Crossing the Chasm between Exploration and Exploitation :

Achieving Ambidexterity through Intrapreneurship

Author: Wouter Rietveld

Programmes:

University of Twente - Business Administration - Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Strategy

Technische Universität Berlin – Innovation Management, Entrepreneurship and Sustainability

University of Twente P.O. Box 217, 7500AE Enschede

The Netherlands

ABSTRACT

This paper explores the transition of intrapreneurial initiatives from exploration to exploitation, referred

to as the liminal state. An abductive methodology is combined with an in-depth comparative case analysis

to investigate three large Dutch high-tech companies in order to enrich the theoretical understanding of

this liminal state. Based on the findings 3 sets of propositions are developed. First, it is proposed that

organisations need to provide legitimacy, funding and preparation for integration to intrapreneurs in order

for them to successfully make initiatives emerge at the end of the liminal state, ready for scaling. Second,

two proposition are developed on the size of the liminal state, suggesting that radical innovation increases

the gap between exploration and exploitation, and that an entrepreneurial mindset within the firm can

reduce the gap between exploration and exploitation. Third, the value of organisational barriers and

market pull on the intrapreneurial process are discussed. All in all, this research aims to increase the

theoretical understanding of the transition between exploration and exploitation and gives ideas on the

role that firms need to play in order to support intrapreneurial initiatives through the liminal state.

Graduation Committee members:

Dr. Ir. K. Visscher – assistant professor of organisation and innovation in the Faculty Behavioural,

Management, and Social Sciences at the University of Twente

Prof. Dr. S. Salomo – professor and chair of Technology & Innovation Management at the Technische

Universität Berlin

Dr. M. de Visser – assistant professor of innovation management in the Faculty Behavioural,

Management, and Social Sciences at the University of Twente.

Keywords

Intrapreneurship, Liminal state, Corporate entrepreneurship, Exploration, Exploitation, Radical

innovation

2

1. INTRODUCTION To survive, firms must find ways to renew

themselves (Burström & Wilson, 2015), their

ability to innovate is critical, especially in

rapidly evolving industries (Menzel, Aaltio, &

Ulijn, 2007; Russell, 1999). Firms need to keep

exploring new market configurations to be

ready for future market needs (Hill &

Birkinshaw, 2014; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2013).

Entrepreneurial activity often forms

the base of these radical changes in

organisational systems (Lassen, Gertsen, &

Riis, 2006; Schumpeter, 1934). Firms

increasingly rely on corporate entrepreneurship,

also called intrapreneurship, to nurture both

today’s and tomorrow’s competitive

advantages (Ireland, Covin, & Kuratko, 2009).

However, organisational contexts generally

hide talent and barrier creativity (Menzel et al.,

2007). At large firms, creativity is often met

with hostile environments (Dess et al., 2003)

and innovative proposals are frequently

defeated by financial control systems or other

formalities that are typical at large

bureaucracies (Kanter, 1983). This leads to a

high turnover of innovative-minded talents,

who end up disenchanted by their organisations

(Kuratko, Montagno, & Hornsby, 1990).

Intrapreneurs need to be able to “defy

systematisation, which unfortunately is the

basis of organising large systems.” (Manimala,

Jose, & Thomas, 2006, p. 50).

This is especially necessary in

dynamic environments, like the high-tech

industry (Russell, 1999) as it operates in a fast-

changing world characterised by frequent

changes in technology, combined with

increased competitive intensity

(Chandrasekaran, Linderman, & Schroeder,

2012).

So large high-tech firms struggle to

combine the explorative efforts of intrapreneurs

with the exploitation of current business.

Achieving both seems contradictory, as

exploration requires experimentation,

creativity, and organic structures (He & Wong,

2004; March, 1991), while exploitation is

achieved through refinement, efficiency, and

bureaucracy (He & Wong, 2004; March, 1991).

The continuous strive for both is referred to as

ambidexterity. Ambidextrous organisations are

flexible and able to adopt new initiatives while

they are simultaneously responsible for

optimizing current business (Thompson, 2017).

Researchers have increasingly come to realize

the importance of balancing these conflicting

tensions (e.g., Burgelman, 1983; Gibson &

Birkinshaw, 2004; March, 1991; Raisch &

Birkinshaw, 2008).

The difficulty in achieving this

balance is felt by intrapreneurs who are

exploring new initiatives. Organisational

systems are often designed in favour of

exploitation with a focus on short-term success

(O’Reilly & Tushman, 2013). However, by its

nature, exploration is inefficient and associated

with an unavoidable increase of uncertainty

(Karrer & Fleck, 2015). This means, for

example, that intrapreneurs in large high tech

firms often experience no willingness from their

organisation to differ from long term planning

(Hornsby, Naffziger, Kuratko, & Montagno,

1993), or that their firms do not look for future

developments to begin with (Kuratko et al.,

1990; Seshadri & Tripathy, 2006). Another

example is that supportive departments have no

time to assist (Hashimoto & Nassif, 2014;

Hornsby et al., 1993),or that hierarchical

decision-making slows down momentum

(Dess, Lumpkin, & McGee, 1999). In summary,

intrapreneurs find themselves blocked by

organisational structures, policies and managers

that are rather configured for exploitation (Hitt,

Nixon, Hoskisson, & Kochhar, 1999). Research

has yet to unravel the intrapreneurial process

through which organisations can support

intrapreneurial behaviour (Neessen, Caniëls,

Vos, & de Jong, 2019)

This is partly due to the complexity of

intrapreneurship. Intrapreneurship is defined as

“the bottom-up initiative of individuals that

make change happen with the goal of improving

their organisations”, (Deprez, Leroy, &

Euwema, 2018, p. 163) regardless of the

resources that the intrapreneurs currently

control (Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990). The

outcomes of intrapreneurship are related to the

development of new products, services, the

entering of new markets or a combination of

these, and can further encompass initiatives that

focus on changing current processes, structures

or capabilities in order to improve its current

competitive standing (Covin & Miles, 1999).

Lassen et al. (2006) claim that intrapreneurial

initiatives can vary in degree of radicalism, but

that overlap exists as both intrapreneurship and

radical innovation focus on the departure from

customary systems to bring life to something

new.

This means that firms that want to

support intrapreneurs, have to provide

intrapreneurs the freedom to explore new

options, while, in the end, they have to achieve

integration, scaling and maturity for the

initiatives to make an impact (Burgelman,

1984). It is currently unclear through which

processes firms develop intrapreneurial

initiatives from exploration into exploitation.

The current understanding of intrapreneurial

3

processes remains fragmented (Belousova &

Gailly, 2013), especially regarding the

organisational tools that foster, capture and

leverage intrapreneurship (Raisch &

Birkinshaw, 2008; Turner & Pennington, 2015).

The difficult orchestration of resources between

these phases is seldom addressed (O’Reilly &

Tushman, 2013; Popadiuk, Luz, & Kretschmer,

2018) and the moment when ideas switch from

exploration into exploitation has historically

been hard to define (Cheng & Van de Ven,

1996). This means that current research defaults

in explaining how organisations can support

initiatives through the transition from

exploration to exploitation (Ireland & Webb,

2007).

The purpose of this research is to

explore the transition of intrapreneurial

initiatives between exploration and exploitation

and to propose organisational tools that large

Dutch high-tech firms can use to support them.

What combination of organisational

tools do large Dutch high-tech firms employ on

an organisational level to support

intrapreneurs through the transition between

exploration and exploitation?

To theoretically explore this problem,

ambidexterity literature is used. This helps to

create an understanding of the differences and

interlude between exploration and exploitation.

By combining intrapreneurship research and

ambidexterity research it is suggested that the

intrapreneurial process from exploration into

exploitation has to cross a chasm, the liminal

state. This gap explains why intrapreneurial

initiatives are often met with exploitatively

oriented systems and processes. Based on

ambidexterity research several organisational

tools are suggested that can help to bridge the

liminal state.

To explore this proposition an

abductive methodology is combined with an in-

depth case analysis. Hence this research starts

from a theoretical perspective to see how that

applies to the case companies to build

propositions on the understanding of the liminal

state. The sample for this study consists out of

three large Dutch high-tech companies. The

reason for this focus is that these firms operate

in a challenging environment due to many

technological changes which require them on

one hand to be open for radical innovative

ideas, while on the other forces them to be

efficient and standardised.

With this approach this paper

contributes to the intrapreneurship and

ambidexterity research in two ways. First, it

enriches the theoretical understanding of the

liminal state. Second it formulates propositions

on how firms can deal with the liminal state.

The paper is divided into three parts. It

starts with a theoretical framework in which the

difference between exploration and

exploitation, the concept of intrapreneurship

and the intrapreneurial process are explored. It

further contains an elaboration on the liminal

state of intrapreneurship, and it provides a

conceptual model of antecedents based on the

proposed ambidexterity solutions. The second

part continues with an empirical explanation of

the methodology and the findings of the semi-

structured interviews, after which a cross-case

analysis is performed. The final part of this

research paper involves a discussion of the

findings, limitations and implications for theory

and practice.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Exploration and Exploitation “Since the publication of March (1991)’s

pioneering article, the terms ‘exploration’ and

‘exploitation’ have increasingly come to

dominate organisational analysis of

technological innovation” (Gupta, Smith, &

Shalley, 2006, p. 693). The concepts are rooted

in Schumpeter (1934)’s theory of economic

development, in which he explains that profits

are a direct result of innovation, while day to

day costs are a result of short term improvement

choices. Simply put, Schumpeter (1934)

sketches the relationship between the

entrepreneurial search of new possibilities and

the efficiency-driven need for old certainties.

March (1991) elaborates on this

relationship by introducing the concepts

exploration and exploitation, and by pitching

them against each other. This is comparable to

the concepts of alignment and adaptability used

by Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) and refers to

the challenge that firms face in reconciling both.

On one hand, exploration, or adaptability, refers

to the capacity to explore new opportunities by

reconfiguring activities in order to quickly

respond to changing environmental needs

(Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). It means

experimentation, search, risk taking, variation,

discovery, and innovation (March, 1991) and

requires organic structures, loosely coupled

systems, improvisation, autonomy and chaos

(He & Wong, 2004). Its rewards are “uncertain,

distant and often negative” (March, 1991, p.

85). On the other hand, exploitation, or

alignment, is considered to be the refinement

and gradual improvement of existing

capabilities (Liu, 2012; O’Reilly & Tushman,

2007). Its purpose is to smoothen production,

4

create more efficiencies and execute plans.

Exploitation is further associated with project

selection, control mechanisms, and

standardization procedures (March, 1991) and

requires mechanistic structures, tightly coupled

systems, path dependence, routinization and

stable technologies (He & Wong, 2004).

Organisations that engage in

exploration, to the exclusion of exploitation,

find themselves suffering high development

costs without reaping the benefits, they build up

too little distinctive competence in any of the

capabilities (Cheng & Van de Ven, 1996).

Meanwhile, firms in the conversed

configuration are trapped in an equilibrium in

which they can expect to see profits declining

(March, 1991). This is the reason why many

researchers call for an appropriate balance

between exploration and exploitation in order to

achieve superior performance (He & Wong,

2004; March, 1991).

The problem is that exploration and

exploitation require fundamentally different

and inconsistent architectures and competencies

(Jansen, 2009). March (1991) argues that

exploration and exploitation compete for the

same scarce resources and that as a result,

organisations need to make trade-off decisions

between the two. In short term, managers are

required to look for alignment or exploitation.

However, this evolutionary change is not rapid

enough to sustain success (Tushman & O'Reilly

III, 1996). In the long-run, firms are required to

adapt to their changing environment and come

up with revolutionary changes that could

destroy the alignment that they have been trying

to achieve (Tushman & O'Reilly III, 1996).

2.2 Ambidexterity: Exploration &

Exploitation Duncan (1976) was the first to use the term

“ambidextrous”. He used it to refer to firms that

can shift structures to accommodate both the

initiation and the execution of innovation. After

researching resilience and adaptability among

larger firms that have survived change over

time, Tushman and O'Reilly III (1996) claim

that true ambidexterity can only be achieved

through the simultaneous pursuit of both. This

is similarly backed by Raisch and Birkinshaw

(2008) and Chandrasekaran et al. (2012) who

argue that ambidexterity can only become a

valuable dynamic capability if the firm’s

exploitation and exploration activities are

strategically integrated to support each other.

Ambidexterity as the simultaneous pursuit of

exploration and exploitation has led to a stream

of research into its precursors (Raisch &

Birkinshaw, 2008), underlying concepts

(Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004) and outcomes

(He & Wong, 2004; Raisch & Birkinshaw,

2008).

Empirical evidence has shown the

importance of ambidexterity in practice. For

example, the research by Adler, Goldoftas, and

Levine (1999) found that balancing efficiency

and flexibility were at the core of Toyota’s

superior performance in the ’90s. This

hypothesis was further tested among a larger

sample of technological innovators by He and

Wong (2004) who found that balance between

exploration and exploitation led to an increase

in sales growth. Similarly Lubatkin, Simsek,

Ling, and Veiga (2006) showed that the

orientation towards exploration and

exploitation, among small and medium

enterprises, positively affected firm

performance. Their research found significant

effects at the firm level, whereas Gibson and

Birkinshaw (2004) and Chandrasekaran et al.

(2012) collected data on business units. They

found evidence that a business unit’s capacity

to simultaneously achieve alignment and

adaptability was significantly related to

performance.

To synthesize all these different

findings, Junni, Sarala, Taras, and Tarba (2013)

performed a meta-analysis of the different

empirical effects ambidexterity has on

organisational performance. They found a clear

positive association between ambidexterity and

performance, and conclude that research should

focus on creating an understanding of when and

how ambidexterity affects performance (Junni

et al., 2013).

2.3 Intrapreneurship: How to

Explore The literature suggests different methodologies

to achieve ambidexterity. Intrapreneurship is

considered to be one of the ways for firms to

build an ambidextrous capability (Burström &

Wilson, 2015). In general, ambidexterity

research considers employees to be an

important source for explorative efforts. Some

authors even argue that the main manifestation

of ambidexterity can be found in individuals,

rather than in the organisational structure

(Cannaerts N, 2016; García-Lillo, Ubeda

García, & Marco, 2017; O’Reilly & Tushman,

2013).

Considering employees as the source

of ambidextrous behaviour leads to the concept

of intrapreneurship. “Intrapreneurship is

defined as the bottom-up initiative of

individuals that make change happen with the

5

goal of improving their organisations” (Deprez

et al., 2018, p. 136). This is often done through

the “introduction and implementation of a

significant innovation for the firm, by one or

more employees” (Rigtering & Weitzel, 2013,

p. 341). The intrapreneurial process is defined

to be a process in which individuals inside

organisations pursue opportunities regardless of

the resources they currently control (Stevenson

& Jarillo, 1990). Intrapreneurship is therefore

considered to be: “entrepreneurship within an

existing organisation” (Antoncic & Hisrich,

2001, p. 495).

The outcomes of intrapreneurship can

either be internal, external or strategic (Covin &

Slevin, 1991). External corporate venturing is

the creation of spin-offs through corporate

incubating (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015).

Internal corporate venturing is the creation new

products/services, new markets or a

combination of these (Covin & Slevin, 1991).

Strategic intrapreneurship corresponds to a

broader array of initiatives that focus on

changing current processes, structures or

capabilities in order to improve its current

competitive standing (Kuratko, 2017). Lassen

et al. (2006) claim that intrapreneurial

initiatives can vary in degree of radicalism, but

that both intrapreneurship and radical

innovation focus on departing from the

customary systems to bring something new to

life.

There are different motivations for

corporations to embark on intrapreneurial

journeys. Often the goal is to find opportunities

that can complement or extend their existing

offering, or to improve its resource utilization

and increase its talent retainment (Zahra, 1991).

Based on their literature study, Ireland et al.

(2009) propose that intrapreneurship is

positively related to the competitive capability

of a firm and its strategic position. Which

makes sense, as both Antoncic and Hisrich

(2001) and Zahra (1991) find that the financial

performance of firms increases due to

intrapreneurship. Zahra (1991) further found

that intrapreneurship increases employee

morale and productivity.

Most intrapreneurship research to date

focusses on characteristics and behaviours that

are expected of intrapreneurs to overcome

organisational barriers (e.g. Antoncic, 2003;

Hisrich, 1990; Rigtering & Weitzel, 2013;

Turro, Lopez, & Urbano, 2013). This makes

sense in smaller firms: Shane and

Venkataraman (2000) describe that in start-ups

the characteristics of the owner (entrepreneur)

heavily influence its strategy, resources,

network, and therefore its success. However, at

large firms, success is less reliant on personal

characteristics and relies more on the systems,

resources and policies that are in place that

support these individuals (Manimala et al.,

2006).

The focus in the literature on personal

characterstics that can overcome organisational

barriers, means that less attention has been

given to researching organisational contexts

that can actually lower these barriers.

Employees in large organisations will only

become intrapreneurs if the organisational

design enables them to act in an entrepreneurial

way (Delić, Đonlagić Alibegović, &

Mešanović, 2016).

2.4 Entrepreneurial process:

Exploration into Exploitation Intrapreneurship is “entrepreneurship within

existing organisations” (Antoncic & Hisrich,

2001, p. 495). Entrepreneurship, as a scholarly

domain, tries to understand how opportunities

are discovered or created and how they can be

exploited, and by whom, in order to create value

(Venkataraman, 1997). This means that its

focus is on the processes of discovery,

evaluation, and exploitation of opportunities

(Shane & Venkataraman, 2000).

Entrepreneurs explore new

opportunities and develop their ideas, after

which they try to exploit these and earn a return

on their investment (Shane & Venkataraman,

2000). As described before, these activities

require different settings, leadership, and

organisational designs. Cheng and Van de Ven

(1996) argue that for individual entrepreneurs

exploration includes search, discovery,

experimentation, and trying new courses of

action, while exploitation includes decision

making, refinement, implementation, and

execution of a particular course of action. This

means that as ventures develop, their business’

requirements switch. An example of these

switching requirements can be found in the

founders-dilemma (Wasserman, 2008): As an

entrepreneurial initiative evolves, different

maturity stages require different leadership

styles. In the early stage, the entrepreneur often

follows its gut and is required to make ad hoc

decisions, while as the company matures, its

role shifts towards stakeholders management

and requires a democratic attitude regarding

decision making.

Cheng and Van de Ven (1996)

describe that both action and outcome events

are chaotic at the beginning of any initiative,

and shift over time to a periodic pattern.

However, their simulations based on real

6

innovative processes have not been able to

identify the parameters where behaviour

changes from explorative to exploitative. With

these phases being so dissimilar, and the

switching moment so difficult to define,

entrepreneurs run into problems as the

requirements change.

2.5 Intrapreneurial process:

entering a Liminal State The intrapreneurial process is similar to the

entrepreneurial process in the sense that an idea

develops from exploration into exploitation.

However, there are two factors that make the

intrapreneurial process inherently more

complex in comparison to the entrepreneurial

process (Hisrich, 1990).

First, the fact that the intrapreneur is

developing its idea within a corporate space.

This means that not only the requirements

change for the intrapreneur, but that the

organisation is also expected to provide

evolving support as the initiative matures.

Second, within intrapreneurship, the

explorative stage is often dragged out, as many

different organisational layers have a say in the

development of the idea. While simultaneously

exploitative characteristics set in early:

intrapreneurs often have easy access to

resources and have to deal with control systems

in early phases. Especially compared to their

entrepreneurial counterparts outside the

organisation, in which entrepreneurs generally

develop their prototypes and business models

before they try to get access to funding (Hisrich,

1990).

It is therefore proposed that instead of

a clear distinctive moment, an overlapping

threshold occurs. During this threshold, the

intrapreneurial initiative exists in a state of

liminality, hanging between exploration and

exploitation. Before the initiative enters this

state, the intrapreneur is in need of pure

explorative support: ideation processes to

identify opportunities and the freedom to

explore their potential (e.g. Antoncic & Hisrich,

2001; Hashimoto & Nassif, 2014; Kuratko,

Ireland, Covin, & Hornsby, 2005). On the

contrary, upon leaving this overlapping state the

initiative enters the exploitative efforts of the

organisation. The initiative has, at that point in

time, multiple paying customer and is ready to

scale. It therefore needs to be fully integrated in

the organisation (Burgelman, 1984). This often

related to standardization, quality control

mechanisms and financial audits, which are all

exploitative constructs (Dai, Maksimov,

Gilbert, & Fernhaber, 2014).

In between those two extremes the

initiative slowly progresses to inherit more

exploitative characteristics while remaining

explorative to some degree. The complex

mixture of the explorative and the exploitative

stage makes it difficult to determine which

support system is necessary at which moment in

time (Cheng & Van de Ven, 1996). Which

could explain the lack of research studies that

describe organisational support activities for

intrapreneurship (Burström & Wilson, 2015).

The phase between pure exploration and pure

exploitation is referred to as the liminal state. It

is a chaotic phase as little is known about what

organisations can do to make some initiatives

emerge and ready for scaling, while others are

abandoned. This is visualised in Figure 1.

Figure 1: The Liminal State

After their formation, initiatives enter

the liminal state when they get in first contact

with control systems, accountability processes,

integration-checks, or other related exploitative

systems. Initiatives leave this liminal state once

they fully embrace existing corporate systems

and are ready for scale up.

Figure 2: Two Ambidexterity Challenges

visualised over time.

Figure 2 summarises the two major

exploration and exploitation challenges firms

run into when supporting intrapreneurship.

First, firms need to balance how much, and in

what way they want to support explorative

efforts. This is the classic ambidexterity-

challenge of balancing exploration and

exploitation within the firm (vertically

depicted). Second, firms need to understand that

as intrapreneurial initiatives develop over time

7

(black box), their requirements for support

change (horizontally depicted). To support

initiatives through the liminal state, firms are

expected to provide support, without creating

bureaucracies that break the explorative efforts

of the initiative, or disrupt the rest of the

business.

Intrapreneurship research to date has

not been able to capture the dynamics of this

process in order to understand intrapreneurship

(Turner & Pennington, 2015), and it is unclear

how innovative-supporting behaviours are

generated and directed (Ferreira, 2009; Russell,

1999). Crossing this chasm between exploration

and exploitation can be a “lengthy, resource-

intensive, and risky -although necessary-

process” (Ireland & Webb, 2009, p. 470)

however, the process through the chasm is

crucial if the organisation wants initiatives to

emerge, ready for scaling.

2.6 Organisational Instruments of

Ambidexterity and Intrapreneurship The core challenge of intrapreneurship is about

the combination of exploration and

exploitation, and is therefore ambidextrous in

nature. Research into ambidexterity provides

several pathways that could potentially be used

to cross the liminal state. These provide a

starting point to determine which tools

influence the intrapreneurial process from

exploration into exploitation.

First, the three solution groups of

ambidexterity research are discussed.

Ambidexterity research finds a consensus in

three broad solution groups that enable firms to

combine exploration with exploitation:

structural solutions that try to physically

separate exploration and exploitation,

contextual solutions that enable employees to

pursue both activities simultaneously within the

same unit, and leadership-based solutions, that

put the pressure on management for reconciling

the tensions of ambidexterity (Raisch &

Birkinshaw, 2008).

Each solution group tries to solve the

ambidexterity premise in its own way. Based on

a review of the literature on these three

solutions all organisational tools that impact the

initiative in liminal state are grouped together in

table 1. The tools are grouped by their solution

group and on basis of their intended outcomes.

Based on this analysis it is suggested that there

are three recurring intended outcomes in all

solutions. This means that independent of the

solutions firms choose, there are three separate

outcomes that firms need to cover in order for

initiatives to develop from explorative into

exploitative. These three outcomes are

proposed to be a necessity in crossing the

chasm, meaning that they shine a light on the

inner workings of the intrapreneurial state of

liminality.

Therefore, on basis of the analysis of

the organisational tools to ambidexterity it is

suggested that the liminal state can be crossed if

firms achieve the following:

Outcome A. Legitimacy

The first set of tools provides legitimacy to

intrapreneurs. It is essential for intrapreneurs to

gain legitimacy from the organisation for their

efforts. The intrapreneur needs the

acknowledgement of peers and supervisors in

order to continue pursuit (Kuratko, 2017). This

can proof difficult in liminality as each step that

provides the necessary legitimacy is often

accompanied by the inclusion of formal

management systems, which can put serious

constraints on the explorative development in

this stage (Tushman & O'Reilly III, 1996).

Intrapreneurs that do not feel legitimised, or

whom are rejected by the organisation cannot

continue their efforts. Providing legitimacy is

therefore necessary but also yields an

opportunity for the organisation to give

direction to the initiatives. This leaves the

question: How do the different solutions provide

legitimacy to the intrapreneurial process?

Outcome B. Funding

The second recurring theme amidst

ambidexterity solutions is the need for

investment. If organisations truly support

intrapreneurial initiatives they have to put

money where their mouth is. Support has to be

expressed in form of time or resource

commitments (Antoncic, 2001), which further

highlights the trust an organisation puts in their

employees (Alpkan, Bulut, Gunday, Ulusoy, &

Kilic, 2010). Investment is often related to

certain accountability structures which can

further decrease the room for exploration (Dai

et al., 2014). It is therefore impertinent to

understand: How do the different solutions

invest resources to the intrapreneurial process?

Outcome C. Prepared for Integration

In order to have an impact on the

organisation, intrapreneurial initiatives need to

be integrated within the organisation

8

(Burgelman, 1984). The third group of

organisational tools prepares the initiative for

integration. Upon leaving the exploration stage

the initiative should be ready for scaling.

Furthermore, accomplishment is an important

motivator for intrapreneurs (Park, Kim, &

Krishna, 2014), a future perspective is therefore

important to keep intrapreneurs passionate

about the initiative. This further increases the

tension between exploration and exploitation as

the initiative is demanded to adhere to the

corporate structure it wants to land in (Burgers

& Covin, 2016). Initiatives that are not prepared

to integrate might not find a landing spot within

the organisation. Which leaves the question:

Through which methods do organisations help

intrapreneurs prepare for integration?

Organisations do not have to provide

legitimacy, resources and integration-support in

a linear fashion. However, all three are required

in order to leave the liminal state. A legitimacy

crisis will lead to re-evaluation, as a lack of

acknowledgement of the firm will barrier

further development (Belousova & Gailly,

2013). However, even if the firm sees the value

of the initiative but struggles to provide the

necessary resources to continue development,

the initiative will fall short (Puech & Durand,

2017). Similarly, if the initiative is tasked with

scaling in an organisational system for which its

own business model is not prepared to integrate,

it will run into steep organisational barriers

(Pinchot, 1987). These three requirements give

a collective insight in the role that the

organisation has to play during the transition

from exploration into exploitation, as visualised

in Figure 3.

The specific organisational tools that firms

can employ to achieve the three outcomes are

discussed next. First, the organisational tools in

structural solutions are discussed, second the

tools of contextual solutions, and third the tools

that are employed in leadership-based solutions.

The goal is to answer the following questions

for each of the three alternatives:

- How do the different solutions

provide legitimisation to the

intrapreneurial process?

- How do the different solutions

invest resources to the

intrapreneurial process?

- Through which methods do

organisations help intrapreneurs

prepare for reintegration?

The organisational tools are summarised in a

conceptual model in Table 1.

Table 1: Overview of the organisational tools mentioned by literature for each solution, grouped

per stage.

Outcome 1: Legitimacy Outcome 2: Funding Outcome 3: Prepared for Integration

Structural

Solutions

Parallel structure (e.g. Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008)

Formal control systems (e.g. Kuratko et al., 1990)

Reward systems (e.g. Antoncic & Hisrich, 2001)

Inter-firm collaboration (e.g. Antoncic, 2001)

Slack Resources (e.g. Asif, 2017)

Allocation of free time (e.g. Alpkan et al., 2010)

Integration systems (Burgers & Covin, 2016)

Through:

- Shared Vision

- Senior team integration - Targeted structural linking

mechanisms

Contextual

Solutions

Peer-support and feedback (e.g. Belousova & Gailly, 2013)

Discretionary Resources (e.g. Hashimoto & Nassif, 2014)

Autonomy (100% “free time”) (e.g. Burström & Wilson, 2015)

Contextual alignment (e.g. Chandrasekaran et al., 2012)

Through:

- Explicit task objectives - Constant reviews

Leadership-

based

Solutions

Middle manager support (e.g. Rigtering & Weitzel, 2013)

Leader-member exchange (e.g. Rosing, Frese, & Bausch, 2011)

Monitoring (Floyd & Lane, 2000)

Strategic Resources (e.g. Garrett, 2013)

Key Performance Indicators (e.g. Kuratko et al., 2005)

Senior executive involvement (e.g. Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008)

Through:

- Internal processes

Figure 3: Necessary outcomes to bridge the

Liminal state.

9

2.6.1 The Structural Solution The structural solution suggests

explorative functions should be separated from

exploitative departments, in structurally

separated units, in order to be effectively

managed (Liu, 2012). Explorative units get the

opportunity to adopt an organic structure, rely

on horizontal coordination (Liu, 2012), and

make use of open communication (Antoncic,

2001) and decentralized decision making (Asif,

2017). It initially legitimises intrapreneurs by

relocating them in a parallel structure (Raisch &

Birkinshaw, 2008), which enables them to work

on their initiative without the distractions of

current business. By employing a separate

business unit, management shows its support of

the intrapreneurial initiative. This effect is

amplified by the existence of formal control

systems that accept and reject certain proposals,

(Antoncic, 2001; Asif, 2017; Kuratko et al.,

1990), and the upheaval of reward systems that

incentivise innovative behaviour (Antoncic,

2001; Asif, 2017). A last advantage of the

structural solution is its adaptability for inter-

firm collaborations, external units provide a

better opportunity for cultures to come together

and keep specific firm-knowledge safe, as

partners are brought into the innovation process

(Antoncic, 2001).

Structural solutions make resources

available to fund experimental projects (e.g.

Antoncic, 2001; Asif, 2017; Belousova &

Gailly, 2013; Burgers & Covin, 2016; Csaszar,

2012). This can be in the form of knowledge,

financial assets, equipment, or employees

(Delić et al., 2016). Parallel structures are often

accompanied by specific resource endowments

for the development of new initiatives (Raisch

& Birkinshaw, 2008). Another known way to

make initial investments is by providing free

time for employees to develop novelties without

the burden of routine work (Alpkan et al.,

2010).

The main downside of the structural

approach has been a point of discussion among

researchers (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008) and is

located on the liminal threshold. Christensen

(1997) claims that disruptive innovation can

only be found through complete separation and

a lack of bureaucracy, while O’Reilly and

Tushman (2013) make the point that

reintegration is imperative for the initiatives to

have a future within the company. Control

systems that evaluate proposals at the entry of

the unit are on one hand ideal to steer the

direction of the innovation efforts, while on the

other hand, they might turn out to be an entry

barrier (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2013). Burgers

and Covin (2016) researched this effect and

found that even though managers “are well

served” by employing dedicated structurally

differentiated innovation units to increase

corporate entrepreneurship, they should also

invest in “the development of integration

mechanisms – shared vision, senior team social

integration, and cross-functional interfaces” to

ensure a future for the ideas that come out of

these units.

2.6.2 The Contextual Solution Contextual ambidexterity calls for the

simultaneous pursuit of exploration and

exploitation within one unit (Gibson &

Birkinshaw, 2004). By generating the right

supportive context, employees should feel

empowered to choose how they want to spend

their time and pursue exploration if they have a

good idea. According to longitudinal studies by

Ghoshal and Bartlett (1994) and Gibson and

Birkinshaw (2004), the primary dimensions of

such a context are discipline, stretch, support,

and trust. This is reflected in the legitimisation

of intrapreneurial initiatives as there is a lack of

formal systems. Intrapreneurs are legitimised by

peer support and direct feedback from the

organisation (Birkinshaw, 1997; Brown &

Eisenhardt, 1997; Goodale, Kuratko, Hornsby,

& Covin, 2011; Puech & Durand, 2017). Covin

and Miles (1999, p. 16) emphasise that the open

expression of radical ideas, the empowerment

of employees, the belief that change is good and

the spirit of teamwork are essential in such

systems.

The stretch and trust factor are further

reflected in the increased levels of autonomy

that permit employees time to propose and test

new ideas (Burström & Wilson, 2015;

Kollmann & Stockmann, 2010) and the fact that

employees can use resources discretionary

(Antoncic & Hisrich, 2004; Burström &

Wilson, 2015; Hashimoto & Nassif, 2014;

Kearney, Hisrich, & Roche, 2007; Puech &

Durand, 2017). This means that within this

context, employees determine their funding

themselves.

In contextual solutions, integration is

within grasps as the initiative operates from

within the business (Mustafa, Gavin, & Hughes,

2018). One of its essentials is the contextual

alignment, which refers to the alignment of

strategic and operational levels

(Chandrasekaran et al., 2012). High levels of

alignment promote consistency and clarity

which makes it more likely that employees

work towards the same goals (Gibson &

Birkinshaw, 2004). It is hypothesised that

alignment is achieved by creating explicit task

objectives and promoting fast feedback cycles

10

(Chandrasekaran et al., 2012; Ghoshal &

Bartlett, 1994). This should mean that all

intrapreneurial initiatives work towards

organisational goals and should therefore be

readily adopted by the organisation upon

maturity. However, contextual solutions can

backfire when the context is unclear, misused,

or when too many different initiatives spread

the innovative force of the company too thin.

An example of this was Google in 2011, when

their CEO communicated that Google was

going to put “more wood behind fewer arrows”,

shutting down multiple initiatives and

concentrating its innovation power in a certain

direction (Page, 2011).

2.6.3 The Leadership-Based Solution The leadership-based solution puts the

pressure on leadership across the organisation

to reconcile the tensions between exploitation

and exploration (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008).

The initiatives are legitimised by the support of

direct supervisors, or middle managers

(Kuratko et al., 2005; Rigtering & Weitzel,

2013; Rosing et al., 2011). This means that

intrapreneurs put their trust in their supervisors

(Rigtering & Weitzel, 2013). That is why

communication exchange between leaders and

employees is so important (Heinonen &

Toivonen, 2007; Rosing et al., 2011). Park et al.

(2014) argue that the quality of the relationship

between employees and management is a key

determinant of their loyalty and willingness to

devote themselves to better performance.

Rosing et al. (2011) claim that a strong leader-

member exchange is positively related to

innovation because of mutual trust. Managers

often put their own reputation on the line

(Burgelman, 1983; Linder & Bothello, 2015) in

order to get initiatives funded. This leads to

increased monitoring by the managers (Floyd &

Lane, 2000)

This exchange further depends on the

autonomy of middle managers, or better said: it

depends on who holds the resources (Linder &

Bothello, 2015). Through the endowment of

strategic resources, middle managers, or higher

hierarchical layers, can fund projects (Garrett,

2013). This requires the right performance

indicators: middle managers should be

rewarded for supporting innovating behaviour

(Kuratko et al., 2005).

In the end, a presentation before the

senior executives, or top management team, is

considered the ultimate goal. Being

incorporated within the organisation requires

their support (Deprez et al., 2018; Garrett, 2013;

Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008), and lobbying to

get strategically integrated is often necessary.

Top management teams can choose to employ

certain internal processes to value and reward

intrapreneurial initiatives, which can both

positively and negatively influence the

intrapreneurial process (Burgess, 2013; Raisch

& Birkinshaw, 2008). The core challenge of

leadership-based solutions in a state of

liminality is simultaneously its core component:

the dependency on leaders. This can be both

positive and negative. It stimulates favouritism,

and lacks a systematic approach to deal with

initiatives. Furthermore, the effect of (not)

changing leaders on the direction of innovation

can impact the initiatives longevity.

3. METHODS

3.1 Research Design This study uses a multiple case comparison

methodology. Case study research involves the

examination of a phenomenon in its natural

setting (Creswell, Hanson, Clark Plano, &

Morales, 2007). The method builds an in-depth,

contextual understanding of the case, relying on

multiple data sources (Yin, 2014). The research

design involves multiple cases: which is

generally regarded as a more robust design,

since it provides for the observation and

analysis of a phenomenon in several settings

(Yin, 2014).

Intrapreneurship has predominantly

been explored through quantitative methods,

that helped establish which antecedents elicited

intrapreneurial behaviour in individuals.

However, how firms deal with the switching

requirements of exploration and exploitation

and during the intrapreneurial process has not

been explored before. An exploratory study is

therefore suitable, in order to unravel the

organisational impact on the progression

through the liminal state and to further

academic understanding of the liminal state.

Intrapreneurial behaviour does not happen in a

vacuum (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Kuratko et al.,

2005; Menzel et al., 2007), it is therefore

imperative to consider the context in which it

initiates (Belousova & Gailly, 2013; Menzel et

al., 2007). This information can best be

uncovered through in-depth investigations of

real-life situations at different intrapreneurial

firms. Secondly, qualitative research lends itself

perfectly to “address process-oriented questions

of interest to the field” (Leech & Onwuegbuzie,

2008). It allows for careful consideration of the

experiences intrapreneurs have with different

organisational tools.

3.2 Data collection Data is collected from multiple sources. The

main method of collection is the use of semi-

11

structured interviews. This method of data

collection provides an opportunity for structure,

while simultaneously leaving room for

conversation and open responses to go further

into depth when required (Longhurst, 2003).

This allows for “the discovery and elaboration

of information that is important to the

participants but may not have previously

thought of as pertinent by the research team”

(Gill, Stewart, Treasure, & Chadwick, 2008, p.

291) which enables this research to expand the

known organisational tools to ambidexterity.

Interviews are most appropriate where little is

known and when detailed insights are required

from individual participants (Gill et al., 2008).

Finally, interviews allow for evaluation of the

person’s non-verbal indicators which increases

the validity of the person’s answers and enables

the researcher to capture of the interviewee’s

judgement of former experiences (Boyce &

Neale, 2006). Questions were asked regarding

the ways in which firms provide legitimacy,

funding and integration to their intrapreneurs.

These semi-structured interviews have taken

place across three companies. The goal was to

select organisations that are large, Dutch and

high-tech.

Size is important as smaller firms have

less trouble integrating ambidextrous goals into

one organisation (Burgers & Covin, 2016).

Furthermore, smaller firms have the option to

apply sequential ambidexterity and switch

between exploration and exploitation (Raisch,

Birkinshaw, Probst, & Tushman, 2009), while

larger firms need to develop a method to

reconcile those. A major complication is the

number of employees, as these are the core

element of intrapreneurship. As the number of

employees increase, firms tend to create

cumbersome structures to control and steer

them, which in turn tends to freeze personal

autonomy and individual creativity (Carrier,

1994). Therefore only large organisations were

selected. The European commission considers

companies with more than 250 employees

large, while the three corporations in the sample

approximately employ 700, 11.500 and 18.000

employees, they are therefore considered large.

The Netherlands is chosen as the

country of research as its employment culture

fits the idea of bottom-up idea generation

through the concepts of “looseness” (Gelfand et

al., 2011) and “low power distance” (Hofstede,

1984). Organisations in loose societies have

less order and cohesion, which allows for

greater innovation and more tolerance for

change (Gelfand, Nishii, & Raver, 2006).

Similarly but separately, Hofstede (1984) found

that the Dutch culture has a low power distance,

which allows for innovative thought sharing,

making the Netherlands a fitting country for

research on intrapreneurial activity.

Certain environmental characteristics

elicit corporate entrepreneurship as well. High-

tech industries, for example, are commonly

composed of disproportionate amounts of

entrepreneurial firms (Covin & Slevin, 1991;

Csaszar, 2012) and have similar statistics for

spin-offs (Garvin, 1983). Empirical evidence

suggests that corporate entrepreneurship is

“particularly effective among companies

operating in hostile environments” (Zahra &

Covin, 1995, p. 44). These dynamic

environments provide external pressure for

constant change and internal renewal (Burgers

& Covin, 2016). High-tech industries operating

in dynamic environments are often responding

to their environmental challenges “by taking

risk, innovating, and exhibiting proactive

behaviours – that is, by adopting

entrepreneurial postures” (Covin & Slevin,

1991, p. 11).

The purpose of this paper is to explore

a new theoretical domain theoretical sampling

of cases is appropriate (Eisenhardt & Graebner,

2007). Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007, p. 27)

define theoretical case sampling as “selection of

cases because they are particularly suitable for

illuminating and extending relationships among

constructs”. So within the population of large,

Dutch, high-tech companies, 3 cases have been

selected that seemed suitable in demonstrating

the variety of intrapreneurship systems. Those

are the following: Royal Dutch Philips, Nedap,

and Thales Nederland. In each organisation,

multiple intrapreneurs have been interviewed to

demystify the organisational tools that are

employed to provide legitimacy, funding, or

integration. These findings were triangulated

with an interview of an innovation manager at

each of the organisations. In general, saturation

was reached after 14 interviews, with 12

different employees, encompassing 4

innovation managers and 8 intrapreneurs,

equally distributed among the case companies.

Intrapreneurs were selected using the

following inclusion and exclusion criteria: all

participants are employed in one of the three

case companies, and active in an intrapreneurial

role. The intrapreneurial role was described as:

“people who have taken initiative in the

development of a new product, new service or

strategic project within company X, while this

is outside of their original job description”. It is

furthermore important that company X

recognizes the value of the initiative, as this is

considered the start of the liminal state of

intrapreneurship.

12

Table 2 shows an overview of the interview

data, including the total amount of interview

minutes.

Table 2: Overview interview data

Source Method Amount

Thales

Intrapreneurs Interview 124 min

Innovation managers Interview 41 min

Philips

Intrapreneurs Interview 141 min

Innovation managers Interview 107 min

Nedap

Intrapreneurs Interview 175 min

Innovation managers Interview 73 min

Following Shenton (2004)’s

assessment of validity in qualitative research,

the researcher took the following steps to

increase the credibility of the phenomena under

scrutiny.

1) Early familiarity of the organisational culture

of the companies allowed for the proper

identification of a contextual, structural and

leadership-based behaviours and enabled the

interviewer to tailor questions accordingly.

2) The found data was triangulated using

corporate documents, and multiple interviews.

Especially the innovation manager-interviews

increased comprehension of the complex

systems in which the intrapreneurs operate and

a call back was arranged to continue the

conversation with the innovation manager in 2

instances.

3) All interviews were conducted face-to-face,

at the location of work of the participants except

for two call-backs. Furthermore, participants

were reminded of their right to withdraw

without disclosure of reason, or change their

admission in hindsight. This research, including

its method has been accorded by the ethics

committee of the faculty BMS, University of

Twente. This means that this study fulfils all

guidelines to ethically study this research

question. Accordingly, all participants were

informed of the research aim, their privacy

rights, anonymity protection, the voluntary

nature of participation and data management.

All interviewees consented to participate.

4) Two organisational cases included one

intrapreneur that did not successfully

implement its initiative. This negative case

analysis was applied to ensure saturation among

different instances of the same phenomenon

(intrapreneurship) (Shenton, 2004).

3.3 Data analysis Based on the consent given by the participants,

all interviews were recorded using an audio

recorder. This allowed for coherent

transcription and enabled an open conversation

during the interviews without the interference

of elaborate note taking. Recordings were

transcribed in order for interviewees to check

these on correctness (Fereday & Muir-

Cochrane, 2006).

To answer the research question an

abductive analysis methodology is used. This is

referred to as iterative grounded theory

(Cannaerts N, 2016) as it is a mixture of

deductive and inductive approaches (Dubois &

Gadde, 2002). Inductive research aims to build

new theory on basis of empirical findings, while

deductive research tests specific hypothesis

based on theory against empirical data

(Morrow, 2007). Hence, this paper starts from

an existing theoretical perspective, compares

this to the found interview data and goes back

to building new theoretical propositions.

The coding scheme and the interview

protocol are based on the framework that was

deduced from theory. Based on the different

solutions to ambidexterity, it is proposed that

organisations provide legitimacy, invest

resources and prepare for integration. This

allows the data to be coded accordingly.

Inductively, patterns emerged around this based

on interviewee input (Miles & Huberman,

1994) which form the basis of the propositions

that are formed in the discussion.

3.4 The research context Next, the context of each of these cases is set,

providing a baseline from which the analysis

can commence (Creswell et al., 2007). This

enables the reader to make decisions about the

generalizability of the findings towards

different contexts (Morrow, 2007).

3.4.1 Philips Royal Dutch Philips is a multinational

conglomerate which is headquartered in

Amsterdam, and was founded in Eindhoven. It

is one of the largest electronic conglomerates in

the world and currently employs 77.400

employees across 100 countries and recorded

18.121 billion euros revenue in 2018. 11.500

employees are based across their campuses in

the Netherlands.

“Royal Philips of the Netherlands is a

leading health technology company focused on

improving people’s health and enabling better

outcomes across the health continuum from

healthy living and prevention, to diagnosis,

13

treatment and home care.” – according the their

own website.

It is organized in two main divisions:

Philips consumer health and well-being and

Philips professional health care. The

organisation is run through several business

units who have their own product portfolios.

Each of these business lines is supported by an

new business creation board (NBX board) that

makes decisions regarding the support of new

business. These decisions are supported by

central located service lines. One of these is the

chief technology office, which plays a role in

the initiation and orchestration of all innovation

processes at Philips. This contains the official

R&D department, as well as the organisations

that deal with innovation management and start-

up engagement.

3.4.2 Nedap Nedap is a Dutch technology firm, located in

Groenlo. It is active around the world and has

10 offices across borders. It employs

approximately 700 people across 7 business

units and recorded revenue of 191.4 million

euros in 2018. They are among the 10 oldest

public companies in the Netherlands.

Their website describes them as “A

vibrant community that inspires growth” and

their vision is rooted in diversity. “We develop

technology that helps people be more

productive in their work by better matching

their individual talents and capabilities”.

Their products are based around the

Near-Field Communication technology (NFC)

and split up among 7 business units that all

serve a different market. Examples of these

markets are Retail (security and logistics),

Livestock management (automatization of

processes), and Healthcare (administrative

systems). Business units are run as independent

companies with 7 general managers leading

them. Each of these units is further split up into

smaller teams and groups. These teams are head

up by captain, responsible for the people within

their team.

3.4.3 Thales Thales Nederland is a technology company

primarily in the cybersecurity, airspace- and

defence technology. It produces advanced

radar- and communication technology. It is a

subsidiary of the Thales Group, which is located

in Paris, France and active across 68 countries.

The Thales Group employs 80,000 employees

of which 17.000 are located in the Netherlands,

most of these are located in Hengelo. The

Thales group has a turnover of 14.86 billion

euros in 2016.

Their website describes their role as

following: “Our solutions help customers to

make the right decisions at the right time and

act accordingly in challenging environments”

Thales Nederland is organized in

different business units that overlap with those

of the Thales group. This entails that business

unit leaders report to both the management team

of Thales Nederland, and to the business unit

directors of the Thales Group. Thales Group has

further organized Thales Research and

Technology department (TRT). These are

funded from Paris, but the Dutch subsidiary co-

decides the topics for the TRT located in

Hengelo. Multiple projects can be run at the

TRT simultaneously.

4. FINDINGS The qualitative data is coded and analysed using

ATLASti. For each of the three case companies

codes emerged around antecedents that enabled

intrapreneurship. These codes fit around the

three core elements of the ambidexterity

solutions: legitimacy, funding and integration.

The results of the analysis are

described in the following sections. First, the

organisational tools that describe the

intrapreneurship system of Philips are

discussed, Nedap follows, and at last the

solution of Thales is described. The findings are

summarized in Table 3.

Table 3 Case study findings summarized per company, divided among the three stages

Outcome 1: Legitimacy Outcome 2: Funding Outcome 3: Prepared for Integration

Philips Parallel structure (Healthworks)

Business support

Formal controls (NBX)

- Stage gate system

- Assessments

Market Pull

Training

Strategic resources

- By: Business Sponsor

- Through: Portfolio Management

Allocation of free time to work on new projects

(CTO office)

(Early) Formal controls (or Targeted structural linking mechanisms)

(NBX)

- Team formation

- Landing spot

- Monthly meeting with steering committee

- Milestones

Nedap Peer-support and feedback

- Monthly meeting

Informal controls

Social Support

- Coach // Captain

- Goal setting

Market pull

Autonomy // Discretionary resources

Contextual alignment

Through:

- (guided) Goal setting

- Fast (informal) feedback cycles

Thales Middle manager support

- Leader-member exchange

Monitoring

Market pull

Strategic resources

- By: Business Sponsor

Senior executive involvement

Through:

- internal processes

- Lobbying

14

4.1 Philips: from Parallel to

Integration Philips has carefully designed a process to

capture and accompany initiatives throughout

development. It is based on Bell-Mason and has

4 stages that each have their own milestones and

gates to pass. The stages are: Pre-seed, Seed,

Alpha and Beta.

Intrapreneurs have two possibilities to enter that

process. Their initiatives can either be brought

to life by the chief technology office (CTO

office) or by one of the business lines. This

determines the location of the Pre-seed phase.

However, once initiatives enter the Seed phase,

they are expected to be sponsored, and located

in the structure of a business. This is the start of

the liminal state as an initiative becomes an

official venture get in contact with the

exploitative organisation.

After development through Seed and Alpha, the

initiatives face the gate to Beta, which requires

a readiness to scale across the Philips markets.

This corresponds with the end of the liminal

state.

4.1.1 Philips: Providing Legitimacy Intrapreneurs at Philips are seen as

legitimate when an official venture is initiated.

Intrapreneurs who immediately start their

venture through one of the business lines feel

legitimised by the business support they

receive. As referred to by an innovation

manager [IM]:

[IM] “It could be that an initiative is immediately embraced

by the business, this means it will be moved in that

business.”

Other ideas enter a parallel structure if

no business line has shown interest yet, but the

chief technology office sees potential. This is a

trajectory that lasts approximately three months

and in which intrapreneurs build their value

proposition. It is called ‘Healthworks’ and

prepares intrapreneurs for finding the business

support necessary to start a new venture. As

referred to by the intrapreneurs [I] and an

innovation manager [IM]:

[I] “We made use of Healthworks, an acceleration program.

We used it in the first months to deepen our potential for

Philips and to come to better insight in how we can start

this venture.”

[I referring to Healthworks] “On basis of analysis we find

out if the problem is big enough, next is to uncover if the

problem is relevant – whether or not the proposed solution

solves the problem and if our impact on it is realistic.”

[IM] “If the [NBX-board of the] CTO office deems the idea

to be promising, but no business is willing to step in,

Healthworks can step in.”

After a venture is created the

progression through the stage-gate process is

monitored by formal control systems, which

further legitimise the efforts of the intrapreneur.

The “new business creation office” (NBX

office) at Philips has designed this process and

assesses the maturity of the different ventures.

These assessments are provided to the ventures,

and to their “steering committees” as

suggestions. The committees consists out of the

ventures’ main stakeholders: the sponsors, a

representative of the market, someone from

NBX and other stakeholders from the business.

The committee is responsible to make decisions

regarding the venture’s maturity, often on basis

of the assessment that is provided by the NBX

office. The different maturity stages legitimise

the effort of the intrapreneur and its team. Each

phase requires different courses of action. The

pre-seed stage leads to a value proposition that

can convince sponsors to start a venture. The

seed stage is about development and early

customer involvement. The gate to pass to

Alpha requires a minimal viable product (MVP)

and a customer who is willing to put some skin

into the game. The gate to Beta requires a

readiness to scale across the Philips markets.

[I when talking about Healthworks/Preseed] “Based on that work we got the support from within the business to start a

venture”

[I] “Before you enter Seed, you have to pass a gate. You’ll

have an investment proposal for that, which consists out of a demonstrator and some risk assessment. In seed you’ll

produce a MVP that is enough to win some commercial

clients. Then you’ll also start marketing in order to move

from seed to alpha.”

[I] “We are currently in Seed, but are Alpha ready. We have

commercial customers.”

[IM when talking about the gate to Alpha] “We have very

detailed checklists, but at a high level you need to have your MVP developed and you need a customer who is willing to

implement - a paying customer!”

All interviewees referred to market

pull as an important cause for legitimacy.

Showing interest from the market helps to

legitimise the efforts towards internal actors.

[I] [Interviewer: “How did you convince them of the

importance of your idea?”] “We showed them results.”

[I] “We interviewed multiple customers and saw that there

was demand which we could play into. That is why we

decided to start a pilot with a customer.”

A last important support value of the

NBX-process seems to be the provision of

Training both to the intrapreneurs and the

supporting organisation. This also reflects back

on the integration phase, but further legitimises

the efforts of intrapreneurs within NBX.

[IM] “We have two kinds of trainings. People who are in the ventures are trained to understand the process, and we

offer training to our leaders to understand, ask the right

questions and give them the right support.”

[IM] “The change of mindset is a challenge. That is why NBX spends time on practitioners of an NBX venture, their

leaders, their periphery and the business leaders To make

15

them conscious of the contrasting requirements between

current and new business.”

All in all, Philips employs an elaborate

formal processes to help intrapreneurs to gain

progress on their ventures, and to legitimise

their efforts. The main recognition has to come

from the support of a business line. However, a

parallel structure can precede this if no interest

has been shown yet. The formal controls and

training that kick in after achieving business

support help the business to value progress and

keep the efforts of the initiative legitimate.

Interest from potential customers, or market

pull speeds up that process.

4.1.2 Philips: Investing Resources The intrapreneurs indicate that in order to start

a venture, they need to convince sponsor to

support the creation of a venture. These

sponsors are business owners, who keep the

strategic resources. However, they are

supported by an NBX board. Each business line

has such a board to advice the business on

investment opportunities.

[I; when talking about Healthworks] “We presented what

we had learned to our stakeholders. Those are the ones that provide the budget. The sponsors told us: ‘we are interested

in this initiative and provide the budget for this venture’.

[IM] “When there is support from a business owner, we say

‘rapid co-create with a team of 3-4 people, now fulltime, to

look at the idea.’”.

These business managers are

stimulated to invest in adjacent businesses

through portfolio management. The innovation

managers explained that key performance

indicators at business level stimulate managers

to look beyond current business and

accommodate the exploration of new

opportunities.

[IM] “We employ portfolio management, the idea is that the

majority of your money needs to go to current business. However, it also needs to go to adjacencies, otherwise they

will only be good for the coming year and not in the future.

So they will have to show that that they have a balanced

portfolio.”

[IM] “The way Philips stimulates this is through different

baskets of money. One is about stimulating current

business, one about adjacencies, and one about completely new business. (…) Every business owner needs to report

every 3 months about their portfolio.”

The innovation managers indicate

another investment tool: employees within the

CTO office have free time to work on new

projects. In doing so, Philips invests time in

testing the waters, which favours CTO

employees or employees who have a network in

the CTO office. In general, employees in the

CTO-office have the opportunity to pick new

initiatives, and the research department (located

in the CTO office) has Friday Afternoon

Experiments, in which researchers are allowed

to pursue pet projects. One intrapreneur came

from the CTO-office and describes how the

availability of time helped its initiation:

[IM] “There is no structured process, and it should not be

a structured process because ideas are never structured.

There are different ways to get your ideas to life. The only thing in my experience is: if you have an idea and you are

behind it, you will find a way to make it work. Either you’ll

find a researcher with some time to spend on a Friday afternoon, or you’ll get a business owner to allocate some

time

[I] [Interviewer: “How did you start working on this

idea?”] “Our department is a service organisation within which we have the room to take on these kind of projects.

(…) It is project based. Together with someone who has

knowledge about the content you have this kind of

flexibility.”

In conclusion, Philips’ investment in

intrapreneurial initiatives is done by the

business lines, who are stimulated to do so by

portfolio management. However, the CTO

office can provide preliminary support if ideas

need time to develop before finding a suitable

business to land in.

4.1.3 Philips: Prepare for Integration The NBX process at Philips starts early with

integration issues. The interviewees referred to

the importance of finding a landing spot early

on, as the initial influence of the business helps

the integration later in the process.

[IM] “The initial guidance in the beginning is to help you make a lot of design decisions early. You already know who

the business owner is, which will help you to make the right

decisions to find the right fit later.”

[IM] “As soon as you enter seed, you’ll need to drag in a

landing spot business who says: ‘this looks promising’.”

Another way in which Philips

stimulates early business integration is seen in

the team formation of ventures, which happens

early on and shows that business integration is

an important facet of the team’s focus.

[I] “We set up an MT [Management team] for the venture in which we saw four roles: a jack of all trades – me, a

commercial lead who is responsible for the complete aspect

of product management, marketing and sales. (…) An operational manager who thought about how we would

have to orchestrate operations within Philips. We had to

develop a product, what if an order would come in? How would that go? Where would it land? And how would we

invoice those orders? That complete trajectory. (…) And my

R&D manager. However, those last two people are part of the current business. I took them in my MT, they do not work

dedicated for the venture, but are significantly involved.”

[IM] “The initiator is someone you want to have in the core

team, but that could be in any role. The team is also

assessed by the NBX-assessments.”

This integration is further supported

through monthly meetings between the venture

team and its steering committee. These

meetings allow the landing business, through

the role of sponsor to influence the progress and

prepare the venture for reintegration.

16

[IM talking about monthly meetings] “For example in Beta and Alpha, the interest is in revenue and sales. But when

you are in Preseed, this is more qualitative. Have you

developed your value proposition? Have you validated? How are you engaging with partners? (…) So it depends on

the phase, you’ll have different discussions.”

[I] “Monthly we have a venture board to discuss the

progress of the venture. Separately I meet with R&D of the business as I make use of his organisation. I kind of

outsource production to him, internally.”

In the end, the issue of integration is

best summarized by the milestones that NBX

expects ventures to cross. These are discussed

in the monthly meetings. The innovation

manager indicated that at Philips, intrapreneurs

are expected to make progress on 16 areas of

interest:

[IM] “At each gate we look at 16 areas of interest. 8 are

product related and 8 are regarding the organisation and capabilities. (…) Those final 8 are about preparing the

venture in order for Philips to actually use these ventures to

their potential.”

So all in all, the formal integration

mechanisms at Philips focus on integration

issues early on. Intrapreneurs are guided

towards integration through the use of

milestones, team formation and monthly

meetings with the steering board. This means

that some of the exploitative barriers are put

upon the exploring venture early on. This is best

summarized by the innovation manager:

[IM] “If you fit in that context you will grow faster than any

external venture, but if you do not fit, it will be slower than

any external venture.”

4.1.4 Philips: Conclusion Overall, Philips’ system aims to cross the

threshold into exploitation by providing

legitimacy, funding and integration-support.

Business owners are tasked with the funding of

new initiatives and play an important role in

legitimising their efforts. This is supported by

the centrally located NBX office and the NBX

boards that are in each business line. An

advantage of this system is related to

integration. The early conformity to the

business lines helps initiatives to integrate in a

later stage. However, a disadvantage is also the

early conformity. It has early exploitative

barriers, which means that there is less room for

wild explorations. The system needs to be

cautious to not become path-dependent to the

current business lines. The CTO office is tasked

with this, and can support ‘wild’ ideas for a

while, however if it does not fit to a current

business line, there is no room to exist outside

them. The idea is to fail early, which helps

integration later, but limits the time that

intrapreneurs get to develop their idea.

[IM] “The big challenge is not to come with a good idea,

there are many good ideas, but the challenge is to find a

good idea in which we have the right to win and the right to

play.

4.2 Nedap: from Autonomy to

Alignment At Nedap the intrapreneurial support system is

characterised by autonomy. Both the innovation

manager [IM] and the intrapreneurs [I] indicate

that the freedom to make autonomous decisions

is important at Nedap.

[IM] “We do not have the illusion that managers know more

about doing the job than the employees themselves.”

[I] “Upon joining the company, one of the first questions I

got was: “what do you want to do?””

[I] “The degree to which you enjoy work is dependent on the

amount of influence you have over it”

This level of autonomy means that

employees set their own development goals,

determine their own working hours and choose

their number of holidays. Which further

highlights how new initiatives are started:

employees can just start working on something

else if they want to. The intrapreneur is

responsible for its development within the

context at Nedap until the products are ready to

be sold to multiple customers. That is the end of

the liminal state.

4.2.1 Nedap: Providing Legitimacy [IM] “I think it is best to let people make their own decisions. Those are taken within the teams. It is our task to

make sure they have the right context, in order for their

decisions to be in line with the direction we want to go. If the decisions go in many different directions it means we

failed in setting down a general direction for the company.”

This quote by the innovation manager

describes the important sources for legitimacy

at Nedap. The most important of these is within

the teams. As an intrapreneur at Nedap, it is

important to obtain legitimacy from your team

around you. Peer feedback is considered as a

decisive tool for legitimacy. All respondents

talked about the peer feedback mechanisms that

are in place.

[I] “At that point, I went to propose the idea to a couple of people. (…) People that had started around the same time

as I did. I knew I could not do this alone. I needed to find

someone to help.”

[I] “I talk to others at the coffee machine. They would ask ‘are we going to ask money for this?’. That plants a seed.

Furthermore, account and sales managers start wondering

if we should not be asking money for this extra feature.”

A formal method of organizing this

peer feedback is a monthly meeting. Each

business unit sits together, at least once a

month, which can be used by employees to

present ideas. Through an organized pitch, and

through the involvement of different peers,

intrapreneurs feel legitimised to work on their

idea.

17

[I] “Most people first explain it to a colleague, and at some point, they start talking about it more openly. At that point,

we tell them: you should pitch this to the whole group, that’s

what the podium is all about. When everyone does this

[PUTS HIS THUMB UP] you can continue.”

[I] “We pitched our idea at the monthly meeting, describing

the problem we wanted to solve. (…) The moment we got

critical questions we knew we managed to interest some people. So we talked with them to find out how we could

improve our idea.”

[I] [After the pitch] “we felt like there was enough support

and that we needed to continue work on this.”

The concept of peer feedback is linked

to the control mechanisms that intrapreneurs

encounter during the development of their

initiative. Intrapreneurs at Nedap are expected

to substantiate their decisions along the way.

Through informal channels, colleagues and

superiors can question their actions and discuss

the outcomes. Multiple examples throughout

the interviews show that even though

intrapreneurs have the autonomy to make

decisions, they often get questions, or go into

discussion to ensure they make the right

decision. These informal mechanisms further

improve legitimacy as the intrapreneur builds

trust in the path he/she is following.

[IM] “You have to show that your decision has substance. If

you can’t, we’ll send you back: please go do your job first.”

[I] “As an example: I wanted to validate our product and

had found a company that could do so for 150.000 euro. I discussed this with our general manager: it is a lot of

money, but I need to have it validated. He said ‘I know a

third party that also does these, you should go talk to them’. He was not critical, because it was my decision as product

lead, but he did help out.”

Other important facets of the context

within which intrapreneurs take these decisions

are reflected in the data pool. These are

summarized as social support systems, which

influence the choices that intrapreneurs take.

Nedap has deployed captains, coaches and a

goal setting-system that influence the degree to

which intrapreneurs feel legitimised in their

actions. This social support system is discussed

next. First of all, employees have the freedom

to set their own goals in discussion with their

“captain”, they discuss their progress at least

once a year, at the request of the employee.

[I] “These are meetings you set with your captain, these

meetings are essentially a discussion in which you look at: what are my goals? What are Nedap’s goals? Are we going

to achieve them together and how do they fit together?”

[I] [referring to freedom for initiatives] “During discussions

we see if they are content with their own goals. People are

their own greatest enemy in taking that freedom”

Employees have coaches that they

meet to discuss personal matters with, and

captains to discuss work related matters with.

This means that all employees have a 1 on 1 at

least every 2/3 weeks. These conversations

range from career perspectives to current tasks

at hand. It allows employees to voice new ideas

and legitimises their efforts.

[I] “In consultation with my coach I put my first project on hold, we were looking for new people but were not able to

find them. [Initiative 2] was transferred to 2 colleagues and

my coach proposed to take over [Initiative 3] if I really

wanted to pursue [Initiative 4].”

These social support system supports

employees in setting priorities, and helps them

in dealing with balancing their time. In its

essence, the system asks employees to

deliberately choose and discuss their individual

balance between explorative and exploitative

work.

[IM] [referring to the early role of captains]: “If you give up

at the first person you meet, your initiative did not have a

future anyway. The role of the captain is to trigger. (…) A captain could slow you down, might say: ‘you should spend

some more time on that’. This is subjective, cannot be done

objective. Some people will make mistakes, others will make

the right choices”

The fourth and last element is external

legitimisation or market pull. A proof of

concept helps to legitimise their efforts and

ensures internal support. All interviewees talk

about the importance of a clear customer need,

and examples show how the process gets sped

up after serious customer interest. Identifying

and formulating customer needs creates a

passion for the project as it allows intrapreneurs

to show the potential impact.

[I] “Actually, the market need was the spark that set it in

motion.”

[I] “I took a couple of months off to travel, and when I returned at Nedap I found the story I crafted around the

product to be very much alive (…) Others were arguing:

“this is unacceptable, this current state, we should do

something about it”.”

[I] “Their first order was 1 million, and I reinvested that

million into software development.”

In short, Nedap enables employees to

make their own decisions which means that its

legitimacy system is more intricate then at

Philips or Thales. Much of it depends on

informal systems and leads to self-

legitimisation. No-one will take responsibility

for the intrapreneurs venture, except for the

intrapreneur. Summarized best by the

innovation manager:

[IM] “Entrepreneurs do not need legitimisation, they can

create their own. We just offer them the support to do so.”

4.2.2 Nedap: Investing Resources At Nedap the level of autonomy gives

intrapreneurs the freedom to drop current tasks

and work on their own ideas. They invest their

own time discretionarily

[I – referring to starting a new initiative] “I had transferred

my responsibilities to someone else, and my partner did the

same during that period. When both of us were finally free,

we started together.”

18

This is similar for company resources. At

Nedap, resources are discretionarily available

to all that need to use it.

[IM] [Question interviewer: “What if I need resources?”]

“You can just take them. Nothing is stopping you from doing

so.”

[I] “After I agreed upon the price I said to my captain: I need to involve a behavioural scientist, and I found one for

1.500 euros a month. Is that okay? The answer was: you

know that it is okay.”

[I] “Their first order was 1 million, and I reinvested that million into software development. Everyone said: you are

completely crazy, even the director said that. But they

allowed it nonetheless.”

4.2.3 Nedap: Prepare for Integration Upon reaching maturity, initiatives are expected

to make an impact upon the organisation. The

interviewees suggest that initiatives are often

easily integrated with the organisation as the

initiatives automatically grow to be part of the

business. This is achieved through the concept

of contextual alignment.

[IM] [talking about the creation of a new branch] “The

management team only found out 4 years later. It was

financed internally without them knowing”

[I] “We are currently determining if we can make enough impact for Nedap to be viable. (…) We have to put it up for

discussion. If we make the choice to continue or stop, we

have to be able to substantiate it.”

To find contextual alignment, Nedap

relies on the before mentioned social support

systems. Informal feedback cycles enable

people throughout the organisation to respond

to initiatives quickly and ask critical questions,

which provides a context for the intrapreneurs.

Another tool that was mentioned before is the

process of goal setting. This process allows the

captains at Nedap to draw up specific conditions

which can influence the direction of an

employees’ goals. Employees are asked to

relate their goals to Nedap’s goals.

[IM] “It is our task to make sure they have the right context, in order for their decisions to be in line with the direction

we want to go to. If the decisions go in many different

directions it means we failed in setting down a general

direction for the company.”

[I] “These are meetings you set with your captain, these

meetings are essentially a discussion in which you look at:

what are my goals? What are Nedap’s goals? Are we going

to achieve them together and how do they fit together?”

This shows how Nedap deliberately

moves away from top-down directives and

relies on informal processes. Even the fast

feedback cycles are organized informally.

[INTERVIEWER] “The context heavily influences what

will happen next, right?”[IM] “No, the effect is limited. Because some people are inclined to break the context. And

it is those people you want to give the freedom to do so. If

you are arrogant, or self-determinant enough to say: “I don’t agree, I am going to do it anyway” – you should go

for it”

4.2.4 Nedap: Summary Nedap’s solution demonstrates how the

threshold between exploration and exploitation

can be bridged through autonomy. Their

solution reduces the general exploitative

requirements and makes the chasm easier to

cross. There is little differentiation between new

explorative efforts, and products that are

currently being exploited. Both are run by

product leads, who set their own goals, who can

take the resources they need, and who both deal

with critical questions from the organisation.

The lack of formal systems to adhere to make it

easiers for new business units to be formed. An

advantage of this system is that it is easier for

intrapreneurs to obtain the necessary resources,

and to stay integrated, however a disadvantage

is that intrapreneurs might feel illegitimate as

they constantly have to prove their worth to the

organisation. This increases the pressure on

individual intrapreneurs, as no-one else takes

responsibility for their actions.

[IM] “This organisation has freedom, responsibility, no fixed working hours, no fixed number of holidays and allows

you to determine your own schedule. That is literally

burnout (...) Especially those that adopt extra insecurity by

taking on a new initiative”

[IM] “If my agenda is full from 9 to 5, I won’t be able to do

new things. But, the question is: why is my agenda full? And

who determines that my agenda is filled? Who says yes?

Who does not make more room? That is me.”

[I] “I think that this is the biggest challenge we faced, the

recognition you get is very soft, you have to find it between

the lines because there is no manager who will say: this is

a good idea, you should do this.”

4.3 Thales: Follow the Leader The complex organisational system of Thales

offers multiple roads for intrapreneurs to start.

The key factor differentiating these roads is the

sponsorship of various budget holders. Multiple

methods were described by the innovation

manager, which were backed-up by the

intrapreneurs. These will be described.

The first possibility is to start an initiative as

part of a research proposal. Smaller initiatives

stay within the bounds of their businesses, and

a third option is to get support from the top

management team.

Thales has an official maturity and scaling

process based on Technology Readiness Levels

(TRL). From TRL 5, a technology should be

validated in the relevant environment and be

scaled into larger systems. This is the end of the

liminal phase.

4.3.1 Thales: Providing Legitimacy The interview data was analysed to identify

organisational tools that provide legitimacy to

19

the intrapreneurs. The importance of direct

managers at Thales cannot be overstated in the

sense that all intrapreneurs mentioned how their

direct managers helped, connected or protected

them in various ways throughout the process.

[I] “We got our technical director to vouch for us. Our team

would continue, regardless of the income we were generating. The presentation that we gave, with help from

the department in France told him “what they are doing fits

one on one”. That helped.”

[I] [talking about the direct manager] “He was a nuanced

man and has been like an umbrella to the department.”

This kind of relationship between

intrapreneur and direct manager is important to

the intrapreneur. Such a backing legitimises the

project. This is often achieved through close

exchanges between leader and member, which

is considered an important tool to build trust and

legitimisation in leadership-based solutions.

All intrapreneurs explained that

throughout the development their progress is

monitored. Through monthly progress

meetings, sponsors want to be kept up to date.

[I][Question interviewer: “Where you held accountable?”]

“Yes, to our two sponsors. (…) We had a monthly progress

report.”

[I] “I had a monthly meeting with my boss, and based on

those we decided to make the investment”

Furthermore, market pull was found to

legitimise the business efforts of the

intrapreneurs at Thales. All interviews

explained that serious interest from the market

accelerated the process.

[I] [referring to the high targets set by Thales] “There was a dowry at the beginning, 1 big project up for tender and the

full expectation that we would win it”

[I] [referring to the first product they had sold] “There

turned out to be a market, and we worked out a commercial model for that. What if we could continue that? (…) At that

moment we knew this could be serious.”

In short, middle manager support,

often through leader-member exchange

legitimises the efforts of intrapreneurs. Their

progress is monitored through monthly

meetings with their supervisors. Market pull

excelled their legitimacy within the corporation.

4.3.2 Thales: Investing Resources At Thales there are multiple sources for finding

resources. This is important, as funding alone

can keep an initiative afloat. This is highlighted

by example an initiative that got funded through

European research funds.

[IM] “There is a lot of subsidies. This is necessary as our

navy wants to be the most innovative navy in the world.”

[I] [When talking about participating in European tenders for subsidy] “As long as we created our own business, we

could continue to do research and get the financial

resources we needed to keep ourselves afloat.”

Finding a sponsor is therefore essential

at Thales. These sponsor are often those that

control the strategic resources and can bestow

them on intrapreneurial initiatives. However,

this does not necessarily have to be the current

supervisor of starting intrapreneurs. Thales has

created a system in which support can come

from a variety of sponsors, as strategic

resources are available both within the

businesses and at the centrally located

innovation committees.

[I] [talking about connecting their manager to another

business unit’s manager] “They became our two sponsors. He watched what we were doing and advised us on

business, how we could develop it and how we could get

support from the management team.”

[IM] [talking about the innovation committees] “Since we are expecting disruption from existing technologies we have

reserved a budget to play with things. We buy a Google

glass, we buy a HoloLens and let people play with them. (...). People from the business lines get the opportunity to

see if we can use that technology in our products”

[IM] [referring to employees who are accepted by the

innovation committee] “They are freed of their daily activities for 50%, and allowed to work on other activities

for 50%. A small team of enthusiastic people achieves more

than a hundred badly motivated people.”

In summary, the idea that support

comes from a direct manager holds at Thales.

However, the system is broader: support can

come from various sponsors. Either from

outside of the organisation, from budgets within

the business lines, or from centrally arranged

budgets. This gives intrapreneurs more

opportunities to find a sponsor who wants to get

involved with their initiative.

4.3.3 Thales: Integration

[Interviewer]: “How do I end up before the management

team?” [IM] “Actually it is quite simple, as in every lobby, you have

to talk to individuals. During that process, the story around

your initiative will get better. (…) At some point you’ll end up together in a room. You’ll say: this is the idea, this is the

business case, what do you think?”

[Interviewer]: “Is there an official decision moment?”

[IM]: “There is a gate, an official gating process”

This paragraph from the interview

with the innovation manager gives an insight

into the final steps toward integration.

Initiatives have to end up at the management

team at Thales, who can make a final integration

decision. Ventures can find a final place within

the businesses of Thales, through senior

executive involvement. A gating process, or

formal internal process is in place to guide that

final process.

An important step to fully integrate a

venture is located at the management team at

Thales. An important discussion with the

management team in this final stage is about the

landing business. In which business unit will the

20

new venture be integrated? To find a fitting

solution, and to end up before the management

team, intrapreneurs employ lobbying.

[IM] [referring to integration in the organisation] “We have

a process for that: the Chorus process. This defines certain

roles, as we are enormous. The Chorus process is necessary because customers want to make sure that “every part of

the supply chain is done correctly”.

[I] [referring to his direct manager] “He stuck his neck out

for us, and gave us the opportunity to pitch our idea at the board. If it sails well we would get the time to bring it into

a product”

[I] “Everyone was looking to each other. [The department

in] France was looking at the [management team in the]

Netherlands: ‘you go and invest first’. While the Netherlands was

thinking: ’if you find it interesting you should invest.’ They were

looking to each other and we were in the middle”

The limited reach of middle managers

requires senior management involvement at

Thales. Their involvement can speed up the

process towards integration, which is further

supported through internal processes that help

to identify the relevant actors during the

integration process. This means that the final

balance decision lies with the senior

management team, who have to decide to what

degree exploration is allowed within the

organisation, and in which directions. This

allows them to provide direction to bottom up

initiatives. It is important for intrapreneurs to

adhere to the management’s vision of the future.

This requires a landing spot in a current

business, or the strategic decision to open a

business into a new direction, both of which

require lobbying from the intrapreneur’s side.

[I] [referring to the management team] “Yes, they gave us a

chance. They financed us for a couple of years, but that was based on the enthusiastic stories from [business unit X].

However the path to integration never came about. (…) In

hindsight I thought: it really needs to be part of their vision and strategy. Only that will give you a chance of survival. If

it does not directly fit, it is seen as a hobby on the side”

4.3.4 Thales: Conclusion At Thales, the different organisational

tools all refer back to the importance of leaders

within the organisation. The sources of

legitimacy, funding and integration are spread

across several hierarchical levels. The liminal

state can therefore only be crossed if managers

are able to combine the necessities of

exploration with those of exploitation. An

advantage of this system is that managers take

personal responsibility in the initiatives, which

provides legitimacy and a forward push to the

intrapreneur. However, a disadvantage of this

system is that managers need to strike the

balance between exploration and exploitation.

At Thales, intrapreneurs expressed that

monitoring was often done based on

exploitative indicators like sales, or revenue, as

their managers had a similar pressure from

higher up the organisation. This shows that

managers struggle with achieving balance

between exploration and exploitation.

[I: Referring to a research department who gets subsidy

from outside Thales] “You have a lot of freedom. The only

thing that Thales is concerned about is that we break-even at the end of the year: that they do not have to sponsor us

too much and interesting results roll out”

[I] [Interviewer: “What were your targets when you

started?”] “Crazy high at that moment. Meaning above the 10 million for the first years. Roughly said: earn a lot of

money with few people and no product portfolio. They

started with a strong believe that the group excelled in this

area which should have excelled us as well.”

[I] “Our boss was interested in sales, because his boss was

interested in his sales. That means he delegates it down to

us.”

The challenge at Thales is to create an

organisational system that enables leadership to

support intrapreneurs over the long time. Such

a system needs patient resources, and long term

focussed key performance indicators that can

further help to align managerial interest with

those of exploration.

4.4 Cross-case analysis The case studies employ different systems in

order to cross the liminal state. Each of these

systems provides legitimacy to the intrapreneur,

invests in its initiative and promotes integration

with the organisation. However, the way these

outcomes are achieved varies greatly among the

case companies. In the following sections the

differences between these cases are discussed.

4.4.1 The sources of Legitimacy, Funding

and Integration The three case companies have distinctive

different sources of legitimacy, funding and

integration. At Thales, managers are tasked

with balancing exploration and exploitation.

They are required to take care of current

business, while they simultaneously support

intrapreneurs. Middle managers legitimise new

ventures, and provide the first round of funding,

and senior management is responsible for

integration within the organisation. An

advantage of this is that managers take a

personal stake in the success of the venture:

intrapreneurs feel protected and legitimised by

the security their manager can offer. A

disadvantage of this involvement is that

intrapreneurs are often expected to contribute to

the financial bottom-line early on, as these

managers feel the same pressure from their

managers. Another risk is its reliance on senior

individuals, who can form a barrier to further

development, as referred to by the innovation

manager.

21

[I-Thales] “Our boss was interested in sales, because his boss was interested in sales. That means that he delegates

it down to us.”

[I-Thales] “Whenever I made an estimation of future

turnover they would double it. But the doubling would be

half of the original plan they had for us.”

[IM-Thales]: “The reality is that I think that in some

positions, innovation-related positions, key-players stay too

long. An advantage is that they have a lot of knowledge and experience, but the other side is that 40 years might be too

long. These might be biased before someone even gets an

opportunity. The moment might be different this time

around.”

This is different at Philips, they

employ a formal process to legitimise, fund and

integrate intrapreneurs. This is process-based

and therefore less reliant on managers. Philips’

initiatives are required to jump through several

hoops in the first months of development.

Through multi-disciplinary team members, and

specific milestones, the process pushes the

initiative forward towards scaling. The

intrapreneur has to find a fit within the

organisation. These high expectations can be

seen as a barrier early on, but stimulate

integration with the firm in a later phase. The

goal of the process is to make sure that the

initiative fits within the organisational

processes of Philips. A fit ensures easy scaling,

but finding this fit is a challenge for

intrapreneurs.

[I-Philips] [referring to supporting departments like quality

regulatory, procurement and architecture] “Let’s say you

start a venture half way through the year. Who is waiting for you? No-one is sitting around and waiting for you to

come by with a venture to work on. It is an illusion to think

that other departments can easily help you out. It is a tug

of war to see if you can free people up to help you out.”

[IM-Philips] “Just as an example: Philips bills on a monthly

basis, let’s say you want to bill unstructured as it fits your

business model. This is not supported by Philips and it is

very difficult to change that.”

[I-Philips] “For all business model capabilities that are

important for our business we had to evaluate and see if we

would get the support.”

At Nedap the intrapreneur carries

responsibility for the legitimisation, funding

and integration. This means that the initiative

has to get accepted by the organisation around

it. The idea is that the departments develop a

shared responsibility for everything that is

going on. A difference with the other firms is

that at Nedap the general exploitative

requirements for businesses are relatively low.

This reduces the gap between new initiatives

and current business and means that there are

little organisational barriers to integrate new

products. An advantage of this model is that

employees can figure the development out

themselves. A downside of this system is that

each new intrapreneur has to go through a

comparable process which can be accompanied

with uncertainty and stress.

[IM-Nedap] “The group can act on that. Maybe because the story just is not right. People start thinking: ‘What is that

person doing? I do not get it at all’. This leads to a

conversation of course. Either your own group corrects you: ‘Please stop it, we have to do more work and we have

no clue what you are contributing’ That is key. If you can

convince others, you have to convince your team to support

you.”

[I-Nedap] “In the past 1,5 year we were focussed on

building the product and validating if it works. The phase

we are currently in is to see if we can make enough impact for Nedap to keep it viable. (…) I hired someone to help

built the business case”

[I-Nedap] “I do not know how you validate a business

model, or what good business models are. You can read about it all you want but there was too much uncertainty

and it was very difficult to determine if we were still on the

right path. Because no-one told us if this was a good idea.”

The cross-case analysis shows that

there are different methods of supporting

intrapreneurs, and that although all three

companies provide legitimacy, funding and

integration the sources of providing it vary

greatly. Each method has advantages and

disadvantages and therefore needs careful

consideration. Next, the effects of these systems

on the intrapreneurial process are discussed.

4.4.2 Organisational Barriers to

Intrapreneurship During the development from exploration to

exploitation intrapreneurs face several barriers.

In order to understand how intrapreneurs cross

this chasm the next step is to compare the

barriers in difficulty and position. Figure 4

simplifies and compares the differences in

difficulty of the organisational barriers at each

organisation per intended outcome.

It shows that intrapreneurs at Thales

have the lowest barrier in obtaining legitimacy

in the liminal state. Their sponsors provide

shade for the intrapreneurs to operate in.

Intrapreneurs at Philips have relatively more

difficulty as they have to reach certain

milestones for each NBX phase. In comparison,

Nedap offers relatively little support to

legitimise intrapreneurs. This is because

intrapreneurs have to continuously substantiate

their decisions to a multitude of organisational

actors.

This is different for acquiring funding.

Intrapreneurs at Nedap can easily take the

resources they need. At Thales and Philips these

are provided by a sponsor, whom intrapreneurs

have to convince. Both companies have certain

requirements for pitches and therefore certain

barriers to pass. However the biggest difference

is the use of portfolio management at Philips.

This tool helps sponsors to balance exploration

and exploitation and ensures that intrapreneurs

22

do not have to contribute to the bottom-line of

the operations.

The three firms further differentiate in

the tools they employ to prepare initiatives for

integration. At Nedap relatively little assistance

is offered to intrapreneurs. They have to figure

out the business requirements on their own, and

find their landing spot in the organisation.

However, Nedap has sparse exploitative

requirements for current businesses, which

means that the difference between current

business and new initiatives is relatively small.

This makes the total barrier relatively easy to

pass, even if intrapreneurs have to do it alone.

Tobe integrated within Thales, initiatives need

to be approved by senior management. Not an

easy feat, even though Thales has employed a

formal internal process to help intrapreneurs

find a landing spot. This is considered to be

more difficult than the integration at Philips as

Philips prioritises integration earlier in the

process. Their total barrier to integration is

higher as many different units within the

organisation maintain different requirements

for new products, however, in comparison to the

other two companies, Philips offers more

integration support, at an earlier stage.

The comparison shows that the

different organisational tools that are employed

by the case companies influence the

configuration of the process during the liminal

state. It highlights that even though these firms

support their intrapreneurs, they still have

organisational barriers in place. The location

and height of these barriers differ.

Outcome 1: Legitimacy Outcome 2: Funding Outcome 3: Prepared for Integration

Structural

Solutions

Parallel structure

Formal control systems

- Stage gate system

Reward systems

Inter-firm collaboration

Market pull

Training

Slack Resources

- Through: Portfolio

Management

Allocation of free time

Integration systems

Through:

- Shared Vision

- Senior team integration

- Targeted structural linking

mechanisms

- Team formation

Contextual

Solutions

Peer-support and feedback

Informal control

- Monthly meeting

Social support systems

- Coach // Captain

- Goal setting

Market pull

Discretionary Resources

Autonomy (100% “free

time”)

Contextual alignment

Through:

- Explicit task objectives

- Constant reviews

Leadership-

based

Solutions

Middle manager support

- Leader-member exchange

Monitoring

Market pull

Strategic Resources

Key Performance Indicators

Senior executive involvement (e.g.

Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008)

Through:

- Internal processes

- Lobbying

Table 4: Full conceptual model (Italics indicate case study findings)

Figure 4: A comparison of barrier difficulty for the intrapreneur per intended outcome (dashed line visualises the

total barrier)

23

5. DISCUSSION The difficult reconciliation of the explorative

actions of intrapreneurs, with the exploitative

efforts of the organisation has been the core

focus of this research. A lack of research into

the intrapreneurial process mystifies the liminal

state between exploration and exploitation,

which makes it unclear what tools firms can

employ to support the development of

initiatives. The purpose of this research is,

therefore, to explore the instruments that are

necessary for firms to support the development

of intrapreneurial initiatives from exploration

into exploitation.

5.1 Three Necessities in Crossing

the Chasm The state of liminality occurs in

intrapreneurship because of the interaction

between the initiative and the organisation, and

the trouble firms have in consolidating the

explorative requirements of one, with the

exploitative requirements of the other. This

core-problem of intrapreneurship is

ambidextrous in nature and this study therefore

draws on ambidexterity research for solutions.

Based on the ambidexterity research field it

is suggested that there are three intended

outcomes that are necessary for initiatives to

develop from exploration into exploitation. In

order to support intrapreneurs firms have to:

1. Provide Legitimacy

2. Invest Resources

3. Prepare for Integration

The case findings corroborate this

proposal. Interestingly, even though the case

companies vary from each other, their

supportive systems in the liminal state can be

summarised based on these three intended

outcomes.

The cross-case analysis shows that the

approach of the case companies to

intrapreneurship varies, as they employ several

tools that lead to different configurations of the

three stages. Appendix 2 shows that the case

companies use organisational tools from

multiple ambidexterity solutions across the

three liminal stages. This is in line with the

suggestions by Raisch and Birkinshaw (2008)

who suggest that organisational tools to

intrapreneurship interact and complement each

other.

Past research on organisational antecedents

of intrapreneurship founds broad concepts like

values, communication or organisational

support to positively influence intrapreneurship

(Antoncic & Hisrich, 2001; Zahra, 1991) or

suggests specific solutions to the intrapreneurial

endeavour: leadership-based support systems

(Deprez et al., 2018) or structural differentiation

(Burgers & Covin, 2016; Zahra, 1991). This

research builds on those findings by providing

an overarching model that captures the tools of

all three possible ambidexterity solutions that

firms can employ to support intrapreneurs.

The notion of liminality in corporate

entrepreneurship has been explored by

Henfridsson and Yoo (2013, p. 945) who claim

that intrapreneurs struggle with uncertain

periods of liminality when “their new possible

innovation trajectory is not fully formed but

coexists side-by-side with established

trajectories”. Their concept highlights the

development process for individual ideas, while

this paper investigates the role of organisations

in that process. This research elaborates former

findings by highlighting the problem that

intrapreneurs face within larger organisations

and by suggesting organisational tools that can

help to cross the chasm.

Proposition 1. Intrapreneurial initiatives

only cross the liminal state if the organisation

provides the initiatives legitimacy, resources

and help with integration .

5.2 The Size of the Chasm It is important to further develop the

understanding of the liminal state, and the

factors that influence its existence. To do so, the

assumption of radicality and the empirical

findings on paradoxical mindsets are discussed.

The liminal state is the difference

between the explorative efforts of the

intrapreneurs with the exploitative efforts of the

organisation. This suggests that as exploration

strides further away from current capabilities,

the gap increases. The interview findings show

that Thales and Philips have specialised

processes in place to support innovative ideas

but still face integration problems. It is therefore

proposed that the liminal state is affected by the

complexity of the innovation. This builds on

the idea of Assink (2006), he finds that large

corporations particularly face barriers in the

development and commercialisation of

disruptive innovations. Incremental innovations

develop and scale with relative ease, as they

make use of current organisational standards

(Ireland & Webb, 2007). However, as radical

innovations depart from the current methods of

working (Lassen et al., 2006) their integration

becomes more difficult (Deprez et al., 2018;

Jansen, 2009). This link between radical

innovation and intrapreneurship was first made

by Lassen et al. (2006) and fits the

conceptualisation of intrapreneurship in this

24

research. All intrapreneurs that were selected

for this study worked on new products, services

or markets for their companies. The

methodology of this paper does not allow to

infer at which level of complexity the problem

of liminality materialises but it does suggest

that the level of innovation complexity

influences the existence, or the size of the

liminal state. The following is therefore

proposed:

Proposition 2. The liminal state materialises

after a certain threshold of innovation

complexity (radicalness).

Another impact on the existence, or on

the size of the liminal state could be the

entrepreneurial mindset of the rest of the

organisation. Assink (2006) suggest that

corporate attitude and employee mental models

can be important inhibitors to radical innovation

and Dess and Lumpkin (2005) suggest that an

entrepreneurial orientation positively affects

intrapreneurship. The idea that the mindset of

the rest of the organisation influences the ease

of integration was further suggested by an

innovation manager at Philips.

[IM-Philips] “You can’t just say: I need a finance and

account person, let me grab one from this pool of people. It

is not going to work, you need a mindset change. We have to understand what we need for that and offer it to our

intrapreneurs. That is the cycle of learning in which Philips

currently resides.”

It also corroborates the interview findings at

Nedap. Their propensity towards autonomy and

risk taking reduces the requirements for

intrapreneurs and eases the threshold between

exploration and exploitation.

[Both IM & I said this separate from each other] “It’s much

better to ask forgiveness than it is to get permission”.

[I-Nedap]: [If it fails] “it might be a waste of money? Yeah, maybe, but it brought us much more. (…) We now have a

team of three people who perfectly fit the organization, who

know exactly how the market operates and have learned to

continuously prove themselves.”

It is therefore suggested that the entrepreneurial

orientation of a firm decreases the chasm

between exploration and exploitation.

Proposition 3. The entrepreneurial

orientation of a firm is negatively related to the

size of the liminal state.

5.3 Being Conscious of

Organisational Barriers Organisational barriers to intrapreneurship are

often the result of new initiatives coming into

contact with actors, procedures or systems that

are oriented towards exploitation. It I therefore

suggested that ambidextrous solutions can

smooth the transition across the liminal state by

eliminating all organisational barriers. This idea

is reflected by research into the organisational

effect on intrapreneurship (Burgess, 2013;

Menzel et al., 2007; Morris & Trotter, 1990).

They argue that a firm can only add value to

intrapreneurs if the corporate structure enables

them, suggesting that all corporate barriers

should be eliminated. However, other authors

argue for the importance of organisational

barriers (Calisto & Sarkar, 2017; Hornsby et al.,

1993; Pinchot, 1987). Pinchot (1987) argues

that barriers show if intrapreneurs truly believe

in their idea. Intrapreneurs must be willing to

fight through organisational barriers (Calisto &

Sarkar, 2017).

Interestingly, the findings of this

research reflect this discussion. The research

findings indicate that although the three firms

consciously support intrapreneurs, they still

maintain several barriers. This suggest that a

barrier-free liminal state is impossible, not

desirable, or that these firms have room to

improve. Based on the methodology of this

research it is not possible to identify a clear

answer to this problem. This requires an

effectiveness analysis of certain intrapreneurial

systems, and a quantification of the value that

barriers can bring. However, the research

findings do suggest a difference between

conscious and unconscious barriers.

Some organisational barriers are

mentioned by intrapreneurs and explained to

have a purpose by the innovation managers (the

organisation is conscious of their existence)

while other barriers are just mentioned by the

intrapreneurs, indicating that they might be

unknown to the organisation. The idea of

conscious barriers is proposed by Hashimoto

and Nassif (2014). They argue that managers

support their intrapreneurs by eliminating some

barriers, and by helping them cross other

barriers that are deliberately left in place.

The research findings indicate

conscious barriers at all three case companies,

see appendix 1. According to the innovation

managers, these barriers have a purpose, and in

all cases the company offers some form of

assistance in passing them. An example of such

a barrier is the entry barrier at Philips. Getting

access to the NBX-process requires approval

from the NBX-board. This means that

intrapreneurs need to officially request access

and await a decision. However, Philips also

provides best-practices and business model

examples to help intrapreneurs to cross this

barrier. So why does Philips maintain this

organisational barrier? This seems to be a

conscious decision on basis of their innovation

goal. Philips has designed its intrapreneurship-

system to selectively decide early on which

25

ideas it wants to invest in. They claim to have

enough ideas and need to filter out the ones with

‘potential’.

[IM-Philips] “The big challenge is not to come with a good

idea, there are many good ideas, but the challenge is to find

a good idea in which we have the right to win and the right to play. We must deliver much higher value to the customer

and bring a superior value compared to competitors.”

The intrapreneurs further mentioned

organisational barriers that were not

acknowledged by innovation managers. By

identifying these barriers, the organisation

becomes conscious of their existence. If they

serve no purpose, they should be eliminated to

ensure that no intrapreneurs are hindered by

them. At all three case companies, unconscious

barriers were found, see appendix 1. A clear

example of such a barrier is provided by Thales.

Once initiatives are approved, and gain

legitimacy through their direct supervisor or

sponsor, all intrapreneurs indicated that the

control mechanisms were not suited for young

initiatives. The innovation manager indicates

that department heads of innovative

departments are tasked with innovative key

performance indicators, but the intrapreneurs

explain that in their experience their supervisors

were mostly interested in their financial bottom-

line. This means that new initiatives get little

time to grow, and are immediately confronted

with exploitative systems. This seems

counterintuitive and if the firm would decide

that this barrier serves no purpose it should be

eliminated. The conceptual model from this

research suggests possible organisational tools

to do so. Thales could employ key performance

indicators for new initiatives that allow

intrapreneurs time to develop and measure their

success not on basis of output measurements,

but on development measurements. Specialised

ring-fenced innovation budgets for department

heads allows them to grant more lenience to

intrapreneurs and tackle this barrier.

[I-Thales] [Interviewer: “What were your targets when you

started?”] “Crazy high at that moment. Meaning above the

10 million for the first years. Roughly said: earn a lot of

money with few people and no product portfolio. They

started with a strong believe that the group excelled in this

area which should have excelled us as well.”

[I-Thales] “Our boss was interested in sales, because his boss was interested in his sales. That means he delegates it

down to us.”

It is unclear if the liminal state can be

crossed without any organisational barriers, and

it is questionable if this is desirable. Research

has indicated the importance of intrapreneurs

passing deliberate organisational barriers. The

idea of deliberate ambidexterity is therefore

proposed (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2008)

Organisations have to be deliberate about their

support system for intrapreneurship, and

consciously decide which barriers are necessary

and which should be eliminated (Delić et al.,

2016). The three intended outcomes of the

intrapreneurial process can help to identify

organisational barriers that enable organisations

to make deliberate choices regarding their need

and function. This research provides

suggestions for eliminating barriers that do not

serve a purpose, but does not allow for a

definitive answer on the usefulness of certain

barriers, as it is centred around the needs of the

intrapreneurs, rather than the needs of the

organisation. The fact that some barriers can be

explained by the organisation does not

necessary make them useful to the process, nor

does this mean that all unconscious barriers

should be eliminated. This research purely

elicits that organisations should make conscious

decisions about their intrapreneurial process.

Future research is necessary to assess the ups

and downs of organisational barriers to

intrapreneurship, and to identify which

organisational trade-offs need to be made.

Proposition 4. Conscious organisational

barriers increase the effectiveness of an

intrapreneurial process.

5.4 The undeniable force of Market

Pull The first intended outcome of the liminal state

is legitimacy. Maintaining the support of the

business is important. An interesting recurring

effect across the three case studies is the value

of external influences on the internal

legitimacy. The recognition and forward

momentum that initiatives gain is highly

dependent on an external factor: pull from the

market.

[I-Thales] “because we had a strong reference point. We had shown through [CUSTOMER #1] that we could really

add value.”

[I-Nedap] “They both ordered a couple thousands, they were two [CUSTOMERS] who were friends with each

other. Their first order was 1 million, and I reinvested that

million into software development.”

[I-Philips] “We interviewed multiple customers and saw that there was demand which we could play into. That is

why we decided to start a pilot with a customer.”

This is not completely unexpected. On

one hand, ambidexterity research, and in

particular the structural solution, discuss the

possibility of inter-firm collaboration

(Cantarello, Martini, & Nosella, 2012), or

customer co-creation (Cannaerts N, 2016).

Structurally separated units offer a protective

environment for the involvement of co-

operators. On the other hand, intrapreneurship

research establishes a relationship between

market orientation and innovation, as external

scanning is found to positively influence

decision risk-taking, which stimulates

26

intrapreneurial initiatives (Chandrasekaran et

al., 2012; Dess et al., 2003).

However, the effect of clear external

signals (market pull) on ambidexterity, or on the

intrapreneurial process have not been discussed

before. The interview data indicate on multiple

occasions throughout the cases that a clear

external buying signals influence the internal

legitimacy of an initiative. This suggests that as

external signals grow, the ambidextrous

challenge for decisionmakers slinks. The future

rewards of the initiative become clearer, which

decreases the chasm between exploration

exploitation, and increases the legitimisation of

the project.

This value of early customers is not

new, as it is clearly recognized in network

theory (Burkhardt & Brass, 1990) and in

entrepreneurship research (Wang, Song, &

Zhao, 2014). Burkhardt and Brass (1990),

suggest that the existence of early adopters

reduces uncertainty for followers (Burkhardt &

Brass, 1990) and Wang et al. (2014) find that

early customers can have a strong signalling

effect on performance.

It is therefore proposed that clear

market pull signals from customers positively

influence the internal legitimacy of

intrapreneurs within their organisation. This is

important for intrapreneurs who are stuck in the

liminal state, and shows the relevance of linking

intrapreneurs to customers for innovation

managers that want to further intrapreneurial

initiatives.

Proposition 5. Market pull is positively

related to the internal legitimacy of an

intrapreneurial initiative.

5.5 Theoretical implications This study contributes to the field of

intrapreneurship in several important ways. It

reconceptualises the process perspective on

intrapreneurship. This research draws out the

threshold between exploration and exploitation

and in doing so gives important insights into the

challenges that intrapreneurs face within large

organisations. The identification of the liminal

state helps to understand why many

intrapreneurial initiatives fail despite clear

explorative and exploitative support systems.

To the best of my knowledge, intrapreneurship

has not been approached through an

ambidextrous lens before, with one notable

exception (Burström & Wilson, 2015).

Burström and Wilson (2015) introduce

the concept of intrapreneurial ambidexterity

and its main building blocks. The present

research builds on that concept and shows that

ambidextrous solutions (structural, contextual

and leadership-based) provide valuable insights

into the organisational tools that can be used to

stimulate the intrapreneurial process.

A second contribution is related to the

liminal state. Past research has provided

valuable insights in the methods that

organisations employ to support the exploration

of opportunities through ideation support (e.g.

Woodman, Sawyer, & Griffin, 1993) and

freedom (e.g. Alpkan et al., 2010; Rigtering &

Weitzel, 2013) and the exploitation of

opportunities through maturity and scaling

models (e.g. Burgers & Covin, 2016; Jansen,

2009). This is also reflected in the three case

studies. The companies use parallel structures,

autonomy and specialised innovation

committees to enable intrapreneurs, while they

simultaneously have formal processes at play.

Thales for example employs technology-

readiness levels and Philips a stage gate system.

This research makes clear that the interlude

between exploration and exploitation can be

problematic for intrapreneurial initiative at

larger firms as it is unclear when and how firms

can develop the initiatives through the

threshold. This research helps to understand the

theoretical concept of the liminal state and

formulates potential relationships that influence

the problem.

An ambidextrous approach to

intrapreneurship enables the research field to

look beyond intrapreneurs’ personality

characteristics and pulls focus towards the

structures, contexts and leadership behaviours

that help organisations to balance explorations

and exploitation throughout the intrapreneurial

process.

5.6 Practical implications The newly developed framework provides a

new managerial perspective on the support of

intrapreneurs. This research suggests that firms

need to make conscious decisions about their

intrapreneurial process from exploration into

exploitation.

This research suggests that radical

intrapreneurial initiatives require organisational

assistance to pass through the liminal state, in

the form of legitimacy, funding and help with

integration. Without support intrapreneurial

initiatives will die once they get in contact with

the exploitative organisation. Organisations

need to provide intrapreneurial initiatives

legitimacy to indicate the potential of the idea

and to understand its development,

organisations need to invest resources into

initiatives for them to actually develop over

27

time, and organisations need to prepare the

initiatives for integration to ensure a future

within the corporate bounds.

The conceptual model, based on

ambidexterity and intrapreneurship research,

and extended based on the case studies provides

a valuable overview of the different

organisational tools that firms can employ to

support intrapreneurial initiatives and take

down organisational barriers. This research

suggests that organisations need to make

conscious decisions regarding the

intrapreneurial systems. The conceptual model

can be useful in designing or evaluating

intrapreneurial processes on the chasm between

exploration and exploitation. This model is

visualised in Table 4.

A final implication is the customer

involvement in the development process.

Market pull is suggested to be an essential

element in the internal legitimacy of an

initiative. This implies that businesses can

leverage their influence on the legitimacy of

intrapreneurs from their suppliers by getting

involved in pilots. Which is a valuable strategy

for firms to stay at the forefront of any

developing industry. It further implies that

organisations should revaluate the role of sales

or customer relations in intrapreneurial

ventures, as the impact of customer input is seen

invaluable to intrapreneurship.

5.7 Research Limitations The results that are reported in this research are

subject to the limitations of its methodology.

The qualitative and explorative work of this

research is meant to be interpreted as such. The

case-study approach provided valuable insights

in the way firms deal with the liminal state, but

does not show any significant results that proof

the theoretical workings of the proposed

conceptual model. Nor does it show the

effectiveness of the proposed solutions.

Another limitation lies within the

analysis method of this research. The

interpretations of both the literature review and

the semi-structured interviews are performed by

one researcher, which increases the chance of

omitted variables in the analysis.

Thirdly, the selection of the interview

sample, achieved through personal network or

official communication channels does not

guarantee an heterogenous sample. It is highly

probable that the interpretation of the first

contact within the organisations steered the

final selection of the sample, which could lead

to an homogenous recollection of affairs: the

omitting of certain support functions or the

amplification of others.

Lastly, the research was conducted

through the use of semi-structured interviews,

the results are therefore based on the experience

of intrapreneurs, self-knowledge, perception

and recall ability. Interviewees can also be

prone to answer politically correct. These

factors can influence the results of this research.

Nevertheless, the interview strategy was

designed to elicit non-biased answers for the

interviewees. Additionally, in accordance with

Alshenqeeti (2014), the interviewees were well

informed before the interview started, they got

the chance to ask questions, they could add to

their earlier given statements, and their data is

kept anonymous.

5.8 Directions for Future Research The results that are reported in this study

suggest several additional possibilities for

future research. The first couple of directions

are related to the propositions that have been

made. The latter discusses linkages to various

other research fields.

This research proposes that

intrapreneurial initiatives can only cross the

liminal state if the organisation provides the

necessary legitimacy, resources and integration

support. Future research is necessary to identify

if these outcomes are completely exhaustive

and if their effect indeed leads to successfully

bridging the gap between explorative and

exploitative systems at innovative

organisations. One research method for this

would be to compare succeeding and failing

initiatives within a single company, assuming

that their development falls short in the liminal

state, to identify the factors that influence

success.

The application of this model to other

forms of innovation should also be tested. It is

proposed that only radical innovations

experience the liminal state, as incremental

innovations more easily fit within the current

exploitative systems. This could be tested by

comparing several innovative proposals over

time and assessing their innovative complexity

and maturity. This could highlight whether the

liminal state exists for other forms of

innovation.

Further research is necessary to

identify if all organisational barriers should be

eliminated. A possible synopsis for this

research design would be to quantitatively cross

reference the maturity of past intrapreneurial

initiatives of various organisational systems

with the barriers that were in place in order to

28

find out which barriers lead to failure, or were

most difficult to cross.

Another point of attention for future

research is the need to address different

possibilities in designing intrapreneurial

systems. This research proposes that

organisations use various combinations of tools

from different ambidexterity solutions. It is

interesting to identify if the arch-solutions from

ambidexterity hold up across a multitude of

organisations and what determines their

success. This research would be most valuable

if it is able to determine why certain

organisations choose to design certain systems.

A final point for future research is

rooted in the homogenous sample of this

research. An example of this is seen in the

gender of the interviewees. All intrapreneurs

and innovation managers that were selected for

this research were male. This could be a

coincidence, it could mean that these firms have

a relative low percentage of women

intrapreneurs (or women employed), or it could

mean that the definition of intrapreneurs

currently used in research provokes masculine

character traits. An interesting path for future

research could therefore be to combine

intrapreneurship with gender studies to explore

this potential relationship. A possible method

for doing so would be to explore within one

organisation whether the diversity of the whole

organisation is reflected in the intrapreneurship

numbers and whether this is influenced by the

diversity of the sponsors/managers. This could

help to determine if the antecedents suggested

in this research are gender specific, or if they

support a variety of intrapreneurs.

6. CONCLUSION This research set out to identify what

organisations can do to support intrapreneurial

initiatives through the threshold between

exploration and exploitation. The theoretical

differences between exploration and

exploitation materialise as organisational

barrier to intrapreneurs. Past research defaults

in explaining how firms can support

intrapreneurs through this threshold. This paper

helps to understand the problem in much more

details and gives some ideas of how firms can

deal with this problem. It is proposed that firms

need to provide legitimacy, funding and

integration-support in order to successfully

develop initiatives out of the liminal state.

7. REFERENCES Adler, P. S., Goldoftas, B., & Levine, D. I. (1999).

Flexibility versus efficiency? A case study

of model changeovers in the Toyota

production system. Organization science,

10(1), 43-68.

Alpkan, L., Bulut, C., Gunday, G., Ulusoy, G., &

Kilic, K. (2010). Organizational support

for intrapreneurship and its interaction

with human capital to enhance innovative

performance. Management Decision,

48(5-6), 732-755.

doi:10.1108/00251741011043902

Alshenqeeti, H. (2014). Interviewing as a data

collection method: A critical review.

English Linguistics Research, 3(1), 39-45.

Antoncic, B. (2001). ORGANIZATIONAL

PROCESSES IN

INTRAPRENEURSHIP: A

CONCEPTUAL INTEGRATION.

Journal of Enterprising Culture, 9(2),

221. doi:10.1142/S0218495801000122

Antoncic, B. (2003). RISK TAKING IN

INTRAPRENEURSHIP:

TRANSLATING THE INDIVIDUAL

LEVEL RISK AVERSION INTO THE

ORGANIZATIONAL RISK TAKING.

Journal of Enterprising Culture, 11(1), 1-

23.

Antoncic, B., & Hisrich, R. D. (2001).

Intrapreneurship: Construct refinement

and cross-cultural validation. Journal of

Business Venturing, 16(5), 495-527.

doi:10.1016/s0883-9026(99)00054-3

Antoncic, B., & Hisrich, R. D. (2004). Corporate

entrepreneurship contingencies and

organizational wealth creation. Journal of

Management Development, 23(6), 518-

550. doi:10.1108/02621710410541114

Asif, M. (2017). Exploring the antecedents of

ambidexterity: a taxonomic approach.

Management Decision, 55(7), 1489-1505.

doi:10.1108/MD-12-2016-0895

Assink, M. (2006). Inhibitors of disruptive

innovation capability: a conceptual model.

European journal of innovation

management.

Belousova, O., & Gailly, B. (2013). Corporate

entrepreneurship in a dispersed setting:

actors, behaviors, and process.

International Entrepreneurship and

Management Journal, 9(3), 361-377.

doi:10.1007/s11365-013-0259-2

Birkinshaw, J. (1997). ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN

MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS:

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF

SUBSIDIARY INITIATIVES. Strategic

Management Journal, 18(3), 207-229.

doi:10.1002/(SICI)1097-

0266(199703)18:3<207::AID-

SMJ864>3.0.CO;2-Q

Boyce, C., & Neale, P. (2006). Conducting in-depth

interviews: A guide for designing and

conducting in-depth interviews for

evaluation input.

Brown, S. L., & Eisenhardt, K. M. (1997). The art

of continuous change: Linking complexity

theory and time-paced evolution in

relentlessly shifting organizations.

Administrative science quarterly, 1-34.

29

Burgelman, R. A. (1983). A process model of

internal corporate venturing in the

diversified major firm. Administrative

science quarterly, 223-244.

Burgelman, R. A. (1984). Designs for corporate

entrepreneurship in established firms.

California Management Review (pre-

1986), 26(000003), 154.

Burgers, J. H., & Covin, J. G. (2016). The

contingent effects of differentiation and

integration on corporate entrepreneurship.

Strategic Management Journal, 37(3),

521-540. doi:doi:10.1002/smj.2343

Burgess, C. (2013). Factors influencing middle

managers’ ability to contribute to

corporate entrepreneurship. International

Journal of Hospitality Management, 32,

193-201.

Burkhardt, M. E., & Brass, D. J. (1990). Changing

patterns or patterns of change: The effects

of a change in technology on social

network structure and power.

Administrative science quarterly, 35(1),

104-127.

Burström, T., & Wilson, T. L. (2015).

Intrapreneurial ambidexterity: a platform

project,Swedish approach. Management

Research Review, 38(11), 1172-1190.

doi:doi:10.1108/MRR-06-2014-0130

Calisto, M. d. L., & Sarkar, S. (2017). Organizations

as biomes of entrepreneurial life: Towards

a clarification of the corporate

entrepreneurship process. Journal of

Business Research, 70, 44-54.

doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2016.07.007

Cannaerts N, S. J., Henderickx E. (2016).

Ambidextrous design and public

organizations: a comparative case study.

International Journal of Public Sector

Management, 29, 708-724.

doi:10.1108/IJPSM-12-2015-0210

Cantarello, S., Martini, A., & Nosella, A. (2012). A

Multi-Level Model for Organizational

Ambidexterity in the Search Phase of the

Innovation Process. Creativity &

Innovation Management, 21(1), 28-48.

doi:10.1111/j.1467-8691.2012.00624.x

Carrier, C. (1994). Intrapreneurship in large firms

and SMEs: a comparative study.

International Small Business Journal,

12(3), 54-61.

Chandrasekaran, A., Linderman, K., & Schroeder,

R. (2012). Antecedents to ambidexterity

competency in high technology

organizations. Journal of Operations

Management, 30(1/2), 134-151.

doi:10.1016/j.jom.2011.10.002

Cheng, Y. T., & Van de Ven, A. H. (1996).

Learning the innovation journey: Order

out of chaos? Organization science, 7(6),

593-614.

Christensen, C. M. (1997). The innovator's

dilemma: when new technologies cause

great firms to fail: Harvard Business

School Press.

Covin, J. G., & Miles, M. P. (1999). Corporate

Entrepreneurship and the Pursuit of

Competitive Advantage.

Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice,

23(3), 47-63.

doi:10.1177/104225879902300304

Covin, J. G., & Slevin, D. P. (1991). A Conceptual

Model of Entrepreneurship as Firm

Behavior. Entrepreneurship Theory and

Practice, 16(1), 7-26.

doi:10.1177/104225879101600102

Creswell, J. W., Hanson, W. E., Clark Plano, V. L.,

& Morales, A. (2007). Qualitative

Research Designs: Selection and

Implementation. The Counseling

Psychologist, 35(2), 236-264.

doi:10.1177/0011000006287390

Csaszar, F. A. (2012). An Efficient Frontier in

Organization Design: Organizational

Structure as a Determinant of Exploration

and Exploitation. Organization science,

24(4), 1083-1101.

doi:10.1287/orsc.1120.0784

Dai, L., Maksimov, V., Gilbert, B. A., & Fernhaber,

S. A. (2014). Entrepreneurial orientation

and international scope: The differential

roles of innovativeness, proactiveness,

and risk-taking. Journal of Business

Venturing, 29(4), 511-524.

Delić, A., Đonlagić Alibegović, S., & Mešanović,

M. (2016). The Role of the Process

Organizational Structure in the

Development of Intrapreneurship in Large

Companies. Our Economy (Nase

Gospodarstvo), 62(4), 42-51.

doi:10.1515/ngoe-2016-0023

Deprez, J., Leroy, H., & Euwema, M. (2018). Three

chronological steps toward encouraging

intrapreneurship: Lessons from the

Wehkamp case. Business Horizons, 61(1),

135-145.

doi:10.1016/j.bushor.2017.09.013

Dess, G. G., Ireland, R. D., Zahra, S. A., Floyd, S.

W., Janney, J. J., & Lane, P. J. (2003).

Emerging issues in corporate

entrepreneurship. Journal of

Management, 29(3), 351-378.

Dess, G. G., & Lumpkin, G. T. (2005). The Role of

Entrepreneurial Orientation in Stimulating

Effective Corporate Entrepreneurship.

Academy of Management Perspectives,

19(1), 147-156.

doi:10.5465/ame.2005.15841975

Dess, G. G., Lumpkin, G. T., & McGee, J. E.

(1999). Linking Corporate

Entrepreneurship to Strategy, Structure,

and Process: Suggested Research

Directions. Entrepreneurship: Theory &

Practice, 23(3), 85-102.

doi:10.1177/104225879902300306

Dubois, A., & Gadde, L.-E. (2002). Systematic

combining: an abductive approach to case

research. Journal of Business Research,

55(7), 553-560.

Duncan, R. B. (1976). The ambidextrous

organization: Designing dual structures

for innovation. The management of

organization, 1(1), 167-188.

30

Eisenhardt, K. M., & Graebner, M. E. (2007).

Theory Building From Cases:

Opportunities And Challenges. Academy

of management Journal, 50(1), 25-32.

doi:10.5465/amj.2007.24160888

Fereday, J., & Muir-Cochrane, E. (2006).

Demonstrating rigor using thematic

analysis: A hybrid approach of inductive

and deductive coding and theme

development. International journal of

qualitative methods, 5(1), 80-92.

Ferreira, J. (2009). Corporate entrepreneurship: a

strategic and structural perspective. New

England Journal of Entrepreneurship,

4(2), 14.

Floyd, S. W., & Lane, P. J. (2000). Strategizing

throughout the organization: Managing

role conflict in strategic renewal.

Academy of Management Review, 25(1),

154-177.

García-Lillo, F., Ubeda García, M., & Marco, B.

(2017). Organisational ambidexterity: a

literature review using bibliometric

methods (Vol. 1).

Garrett, R. P. (2013). Top Management Support and

Initial Strategic Assets: A Dependency

Model for Internal Corporate Venture

Performance. Journal of Product

Innovation Management, 30(5), 896-915.

Garvin, D. A. (1983). Spin-Offs and the New Firm

Formation Process. California

Management Review, 25(2), 3-20.

doi:10.2307/41165001

Gelfand, M. J., Nishii, L., & Raver, J. L. (2006). On

the nature and importance of cultural

tightness-looseness. Journal of Applied

Psychology, 91(6), 1225.

Gelfand, M. J., Raver, J. L., Nishii, L., Leslie, L.

M., Lun, J., Lim, B. C., . . . Yamaguchi, S.

(2011). Differences Between Tight and

Loose Cultures: A 33-Nation Study.

Science, 332(6033), 1100-1104.

doi:10.1126/science.1197754

Ghoshal, S., & Bartlett, C. A. (1994). Linking

organizational context and managerial

action: The dimensions of quality of

management. Strategic Management

Journal, 15(S2), 91-112.

doi:10.1002/smj.4250151007

Gibson, C. B., & Birkinshaw, J. (2004). The

antecedents, consequences, and mediating

role of organizational ambidexterity.

Academy of management Journal, 47(2),

209-226.

Gill, P., Stewart, K., Treasure, E., & Chadwick, B.

(2008). Methods of data collection in

qualitative research: interviews and focus

groups. British dental journal, 204(6),

291.

Goodale, J. C., Kuratko, D. F., Hornsby, J. S., &

Covin, J. G. (2011). Operations

management and corporate

entrepreneurship: The moderating effect

of operations control on the antecedents of

corporate entrepreneurial activity in

relation to innovation performance.

Journal of Operations Management,

29(1/2), 116-127.

doi:10.1016/j.jom.2010.07.005

Gupta, A. K., Smith, K. G., & Shalley, C. E. (2006).

The Interplay between Exploration and

Exploitation. The Academy of

Management Journal, 49(4), 693-706.

doi:10.2307/20159793

Hashimoto, M., & Nassif, V. M. J. (2014).

Inhibition and Encouragement of

Entrepreneurial Behavior: Antecedents

Analysis from Managers' Perspectives.

BAR - Brazilian Administration Review,

11(4), 385-406. doi:10.1590/1807-

7692bar2014130008

He, Z.-L., & Wong, P.-K. (2004). Exploration vs.

exploitation: An empirical test of the

ambidexterity hypothesis. Organization

science, 15(4), 481-494.

Heinonen, J., & Toivonen, J. (2007).

APPROACHING A DEEPER

UNDERSTANDING OF CORPORATE

ENTREPRENEURSHIP - FOCUSING

ON CO-EVOLUTIONARY

PROCESSES. Journal of Enterprising

Culture, 15(2), 165-186.

doi:10.1142/S0218495807000095

Henfridsson, O., & Yoo, Y. (2013). The liminality

of trajectory shifts in institutional

entrepreneurship. Organization science,

25(3), 932-950.

Hill, S. A., & Birkinshaw, J. (2014). Ambidexterity

and survival in corporate venture units.

Journal of Management, 40(7), 1899-

1931.

Hisrich, R. D. (1990).

Entrepreneurship/intrapreneurship.

American psychologist, 45(2), 209.

Hitt, M. A., Nixon, R. D., Hoskisson, R. F., &

Kochhar, R. (1999). Corporate

Entrepreneurship and Cross-Functional

Fertilization: Activation, Process and

Disintegration of a New Product Design

Team. Entrepreneurship: Theory &

Practice, 23(3), 145-167.

doi:10.1177/104225879902300309

Hofstede, G. (1984). Culture's consequences:

International differences in work-related

values (Vol. 5): sage.

Hornsby, J. S., Naffziger, D. W., Kuratko, D. F., &

Montagno, R. V. (1993). An Interactive

Model of the Corporate Entrepreneurship

Process. Entrepreneurship Theory and

Practice, 17(2), 29-37.

doi:10.1177/104225879301700203

Ireland, R. D., Covin, J. G., & Kuratko, D. F.

(2009). Conceptualizing corporate

entrepreneurship strategy.

Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,

33(1), 19-46.

Ireland, R. D., & Webb, J. W. (2007). Strategic

entrepreneurship: Creating competitive

advantage through streams of innovation.

Business Horizons, 50(1), 49-59.

Ireland, R. D., & Webb, J. W. (2009). Crossing the

great divide of strategic entrepreneurship:

Transitioning between exploration and

31

exploitation. Business Horizons, 52(5),

469-479.

Jansen, J. J. P. (2009). Structural Differentiation and

Ambidexterity: The Mediating Role of

Integration Mechanisms. Organization

science, 20(4), 797-811.

Junni, P., Sarala, R. M., Taras, V., & Tarba, S. Y.

(2013). Organizational ambidexterity and

performance: A meta-analysis. Academy

of Management Perspectives, 27(4), 299-

312.

Kanter, R. M. (1983). The change masters New

York–Simon and Schuster. KanterThe

Change Masters1983.

Karrer, D., & Fleck, D. (2015). Organizing for

Ambidexterity: A Paradox-based

Typology of Ambidexterity-related

Organizational States. BAR - Brazilian

Administration Review, 12(4), 365-383.

doi:10.1590/1807-7692bar2015150029

Kearney, C., Hisrich, R., & Roche, F. (2007).

FACILITATING PUBLIC SECTOR

CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP

PROCESS:: A CONCEPTUAL MODEL.

Journal of Enterprising Culture, 15(3),

275-299.

doi:10.1142/S0218495807000150

Kollmann, T., & Stockmann, C. (2010).

Antecedents of strategic ambidexterity:

effects of entrepreneurial orientation on

exploratory and exploitative innovations

in adolescent organisations. International

Journal of Technology Management,

52(1-2), 153-174.

doi:10.1504/ijtm.2010.035860

Kuratko, D. F. (2017). Corporate Entrepreneurship

2.0: Research Development and Future

Directions. Foundations and Trends® in

Entrepreneurship, 13(6), 441-490.

doi:10.1561/0300000082

Kuratko, D. F., Ireland, R. D., Covin, J. G., &

Hornsby, J. S. (2005). A model of

middle–level managers’ entrepreneurial

behavior. Entrepreneurship Theory and

Practice, 29(6), 699-716.

Kuratko, D. F., Montagno, R. V., & Hornsby, J. S.

(1990). Developing an intrapreneurial

assessment instrument for an effective

corporate entrepreneurial environment.

Strategic Management Journal, 49-58.

Lassen, A. H., Gertsen, F., & Riis, J. O. (2006). The

nexus of corporate entrepreneurship and

radical innovation. Creativity and

Innovation Management, 15(4), 359-372.

Leech, N. L., & Onwuegbuzie, A. J. (2008).

Qualitative data analysis: A compendium

of techniques and a framework for

selection for school psychology research

and beyond. School Psychology

Quarterly, 23(4), 587.

Linder, S., & Bothello, J. (2015). Antecedents to

Autonomous Strategic Action: What

About Decline? IEEE Transactions on

Engineering Management, 62(2), 226-

236. doi:10.1109/TEM.2014.2382554

Liu, L. (2012). Simultaneous Pursuit of Innovation

and Efficiency in Complex Engineering

Projects-A Study of the Antecedents and

Impacts of Ambidexterity in Project

Teams. Project Management Journal,

43(6), 97-110.

Longhurst, R. (2003). Semi-structured interviews

and focus groups. Key methods in

geography, 3, 143-156.

Lubatkin, M., Simsek, Z., Ling, Y., & Veiga, J.

(2006). Ambidexterity and Performance in

Small-to Medium-Sized Firms: The

Pivotal Role of Top Management Team

Behavioral Integration (Vol. 32).

Manimala, M. J., Jose, P., & Thomas, K. R. (2006).

Organizational constraints on innovation

and intrapreneurship: Insights from public

sector. Vikalpa, 31(1), 49-50.

March, J. G. (1991). Exploration and exploitation in

organizational learning. Organization

science, 2(1), 71-87.

Menzel, H. C., Aaltio, I., & Ulijn, J. M. (2007). On

the way to creativity: Engineers as

intrapreneurs in organizations.

Technovation, 27(12), 732-743.

doi:10.1016/j.technovation.2007.05.004

Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1994).

Qualitative data analysis: An expanded

sourcebook: sage.

Morris, M. H., & Trotter, J. D. (1990).

Institutionalizing Entrepreneurship in a

Large Company: A Case Study at AT&T.

Industrial Marketing Management, 19(2),

131-139. doi:10.1016/0019-

8501(90)90037-V

Morrow, S. L. (2007). Qualitative research in

counseling psychology: Conceptual

foundations. The Counseling

Psychologist, 35(2), 209-235.

Mustafa, M., Gavin, F., & Hughes, M. (2018).

Contextual Determinants of Employee

Entrepreneurial Behavior in Support of

Corporate Entrepreneurship: A Systematic

Review and Research Agenda. Journal of

Enterprising Culture, 26(3), 285-326.

doi:10.1142/S0218495818500115

Neessen, P. C. M., Caniëls, M. C. J., Vos, B., & de

Jong, J. P. (2019). The intrapreneurial

employee: toward an integrated model of

intrapreneurship and research agenda.

International Entrepreneurship and

Management Journal, 15(2), 545-571.

doi:10.1007/s11365-018-0552-1

O'Reilly, C., & Tushman, M. (2008). Ambidexterity

as a dynamic capability: Resolving the

innovator's dilemma. Research in

Organizational Behavior, 28, 185-206.

doi:10.1016/j.riob.2008.06.002

O’Reilly, C., & Tushman, M. (2007). Ambidexterity

as a Dynamic Capability: Resolving the

Innovator’s Dilemma.

O’Reilly, C., & Tushman, M. (2013).

Organizational ambidexterity: Past,

present, and future. Academy of

Management Perspectives, 27(4), 324-

338.

Page, L. (2011). More wood behind fewer arrows

[Press release]

32

Park, S. H., Kim, J.-N., & Krishna, A. (2014).

Bottom-up building of an innovative

organization: Motivating employee

intrapreneurship and scouting and their

strategic value. Management

Communication Quarterly, 28(4), 531-

560.

Pinchot, G. (1987). INNOVATION THROUGH

INTRAPRENEURING. Research

Management, 30(2), 14-17.

Popadiuk, S., Luz, A. R. S., & Kretschmer, C.

(2018). Dynamic Capabilities and

Ambidexterity: How are These Concepts

Related? Revista de Administração

Contemporânea, 22, 639-660.

Puech, L., & Durand, T. (2017). Classification of

time spent in the intrapreneurial process.

Creativity & Innovation Management,

26(2), 142-151. doi:10.1111/caim.12214

Raisch, S., & Birkinshaw, J. (2008). Organizational

ambidexterity: Antecedents, outcomes,

and moderators. Journal of Management,

34(3), 375-409.

Raisch, S., Birkinshaw, J., Probst, G., & Tushman,

M. L. (2009). Organizational

ambidexterity: Balancing exploitation and

exploration for sustained performance.

Organization science, 20(4), 685-695.

Rigtering, J. P. C., & Weitzel, U. (2013). Work

context and employee behaviour as

antecedents for intrapreneurship.

International Entrepreneurship and

Management Journal, 9(3), 337-360.

doi:10.1007/s11365-013-0258-3

Rosing, K., Frese, M., & Bausch, A. (2011).

Explaining the heterogeneity of the

leadership-innovation relationship:

Ambidextrous leadership. The Leadership

Quarterly, 22(5), 956-974.

doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2011.

07.014

Russell, R. D. (1999). Developing a Process Model

of Intrapreneurial Systems: A Cognitive

Mapping Approach. Entrepreneurship

Theory and Practice, 23(3), 65-84.

doi:10.1177/104225879902300305

Schumpeter, J. A. (1934). Theory of economic

development: Routledge.

Seshadri, D. V. R., & Tripathy, A. (2006).

Innovation through Intrapreneurship: The

Road Less Travelled. Vikalpa: The

Journal for Decision Makers, 31(1), 17-

29. doi:10.1177/0256090920060102

Shane, S., & Venkataraman, S. (2000). The promise

of entrepreneurship as a field of research.

Academy of Management Review, 25(1),

217-226.

Shenton, A. K. (2004). Strategies for ensuring

trustworthiness in qualitative research

projects. Education for information,

22(2), 63-75.

Stevenson, H. H., & Jarillo, J. C. (1990). A

paradigm of entrepreneurship:

Entrepreneurial management. In

Entrepreneurship (pp. 155-170): Springer.

Thompson, J. D. (2017). Organizations in action:

Social science bases of administrative

theory: Routledge.

Turner, T., & Pennington, W. (2015).

Organizational networks and the process

of corporate entrepreneurship: how the

motivation, opportunity, and ability to act

affect firm knowledge, learning, and

innovation. Small Business Economics,

45(2), 447-463. doi:10.1007/s11187-015-

9638-0

Turro, A., Lopez, L., & Urbano, D. (2013).

Intrapreneurship conditioning factors

from a resource-based theory. European

Journal of International Management,

7(3), 315-332.

doi:10.1504/ejim.2013.054328

Tushman, M. L., & O'Reilly III, C. A. (1996).

Ambidextrous organizations: Managing

evolutionary and revolutionary change.

California Management Review, 38(4), 8-

29.

Venkataraman, S. (1997). The distinctive domain of

entrepreneurship research. In Seminal

Ideas for the Next Twenty-Five Years of

Advances (pp. 5-20): Emerald Publishing

Limited.

Wang, T., Song, M., & Zhao, Y. L. (2014).

Legitimacy and the Value of Early

Customers. Journal of Product Innovation

Management, 31(5), 1057-1075.

doi:10.1111/jpim.12144

Wasserman, N. (2008). The Founder’s Dilemma.

Harvard Business review, February 2008

issue.

Weiblen, T., & Chesbrough, H. W. (2015).

Engaging with Startups to Enhance

Corporate Innovation. California

Management Review, 57(2), 66-90.

doi:10.1525/cmr.2015.57.2.66

Woodman, R. W., Sawyer, J. E., & Griffin, R. W.

(1993). Toward a theory of organizational

creativity. Academy of Management

Review, 18(2), 293-321.

Yin, R. K. (2014). Case Study Research Design and

Methods (5 ed.): Thousand Oaks, CA:

Sage.

Zahra, S. A. (1991). PREDICTORS AND

FINANCIAL OUTCOMES OF

CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP -

AN EXPLORATORY-STUDY. Journal

of Business Venturing, 6(4), 259-285.

doi:10.1016/0883-9026(91)90019-a

Zahra, S. A., & Covin, J. G. (1995).

CONTEXTUAL INFLUENCES ON THE

CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP-

PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIP: A

LONGITUDINAL. Journal of Business

Venturing, 10(1), 43. doi:10.1016/0883-

9026(94)00004-E

33

Appendix 1: Conscious and Unconscious barriers

Based on the interviews with intrapreneurs and innovation managers it is suggested that intrapreneurs

run into the following:

Conscious barrier:

➢ The entry barrier to the NBX process

o Potential reason: In order to focus innovation, Philips employs a hefty entry barrier to

the NBX process. Its aim is to fail early and ensure that all initiatives that are

invested in have a great chance of succeeding.

o Innovation manager:

▪ “Also to be honest: the initial guidance in the beginning when you make a lot of design

decisions early in the process and the fact that you know who is the business owner will help

you to make the right decisions to find the right fit later. The big challenge is not to come with a

good idea, there are many good ideas, but the challenge is to find a good idea in which we have

the right to win, and the right to play. We must deliver much higher value to the customer and

bring a superior value compared to competitors.”

▪ “Stopping is not a bad thing, it is a good thing early. Stopping is bad in beta and we find out it

is not a strategic fit or there is no willingness to pay or that the amount of people that are

willing to pay is very limited. If you find this out in the beginning, it is a very good failure, if

you find it out in beta, after you invested millions this is a very bad failure”

▪ “ Many ideas were continued for too long in the past. A moment will come when too much

money is invested and no-one dares to admit failure. (…) So we figured out that those late fails

often happened because of a lack of business-interest. So we created a mechanism that forces a

fail-early. If you are not able to get a business line interested in Seed, it is a serious reason to

stop what you are doing.”

Sub-conscious barrier:

➢ Integration problems with individual supporting departments

o Description: As initiatives mature they need to discuss the various parts of their

business model and find a fit within Philips. Intrapreneurs struggle to get the

attention of procurement, quality regulatory and architects. Philips seems to be

conscious of this barrier and is working on resolving it by providing training to

various parts of the organisation in order to teach a more flexible mindset and

entrepreneurial orientation.

o Intrapreneurs:

▪ “You have to know all processes and procedures, and even if you do, you are still running

against the wind.”

▪ “Even when you have a budget, it does not mean you have priority with any of the resources.”

▪ “Let’s say you start a venture half way through the year. Who is waiting for you? No-one is

sitting around and waiting for you to come by with a venture to work on. It is an illusion to

think that other departments can easily help you out. It is a tug of war to see if you can free

people up to help you out.”

o Innovation Manager

▪ “You can’t just say: I need a finance and account person, let me grab one from this pool of

people. It is not going to work, you need a mindset change. We have to understand what we

need for that and offer it to our intrapreneurs. That is the cycle of learning in which Philips

currently resides.”

o Potential solution:

▪ As proposed before, a change of mindset is necessary for departments to

support intrapreneurs. Training of such a mindset change is an important

step but Philips could do more to ensure that their initiative achieve the

necessary support. Based on the conceptual model it is proposed that

supportive departments should also feel the responsibility to renew

34

themselves and accommodate new initiatives. This can be done using the

proper reward systems, and through senior management integration. If

Philips truly wants to make sure that intrapreneurs succeed it is worthwhile

for supportive departments to invest in procedures or employees that are

oriented towards explorative ideas. The size of the organisation might

warrant such measures.

35

Based on the interviews with intrapreneurs and innovation managers it is suggested that intrapreneurs

run into the following:

Conscious barrier:

➢ No official internal sources for legitimacy

o Potential reason: Even though it can be tough on intrapreneurs, Nedap deliberately

chooses to provide little legitimacy to intrapreneurs. Employees need to take their

own responsibility and decide what is best for the organisation.

o Intrapreneur: “I think that this is the biggest challenge we faced, the recognition you get is very soft,

you have to find it between the lines because there is no manager who will say: this is a good idea, you

should do this.”

o Innovation manager: “Entrepreneurs do not need legitimisation, they can create their own. We just

offer them the support to do so.”

Unconscious barrier:

➢ No support during integration: lack of business model development

o Intrapreneur:

▪ “I do not know how you validate a business model, or what good business models are. You can

read about it all you want but there was too much uncertainty and it was very difficult to

determine if we were still on the right path. Because no-one told us if this was a good idea.”

▪ [Interviewer: At some point you noticed you needed someone for Sales?]“Yes, I noticed: this is

not my strong-suit.”

o Potential solution: An effect of the informal control systems at Nedap is that

intrapreneurs make progress in some areas and lack behind in others. Intrapreneurs at

Nedap seem to first develop a solution, often in collaboration with a potential

customer, but do not develop their business model until relatively late in the process,

especially compared to Thales and Philips. The peer-support or social support

systems are required to have some oriented towards business in order for the

intrapreneur to face business model questions. A possible fitting solution might be to

provide more support in team formation, in order to combine technological

developers with business developers. Another support system could be the use of

champions or experts: old-intrapreneurs whom have experience with the

development of business models that can provide advice on the background.

36

Based on the interviews with intrapreneurs and innovation managers it is suggested that intrapreneurs

run into the following:

Conscious barrier:

➢ Obtaining permission for certain intrapreneurial decisions

o Potential reason: As a defence contractor the security of their operations and those of

its clients of utmost importance. Thales therefore employs a rather hierarchical

structure that requires permission for certain business and investment decisions. This

means that even if intrapreneurs are allowed certain budgets, they still might need to

get permission from higher-up for certain investments, acquisitions or market-entries.

o Intrapreneur: ““I had my own budget, but the signatory authority at Thales is limited. That is another

thing: having to get permission for each fart does not stimulate entrepreneurship.”

o Innovation manager:

▪ “Our strength is that we are so secure that we actually able to do those updates.”

▪ “Those are the rules we are committed to. The clients’ primary concern is in security”

▪ “We have to do it together with the customer. Security plays an important role in this. We have

to convince them that it actually fits within their processes.”

Unconscious barrier:

➢ Intrapreneurial initiatives contributing ot the financial bottom-line: lack of patient resources.

o Intrapreneur:

▪ [Interviewer: “What were your targets when you started?”] “Crazy high at that moment.

Meaning above the 10 million for the first years. Roughly said: earn a lot of money with few

people and no product portfolio. They started with a strong believe that the group excelled in

this area which should have excelled us as well.”

▪ “Our boss was interested in sales, because his boss was interested in his sales. That means he

delegates it down to us.”

o Potential solution: It is important that resource commitments are made for longer

periods of time to ensure intrapreneurs the freedom to develop. Thales could employ

key performance indicators for new initiatives that allow intrapreneurs time to

develop and measure their success not on basis of output measurements, but on

development measurements. Specialised ring-fenced innovation budgets for

department heads could allows them to grant more lenience to intrapreneurs and

tackle this barrier.