Current Developments & Challenges in Tsunami Warning Systems: Sri Lanka

Rohan Samarajiva

samarajiva@lirne.net

Agenda

How did warnings actually work in Sri Lanka? 26th December 2004 27th February 2005 28th March 2005

Current situation Legal and institutional framework and its

weaknesses The way forward: Public-private

partnerships

December 26th, 2004

Seismic information on 9.3 earthquake (0059 hrs UMT) known in Colombo (0110 UMT), more or less at same time as Hawai’i

Navy and Police knew of abnormal situation in East Coast after 0300 hrs but did not issue warning

Journalists got first information around 0300 and carried stories at 0334 and 0341 hrs

~40,000 lives lost from 0230 to 0600 hrs UMT, without one minute of official warning

February 27th, 2005 (2 months later)

PTWC unable to communicate to Government designated warning center using fax and email

March 27th, 2005 (3 months later) Great Nias Earthquake occured at 1610 UMT

(2210 LK time) PTWC issued tsunami bulletin at 1626 hrs UMT I received an SMS at 1658 hrs UMT and

confirmed quake using Internet BBC carried story around 1715 hrs UMT Sarvodaya district centers (and some

government officials) informed before government media carried warning & before congestion hit the networks

March 27th, 2005

Sri Lanka TV and radio channels carried warning & 2 km evacuation order at around 1730 hrs UMT Only 10 minutes before the 90 mts it took for

the first wave to hit East Coast on 26th December 2004

Media knew as early as 1700 hrs UMT but did not broadcast lacking authorization from government

No all clear announced after warning/ evacuation ordered

Policy discourse snapshot 29th March 2005: Select Committee

Sri Lankan legislators called for a single body to issue warnings on potential natural disasters

“We could not find any authority who was willing to say it was safe for people to go back, that is why we need a centralised system from where authoritative information can be obtained.”—head of broadcasting organization

A high-ranking official for media policy said the government will seek a public service clause in licenses issued to broadcasters, requiring uniform disaster alerts

Current situation: Institutional Disaster Management Act became law in

May 2005 Disaster Management Center established in

July 2005 under President Previous NDMC continues to exist under

Ministry of Social Services Ministry of Disaster Management created in

November 2005 Road Map published in December 2005

Current situation: warning

Weather-related: Department of Meteorology (Tsunami Early Warning Center)

Seismological: Geological Survey & Mines Bureau (24 hr monitoring of earthquake waveforms)

Ocean waves: National Aquatic Resources Authority

Media have trouble confirming stories; getting direction from government (July 2005)

Road Map on warning

Multi-hazard early warning center to be established by DMC within 1-2 years at cost of USD 0.28 m Multi-hazard EW Division of the DMC to be located at

premises of Meteorological Department Dissemination of alerts and warnings via

Existing government channels TV, newspapers (?), radio Police wireless network Military communication networks Explore options of using networks of Sri Lanka Red

Cross Society & other NGOs to “multiply” reach of conventional channels

Adopted model

National Early Warning System: Sri Lanka(statutory body)

Met. Dept

Geog. Survey & Mines Bureau

Int’l warning systems Etc...

EmergencyServices

Armedforces

DistrictAuthorities

Etc…Media

Detection and assessment of hazard

Issue warning

Telecom Operators

Hazard detection agencies

Private sector, Civil Society

Partnership

Weaknesses

Efficacy of DMC and its EW Division rests on quality of leadership No insulation from “ocean of bad

governance”; no lessons learned from experience with regulatory agencies/authorities

No independence for Director General No assured funding

Apparent total reliance of external funds

Weaknesses

Apparent over-reliance of seconded government officials, making likely a low-performance organization

Over-dependence on government & neglect of private sector

Lacuna re media and telecom E.g., former government-owned incumbent included

in DMC coordination chart, but not largest telco Communication of warnings ill understood

Over-reliance on government entities, non-reliance on the effective organizations

Lacuna on last-mile warning

Warning, a public good that has to be supplied despite government failure . . . Bangladesh: Warning supplied

through public-private partnerships “The cyclone of 1970 took the lives of

300,000 people but the cyclone of the same intensity of 1991 killed 138,000 people, and the cyclones of 1997 and 1998 resulted in only 127 and 6-7 deaths respectively”

More information

www.lirneasia.net Google relevant terms with Sri Lanka

included Samarajiva, R. (2005) Mobilizing

information and communications technologies for effective disaster warning: Lessons from the 2004 tsunami, New Media and Society (7(6); 731-47. http://nms.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/7/6/731. Prepublication version: http://www.lirneasia.net/2005/07/icts-and-early-warning/