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    G.R. No. L-28232 February 6, 1971

    THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.J I!E JOSE " GO!E#, ET L., $e%e&$a&'(. J I!E JOSE

    " GO!E#, ) SILIO PINE* , JR., a+ a( )O", E*G R*O/INO " P "/!O a&$ ROGELIO 0 L "

    SE ILL , defendants-appellants.

    Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Augusto M. Amores for plaintiff-appellee.

    Baizas, Alberto and Associates, Andreciano F. aballero and !ota, Paraiso, Garcia and "ue#as for defendant-appellant $aime G. $ose.

    Mabanag, %liger and Associates for defendant-appellant Basilio Pineda, $r.

    S&cip, Salazar, !una, Manalo and Feliciano for defendant-appellant %dgardo P. A'uino.

    Antonio oronel !a( Office and )oberto $. *gnacio for defendant-appellant )ogelio S. anial.

    PER 0/RI !

    The amended complaint filed in this case in the court below,reads as follows:

    The undersigned complainant accuses JAIMEJ !E " # ME$, %A!I&I 'I(E)A, J*. Alias+% ",+ E) A*) A I( " 'A" M alias+E))IE+ and * #E&I A/A& " !E0I&&Aalias +* #E*,+ as principals, 1 (# &A"' E(#, !I&0E*I # A($ ( " * ME*and JE!!IE # I ( " E(0 &TA*I as

    accomplices, of the crime of 2orcible Abductionwith rape, committed as follows:

    That on or about the 34th da5 of June, 6748, inue9on it5, and within the urisdiction of this

    ;onorable ourt, the above-named principalaccused, conspiring together, confederatingwith and mutuall5 helping one another, did, thenand there, wilfull5, unlawfull5 and feloniousl5,with lewd design, forcibl5 abduct theundersigned complainant against her will, anddid, then and there ta

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    That the aforestated offense has been attendedb5 the following aggravating circumstances:

    6. se of a motor vehicle.

    3. (ight time sought purposel5 to facilitate thecommission of the crime and to ma. That means were emplo5ed or circumstancesbrought about which added ignomin5 to thenatural effects of the actB and

    D. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberatel5 augmented b5 causingother wrong not necessar5 for the commission.

    (T*A*" T &A1.

    pon arraignment, %asilio 'ineda, Jr. pleaded guilt5 to thecharge imputed in the above- uoted amended complaintBhowever, in an order dated Jul5 66, 6748, the court reserved udgment +until such time as the prosecution shall haveconcluded presenting all of its evidence to prove theaggravating circumstances listed in the complaint.+ pon theother hand, the rest of the defendants went to trial on their

    respective pleas of not guilt5. After the merits, the court belowrendered its decision on ctober 3, 6748, the dispositiveportion of which reads as follows:

    1;E*E2 *E, the ourt finds the accusedJaime Jose, *ogelio a al, Eduardo A uinoand %asilio 'ineda, Jr. guilt5 be5ond reasonabledoubt of the crime of forcible abduction withrape as described under Art. CCD of the *evised'enal ode, as amended, and hereb5sentences each of them to the death penalt5 to

    be e@ecuted at a date to be set and in the

    manner provided for b5 lawB and each toindemnif5 the complainant in the amount of tenthousand pesos. n the ground that theprosecution has failed to establish a primafacie case against the accomplices 1ong &a5'ueng, !ilverio #uan9on 5 *omero, and Jessie#uion 5 Envoltario, the Motion to )ismiss filed

    for and in their behalf is hereb5 granted, and thecase dismissed against the aforementionedaccused.

    Insofar as the car used in the abduction of thevictim which Jaime Jose identified b5 pointing toit from the window of the courtroom andpictures of which were submitted and marD of the *evised 'enal ode,which re uires the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime, the

    ourt hereb5 orders its confiscation.

    This case is now before us b5 virtue of the appeal interposedb5 %asilio 'ineda, Jr., Edgardo A uino, and Jaime Jose, andfor automatic review as regards *ogelio a al. ;owever, for practical purposes all of them shall hereafter be referred to asappellants.

    The complainant, Magdalena +Maggie+ de la *iva, was, at thetime of the incident, 3D 5ears old and singleB she graduatedfrom high school in 67DF at Mar5

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    !o it was that at about >:CG oHcloc< in the morning of June 34,6748, Miss )e la *iva, homeward bound from the A%! !tudioon *o@as %lvd., 'asa5 it5, was driving her bantam car accompanied b5 her maid ;elen alderon, who was also atthe front seat. ;er house was at (o. >F, 63th !treet, (ewManila, ue9on it5. !he was alread5 near her destinationwhen a 'ontiac two-door convertible car with four men aboard

    =later identified as the four appellants? came abreast of her car and tried to bump it. !he stepped on her bra

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    them smiling meaningfull5. 'ineda told the complainant:+Magburles ue

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    that onl5 'ineda and A uino criminall5 assaulted thecomplainant.

    After E@h, +I+ was e@ecuted b5 Jose, an informant furnished'at. 0inas with a picture of appellant Edgardo A uino. Thepicture was shown to Miss )e la *iva, who declared in her sworn statement =E@h. +%-C+? that the man in the picture wasone of her abductors and rapists. The same picture was shownto Jose, who, in another sworn statement =E@h. +I-l+?, identifiedthe man in the picture as appellant A uino.

    After the apprehension of Jose, the other three soon fell intothe hands of the authorities: 'ineda and a al on Jul5 6,6748, in &ipa it5, and A uino on Jul5 D, 6748, in the provinceof %atangas. n the evening of Jul5 6, 6748. Miss )e la *ivapointed to 'ineda and a al as among the four persons whoabducted and raped her. !he pic

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    somewhere in Mabini street in Manila, and there

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    more and the three accused =Jaime Jose,Eduardo A uino and *ogelio a al? left theroom to wait in the car for %o5 'ineda andMaggie de la *iva who were apparentl5 stilldiscussing the mode of pa5ment of the balance.Three minutes later Maggie de la *iva and %o5'ineda oined them. (ow, the uestion of how

    and where to drop Maggie came up and it istestified to b5 the accused that it was MaggieHsidea that the5 should drop her near the A%!!tudio so that it would appear as if she had ustcome from her wor

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    offered was to her satisfaction, whom womanwould be willing to perform first and be paidlater It is simpl5 preposterous to believe thatMaggie de la *iva should have consent to do astriptease act for a measl5 down-pa5ment of '6GG.GG and the balance to be paid #od

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    one another in dragging her into the car against her willB thatshe did not

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    concocted b5 the authorities. The statements were given in thepresence of several people and subscribed and sworn tobefore the it5 2iscal of ue9on it5, to whom neither of theaforesaid appellants intimated the use of inordinate methodsb5 the police. The5 are replete with details which could hardl5be .!. >C4?.

    The provision of the onstitution of the 'hilippines in point is Article III =%ill of *ights?, !ection 6, par. 68 of which provides:+In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall ... en o5 the right

    to be heard b5 himself and counsel ...+ 1hile the said provisionis identical to that in the onstitution of the nited !tates, inthis urisdiction the termcriminal prosecutions was interpretedb5 this ourt, in .!. vs. %eecham, 3C 'hil., 3DF =6763?, inconnection with a similar provision in the 'hilippine %ill of *ights =!ection D of Act of ongress of Jul5 6, 67G3? to meanproceedings before the trial court from arraignment to renditionof the udgment. Implementing the said constitutionalprovision, 1e have provided in !ection 6, *ule 66D of the*ules of ourt that +In all criminal prosecutions the defendantshall be entitled ... =b? to be present and defend in person and

    b5 attorne5 at ever5 stage of the proceedings, that is, from thearraignment to the promulgation of the 1udgment .+ The onl5instances where an accused is entitled to counsel beforearraignment, if he so re uests, are during the second stage of the preliminar5 investigation =*ule 663, !ection 66? and after the arrest =*ule 66C, !ection 6F?. The rule in the nited !tatesneed not be un uestioningl5 adhered to in this urisdiction, notonl5 because it has no binding effect here, but also because ininterpreting a provision of the onstitution the meaningattached thereto at the time of the adoption thereof should beconsidered. And even there the said rule is not 5et uite

    settled, as can be deduced from the absence of unanimit5 inthe voting b5 the members of the nited !tates !upremeourt in all the three above-cited cases.

    D. Appellant 'ineda claims that insofar as he is concernedthere was a mistrial resulting in gross miscarriage of ustice.;e contends that because the charge against him and his co-appellants is a capital offense and the amended complaintcited aggravating circumstances, which, if proved, would raisethe penalt5 to death, it was the dut5 of the court to insist on hispresence during all stages of the trial. The contention is

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    untenable. 1hile a plea of guilt5 is mitigating, at the same timeit constitutes an admission of all the material facts alleged inthe information, including the aggravating circumstances, andit matters not that the offense is capital, for the admission =pleaof guilt5? covers both the crime and its attendantcircumstances ualif5ing and or aggravating the crime ='eoplevs. %o5les, et al., &-6DCGF, Ma5 37, 674>,citing 'eople vs.

    Ama, &-6>8FC, April 37, 6746, and 'eople vs. 'arete, &-6DD6D, April 37, 6746?. %ecause of the aforesaid legal effect of 'inedaHs plea of guilt5, it was not incumbent upon the trialcourt to receive his evidence, much less to re uire hispresence in court. It would be different had appellant 'inedare uested the court to allow him to prove mitigatingcircumstances, for then it would be the better part of discretionon the part of the trial court to grant his re uest. = f. 'eoplevs. Arconado, &-6468D, 2ebruar5 3F, 6743.? The case of .!.vs. Agcaoili =C6 'hil., 76?, cited b5 'ineda, is not in point, for there this ourt ordered a new trial because it found for a fact

    that the accused, who had pleaded guilt5, +did not intend toadmit that he committed the offense with the aggravatingcircumstances+ mentioned in the information. 1e are not in aposition to ma, andwhich provides as follows:

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    A*T. CCD. 2hen and ho( rape committed .*ape is committed b5 having carnal

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    onl5 one life to pa5 for a wrong, the ends of ustice would beserved, and societ5 and the victim would be vindicated ust aswell, if onl5 one death penalt5 were imposed on each of theappellants.

    1e cannot agree with the trial court. Article 8G of the *evised'enal ode can onl5 be ta

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    the offenses charged and proved and thecorresponding penalties prescribed b5 law.

    Multiple death penalties are not impossible toserve because the5 will have to be e@ecutedsimultaneousl5. A cursor5 reading of article 8Gwill show that there are onl5 two moves of

    serving two or more =multiple? penalties:simultaneousl5 or successi0el& . The first rule isthat two or more penalties shall be servedsimultaneousl5 if the nature of the penalties willso permit. In the case of multiple capitalpenalties, the nature of said penal sanctionsdoes not onl5 permit but actuall5 necessitatessimultaneous service.

    The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a useless formalit5, has practical

    importance. The sentencing of an accused toseveral capital penalties is an indelible badge of his e@treme criminal perversit5, which ma5 notbe accuratel5 pro ected b5 the imposition of onl5 one death sentence irrespective of thenumber of capital felonies for which he is liable.!howing thus the reprehensible character of theconvict in its real dimensions, the possibilit5 of agrant of e@ecutive clemenc5 is ustifiabl5reduced in no small measure. ;ence, theimposition of multiple death penalties could

    effectivel5 serve as deterrent to an improvidentgrant of pardon or commutation. 2aced with theutter delin uenc5 of such a convict, the proper penitentiar5 authorities would e@ercise udiciousrestraint in recommending clemenc5 or lenienc5in his behalf.

    #ranting, however, that the hief E@ecutive, inthe e@ercise of his constitutional power topardon =one of the presidential prerogativeswhich is almost absolute? deems it proper to

    commute the multiple death penalties tomultiple life imprisonments, then the practicaleffect is that the convict has to serve thema@imum fort5 =>G? 5ears of multiple lifesentences. If onl5 one death penalt5 isimposed, and then is commuted to lifeimprisonment, the convict will have to serve a

    ma@imum of onl5 thirt5 5ears corresponding to asingle life sentence.

    1e are, therefore, of the opinion that in view of the e@istenceof conspirac5 among them and of our finding as regards thenature and number of the crimes committed, as well as of thepresence of aggravating circumstances, four death penaltiesshould be imposed in the premises.

    %efore s is a petition for intervention filed b5 2ilipinasInvestment P 2inance orporation as, 2ile (o. 66DF>686, alleged b5 theintervenor to be in the custod5 of Ma or Ernesto !an )iego of the ue9on it5 'olice )epartment. The car is registered inthe name of Mrs. )olores #ome9.

    n April >, 6748, Mrs. )olores #ome9, mother of an appellantJaime #. Jose, bought the car from the Mala5an Motors

    orporation and simultaneousl5 e@ecuted a chattel mortgagethereon to secure pa5ment of the purchase price of '6C,3GG,which was stipulated to be pa5able in 3> monthl5 installmentsof 'DDG beginning Ma5 >, 6748 up to April >, 6747. Themortgage was dul5 registered with the &and Transportation

    ommission and inscribed in the hattel Mortgage *egistr5.The mortgage lien was annotated on the motor registrationcertificate. n April 68, 6748, for value received and withnotice to Mrs. #ome9, the Mala5an Motors orporation

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    assigned its credit against Mrs. #ome9, as well as the chattelmortgage, to the intervenor. The assignment was dul5registered with the &and Transportation ommission andannotated on the registration certificate.

    Mrs. #ome9 failed to pa5 an5 of the installments due, in viewof which the intervenor filed on Jul5 D, 6748, an action for

    replevin against her = ivil ase (o. 4777C, ourt of 2irstInstance of Manila? as a preliminar5 step to foreclosure of thechattel mortgage. n Jul5 8, 6748, the court issued an order for the sei9ure of the car. The sheriff, however, could notenforce the writ of replevin because the car was not in Mrs.#ome9H possession, the same having been used b5 her son,appellant Jaime #. Jose, together with the other appellants inthis case, in the abduction of Miss )e la *iva, as a result of which the car was sei9ed b5 the ue9on it5 police andplaced in the custod5 of Ma or !an )iego, who refused tosurrender it to the sheriff on the ground that it would be used

    as evidence in the trial of the criminal case.)uring the pendenc5 of that criminal case in the court below,or on Jul5 34, 6748, the intervenor filed with the said court apetition for intervention. The said petition was not, however,acted upon. n ctober 3, 6748, the trial court rendered its udgment in the present case ordering the carHs confiscation asan instrument of the crime. Although not notified of the saiddecision, the intervenor filed, on ctober 68, 6748, a motionfor reconsideration of the order of confiscationB but the samewas denied on ctober C6, 6748, on the ground that the trial

    court had lost urisdiction over the case in view of theautomatic elevation thereof to this ourt. The intervenor thenfiled a petition for relief from udgement, but the same was alsodenied.

    n 2ebruar5 D, 674F, udgement was rendered in the replevincase ordering Mrs. #ome9 to deliver the car to the intervenor so that the chattel mortgage thereon could be foreclosed, or, inthe alternative, to pa5 the intervenor the sum of '6C,3GG withinterest thereon at 63Q per annum from Jul5 D, 674F, thepremium bond, attorne5Hs fees, and the costs of suit. The

    udgment became final and e@ecutor5. Attempts to e@ecute the udgment against the properties of Mrs. #ome9 wereunavailingB the writ of e@ecution was returned b5 the sheriff unsatisfied. n Jul5 34, 674F, the present petition for intervention was filed with this ourt, which allowed theintervenor to file a brief. In his brief the !olicitor #eneralcontends, among others, that the court a 'uo having found

    that appellant Jose is the owner of the car, the order of confiscation is correct.

    onsidering that the car in uestion is registered in the nameof Mrs. )olores #ome9, who, in the absence of strongevidence to the contrar5, must be considered as the lawfulowner thereofB that the onl5 basis of the courta 'uo inconcluding that the said car belongs to appellant Jose werethe latterHs statements during the trial of the criminal case tothat effectB that the said statement were not, however, intendedto be, nor could constitute, a claim of ownership over the car

    adverse to his mother, but were made simpl5 in answer touestions propounded in court for the sole purpose of establishing the identit5 of the defendant who furnished the car used b5 the appellants in the commission of the crimeB that thechattel mortgage on the car and its assignment in the favor of the intervenor were made several months before the date of commission of the crimes charged, which circumstanceforecloses the possibilit5 of collusion to prevent the !tate fromconfiscating the carB that the final udgement in the replevincase can onl5 be e@ecuted b5 delivering the possession of thecar to the intervenor for foreclosure of the chattel mortgageB

    and the Article >D of the *evised 'enal ode bars theconfiscation and forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in thecommission of the crime if such +be the propert5 of a thirdperson not liable for the offense,+ it is the sense of this ourtthat the order of the court below for confiscation of the car in

    uestion should be set aside and that the said car should beordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreedin the udgment of the ourt of 2irst Instance of Manila in thereplevin case, ivil ase (o. 4777C.

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    %efore the actual promulgation of this decision, this ourtreceived a formal manifestation on the part of the !olicitor #eneral to the effect that *ogelio a al, one of the hereinappellants, died in prison on )ecember 3F, 678G. As a resultof this development, this case is hereb5 dismissed as to himalone, and onl5 insofar as his criminal liabilit5 is concerned,with one-fourth =6 >? of the costs declaredde oficio .

    1;E*E2 *E, the udgment under review is hereb5 modifiedas follows: appellants Jaime #. Jose, %asilio 'ineda, Jr., andEdgardo '. A uino are pronounced guilt5 of the comple@ crimeof forcible abduction with rape, and each and ever5 one of them is li? death penaltiesB all of them shall, ointl5 and severall5,indemnif5 the complainant of the sum of '6G,GGG.GG in each of the four crimes, or a total of >G,GGG.GGB and each shall pa5one-fourth =6 >? of the costs.

    Insofar as the car used in the commission of the crime isconcerned, the order of the court a 'uo for its confiscation ishereb5 set asideB and whoever is in custod5 thereof is hereb5ordered to deliver its possession to intervenor 2ilipinasInvestment P 2inance orporation in accordance with the udgment of the ourt of 2irst Instance of Manila in ivil ase(o. 4777C thereof.

    oncepcion, .$., )e&es, $.B.!., "izon, Ma/alintal, 3aldi0ar,astro, Fernando, 4illamor and Ma/asiar, $$., concur.

    Barredo and 5eehan/ee, $$., too/ no part.

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    G.R. No. 137114 u5u(' 1, 2444

    IN0ENT P /L G. !ER0 *O a. .a. IN0ENT G.!ER0 *O, petitioner,vs.0ONS/ELO T N, respondent.

    ) E I ! I (

    P NG NI) N, J.:

    A udicial declaration of nullit5 of a previous marriage isnecessar5 before a subse uent one can be legall5 contracted.

    ne who enters into a subse uent marriage without firstobtaining such udicial declaration is guilt5 of bigam5. Thisprinciple applies even if the earlier union is characteri9ed b5statute as +void.+

    The ase

    %efore us is a 'etition for *eview on ertiorari assailing theJul5 6>, 677F )ecision of the ourt of Appeals = A?6 in A-#*

    * (o. 67FCG and its Januar5 >, 6777 *esolution den5ingreconsideration. The assailed )ecision affirmed the ruling of the *egional Trial ourt =*T ? of %acolod it5 in riminal

    ase (o. 6CF>F, which convicted herein petitioner of bigam5as follows:

    +1;E*E2 *E, finding the guilt of accused )r. 0incent 'aul#. Mercado a.7 of the *evised 'enal

    ode to have been proven be5ond reasonable doubt, Rthecourt hereb5 rendersS udgment imposing upon him a prisonterm of three =C? 5ears, four =>? months and fifteen =6D? da5s of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminatesentence, to eight =F? 5ears and twent5-one =36? da5s of prision ma5or, as ma@imum, plus accessor5 penalties providedb5 law.

    osts against accused.+ 3

    The 2acts

    The facts are uoted b5 ourt of Appeals = A? from the trialcourt s udgment, as follows: +2rom the evidence adduced b5the parties, there is no dispute that accused )r. 0incentMercado and complainant Ma. onsuelo Tan got married onJune 38, 6776 before MT -%acolod it5 %r. 8 Judge#orgonio J. Iba e9 Rb5 reason ofS which a Marriage ontractwas dul5 e@ecuted and signed b5 the parties. As entered insaid document, the status of accused was Usingle . There is nodispute either that at the time of the celebration of the weddingwith complainant, accused was actuall5 a married man, havingbeen in lawful wedloc< with Ma. Thelma liva in a marriageceremon5 solemni9ed on April 6G, 6784 b5 Judge &eonardo %.

    a ares, 2I-%r. VI0, ebu it5 per Marriage ertificateissued in connection therewith, which matrimon5 was further blessed b5 *ev. 2ather Arthur %aur on ctober 6G, 6784 inreligious rites at the !acred ;eart hurch, ebu it5. In thesame manner, the civil marriage between accused andcomplainant was confirmed in a church ceremon5 on June 37,6776 officiated b5 Msgr. 0ictorino A. *ivas, Judicial 0icar,)iocese of %acolod it5. %oth marriages were consummatedwhen out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma liva boreaccused two children, while a child, 0incent 'aul, Jr. was siredb5 accused with complainant Ma. onsuelo Tan.

    + n ctober D, 6773, a letter-complaint for bigam5 was filed b5complainant through counsel with the it5 'rosecutor of %acolod it5, which eventuall5 resulted RinS the institution of thepresent case before this ourt against said accused, )r.0incent #. Mercado, on March 6, 677C in an Information datedJanuar5 33, 677C.

    + n (ovember 6C, 6773, or more than a month after thebigam5 case was lodged in the 'rosecutor s ffice, accusedfiled an action for )eclaration of (ullit5 of Marriage againstMa. Thelma 0. liva in *T -%r. 33, ebu it5, and in a

    http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_137110_2000.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_137110_2000.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_137110_2000.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_137110_2000.html#fnt1

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    'etitioner was convicted of bigam5 under Article C>7 of the*evised 'enal ode, which provides:

    +The penalt5 of prision ma&or shall be imposed upon an5person who shall contract a second or subse uent marriagebefore the former marriage has been legall5 dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptivel5

    dead b5 means of a udgment rendered in the proper proceedings.+

    The elements of this crime are as follows:

    +6. That the offender has been legall5 marriedB

    3. That the marriage has not been legall5 dissolved or,in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spousecould not 5et be presumed dead according to the ivil

    odeB

    C. That he contracts a second or subse uent marriageB

    >. That the second or subse uent marriage has all theessential re uisites for validit5.+8

    1hen the Information was filed on Januar5 33, 677C, all theelements of bigam5 were present. It is undisputed thatpetitioner married Thelma #. liva on April 6G, 6784 in ebu

    it5. 1hile that marriage was still subsisting, he contracted asecond marriage, this time with *espondent Ma. onsuelo Tanwho subse uentl5 filed the omplaint for bigam5.

    'etitioner contends, however, that he obtained a udicialdeclaration of nullit5 of his first marriage under Article C4 of the2amil5 ode, thereb5 rendering it void ab initio . nli

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    can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated whilethe first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for

    1udicial declaration of such nullit&.6

    In 5olentino 0. Paras, 6> however, the ourt again held that udicial declaration of nullit5 of a void marriage was notnecessar5. In that case, a man married twice. In his )eath

    ertificate, his second wife was named as his survivingspouse. The first wife then filed a 'etition to correct the saidentr5 in the )eath ertificate. The ourt ruled in favor of thefirst wife, holding that +the second marriage that he contractedwith private respondent during the lifetime of the first spouse isnull and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. 7o

    1udicial decree is necessar& to establish the in0alidit& of a 0oid marriage.6

    In 2iegel 0. Sempio-"i&, 6D the ourt stressed the need for such declaration. In that case, Karl ;ein9 1iegel filed an

    action for the declaration of nullit5 of his marriage to &ilia livia1iegel on the ground that the latter had a prior e@istingmarriage. After pretrial, &ilia as

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    from its performance, and no 1udicial decree is necessar& toestablish its in0alidit&, as distinguished from mere annulablemarriages. +67

    The provision appeared in substantiall5 the same form under Article FC of the 67DG ivil ode and Article >6 of the 2amil5

    ode. ;owever, Article >G of the 2amil5 ode, a new

    provision, e@pressl5 re uires a udicial declaration of nullit5 of the previous marriage, as follows:

    +A*T. >G. The absolute nullit5 of a previous marriage ma5 beinvoGS is also in line with the recent decisions of the!upreme ourt that the marriage of a person ma5 be null andvoid but there is need of a udicial declaration of such factbefore that person can marr5 againB otherwise, the secondmarriage will also be void =1iegel v. !empio-)i5, Aug. 67 F4,6>C ! *A >77, 0da. )e onsuegra v. #!I!, C8 ! *AC6D?.5his pro0ision changes the old rule that (here amarriage is illegal and 0oid from its performance, no 1udicial decree is necessar& to establish its 0alidit& ;People 0.Mendoza, ?@: People 0. Aragon, Phil. @@ .6 3G

    In this light, the statutor5 mooring of the rulingin Mendoza and Aragon W that there is no need for a udicialdeclaration of nullit5 of a void marriage -- has been cast asideb5 Article >G of the 2amil5 ode. !uch declaration is nownecessar5 before one can contract a second marriage. Absentthat declaration, we hold that one ma5 be charged with andconvicted of bigam5.

    The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncementin 5erre 0. 5erre, 36 which involved an administrative omplaintagainst a law5er for marr5ing twice. In re ecting the law5er sargument that he was free to enter into a second marriagebecause the first one was void ab initio , the ourt ruled: +for purposes of determining whether a person is legall5 free tocontract a second marriage, a udicial declaration that the first

    marriage was null and void ab initio is essential .+ The ourtfurther noted that the said rule was +cast into statutor5 form b5 Article >G of the 2amil5 ode.+ !ignificantl5, it observed thatthe second marriage, contracted without a udicial declarationthat the first marriage was void, was +bigamous and criminal incharacter.+

    Moreover, Justice *e5es, an authorit5 in riminal &aw whoseearlier wor< was cited b5 petitioner, changed his view on thesub ect in view of Article >G of the 2amil5 ode and wrote in677C that a person must first obtain a udicial declaration of the

    nullit5 of a void marriage before contracting a subse uentmarriage:33

    +*t is no( settled that the fact that the first marriage is 0oid from the beginning is not a defense in a bigam& charge. As(ith a 0oidable marriage, there must be a 1udicial declarationof the nullit& of a marriage before contracting the second marriage . Article >G of the 2amil5 ode states that @ @ @. The

    ode ommission believes that the parties to a marriageshould not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void,even if such is the fact, but must first secure a udicial

    declaration of nullit5 of their marriage before the5 should beallowed to marr5 again. @ @ @.+

    In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriagealthough there was 5et no udicial declaration of nullit5 of hisfirst marriage. In fact, he instituted the 'etition to have the firstmarriage declared void onl5 after complainant had filed aletter-complaint charging him with bigam5. %5 contracting asecond marriage while the first was still subsisting, hecommitted the acts punishable under Article C>7 of the*evised 'enal ode.

    http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_137110_2000.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_137110_2000.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_137110_2000.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_137110_2000.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_137110_2000.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_137110_2000.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_137110_2000.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_137110_2000.html#fnt22

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    That he subse uentl5 obtained a udicial declaration of thenullit5 of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crimehad alread5 been consummated b5 then. Moreover, his vieweffectivel5 encourages dela5 in the prosecution of bigam5casesB an accused could simpl5 file a petition to declare hisprevious marriage void and invo

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    G.R. No(. 1187 7 121 71 O:'ober 19, 244;

    RO)ERTO )RILL NTE, petitioner,vs.0O/RT OF PPE LS a&$ THE PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, respondents.

    ) E I ! I (TING , J.:

    #ood name in man and woman, dear m5 &ord,Is the immediate ewel of their souls:1ho steals m5 purse steals trashB Utis!omething, nothingBX%ut he that filches from me m5 good name*obs me of that which not enriches him,

    And ma

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    a commander 2rancis %alolo5. !ub ect of themeeting was +1inning the Election at all osts.+

    @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @

    C. n )ecember 68, 67F8, )r. 'rudente, Att5.%ina5 and others including some unidentified

    government officials discussed operation +)irt52ingers+ after the A!EA( !ummit Meeting. Theoperation involves terrorism, the use of publicschool teachers, the threat to . n )ecember F, 67F8, a certain Emilio Anecito,tagged as a hitman in the group of )r. 'rudente, hasbeen specificall5 assigned to assassinate Mr. !5 uco,

    Aniceto has been described as Iranian mesti9o loo

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    %uan was not included in the trial of the cases in the *T -Manila because he eluded arrest and was not arraigned. Thecharges against 'ascual and uimlat were dropped uponmotion of the Assistant 'rosecutor. The charges againstMacasaet and Albano were also eventuall5 dismissed uponmotion of the prosecution. nl5 %rillante and !ison remainedas accused. 64 %oth pleaded not guilt5 to the charges against

    them.n Januar5 3D, 677C, the *T -Manila ac uitted !ison but

    found %rillante guilt5 of libel on four counts. The dispositiveportion of the trial court s"ecision in the consolidated casesreads:

    1;E*E2 *E, udgment is rendered pronouncingaccused %obb5 %rillante, also ?counts, as author or writer, of &I%E& defined under

    Article CDC of the *evised 'enal ode and penali9edunder Article CDD of the same code, and sentencinghim in each count to the indeterminate penalt5 of 2 * =>? M (T;! of arresto ma5or, as minimum, toT1 =3? "EA*! ofprision ma5or, as ma@imum, and topa5 a fine of '3,GGG.GG with subsidiar5 imprisonment incase of insolvenc5 at the rate of (E =6? )A" for ever5 ' F.GG that he is unable to pa5, but whichsubsidiar5 imprisonment shall not e@ceed EI#;T =F?months.

    Accused %obb5 %rillante is ordered to pa5 the privateoffended part5, )r. (emesio 'rudente, the total sumof'6,GGG,GGG.GG in these four =>? cases for moraldamages which the latter suffered.

    Accused Arcadio !ison is ac uitted in the two casesagainst him, his guilt of the charges against him nothaving been established be5ond reasonable RdoubtS.

    Two-third =3 C? of the costs is assessed againstaccused %obb5 %rillante while the remaining one-third=6 C? is chargedde oficio .68

    !ubse uentl5, %rillante appealed the "ecision of the *T -Manila to the ourt of Appeals.6F %rillante contended that whenthe *nformations in riminal ases (o. F7-4746> to 68 were

    filed b5 the prosecutor on Januar5 64, 67F7, the offense hadalread5 prescribed because more than one 5ear had elapsedsince the publication of the open letter on Januar5 6G, 66 and63, 67FF. ;e also averred that the open letter which he wroteand caused to be published was not defamator5 and waswithout malice. %rillante also claimed that the publication isconsidered privileged communication. 2inall5, he argued thathe is entitled to e ual protection of the laws and should beac uitted of the offenses charged li, the ourt of Appeals promulgated

    its "ecision in A-#.*. (o. 6>>8D affirming the decision of the*T -Manila. The appellate court held that the offense of libelhad not 5et prescribed because the one-5ear prescriptionperiod should be rec

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    e@posing him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule.36 Theourt of Appeals re ected %rillante s argument that the open

    letter ma5 be considered privileged communication becausethe evidence does not show that %rillante wrote and publishedit out of a legal, moral or social dut5.33

    The appellate court also debun63, FF-CG4G and F7-836. The dispositiveportion of the "ecision dated March 33, 677C of the *T -Ma6G, FF-6>66,FF-6>63, FF-CG4G and F7-836, finding accused

    %obb5 %rillante, also . In riminal ases (os. FF-6>6G and FF-6>63, A ITTI(# accused Ma@ %uan, Jr.,

    Angel #onong and &ouie amino, of the twocharges against them on the ground that their guilt has not been proven be5ond reasonabledoubt.

    D. In riminal ase (o. FF-6>66 =e@cept for accused %rillante? ordering the same

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    A* ;I0E) on the ground that the other accused herein, #loria ;ernande9, Augusto0illanueva and 0irgilio Manuel, have not beenbrought to the urisdiction of this ourtB let aliaswarrant issue for their arrest.

    4. In riminal ases (os. FF-CG4G and F7-836,

    li8D.

    n 2ebruar5 3F, 677D, the ourt of Appeals renderedits "ecision in A-#.*. * (o. 6D68> affirming the decision of the *T -Ma

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    T MA&I#( T;E 'E*! (, ; ( * A()*E' TATI ( 2 T;E M'&AI(A(TR'* )E(TE %I(A"S % T ! &E&" 2 * T;EJ !TI2IE) A() ; (E!T ' *' !E 2 %*I(#I(#T T;E ATTE(TI ( 2 A&& A T; *ITIE!

    ( E*(E) T;E *E' *T! T;E*EI(ME(TI (E) 2 * A''* '*IATE A TI (. 1;E*ET;E*E I! ( MA&I E, T;E*E I! ( &I%E&.

    III

    I( T* T;, ' %&I &" K( 1( 'A*AMI&ITA*" A TI0ITIE! 2 M'&AI(A(T, )*. (EME!I'* )E(TE, A&*EA)" I( 'E*ATI ( & (#%E2 *E JA( A*" 63, 67FF, I()I ATE T;AT ;E1A! ( T I( A'A%&E 2 ( *I!;I(# 0I &E(TI(TE(TI (! A#AI(!T T;E ' &ITI A&

    '' (E(T! 2 MA" * %I(A".

    I0

    M *E 0E*, (!I)E*I(# T;AT T;E MATTE**E2E**E) T I( T;E &ETTE* I() %ITA%&"*E&ATE! T T;E E&E TI ( AM'AI#( T;E(# I(# ( A! 1E&& A! T;E 'A*TI I'ATI ( 2'ETITI (E* A() M'&AI(A(T T;E*EI(,1;ATE0E* I! (TAI(E) I( !AI) &ETTE* A(

    AT M !T %E ( M *E T;A( A ' &ITI A& &I%E&,1;I ; I! ( T ' (I!;A%&E.

    1E EA*(E!T&" *#E T;AT T;I! '* ' !ITI (%E E( ( IATE) A! A 2 ()AME(TA& '*I( I'&EI( T;E &A1 ( &I%E&.

    0

    I( T;E *EM TE ' !!I%I&IT" T;AT T;I!; ( *A%&E *T MA" 'E* EI0E A("

    *IMI(A& &I%E& I( T;I! A!E, T;E 'E(A&T"IM' !E) ' ( 'ETITI (E* I! * E& A()

    EV E!!I0E, 'A*TI &A*&", A! T T;E AM (T2 )AMA#E! A1A*)E) T M'&AI(A(T. CC

    In G.R. No. 121 71, he ma

    1ith respect to the issue of prescription, %rillante anchors hisclaim on the ourt s ruling inPeople 0. 5a&co CD that theprescriptive period of a crime is interrupted onl5 upon the filingof the complaint in court and not the filing thereof with thefiscal s office. According to %rillante, the ruling inPeople 0.Olarte C4 did not modif5 the doctrine in5a&co because

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    in Olarte, the ourt referred to a complaint filed +in court,+ notin the +fiscal s office.+ The ruling inFrancisco0. ourt of

    Appeals C8 that a complaint filed with the fiscal s office alsointerrupts the prescriptive period of a criminal offense allegedl5cannot overturn the ruling in Olarte because the latter wasdecided b5 the ourt %n Banc whileFrancisco was decided b5a mere division of the ourt.CF

    It is further asserted b5 %rillante that the rule in the 67FD *uleson riminal 'rocedure that the filing of the criminal complaintwith the fiscal s office interrupts the prescriptive period, cannotbe applied retroactivel5 to the cases against him because itimpairs his vested right to have the cases against himdismissed on the ground of prescription. C7 In addition, heclaims that !ection 4=b?, *ule C of the 67FD *ules on riminal'rocedure which states that +RtShe pendenc5 of a petition for suspension of the criminal action still undergoing preliminar5investigation in the fiscal s office shall interrupt the prescriptive

    period for filing the corresponding complaint of information+supports his position that prior to the amendment of the *uleson riminal 'rocedure in 67FD, the prevailing rule was thatonl5 the filing of the complaint or information in court tolls theprescriptive period for a criminal offense.>G

    %rillante denies that he is liable for libel for causing to bepublished his open letter implicating %ina5, 'rudente and their associates in a planned assassination of !5 uco as well aselection-related terrorism, and in uttering remar6 !ince hisstatements were privileged communication, malice cannot bepresumed from them. >3%rillante adds that at the time he madethe statements, he honestl5 believed that the5 were true.

    iting an American case, Ba&s 0. Eunt, >C he contends thatwhere there is an honest belief in the truth of the chargesmade, and the publication is in good faith, one is notresponsible even for publishing an untruth. >>

    It is further asserted b5 %rillante that since %ina5, the sub ect of the allegedl5 defamator5 statements is a public figure, his=%rillante s? comments affecting %ina5 s reputation isconstitutionall5 protected speech. >D

    %rillante also urges the ourt to reverse his convictions,reasoning that at most, what he ma5 have committed is+political libel+ which should e@empt him form criminal liabilit5,considering that election campaigns can become ver5 heatedand candidates from rival camps often ma4

    %rillante li

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    To the writerHs mind, these reasons logicall5 call withe ual force, for the e@press overruling also of thedoctrine in 'eople vs. Ta5co, 8C 'hil. DG7, =67>6? thatthe filing of a complaint or denuncia b5 the offendedpart5 with the it5 2iscalHs ffice which is re uired b5law to conduct the preliminar5 investigation does notinterrupt the period of prescription. In chartered cities,criminal prosecution is generall5 initiated b5 the filing of the complaint or denuncia with the cit5 fiscal for preliminar5 investigation. In the case of provincialfiscals, besides being empowered li

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    in the planning of the election-related terrorism and theassassination of !5 uco not onl5 in his open letter but alsoduring the press conference.

    Thus, the determination of %rillante s culpabilit5 for libel hingeson the uestion of whether his statements were made withmalice.

    Malice is a term used to indicate the fact that the offender isprompted b5 personal ill-will or spite and speaua+ % e$+y

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    In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of aualifiedl5 privileged communication under Article CD>, (o. 6,

    the following re uisites must concur: =6? the person who madethe communication had a legal, moral, or social dut5 to ma

    1ith respect to the first re uisite, the ourt in D.S. 0.a#ete 8D clarified that the interest sought to be protected b5

    the person ma

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    In "aez 0. ourt of Appeals ,8F )ae9 was charged with libel for publishing a letter which accused the Ma5or of Me5caua5an,%ulacan of corruption. The letter addressed to the Ma5or wassent not onl5 to him but also to the Municipal ourt, Municipal

    ouncil and hief of 'olice of Me5caua5an, %ulacan. )ae9contended therein that he was not guilt5 of libel because hewas not motivated b5 malice or ill-will in publishing the letter,but rather, he did it out of good intentions and a social dut5 tobring about reforms in the administration of the municipalgovernment of Me5caua5an, %ulacan. The ourt affirmed hisconviction for libel and held:

    XThe goodness of the intention is not alwa5s sufficientb5 itself to ustif5 the publication of an in urious factBthus the goodness of the end is not a sufficient motiveto warrant the emplo5ment of illicit means to obtain it.The e@istence of ustifiable motives is a uestion whichhas to be decided b5 ta

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    The ourt in !u hu Sing 0. !u 5iong Gui F3 clarified that thefact that a communication is privileged does not mean that it isnot actionableB the privileged character of the communicationsimpl5 does awa5 with the presumption of malice, and theplaintiff has to prove the fact of malice in such case.

    ;owever, since the open letter and the statements uttered b5%rillante during the Januar5 8, 67FF press conference aredefamator5 and do not ualif5 as conditionall5 privilegedcommunication, malice is presumed and need not be provenseparatel5 from the e@istence of the defamator5 statement. FC

    onsidering that all the elements of libel are present in thecases against %rillante, the ourt finds that no reversible error was committed b5 the ourt of Appeals in affirming hisconvictions b5 the *T -Manila and *T -Ma provide for sanctions against un ustified andmalicious in ur5 to a person s reputation and honor. Althoughwider latitude is given to defamator5 utterances against publicofficials in connection with or relevant to their performance of

    official duties,FD

    or against public figures in relation to mattersof public interest involving them,F4 such defamator5 utterancesdo not automaticall5 fall within the ambit of constitutionall5protected speech. If the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a public officer s performance of his duties, thesame ma5 give rise to criminal and civil liabilit5.

    1ith respect to the third issue, the ourt agrees with theappellate court that %rillante s right to e ual protection of thelaws was not violated when he was convicted of libel while hisco-accused were ac uitted.

    The e ual protection clause is not absoluteB rather, it permitsof reasonable classification. If the classification ischaracteri9ed b5 real and substantial differences, one classma5 be treated differentl5 from another. F8 It is sufficient that thelaw operates e uall5 and uniforml5 on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons are treated in thesame manner, the conditions not being different, both in theprivileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.FF

    As mentioned earlier, the cases against some of some of %rillante s co-accused were dismissed during the pendenc5 of the cases before the trial courts. F7 !till, some of his co-accusedremained at large, 7G leaving the trial courts with no option butto archive the case as against them. %rillante s other co-accused were ac uitted since, unli

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    G.R. No. L-; 431 O:'ober 21, 1991

    N NERI0O *. S NTOS, petitioner,vs.THE 0O/RT OF PPE LS, respondents .

    Siguion )e&na, Montecillo I Ongsia/o !a( Offices for

    petitioner.

    FERN N, C.J.:p

    'etition for review of the decision of the ourt of Appealpromulgated on August 3D, 6784 which affirmed the udgmentof the then ourt of 2irst Instance of *i9al, %ranch 0III ='asig?convicting (anerico ). !antos of the crime of libel andsentencing him to pa5 a fine of '4,GGG.GG with subsidiar5

    imprisonment in case of insolvenc5, to indemnif5 the privateoffended parties arlos Moran !ison and &uis 2. !ison in theamount of 'DG,GGG.GG b5 wa5 of actual, conse uential ande@emplar5 damages and costs. 1

    The instant petition raises the ultimate issue of whether or notthe publication of a complaint filed with the !ecurities andE@change ommission before an5 udicial action is ta

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    The article in uestion is not a privilegedcommunication. At the time the complaint filedwith the !ecurities and E@change ommissionwas published in the column of the accusedthere was as 5et no proceeding at which bothparties had an opportunit5 to be present and tobe heard. =%arreto vs. 'hilippine 'ublishing o.,CG 'hil. FF?. 'ublishing an article based upon acomplaint filed in a ourt of 2irst Instancebefore an5 udicial action is ta'hil, >>8?.

    The article in uestion is libelous. It imputes acrime to the private offended parties, that of Hwillful violation of the provisions of the!ecurities Act and the implementing *ules and*egulations issued b5 the commissionHwhich ispenali9ed b5 imprisonment or fine or both andsaid published article of the accused imputes tothe private offended parties, as stoc

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    ;owever, it would seem that the passage of time has wor-3CD. Thus:

    The reason for the rule that pleadings in udicialproceedings are considered privileged is notonl5 because said pleadings have become partof public record open to the public to scrutini9e,but also due to the undeniable fact that saidpleadings are presumed to contain allegationsand assertions lawful and legal in nature,appropriate to the disposition of issuesventilated before the courts for the proper administration of ustice and, therefore, of general public concern. Moreover, pleadingsare presumed to contain allegationssubstantiall5 true because the5 can besupported b5 evidence presented in good faith,the contents of which would be under thescrutin5 of courts, and therefore, sub ect to bepurged of all improprieties and illegalstatements contained therein.

    1e are firml5 convinced that the correct rule onthe matter should be that a fair and true reportof a complaint filed in court without remar

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    G.R. No. 14;189 !ar:@ 34, 1993

    !ELI L RO)IS, petitioner,vs.0O/RT OF PPE LS a&$ '@e PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,respondents.

    Francisco ". Alas for petitioner.

    5he Solicitor General for public respondents.

    /I SON, J.:

    This is a petition for review oncertiorari under *ule >D of the*evised *ules of ourt of the decision of the ourt of Appealsin A-#.*. * (o. 6GDG8, entitled +Amelia &arobis v. ;on.

    *odrigo 2. &im, Jr., at al.+ promulgated on (ovember 3G, 6776and the resolution of the same ourt dated Januar5 33, 6773,den5ing the motion for reconsideration of said decision.

    In A-#.*. (o. 6GDG8, the ourt of Appeals affirmed thedecision of the *egional Trial ourt, Manolo-2ortich, %u ! *A D6>

    R6776S?The sole legal uestion raised b5 petitioner is her claim that, atmost, she is liable onl5 for the crime of slight oral defamation.=)ollo , p. 6>?

    1hether the offense committed is serious or slight oraldefamation, depends not onl5 upon the sense andgrammatical meaning of the utterances but also upon thespecial circumstances of the case, li

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    Appeals, 68C ! *A 4>D R67F7SB %alite v. 'eople, 6F ! *A3FG R6744S?

    Elements that ualif5 the oral defamation to the graver offenseare e@tant. 'etitioner disregarded the respect due to the ageand status of the complainant, who was 46 5ears old and hasbeen a public school teacher for the past C3 5ears.

    The offense, having been ualified to grave oral defamation b5the aforementioned special circumstances, cannot be reducedto simple oral defamation b5 the claim that the slanderouswords were said in the heat of anger. %esides, the slanderouswords were uttered with evident intent, using the languageof Balite 0. People =6F ! *A 3FG? to +stri, *evised 'enal ode?.

    )ividing the penalt5 for grave oral defamation into threeperiods produces the following results:

    Minimum 2our =>? months and one =6? da5 toone =6? 5earB

    Medium: ne =6? 5ear and one =6? da5 to one=6? 5ear and eight =F? monthsB and

    Ma@imum: ne =6? 5ear, eight =F? months andone =6? da5 to two =3? 5ears and four =>?months. =II *e5es, The *evised 'enal ode,63th ed., 6GG4?

    There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstancespresent in this case, the ma@imum term of the penalt5 shouldbe imposed in its medium period, i.e ., within the range of one=6? 5ear and one =6? da5 to one =6? 5ear and eight =F? months.=Art. 4D =6?, *evised 'enal ode?

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    The ma@imum term of the penalt5 imposed b5 the *egionalTrial ourt is within the range of the medium period and thereis no legal basis for the ourt of Appeals to change it.

    The courts should be careful in fi@ing penalties because an5error ma5 have dire conse uences, as in this case wherein theprison term imposed on the accused has been increasederroneousl5. To undul5 prolong the confinement of an accused,even b5 onl5 one da5, is un ust in an5 sense of the word.

    1;E*E2 *E, the decision of the ourt of Appeals is affirmedwith the modification that the petitioner is sentenced to an

    indeterminate penalt5 ranging from three =C? months ofarrestoma&or to one =6? 5ear and one =6? da5 of prision correccional .In all other respects, the civil liabilities imposed b5 the*egional Trial ourt are affirmed.

    ! *)E*E).

    ruz, Gri#o-A'uino and Bellosillo, $$., concur .