8/6/2019 Cultural Encounter 5a...Why Were the Romans Defeated at Cannae?

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Humanities 2270

Harry A Wilson

March 10, 2011Cultural Encounter 5

Why Were the Romans Defeated at Cannae?

According to Daly in Cannae: The Experience of Battle in the Second Punic War,Hannibals invasion of Italy was not to destroy Rome, but rather to reduce it to a secondrate power. Why then faced with overwhelmingly superior enemy numbers at Cannae

was Hannibal able to defeat the Romans? The answer lies not only with the brilliance ofHannibals battle strategy, leadership and the superior performance of his troops, but with

the failure of the Roman leadership and battle plan.The Romans: The cursus honorum, or path of honor, was a Roman method used

for advancement. It enabled men to gain experience in office, and the ability to rise as faras their abilities and drive would allow them. In the Battle of Cannae, that system

backfired on the Romans, as two Consuls, Paullus and Varro, led the troops together.Having equal power, yet disagreeing on strategy, they alternated days of leadership.

Paullus believed, as the Dictator Fabius had before him, that Hannibals weakness washis inability to receive supplies and reinforcements. Fabius represented the practical side

that ran parallel to the aggressive side in Roman society. This meant that a prolonged,containment strategy was in Romes best interest. In addition, Paullus believed that the

flat plains below Cannae played to Hannibals cavalry advantage .Varro, a New Man,was more impulsive and shared the Senates and average Roman citizens desire for action

against Hannibal. He believed that waiting worsened the Roman position and that the flatplains were well suited for an infantry assault. Consuls served only annual terms before

reelection, so were unable to develop the strong bonds of loyalty, from their soldiers, thatcame from years of service together. The Roman army was well equipped and consisted

of eighty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry troops.( Roman and alae ) For

an unknown reason, perhaps the terrain, the Romans chose to have a front line the samewidth as Hannibals, but with much greater depth than normal. Varro possibly meant topunch a hole in the Carthaginian center, and then through mass of numbers, secure

victory.Hannibal: Hannibal, at age nine, along with his father Hamilcar Barca, made

sacrifice to the gods Baal and Melqart. His father asked him to accompany him to Spain,but also made him take an oath never to be a friend of Rome. In Hannibals own words

from that time forward he spent the rest of his life in the struggle against Roman powerand domination. Under his fathers wing, Hannibal learned arms, and accompanied him

on most campaigns, including at eighteen the battle where his father was killed. Hannibalhad shown so much courage and capacity for war, that his fathers successor Hasdrubal

gave him a command position. He showed at an early age that he had great control overmens minds and earned their devotion. Upon Hasdrubals assassination, Hannibal, at age

twenty six, took over as Commander in Chief. At Cannae, Hannibal was outnumberedtwo to one in infantry, but held a ten thousand to six thousand advantage in cavalry. He

employed a series of maneuvers to defeat the Romans. He positioned his army so that therising sun would be in the enemies eyes. With the wind at his back the dust and dirt from

battle would be blown into the Romans faces. Skirmishes from the previous day hadprevented the Romans from collecting water, causing them to bake in the summer heat

with little or no water. Knowing that the Roman legions vastly outnumbered his infantry,

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he arranged his troops in a convex formation, with his cavalry on the flanks. Healternated the different nationalities based on their fighting skills. His plan was to take the

main Roman thrust down the middle, and flex into a concave shape, so that whenpursued, the Roman flanks would be exposed. At that point, he would attack the flanks

with his African cavalry, and encircle the Romans in a pincer movement. As the Romanflanks collapsed inwards on themselves, the cavalry attacked from the sides and the rear

creating a killing zone. This maneuver of exposing the flanks of an enemy for attack was

not unlike that of Alexander at the Battle of Granicus. Up to fifty thousand Romans wereannihilated that day at Cannae. Historians are left to debate two things. Why didntHannibal take advantage of this massive victory to move on to deliver the fatal blow to

Rome? What would have happened to Hannibal had Rome followed the Fabian Plan?Shean puts forth that both of these questions can be answered through logistics. He

believes that every move Hannibal made inside Italy is based upon feeding his army,which was cut off from supplies and reinforcements from Spain or Carthage. He believes

that if Rome had contained Hannibal and avoided direct confrontation his forces wouldhave withered within a year due to lack of supplies. Instead Hannibal continued to fight

on for another thirteen years before being defeated by Rome.Analysis: Hannibal was a great military leader, with courage and battlefield skill.

He understood the Roman hierarchy and military strategy and took advantage of theirflaws to defeat them in battle after battle. He stands in military history next to Alexander

in that they both fought campaigns far from home, cut off from supplies andreinforcements, using local resources. They also used similar battle tactics to expose the

enemies weak links and take advantage of the natural terrain. The Battle of Cannaeresulted in many changes to the Roman military, including a more flexible army and a

unified command. Hannibals legacy is tarnished by his inability to parlay his victories atTribia, Lake Trasimene, and Cannae into the siege of Rome, and by his eventual defeat.

His battle plan at Cannae has been studied through the centuries and stands out as thequintessential pincer movement strategy.

Ardant du Picq, CJ. (2009).Battle studies: ancient and modern battles. Gloucester, UK:DoDo Press.

Arnold, T & Wight, OW (1879).Life of hannibal. NY, NY: American Book Exchange.

Daly, G. (2003). Cannae: the experience of battle in the second punic war. NY, NY:Routledge.

OBrien, C. (2010). Outnumbered: incredible stories of historys most surprising

battlefield upsets. Beverly, Ma: FairWinds Press.

Shean, JF. (1996). Hannibal's mules: the logistical limitations of hannibal's army and thebattle of cannae, 216B.Sc.Historia:Zeitschrift fur Alte Geschichte, 45(2), 159-187.