crimrev case digest

8/12/2019 CrimRev Case Digest

1/8

BASIC PRINCIPLES IN CRIMINAL LAW

DOCTRINE OF PRO REO/

EQUIPOISE RULE/ LENITY RULE

PEOPLE V. PABIONA

Regional Trial Court convicted Pabiona,Basalatan, Metano and Silarca of the crime of

murder. The Information charged the appellantsand accused Christopher de los Reyes with

murder reads as follows:

That on or about the 20thday of November,1996, in the Municipality of Passi, Province ofIloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of

this Honorable Court, the above-namedaccused, conspiring, confederating and mutuallyhelping each other, with treachery and

deliberate intent to kill, did then and therewillfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack and

assault ROBERT PAGAYON with fist and kickblows and bamboo poles, as a result of whichthe said Robert Pagayon suffered multiple

physical injuries on his body which caused hisdeath thereafter. Their co-accused, Christopherde los Reyes, has remained at large.

Michael Pagayon (Michael), a cousin of thevictim, testified that while he was on his way tothe house of his aunt, Rosalina Padernal, heheard a cry for help emanating from a nearbyriver.[4]When he was about ten (10) metersfrom the river, he saw appellants, includingaccused Christopher de los Reyes, wieldingbamboo poles. All of the accused were strikingand kicking an unidentified man who wascrawling. He then heard appellant Pabionasay, What did you tell, ha?[5]Michael thenproceeded to his aunts house and spent thenight there.

The following morning Michael left hisaunts house. On his way to work at Villa, Iloilo,he passed by the place where he saw appellantsbeating up the unidentified man. He saw twomen at the area but he kept on walking and wasnot able to identify them.[6]

Two weeks later, he heard a radio news

report that his cousin Robert died at BarangayAgtambo after falling into a well on the date he

witnessed appellants mauling an unknownvictim.[7]He then narrated what he saw on thenight of November 20, 1996 to his wife. Two

months after hearing the radio report, herecounted what he witnessed to the mother ofthe victim, Marina Pagayon.[8]

Marina Pagayon (Marina) who, like the restof the accused, was a member of appellantPabionas religious group, Catholic Movement ofJesus and Mary (CMJM), testified that at about 7p.m. on November 20, 1996, appellant Pabionaand his brother Popoy went to her house atGines Viejo, Passi, Iloilo and asked her to spendthe night at his house in Dorillo Street, Passi,Iloilo and that Robert go along with them and

resume work at his well. She acquiesced. Laterthat evening, appellant Basalatan, his wifeTeresita and two others arrived at the Pagayonhouse and they all boarded appellant Basalatans

jeepney and headed for appellant Pabionashouse at Dorillo where she and Popoy Pabiona

alighted. Appellant Basalatan and the rest ofthe passengers then proceeded to the well atBarangay Agtambo.

The morning after, Marina went back to herhouse to attend to her grandson. At about 11

a.m., Popoy Pabiona and Annie Ardales arrived

at her house and told her to go to BarangayAgtambo.[9]Upon arriving thereat, she saw

appellants Pabiona, Metano, Silarca, appellantPabionas mother Avelina, and a certain CherylPampag at Pabionas nipa hut. She then saw

the lifeless body of her son-the victim on thefloor of the hut. She cried and asked appellantPabiona what had happened. Appellant Pabionatold her that her son died after falling into thewell at about 9 a.m. She then asked why theydid not bring him to a hospital to whichappellant Pabiona replied that the victim wasalready dead when they found him. Marina then

noticed that her sons body was clean and hewas wearing a pair of shorts which did notbelong to him, prompting her to ask appellantPabiona, If he fell why is it there is no mud onthe body and he is already clean.AppellantPabiona replied that they already bathed Robertbefore she arrived.[10]
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn4


2/8

A jeepney from Funeraria Pamplona later

arrived to take the victims body. While on thejeepney, appellant Pabiona instructed Marina to

keep quiet and not cry loudly as other peoplemight hear her. He likewise instructed her tocover the victim with a blanket and made to sit

beside the driver so that other people would notknow that he was dead. Because the victimsbody had already hardened, however, he waslaid down on the jeepney. His body was thentaken to Funeraria Pamplona.

As Marina had misgivings about the causeof her sons death, she went to appellantPabionas house to talk to him and ask himagain about what really transpired before thevictim died. Appellant Pabiona told her to acceptthat what happened was an accident andsuggested that there be no autopsy conducted

on the victims body as it might causetrouble. Avelina, appellant Pabionas mother,then told her that she should not be saddenedas they would shoulder all the funeral

expenses.[11]As she still could not think clearly,she agreed to everything that appellant Pabiona

and his mother had told her.

Emma Pagayon (Emma), the victims sister-in-law, testified that at about 6:30

a.m. on November 22, 1996, she was informedby Tessie Basalatan (Tessie), the wife of

appellant Basalatan, and Gina Panerio (Gina), a

member of CMJM, that the victim died afterfalling from the roof of appellant Pabionas nipa

hut in Barangay Agtambo.[12]Emma thus wokeup her husband Renato Pagayon and theyinterrogated Tessie and Gina about the

circumstances surrounding the victims allegedfall from the roof. They were told that Robertfell face down on the ground and hit a hardobject,[13]and that he was no longer brought toa hospital as he died immediately. Upon furtherquestioning by the Pagayons, Tessie and Ginatold them that nobody reported the incident tothe police as all of them were demoralized by

the victims death.[14]

Emma thereupon repaired to FunerariaPamplona and had photographs of her brother-in-law taken as she planned to request for anautopsy of his body. When she broached theidea of subjecting the victims body to anautopsy to Marina, the latter initially refused

because of appellant Pabionas instructions. She

later agreed upon Emmas prodding.

Emma then went to Dr. Leonardo Deza, the

municipal health officer of Passi, Iloilo, andrequested for an autopsy of the victimsbody. Dr. Deza was astonished and told Emma

that he had already released the victims deathcertificate[15]upon processing by an unidentifiedwoman.[16]He then immediately caused thecancellation[17]of the death certificate at theOffice of the Civil Registrar. Upon examinationof the cancelled death certificate, Emma noticedthat her mother-in-laws signature therein wasforged.[18]

Upon the other hand, the defensepresented appellants and Rosalina Padernalwhose testimonies follow after their respectivenames:

Appellant Pabiona testified that at about 7p.m. on November 20, 1996, he was told by hismother that Marina went to their house earlierto inform him that her son-the victim wouldresume work at his well.[20]He thereupon askedhis brother to accompany him in fetching the

victim. On arrival at the Pagayon house atabout 7:30 p.m., Marina told them to wait whileshe prepared Roberts belongings. In the

meantime, appellant Basalatan, together withhis wife Teresita, arrived. The six of them, on

board appellant Basalatans jeepney, then left

for appellant Pabionas house where Marina andappellant Pabionas brother alighted as they

were to spend the night there. The rest of themproceeded to appellant Pabionas farm inBarangay Agtambo at about 9 p.m. as they

planned to continue digging at the well thefollowing day.[21]

Appellant Pabiona and company arrived atthe farm at about 9:30 p.m. and proceeded to anipa hut, ten (10) meters away from the well,where they met appellants Metano, Silarca andaccused de los Reyes.[22]They took supper after

which appellant Basalatan and his wife Teresitaleft for home. The five remaining men thenslept at the nipa hut.

Appellant Pabiona woke up the next day atabout 5:45 a.m. and joined his companions whowere drinking coffee. At around 7 a.m., he toldthem to stay at the nipa hut while he walkedaround the farm. His companions then told him
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn11


3/8

that they would start digging shortly after he

leaves.

At around 11:00 a.m., when appellant

Pabiona was about 500 meters from the nipahut, he was startled to find appellant Silarcarunning towards him, shouting that the victim

fell down the well.[23]Both of them thus repairedto the well and found appellant Metano cryingwhile accused de los Reyes was inside the wellcradling the victim. Appellant Pabiona theninstructed appellants Metano and Silarca to helpthe victim. After much difficulty, the victimbeing heavy, they were finally able to lift himfrom the 15 meter deep well by spreading hislegs, placing him astride appellant Silarcasshoulders, tying a blanket which was connectedto a rope around his armpits, pulling the rope(by appellant Pabiona) as appellant Metano and

accused de los Reyes helped appellant Silarcaclimb the bamboo ladder inside the well.

After lifting the victim from the well,appellant Silarca performed mouth to mouthresuscitation in order to revive Robert, but to noavail.[24]They thereupon brought him to the

nipa hut. Appellant Pabiona instructed accusedde los Reyes to look for a vehicle so they couldbring Robert to a doctor. He likewise ordered

him to inform Marina that her son was involvedin an accident.[25]

At about 12 noon, Marina, together with

Annie Ardales, arrived at the nipa hut. AppellantPabiona left for home at about 2:30

p.m.[26]while appellants Metano and Silarcaremained in the hut with Marina and Annie.

Appellant Silarca testified that at

about 9:30 p.m. on November 20, 1996, he,together with appellant Metano and accused de

los Reyes, was at appellant Pabionas nipa hut atBarangay Agtambo to work on the nearby wellwhen appellants Pabiona and Basalatan,Teresita Basalatan and the victim arrived.[27]Hethen substantially corroborated appellant

Pabionas testimony regarding the events thattranspired that night.

The following morning, with appellantMetano, accused de los Reyes and the victim,appellant Silarca prepared to work on thewell. An iron bar, two bamboo poles and ashovel were inside the well.[28]While the victimwas going down the bamboo ladder, he slipped

on one of the rungs and let out a

cry.[29]Appellants Silarca and accused de losReyes were about seven meters away while

appellant Metano was about a meter away whenthe victim slipped. Accused de los Reyes andappellant Metano went down the well to help

the victim who fell on the objects earlier placedtherein while he ran to find appellantPabiona. He then corroborated appellantPabionas version of the events that transpiredthereafter, adding only that they washed thevictims body after lifting him from the well inorder to check his injuries, his body beingcovered by mud from the well.[30]

Appellant Basalatan corroborated his co-appellants version of what happened on thenight of November 20, 1996 and added that heand his wife Teresita left the nipa hut at

Barangay Agtambo at about 11:30 p.m. andproceeded to their home.[31]The following day,at about 6:30 a.m., he traveled to Iloilo City forsome business and went home to Passi, Iloilo at

about 4 p.m. He was then informed by his wifethat the victim died after falling from the well at

appellant Pabionas farm.[32]

Appellant Metano corroborated his co-appellants testimonies.

Rosalina Padernal, the aunt of MichaelPagayon, testified that, contrary to her nephews

testimony, Michael did not spend the night at

her house on November 20, 1996.[33]Shelikewise testified that sometime in April 1997,

Michael, together with a companion, went to herhouse and told her that if anyone asks whetherhe spent the night at her place on November 20,

1996, she should answer in the affirmative.

The fundamental issue in the instant appeal

is whether or not there is sufficientcircumstantial evidence to sustain the trialcourts judgment finding appellants guiltybeyond reasonable doubt.

Circumstantial evidence is that evidencewhich proves a fact or series of facts from whichthe facts in issue may be established byinference.[43]Such evidence is founded onexperience and observed facts and coincidencesestablishing a connection between the knownand proven facts and the facts sought to beproved.[44]
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn33http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn33http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn33http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn43http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn43http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn43http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn44http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn44http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn44http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn44http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn43http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn33http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn23


4/8

Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules on

Evidence provides that circumstantial evidence issufficient for conviction if the following

requisites are complied with: (1) there is morethan one circumstance; (2) the facts from whichthe inferences are derived are proven; and (3)

the combination of all the circumstances is suchas to produce a conviction beyond reasonabledoubt. With respect to the third requisite, thecircumstantial evidence presented mustconstitute an unbroken chain which leads to onefair and reasonable conclusion pointing to theaccused, to the exclusion of others, as the guiltyperson.[45]All the circumstances must beconsistent with each other, consistent with thehypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at thesame time inconsistent with the hypothesis thathe is innocent and with every other rationalhypothesis except that of guilt.[46]

From a considered scrutiny of the evidencein the case at bar in light of the standards setforth above, this Court holds that the evidence

adduced by the prosecution does not prove theguilt beyond reasonable doubt of appellants.

The evidence does not rule out thepossibility that there had only been anaccidental death. Hitting ones head on a hard

object such as an iron bar or shovel afteraccidentally slipping could account for the

fracture, blood clot and scalp hematoma found

on the back of the victims head which, in turn,could have caused his death soon thereafter.

The victims injuries, contrary to the trialcourts evaluation, are more consistent withappellants version of the events that transpired

on November 21, 1996. While the victimsustained a fracture, a hematoma and a bloodclot on his head, the rest of the injuries on hisbody are mere abrasions.[48]Abrasions areinjuries characterized by the removal of thesuperficial epithelial layer of the skin caused byrubbing or friction against a hard rough

surface.

[49]

Such abrasions found on the victimsbody are more likely to have been caused by hisslipping from the bamboo ladder and falling intothe well rather than by force applied by fiveable-bodied men striking him with bamboo polesand kicking him as claimed by the prosecution.

The mere presence of appellants at analleged locus criminisdoes not suffice toimplicate them in a crime,[51]more so as in the

case at bar where appellants presence was

sufficiently explained to have been due to theirdigging of the well on appellant Pabionas

property which commenced longbefore November 20, 1996.

While the motive of the accused in a

criminal case is generally held to be immaterial,not being an element of the crime, motivebecomes important when, as in this case, theevidence of the commission of the crime ispurely circumstantial or inconclusive and there issome doubt on whether a crime has beencommitted or whether the accused hascommitted it.[52]

In the case at bar, the prosecution wasunable to establish motive of the appellants inallegedly perpetrating the offense charged.

The records reveal, on the other hand, thatthe Pagayons enjoyed close relations withappellants, Marina being, as reflected above, aco-member of the appellants in CMJM. It waseven shown that she was accustomed tosleeping over at the Pabiona residence at everyopportunity.[54]

This Court likewise notes prosecutioneyewitness Michael Pagayons inordinate delayin reporting what he allegedly saw on the nightof November 20, 1996. Even after hearing theradio news report on his cousin-the victims

death on December 1, 1996 and deducing thathe was the victim of the mauling that he claimedto have witnessed, he only reported such

incident to his aunt Marina and the authoritiestwo months later. It is but logical for a relativewho was an eyewitness to a crime to promptly

and audaciously take the necessary steps tobring the culprit into the hands of the law and

seek justice for the poor victim.[55]

That appellants were the malefactors

cannot be simply inferred from the mere factthat appellant Pabiona and his family offered to

shoulder the expenses for the burial ofRobert. As the victim was in appellant Pabionasemploy and died while working at his well, itwas not unnatural for him to make an offer tobear the expenses that Marina would incurattendant to the burial of her son.

Nor can appellants failure to report thevictims death to police authorities and barangayofficials be considered as an indication of their
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn45http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn45http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn45http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn46http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn46http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn46http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn48http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn48http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn48http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn49http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn49http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn49http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn51http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn51http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn51http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn52http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn52http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn52http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn54http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn54http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn54http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn55http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn55http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn55http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn55http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn54http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn52http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn51http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn49http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn48http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn46http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn45


5/8

guilt, as the records show that they, through

their relatives,[58]immediately informed thevictims mother and brother that he died.

The other circumstances enumerated bythe trial court are too equivocal to establishappellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

InPeople v. Capili,[59]this Court similarlyruled that the circumstantial evidence adduced

by the prosecution was utterly inadequate tojustify a judgment of conviction:

In fact, there is even some possibility thatBaduas identification of accused-appellant as

the perpetrator was a mere afterthought, therebeing no definite lead as to the identity of theauthor of the crime even after the lapse ofseveral days following the finding of the cadaverof the victim by the riverside on October 7,1994. The foregoing considerations takentogether cast reasonable doubt on theculpability of accused-appellant as killer ofAlberto Capili. The evidence which stands onrecord does not eliminate the possibility ofabsence of foul-play, i.e., that there had beenonly an accidental death by drowning. Striking arock after accidentally slipping could causecontusions similar to those found at the back of

the victims head and shoulders and result in theloss of consciousness leading to drowning. Only

by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which

requires moral certainty, may the presumptionof innocence be overcome. Moral certainty has

been defined as a certainty that convinces andsatisfies the reason and conscience of those whoare to act upon it. Absent the moral certainty

that accused-appellant caused the death of thevictim, acquittal perforce follows.[60]

It is a basic principle in criminal law thatwhere the evidence is capable of two or more

inferences, one of which is consistent with thepresumption of innocence and the other

compatible with a finding of guilt, the court mustacquit the accused because the evidence doesnot fulfill the test of moral certainty and

therefore is insufficient to support a judgment ofconviction.[61]Where the evidence on an issue of

fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on whichside the evidence preponderates, the partyhaving the burden of proof loses.[62]

In the case at bar, two antithetical

interpretations may be inferred from theevidence presented. The pieces of

circumstantial evidence do not inexorably lead tothe conclusion that appellants are guilty of thecrime charged.

The circumstances proffered by theprosecution and relied upon by the trial courtonly create suspicion that appellants probablyperpetrated the crime charged. However, it isnot sufficient for a conviction that the evidenceestablishes a strong suspicion or probability ofguilt.[63]

The basis of acquittal in this case isreasonable doubt, the evidence for theprosecution not being sufficient to sustain andprove the guilt of appellants with moralcertainty. By reasonable doubt is not meantthat which of possibility may arise but it is thatdoubt engendered by an investigation of thewhole proof and an inability, after such aninvestigation, to let the mind rest easy upon thecertainty of guilt.[64]An acquittal based onreasonable doubt will prosper even though the

appellants innocence may be doubted, for acriminal conviction rests on the strength of theevidence of the prosecutionand not on the

weakness of the evidence of the defense.[65]

PEOPLE V. DIMALANTA

Dimalanta was found guilty of Estafa by the

RTC.

Dimalanta after misrepresentation that she hasmore than enough fund, defrauded and

deceived ABARCA . Dimalanta purchased andreceived assorted jewelries fromAbarca in thetotal amount of P408,826.00 and in paymentthereof, accused simultaneously issued checkswhen said accused knew fully well that at the

time the said checks were not covered withsufficient funds in said bank and would not havesuch fund even on the date stated on the facesthereof, and when the said checks werepresented to the drawee bank for encashment,the same were dishonored for the reasonACCOUNT CLOSED and despite due noticerepeated demands, continuously refuse and failto make good her checks.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn58http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn58http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn58http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/june2000/130588.htmlhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/june2000/130588.htmlhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn59http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn59http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn59http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn60http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn60http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn60http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn61http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn61http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn61http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn62http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn62http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn62http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn63http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn63http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn63http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn64http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn64http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn64http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn65http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn65http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn65http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn65http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn64http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn63http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn62http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn61http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn60http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn59http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/june2000/130588.htmlhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/145803.htm#_ftn58


6/8

The first check issued by appellant was honored

and paid by the drawee bank. However, theeleven checks were all returned unpaid by the

drawee bank for the reason that appellantsaccount was closed.

[5]In her defense, appellant denied that shepurchased jewelry from complainant, saying that

she could not afford them. She alleged that itwas complainant who approached her asking forhelp in selling jewelry. In turn, appellant asked

her friend, Levinia Maranan, to look for buyersfor the jewelry. Appellant and complainantagreed that Maranan will sell the jewelry and,upon the latters confirmation that the items hadbeen sold, appellant shall deliver to complainantthe postdated checks in payment therefor. Theyfurther agreed that the unsold pieces of jewelryshall be returned to complainant.[9]

In the middle of September 1998,complainant delivered to appellant the pieces ofjewelry to be sold, which were then picked upby Maranan. After one week, appellant issued tocomplainant postdated checks representing thepurchase price of the sold jewelry, with theunderstanding that Maranan will fund thesame. Maranan was able to remit to appellantmoney to cover the first check, hence it washonored by the drawee bank.[10]

Maranan failed to fund the second check.In order to cover its amount, appellant gavecomplainant P25,000.00 out of her own moneyas partial satisfaction. Subsequently, Maranan,

who had apparently encountered financialproblems, went into hiding. As a consequence,the rest of appellants checks were

dishonored.[11]

Appellant was charged with and convictedof Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) ofthe Revised Penal Code, as amended by

Republic Act No. 4885, defined as follows:

2. By means of any of the following falsepretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to orsimultaneously with the commission of the

fraud:

xxx xxx xxx.

(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check

in payment of an obligation when the offenderhad no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited

therein were not sufficient to cover the amountof the check. The failure of the drawer of thecheck to deposit the amount necessary to cover

his check within three (3) days from receipt ofnotice from the bank and/or the payee or holderthat said check has been dishonored for lack orinsufficiency of funds shall be primafacie evidence of deceit constituting falsepretense or fraudulent act.

xxx xxx xxx.

Presidential Decree No. 818 amended

Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code insofar asthe penalties for felonies under paragraph 2 (d)

are concerned, viz:

SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud

another by means of false pretenses orfraudulent acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) ofArticle 315 of the Revised Penal Code, asamended by Republic Act No. 4885, shall bepunished by x x x

The elements of this form of Estafa are: (1)

postdating or issuing a check in payment of anobligation contracted at the time the check wasissued; (2) lack of sufficient funds to cover the

check; (3) knowledge on the part of theoffender of such circumstances; and (4) damageto the complainant.[14]

Damage and deceit are essential elementsof the offense and must be established withsatisfactory proof to warrant conviction. Thefalse pretense or fraudulent act must becommitted prior to or simultaneously with theissuance of the bad check.[15]Thus, the drawerof the dishonored check is given three days fromreceipt of the notice of dishonor to cover theamount of the check. Otherwise aprima

faciepresumption of deceit arises.[16]

In the case at bar, the prosecution failed toestablish beyond a shadow of a doubt thatappellant employed deceit. Its evidence wasovercome by the defenses proof that the piecesof jewelry were not purchased by appellant for

her own use; rather the same were merely givento her for resale.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn9


7/8

ittal, it made the following observations:

This admission lends credence to the claim ofappellant that she subsequently delivered thejewelry to Maranan. It was only after noticefrom Maranan that the jewelry had been sold on

installment that appellant issued the postdatedchecks. The issuance of the checks was merely

to facilitate collection by Abarca of paymentsdue. Thus, the checks were not the efficientcause of the defraudation. The bad checks were

not issued prior to or simultaneous with the actof fraud, but rather, for a pre-existing obligation.This fact is evidenced by Abarcas owntestimony that appellant signed a piece of paperacknowledging receipt of the jewelry, theindividual items of which were listedtherein. Abarca went on to say that she nolonger had the receipt signed by appellant,which was why she had to rely on another liston a pink slip of paper during her testimony incourt (TSN, April 23, 2001, p. 4). If indeedappellant issued the postdated checks aspayment for the jewelry on the same occasionthat the said jewelry were delivered, why thenwould she need to sign a receipt for thesame? Moreover, why was the said receipt no

longer in the possession of Abarca? It is entirelypossible that Abarca surrendered the receipt

upon the subsequent delivery of the checks toher by appellant.

xxx xxx xxx.

Thus, even assuming that the checks wereindeed issued simultaneously with the deliveryof the jewelry as Abarca claims, she was not

induced to part with the jewelry because of thechecks. Abarca admitted that she knew thatappellant was just a secretary at the Caloocan

City Hall and that the latter was merely rentingthe place where she was residing. These facts

tend to show that Abarca was aware of thefinancial status of appellant, that is, that the

latter could not afford the P408,826.00-price ofthe jewelry. Consequently, Abarca must havelikewise known at the time the checks were

issued that appellant had no money of her ownto fund the checks on their maturity. She waswell aware that the jewelry were to be sold by

appellant and that the proceeds of the salewould be deposited by the latter in her currentaccount to fund the checks. It was a business

arrangement she entered into with appellant

whereby the latter would assist her in selling thejewelry. Abarca had been in the business of

buying and selling jewelry for around ten yearsalready. Abarca was thus fully aware of theconditions, advantages and disadvantages of the

arrangement and cannot now allege to be thevictim of deceit.[18]

In effect, therefore, appellant issued thechecks as evidence of indebtedness to cover the

value of the jewelry. It has been ruled in thisconnection that a drawer who issues a check assecurity or evidence of investment is not liablefor Estafa.[19]

Furthermore, we find that appellant actedin good faith during the transaction. After thefirst check was dishonored, she exerted best

efforts to make good the value of the check,albeit only to the extent of P25,000.00. Goodfaith is a defense to a charge of Estafa bypostdating a check. This may be manifested byappellants act of offering to make arrangementswith complainant as to the manner ofpayment.[20]

In the recent case of People v. Ojeda, etal.,[21]it was held:

The prosecution failed to prove deceit in thiscase. The prima faciepresumption of deceit was

successfully rebutted by appellants evidence ofgood faith, a defense in estafaby postdating acheck. Good faith may be demonstrated, forinstance, by a debtors offer to arrange a

payment scheme with his creditor. In this case,the debtor not only made arrangements forpayment; as complainant herself categorically

stated, the debtor-appellant fully paid the entireamount of the dishonored checks.

It must be noted that our Revised Penal Codewas enacted to penalize unlawful acts

accompanied by evil intent denominated ascrimes mala in se. The principal consideration is

the existence of malicious intent. There is aconcurrence of freedom, intelligence and intentwhich together make up the criminal mind

behind the criminal act. Thus, to constitute acrime, the act must, generally and in mostcases, be accompanied by a criminal

intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sitrea. No crime is committed if the mind of the
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn18


8/8

person performing the act complained of is

innocent.

Indeed, any allegation of intent of malice ordeceit on appellants part was rebutted by herextraordinary effort to pay complainant

notwithstanding her own financial situation.[22]

In the case at bar, the evidence for the

prosecution is concededly weak. In such cases,even if the evidence for defense is also weak,the accused must be duly accorded the benefit

of the doubt in view of the constitutionalpresumption of innocence that an accusedenjoys. When the circumstances are capable oftwo or more inferences, as in this case, one ofwhich is consistent with the presumption ofinnocence while the other is compatible withguilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail

and the court must acquit.[23]

Courts are mandated to put prosecutionevidence under severe testing. Furthermore,the constitutional presumption of innocencerequires them to take a more than casualconsideration of every circumstance or doubtfavoring the innocence of the accused.[24]Theevidence for the prosecution must stand or fallon its own weight and cannot be allowed to

draw strength from the weakness of thedefense.[25]Considering the failure of the

prosecution to discharge its burden of proof and

overcome the constitutional presumption ofinnocence, it is not only appellants right to be

freed; it is, even more, this Courts constitutionalduty to acquit her.[26]
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/oct2004/157039.htm#_ftn22

crimrev case digest

Documents