Crowd behaviour in emergencies:Research findings and implications for emergency planners

Presentation for the EPC 10/7/2007Dr Chris Cocking

University of Sussexcpc20@sussex.ac.uk

Outline of Presentation

1) Background and aims of research

2) Examples of how behaviour in emergencies support our theories

3) Implications for emergency planners

Context of research Crowd behaviour theories have

developed over time 19th Century- Le Bon irrationalist

approach 1960s - 70s more rationalist

approach- ENT From 1980s to present- The Social

Identity Model

Poll Tax riot London March 1990

Portugal, Euro 2004

The ‘Panic’ model

Part of the irrationalist tradition in crowd psychology

a) Threat causes emotion to overwhelm reason

b) Collective identity breaks down c) Selfish behaviours- pushing trampling d) Contagion-these behaviours spread

to crowd as a whole

Problems with the panic model Mass panic is rare in emergencies and

disasters

London ‘Blitz’, and atomic bombing of Japan during World War II

Kings Cross underground fire (1987) World Trade Centre evacuation, Sept 11th,

2001:‘classic panic action or people behaving in an

irrational manner was noted in [just] 1/124 (0.8%) cases’ (Blake et al. 2004)

Social attachment model Developed by Mawson (2005) Derives from Bowlby’s attachment theories In times of stress, people seek out

attachment figures- known as affiliative behaviour

Social norms rarely break down But these ties can have fatal

consequences- people tend to leave or die as a group

Social attachment model

Improvement on panic model, and supported by evidence from disasters, (Cornwell, 2001) but problems remain

a) Implies that panic in a crowd of strangers is more likely

b) Neglects possibility that previous strangers may co-operate with each other

The self-categorisation approach Disasters can create a common identity

or sense of ‘we-ness’- Clarke (2002) This common identity can result in

orderly, altruistic behaviour as people escape common threat

Increased threat can enhance common identity

Evidence so far supports this

Scope of research project

Project funded by ESRC that ended in April 2007

Can existing psychological models of crowd behaviour can be applied to emergencies?

3 different areas of research; interviews, room evacuations, and VR simulations

Interviewing disaster survivors

Sinking of the Jupiter, 1988 & Oceana, 1991 Hillsborough football stadium disaster, 1989

Ghana football stadium ‘stampede’, 2001 Bradford (UK) football stadium fire, 1985 Fatboy Slim beach party, 2002 Harrods bomb, 1983 Canary Wharf (UK) evacuation, 2001

Results from interviews

Common identity quickly emerges Co-operative rather than selfish

behaviour predominates If selfish behaviour happens, it is

usually isolated and rarely spreads

Hillsborough 1989

I don’t think people did lose control of their emotions [ ] they were clearly in control of their own emotions and their own physical insecurity, I mean [] you’re being crushed, you’re beginning to fear for your own personal safety, and yet they were [ ] controlling or tempering their emotions to help try and remedy the situation and help others who were clearly struggling

‘Fat Boy Slim’ Brighton 2002

People were helping people up and helping people down it was it was a very different atmosphere from any other gig that I’d ever worked before.

It was like a massive rave party where everybody felt they knew each other where they could go up to each other hug total strangers and they were in such close proximity to each other and all you could see was people sticking their arms round each other and grinning and you know it was oh god it’s a bit packed isn’t it that sort of…those conversations were going on but not complaints about it

Room evacuation studies

Simulated role-plays of room evacuations with smoke and time pressures

Some evidence of common identity emerging in response to shared fate

But study suffered from lack of realism

VR evacuation programme Joint project with computing scientists at

Universities of Nottingham & RMIT (Australia)

Many simulations of crowd flow, but ours was first to consider psychological theories of crowd behaviour

Evidence for link between sense of groupness and helping

Discussions with potential users (e.g. Home Office/SciTech) to market it as a training tool

Research into 7th July

Gathering data from Press reports and web-logs

Web- based questionnaire study for eye-witnesses of bombings; www.sussex.ac.uk/affiliates/panic/

Interview study of survivors Results so far support our theories

Rough chronology of events on the tube on 7/7

1) Blast followed by darkness and silence 2) Screams of fear and distress-

passengers try to find out what’s going on

3) Smoke & soot clear- attempts to help/ comfort others, & escape- some delay because of fear that tracks are live

4) Passengers wait approx 30 mins. for rescue, and walk in orderly fashion along tracks when directed

Response to 7/7

Individual fear and distress, but no mass panic

Evacuations characterised by orderly, calm behaviour

Many reports of altruism, co-operation, and collective spirit of Londoners/ UK as a whole

The myth of Panic

Many accounts of ‘panic’ But what actually is panic, and what

is logical flight behaviour? Need to look at what people actually

do, and decide if it is indeed ‘panic’ More than just semantics, as it could

affect emergency evacuation planning

Panic? ‘There was no real panic - just an

overwhelming sense to get out of the station quickly’

‘almost straight away our packed carriage started to fill with smoke, and people panicked immediately. Thankfully there were some level-headed people on the carriage who managed to calm everyone down’

Unity

‘I felt there was a real sense of unity. We were all trying our best to find a way out of there and reassure each other’.

‘One of the things which struck me about this experience is that one minute you are standing around strangers and the next minute they become the closest and most important people in your life. That feeling was quite extraordinary’

Co-operative behaviour

‘Many people kept calm and tried to help one another to see if anyone was injured’

‘I was very aware of people helping each other out and I was being helped myself’

‘Passengers with medical experience were found, I found a tool box and we smashed a window, allowing the medical guys to enter the other train’

Orderly evacuation

Lasting benefits of shared identity?

Panic in New York on 9/11?

New Orleans Sept 2005

Recent terrorist attacks:Panic or habituation?

Research on emergency evacuations: General conclusions

The image of the panicking crowd is overdone

The ‘panic’ model should not be used in designing emergency procedures

The evidence is that people exit quicker when kept informed

When people don’t help each other it is often due to physical constraints rather than ‘selfishness’.

Possible applications of the research

More information rather than less Very little evidence supports idea that

people will panic if they know severity of the situation and some shows exact opposite (e.g. Proulx & Sime 1991)

If information is given in clear ways that people can safely act upon to escape threat, they usually do

Consequently, deliberately withholding info could cause problems in any future emergencies, as people may not trust accuracy of messages

Evacuation Posters

Carriage Evacuation ProceduresPlease take a moment to read over the instructions

Transport for LondonMaking Your Tube Safer

Listen Carefully to Instructionsfrom the dr iver

Talk to the driver using the system located by the main doors

Utilise the first aid kits located under the designated seats

When the driver is readyto evacuate the train, foll ow the lighted arrows

If the carriage is in any way in risk, move to the nearestsafe carriage

Do not attempt to exit the carriage via the side doors

How information is relayed and by whom affects whether it is acted upon

Information needs to be clear and unambiguous, delivered confidently, and come from believable source that crowd identifies with

This could depend on type of crowd; e.g. commuters, football fans

Representative leader figures may also emerge from crowd that are influential, and can be useful rather than a hindrance!

Spontaneous leaders emerge on July 7th

Appeal to the crowds’ collective

identity/ common humanity

Having a common fate can encourage co-operative behaviour- ‘we’re all in this together’

Both PA and physical presence should be used

Don’t appeal to commuters as atomised ‘customers’

Practice emergency evacuations

Don’t say ‘don’t panic’! Practice makes less imperfect Train all stewards in knowledge of each

venue, and how to relay information effectively in emergencies

Different rates of evacuation of WTC in 1993 and 2001

Owners/managers need to take the possibility of emergency seriously- don’t think ‘it couldn’t happen to me!’

Summary 1) Crowds in emergencies behave

in ways that are consistent with their social identities and governed by the social norms of the situation

2) The ‘panic model’ is largely a myth

3) Evidence gathered from many different emergencies supports our theories

References: Blake et al (2004). Proceedings of Third

International Symposium on Human Behaviour in Fire.

Clarke, L. (2002). Contexts, 1, 21-26 Cornwell, B. (2001). The Sociological Quarterly, 44,

617-638. Jones et al (2006) Journal of Risk Research 9 (1) 57-

73 Le Bon, G. (1968)The crowd: A study of the popular

mind. (Originally published 1895) Mawson, A.R. (2005) Psychiatry, 68, (2) 95-113. Proulx, G. & Sime, J.D. (1991). Fire Safety Science:

Proceedings of the Third International Symposium, 843-852.