET) flight test launch operations.

The BCS enables two-way connectivity throughoutthe depth/speed regime allowed with a standard sub-marine receive-only floating wire antenna. SpecialAPL-designed “birdcage” antennas located on theLASS afford an adequate radio link with the subma-rine buoyant cable antenna receive/transmit elementfloating on the sea. Special tests of BCS connectivityto a Navy P3i Orion aircraft have also been conducted(Fig. A3-2a). Bidirectional voice and digital data havebeen transmitted between a submerged SSBN andLASS at distances of up to 30 km. SSD designed andbuilt the BCS and the interfacing data acquisitionunits that were installed on the Trident SSBN andLASS.

The first operational use of the BCS during a missilelaunch was in support of the USS Michigan (SSBN

(a) (b)

(c) (d)

Figure A3-2. Launch area portable range instrumentation. (a) The submarine Buoyant Cable Communications System (BCS) is usedfor two-way communications with the launch area support ship (LASS), and (b) the Portable Underwater Reference System providesreal-time submarine position determination. The Flight Test Support Systems (c) on the LASS (USNS Waters) and (d) at the JonathanDickinson Missile Tracking Annex Down-Range Support Site ground station provide the eastern Range Command and Control Centerat Cape Canaveral, Florida, with real-time data for range safety purposes.

98) 399

R. G. BUCKMAN, JR., AND J. R. VETTER

727) DASO in October 1995. Subsequently, the BCShas been installed and used onboard the USS Maine(SSBN 741), USS Wyoming (SSBN 742), and theUnited Kingdom SSBN HMS Vigilant to support FBMDASO flight test operations. During this period, SSDstaff operated the BCS in a test mode. However, thesystem is currently being transferred to the Navy forfuture operational use during FCETs.

Portable Underwater Reference SystemSSD is evaluating the use of an expendable GPS–

sonobuoy system, deployable from a ship or aircraft inthe launch area, as a potential replacement to the

Figure A3-3. Terminal area range instrumentation. (a) The Navycurrently uses a terminal area aircraft to deploy the PortableImpact Location System sonobuoys for reentry body impactscoring, launch the Global Positioning System (GPS) air-launchablemeteorological (ALMET) probe for meteorological data, and col-lect instrumented reentry body telemetry when applicable. (b) Amore versatile, improved Navy Mobile Instrumentation System,located on a Navy TAGS-60 class ship, will replace the aircraftfunctions while adding a terminal area tracking capability.

Telemetryvan

Photovan

Radarset

Weatherdeployment

system

(b)

(a)

GPSsatellites

GPSsonde

GPSprobe

400 JOH

existing system, the fixed, bottom-mounted Position-Velocity Deep Ocean Transponder (PVDOT). Thelaunch-area PVDOT arrays provide a velocity-positionreference system for the submerged SSBN duringFCET, but are costly to implant, survey, and maintain.PURS is a cost-effective, versatile alternative to thePVDOT arrays (Fig. A3-2b). Originally developed un-der an SSD independent research and developmentproject, PURS was successfully transferred to directNavy sponsorship in 1997. A set of APL-built proto-type PURS sonobuoys was tested as part of a deep-ocean demonstration exercise in December 1997.PURS is planned for use as a ship-deployable alterna-tive to the P3 aircraft-deployable Velocity/PositionReference System Replacement System in 1999.

Flight Test Support System IIIThe FTSS III is a portable system consisting of two

vans that can be temporarily installed on Navy ships-of-opportunity and used to support at-sea missile flighttests. A typical FBM flight test uses both a LASS anda downrange support site (DRSS) to provide for con-tinuous tracking coverage (Figs. A3-2c and d, respec-tively). The FTSS III system supports the collection ofreal-time FBM telemetry, provides a real-time commu-nications link and data relay from the launch area tothe USAF Eastern Range Operations Control Centervia the International Maritime Satellite, and will sup-port a real-time GPS tracking capability to satisfy in-flight range safety requirements. The FTSS III trackingsystem element includes a GPS translator-processorlocated on both the LASS and at an Eastern Rangeground station (Jonathan Dickinson Missile TrackingAnnex), which simultaneously receive data from allGPS satellites in view as well as in-flight signals fromthe missile-borne GPS translator. These data providereal-time precision missile tracking for range safetycalculations.

The in-flight FBM position/velocity (obtained fromGPS data and FBM telemetry) is compared to a nom-inal mission trajectory profile developed during pre-flight mission planning to detect abnormal in-flighttrajectory deviations that could require safety destructaction. APL develops the overall FBM flight test pro-gram, which contains a variety of mission options ina DASO/CET targeting library, and provides the com-munity with the mission parameters used to derive thenominal preflight trajectory for range safety. The SSDRange Systems Program conducts a validation of theflight test mission parameter data tapes used by therange to ensure that the proper reference trajectory isimplemented.

The Range Systems Program has been involved inthe verification and validation of all facets of the FTSSIII. SSD developed the FTSS III Quicklook System to


provide timely unit reports on each FBM launch toassess FTSS III subsystem problem areas and the qual-ity of data from the instrumentation systems used tosupport the launch. The Quicklook System processesboth telemetry and tracking systems data and providesa rapid evaluation of missile trajectory events, abnor-mal differences between telemetry and state-vectordata obtained from GPS, and real-time angle-trackingperformance. The LASS and DRSS FTSS III includean updated SATRACK III recording capability whichhas been validated by APL.

TERMINAL AREAINSTRUMENTATION

GPS-ALMET ProbeSSD has completed an effort to replace the current

ALMET probe that utilized the Omega navigation sys-tem, which was phased out in September 1997, withan improved GPS-based probe, GPS-ALMET. Theprobe is dropped from a Navy P3 Orion aircraft, para-chutes to the ocean surface where a helium-filled bal-loon carrying a radiosonde is released, and ascends



while transmitting meteorological and GPS data to theaircraft. Figure A3-3 includes a conceptual overview ofits use in the flight test impact area. The GPS-ALMETprovides improved position, wind-vector, and meteoro-logical measurements as a function of altitude for re-entry analyses. The GPS-ALMET was recently de-ployed to support DASO flight tests with HMS Vigilant.

Navy Mobile Instrumentation SystemAPL was asked to act as the system integration

agent for the new SSP Navy Mobile InstrumentationSystem (NMIS). The NMIS will provide a modern,mobile, and portable test range instrumentation sys-tem to support radar tracking, telemetry acquisition,optics, weather, and communications requirements forTrident missile launches in any ocean. It will use therecently commissioned TAGS-60 class of NavalOceanographic Service ships as the platform, allowingflexibility for use in any operating area. The NMISconcept was partially tested in December 1997 tosupport the Vigilant DASO in the terminal impact areaby using a mobile X-band radar tracker and GPS-ALMET ship-based deployment system.

THE AUTHORS

R. GILBERT BUCKMAN, JR., is the Range Systems Program Manager in SSD.He received a B.S. degree in mechanical engineering from Virginia PolytechnicInstitute and State University in 1962 and an M.S. in technical managementfrom The Johns Hopkins University in 1984. Mr. Buckman joined APL in May1965, and from 1966 to 1968, he was Assistant Supervisor of the APL EuropeanField Office in Heidelberg, Germany, where he developed an automateddata collection and transmission system. He has been a group and programsupervisor and has been responsible for the development of many innovative,cost-effective projects for the Navy SSP. Mr. Buckman’s e-mail address [email protected].

JEROME R. VETTER holds a B.S. degree in aeronautical engineering from St.Louis University (1960), an M.S. degree in applied physics from The JohnsHopkins University (1974), and has completed graduate studies in the Ph.D.program in astronomy at Georgetown University. He joined APL in 1974, is amember of APL’s Principal Professional Staff, and is currently the AssistantProgram Manager for Range Systems, as well as Project Manager of the HighFrequency Ground Wave-Buoyant Cable Antenna project in SSD. His researchinterests included space geodesy and satellite navigation, applications of Kalmanfiltering, missile inertial navigation and guidance analysis, and radio and opticalastronomy. His e-mail address is [email protected].

998) 401



SECTION B. TACTICAL SYSTEMS

B1. Tomahawk Cruise Missile Test and EvaluationDavid J. Carter

The considerable SSD test and evaluation expertiseaccumulated in support of strategic nuclear weaponssystems has been successfully applied to several tacticalsystems. An excellent example of this effort is ourparticipation in the Tomahawk Cruise Missile Oper-ational Test Launch (OTL) Program. That programresulted from two complementary events in 1988:(1) the SSD Pershing II and Ground-Launch CruiseMissile theater nuclear forces evaluation programswere being terminated and subsequently withdrawnfrom Europe in response to the Intermediate-RangeNuclear Forces Treaty with the Soviet Union, and(2) the Tomahawk Cruise Missile Program Office wasundergoing an extensive reexamination of its OTLFlight Test Program.

The Tomahawk OTL Program had been establishedby direction of the Chief of Naval Operations basedon the concepts of the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff Com-mander-in-Chief evaluation requirement for the stra-tegic ballistic missile programs. However, the OTLProgram differed from the ballistic missile programs: itcombined the primary objective of realistically testingthe deployed force with the need to conduct periodicflight testing for system development and Fleet train-ing objectives. The intent of the 1988 review of theOTL was to improve the overall effectiveness of thetest program to meet these combined objectives.

In its role as the Technical Direction Agent(TDA) for Tomahawk, the APL Program Office in theFleet Systems Department (now the Power ProjectionSystems Department) was asked to increase its role inthe OTL Program in both the planning and analysisareas. The Program Office requested the support ofSSD, and an interdepartmental effort—which contin-ues today— was established whereby SSD would con-duct the bulk of the Tomahawk test and evaluationeffort within the TDA function.

The application of SSD’s expertise to the Toma-hawk Program encountered some challenges stemmingmainly from the differences between the strategic andtactical force perspectives and organizational struc-tures. However, the transition was generally smooth,due chiefly to the similarities between the evaluationrequirements for the Tomahawk OTL Tactical Pro-gram and the strategic programs evaluated within SSD(Polaris, Poseidon, Trident, and Pershing).

Since 1989, the Tomahaproject has involved many efforts include flight test ppreparations, and the systemperformance assessment, whito the Program Executive Oand operational mission planuation tasks have also been uidation of initial concepts forto support coordinated striksupport of various system dcluding the recent Block IV

One direct spin-off from thevaluation experience occurvelopment of an at-sea telaunch exercise of the nuclemonitor and improve systemcalled TOMOPEX (Tomahawwas developed for the CommU.S. Atlantic Fleet, and was ing once in conjunction wbefore transitioning to the F

The SSD effort in suppocontinues to evolve as thechanges. For example, the sTomahawk in Desert Storminto Bosnia and Iraq have dcial contribution of a conprogram to the understandisystem capabilities. Current evaluation efforts focus on reto provide more tactically reporate a greater variety of trealistic test scenarios. Wecontinue to be a major comfor Tomahawk.

In its role as the Techni

for Tomahawk, the A

. . . requested the supp

interdepartmental effor

today—was established

402 JOH

wk test and evaluationtasks. Several recurringlanning, individual test-level terminal accuracych is presented annuallyfficer for Cruise Missilesners. Nonrecurring eval-ndertaken, e.g., the val- controlled time of flightes (“Strike Derby”) andevelopment options (in- upgrade effort).e SSD strategic programs

red in 1989 with the de-st concept: a simulatedar Tomahawk variant to performance. This test,k Operational Exercise),ander, Submarine Force,

used several times includ-ith an OTL flight test,leet for their own use.rt of the OTL Program focus of the programuccessful tactical use of and subsequent strikesemonstrated the benefi-tinuing operational testng and improvement ofSSD Tomahawk test andfining the OTL Programalistic results that incor-est conditions and more expect this effort willponent of SSD’s support

cal Direction Agent

PL Program Office

ort of SSD, and an

t—which continues

. . .



B2. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Tactical Control SystemPaul D. Worley

THE AUTHOR

DAVID J. CARTER is a member of APL’s Principal Professional Staff. Heobtained a B.A. in engineering science in 1966 and an M.S. in engineering in1968, both from Purdue University. Since joining APL in 1970, he hasparticipated in several operational test and evaluation efforts including theArmy Pershing, the Air Force Ground-Launched Cruise Missile, and currentlythe Navy Tomahawk Sea-Launched Cruise Missile programs. Mr. Carter servedtwo tours at the APL European Field Office (EFO), first as the AssistantEFO Supervisor (1971–1972) in Heidelberg, West Germany, and later(1984–1986) as Supervisor of the APL Branch Office at Ramstein AirBase, Kaiserslautern, West Germany. He is currently the Manager of the SSDTactical Systems Evaluation Project and the SSD/PPSD interdepartmental(Tomahawk) System Test and Evaluation Project. His e-mail address [email protected].

INTRODUCTIONOver the past decade, widespread military interest

in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has spurred thedevelopment of many enhancements, including im-proved capabilities for surveillance and reconnaissanceapplications. To optimally use these new capabilities,UAVs must be placed in the direct control of forwardarea forces and must interface with command, control,communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I)networks to disseminate critical information in a time-ly manner. The following goals have been established:

• Minimize the time required to provide useful andrelevant battlefield information.

• Optimize the control of reconnaissance capabilitiesby putting the UAV directly inthe hands of the intelligenceuser.

• Simplify operator training by pro-viding a single common controland display system.

To meet these operational goals,the Program Executive Office forthe Cruise Missile Project (PEO(CU))/Program Manager for Tacti-cal Systems is developing a com-mon UAV Tactical Control System(TCS) that will provide scalableC3 capabilities for the Predator,Outrider, Pioneer, and future UAVsystems while allowing receive anddata dissemination capabilities forhigh-altitude UAVs. Figure B2-1 isa basic block diagram of the TCS

Navigationdata

Hi-8 VCR

Figure B2-1. Block d(TCS). C4I = commaIDT = Integrated Data

JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST,

system.

Interoperability between a UAV and a Navy sub-marine was first demonstrated in the SSN/UAV Pred-ator Demonstration that occurred near San ClementeIsland, California, in June 1996 (see the article byVigliotti in this issue). The SSN/UAV test demon-strated the use of a joint UAV asset being “handed off ”in flight to a forward-deployed SSN (USS Chicago)operating submerged at periscope depth, which subse-quently used the Predator to support a Special Oper-ations Force (SOF) mission. That demonstration wasthe culmination of an intense 10-month-long systemdevelopment effort led by the Strategic Systems De-partment with sponsorship by the Office of NavalIntelligence, Chief of Naval Operations (N87), and

C4I system(s)

Antenna

TCS

PDCM

ODCM

Transmitter/receiver

Pointing angles,command,and status

Video andserial data

stream

Operatorcommands

IDT

iagram of the unmanned aerial vehicle Tactical Control Systemnd, control, communications, computer, and intelligence;

Terminal; ODCM = Outrider Data Control Module; PDCM = PredatorData Control Module.

VOLUME 19, NUMBER 4 (1998) 403


P. D. WORLEY

PEO(CU). The objectives of the development effortwere to build a specialized prototype UAV controlsystem to be installed on submarines and to demon-strate interoperability between the Predator UAV andthe submarine’s C4I network.

The engineering testing performed with the SSN/UAV control system indicated robust range perfor-mance limited only by the radio horizon (170 nmi ata 21,000-ft altitude) and culminated with the use ofthe Predator UAV to support insertion of the SOFfrom the SSN onto San Clemente Island. This highlysuccessful system demonstration led to a request forAPL to participate in the engineering development ofthe common UAV TCS.

TCS DEVELOPMENTThe UAV TCS Program at APL comprises an in-

terdepartmental team with members from the Strate-gic Systems, Power Projection Systems, and Air De-fense Systems Departments. This program is sponsoredby PEO(CU). The engineering development work isprimarily concentrated on the data link between theUAV and TCS. Along with the engineering develop-ment of this link, APL provides support for field dem-onstrations of the TCS.

The data link furnishes the critical connectivityfunction between the UAV and the ground stationduring the mission. It includes transmission of com-mand and control signals from the ground station tothe aircraft (uplink) and transmission of payload andaircraft status data from the aircraft to the ground

404 JOH

station (downlink). The link may also provide receive(downlink only) access to UAV imagery and status forbattlefield users such as SOF personnel.

During FY97, the TCS team developed the require-ments and specification for a marine-environmentversion of the C-band line-of-sight antenna developedfor the SSN/UAV demonstration. The new antennaderived from this specification was used successfullyduring testing with an Outrider UAV in February 1998.It included the same stabilized pedestal technologydesigned for the SSN antenna. The primary differencesbetween the SSN antenna and the new marine-envi-ronment antenna are the requirements to provide abroader frequency band to cover two independentuplink frequency bands, a wider downlink band, andan omnidirectional capability.

The wider bandwidth provides support for multipletypes of UAVs. Figure B2-2 illustrates the frequenciesrequired by the data link to support various UAVs usedby the military. The omnidirectional capability wasneeded to support launch and recovery requirementssince rapid changes in azimuth and elevation duringshipboard UAV launch and recovery are expected tobe too fast for a directional antenna to follow. Becauseof these requirements, the new antenna needed aswitching capability to select the appropriate uplink RFpower amplifier, diplexer circuitry, and antenna type(e.g., directional or omnidirectional). Figure B2-3 is ablock diagram of the antenna circuitry.

During FY98, the TCS team concentrated on ex-tending this new antenna design to support mobileland-based TCS applications. The antenna requires a

X X

X X

Uplink

Downlink

Predator

Outrider

Pioneer

Hunter A

Hunter B

TCS

4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0Frequency (GHz)

Uses a subsetof the Hunterfrequencies

Uplink Downlink

TCS frequencies (GHz)

4.40–4.62 4.75–5.00

5.25–5.47 5.62–5.85

Location

Continental U.S.

Outside continental U.S.

Figure B2-2. Data link frequencies for unmanned aerial vehicles.


minimal setup time to support the Army Tactical Op-erational Command Centers and high-mobility mul-tipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) operations. Inaddition, the land-based version supports requirementsof the Marine Corps for a mobile TCS. The RF andelectronics capabilities of the land-based antennaduplicated the marine-environment antenna; howev-er, the additional shock and vibration involved inmoving and setup was analyzed to determine therequirements for the pedestal and packaging. Thisanalysis concluded that the antenna/pedestal systemdeveloped for marine application is suitable for land-based use.

In conjunction with the antenna development,there is a requirement to control the antenna’s point-ing direction and functional setup. Antenna pointingand function control software was developed at APLduring development of the SSN/UAV demonstrationsystem. This software, which ran on a Sun SPARC 20workstation, was integrated into the TCS core soft-ware. APL will continue to support this software in-tegration through flight qualification testing, systemintegration testing, and flight certification testing foreach applicable UAV.

TCS FIELD DEMONSTRATIONSIn early 1997, TCS participated in the Army Task

Force XXI major field demonstration. The prototypeTCS equipment, developed for the SSN/UAV interop-erability test, was installed onto an Army HMMWVshelter (Fig. B2-4), and the stationary system was usedto control Predator UAV pilot and payload functions.The equipment was interfaced to a Sun workstation

markable accoed the significby forward aredisseminationfrared, to the

By late 19APL antenn

Figure B2-3. Functional block diagram of the UAV Tactical Control System antenna(FPA = final power amplifier, LNA = low noise amplifier).

Figure B2-4. APlized pedestal amultipurpose wh

Diplexer 1

Dipole

Highgain

LNA

FPA

DC-DCpower OnOn

FPA Low band High band

DC-DCpower OnOn

Diplexer 2Diplexer 2

S1S2

12 V DC 12 V DC

To receiver

HF enableLF enable50 V DC

JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 19, NUMBER 4 (


that ran the TCS core software,which provided video capture capa-bility and interface to several ArmyC4I systems.

In addition to supporting installa-tion and integration of the antennaand antenna control computer duringthis exercise, the Laboratory also pro-vided flight certification testing at theEl Mirage, California, flight test facil-ity and subsequent demonstrationsupport for Task Force XXI at FortIrwin, California. The demonstrationresulted in five successful Gnat 750(Predator variant) UAV surveillanceflights over Fort Irwin and was instru-mental in the Task Force XXI Bri-gade’s fighting the opposition RedForce to a declared standoff. Theability to successfully hold the RedBrigade (the Ft. Irwin SpecializedTraining Force) was considered a re-

mplishment. This exercise demonstrat-ant value of direct control of the UAVa forces and the value of near–real-time of aerial imagery, both optical and in- forward area intelligence network.97, the prototype TCS, including thea and antenna control system, was

L-developed UAV Tactical Control System stabi-nd antenna mounted on an Army high-mobilityeeled vehicle.

1998) 405

installed on USS Tarawa (LHA-1) (Fig. B2-5) to sup-port operations with the Tarawa Amphibious AssaultBattle Group and the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unitduring Fleet exercise (FLEETEX) 98-1M. These dem-onstration activities included installation of the anten-na and control system onto a mobile test bed, flightcertification at the El Mirage flight test facility, pier-side testing, and at-sea data link testing using amanned light aircraft with a Predator data link in-stalled. In addition to the TCS antenna control soft-ware, the APL multiple image coordinate extractiontargeting concept software was installed on the anten-na control computer for at-sea testing (see the articleby Criss et al., this issue). FLEETEX 98-1M includedflight operations near San Clemente Island and CampPendleton, California. These flights aided in aerial

P. D. WORLEY

406 JO

intelligence gathering, direct gunfire support, and bat-tle damage assessment.

CONCLUSIONThe use of UAVs to provide safe, reliable, and ex-

pendable battlefield surveillance is expected to growsignificantly over the next decade. This growth willfuel the need for advanced surveillance capabilities.New aircraft concepts, such as the uninhabited combataerial vehicle and miniature UAVs, are already on thedrawing boards. SSD has demonstrated the broad-based systems engineering expertise required to devel-op reliable and versatile advanced unmanned vehiclesystems, including advanced onboard sensor suites anddata links.

APL antenna control system

APL antenna

UAV

Figure B2-5. APL UAV Tactical Control System antenna installation onboard USS Tarawa.



B3. The Joint Countermine Advanced Concept TechnologyDemonstrationAnn G. Arnold

THE AUTHOR

PAUL D. WORLEY received a B.S. in electrical engineering from ColoradoState University in 1981 and an M.S. in electrical engineering from The JohnsHopkins University in 1991. He joined APL’s Strategic Systems Department in1981 and worked in the Sonar Evaluation Program. In 1985, Mr. Worley wasappointed the first APL representative to the staff of Commander SubmarineDevelopment Squadron Twelve in Groton, CT. In 1990, Mr. Worley became amember of the SSD Signal Processing Group, where he worked on passiveautomation and SURTASS Twinline projects. He acted as Project Manager forthe Twinline Sea Test Project and is currently the Program Manager for theUAV Tactical Control System. His e-mail address is [email protected].

In 1995, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense forAdvanced Technology initiated a new and innovativeaspect of DoD acquisition reform called AdvancedConcept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs).These demonstrations represent an attempt to accel-erate the acquisition process and to encourage theacquisition community to cooperate earlier and morefully with the intended military user. The objective isto facilitate the evaluation of mature, advanced tech-nologies that lead to an enhanced military operationalcapability or improved cost-effectiveness.

Significant participation by the warfighter in theplanning and execution of the various demonstrationsand exercises is a precept of the ACTD process. Thisapproach provides a sound basis for investment deci-sions before commitment to system acquisition, fostersthe development of new concepts of operation, andleaves behind a residual capability for the military user.An ACTD generally has a 3-year term and involvestwo large-scale demonstrations that focus on assessingthe incremental military utility added by the new tech-nology. When successful, ACTDs are intended torapidly transfer the technology from the developer tothe user.

The objective of the Joint Countermine ACTD(JCM ACTD), a “system-of-systems” demonstration, isseamless amphibious mine countermeasure operationsfrom sea to land. The challenge is to demonstrate thecapability to conduct such operations with major em-phasis on clandestine reconnaissance and surveillancefrom space, air, surface, and subsurface platforms. TableB3-1 summarizes the 11 novel systems that constitutedDemo II of the JCM ACTD. Other important elementswere an enhanced C4I (command, control, communi-cations, computers, and intelligence) capability and a


modeling/simulation component known as the JointCountermine Operational Simulation.

In order to contrast capabilities and evaluate thepotential military utility of the participating novelsystems, an assessment strategy had to be developed.The extensive expertise of the Strategic Systems De-partment, accumulated from tests and evaluations ofother programs, was leveraged to devise an analysismethodology for the JCM ACTD. Our responsibilitiesincluded developing a detailed analysis approach,defining data requirements and a data collection/analysis plan, participating in planning the ACTDscenarios, and producing Demo I and II scenario scriptplaybooks.

The U.S. Atlantic Command, the operationalsponsor for this ACTD, specified in their integratedassessment plan four critical operational issues (COIs)that form the basis for their evaluation of the improve-ment in countermine capability provided by the novelsystems. From these COIs, system-level measures ofeffectiveness (MOEs) were developed. Figure B3-1 il-lustrates the bottom-up flow from the measures of per-formance of the countermine systems to the MOEs ofeach countermine operation, and finally to the COIs.

This initial architecture provided a structure for thedevelopment of specific countermine vignettes or sub-phase overlays to the exercise scenario that enableddemonstration of these countermine functions: mis-sion planning, advanced force reconnaissance (covertand overt), clearance/breach, follow-on clearance, androute (chokepoint) breach/clearance. Developmentof each scenario overlay was intended to naturallymotivate the use of the novel systems, provide themaximum opportunity to demonstrate the significant(i.e., measurable) utility of each novel system to the

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A. G. ARNOLD

Table B3-1. Novel systems participating in the Joint Countermine Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration.

System Countermine function Technology Objectives

Littoral Remote Clandestine surveillance Infrared and visible imaging Fuse and disseminate surveillanceSensing and reconnaissance data from material assets and

(Navy) sensorsProvide essential elements of in-

formation (minelaying activi-ties; minefield and obstaclelocations)

Advanced Sensors Covert reconnaissance Toroidal volume search Clandestinely detect, classify, and(Navy) sonar identify mines from deep through

Side-looking sonar shallow waterDual-frequency synthetic

aperture sonarElectro-optic identification

sensorMagnetic gradiometer

Near-Term Mine Covert reconnaissance SSN-hosted recoverable un- Locate minefield gaps or lightlyReconnaissance (Navy) manned underwater vehi- mined areas for approach lanesSystem cle with multibeam active from sea echelon area to inner

search sonars transport area and inner trans-Side-scan classification sonar port area to craft landing zone

Magic Lantern Overt reconnaissance Gated blue-green laser Detect minefields in shallow(Adaptation) (Navy) imaging water, very shallow water, and

on beachFind suitable craft landing zones

Airborne Standoff Overt reconnaissance Airborne infrared imaging Detect minefields inlandMinefield (Army)Detection System

Coastal Battlefield Overt reconnaissance Multispectral optical sensor Detect minefields on beach andReconnaissance (Marine Corps) inlandAnalysis Find suitable craft landing zones

Advanced Light- Breaching (Navy) Pulse-power–driven plasma Sweep lanes from inner transportweight Influence discharge technology area to craft landing zone forSweep System Superconducting magnetic follow-on forces

technology

Explosive Neutrali- Breaching (Navy) PC system with autono- Deploy explosive charges tozation (Advanced mous craft control neutralize surf zone minesTechnology Distributed explosive tech- Clear lanes for landing craft air-Demonstration) nology cushioned and amphibious

assault vehicles

Power Blade (D7 Breaching (congres- Side-sweeping blade Clear lanes for landing craft air-bulldozer) sional mandate) cushioned vehicles from high

water mark to craft landingzone

Perform follow-on clearance ofbeach and craft landing zones

Power Blade (D8 Clearing (congressional Side-sweeping blade Perform follow-on clearance ofbulldozer) mandate) beach and craft landing zones

Close-In Man Clearing (Army) Ground-penetrating radar Detect metallic and nonmetallicPortable Mine and infrared mines for various countermineDetector situations

Note: Systems listed in sequential order of use.



Figure B3-1. Joint Countermine Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration hierarchy of analysis measures developed to assessincremental military utility of participating novel countermine systems.

Critical operational issues

1. Enhance Joint Task Force (JTF) countermine capability during operational maneuver from the sea2. Enhance JTF countermine command, control, and planning3. Provide potential to meet JTF suitability and logistics requirements4. Enhance planning, rehearsal, and analysis through modeling and simulation

Surveillance

Objective: Assess enemy defenses in mission planningStandard:

Correct characterization of littoral defensesMinefield/obstacle locationTime from request to delivery of surveillance assessment

Countermine ACTD objective

Realistic assessment of novel systems’potential contribution to operational effectiveness

Reconnaissance/detection

Objective: Determine minefield location and characteristicsStandard: Time to complete reconnaissance Minefield detection Minefield location accuracy

Neutralization/breaching/marking

Objective: Remove/render inoperative mines and obstacles and/or avoid mines and obstaclesStandard: Time to clear and mark route Percent clearance and simple initial threat Breach/cleared area marking accuracy

Processing timeFalse alarm rateSurveillance cycle timeImage resolution

Probability of detectionProbability of correct classificationFalse alarm rateArea search rateMine/minefield localization accuracyProbability of survivability

Area clearance ratePer-mine clearance rateMarking accuracyArea coverage accuracyProbability of survivability

Tactics/concept ofoperations

Measures ofeffectiveness

Measures ofperformance

Preassault operations/assault/operations ashore

Constraints

TimeThreatArea/environmentDetectability

top-level MOEs and COIs, and present a significantbut fair challenge to each novel system.

To ensure that adequate data were collected fromeach vignette during demonstrations so that meaning-ful evaluations of the participating systems and archi-tectures could be made, SSD produced an analysis planand associated data collection plan. These plans wouldensure that a full reconstruction of the demonstrationevents (something that often goes undocumented inmany major military exercises) would be available andthat objective assessments could be made. The addi-tional C4I element noted previously provided the in-strumentation needed to collect the quantitative datafrom each novel system.

JCM ACTD Demo I was conducted as part of JointTask Force Exercise 97-3 at Camp Lejeune and FortBragg, North Carolina, in August and September 1997.Demo II was part of the U.N.-sanctioned, NATO-led, and Canadian-commanded exercise Maritime

JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 19, NUMBER 4 (

Combined Operations Training (MARCOT)/UnifiedSpirit (US) 1998 held in June 1998 in Stephenville,Newfoundland. During both demonstrations, APLstaff from SSD and the Joint Warfare Analysis Depart-ment observed the operations, collected quantitativedata, and solicited qualitative assessments fromthe operational users via structured interviews andquestionnaires.

A “quicklook” report1 and final report2 were pro-duced for Demo I, and the quicklook brief3 for therecently completed Demo II was issued in July 1998.The results from Demo I have been widely disseminat-ed throughout the defense community, and there isheightened interest in the MARCOT results to pro-vide insights to guide significant countermine systemsacquisition decisions. The analysis methodology de-veloped by SSD and successfully applied to the JCMACTD has enhanced the recognition of APL as aneffective independent assessment agent.

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A. G. ARNOLD

REFERENCES1Arnold, A. G., Dean, R. J., Elliott, G. W., Madden, J. P., et al., Joint

Countermine Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration, Demonstration IAnalysis Quicklook Report, SSD/POR-97-7102/CAB-97-97, JHU/APL, Lau-rel, MD (Oct 1997).

2Arnold, A. G., Dean, R. J., Elliott, G. W., Luman, R. R., Madden,J. P., et al., Joint Countermine Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration,

410 JOHN

Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to support the

Demonstration I Analysis Final Report, SSD/POR-98-7108, JHU/APL, Laurel,MD (Mar 1998).

3Arnold, A. G., Criss, T. B., Dean, R. J., Kim, H. W., Kujawa, W. F., et al.,Joint Countermine Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration, DemonstrationII Analysis Quicklook Report, JHU/APL, Laurel, MD (Jul 1998).

THE AUTHOR

ANN G. ARNOLD is a member of the APL Principal Professional Staff andcurrently the Program Manager for the Laboratory’s efforts on the JCM ACTD.She received a B.S. in mathematics from the University of Maryland, CollegePark, in 1972 and joined APL later that year. Since then, she has contributedto several major test and evaluation programs executed by SSD. Mrs. Arnoldalso played a key role on the Government Evaluation Team for the AutomatedSurveillance Information Processing System. She serves as Supervisor of theOperations Assessment Section of the Undersea Systems Evaluation Group inSSD. Her e-mail address is [email protected].

SECTION C. UNDERSEA SYSTEMS PROGRAMS

Douglas L. Geffert

The Strategic Systems Department Undersea Sys-tems Program Area conducts systems development andperformance analysis for submarine combat and mis-sion support systems. Current programs include (1) theTrident Sonar Evaluation Program (TSEP) sponsoredby the Director of Strategic Systems Programs(DIRSSP); (2) the Ocean Data Acquisition Program(ODAP) sponsored by the Office of Naval Intelligence(ONI); (3) the Navy Unmanned Undersea Vehicles(UUV) Program sponsored by the Program ExecutiveOffice for Undersea Warfare, UUV Programs Office;(4) the Seafloor Characterization and MappingProject (SCAMP) sponsored by the Office of NavalResearch (ONR) and the Lamont-Doherty Earth Ob-servatory of Columbia University; and (5) the OceanEngineering Program sponsored by several Navy agen-cies. In addition to these programs, SSD also supportsthe APL Submarine Technology Department in sev-eral areas related to undersea surveillance and subma-rine security.

TRIDENT SONAR EVALUATIONPROGRAM

The Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) Sonar EvaluationProgram (SEP) was established in the early 1970sby the Submarine Directorate in the Office of the

independent assessment of sonar systems performanceon the Polaris/Poseidon SSBN submarines (Fig. C1).The responsibility for execution of this program wassubordinated by the CNO to the DIRSSP, and in 1975,APL was designated as the technical agent for thisprogram. The SEP was extended to include the newOhio class Trident SSBNs in 1983 under a manage-ment agreement between the Trident AcquisitionProgram Manager (PM-2), the CNO Strategic Subma-rine Branch (CNO OP-21), and DIRSSP. The scopeand objectives of the TSEP were modified in 1992 andagain in 1996 in response to the changing nature ofthe threat to the SSBN force (the FBM fleet consistsof 18 Trident SSBNs).

Today, the fundamental guidance that shapes theTSEP technical objectives is reflected in the followingpassage from a Joint CNO N87/DIRSSP memo of un-derstanding established in 1992 and reaffirmed in 1996:

The TSEP contributes both technically and operationally tothe security and effectiveness of the SSBN force. The TSEPshall focus on determination of sonar performance andeffectiveness, and provide independent assessments of acous-tic vulnerability.

The fundamental approach to addressing the sonaranalysis requirements is to rely heavily on the use ofinstrumented acoustic data as a “ground truth” sourcefrom which assessments can be derived. Four TridentSSBNs have been equipped with SSD-developed

S HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 19, NUMBER 4 (1998)



Trident special-purpose acoustic recording system(TSPARS) instrumentation that continuously recordsthe raw acoustic sensor data from all of the SSBNpassive sonar acoustic sensors. These recorders areoperated continuously whenever the SSBN is at sea onpatrol. The data are collected after the patrol and areprocessed at APL using the Trident SEP Processor/Analyzer (TSPAN) processing and display system (seethe article by South et al. in this issue).

The postpatrol processed data provide a groundtruth picture of the entire acoustic contact environ-ment surrounding the patrolling submarine. Compar-ison between real-time observations derived from theonboard displays by the sonar watchstanders and theground truth picture produced from the TSPARS re-corded data provides valuable feedback to the Fleetand the SSBN crew. An examination of the own-shipsignature derived from the recorded acoustic data pro-vides a continuous monitoring ofship “acoustic health.” Both theTSPARS recording systems andthe TSPAN processing and displayfacility are being upgraded to en-sure that the capabilities requiredto support continuing assessmentsof SSBN sonar performance andacoustic health are sustained.

OCEAN DATAACQUISITION PROGRAM

ODAP was established in 1976by the Director of Naval Intelli-gence (CNO OP-009) in responseto information developed by theSSBN Security Technology Pro-gram, sponsored by CNO OP-21.ODAP was tasked with devel-oping nonacoustic antisubmarinewarfare (ASW) sensor systems toinvestigate the tactical utility of

The scope oftems developrequirementstion with shipersonnel inequipment, aport, and fiODAP contiSystems Branety of specialplatforms.

NAVY UNVEHICLE

The APL support vehicfense Advanc

Tacticalpicture Compare

TSPARS(recording

instruments)

TSPAN(APL analysis

system)

Postmission analysis

Towedarray

Figure C1. Functional flow for the APL Trident Sonar Evaluation Program.

Figure C2. Ocean Data Acquisition Probottom of a submarine in drydock.

JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOL

nonacoustic ocean phenomenology.In the mid-1980s, the focus of ODAPwas shifted to the development ofspecial-purpose systems for use invarious data collection applications.These systems have gone throughseveral generations of developmentand refinement and have been usedwith considerable success.

More recently, ODAP has beentasked with developing a special vari-ant of side-scan sonar to providebathymetry mapping capability (Fig.C2). The first generation of this sys-tem was successfully deployed in 1996.

ODAP tasking covers all aspects of sys-ment and operational support, including definition, design, fabrication, integra-p systems, installation, training of Navy operations and maintenance of specialt-sea testing and grooming, mission sup-eld service repair and refurbishment.nues to be tasked by the ONI, Maritimech (ONI-7MS), with developing a vari--purpose sensor systems for use by Navy

MANNED UNDERSEAS PROGRAMUUV Program was established in 1986 tole development efforts for both the De-ed Research Projects Agency (DARPA)

Instrumentationpod

gram external instrumentation pod affixed to the

UME 19, NUMBER 4 (1998) 411

D. L. GEFFERT

and the Navy. Begun initially as part of the APL Sub-marine Security Program within the Submarine Tech-nology Department, the UUV Program transitioned toSSD in 1990 and currently is a multidepartmentaleffort. DARPA vehicles were tested extensively at seafrom 1990 to 1996 on four projects: Tactical AcousticSystem, Mine Search System, Submarine/UUV LaserCommunications, and Autonomous Minehunting andMapping Technologies. For the DARPA program,APL assisted in the formulation of system performancerequirements, vehicle design concepts, test planning,test direction, and data analysis.

In 1991, the Navy’s Program Office for UnmannedUndersea Vehicles (PMS-403) was established withoversight of ASW training targets and with the near-term goal of acquiring submarine-deployed UUVs.The Laboratory led development of a threshold base-line concept design for the Submarine Offboard MineSearch System (SOMSS), which examined the feasi-bility of meeting operational minehunting require-ment thresholds in an affordable UUV design. APLstaff also contributed to the Navy’s UUV Master Plan,which replaced SOMSS with the Near-term Mine Re-connaissance System and the Long-term Mine Recon-naissance System (LMRS). APL led the Cost and Op-erational Effectiveness Analyses for LMRS and the Mk30 Mod 2 ASW Training Target and continues tosupport the government in the technical evaluation ofLMRS designs by industry competitors. APL plans tomaintain a strong relationship with the UUV ProgramOffice as the Navy begins to deploy these vehicles ona variety of missions.

SEAFLOOR CHARACTERIZATIONAND MAPPING PROJECT

SCAMP is a submarine-mounted geophysical surveysystem for use under the Arctic ice sheet. The projectwas established at the Laboratory in 1997 to supportthe joint Navy/National Science Foundation (NSF)initiatives to explore the Arctic Ocean basin. Navysubmarines are being used for annual unclassifiedArctic scientific missions by a consortium that includesthe Navy’s ONR and Arctic Submarine Laboratory,NSF, the National Oceanographic and AtmosphericAdministration, the U.S. Geological Survey, andthe Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory at ColumbiaUniversity.

The APL task, which was contractually establishedthrough a grant from Columbia University, providedfor the design, development, fabrication, and pier-sideinstallation of two externally mounted instrumenta-tion pods attached to the bottom of a Sturgeon classSSN submarine (Fig. C3). The smaller forward podcontains a high-resolution subbottom profiler (HRSP),and the larger, 16-ft-long aft pod contains a sidescanswath bathymetric sonar (SSBS). The HRSP is expect-ed to penetrate the seafloor up to 100 m with a res-olution in the tens of centimeters; the SSBS includesimagery over a 150° swath with good bathymetry overat least 130° in water depths of 2 to 3 km. Each podis attached via a specially designed foundation mount-ed to studs welded on the hull; power and telemetryinterfaces to the pods use existing SSN hull penetra-tion fittings.


Aft podForward pod

Figure C3. The Seafloor Characterization and Mapping Project (SCAMP) mission will gather seabed bathymetry and profile data underthe Arctic Ocean ice sheet during a joint National Science Foundation/Navy science mission using USS Hawkbill (SSN-666). APLdesigned, built, and installed the SSN external instrumentation pods and attachments to carry the special SCAMP instrumentation.

The Navy has provided USS Hawkbill (SSN-666)as the platform for conducting the Arctic Ocean basinsurveys with SCAMP. Special fixtures were designedby APL to allow the foundations and pods to be at-tached to the submarine without the need for drydock-ing (see Fig. C3). The SCAMP installation was



successfully completed on the Hawkbill in April 1998in preparation for the first of several Science IceExercise deployments to the Arctic. The SSD workperformed within SCAMP has drawn heavily on theextensive experience gained in ODAP.

THE AUTHOR

DOUGLAS L. GEFFERT has a B.S. degree in mechanical engineering fromValparaiso University (1969) and is a member of APL’s Principal ProfessionalStaff. He joined APL in 1969 and worked in the Ship and Launcher SubsystemsGroup on a variety of Fleet Ballistic Missile tasks. In 1975, he was selected to beAPL’s Submarine Security Representative on the staff of the Commander,Submarine Force U.S. Atlantic Fleet, located in Norfolk, Virginia, and served inthat assignment for 3 years. Upon returning to APL, Mr. Geffert served innumerous project and program management assignments, including ProgramManager, Trident Sonar Evaluation Program, from 1988 until 1998. He iscurrently the Program Area Manager for Undersea Systems in the StrategicSystems Department. Mr. Geffert’s professional interests include submarineoperations, at-sea experimentation, systems development, performance assess-ment of complex undersea systems, and program and fiscal management. His e-mail address is [email protected].

SECTION D. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

D1. Technical Support for the Ballistic Missile Defense OrganizationJudson C. Brown and Gary R. Bartnick

INTRODUCTIONThe Strategic Defense Initiative Organization

(SDIO), established in 1983, recognized the need tocreate an entity that would provide broad, flexiblescience and engineering support focused principally onindependent technical assessment and advice. Afterconsidering various approaches to obtaining such sup-port for in-depth technical studies, SDIO initiated aconsortium of federally funded research and develop-ment centers, national laboratories, and universityaffiliated research centers. The focus of SDIO was then“Phase One” deployment of an umbrella defense basedon kinetic energy kill mechanisms (“Phase Two” wouldprovide directed energy defensive systems in the 21stcentury). The newly formed consortium was thereforeappropriately called the Phase One Engineering Team(POET).

The original members of POET, formed in November1987, were the Aerospace Corporation, APL, theCharles Stark Draper Laboratory (CSDL), three Depart-ment of Energy units (Los Alamos, Livermore, andSandia National Laboratories), the Institute for DefenseAnalyses, the Logistic Management Institute, MIT Lin-coln Laboratory, the MITRE Corporation, and the RandCorporation. All but CSDL remain today on POET, a

name retained because of its recognition factor despitethe loss of the Phase One concept when SDIO becamethe Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO).

SSD CONTRIBUTIONSSSD has been an active member of the APL team

supporting the POET consortium and, since 1994, hasprovided the leadership of that team. Our efforts havefallen into four general categories, which are outlinedin the following paragraphs.

1. Major defense acquisition program (MDAP)interface

2. Specification and development of test and analysistools

3. Technology investigations4. System evaluation concepts

In support of the MDAP interface, SSD has assessedselected weapon system design features and has partic-ipated on source-selection technical advisory teams,test flight readiness review teams, and flight failureinvestigation teams. Specific areas of contributionhave focused on

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J. C. BROWN AND G. R. BARTNICK

• Target development: participation on integratedproduct teams to review new candidate targets, tar-get capabilities, and test range improvements neededto support BMDO programs

• Facility development: conduct of an independentreview of the value and need for selected new hard-ware-in-the-loop test facilities

• Interoperability test tools: design review of the The-ater Missile Defense System Exerciser, a majorwargaming tool, and specification of exercises neededto assess BMDO interoperability issues

• Models and simulations: critique of major force-levelmodels as well as independent verification and vali-dation of other selected models

• Wargames: participation in the planning and execu-tion of major wargames addressing BMDO battlemanagement and command, control, communica-tions, computers, and intelligence issues; adaptationof the APL Warfare Analysis Laboratory for appro-priate exercises to address BMDO technical andoperational issues

Technology investigations supported by POET haveincluded phenomenological studies (e.g., target signa-tures) and analyses of countermeasures, technologyinsertions, and threats. SSD established the metrics forthese investigations that allowed the merits of eachoption to be prioritized for consideration. POET is theprimary source of independent technical support forthe major system-level evaluations and assessmentsundertaken by BMDO.

SSD’s heritage in evaluating large, complex weap-ons programs has resulted in many key contributions.These have included participation in major studiesof technical and operational architectures (e.g., the

414 JOH

Theater Missile Defense Capstone Cost and Opera-tional Effectiveness Analysis), studies of internationalcooperative architectures, and value-added assess-ments of new battle management capabilities into thecandidate system architecture. Most significantly,SSD has structured a full system-of-systems effective-ness evaluation framework called the APL System-of-Systems Effectiveness Tracking (ASSET) process,which is discussed in the next section.

THE ASSET APPROACHSSD began an effort to define an independent sys-

tems evaluation concept, the Technical IndependentEvaluation (TIE) Program, in 1992. Subsequently,BMDO shifted its focus from global protection againstlimited strikes to theater missile defense. As a result,the TIE Program was restructured and renamed AS-SET (Fig. D1-1). The technical challenge facing theASSET Program is to develop and implement a rig-orous analytical methodology that allows for early per-formance predictions based on a limited amount ofactual test data. Its purpose is to identify key perfor-mance drivers and techniques to mitigate potentialdeficiencies. In addition, it tracks the evolution ofsystem capability as components proceed through theirdevelopment cycles.

The ASSET methodology uses Bayesian statisticaltechniques at the individual weapon system level andstochastic analytical techniques at the force-on-forcelevel. With the ASSET process, APL has been able todemonstrate these analytical techniques and theirability to produce relevant family-of-systems perfor-mance insights. Specifically, SSD focused on the

Figure D1-1. The ASSET process approach. The goals of this tracking methodology are to quantify the family-of-systems (FoS)performance, identify performance drivers, identify strategies to mitigate deficiencies, and collect feedback to asses the test program andFoS design.

Monte Carloforce-on-force

simulation

Sensitivityanalysis

Laydownoptimization

Trackingscenarios

System designand architecture

DesignConcept of operationsInventoryBattle management/ command, control, and communications

Test program

FoSFlightGroundHistorical

Bayesiandistribution

development

Statisticalconfidence

Main and two-factorsensitivities

FoSperformancegoals

FoS protectioneffectiveness


projected initial deployment configuration of the the-ater missile defense family of systems. This configura-tion will have limited interceptor inventories, bothupper and lower tiers. Optimizing defensive capabilitieswith such restricted inventories was a critical issue forboth developers and users. With the ASSET analytical



methodology, SSD was able to project alternative battlemanagement and firing doctrine performance based ona conservative inventory. Efforts are currently underway to produce a second evaluation, which will extendthe analyses to other theaters and expand the perfor-mance measures to include timing and system accuracy.

THE AUTHORS

JUDSON C. BROWN holds an M.S. degree in physics from the University ofVirginia. He is a member of the APL Principal Professional Staff and is currentlySupervisor of the SSD Defensive Weapons Section as well as the AssistantProgram Manager of the BMDO POET and test and evaluation programs. Uponjoining APL in 1975, he worked in the Pershing Evaluation Program,specializing in C3 issues. Mr. Brown spent 4 years (1977–1981) at the APLEuropean Field Office (EFO) in Heidelberg, West Germany, and served as theEFO Supervisor for 1 year. Following his return, he assumed responsibility for aDefense Nuclear Agency program to evaluate and enhance the survivability ofthe nuclear-capable land-mobile missile systems in Europe (Pershing, Lance,etc.). Mr. Brown also served as the Project Manager for the Joint Over-the-Horizon Targeting Program. Since 1992, his efforts have been devoted tosupport of BMDO, specializing in test and evaluation issues and C4I. His e-mailaddress is [email protected].

GARY R. BARTNICK joined APL in 1964 while pursuing graduate studies inspace science at Catholic University, having received a B.S. in physics fromSiena College. He is currently the Program Manager for the BMDO POETSupport Program and a member of APL’s Principal Professional Staff. He servedfor 4 years as a member of the APL Polaris Division Fire-Control Group beforebecoming a charter member of the Pershing evaluation team. Mr. Bartnick spent3 years as Assistant Supervisor of the APL European Field Office in Heidelberg,West Germany. He became the Assistant Manager for the APL PershingProgram in 1976 as well as the Chief Architect and Principal Analyst for thePershing Survivability Program. Since 1989, Mr. Bartnick has been workingwith SDIO/BMDO concentrating on adapting APL’s test and evaluationheritage to emerging missile defense system-of-systems concepts. His e-mailaddress is [email protected].

SECTION E. CIVILIAN PROGRAMS

E1. Commercial Vehicle Operations ProgramKim E. Richeson

INTRODUCTIONThe Commercial Vehicle Operations (CVO) Pro-

gram began at APL in January 1994 under the spon-sorship of the Federal Highway Administration(FHWA). CVO is one element of the FHWA’s Intel-ligent Transportation Systems (ITS) Program, whichis intended to increase roadway safety, reduce motoristdelays and air pollution, and improve the overall pro-ductivity of CVO through the use of advanced tech-nology. The FHWA is currently developing, testing,evaluating, and sponsoring the deployment of technol-ogies to support traveler information services, traffic

and transit management, driver security, and CVO.Furthermore, FHWA has developed a national ITSarchitecture that provides a framework for the devel-opment and deployment of these technologies. Thisframework includes the identification of standards forinterfaces between systems.

The architectural framework and associated stan-dards are essential to achieve North American in-teroperability and, thus, realize the full benefits of ITS.Under a series of tasks sponsored by the FHWA, APL,as system architect, developed the CVO information

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K. E. RICHESON

systems component of the national ITS architecture,now called the Commercial Vehicle InformationSystems and Networks (CVISN, pronounced “see-vision”). APL’s role includes providing technical sup-port to the FHWA throughout the life cycle of the nextgeneration of CVISN in multiple areas as follows.

• Develop guiding principles• Develop concept of operations including

Key conceptsScenarios

• Define the architecture includingLogical elements and interfacesStandards requirements

• Develop a system design includingPhysical elements and interfacesStandards

• Develop the CVISN prototype to provide a techni-cal demonstration and validation of the architecture

• Provide consultation to the CVISN pilot project inthe form of workshops and advisory support

• Coordinate deployment throughIntegration supportInteroperability testingTraining

The result of this support will be the pilot testingand deployment of government and carrier adminis-trative/operations systems, government roadside sys-tems, vehicle systems, and technical infrastructuresystems.

CAPABILITIESThe CVISN Program has evolved to focus on three

primary capability areas:

1. Safety information exchange2. Credentials administration3. Electronic screening

Safety Information ExchangeSafety information exchange provides carrier, vehi-

cle, and driver safety information to roadside enforce-ment personnel and other authorized users. For severalyears, the FHWA has funded states through the MotorCarrier Safety Assessment Program to perform road-side audits of the safety processes of selected motorcarriers and safety inspections of selected commercialvehicles. The Administration maintains a centralMotor Carrier Management Information System (MC-MIS) to support these tasks.

The safety information exchange capability is in-tended to provide automated collection of the resultsof vehicle inspections via a system called ASPEN(Fig. E1-1). Law enforcement personnel use this

416 JOH

laptop or pen-based unit to enter the results of vehicle

inspections as they are performed. This improves theaccuracy of the entered data and enables officers tosubmit their reports immediately over a network, dial-up, or wireless cellular digital packet data link.

These inspection reports are relayed by the Safetyand Fitness Electronic Records (SAFER) System backto existing state systems for some quality checks. Thestate systems in turn transmit the reports via SAFERto the FHWA’s central MCMIS. In the past, datafrom this central system were available only via paperreports, but SAFER is now providing them online tosafety analysts and law enforcement personnel.

The SAFER System receives an extract of subsetsof MCMIS data, referred to as motor carrier, vehicle,and driver “snapshots.” Snapshots are standardized setsof data that are used by automated systems, enforce-ment personnel, and administrative personnel to makesafety and regulatory decisions. For example, the car-rier snapshot contains the name and Department ofTransportation identifier of the carrier, several statis-tical safety indicators, tax payment records, and otherregulatory data items. SAFER snapshots are availableto the general public via http://www.safersys.org/.

A key feature of the snapshot data is that changesare automatically distributed to users. Source systemsrecognize when a significant change has occurred andforward the data proactively to SAFER. SAFER usesthe change notice to update snapshot data and for-wards the data to update service subscribers. A statemay subscribe to the carrier snapshots for all carriersregistered to operate within it (an average of approx-imately 10,000 carriers per state).

A major expected benefit of the safety informationexchange capability is to allow federal, state, andmotor carrier personnel to improve the effectivenessof their safety programs by making more accurate andtimely safety and related credentialing informationaccessible to them. In the past, it has typically taken90 days or more for the results of an inspection reportto be available to the enforcement community. Now,it can be done in less than 30 minutes. With betterinformation, government agencies can focus limitedresources on operators whose records indicate a safetyhistory problem. Motor carriers can also use the datato help evaluate their own performance and targetareas for improvement. APL’s contribution to this areaincludes development of the overall architecture, elec-tronic data interchange (EDI) standards for snapshotdata exchange, and the SAFER System.

Credentials Administration The central concept for this area is to allow motor

carriers to apply for, pay for, and receive credentialselectronically. Anyone who has had to title or registera personal vehicle can appreciate the magnitude of the



Figure E1-1. Safety inspection reports are entered into the ASPEN system and relayed electronically to state and federal systems(SAFER = Safety and Fitness Electronic Records System, MCMIS = Motor Carrier Management Information System).

MCMIS(Washington, DC)

SAFER

SAFERSystem

Download snapshot updates

Transmit checked inspection reports to MCMIS

Return edited inspection report

Retrieve and check inspection report

Send insp

ection re

port

Distrib

ute updated snapsh

otsRoadside vehicle inspection

Safety inspector

ASPEN

State agencysafety analyst

commercial carrier’s task, which may involve manyhundreds of vehicles.

Most states have extensive information systems toprocess all the credentialing aspects of CVO. Motorcarriers typically submit forms to register to operate ascarriers, demonstrate possession of the required liabil-ity insurance, register and title vehicles, pay fuel taxes,apply for special oversize/overweight permits—the listgoes on. The state processes these applications bothmanually and automatically. Often some sort of in-voicing and payment is involved, which may be doneelectronically.

One goal of CVISN is to provide “end-to-end”automation of these credentialing processes, i.e., theelectronic application, processing, fee collection, issu-ance, and distribution of CVO credentials, automationof tax filing and auditing, and the support of multistateinformation exchange and processing agreements. Thecarrier would use a software package called CAT (car-rier automated transactions) to prepare applications.CAT would provide prompting and error checking tohelp improve the accuracy of the applications. (Somestate agencies report that as many as 40% of the


applications submitted manually contain some type oferror, e.g., illegible entries, missing items, wrong iden-tifiers, etc.) After completing the application, thecarrier would transmit the form electronically to thestate.

The information systems design used by each statewill vary. A typical design is shown in Fig. E1-2. In thisexample, the state has a credentialing interface (CI)system that receives the applications and requests forall state agencies. The CI does some initial errorchecking and transaction archiving, and then routesthe transaction to the appropriate state agency systemto process the particular submission. For example,vehicle registration requests or renewals might go tothe Department of Motor Vehicles, whereas fuel taxpayments might go to the state Comptroller’s Office.The actual processing of the form would be done ina system operated by a particular agency.

The CI system would typically be a “legacy” (pre-viously existing) system that has been modified toinclude a new interface for accepting electronic trans-actions from the CI instead of accepting manual en-tries from state agency clerks. Part of the processing

998) 417

K. E. RICHESON

Figure E1-2. Standard electronic data interchange (EDI) transactions enable motorcarriers to obtain credentials and states to process the applications and support basestate agreements electronically (CAT = carrier automated transaction, EFT = electronicfunds transfer, CI = credentialing interface, LM = legacy modification, LSI = legacy systeminterface).

might include checks to other systems to determine,for example, that a carrier who is requesting to registera vehicle is current on tax payments or that the vehicleis properly titled. The details of the processing differfor each transaction, but generally include error check-ing, cross checks with other databases, fee calculations,invoicing, payment, and issuance of some type ofdecal, sticker, plate, or paper document.

The goal of a CI system is to allow carriers to printtheir own paper documents. Decals and metal plateswill need to be mailed to smaller carriers, althoughlarger carriers will be able to maintain an inventory ofthese items at their sites, just as some states allow carand truck dealers to do today.

Another aspect of credentialing is sharing informa-tion among multiple states. States have evolved anumber of “base-state agreements” over the years, in-cluding the International Registration Plan and Inter-national Fuel Tax Agreement. These agreements allowa carrier to designate a base state that it deals with, andthat state in turn provides information and fee pay-ments to other states. For example, a carrier may op-erate in Maryland and 10 other surrounding states. Thecarrier could choose to register its vehicles in Marylandas its base state. In completing the registration form(using CAT), the carrier would specify the expectedpercentage of allocation of each vehicle’s mileage toeach of the 10 states. The state of Maryland wouldprocess the data, calculate the fees based on the differ-ing rates for each state, and exchange the necessaryinformation and fee payments with each state. This isa great simplification for carriers who, until a decadeago, had to separately register and obtain license platesfrom each state for each vehicle that would operate inthe state. A further improvement that CVISN is ex-pected to achieve is the development of clearinghouses

will provide bettereffectiveness and continual improveover time. APL’s cdevelopment of thdards for credentiasive set of requireof Maryland and

In summary, stcarriers to

• File for credent• Process applica• Exchange infor

state agreemen

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Electronic Scree Most drivers h

highways. Signs dito ensure that thelations. Overweigwear. Most statesmum, with corresaxle. At a typicala slow roll or stopaxle and total vehlittle as 30 secondon traffic. But sucimpact on some tthe vehicle is sloenforcement persand any obvious problem, they ask

Carrierbank

Statebank

Clearinghousebank

ClearinghousesLegacy systemsfor credentials,

etc.

State SafetySystem

CIserver

Motorcarrier

CAT System

EDI EFT EFT

EDI

EDI

EDI

EDI

EDIEDI

EDI

State

LM

418 JOH

(e.g., International RegistrationPlan Clearinghouse, InternationalFuel Tax Agreement Clearing-house) that will allow the states toexchange data and fees electroni-cally rather than via paper reportsas is done today.

The expected benefit resultingfrom the credentials administra-tion capabilities is more efficientand responsive administrative pro-cesses for carriers and governmentagencies. The cost of compliancewith regulations for both carriersand government agencies may beas high as $6B annually. Even asmall percentage reduction in thisfigure can provide a high return oninvestment. In addition to the di-rect savings, automated processes

information for measuring costs andwill create a better environment forment of these processes and systemsontributions to this area include thee overall architecture, the EDI stan-ls data exchange, and a comprehen-ments for the credentialing systemsVirginia (Fig. E1-2).andardized transactions with enable

ials from their offices and statestions automaticallymation electronically to support base-ts

s will also support fee paymentsyees, and banks.

ningave passed weigh stations on majorrect trucks to pull into these stationsy are within federal and state regu-ht trucks can cause excessive road limit trucks to an 80,000-lb maxi-ponding maximum weights on each weigh station, trucks decelerate to at a static scale, which weighs eachicle gross weight. This may take as

s or as much as 5 minutes, dependingh delays can have a significant costypes of trucking operations. While

wing and stopped on the scale, lawonnel check for the proper decalssafety problems. If they observe a

the driver to pull into an inspection



Figure E1-3. Electronhistory of the carrier to

area at the site for a more thoroughexamination.

Another aspect of ITS/CVO isto put weigh-in-motion scales inthe main highway (or at the begin-ning of the weigh station ramp) tomeasure the weight of trucks whilethey are moving at highway (orramp) speeds. The trucks wouldalso be equipped with dedicatedshort-range communication(DSRC) transponders, which canbe interrogated by roadside readersas the vehicle goes over the scale.This reader would obtain identify-ing information from the tran-sponder equivalent to the licenseplate number. A roadside opera-tions computer in the weigh sta-tion would use this identifier tocheck information about the vehi-cle and the associated carrier usingthe snapshot information providedby SAFER. The computer wouldcheck the safety rating of the vehicle and carrier aswell as proper vehicle registration, current tax obliga-tions, and other recent problems. If the weight andother checks are good, the DSRC reader will send backa message to the transponder to that effect. The tran-sponder, which would be mounted on the dashboard,then would display a green indicator to signify that thedriver may proceed or a red indicator to signify thatthe truck is to pull into the scale. Enforcement per-sonnel would be able to set up the computer to pullin a certain number of vehicles for random safetyinspections, just as they do today with manual systems.

These electronic screening capabilities will allowstate safety enforcement units to focus on high-riskoperators and will provide safe and legal carriers moreefficient movement of freight (Fig. E1-3). APL isdeveloping the overall architecture and DSRC stan-dards, serving as the system integrator for the StephensCity, Virginia, weigh station, and developing the road-side operations computer software for Stephens City.The electronic screening capability may be imple-mented at either fixed or mobile sites. APL developeda mobile version of an electronic screening systemcalled the Roving Vehicle Verification System (ROV-ER) that has been used to demonstrate the concept tostate and federal officials. Virginia used the ROVER asa model for a similar mobile unit called NOMAD thatthey have deployed this year.

DEPLOYMENT The CVISN Program is proceeding in five major

steps.

Rovingverification site

Widen

98) 419


ic screening allows the weight, safety history, and credentials be checked without stopping the vehicle.

1. Develop the management (plans) and technical (ar-chitecture) frameworks necessary to coordinate thesubsequent phases (1994–1996)

2. Prototype the technology in an integrated way in twostates to demonstrate operational concepts and vali-date requirements (1996–1999)

3. Pilot the approach in eight additional states (Cali-fornia, Colorado, Connecticut, Kentucky, Michi-gan, Minnesota, Oregon, Washington) before pro-ceeding to widespread deployment (1996–2000)

4. Expand the effort from the pilot states to all inter-ested states (1999–2005)

5. Operate and maintain deployed systems (20001)

Step 4 should be a smooth expansion, since eachexpansion state will be coordinating with a pilot statein the same region. By this time the technology, con-cepts, costs, and benefits should be well understoodand documented. Deployment should be straightfor-ward with little risk.

Throughout this process, the FHWA is focusing on“mainstreaming,” a term which refers to the organiza-tional aspects of moving ITS/CVO services beyond theconcept development phase and into operation. Aspart of mainstreaming, certain organizational strategieswill be implemented to support the technical activities.The ITS/CVO Program will develop policies, plans,programs, and projects at the state, regional, and na-tional levels: at the state level because the states havethe power and responsibility for building and maintain-ing highways and for taxing and regulating the motorcarriers that use them; at the regional level becausemost trucks operate at the regional level; and at the

Statecommercial

vehicleinformationexchange

Weigh, identify, clear

eigh,tify, clear

Inspection area

ExitreaderFixed

verification site

State scaleLicense plate reader

numerous to mention.

K. E. RICHESON

national level because of the need to ensure uniformityof services for interregional and international motorcarriers. APL will provide technical support to theseprograms and projects as required to make certain thatlessons learned from the prototype and pilot efforts arebrought forward to the CVO community.

SUMMARYThe ITS/CVO Program offers an exciting opportu-

nity for APL to contribute to a significant nationalproblem in a nondefense arena. The problem has manyinteresting technical aspects including system archi-tecture, standards development, information systemsdevelopment, communications, and technical pro-gram management. It also includes equally challenginginstitutional problems in bringing together the federalgovernment, state governments, motor carriers, andtechnology vendors in a cooperative effort to reachpolicy agreements and develop interoperable systems.

The program draws upon APL’s expertise in sys-tems engineering and program management derivedfrom our defense activities. We anticipate that the

420 JOH

technologies currently being developed under thisprogram will be widely deployed among the majorityof states and many motor carriers over the next 5 to10 years. The expected benefits in safety, savings, andsimplicity will more than justify the investmentsmade in the development of these capabilities.

The first areas of focus—safety information ex-change, credentials administration, and electronicscreening—are only the first in a series of possibleimprovements. Future FHWA efforts will continue toenhance and improve these capabilities as well asdevelop others in the areas of onboard vehicle mon-itoring and control and intermodal freight transporta-tion. Current information about the APL CVISNProgram can be found at the program’s Web site (http://www.jhuapl.edu/cvisn/).

ACKNOWLEDGMENT: I wish to thank the FHWA personnel who sponsoredvarious aspects of the program, including Steve Crane, Mike Curtis, Tom Hillegass,Jeff Loftus, Doug McKelvey, Mike Onder, Jeff Secrist, and Mike Shagrin. I alsowish to acknowledge the contributions of the APL team members who carried outthe work of the program including Val Barnes, Ron Char, Brenda Clyde, JohnFewer, Karen Goldee, Barbara Grimes, John Hardy, Tim Herder, Tom Hormby,Eric King, Alan Mick, Ed Moses, Theresa Nester, Paul North, Jim Polaha, BethRoberts, Karen Smith, Janet Spedden, DJ Waddell, Ray Yuan, and others too

THE AUTHOR

KIM E. RICHESON received a B.S. in engineering science from PurdueUniversity in 1968, and an M.S. in computer science from The Johns HopkinsUniversity in 1975. He has 30 years of experience in developing managementinformation, business, and tactical defense systems and software. Mr. Richesonwas a part-time instructor in the Technical Management Program at the JHUG.W.C. Whiting School of Engineering from 1990 to 1993. His workassignments have included both management and systems engineeringresponsibilities in applications areas for commercial vehicle operations,management and business information systems, computer facility development,computer peripheral emulators, shipboard combat simulators, tacticalsimulations, and radar detection and tracking systems. Mr. Richeson iscurrently the Manager for the APL CVISN Program. His e-mail address [email protected].



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