PROJECT ON Criminal law

CASE COMMENT ON

DPP v. Beard [1920] AC 479

2012-2017 BATCH

BY:-

Pragalbh Bhardwaj

2012/BBA/034

Table of Contents

Facts:.........................................................................................................................................3

Issues framed by the court:......................................................................................................4

Issues overlooked by the court:...............................................................................................4

Decision of the court:...............................................................................................................5

Whether the case was a departure from earlier precedents:...............................................8

Analysis of the case:...............................................................................................................10

Facts:

The appellant or the accused, Arthur Beard, whilst intoxicated raped young, 13 year old, Ivy

Wood and in the process of doing so, he put his hand over her mouth and his thumb on her

throat to stop her from screaming. As a result of that, she died of suffocation. There was

evidence that he had been drinking. It was a case of death caused during rape. The sole

defence was a plea of drunkenness. Beard's position at trial was that he was only guilty of

manslaughter as his self-induced intoxication rendered him incapable of knowing that what he

was doing was likely to inflict serious injury. The case eventually found its way to Britain's

House of Lords.

Issues framed by the court:

In this case, the court looked into many issues either explicitly or impliedly. But the decision

of the court was basically dependent on the answers of these basic issues:

The first issue was to determine what amounts to the state of intoxication.

The second issue before the court concerned the manner in which a jury should be instructed on

the relationship between intoxication and intent and the meaning of ‘specific intent’.

The third major issue before the court was to find out whether the crime committed by Beard

was an act of murder or manslaughter.

Issues overlooked by the court:

This is one of the most important cases under Criminal Law and, according to me the court

has perfectly determined all the issues and hence came to the conclusion.

All relevant issues were taken in to consideration while deciding the case although all the

issues are not expressly mentioned in the judgment but all matters were taken care of in the

case.

Decision of the court:

The counsel for the defence in this case, the counsel from the side of Beard, did not in any

way dispute the prisoner’s criminal responsibility for the homicide of the girl.

The only defence that they intended to present was that in circumstances proved the decision

of the court should be of manslaughter and not of murder on the ground that there was no

intention on the part of Beard to cause the girl’s death and that he was in such a state or

condition because of his drinks that he was incapable of knowing that what he was doing was

likely to inflict serious injury within the rule laid down by the court of criminal appeal in Rex

v. Meade1.

At the trial court, Bailhache J. directed the jury that if they were satisfied by evidence that the

accused was so drunk that he did not know what he was doing or did not know that he was

doing wrong, the defence of drunkenness succeeded to the extent of reducing the crime to

manslaughter. The accused was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.

The court of criminal appeal quashed the conviction on the ground of misdirection.

According to them, the judge was, in this particular case, wrong in applying to a case of

drunkenness, the test which was supposed to be a test of insanity. The given test, which was

quite apparently, less favourable to the prisoner than the test imposed by Rex v. Meade, and

that the accused was entitled to have the law stated to the jury as laid down in Rex v. Meade,

which established that the presumption that a man intended the natural consequences of his

acts might be rebutted in the case of drunkenness by showing that his mind was so affected

by the drink he had taken that he was incapable of knowing that what he was doing was

dangerous – i.e. likely to cause serious harm. The verdict therefore was reduced to that of

manslaughter.

The House of Lords, held that the rule laid down by the court in Rex v. Meade will not be of

application in this current case and that drunkenness was no defence in this case unless it

could be proved that the accused at the time of committing rape was so inebriated that he was

incapable of forming the intent to commit the crime,  in so far as death resulted from

succession of acts, the rape and the act of violence causing suffocation, which could not be

regarded independently of each other; secondly, that the trial court judge was mistaken in

1 [1909] K.B 879

applying the test of insanity to a case of drunkenness not amounting to insanity, but that read

as a whole the summing up did not amount to a misdirection. It was therefore held by the

court that the conviction of murder should be restored. Decision of the Court of Criminal

Appeal reversed.

In the present the case, the death resulted from two acts the rape and the act of violence

causing suffocation, these acts cannot be regarded separately and independently of each

other.

When the case moved to the House of Lords, Lord Birkenhead, who was the

judge in the case of DPP v. Beard, set out the three propositions which have

been so frequently referred to in cases involving intoxication and criminal

behaviour:

1. The first proposition as in this regard, as laid down by Lord Birkenhead, is

that any form of insanity, whether produced by inebriation or otherwise, is a

defence to the crime charged. The distinction between ‘the defences of

insanity in the true sense caused by excessive drinking’ and ‘the defence of

drunkenness which produces a condition such that the drunken man's mind

becomes incapable of forming a specific intention,’ has been preserved

throughout the cases. 

The insane person cannot be convicted of a crime but, upon a verdict of

insanity, is ordered to be detained. In these cases, the cause of the insanity

is of no importance.

If, as the result of alcoholic excess, actual disorder of the mind in fact

supervenes, it renders as complete an answer to a criminal charge as

insanity induced by any other cause whatever that maybe.

2. According to the second proposition laid down by Lord Birkenhead, in

order to determine whether or not the person had the intent, evidence of

drunkenness which furnishes the person who has been accused incapable of

forming the specific intent essential to establish the crime should be taken

into consideration with the other facts proved.

3. Lord Birkenhead’s third proposition is that evidence of drunkenness

falling short of a proved incapacity in the accused to form the intent

necessary to constitute the crime, and merely establishing that his mind

was affected so much by drink that he, in the case, more promptly gave in

to some violent passion, does not rebut the given that a man intends only

the natural consequences of his acts. 

Whether the case was a departure from earlier

precedents:

The history of law as regards to the effect of drunkenness upon criminal responsibility:

There are three definitely marked periods in the development of the law upon this point.

The first period was from the time of Coke upon Littleton to 1800, the date of Emlyn’s

edition of Hale’s Pleas of the crown. Coke’s conception was that Drunkenness aggravated

crime but Sir Hale said that drunkenness was neither an aggravation nor an excuse and thus

the drunken man was treated as having the same judgment as if he were in his right senses.2

The second was from 1800 to 1835 when the doctrine that drink might be pleaded in

mitigation first crept into the reports and a controversy arose among the judges as to the

limits of that doctrine. The question whether a crime is murder or manslaughter depends upon

malice aforethought, and that is an issue of fact for the jury. The third was from 1835

onwards to Rex v. Meade in 1909, by which date the doctrine had hardened into the rule laid

down by Darling J.

In Meade’s case, the rule regarding whether the jury are justified in returning a verdict of

manslaughter was laid down. According to that case, the rule that a man is taken to intend the

natural consequences of his acts may be rebutted, in the case of a man who is drunk and

whose mind is so affected by the drink that he is incapable of knowing the consequences of

the act. If this is proved, the presumption that he intends to do bodily harm can be rebutted. In

the case of a man who is drunk and whose mind is so affected by the drink that he is

incapable of knowing the consequences of the act it is justified in such cases that the charged

be reduced from murder to manslaughter.

In Meade’s case it was essential to prove the specific intent; in Beard’s case it was only

required to prove that the violent act causing death was done in furtherance of the felony of

rape.

It was not until the House of Lord’s decision in Beard’s case in the first decades of the

twentieth century that the M’Naghten test3 was rejected on the basis that it was inapplicable

to an assessment of the effect of intoxication on criminal responsibility.

2 Hale’s Pleas of the crown (1800 ed.), vol. i. , p. 32. 3 M'Naghten's Case 1843 10 C & F 200

In Beard’s case, Lord Birkenhead stated that there was a distinction between the ‘defence of

insanity in its true sense caused by excessive drinking’ and the ‘defence of drunkenness

which produces a condition such that a drunken man’s mind becomes incapable of forming a

specific intention’. Beard’s case also marked another step in the process of formalization of

the law on intoxicated offending. This step entailed the explication of the relationship

between intoxication and criminal fault via the elaboration of the meaning of the term

‘specific intent’.

In Beard’s case, the court stated that, where a specific intent is an essential element in the

offence, evidence of a state of drunkenness rendering the accused incapable of forming such

an intention should be taken into consideration in determining whether he or she had in fact

formed intent.

The Beard approach to intoxication, fault, and ‘specific intent’ was adopted in subsequent

appellate judgments, including by the House of Lords in DPP v. Majewski.4

The judges in the case said that ‘it was only necessary to prove that the violent act causing

death was done in furtherance of the crime of rape’; their decision was that drunkenness

could be no defence unless it could be established that Beard at the time of committing the

rape was so inebriated that he was incapable of forming the intent to commit it.

4 DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443 

Analysis of the case:

According to me, the judgement delivered by the House of Lords is correct and it makes total

sense to me that Beard should be held liable for the charge of murder. And his crime must not

be reduced from murder to manslaughter. Reason being, according to the general rule, a man

is presumed to intend, the natural consequences of his acts. Here, Beard knew for a fact that

he was committing the crime of rape and when he put his hand on her throat to stop her from

screaming, he knew he was also committing an act of violence in furtherance of the act of

rape. It cannot be taken as a defence that a person be excused for the crime of murder just

because he claims that he was drunk and he would not have done so had he not been drunk.

Voluntary drunkenness can never be a defence for a criminal misconduct. In this case, it has

been already established that the prisoner killed the child by an act in furtherance of the crime

of rape, a felony involving violence. Rightly held by the House of Lords, the two acts: the

rape and the act of violence causing suffocation, these acts cannot be regarded separately and

independently of each other.