cuba - united states secret diplomacy documents (1961-1977)

8/10/2019 Cuba - United States Secret Diplomacy Documents (1961-1977)

1/98

Cuba - United States Secret Diplomacy

(1961-1977)

Historical Documents

BACM Research

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2/98


3/98

About BACM ResearchPaperlessArchives.com

BACM Research/PaperlessArchives.com publishes documentary historical

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Materials cover Presidencies, Historical Figures, Historical Events, Celebrities,

Organized Crime, Politics, Military Operations, Famous Crimes, Intelligence

Gathering, Espionage, Civil Rights, World War I, World War II, Korean War,

Vietnam War, and more.

Source material from Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),

Secret Service, National Security Council, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of

Staff, Department of Justice, National Archive Records and Administration, and

Presidential Libraries.

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4/98

Other BACM Research - PaperlessArchives.com collections related to the United

States and Cuba

Kennedy Administration Cuba Policy Papers

The Califano Papers, 1,300 pages of Kennedy Administration papersdealing with Cuba policy

http://www.paperlessarchives.com/jfk_cuba.html

Cuban Missile Crisis: - CIA - NSA - NSC - State Dept. Files - Audio

Recordings1370 pages of files covering the Cuba Missile Crisishttp://www.paperlessarchives.com/cubamiss.html

Cuban Missile Crisis: Robert F. Kennedy Papers3,584 pages of documents produced or accumulated by United States

Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, while acting in his role as an

advisor to President John F. Kennedy concerning the Cuban Missile

Crisis.

http://www.paperlessarchives.com/cuban-missile-crisis-rfk-files.html

Bay of Pigs: CIA - NSC - State Department Files2,200 pages of CIA, National Security Council, and Department of State

files covering the Bay of Pigs. In 1961 a covert operation codenamed

"Operation Zapata" called for 1,500 Cuban exiles to land on the

southwestern coast of Cuba, mostly at the Bay of Pigs (Bahia de los

Cochinos).

http://www.paperlessarchives.com/baypigs.html

Bay of Pigs - CIA Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation

1,582 pages of CIA Bay of Pigs Official History compiled between 1974

and 1984.

http://www.paperlessarchives.com/bay_of_pigs_cia_history.html
http://www.paperlessarchives.com/jfk_cuba.htmlhttp://www.paperlessarchives.com/jfk_cuba.htmlhttp://www.paperlessarchives.com/cubamiss.htmlhttp://www.paperlessarchives.com/cubamiss.htmlhttp://www.paperlessarchives.com/cuban-missile-crisis-rfk-files.htmlhttp://www.paperlessarchives.com/cuban-missile-crisis-rfk-files.htmlhttp://www.paperlessarchives.com/baypigs.htmlhttp://www.paperlessarchives.com/baypigs.htmlhttp://www.paperlessarchives.com/baypigs.htmlhttp://www.paperlessarchives.com/baypigs.htmlhttp://www.paperlessarchives.com/baypigs.htmlhttp://www.paperlessarchives.com/cuban-missile-crisis-rfk-files.htmlhttp://www.paperlessarchives.com/cubamiss.htmlhttp://www.paperlessarchives.com/jfk_cuba.html


5/98

NOTES

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6/98

Cuba - United States

Secret Diplomacy Documents

(1961-1977)

A selection of documents dating from 1961 to 1977 chronicling secretdiplomacy between the United States and Cuba. Includes documentsfrom the Kennedy, Johnson, Ford, and Carter Administrations,Department of State, CIA, Justice Department, and Kennedy secretWhite House audio recordings.

Highlights from the Material include:

Kennedy Approves Secret Meeting between Envoy and Castro

Seventeen days before his assassination a recording made in the WhiteHouses Oval Officecaptures a conversation between President Kennedyand his national security advisor, McGeorge Bundy, discussing the Castroregimesoverture to have a meeting in Havana with a KennedyAdministration envoy. Kennedy's conclusion was that he approved, if it

could be assured that it could be denied that that the meeting ever tookplace. Memorandums document the process in arranging for a meetingbetween William Attwood, a deputy to UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson.This initiative waned after Kennedy's assassination.

Kennedy Speech Writer and Advisor Meets with Ernesto "Che" Guevara

A memo dated August 22, 1961, written by JFK speech writer and advisor

Richard N. Goodwin conveys to the President details about his chancemeeting with Guevara in Uruguay.


7/98

Castro Offers to Aid LBJ's Campaign

The notation of a verbal message from Castro to LBJ given through ABCnews reporter Lisa Howard. The document in part records Castro'smessage as, "Please tell President Johnson that I earnestly desire hiselection to the Presidency in November though that appears assured. Butif there is anything I can do to add to his majority (aside from retiringfrom politics), I shall be happy to cooperate." Further the messagecontains Castros assessment of the juncture of U.S. domestic politicsand U.S./Cuba relations.

Frank Mankiewicz Secret Intermediary to Cuba

Frank Mankiewiczscareer included serving as Robert F. Kennedy's presssecretary, George McGovern's presidential campaign strategist, and thepresident of National Public Radio (NPR).

In April of 1974 Mankiewicz called Secretary of State Henry Kissinger toinform him of an upcoming trip to Havana to interview Cuban leaderFidel Castro. Kissinger used this as an opportunity to have delivered toCastro a handwritten letter. On his return Mankiewicz delivered a

handwritten letter and a box of Cuban Cohiba cigars to Kissinger fromCastro. Mankiewicz's efforts lead to Kissinger's deputies and FidelCastro's representatives having a meeting at La Guardia Airport onJanuary 11, 1975.

Jimmy Carter Presidential Directive

A Presidential Directive signed by President Jimmy Carter dated March15, 1977, stating, "I have concluded that we should attempt to achieve

normalization of our relations with Cuba.


8/98

Letter from Fidel Castro to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 11/06/1940

Castro first reached out to an American President when he was 14-years-old. In the letter Castro congratulates President Roosevelt on his recentre-election, and asks FDR to send him a $10 bill. Theres an interestingdiscrepancy in the letter: in 1940, Fidel was 14 years old, however hestates in the letter that he is 12-years-old.


9/98

CONTENTS

1940-11-06 (White House - FDR) Letter from Fidel Castro to President Franklin D.

Roosevelt, November 16, 1940

1961-08-22 (White House - Kennedy) White House memorandum, Secret, Conversation

with Commandante Ernesto Guevara of Cuba, August 22, 1961

1963-03-04 (White House - Kennedy) White House memorandum, Top Secret, Mr.

Donovan's Trip to Cuba, March 4, 1963

1963-04-11 (White House - Kennedy) White House memorandum, Top Secret, Cuba -

Policy, April 11, 1963.

1963-05-01 (CIA) Briefing paper, Secret, Interview of U.S. Newswoman with FidelCastro Indicating Possible Interest in Rapprochement with the United States, May

1,1963

1963-11-12 (White House - Kennedy) White House memorandum, Secret, November

12, 1963 Bundy reports to William Attwood on Kennedy's opinion of the viability of a

secret meeting with Havana

1963-11-19 (White House - Kennedy) White House memorandum, Top Secret,

Approach to Castro, November 19, 1963.

1963-11-22 (Department of State) U.S. UN Mission memorandum, Secret, Chronology

of events leading up Castro invitation to receive a U.S. official for talks in Cuba,

November 8, 22, 1963

1963-11-25 (White House - Johnson) White House memorandum, Top Secret, Cuba -

Item of Presidential Interest, November 25, 1963.

1963-12-12 (Justice Department) Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney

General, RFK Memo -Travel to Cuba, December 12, 1963

1963-12-13 (Department of State) State Department, Travel Regulations, December13, 1963

1964-02-12 (White House - Johnson) Message from Fidel Castro to Lyndon Johnson,

Verbal Message given to Miss Lisa Howard of ABC News on February 12,1964, in

Havana, Cuba.


10/98

1964-06-16 (Department of State) United Nations memo, Top Secret, from Adlai

Stevenson to President Johnson, June 16, 1964. Stevenson sends the verbal message

given to Lisa Howard from Castro to LBJ

1964-07-07 (White House - Johnson) White House memorandum, Top Secret, Adlai

Stevenson and Lisa Howard, July 7, 1964

1974-04-24 (Department of State) Department of State, Telcon, [Kissinger

conversation with Frank Mankiewicz about seeing Castro], April 24, 1974

1974-08-30 (White House - Ford) National Security Council, memorandum for

Secretary Kissinger, Confidential, Cuba Policy, August 30, 1974

1975-01-11 (White House - Ford) Kissinger Aide-Memoire to Cuba, January 11, 1975

1975-01-11 (Department of State) Department of State, Meeting Memorandum,

Meeting in New York with Cuban Representatives, Secret-Sensitive, January 11, 1975

1975-01-16 (Department of State) Department of State, Memorandum, Message to

Castro, January 16,1 975

1975-01-20 (Department of State) Department of State, Action Memorandum, The

Mankiewicz Trip, Secret-Nod is-Eyes Only, January 20,1975

1975-03-27 (Department of State) Department of State, Secret, Normalizing relations

with Cuba, March 27, 1975.

1975-07-09 (White House - Ford) Memorandum of Conversation, Pierre Hotel U.S.-Cuba Meeting, July 9, 1975

1977-03-15 (White House - Carter) Presidential Directive - NSC-6, Subject Cuba, March

15, 1977, Secret


11/98

C O L E G I O D E

D O L O R E S

P R T D O 1

S N T I G O D E

C U B


12/98


13/98

SECRET

THE

WHITE HOUSE

W S H I N G T O N

August 22, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

PRESIDENT

Subject: Conversation with Commandante

Ernesto

Guevara of Cuba

The conversation

took place the evening of

August 17 at 2

A. M.

Several

members

of the Brazil ian and Argentine

delegations

had

made efforts

-

throughout the Punta del Este C o n f e r e n c ~ ; t o ar range a meeting between

me and Che.

This was obviously done

with Che

s

approval, i

not his

urging, I had

avoided

such a meeting during the

Conference, On

Thurs-

day we

ar r ived in Montevideo and I was invited to a birthday par ty for

the. local Brazi l ian

delegate

to the Free Trade area, ;

After I

arrived,

and had been there for

about

an hour,

one

of the Argentines

present

(who

had

been on the Argentine delegation)

informed m e

they were in-

viting Che to the party, .

He

arr ived about 2 A,

M.

and

told

Edmundo

Barbosa DaSHva of Brazi l

and Horatio :Larre t ta

of

Argentine that

he

had

something to say to

me,

The four of us entered a room, and the follow-

ing is a

summary

of what

took place, (The

Argentine and Brazil ian

al-

ternated as interpreters)

Che was wearing green fatigues,

and

his

usual

overgrown and scraggly

beard, Behind the beard his features are quite

soft,

almost feminine,

and his

manner is

intense,

He has

a

good sense of humor, and

there

was considerable joking back and

for th

during the meeting. He seemed

very

i l l a t ease

~ e r i

we

began

to talk, but soon became re laxed

and

spoke

freely, Although he lef t no doubt

of his personal and

intense

de-

votion to

communism,

his

conversation

was f ree

of propaganda and

bombast, . He spoke calmly,

in

a

st raightforward manner ,

and with

the

appearance

of detachment

and

objectivity,

He le f t no doubt, a t

any

time,

that he felt completely free to speak for his

gover=ien t

and

ra re ly dis-

tinguishe.d

between his personal observations

and the official

posi t ion

of

the Cuban

government,, I

had the

definite

impress ion

that he

had

thought

out his r emarks very

carefully they

were extremely well organized.

DeCLASSIFIEO

E 0 1 :??ISt ~ e

3,4

l-h i.


14/98

SECRET

2

I

told him

at

the

outset

that

I

had

no

authority

to

negotiate my

countryts

problems, but would repor t what he said

to

inter\)sted

offi.cials

of

our government, He

said good and

began,

Guevara

began by

saying that

I

must

unders tand

the

Cuban revolu

tion,,

They intend

to

build

a socia l is t s tate ,

and

the revolution

which

they

have

begun is i r revers ib le , They a re also now out of the

U.:S.

sphere

of infl.uence,

and

that too is i r revers ib le

They

w ll establish

a

s ingle-party

sys tem

with Fidel as Secretary-General of

the party,

Their t ies with

the

East stpm

f rom

natural sympathies , and

common

beliefs in

the proper s tructure of the social

orde r

They

feel that

they

have

the

support

of the

masses

for

their

revolution,

and

that that

suppor.t will grow as

t ime

passes

He

said that

the United States

must

not act on the false assumptions

that (a) we

can rescue Cuba f rom the

claws

of conununism

(he

meant

by

other

than

direct mili tary action}; b} that

Fidel

is

a

moderate

surrounded

by a bunch of fanatic and aggressive men, and might be

moved to

the

Western side; (c) that

the

Cuban

revolut ion

can be over

thrown f rom

within

- - there is he said, diminishing support

for

such

an effort and

i t

will never be s trong enough,

He spoke of

the

grea t

st rength

of

the

Cuban

revolution,

and

the impact

i t

has

had

on l ibera l

thought

throughout Latin Ainerica , For

example,

he

said,

all

the leftwing forces

in

Uruguay were joining

forces under

the banner of

Cuba,.

He said civil war would break

out

in

many coun

trie's. i Cuba

were

in

danger - -

and

such

war might break

out

in

any

event,,

He

spoke

with

great

intensi ty

of the

i lnpact

of

Cuba

on the

con

t inent

and

the

growing

s trength of i ts example,

e

said that in

building a

communis t s tate

they

had

not r e p e t e d ~

of the aggressive moves of the East,) They did not intend to construct

an i ron cur ta in

around Cuba

but

to

welcome technicians

and

visitors.

f rom

all

countries

to

come

and

work,j

He

touched

on the matter of the plane thefts He said

he

didntt know i

I knew

but they

had not been

responsible for

any hijackings, , The

f i rst

plane

was

taken

by a

young fellow

who was a

good

boy but a

l i t t le

wild

and

who is now

in

ja i l They

suspected

that

the l a s t

plane

was

taken

by

a provocateur (a CIA agent),J He is afraid that i

t hese

thefts keep up

i t

wi l l be very

dangerous,

SEGRET


15/98

SECRET

- 3 -

He began

t discuss

the

difficulties of the Alliance for Progress . He

asked

me i f

I

had

heard his speech at the

closing

of

the conference.

I said I

had Hstened to i t closely.

He

said

that

t

explained

his view-

point on the Alliance for Progress . (In

this

speech he said the idea

of

the

Alianza

was fine, but i t would fail . He spoke

also

of the play

of historical

forces

working on behalf

of

comrrmnis:rn, etc. - - that

there

would

be either

left ists

revolutions

or r ight ist

coups leading to

le f t is t

takeovers, and there

was

also a s t rong chance that the corrunies

would get in through popular

election.


16/98

SECRET

- 4 -

put forth such a formula because

we had public opinion to

worry

about

whereas

he

could accept anything without worrying about

public

opinion.

I said

nothing, and

he waited

and then said that, in

any event, there

were

Some things he

had

in mind.I

1. That

they could not give

back

the

expropriated

properties the

fac

to r ies

and banks but

they could

pay

for them

in trade.

z.

They could agree not to make any

polit ical all iance

with the East -

although this would

not affect

their natural sym pathies .

3. They would have free elections but only after a period of institu

t ionalizing the revolution had been completed. In

response

to

m y

question

he said

that this included the establishment of a one-party

system.:

4 .

f course, they would

not

attack Guantanamo., (At this point

he

laughed as i

a t

the absurdly self-evident nature of such a s tatement _

5.1 He indicated, very obliquely,

and with evident r ~ u c t n c e

because

of

the

company in which we were talking, that they could also discuss

the

activi

t ies of

the

Cuban revolution in

other

countries.:

He

then went

on

to

say

that he wanted to thank

us

very

much for the

in

vasion tha t

i t

had been a

great

political victory for them

enabled

them to consol.idate and transformed

them

f rom

an aggrieved

little

country to an equal.

Guevara

said he knew

i t

was difficult

to

air;i;:S these

things

but

we could

open

up some

of

these

i ssues by beginning

to discuss subordinate i ssues

He suggested discussion of the airplane

issue.

(presumably,

we would

use

the airplane

i ssue as

a

cover

for

more ser ious conversation}

He said they could discuss no

formula

th;: .t

would

mean giving up

the

type

of

society

to

which they

were

dedicated.

At close

he

said that

he

would tel l

no

one of the

substance

of this

conversa

tion except

Fidel .

I said I would not publicize i t either.1

SECRET


17/98

SECRET

5

After the conversation was

terminated

I

left

to

record

notes

on

what

had been said. He stayed at the

party,

and talked with the Brazilian

and

Argentine.,

The Argentine fellow l larret ta called

m e

the

next morning

to say

that Guevara had thought

the

conversation

quite

profitable, and had told

im

that i t was much easier to

talk

to someone of the

newer

generation,1

The above is substantially a complete account of the entire c o n v ~ e r s a t i o n

( \ )1c)L-

Dick

Goodwin

SECRET


18/98

l OF SECRET

EYES

ON:L Y

March 4,

1963

.ME1vi0RANDUM

FOR

THE RECORD

SUBJECT:

Mr.

Donovan s Trip

to Cuba

At

Mr.

Bundy s

request

I

passed

to

Bob

Hurwitch the

following

Presidential

reactions to the

attached memorandum:

._.-

'- ._

t..- _.. - :.

1. The President does

not

agree that we

should

make the

breaking

of

Sino/Soviet t ies a non-negotiable

point.

We don t want

to present

Gasho

with a condition that he obviously cannot fuUUl.

We

should start thinking along more flexible

lines.

2.

Donovan

should reeiat

taking his

week-long walk along

the beach

with

Castro

until

we

have had a chance to give Donovan

a very good briefing. We may want to give Donovan

some flies

to

dangle

in

front of

Castro.

3. The above must

be

kept close to

the

vest. The

President ,

himself,

ia very

interested

n this one.

Gordon Chase

TOP S::GRE f ETES ONLY


19/98

TOP SECRET - EYES QNLY

April

11, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr Bundy

SUBJECT:

Cuba

Policy

l We are all concerned about solving our

Cuba

problem, but so far,

we

have been looking

seriously

at only

one side

of the coin ways

to hurt Castro by varying

degrees

of overt and

covert

nastiness. We

have not yet

lo6ked seriously

at the

other side

of the coin quietly

enticing

Castro

over to US.

z

I f the

sweet

approach

turned out to

be feasible

and,

in

turn,

successful, the benefits

would

be substantial.

n

the short

run, we

would probably

be able to

neutralize

at lea.st 2 of

our

main worries

about

Castro

the reintroduction of offensive missiles and

Cuban

subversion.

n

the long

run, we

would

be

able

to

work on eliminating

Castro

at our

leisure

and from a

good

vantage

point.

3.

While

the practical obstacles

to

this sort of approach

may

be

immense,

they

may not be

insuperable. Two

such obstacles

are

the domestic

p8Utical

situation and Castro s reluctance to be entieed.

(a)

Domestic Problem

I f the American people

can

be shown

that

the

offensive missi le threat and the subversive threat

are

under

control, that the Russian presence in

Cuba

i s

reduced and

that Castro

is much more a nationalist than

a

Communist, the selling

Vc>b

necessary

for

a

careful,

quiet policy

turn-around

may not be impossible.

b) Castro s

Reluctance to be Enticed This may beuan

easier

nut to crack now than

lt once

would have been,

Castio

may

have received, from our

point

of

view,

some very

valuable

education

over the past couple

years.

Hopefully,

he

has

learned that

the

Russians

are not

as

tough and

reliable as

he

thought they

were and that

we

are a

lot tougher

and nastier

than he thought we were; also

hopefully,

he

is

scared.

DECLASSiFl ::D


20/98


21/98

. .. .g:E-C-R-E-T' _ I

NO

FO .REIGN

DISSEM/CONTROLLED

DISSEM/NO

DISSEM A B ~ D B A C K G R O U N D USE ONLY

CENTR L INTELLIGENCE GENCY

WASHINGTON 2S

D C.

1 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intel l igence

SUBJECT Interview of U.S. Newswoman with

Fidel

Castro Indicating Possible Interes t in

Rapprochement

with the United

Sta tes

1. On 30 April 1963

Liza

Howard U.S. newswoman

associated with

the American

Broadcasting.

Company

returned to

Miami

from

Cuba

where

she

.had

interviewed

a

number

of high-ranking Cuban

of f ic ia l s including

Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, Ernesto Che Guevara,

Vilma

Espin

de

Castro,

Raul Roa, and Rene Vallejo. Her

conversat ions with

Fidel

Castro tota led

about

ten hours

and included one session

on 22

April which las ted from

12:45 a.m. to 5:30 a.m.

Following

is an account of

those conversations and Liza Howard's observations

concerning the present Cuban

s i tua t ion .

2. I t appears that

Fidel

Castro

i s

looking for

a

way to reach a rapprochement with the United Sta tes

Government,

probably because

he

is aware

tha t

Cuba

is

in

a s t a t e of economic chaos.

The October

blockade

hurt the

Cuban economy. Liza Howard believes

tha t

Castro

ta lked

about

th is

matter

with her

because

she

is known as a

progressive

and she

ta lked

with

him

in frank, blunt ,

honest terms; Castro has l i t t l e opportunity to hear

th is type of conversat ion. Castro indicated tha t

i f

a

rapprochement

was

wanted President John F.

Kennedy

would

have

to

make the f i r s t move. In response to

the

s t a t e -

ment tha t Castro would probably have to make the f i r s t

move,

Castro asked what

the U.S. wanted

from

him.

When

a

re turn to

the original aims of the revolut ion was

suggested, Fidel

said

that perhaps

he,

President

Kennedy,

S-::.E-C-R.;.E-T

NO

FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM

ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY


22/98


23/98


24/98

, . - i E C-R-E-'J . -- .

O

FOREIGN

DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE

ONLY

discuss rapprochement and

she

herself is

ready

to discuss

i t

with

him

i

asked

to

do

so

by

the

U.S.

Government.

- ? z - h : : d ~

Deputy Director Plans)

CSDB-3/654,439

Orig: The

Director

of Central

Intel l igence

cc:

Special

Assistant

to the President

for National Security

Affairs

The Director of Intell igence

and Research

Department of

State

The Director,

Defense

Intelligenci;;, gency

The Attorney General

The

Department

of Just ice

The

Deputy Director

of

Central

Intel l igence

Deputy Director for Intel l igence

Assistant

Director

for

National Estimates

Assistant Director for u r ~ e n t Inte l l igence

- 4 -

lil

E GcR

-El

='il

O FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY


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- Sli:C:>l ET

SEMB1TI V

Novcnilicr lZ, 1903

I

talkod

l:hi.s :;lftornoon with William .Attwood a:c.d "tllll&

him

that

at

th-a P raGident s instruction. I was conveying thi.G

mes.sage

o::: .lly

and

nc:

by

C i : . ~ l c .

I

told him

that

the

Presldant

hop ?d

110 would

go1 n touch with

Vallejo

to

i:eport that

i t

did net

aacm

p;;acticr.blo

to us at

this

:;it.'.lge to

sand

an Amcdcan ofii.cicl. to Caba

=d

1/bs.t

we

;-;o"ld

pl"o er

to be:;:in with a vi.cit

by

V'clfojo

to tho

O

.S. where.

..'1.tt\yood would

be

glad

to lleo him

and to liatan

to

any me&SatJS

he miaht bring ::om CV .&. , . ; ; : r ~ - l IC'> l :t

i:...o;::;. :::.:::

C - : . i ? ; ~ n : : : r . . 1 \ t i ~ o o ~ :ln:::=.catcd

W

me. thot. Jv;

-ex-pectecl

U ~ c . .

- I r . : . i : ;

r ; . : . ~ d .

to

t : ; : l ~ ~ - i c : i a

..

a l l c j t ~

and

h ~ a

probably

to

get

Ol'l-tlte

l i ~ ~

l ~ ~

?Jc1 to Uo.ndl:a t ;.o c c t 1 \ ~ o r 3 c . t c n alons i lle lines staied ~ a t t e .

P tt ..

~ o o d

t'":ill

l"c-po:rt

t . 1 . - ~ :-cct"lt.::J

o:

tbio

c o m m t t n L e ~ ' l i o n .

and n - t 1 J ~

event i: 'lr:t

an ~ r Z ~ : l e c m o n t mado fc:r Vallejo "to came

to

Mew

Yark

Att-;;-ccd will como to Wachlnzton to concert a rnsliibl l-k.r bls iise

k i this cc11.11er.saoon.

~ c G .

B,

SEGRE'X' - SENSl'fIZE

c

2

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.1. .

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..... u,. copy

c e ~

UlJ

LIBRARY


26/98

SF

:3ECR

. :I -

SENSI:PIVE -

EYE

Q N I y

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE

WHITE

HOUSE

WASH INGTON

November 19, 1963

MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Approach to Castro

Bill

Attwood called to report the

following:

. . . .

.

1.

Lisa

Howard

called

Vallejo and

then

put

Bil l

Attwood on

the

line. Vallejo repeated his

invitation

for Bil l to come

to

Cuba,

adding that the vis i t would be very

secure. Bill replied

that

this

was impossible for the present , that

preliminary

talks were es-

sential ,

and

that Vallejo

might

consider

coming

to New

York.

2. Vallejo said he

could not

make

it

to

New

York

at

this

t ime.

However,

a message would be sent to

Lechuga instructing

him to

discuss

an

agenda with

Bill. Bill

agreed

that this

might be a

good

way

for

the

Cubans to

convey what was on their

mind.

He added that

we are

prepared to

listen.

.

3.

The

ball

is

now in

astro

1

s

court . As

ljlOOn

as

Lechuga

calls

Bill

to

set up

an

appointment for the

discuss ion

of

an

agenda,

Bill

will get

in touch

with us.

Gordon Chase

fOP

SECRET

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SENOil l PTE

EYES

ONLY

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... . . ........ . . - - - : '

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C6Ff

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LIBRARY


27/98

...

l

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s

'Y I ' ' '

. 'his document ~ o n s i s t o:t ,f' nage

No

o t

4

oopies,

Series- B

UNITED STATES MISSION

TO THE

UNITED

NATIONS

MEMORANDUM

SBSFH3 3.

TO:

Gordon Chase

FROM:

William Attwood

November 8, 1963

DEC .ASSmED

E.O. 12356,

Sec.

3.


28/98

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Thia article

stressed

Castro s expressed desire for

reaching an accommodation

with

the united States and

his

willingness

to make substantial concessions

to

this

end. On September 12 I talked with Miss Howard whom

I have known for some

years,

and .she echoed Ambassador

Diallo

1

s

opinion that

there was a

r i t

between Castro

and the Guevara-Hart-Aliieida groupon the question of

Cuba s

future

course,

On

September 12 I

discussed

this

with

Under

Secretary

Harriman in Washington.

He suggested

I prepare a

memo

and

we arranged to meet in New York

the

following week.

On September 18 I wrote a

memorandum

based on

these

talks and on

corroborating information

I had heard in

Conakry.

In i t

I

suggested

that discreet contact might

be

established with

the

Cubans at the

n i t e ~

Nations to find

out whether

Castro

in fact wanted

to talk,

and on our terms.

I showed this

memo

to Ambassador

Stevenson, who

felt

the

matter

was worth exploring quietly and

who

indicated he

might discuss i t with the

President.

On September 19 I met Harriman in New York. After

reading my memo he suggested I also discuss i t

with

the

Attorney-General

because

of the poli t ical

implications

of the Cuban issue.

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t BRARY


29/98

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On September

20,

I made an appointment with the

Attorney-General in

Washington. Meanwhile, Stevenson

obtained the President s approval for me to make

discreet

contact

with

Dr. Lechuga, cubas

chief

delegate at the

United Nations.

On September 23, I met Dr. Lechuga at Miss Howard s

apartment. She has been on good terms with Lechuga since

her

vis i t with

Castro

and

invited

him

for

a

drink to

meet

some

friends who

had

also

been

to

Cuba, I was

Just

one

of

those friends, In

the

course of our conversation,

which

started

with recollections of my own talks

with

Castro in

1959, I mentioned

having read

Miss Howard s

ar t icle .

Lechuga

hinted that Castro

was

indeed

in

a

mood to

talk,

especially

with someone he had met before.

He thought

there was a good

chance that I might be

invited

to Cuba

i

l9-Wished to resume

our 1959

talk.

I

told

him that in

ciy

present

position,

I

would need

off icial authorization to make

such a t r ip , and

did not know i i t would be forthcoming. However, I

said

an

exchange

of

views

might

well be

useful

and that I would

find

out

and

le t

him know.

On September

24,

I

saw

the

Attorney-General

in Washington,

gave

him

my

September 18

memo

and

reported my

meeting

with

Lechuga. He said he would

pass

the memo on to Mr. McGeorge

Bundy; meanwhile, he

thought that

i t would be

diff icult

for me to

visit Cuba

without

i t

being known

and

risking

SESRE Jl


30/98

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the accusation

that

we were trying to make a deal with Castro,

e wondered

i f

i t might be possible to meet Castro

i f

that 's

what he wanted in another

country,

such as Mexico,

or

at

the United Nations, Meanwhile, he agreed

i t

would be

useful

to

maintain contact

with Lechuga. I

said

I would so

inform

Lechuga and

wait

to

hear

from him or Bundy.

Back in New York, I informed Stevenson of my talk with

Lechuga and the Attorney-General.

On

Seppember 27, I

ran

into

Lechuga

at

the

United

Nations,

where he was doing a television interview in the lobby with

Miss Howard, I told him

that

I had discussed our talk in

Washington, and that

i t

was felt that my

accepting an

inv.ita

t ion

to

go

to

Cuba would be ciifficult'under present circum

stances, especially in view of my official

status,

I added,

however, that i f

Castro

or a personal emis-i.ary had something

to

t e l l

us,

we

were

prepared to

meet him and

l isten

wherever

else

would be convenient. Lechuga said he would so inform

Havana. Meanwhile,

he forewarned

me that

he

would be making

a hard anti-U.S. speech in the

United

Nations on.October 7,

I remarked that i t wouldn't help reduce tensions; he replied

he couldn't help making i t because of

the

blockade.

On October 7, in his reply to Lechuga

1

s

tough

speech,

Stevenson

suggested that i f Castro wanted peace with his

neighbors, he need

only

do

three

things

,--

stop

being

a Soviet

stooge, stop

trying

to subvert other

nations,

and star t

carrying out

the

promises

of his revolution regarding consti-


31/98

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On October

18,

at dinner

at the

home of Mrs. Eugene

Meyer, I talked with Mr. c. A. Doxiades, a noted Greek

architect

and

town-planner,

who

had

Just

returned

from an

architects congress

in

Havana, where he had talked

alone

to both Castro and Guevara, among others. He

sought me

out, as

a government

official ,

to say he was

convinced

Castro would welcome a normalization of relations with the

United States i he

could do

so without

losing too

much

face. He also said that

Guevara and the

other

communists

were oppos.ed

to

any

deal,

and

regarded Castro as dangerously

unreliable; and

that

they would get r id of Castro

i

they

thought

they could

carry

on

without

him and retain his

popular support.

On October 20, Miss Howard asked

me

i

she

might cal l

Major Rene ValleJo, a Cuban

surgeon

who

is

also Castro s

current right-hand man

and

confidant.

She?said

Vallejo

helped her see

Castro

and made,it plain to

her

he opposed

the Guevara group. They became friends and have talked on

the

phone several times since

the

interview, Miss Howard s

purpose

in

calling him now was that she

thought

any message

from Lechuga would

not get past the foreign office,

and

she

wanted to make

certain,

through ValleJo, that Castro knew

there

was a U.S.

official

available i

he

wanted

to

talk.

I told

her

to go ahead, so long as she referred to my

SECFffi'f

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32/98

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talk with

Lechuga and made

i t quite

plain we were

not

soliciting

a meeting but only expressing our

willingness

to l isten

to

anything

they

had to say, She then

'called

Vallejo at his home He was

out

and she lef t word for

him

to

call her back.

On October

21, Gordon Chase

called me

from the White

House

in connection with my

September 18

memo

I

brought

him up

to

date and said the ball

was

in their court.

On

October

23,

Vallejo

called

Miss Howard

at

her

New

York apartment. She was out of town; he lef t word with

the

maid

that

he would call

again.

On

October

28, I ran into Lechuga in the U.N. Delegates

Lounge. He

told me

that Havana did

not

think

sending

someone

to

the United Nations for

talks would be

useful

at

this

time .

But he hoped he and I might have

s ~ informal

chats from time

to

time, I said i t was up

to

him and he

could

call

me

i f

he fel t

like

i t , He wrote

down

my

extension.

On October 29, Vallejo a g ~ i n

called

Miss Howard

at

home,

He assured

her,

in response

to her

question, that Castro s t i l l

fel t as he

did

in April about improving relations

with

us,

As to his going to

the

United Nations or elsewhere for such a

talk,

Vallejo said

i t

was impossible

for Castro

to leave the

country at the present time. But he said he would relay h.er

.

t ~


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I

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d

.

< f ~ S llSREW

do

not

remember

him).

Miss Howard

got

the

impression

that Lechugas previous

message

to

Havana had

not

reached

Vallejo

or

Castro.

On

November 1, Miss Howard

reported the Vallejo call

to me

and I

repeated i t

to Chase

on

November

4.

On November 5, I met

with

Bundy and Chase

at

the

h i ~ e

House and informed them

of the foregoing, The

next day, Chase

called

and asked me

to

put

i t in

writing,

'

WAttwood:nmg

.,

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~ a

.

.

.. .

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35/98

.

UNITED

STATES MISSION

TO

THE

UNITED NATIONS

November 22, 1963

MEMORANDUM

TO: Gordon Chase

FROM:

William Attwood

Following

is

an

addition

to my memorandum to you dated

November 8, 1963;

On November 11,

Vallejo

called

Miss

Howard again to

1

-

reiterate their appreciation

of the need

for security

and to

say that Castro would

go along with any

arrangements

we might

want to make. He

specif ical ly

suggested that a Cuban

plane

could

come

to Key West and

pick

up

the

emissary;

alternatively

they would agree to have him come in a u.s1'plane which could

land at one

of

several secret airf ie lds .near Havana.

He

emphasized that only

Castro and himself would be

present

at

the talks and that no one else

he

specif ical ly mentioned

Guevara

would be

involved. Vallejo also rei tereated

Castro

desire for th is ta lk and hoped to hear

our answer

soon.

On

November

12,

Bundy

called

me

and

I

reported Vallejo

1

s

message. He said this

did

not affect

the

White House decision

that a preliminary

ta lk

with

Vallejo

at

the United Nations

should be held

in order

to

find

out

what Castro

wanted to

SECRE f

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36/98

2-

SE8RE'f

ta lk

about

-- part icularly i f he was seriously interested

in

discussing

the

points cited

in

Stevenson s

October 7

speech.

Bundy

suggested

I

transmit

our

decision to

Vallejo,

stressing

the

fact that , since we are

responding

to their invi ta t ion

and are not sol ic i t ing a

meeting,

we

would

l ike to know more

about

what

i s on Castro s mind before

commiting

ourselves

to further

talks

in Cuba

n November 13, I went to Miss

Howard s

apartment

and

called

Vallejo

at

home

There

was no

answer.

She

then sent

a telegram asking that he cal l her at his convenience.

n November 14, Vallejo called her. She gave him

my

message --

that we

would want

to

ta lk

to

him

here a t the

United Nations

before

accepting an

invi ta t ion

to go to Cuba

She

said

that , i f he wished to

confirm

or

~ i s u s s

th i s

further

with

the U.S.

off ic ia l

he

could

cal l him (Vallejo)

at

home

on

the evening of November

18.

Vallejo said he

would

be there to receive the

call .

Meanwhile, he did not exclude

the

possibi l i ty

of his coming to the

United

Nations

and

said

he

would

discuss i t

with

Castro.

n November 18,

Miss

Howard reached Vallejo

at home

and

passed

the

phone

to me I told him Miss Howard had kept

me

informed of her ta lks with him

and that

I assumed

he

knew of

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our

in terest in

hearing

what Castro had in mind.

Vallejo

said

he

did,

and

rei terated

the invi ta t ion to

Cuba,

stressing

the

fact

that security could

be guaranteed.

I

replied

that

we fel t a

preliminary meeting

was

essential to

make

sure

there

was something

useful to

talk

about, and

asked

i f

he was

able

to come to New York. Vallejo

said

he

could

not come at this

time . However,

i f that s

how we fe l t , he said that we

would send

instructions to

Lechuga

to

propose

and

discuss

with

me

an

agenda

for

a

la ter

meeting

with

Castro.

I

said

I would

await

Lechugas cal l . Vallejo

1

s manner was extremely cordial

and he called me Sir

throughout

the conversation.

On

November

19,

I called Chase, and reported the

conversa-

tion.

WAttwood:nmg

-SECRE P

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LIBRARY


38/98

THE WHITE

H O U S E

\VA ;

--l

IN TON

TO P i>ECPl:T - EYES ONLY

November 25, l963

MEMOR/1.NDUM

FOR MR. DUNDY

SUBJECT: Cubil - -

I tem

of

Prcsidcnti i l l

l n t e r c s t _

1. I

assume

you will want to br ief the Pres iden t on Bill Attwood's

Cuban

ex

erc i se which

is

presumJ.b]y st i l l in t ra in {sc:c

attached).

2. My own thinking on this one, vis a

vis

the

events of November 22,

is st i l l

very

fluid; but here

i t is . Dasic;illy, the, events

of

November 22 would appear

to

make

accomodation with Cast ro an even more doubtful issue than i t was.

while

I think that Pres iden t

Kennedy

could have accornodated

with

Cast ro and

gotten away

with it with

a minimum

of

domest ic

heat ,

I m

not

sure

about

Pres i -

. dent

Johnson. For

one

thing,

a new

Pres iden t who

has no

background

of being

successful ly nasty to

Cas t ro and

the Communis t s

(e,

g.

Pres ident Kennedy

in

October ,

1962 ,

would probably run

a

grea ter

r i sk of being

accused, by

the

Amer ican

people,

of going

sof t , In

addit ion,

the

fact that Lee Oswald has

been heralded as

a

pro-Cas t ro

type

may

make

rapproachment

with Cuba

more

difficult - - although

it is

ha r d to

say

how much more difficult .

3.

I f

one concludes thCJ t

the prospects for accornodation

with Cas t ro

a re

much

d immer than they

were

before

November 22, then Bil l

Attwood

1

s

present

effor t loses much of i ts meaning. We

would

appear to

have three a l ternat ive

courses

of

action

in

handling the presen t status

of

the Attwood-1;


39/98

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40/98

~

.

O ) f f i c ~ nf

t ~ e

i\ttnrn.ey 0 D r u 1 ~ r u l

llanl1ingtntt ii

Qt

December

12,

1

~ 6 3

HLllOP.ANDUM FOR HONO

RAB

LE DEAN H.USl:

0ECHTAIts to p roh ib i t

f u t u r e

t r ave l to Cuba

woulc

t ake the f ollowing

form:

{1)

Publ ic i ty

t ha t

t r a v ~ l

to

Cuba

i s

p.rohibi

ecl

l;,y t he

goverrtril


41/98

(2)

No

't i f i c a t i o n o f all c a r r i er s

and

c u ~ : : t o m

s

o f f i c i a1 s t h a t t r a v e l to Cuba i s proh ib i t ed

and th:1 :t they . should ta l ;::e

measures

to br ing

to t h e

P

OV

ernment

s

a t t e n t i o n any

a

t teni

ot s

to

v i o l ~ t e

t he

law.

.

------

. : - ----

(3 )

l n

efi,:.ort

to

remove

pas

f :;p

o r t s

of

p er

.sons

wherever we

have r easonab le ground

t

ha

t

they

may be headed for

Cuba

. This pres e

n t s

some

. l e g

a l and

p r a c t i c a l

d i f f i c u l t i e s .

The

r

ig h t

t o phys ica l ly

s e i z e

p s ~ p o r t s h ~ s never

been

t e s ted

; it

would be d i f f i c u l t in

many i n s t ances

to

g o to Cuba ; and p a s s p o ~ t

0 o u l d

n o ~ b ~ needed

fo r t r ave l to Cuba from Ca .nacla o r Mexico , and

pe

rhaps

some

other .c:::oul:rtries

L})

Prosecu t ion

Of

all

peri:>onS .

t r a v e l i n

g

to

.

Cuba

. in v i o l a t i o n of l ~ w ~ This i s c o n t ~ ~ r y

to t he s t eos we took in the first

in s tan6

c

t6

p r o s e ~ u t e l eader s

or1ly;

would r equ i r e us to

i n d i c t

a l l 'o r

most

o f '. :tJ1e

s tudents

.

who

made

t he p:rior t r i p ; ahd c: ould"

r e s u l t

,n l i t e r 1 l l y .

hundreds

of

.

ind ic tmen ts

if

p:resent plans f e r

t r a v e l to Cuba a r e c a r r i e d th rough.

. ( 5)

Seek

an i n j u n c t i o n

with

r e s pec t

to

any

group

Hhere

we

have

rea son

to

be l i eve th e

y

.

a r e

headed fo r C ~ b a .

There

a re

l ega l d i f f i

c u l t i e s

in secur ing s0ch an in j t inc t ion in view

o f th e f a c t th .a t c r imina l

refl\ed i e

s

e x i s

t t ie

could

improve

our> chances fo r i n junc t ive r e l i e f

on l y

by

p

r>omptly

br ing ing more

in


42/98

i n c c ma j o r appea l to

s tuc lents

o f

s u

ch t r a v l . l i e :3

i n t h e

f a c t

. t h a t

the government

p r o h i b i t s

it

.

Th e ma j o r

arguments

a g a i n s t p e r ~ i t t i n g t rav e l to

Cuba are :

(1)

I t

0oul d

be

i n t e rp re fe d

by som

e g rou ps

as

a

sof t e n i ng

of our

pol i cy to

w

ard

Cu ba ;

(

2 )

e cannot provic1e pi.. o

- tect ion

fo r p

e r

son s

t rav e l l i n ~ t h e r e th rough

normal

d i p

lom

a

ti

c

c hu n n

e l s ;

ancl

O ) I t makes more d i f f i c u l t

our

po s

iti

o n \vi t h

r e

s p ec t t o

t he Cen t ra l

American

c o u n t r i es

,

ha

v i

ng a gr eed wi th them to t ake e f f o r t s to

c urt il t r a v e l to Cu ba .

The pr i n c i p a l

aP

guments

fo r

remov

in

g the pr e s e n t

r es t r i c t i o n s

a re

:

1 )

I t

i s g oing to be ex t remely d i f f i c u l,t

under

t h e

be s t of cond i t ions to .pr e v

en t

t r a v eJ

to

Cu ba ancl

t h i s pro b lem i s li ke ly

to

be i n c r ea s

in

g l y e:nbar r a s s

in

g

to us t h i s summer ;

( 2 ) I t i s

more

cons

i s t e n t

with our

v ie

ws

o f

a

f r

ee

s o c i e ty and wou l d c o n t r a s t with such t h in g s

as

t h e Be r l i n Wall and Communist c o n t ro l s on such t r a v e l .

h e

n

th e se

two

a r e put t o g e th e r , they

form a

power f u l

a r g umen t

in t e rms

o f

both domest ic

and i n t e r n a t i o n a l

p o l i t i c s (excep t f

o r

Cen t r a l America ) f or

t ak ing such

a s t e o. And I

be l i eve it l i k e l y

t h a t

th

e r e muld b e

l ess t r a v e l

to

Cuba i f r e s t r i c t l . ons wer e

removed

than

th ere wi l l be

if t h ~ y

a r e mainta ined . Fur the r ,

tho

s e

who t r ave l would

be

l e s s l i k e l y to

be organ iz

ed b } ,

i

nf luence

d

by

rn

d ,

to

a

degree

,

co n t r o l l ed

by

t he

l e

ft

-

wing rn

ovements which

have

p r e s en t l y taken ov er

much o f

t h i s

a g i t a t i o n . The chances . f6 r Cas t ro to

g e t a

cl

v a nta g e from ou r permi t t i ng

t r a v e l

a:r' e faP l e s s

t h

an from

our p

r o h i b i t i o n

coupled

with t he

i rrun

en

s e

an

d d i s t a s t e f u l p r o s ecu t i

on

s

which

it

i;

1i11 p

roba

b

ly

r e o u

i r e .

I-t J O u l c l

b e

much

e a s i e r

to

remove r e s tri c t ion$ on

t r av

e l

to Cuba now than it woulcl be a f t

e r

t h e com

D

l e t

i

on

o f sev e ra l of t h e contem p

l a t ed

t r i p s and

wh

en t he . m

a t t e r

i s

i.

n t h e D

Ubl ic

e y

e . Hhi le th

e r e

woul

cl

be

.c r i t i ci.s

rn

,

J 1; di e v c tiL:1t it wou1 cl

be

l es s c P i t i c i ;

:c

d

a

nd mor e


43/98


44/98

~ ~ . w .

J f ' i ' ; ' 4

l ~ ~ ' t J ,

t h ~ i l : t t ~ m t . ~ ~ J .

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1.. ~

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n. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e witb

t b ~

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45/98


46/98


47/98

\ _c

4.

Tell

the

President and I cannot

stress

this too

strongly) that I seriously hope that Cuba and

the

United States can eventually

s i t down

in an atmosphere

of good will and of mutual respect and

negotiate our

d i f f e r e ~ c e s

I believe that there are Q. areas of

contention

between us that

cannot

be

discussed

and

sett led within a climate of mutual understanding.

But

f i rs t

of

course,

t

i s

necessary

to discuss

our

dif-

ferences. I now

believe that

this host i l i ty between

Cuba and

the United

States 1s both unnatural and

unnecessary - and

i t

can be e l i m i n a t e d ~

5. Tell

the

President he should not interpret my conciliator

att i tude, my desire for

discussions

as

a

sign

of weakness

Such an interpretation would be a

serious

miscalculation.

We are not weak the

Revolution

1s strong

very

strong.

Nothing, absolutely

nothing that the United

States can do will destroy the

Revolution.

Yes, we are

strong.

nd

i t

is

from

this

position

of

strength

that

we wish to resolve

our

differences

with

the United States

and

to

l ive in

peace

with

l l

the nations of the

world.

6.

Tell

the President

I

realize fully the

need for absolute

secrecy,

1f

he should decide to continue the Kennedy

approach.

I revealed

nothing

at that

time

I have

revealed

nothing since

I would reveal

nothing

now.

COPY L J

LIBRA


48/98

99

UNITED

NATIONS PLAZA

NE\V YORK 17 N

Y

YUkon 6 4 4

To:

From:

FOP SECRE F

The President

UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE

TO

THE UNITED NATIONS

June 16, 1964

Adlai E,

S t e v e n so n Q 2 f -

Last fa l l ,

with

the knowledge of

JFK, I

brought

Lisa Howard

and

Ambassador Bil l

Attwood

now

in

Nairobi)

together to

consider

Castro s statement to her

in

Havana

that he

wanted

to

open

discussions with

the United

States .

Under my

supervision,

the project had

reached

the

point

of preparat ion of

an agenda by

the

Cubans,

when

President

Kennedy was assassinated. Lisa Howard now

informs

me

that following

fur ther ta lks and

correspondence

with

Castro she

was asked to

give

you the attached message.

Attwood s

communication

was through Dr. Rene Vallejo,

said to be Castro s close friend and companion. e speaks

perfect

French

and

English.

While I

am

not sanguine that anything wil l come

of th is , she is

convinced

that he sincerely

wants

some

channel of communication. I f

t

could be resumed on a

low enough level

to

avoid any

possible embarrassment, t

might be worth

considering.

I am.sure i t cannot be done

through the

usual

channels,

I f

you

wish to

discuss th is fur ther ,

l e t

me

know.

COPY LBu LIBR


49/98


50/98

MEMORANDUM

THE

WHITE HOUSE

.-'f'OP SECRE'I

.,,..

W SHINGTON

EYES ONLY

-

-2-

at the same

time

we could

indicate to

Castro

that

we

prefer

to communicate on

the

Lechuga channel

and

that

we

would

apprecia te

his

cooperat ion in keeping

f rom Lisa

news of

this switch in channels.

Another possibility is to level with Lisa

and

tell

her

1)

that we are very

chary of the secur i ty aspects of her p:fy;one

conversat ions between the U.S. and

Havana,

2)

that

we have

decided to use

the Lechuga channel

for

any fur ther m e s -

sages (which Lisa effectively set up), and 3) Lisa should relax, s tay quiet,

and

stand at

the

ready we may want to use her influence with Castro in the future .

r c

Gordon

Chase

COPY LB J


51/98


52/98


53/98

Mankiewiecz - page 3

K: And the

NY

Times

with i t s great

acumen

has

missed

the whole point of

what we did with Cuba at the

OAS.

M:

Really?

I

haven t seen

the

Times.

K: Well,

they

have

an

editorial compru_ning.

M: Complaining that you

didn t

do k anything.

K:

That

the Latin s know what we re doing.

M: Of course they do. I got that from the AP.

f

you know how to read and

if

you know how Latin s

talk,

it

was

quite obvious. I wasn

t surprised when

this other thing came along. I

think

we can make

l l

kinds of ground.

K: Exactly.

What you re doing

may fit really

very

nicely

into

it.

M: I hope

that

you will

not

mention

it

to anybody.

K: Look,

i t s against

my interest.

M: Where

it

could get back to

them.

Above

all,

we certainly

don t

want them

to

think

K:

No, no. What you can do

is

to give

your

impressions. I don t want you to

be a

messenger.

M:

But in any event, you

don t

know that I m going or at least you re not

trea

i t very

seriously

because

otherwise

they get the impression that I seerm to be

but

that I m indeed some kind of

K: No, I

m not going to

talk

to anybody about it.

M:

Good.

K: There s no NE

need

for me to talk to anybody.

M: But file the information away that

that

happened a day or two ago, i t shou

effect your

thinking about other things, perhaps.

K: Exactly. No, I don t consider it an

~ a c c i d e n t

M:

I don t either Just put

it

into your file and I

think

it s significant,

if

you

want to know, that this was the only one

accepted.


54/98

Manki.ewiecz - page 4

K: What

channels

did

they use? I mean, they didn t use

the Soviets

that s

all

M: No

they

used their own UN mission.

K: OK well that s

fine.

M: And

simultaneously

did not

accept

major

networks, all

of which had

been

asking

for

the same thing.

K That s intelligence.

M

In

other

words,

they want

exposure, but

a

K But

from

somebody

with

political

sophistitcation.

M: Exactly.

K Very intelligent.

M: And whom

they

have

reason to

believe,

you know if

not

friendly,

at least

open.

K Exactly.

M: So

it

all

sort

of

fits together

and

r

K

Look

as

soon

as

you

hear

that

r back, will

you call

me.

M:

Yes

I

will.

K Good Franko

M: I will

and

if

you could give them a

date, we d

set

something

up

for late

M

on

the other thing.

K

Right.

M:

Alright, Thank

you

Henry

and

congratulations.

K

Thank

you Frank.

K

END


55/98

MEMORANDUM

CONFIB-ENTL \-J,, (GDS)

NATIONAL

SECURITY

COUNCIL

ACTION

August

30,

1974

MEMORANDUM

FOR:

SECRETARY

KISSINGER

STEPHEN

Lovf >C

FROM:

SUBJECT: Cuba Policy

Events

are

now forcing

us

to make piecemeal

decisions

relating

to

our sanc

tions policy. Decisions already taken on l icenses for Argentine

subsidiar ies

and

agreement for an OAS Committee of Inquiry have moved

us beyond

the

policy framework within which we had

previously been

operating. We are

called

on to make

recommendations and decisions

on

such

matte rs

as Cuban

~

0

0

g

1

their

own decisions,

We should examine

the implications

of these two

out

comes

while there is s t i l l t ime to influence the process , The

terms

of

reference under which the Committee operates will

have

a significant effect

and these will

be

decided within the next two

to

three weeks.

l

In addressing

these

tactical decisions,

we have to think

ahead

to

a restatemen1

of U.S. -Cuba

policy after

the sanctions

have

been lifted o r

modified.

That \

policy will have

to

deal with

maintenance of aabilateral

position as well as

current legislative ,and executive

sanctions

against

thi rd

country trading with

Cuba.

As

more

countries normalize

their

t rade

and

diplomatic relations

with Cuba, pressures

on us

to modify these laws and regulations will increase 1::1

That policy must also

deal with

our bargaining

position vis-a-vis

the Soviet [

Union and Cuba

and pressures from the Congress

to

move quickly toward g

normalization

of bi lateral

relations.

If

you agree, I would propose

to

draw up an options

paper

dealing with the

various alternatives

involved.

The

project should

be

held very closely. I

would plan to

work with

only one person

each

f rom

CIA, State and

Defense.

We would hope to

submit

the paper

for your

and the Pres ident s

consideration

within the next few days,

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve drawing up an options paper

as

outlined above by NSC,

CIA, State

and Defense and on

an extremely res t r i ted

basis

for sub-

mission

to

the President .

Approve

Dis approve

CO:t-lFIDENTJ,;',L (GDS)

a

? I


57/98

We are meeting

here

to explore the

possibilities for

a

rnore no l n1al

relati

> n s ~ 1 i w .:;etv.;eer:

~ u :v,o cOuntries. We do

this a g a L ~ t a b;:.c .


58/98

- 2 -

The United St 'te_s, considers

it

appropriate

t:iat

~ u b a r s

begin

t 9ar>i< ipare 'more

actively

h ~ in:e lectual l:fc of tt.e U n ~ t e d States.

No

purpose

is served in attempting

to embargo

ideas.

Therefore,

it

is reasonable to

expect

that

the

Government of

the United States

may

begin

to grant

additional

visas

f rom time

to

t ime

to Cubans to

visit

this

country

for

cultural,

scientific

and educational meetings and

for other

similar purposes,

in

order

that

such

scholars

and experts may

begin

to communicate more

effectively with

their

colleagues in this country.

We recognize

that there re a number

of

issues

on

both sides.

We anticipate that

many

of these issues

must be

resolved over time

between

us for

itnportant substantive

reasons,

while a number of

them

re essential

for

Cuba or

for the

United States to settle

for

symbolic

reasons.

It would,

ther


59/98

....

- "

DEPARTMENT

OF

STATZ

i

..

OFi'ICE ? 'l"'EE

~ T A R Y

S E C R E ~ T I V E

:;:::::>

.

January

11, 1975

M E J ~ O R A N D U M FOR

THE SECRETARY

. . .

:

. ..

' . .

Subject:

Meeting

"i.n

New York with Cuban

R e p r e s c n t ~ t h e s

Frank

Mankiewicz and I

met

today

at LaGuardia ai rpor t

with

Mr. Nestor Garcia , Fi rs t Secre ta ry of the Cuban Mission to

the

United Nations and Mankiewicz'

basic

contact , and Mr.

Ramon

Sanchez Parodi ,

who

had been

sent

f rom

Havana

to New

York

for

this

meeting.

After M a n ~ i e w i c z

made

the necessary introductions, the fo1.1r

of Ul3

had

cof cc

together

in a La.Guardia res taurant .

Our

conversa

t ion lanted for approximately one

hour.

I

began by saying that" you

a.nd l

had

met scvc ral

t imes on thi.o

iGsua, mo:Jt

r e c e n t ~ for about r.n

hour

lc:i.st night, anci

that

th3

docunlcnt

I

w ~ I J about to

h

i \.nd

o\cr to

them

{

nttachcd)

v.'ils

r o ~ 1 r s

in

both t 1 . o u ~ h t ~ n c l 1Ui1f.U;,:\f. C

that it had be

en

t;pcd

b; my accretaq ' ,

e.nd

t h ~ t

no one

olso

hacl s een

i t . l invited the tv."O

Curons

t:o rca.d

tha

c ocumemt

r.nd

make

any

commentg they m i ~ h t wioh.

A tor

,

rc:oding

the

doc1.uncnt, S:inchoz

P ~ r o d i

sc:.id

that

nr.ithei

hc

nor No i; to

1G l?"ciC& hn.d. l ny ;:iat.l:arHy

to

nc-s otiflto: their

task

w:io

to l b e l \ ~ n t l 1cport

back

to

tbcir

~ u t horiticP. in

H ~ v a n n . . Howc1.or, he

did ..-J:i.r.t t.o rr:a.ke a nu..rnbcr of person.:V. coa1rncnt&:

0

11

..

C u b z ~

cor.:dtlcrcd

th;-.t ' 'US c:n.': in.r. of the b l o d ~ d o of Cub:l

~ . - ; . o

th-:

n ~ c .. e s n r ~

c c ~ d . i t . o n

for

b

i n ~ i . n g th

procoe;' i of

n o n n : : . U : ~ t i l l n . "

It

IH:

?n i

d.

" the d r . ~

q u ~

non. t

would be im?{)f'ir.ibo

for-

Cub.:i

to

b r ~ i n c.lincusdon:i '.'r'ith

tho L ? n ~ t ~ c l S t ; , . ~ : : : a

011

o ~ h ~ r

fo

;) :-t

e ~ u t l t ~ m i ~ .

: : i . ~ d th

i s

r c q ~ i :-r.:d

t h ~ t

tho b . r ; . c : ~ ~ . ; c P . bi?

b r o l ; : : : ~ t to

:ln cm. He ~ ~ i d

t h ~ t

wh

U

o

t

h t: b-2oc

~ c i c w

: ,

r.ol

::

:::

cct:.

e

ro. l'il

y h:\

rrr.

fol.

it

clid

p ~ 0 \ c n t C1:c.:; tr(" m ; l c C c ~ to

t h

e.: .r'\1"' 'lcric


60/98


61/98

SECRET ' - :S ITIVE

7

- 3 -

an

act { Cong

res 9 . I

aisked

whether in his

personal

opinion Cuba would

requi re that we change our

laws

before

t he process

o r:orma.lh:ation

could bcsin. Sanchez Parodi

replied,

"I co n ~ t

think

eo.

Sanchez

Parodi then s i id t h ~ t we had probably seen report

o

.

Cnstro

1

a i s t : l t c : m ~ n t s agninet the l :i.ited Stoi.te:s during the

.. b i t

o Sena tor a

J2.vit:i

ilnd Pell . Ha i1aid thnt ~ ' i c ' e s ta tements were ' ' un;:noidablc " at

the times

but

th.it

~ . - e we:-e rit:1t to t.:i..kc

them

~ ~

v i: n ~ t h e : I'

t

1\

'1:1

: - r . r :

\ ' t c r ~

t t

l ~ i c r ) . , ~ . \ r ; ' ? v i . m cur- t . 1rn.

. . l . . ., i . r .

f1

; .

:-. "l l ~ ; . : tJ t::: < . t

'm:

t 1:; f

~

u t y

n

..i natl y ln '-

,

'11

r;oon r

. ;

[ ,_

n

t;'

h

'-1:l

' " n ~ : i

'}:.zn r r;tl

i t

-:-

.

:.

:

C < '

:l

o

d .11

to

t 1c

quo:.tiOl\

of

thr;

h l ~ ~ " " I b s::.: , _ ~ t " t w : n ~

1 f ' " J . ~ h e d ) :tc


62/98

- 4 -

bnpor tan t ,

he

said, "to es tablish

a

w a ~ {

o r

get an

agreement whe "c-by

the

blockade

i no longer

an

i ssue . Perhaps a change in the

way

in

,..,hieh

the United

States reacts on

t rade

and economic

relations would

be suff ic ient; perhaps mo\.es ::o ch;lnge

our

legislation would be

necessary .

1 do not

know precise ly , but

I do know that the

situa.tioo

has to

be chanzed in

some

way. l unde s ta

.nd

t h ~ t the

is

sue is

complicated.

but

the

US mu ' l t take

.cti

v e

steps

in that sense. As

long as there is no ar ran si; t?1T1ent with respect to

the blockade

and i ts

removal, there

can

be no ad vance in our relat ionship. ' '

Sanchez

Parodi went on

to

sar that in Cuba's

view

t ime is ruo:Ung

aga

inst the

United Stat ' s, which is

running the u

r isk

oi

isolat ing i tse lf f rom

the

rent

o

the

Hemisphere .

11

Sanchez Parodi

in1ic:?.led that this \l.''1- >

the

e:\."tcnt of

h h personnl

rc m n.

rk J.

1 facn aaid t lu t I h::id some a d d

t i o n ~

orcl poi

nts

to

ma1:

The U n i t ~ c l

Statee ic prcpa t'cd to impro

ve

relations

with

Cub3.,

We

~ ~ c nt aGld ng

that C

b ~ g ive up

i ts

domestic

fltr.u.ct-..:re o r m ~ L h o d

oi

go \'

errunent.

We do believe,

bowevcl",

that

Cub..i

;h

o

dcl

pursu e

an

indcpcnriant

ot'ilign P I

e : o r n t ~ n

els n

a t

b t

c r

ti:

n c

c o:.

t. cl

c

?

t

:t

h1g

ue

and

dlscur.s

in w h ~ t c v : : i r orcler was mutunlly a greed.

Cub::.

mu :t u n d ~ r s t ~ n < l t h ~ :

v

hilc we

nre ,

of cour :

e ,

intcrestc


63/98

-

countr ies , thi S

was not

a part icularly

"big

cleal' '

for

the

United

States.

It

was

not

. for example. so

significant

for

i lS

the process of normal.bing

relations with

the PRC ~ . . - h i . c h w ~

are

now

engaged in.

Cuba

must al.so understand that any normal ization

of

rclation5hips b z t ~ c e n our h\--o

countries must

involve

a. quid

pro

quo. Uncle.- no circumstances would the

United States be prepared to

view

the normalization

of relations

as

a one

way

street in

which

we gilvo

and

Cuba took.

After going

t h r o u ~ h

" instructed" comment J. I said that I

had flovoru t)c r .

.

on:. .l c o . n m c : n t ~ m ~ k a I c mph.:i.siz.ed that thcso

wero t o t ~ y rn;- u:m ro : action to the discus aion so

a r

nnd t h ~ t thoy

. in no wuy r eprcnr.:ntcd tho views

o nnyo

no o thi:?r than

myacH.

I s:i.id

t h ~ t in my cplnion i u b ~ .

rorr.tircd

d complete clL"nin:lt ion

of

the

b l o c J , ~ d c boforo L'..ny efforto toward n o r m , l b ~ ~ t i o n

of

rabtion& c:oulcl

k ~ pfat:c, the U : ~ i c d States v:ould be unprcparod to pl'"ocoed i 1 , , ~ r t h o r .

T h i ~ would h ~ r c l l y be a

11

b;J..anccd

11

way or

p r . o c c e d L ~ g . 1 on th3 oti1or

hllncl, wh


64/98


65/98

S E CRE ; /S;z


66/98

8

I will ~ < i l < e steps

on

Monday to ilce th;lt

we

c h l n ~ e

the

~ r . a " l l

res tr ic t ions on Cuban t::-\ diplomats . permit t ing them to t r:wel to

and from

W a s h i n ~ t o n

As

to

Manzdev:icz'

Ut)corr..in:

tr-i O to

H.3 3na.

' '

.

.

you

~ i l l want

to

consider v.-ith Bill o ~ v.hat u d d i t ~ o r . . a l mc::::iiat;c

Fri.i.nk

misht

l " . a r r ~ with him.

.

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