crim murder homicide cases

8/12/2019 Crim Murder Homicide Cases

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People v Tomas

Version of the Prosecution

Estrella Doctor Casco (Estrella) was based in the United States, working there as a procurement specialist with

Safeway, Inc. and as a planner. She arrived in the Philippineson July 9, 2006 or about 10 days before her untimely

demise.

At around 9:45 in the evening on July 19, 2006, the victim (Estrella), with her mother Damiana Doctor (Damiana)

and caretakers Liezl Toledo (Liezl) and Angelita Duque (Angelita), were traversing the road towards her house

in Barangay Baybayaos, Mayantoc, Tarlac after she had parked her rented car at the house of Liezl’s mother-in-

law, Erlinda Toledo. They had just come from the clinic of Dr. Salvador for a medical check-up of Damiana.

Estrella was walking slightly ahead of her mother and Angelita when appellants Tomas, Sr., Doctor and

Gatchalian suddenly came out from the side of the road. Tomas, Sr. and Doctor are cousins of

Estrella. Thereupon, without saying anything, Tomas, Sr. drew a gun and shot Estrella twice at a distance of

about 1.5 meters away. Gatchalian, without a gun, allegedly supported Tomas, Sr. by standing in a blocking

position along the road, while Doctor positioned himself at the back of Damiana and Angelita and poked a

handgun at them, telling them to lie face down on the ground, though they did not totally drop on the road but

were in a kneeling position.

When Tomas, Sr. fired the first two shots at Estrella, the latter fell down but the former still followed it with three

more shots when she was already prone on the ground. After the five shots, the three accused fled towards the

house of Tomas, Sr. Liezl, who was standing about four meters away from Estrella, shouted, “Saklulu, tulungan

ninyo kami (Help, help us),” then ran to her house. Meanwhile, Angelita came to the aid of 80-year-old Damiana,

who suffered a hypertensive attack after seeing what happened to her daughter. Angelita waved her hand to

seek assistance from Barangay Kagawad Yolanda Pablo (Kagawad Pablo) who came out on the road.

Both Liezl and Angelita recognized the three accused from the light coming from the lamppost. The road was

well lit. Doctor’s house was barely seven (7) meters from the scene of the crime, that of Tomas, Sr. about 15

meters away, while Gatchalian was staying in a hut in the fields.

On the same day, July 20, 2006, Tomas, Sr. and Doctor were arrested in their respective homes, while Gatchalian

was arrested in the woodland (kahuyan). The three were subjected to paraffin tests shortly after the policementook them in custody and were found negative for gunpowder burns.

Liezl opined that what probably prompted the three accused to murder Estrella were the facts that: (1) Tomas, Sr.

was removed as administrator of Estrella’s properties inBarangay Baybayaos, Mayantoc, Tarlac; (2) Tomas, Sr.

lost several cases against Estrella’s father, Cecilio Doctor (Cecilio); (3) Tomas, Sr. accused Estrella of instigating

and financing several cases filed against him; and (4) Cecilio filed a case against Alejandro Doctor, the father of

accused Doctor, involving an easement of a property. These apparent motives were corroborated by Angelita.

Version of the Defense

The accused denied involvement in the incident.

Tomas, Sr. averred that he was at home sleeping when the incident happened. Since he suffered a cardiac arrest

in December 1988, he had regular attacks and, on that day, feeling bad, he slept early at around 7:00 p.m. in a bed

in the living room in front of the television and woke up at 4:00 a.m. the next day. He was not awakened by the

gunshots the previous night and it was his wife who told him about Estrella’s death from the shooting. In the

morning of July 20, 2006, as barangay captain, he confirmed Estrella’s death in front of Doctor’s house from his

neighbors. His investigation did not identify the persons responsible for the crime.

On the other hand, Doctor, the brother-in-law of Tomas, Sr. and a cousin of Estrella, likewise denied any

involvement in the incident. He asserted that after working in the field the whole day of July 19, 2006, he went



home at 4:00 p.m. At around 9:00 p.m. he went to sleep. At 10:00 p.m. he awoke to urinate and was told by his

wife that his cousin Estrella met an accident. He was prevailed upon by his wife not to go out of the house. He

then went back to sleep and woke up at 5:00 a.m. the next day.

Gatchalian admitted that he was a farm helper of Tomas, Sr. and worked in the latter’s rice field. On the night of

the incident, he claimed he was at home asleep with his 10-year-old son Jayson. He woke up the next day at 5:00

a.m. and proceeded to work in the farm of Tomas, Sr.

On July 20, 2006, P/Insp. Mangrobang invited the accused to the Mayantoc police station for investigation but

instead immediately brought them inside the municipal jail. An hour later, policemen brought them

to Camp Macabulos for paraffin tests. Thereafter, they were returned to jail.

RTC – Guilty of murder. The RTC appreciated treachery in the swiftness and unexpectedness of the attack upon

the unarmed Estrella without the slightest provocation, and the attendance of conspiracy through the accused’s

contributory acts to successfully carry out the crim

CA affirmed.

SC:

ISSUE 1: Credibility of Liezl and Angelita: First Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses

Accused-appellants assert that prosecution witnesses Liezl and Angelita are not credible witnesses on the

grounds of their partiality since they rely on the family of Estrella for their livelihood. They argue that the

testimonies of Liezl and Angelita are too perfect since appellants could not have committed the crime in such a

well-lit place where they could easily be identified, coupled with the fact that Liezl, Angelita and Damiana were

spared from harm. They infer that the testimonies of Liezl and Angelita were fabricated. They also point to the

reason that the adverse testimony of Liezl is on account of her ill feelings towards Doctor who previously

subjected her to shame when he slapped her in public, and also to ingratiate herself to her employer, Cecilio,

Estrella’s father, who was charged by Tomas, Sr. in a case.

To cast more doubt on their testimonies, accused-appellants point to the incongruity of both Liezl and Angelita

not identifying them as the perpetrators of Estrella’s killing immediately after the incident when they had ample

opportunity to do so. In the case of Angelita, she only mentioned Tomas, Sr. to Cecilio and did not include Doctorand Gatchalian. And much worse in the case of Liezl, who rushed home looking for her cellular phone, and did not

even bother to reveal accused-appellants’ identities to the responding policemen.

We disagree.

Liezl and Angelita narrated in a straightforward and candid manner

2nd

issue: negative paraffin test

ccused-appellants were subjected to paraffin tests on July 20, 2006 at 11:05 a.m. or the very next day and a little

over 14 hours after the shooting incident. Since gunpowder nitrates stay for 72 hours in the hands of a person

who fired a handgun, a timely paraffin test, if positive, will definitely prove that a person had fired a handgun

within that time frame. A negative result, however, does not merit conclusive proof that a person had not fired a

handgun. Thus, the negative paraffin test results of accused-appellants cannot exculpate them, particularly

Tomas, Sr., from the crime.

Time and again this Court had reiterated that “even negative findings of the paraffin test do not conclusively show

that a person did not fire a gun,”[20]

and that “a paraffin test has been held to be highly unreliable.”[21]

This is so

since there are many ways, either deliberately or accidentally, that the residue of gunpowder nitrates in the hands

of a person who fired a handgun can be removed.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/february2011/192251.htm#_ftn20










Issue 3&4: conspiracy and treachery

ince their simultaneous and sudden appearance could not amount to it, for Tomas, Sr. still had to draw his gun

before shooting Estrella, and Doctor still had to position himself behind Damiana and Angelita before ordering

them to drop or lie face down on the ground. Evidently, the victim Estrella had ample opportunity to dodge or

defend herself.

And finally, accused-appellants point to the dearth of evidence showing their concerted acts in pursuing acommon design to kill Estrella. Prosecution witnesses Liezl and Angelita point to Tomas, Sr. as the one who fired

a handgun; Doctor was purportedly carrying one but did not use it, while Gatchalian did not carry one. They aver

that the prosecution failed to show evidence of their intentional participation in the crime with a common design

and purpose since Doctor’s act of holding a gun was never shown to be in furtherance of the killing of

Estrella. And much less can Gatchalian’s act of merely standing on the road in the path of the four ladies ever

constitute furtherance of the common purpose of killing Estrella.

Accused-appellants’ arguments are partly meritorious.

After a judicious study of the records at hand, We are compelled to affirm the presence of the qualifying

circumstance of treachery and of conspiracy. However, the evidence adduced and the records do not support a

finding of conspiracy against appellant Gatchalian

Gatchalian, however, is differently situated as Doctor. We note that the evidence adduced and the records would

show that Gatchalian did not do overt acts for the furtherance of the shooting of Estrella. As mentioned above,

mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission without proof of cooperation or agreement

to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy.[44]

It appears that Gatchalian is a party to the conspiracy as found by the courts a quo. Gatchalian appeared in the

company of Tomas, Sr. and Doctor. He also fled together with them. However, Gatchalian was unarmed and did

not say anything or commit any overt act to externally manifest his cooperation with the shooting of Estrella. On

the other hand, Gatchalian never attempted to stop the shooting, which tends to show that he was aware of the

plan and intent to kill Estrella or, at the very least, that he acquiesced to the shooting of Estrella.

The trial court viewed Gatchalian as supporting Tomas, Sr. by taking a “blocking position” in the road. We,

however, cannot subscribe to such a view considering that his presence is merely extraneous to theaccomplishment of the crime. Besides, Angelita and Damiana were covered by Doctor who poked a gun at them,

while Liezl was so far back that it would be incongruous, to say the least, that Gatchalian was blocking the

road. Who would he be blocking then when the road is wide and Liezl was far back?







People v Estacio

Facts:

At around 10:00 in the evening of October 10, 1995, Maritess, together with Estacio and Sumipo, arrived at Casa

Leonisa, a bar-restaurant at Examiner Street, Quezon Citywhere the three of them would meet with Charlie

Mancilla Chua (the victim). Maritess had earlier told Sumipo that she would settle her debt to the victim and then

“deretsong dukot na rin x x x kay Charlie [the victim].”[6]

Sumipo assumed, however, that Maritess was just joking.

After the victim arrived past midnight and talked to Maritess for a short while, the group boarded his car, Maritess

taking the seat beside the victim who was driving, as Estacio and Sumipo took the backseat.

Not long after, Estacio pulled out a gun and ordered the victim to pull the car over. As the victim complied,

Estacio, with a gun pointed at him, pulled him to the backseat as Maritess transferred to the backseat, sat beside

the victim, tied the victim’s hands behind his back, and placed tape on his mouth. Estacio then directed Sumipo

to take over the wheels as he did.[7]

While Sumipo tried to dissuade appellants from pursuing their plan, they replied that they would kill the victim so

that he would not take revenge.[8]

Thereupon, the victim told Maritess, “bakit mo nagawa sa akin ito sa kabila ng

lahat?,” to which she replied, “Bayad na ako sa utang ko sa iyo ngayon .”

On Estacio’s instruction, Sumipo drove towards San Jose del Monte, Bulacan and on reaching a secluded place,

Estacio ordered Sumipo to stop the car as he did. Maritess and Estacio then brought the victim to a grassy

place. Estacio with bloodied hands later resurfaced.

The three then headed towards Malinta, Valenzuela, Bulacan. On the way, Estacio and Maritess talked about how

they killed the victim, Estacio telling Maritess, “Honey,wala na tayong problema dahil siguradong patay na si

Charlie sa dami ng saksak na nakuha niya.”

On Estacio’s and Maritess’ directive, Sumipo stopped by a drug store where Maritess bought alcohol to clean their

hands. Along the way, Maritess and Estacio threw out the victim’s attaché case. Maritess later told Estacio

“Honey, sana hindi muna natin pinatay si Charlie para makahingi pa tayo ng pera sa mga magulang [niya].”

The three later abandoned the car in Malinta.

The following morning, Estacio went to the residence of Sumipo where he called up by telephone the victim’s

mother and demanded a P15,000,000 ransom. The mother replied, however, that she could not afford that

amount.

In the afternoon of the same day, Maritess and Estacio went to Sumipo’s residence again where Estacio again

called up the victim’s mother, this time lowering the ransom demand to P10,000,000 which she still found to be

too steep. Sumipo expressed his misgivings about future calls, as they might get caught, but Estacio and Maritess

assured him that that call would be the last.

The group then went to Greenhills where Estacio still again called up the victim’s mother, still lowering the

ransom demand to P5,000,000, P1,000,000 of which should be advanced. The victim’s mother having agreed to

the demand, Maritess and Estacio directed her to place the money in a garbage can near Pizza Hut in Greenhills

at 11:30 in the evening. Estacio and Sumipo later proceeded to Pizza Hut, and as they were seated there, a patrol

car passed by, drawing them to leave and part ways.

Sumipo soon learned that Maritess and Estacio sold Chua’s gun, watch, and necklace from the proceeds of which

he was given P7,000.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/july2009/171655.htm#_ftn6














On May 16, 1996, Sumipo surrendered to the National Bureau of Investigation. On May 23, 1996, Estacio

surrendered to the police. The police then informed the victim’s mother that Estacio had admitted having killed

her son, and that he offered to accompany them to the crime scene.

SUMIPO

Sumipo explained in an affidavit,[9]

which he identified in open court,[10]

that Maritess got angry with the victimafter he lent money to her husband, one Robert Ong,

[11]enabling him to leave the country without her knowledge,

while Estacio was jealous of the victim with whom Maritess had a relationship.[12]

Version of defense

In his affidavit[13]

which he identified in open court, Estacio claimed that a quarrel broke out in the car between

the victim and Maritess about a debt to the victim; that he tried to pacify the two, but the victim got angry at him,

prompting him to point a fan knife at his neck; and that he then asked Sumipo to drive the car up to Barangay Sto.

Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan where he dragged the victim away from the car and accidentally stabbed him.

When asked on cross-examination why the stabbing was accidental, Estacio replied that he and Maritess

originally planned to leave the victim in Bulacan, but since there was talk of the victim getting back at them, he

“got confused and so it happened.”[14]

Maritess for her part denied[15]

having conspired with Estacio. She claimed that while on board the car, the victim

took issue with her “friendship” with Estacio, whom he insulted. Incensed, Estacio grabbed the victim by the

collar, prompting the victim to pull out a gun from under the driver’s seat which he aimed at Estacio.

Continuing, Maritess claimed that she tried to pacify the quarreling men; that the car stopped at San Jose del

Monte and the three men alighted; that Sumipo returned to the car and was later followed by Estacio who

said “Masama raw ang nangyari,”[16]

he adding that he did not intend to stab the victim.

RTC: kidnapping on the occasion of which the victim was killed

CA: Kidnapping with murder

Sc: The Court finds, however, that the offense of which appellants were convicted was erroneously designated.

Appellants were eventually charged with and convicted of the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder,

defined in the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. In a special complex crime, the prosecution

must prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made

the subject of separate complaints.[28]

In the case at bar, kidnapping was not sufficiently proven. Although appellants bound and gagged Chua and

transported him to Bulacan against his will, they did these acts to facilitate his killing, not because they intended

to detain or confine him. As soon as they arrived at the locus criminis, appellants wasted no time in killing

him. That appellants’ intention from the beginning was to kill the victim is confirmed by the conversation which

Sumipo heard in the car in which Maritess said that a knife would be used to kill him so that it would not create

noise.[29]

The subsequent demand for ransom was an afterthought which did not qualify appellants’ prior acts as

kidnapping.

Thus, where the evident purpose of taking the victims was to kill them, and from the acts of the accused it cannot

be inferred that the latter’s purpose was actually to detain or deprive the victims of their liberty, the subsequent

killing of the victims constitute the crime of murder, hence the crime of kidnapping does not exist and cannot be

considered as a component felony to produce the complex crime of kidnapping with murder.











































Murder with gen aggravating circumstance use of a motor vehicle, reclusion perpetua.



People v Molina

“ROLANDO DREZA testified that as one of the civilian security officers of the deceased/victim Mayor Bonifacio

Uy, he reported for work on August 14, 1989 at 7:00 in the morning. He was in the office when the Mayor received

an invitation to administer the oath of the new officers of the Parents-Teachers Association at the Agro Industrial

School in Barangay San Antonio, Ilagan, Isabela. The [m]ayor consented and left the office at 11:00 o’clock a.m.

with Councilor Antonio Manaligod, DILG Officer Potenciano Tabije and four (4) civilian security men -- PolicarpioEstrada, Rolando Dreza, Rodolfo Bunagan and Jaime Vargas. They had lunch upon arrival at the school. Later, at

3:00 o’clock p.m., the program started right in front of the school and this lasted [until] 5:00 o’clock p.m., followed

by some socializing and food and drink session, singing and guitar playing. They ended at about 10:30 o’clock

p.m. Barangay Captain Veriato Molina invited the Mayor to a funeral wake in the house of Ventura Hernandez,

about 200 meters from the school. Mayor Uy obliged, and with Councilor Manaligod, Mr. Tabije, Barangay Capt.

Molina and other officials of the PTA, followed by the Mayor’s civilian security men, proceeded to the wake,

walking. Their vehicle, the NISSAN 4 x 4, was attended to by Bunagan.

When the [m]ayor and Barangay Captain Veriato Molina arrived, Ruben Molina (another accused and uncle of

Veriato) was already there. He and the [m]ayor greeted each other before the [m]ayor entered the house where

the body of the girl was lying in state. When he came out, he (the [m]ayor) joined Ruben Molina. The two

conversed[;] Dreza heard Ruben Molina’s remark: ‘Pare, ang saya-saya ninyo sa eskwelahan’, and the [m]ayor’s

answer, ‘Ikaw kasi, wala ka roon’. Dreza also heard ‘Wala na bang natira’ from Ruben (which Dreza assumed

refer[red] to the drinks). To this the [m]ayor replied, ‘If you want, let’s buy some more’ (in Tagalog) but Ruben

assured he [would] take care, requested Veriato to buy. Veriato left and returned 30-40 minutes later, with

bottles. Veriato was seen whispering to Ruben before leaving the place.

Ruben opened the bottle, took one shot, followed by the [m]ayor who also took one shot. The conversation grew

heated, but Dreza opined it was because they (Ruben and the [m]ayor) had a previous standing grudge against

each other.

The further questions and answers, in the direct examination conducted by Private Prosecutor Mario Ongkiko on

[W]itness Rolando Dreza on January 8, 1992, follows:

‘Atty. Ongkiko:

Q And when the conversation became heated will you describe to the Honorable Court the events that

eventually followed?

A I heard Ruben Molina uttered to Mayor Uy, in Ilocano, ‘Ukinam (Putang Ina mo).

Q And what was the reaction of Mayor Uy?A Mayor Uy reacted immediately and he threw a kick at Ruben Molina.

Q And do you know if Ruben Molina was hit?

A I did not know if he was hit or not.

Q And what happened after Mayor Uy threw a kick at Ruben Molina?

A When I saw that, I brought the [m]ayor away from Ruben Molina.

Q And what happened next?

A When I was leading Mayor Uy away from Ruben Molina, that was the time when I saw Bgy. Captain Veriato

Molina approached [sic] with a gun (‘baril’).

Q My question is, do you know what kind of gun Bgy. Captain Molina was carrying?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was it?

A It was an M-14 folded, sir.

Q And what happened when Bgy. Capt. Molina approached with a folded M-14, did he utter any word or words?

A What I heard was, Bgy. Capt. Molina uttered, ‘Papatayin ko kayo’.

Q Was this in Tagalog or in Ilocano?

A It was in Tagalog.

Q And after you heard Bgy. Capt. Molina uttered those words, what happened?

A Tumakbo po ako.

x x x x x x x x x

Q And did you hear anything while you were running?

A That was when I heard many shots.



Q Do you know or did you see anyone firing any of those shots?

A I only saw Bgy. Capt. Veriato Molina firing shots.

(TSN, Jan. 8, 1992, pp. 35 to 36)

Atty. Ongkiko:

Q And do you recall what happened after you heard shots?

A After I heard the gun fire, I saw Mayor Uy clutching a post already weak (‘mahinang-mahina na’), and I

concluded that he was hit.(TSN, p. 37, Jan. 8, 1992)

Atty. Ongkiko:

Q And when you saw the [m]ayor in a reclining position, his feet moving, what else did you see or notice?

A Then I saw Bgy. Capt. Veriato Molina returned [sic] and again open fire at the [m]ayor.

Q Do you know what weapon did Bgy. Capt. Molina use this time?

A He was using the same M-14 folded.

Defense’s version:

n August 14, 1989, after attending, as inducting officer-guest speaker, the induction of officers of the Parents

Teachers Association of Isabela which started noontime with a luncheon and ended at 5:30 p.m., followed by a

drinking session which lasted up to about 10:30 p.m., Ilagan, Isabela Mayor Bonifacio Uy, together with

[M]unicipal [C]ouncilor Antonio Manaligod, the mayor’s three bodyguards, namely Jaime Vargas, Policarpio

Estrada and Rolando Dreza, DILG officer Potenciano Tabije, [b]arangay [c]aptain of Centro San Antonio, Veriato

Molina and others walked to the house of Ventura Hernandez which was about 200 meters away from the school

to attend the wake of Hernandez' deceased daughter Michelle. Another bodyguard of the mayor, Rodolfo

Bunagan, drove the mayor's Nissan pick-up to the [sic] Hernandez' residence.

On reaching Hernandez' house, the mayor greeted Ruben Molina, herein accused-appellant, who was then

seated, along with others, between Hernandez' house and that of the latter's brother-in-law Jerome Rivero. The

mayor then went inside the house to view the remains of the deceased after which he went out and joined Ruben

Molina.

While outside, the mayor and Ruben Molina drank liquor in the course of which, though they started with

cordiality, they later engaged in a heated argument which arose from the mayor’s accusation that Ruben’s jeep

was the vehicle used by the killers of his (mayor’s) aunt and that Ruben’s act in the previous elections was

suspect. One Moises de la Cruz, a pastor of the Iglesia ni Cristo, tried to pacify the mayor by suggesting that he

change the topic, he (de la Cruz) having become aware that people around were apprehensive and some had infact started leaving.

As the mayor repeatedly accused Ruben Molina, the latter suggested that he bring the matter to court drawing

the mayor to say “Ukinam”, and [to] kick Ruben who fell down. Not long after, shooting occurred and when it

ended, the mayor, the councilor and two of the mayor’s bodyguards, namely, Policarpio Estrada and Jaime

Vargas, were dead while the following were wounded: Ruben Molina, who had [a] gunshot wound below his left

knee, and Veriato Molina, a nephew of Ruben (Ruben and Veriato’s father being brothers), who had ‘thru and thru’

gunshot wound at his right thigh.

RTC: The trial court further concluded that the crime committed was multiple murder and frustrated murder

qualified by treachery, abuse of superior strength and use of armed men. That the intention of accused-

appellants was to kill the mayor and his bodyguards, including the councilor, was deduced by the trial judge from

the statement reportedly made by Appellant Veriato Molina: “Papatayin ko kayo.” The collective pronoun

“kayo” was used instead of its singular form, which Veriato could have used had he meant to kill the mayor only.

The lower court also found both accused-appellants guilty of illegal possession of firearms and

ammunitions. Evidence recovered from the crime scene included a Smith and Wesson revolver (.38 caliber),

bearing SN (Serial Number) C617376, and six spent shells which were found by the NBI to have been fired from the

aforementioned revolver. The Firearms and Explosives Unit in Camp Crame, Quezon City, certified that said

revolver had been issued to Veriato Molina of Amulung, Cagayan; and that Ruben Molina was likewise a licensed

holder of a registered revolver, Orohm Caliber .22, with SN 232904. Neither appellant, however, had a permit to

carry any firearm outside his residence.[30]

With respect to the other individuals charged together with the Molinas, the court a quo sadly noted that none of

the prosecution witnesses -- vital and corroborative -- ever mentioned as present, during that fateful incident, the

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jul1998/115835_36.htm#_edn30






names of Accused Gregorio Gajas, Casimiro Castillo and Jesus Ariola. During the cross-examination of Defense

Witness Oscar Malana, Private Prosecutor Ongkiko attempted to establish the participation of these three

accused, but in vain.[31]

Thus, their acquittal.

Upon conviction by the trial court, Veriato and his uncle Ruben, both surnamed Molina, filed through

counsel[32]

their Notice of Appeal[33]

direct to this Court.

ISSUE: Sufficiency of evidence for murder and frustrated murder: Appellants contend that the prosecution’sevidence is not sufficient to override the constitutional presumption of their innocence; neither does it prove their

guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

We carefully reviewed the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who were perceived to be credible, and

found that their accounts of the shooting incident corroborated one another on material points. In any event,

based on the declarations in court of both prosecution and defense eyewitnesses, there is no real dispute on the

antecedents leading to the initial burst of gunfire

He was positively seen pointing an M-14 rifle at Mayor Uy and, while in that position, he was heard spewing upon

his very victim the exact words of his ill design to snuff out the life of the latter. Almost simultaneously, he fired at

the mayor. Chaos within the premises ensued, followed by successive bursts of gunfire. Veriato himself was shot

on his right leg. Yet, upon seeing the mayor still alive, though barely, Veriato -- doubtless determined to end the

mayor’s life -- approached and fired his automatic weapon two more times upon his unarmed victim, despite the

latter’s pleas of surrender

Issue: attendance of treachery

n convicting accused-appellants of multiple murder and frustrated murder, the trial court ruled that the crimes

were “qualified by treachery, abuse of superior strength and use of armed men.” But, as the appellants note, the

said court did not explain its basis for appreciating the last two circumstances. Indeed, the records of the case do

not contain evidence sufficient to conclude that appellants took advantage of excessive force notoriously out of

proportion to the means of defense available to the persons attacked.[52]

Neither is there enough evidence to

support, beyond reasonable doubt, a finding that appellants had purposely sought and used the aid of armed men

in attacking their victim. It is a settled rule that the circumstances qualifying a killing to murder must be proven as

indubitably as the crime itself .[53]

At first glance, the circumstances immediately preceding the shoot-out seem to negate the presence of

treachery. Quite evident in the records is the fact that the victim, Bonifacio Uy, who was drunk at the time and ina sardonic predisposition, engaged Appellant Ruben Molina in a heated argument, accusing him of complicity in

the killing of a relative. The drunk mayor even asked for a grenade which he threatened to detonate in the

premises. When no one gave him any, he took a gun from one of his bodyguards and proposed to Appellant

Ruben that they play Russian roulette. Said appellant, still unprovoked at the time, calmly refused. Then the

victim shouted invectives at Ruben and even kicked him. All in all, the victim’s acts, done in the presence of

several people who knew him and Ruben, constituted provocation sufficient to make the latter’s blood

boil. Within hearing and seeing distance was Ruben’s nephew Veriato who, in all likelihood, also heard the threats

and accusations hurled at his uncle, as well as witnessed the foul deeds done to him. A reprisal from Ruben or his

nephew was, therefore, not unexpected.

However, the subsequent acts of accused-appellants were definitely treacherous. After the initial shot, Appellant

Veriato, despite seeing his helpless victim on his last legs and pleading to be spared of any more shooting, still

cold bloodedly fired his automatic rifle at the unarmed mayor. The victim was already defenseless when Veriato

attacked him the second time. Treachery may also be appreciated even when the victim was warned of danger or

initially assaulted frontally, but was attacked again after being rendered helpless and had no means to defend

himself or to retaliate.[56]

CONSPIRACY ISSUE: yes may conspiracy



























Esqueda v people

Venancia Aliser (Venancia) and Gaudencio Quiniquito (Gaudencio) are live-in partners, living at Sitio Nagbinlod,

Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental, together with their children from their first marriages. They were already in bed

when, at around 11:30 o'clock in the evening of March 3, 1999, Gaudencio was awakened by a voice coming from

the outside of their house calling his live-in partner and asking for a drink. He immediately awakened his live-in

partner. While inside the house, Venancia asked the person outside to identify himself. In response, the voicereplied that he and his companions are men of Sgt. Torres conducting a roving patrol. When Venancia asked how

many they were, the person replied that they are many and with them is Toto Vibar, the son of

their Barangay Captain. Venancia directed Gaudencio to light a lamp. After lighting the lamp, Gaudencio

proceeded to open the door and went out, while Venancia tailed him and stayed by the door. Outside, at the

porch, they found a person sitting on a bamboo bench whom they could not identify, while a person whom they

identified as Edgar Esqueda (petitioner herein) was standing at the side of the door leading to the

porch. Suddenly, the unidentified man stood up and stabbed Gaudencio hitting him on the chest. When

Venancia saw the stabbing, she shouted “watch out Dong!” and she turned her back to run away but was stabbed

by petitioner. She then fell to the ground, but petitioner continued stabbing her on different parts of her

body. Gaudencio lost his consciousness. Their children brought them to the crossing in Nagbinlod and they were

brought to the Bayawan District Hospital by a barangay councilman. Dr. Patrocinio Garupa was the attending

physician who treated them. The medical certificate of Gaudencio showed that he sustained a perforating stab

wound at the left anterior chest, stab wounds at the neck, left arm and left part of the axillary area.[6] Venancia's

certificate showed that she suffered from multiple stab and incised wounds.[7]

SPO1 Jamandron conducted his

initial investigation at the hospital by interrogating Venancia and Gaudencio. The offended parties were referred

to the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital, where they were confined for more than a week.

The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of Claudio Babor, Domingo Dimol, SPO4

Hermenegildo Cadungog, SPO1 Winefredo Jamandron, Viviana Namoco and the accused Esqueda. The evidence

of the defense was intended to establish the following:

On March 3, 1999, from 8 o'clock in the evening to 2 o'clock in the morning of March 4, 1999, petitioner was trawl-

fishing in the sea of Cawitan, Sta. Catalina. Claudio Babor testified that he was also trawl- fishing at the same

time. He and petitioner, together with their respective companions, were on different boats, which were side by

side. Both were able to catch Atay-atay and Tulakhang.

Domingo Dimol was at the beach of Cawitan, Sta. Catalina. He stayed there from 8 o’clock in the evening

of March 3, 1999 until 2 o'clock in the morning of the following day waiting for petitioner and Claudio to buy fish

from them. At 2 o'clock in the morning, petitioner came ashore and Domingo bought fish from him.

Viviana was at the seashore of Cawitan, Sta. Catalina from 8 o'clock in the evening of March 3, 1999 until 2

o'clock in the morning of March 4, 1999. She, together with twenty other persons, helped the group of petitioner

in pulling the rope of the fishing net. Petitioner was manning the rudder. She said that there were two fishing

groups. At 2 o'clock in the morning, they all went home and petitioner gave her fish for free.

SPO1 Jamandron conducted the initial investigation in the morning of March 4, 1999 at

the Bayawan Emergency Hospital where Gaudencio and Venancia were confined. His investigation revealed that

Gaudencio and Venancia could not identify their assailants. He also testified that Gaudencio and Venancia were

both conscious, but were in pain during the investigation. He recorded the result of his investigation in the police

blotter.

Petitioner denied having committed the crime imputed against him.

RTC = FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE, NO TREACHERY

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/june2009/170222.htm#_ftn6










Petitioner's defense is anchored on alibi and denial. His witnesses, Claudio, Domingo and Viviana, aver that

during the time of the incident, petitioner was out at sea fishing. Petitioner, when called to the witness stand,

denied having committed the crime.

Court= Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere else when the

crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the

crime. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crimetranspired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two

places.[17]

Where there is least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi must

fail.[18]

Aside from the testimonies of petitioner's witnesses that he was fishing at Cawitan, Sta. Catalina from 8

o'clock in the evening of March 3, 1999 until 2 o'clock in the morning the following day, petitioner was unable to

show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.

During the trial of the case, both the prosecution and defense witnesses testified that Nagbinlod and

Cawitan, Sta. Catalina, were merely more than 5 kilometers apart which would only take about 20 to 40 minutes’

ride. Thus, it was not physically impossible for the petitioner to be at the locus criminis at the time of the incident

HEART AND SOUL OF THE CASE:

However, with regard to the proper crime committed, We are inclined to modify the trial court’s ruling.

Petitioner was charged with frustrated murder in an Amended Information. After trial on the merits, the

court found that petitioner committed the crime of frustrated homicide. The trial court found that treachery,

which would qualify the crime to frustrated murder, was wanting in the present case.

The trial court found that Venancia was already aware of what would happen to Gaudencio because she

shouted “watch out Dong” before Gaudencio was stabbed. Before Venancia was stabbed by petitioner, she too

was aware of the fate that befell her, because she tried to retreat to the confines of her house when she herself

was unfortunately stabbed. The trial court postulated that Venancia must have already been alerted and

forewarned of the impending attack; thus, there was no treachery.

We rule that the trial court's finding that there was no treachery is misplaced.

MAY TREACHERY! In the present case, treachery in the commission of the crime was sufficiently proven by the

prosecution. When Gaudencio opened the door and went outside, Venancia tailed him. There they found two

persons at the porch, one sitting at the bench and the other standing. Without warning, the unidentified man

stood up and stabbed Gaudencio in the chest. Upon seeing this, Venancia shouted “Watch out, Dong!” She then

turned her back, but was stabbed by petitioner and fell on the ground. While in this position, petitioner continued

hitting her on different parts of her body. Clearly, the hapless Venancia was stabbed immediately after the

unidentified person stabbed her live-in partner, thus, giving her no opportunity to retaliate or defend herself. It

could not have taken Venancia more than a second or two to run after Gaudencio was stabbed.

The method of attack adopted by the petitioner placed Venancia in a situation where it would be impossible

for her to resist the attack or defend her person.

The suddenness of the attack is shown by the fact that Venancia was immediately stabbed by petitioner right

after she turned her back to run. She was not able to safely distance herself due to the suddenness of the

attack. Further, before opening the door, she and her live-in partner had no inkling that they would be attacked,

since petitioner did not reveal his true identity to the victims. His partner in crime misrepresented that they were

the men of Sgt. Torres and with them was Toto Vibar, the son of the barangay captain. Petitioner misled the













victims, so the latter lowered their guard and suspicion. Thereafter, when the door was opened, the malefactors

attacked them. Indeed, all these circumstances indicate that the assault on the victims was treacherous



COLINARES V PEOPLE

The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Arnel Colinares (Arnel) with frustrated homicide

before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213.[1]

Complainant Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that at around 7:00 in the evening on June 25, 2000, he and

Jesus Paulite (Jesus) went out to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. On their way, Jesus took a leak by the roadsidewith Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked behind and struck Rufino twice on the head with a

huge stone, about 15 ½ inches in diameter. Rufino fell unconscious as Jesus fled.

Ananias Jallores (Ananias) testified that he was walking home when he saw Rufino lying by the

roadside. Ananias tried to help but someone struck him with something hard on the right temple, knocking him

out. He later learned that Arnel had hit him.

Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified that he saw the whole incident since he happened to be smoking outside

his house. He sought the help of a barangay tanod and they brought Rufino to the hospital.

Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate[2]

showing that Rufino suffered two lacerated wounds on

the forehead, along the hairline area. The doctor testified that these injuries were serious and potentially fatal but

Rufino chose to go home after initial treatment.

The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes). Arnel claimed self-defense. He testified

that he was on his way home that evening when he met Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias who were all quite

drunk. Arnel asked Rufino where he supposed the Mayor of Tigaon was but, rather than reply, Rufino pushed him,

causing his fall. Jesus and Ananias then boxed Arnel several times on the back. Rufino tried to stab Arnel but

missed. The latter picked up a stone and, defending himself, struck Rufino on the head with it. When Ananias

saw this, he charged towards Arnel and tried to stab him with a gaff. Arnel was able to avoid the attack and hit

Ananias with the same stone. Arnel then fled and hid in his sister’s house. On September 4, 2000, he voluntarily

surrendered at the Tigaon Municipal Police Station.

Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a pre-wedding party on the night of the

incident. His three companions were all drunk. On his way home, Diomedes saw the three engaged in heatedargument with Arnel.

RTC = FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE

CA= AFFIRMED, CORINALES INVOKED SELF-DEFENSE

SELF DEFENSE NOT PROVEN

One. Arnel claims that Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attacked him first and that he merely acted in self-defense

when he hit Rufino back with a stone.

When the accused invokes self-defense, he bears the burden of showing that he was legally justified in killing the

victim or inflicting injury to him. The accused must establish the elements of self-defense by clear and convincing

evidence. When successful, the otherwise felonious deed would be excused, mainly predicated on the lack of

criminal intent of the accused.[4]

In homicide, whether consummated, frustrated, or attempted, self-defense requires (1) that the person whom the

offender killed or injured committed unlawful aggression; (2) that the offender employed means that is

reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that the person defending himself did

not act with sufficient provocation.[5]

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/december2011/182748.htm#_ftn1


















If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused, the latter has nothing to prevent or repel

and the other two requisites of self-defense would have no basis for being appreciated. Unlawful aggression

contemplates an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or an imminent danger of such attack. A mere

threatening or intimidating attitude is not enough. The victim must attack the accused with actual physical force

or with a weapon.[6]

Here, the lower courts found that Arnel failed to prove the element of unlawful aggression. He alone testified thatJesus and Ananias rained fist blows on him and that Rufino and Ananias tried to stab him. No one corroborated

Arnel’s testimony that it was Rufino who started it. Arnel’s only other witness, Diomedes, merely testified that he

saw those involved having a heated argument in the middle of the street. Arnel did not submit any medical

certificate to prove his point that he suffered injuries in the hands of Rufino and his companions

FRUSTRATED/ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE??

Two. But given that Arnel, the accused, was indeed the aggressor, would he be liable for frustrated homicide

when the wounds he inflicted on Rufino, his victim, were not fatal and could not have resulted in death as in fact it

did not?

The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accused’s intent to take his victim’s life. The

prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal

intent.[9]

And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things, the means the offender used and the

nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim.[10]

Here, Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The blow was so forceful that it knocked Rufino

out. Considering the great size of his weapon, the impact it produced, and the location of the wounds that Arnel

inflicted on his victim, the Court is convinced that he intended to kill him.

The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted, not frustrated, homicide. In Palaganas v.

People,[11]

we ruled that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as shown by his use of a deadly weapon and

the wounds he inflicted, but the victim did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime is frustrated

murder or frustrated homicide. If the victim’s wounds are not fatal, the crime is only attempted murder or

attempted homicide.

Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent, depth, and severity of the victim’s

wounds. While Dr. Belleza testified that “head injuries are always very serious,”[12]

he could not categorically say

that Rufino’s wounds in this case were “fatal.”























People v Penesa

Timoteo Penesa and Rosario Aguillon lived, as husband and wife, in the barrio of Marupit, municipality of

Camalingan, Province of Camarines Sur. Their daughter and five children of Rosario by her late husband lived with

them. Due to continuous wrangles between Timoteo and Rosario's children by her late husband, both agreed to

part. In pursuance of the agreement and after dividing the palay, lumber and firewood between Timoteo and the

children of Rosario by her late husband, Timoteo left the house on 30 August 1942. Early in the morning of thefollowing day, Timoteo returned to the house and asked Rosario to live with him in another place (pp. 4, 31, t.s.n.).

The request was refused (p. 4, t.s.n.). Santiago Cerrado, a cousin of Rosario, came to the house and, upon seeing

Timoteo, asked the latter why he was there after they had agreed to live apart. Angered by this remark, Timoteo

unsheathed his bolo and assaulted Santiago. Crescencio Doro, the eldest son of Rosario, who tried to prevent

another blow upon Santiago and had made a remark similar to that of Santiago before the latter came to the

house, was also assaulted by Timoteo. At this juncture, Rosario went down through the stairway, preceded by

Santiago. Crescencio and Timoteo grappled for the possession of the bolo and both fell to the floor. A brother of

Rosario appeared upon the scene and snatched the bolo and a dagger from the hands of Timoteo. As a result of

the assault upon Santiago Cerrado, two wounds were inflicted upon him, one on the left forearm and another

under the left axilla. They were not serious. Upon Crescensio Doro, the following wounds were inflicted: in the left

palm affecting two fingers, 3 inches long and from 1/2 to 3/4 inch deep, which on the day of the trial was still

bandaged because it was not yet healed; a cut in the skin not so deep in the left axilla parallel to the left nipple, 3

inches long; a cut above the elbow of the left arm, 3 inches long and 1/8 inch deep; and another in the right hand

from the index to the little finger. The one in the left palm which cut the joints of the bones was serious and, if the

hemorrhage was not stopped, it would have resulted in Crescencio's death

Version of defense:

Appellant testifies that on 30 August 1942, Rosario Aguillon agreed to live with him in another house; that early in

the morning of the following day, he returned to the house and sat on a trunk, and not long after Santiago

Cerrado came and in a loud voice told him to come down because he had nothing left in that house, a remark

which Santiago repeated when he went up the house; that he answered Santiago that he had a share in the house

because he had built it, and for that reason he hold him that he would not move out; that Santiago took hold of

him by the hand and forced him to leave immediately; that while he was being led by Santiago and pushed toward

the kitchen, he was assaulted from behind with a piercing weapon, and for that reason he fell down; that when he

tried to rise, they struck him on the right shoulder and on the head; that he took from the partition wall ( tabique) abolo to defend himself; that he struck and hit with the bolo all his assailants; that he was further struck on the

right side of the breast, on the right eye, on the neck, and on the cheek; that fell unconscious; and that when he

came to he found himself tied to a post.

RTC = FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE

SC: There was no reason for Santiago Cerrado and Crescencio Doro to force the appellant to leave the house,

after all the latter and Rosario Aguillon already had agreed the previous day to live apart. It is incredible that he

could have gotten hold of the bolo from the partition wall (tabique), because the trunk on which he sat was

opposite the corner of the house where the bolo was kept and the trunk was nearer the door and the kitchen than

said corner (pp. 46, 47, t. s. n.), and he was being pushed from the trunk to the kitchen.

When he went to the house of Rosario early in the morning of 31 August, it was not with the intention to kill

anybody, for he went there to entreat Rosario Aguillon to live with him in another house. Neither could the

remarks uttered by Crescencio Doro and Santiago Cerrado have aroused his temper to such an extent as to

engender the desire and intent to kill them. The finding of the trial court is based on the kind of weapons carried

by the appellant when he went to the house and on the parts of the victims' bodies at which the weapons were

aimed, as shown by the wounds inflicted. The bolo with the appellant inflicted the wounds upon Santiago Cerrado

and Crescencio Doro was one ordinarily used by farm laborers. The dagger was carried for self-defense. The

wounds inflicted upon the offended parties by the appellant were caused indiscriminately and not deliberately.



Appellant's purpose in going to the house, and not the kind of weapons he carried, nor the parts of the victims'

bodies on which the wounds were inflicted indiscriminately, is indicative and determinative of his intent.

We are of the opinion that crime committed by the appellant against Santiago Cerrado, in the absence of proof as

to the period of the offended party's incapacity for labor or of the required medical attendance, is slight physical

injuries, as provided for in article 266 of the Revised Penal Code; and against Crescencio Doro is serious physical

injuries, for, although the physical who had treated him did not state in his testimony the time during which the

wounds would heal or the period during which the offended party would be incapacitated to perform his ordinaryor usual work, nevertheless the evidence shows that the wound inflicted on the 31st of August upon Crescencio

Doro in the left palm affecting two fingers, 3 inches long and from ½ to ¼ inch deep, was not yet cured on the day

of the trial held on 9 October 1942, or that the wound did not heal within 30 days. Pursuant to article 263,

paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, and giving the appellant the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of

passion and obfuscation, taken into consideration in his favor by the trial court (article 13, paragraph 6, Revised

Penal Code), the penalty to be imposed upon him is six months and 1 day of prision correccional for the wounds

inflicted upon Crescencio Doro; and 15 days of arresto menor for the wounds inflicted upon Santiago Cerrado



PEOPLE V CASTILLO

Spartein sulphate 1.00

Phenobarbital 0.50

Carbromal 5.00

Mx. Div. et pone in cap. No.XV

Sig.; one capsule once aday.

Belarmino presented the prescription to the Universal Drug Store, in the City of Manila, where he

secured the medicine described therein contained in a bottle (Exhibit C) on which the prescriptionwas written, and after taking said medicine his health was somewhat improved. When the symptomsof the said disease recurred, following the instructions given him by Doctor Sison to continue takingsaid medicine, he copied said prescription (Exhibit 2), and, in the morning of February 18, 1941,presented it to the Escudero Drug Store, in the City of San Pablo, Laguna, and asked Dr. LeonCastillo, the manager of the said drug store, and a friend of the complainant, whether they couldprepare said medicine, after having failed to secure the same in other drug stores in the locality; andhaving been answered in the affirmative, the complaining witness requested Doctor Castillo to haveprepared for him 1/3 of the formula and Doctor Castillo himself wrote "1/3 f." on Exhibit 2, for P1, asthe whole formula cost P3; as there was some doubt as to the figure appearing after the word"carbromal" on Exhibit 2, Belarmino requested Doctor Castillo to check it up, and the latter correctedthe said figure by writing the figure "5" in ink in the figure "6" appearing after the word "carbromal."

As Belarmino himself wanted to be sure about the said figure, he proposed to return to said drugstore in the afternoon with the bottle marked Exhibit C, on which the prescription was written; and infact he returned at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day. The pharmacist, SaturninoGesmundo Cortes, of said drug store, was then in the house, and Doctor Castillo sent for defendant-appellant Nena Tanalega Raymundo, who was employed in said drug store as pharmacy clerk. Mrs.Raymundo was already a pharmacy graduate, but she had not yet taken and passed thegovernment examination conducted by the Board of Pharmaceutical Examiners; and she hadworked as a pharmacy clerk in different drug stores in the City of Manila, before her employment inthe same capacity in the Escudero Drug Store in the City of San Pablo. Before the arrival of thedefendant and appellant, Doctor Castillo, took two bottles from the shelves and a cardboard box andplaced them on the dispensation table. Mrs. Raymundo then prepared the balance and begancomputing the formula contained in Exhibit 2 to reduce it to 1/3 after which she proceeded tocompound the medicine, using, among others, the substances contained in said two bottles. The

medicine compounded by defendant and appellant was placed in five (5) capsules and wasdelivered by Doctor Castillo to herein complainant contained in a cardboard box (Exhibit B), forwhich he paid P1, as previously agreed upon with Dr. Leon Castillo, manager of the Escudero DrugStore; that at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, February 18, 1941, the complainanttook one of the capsules with a glass of water, and left his house for a walk; and about 20 minutesafter he had taken said medicine, he became ill. He felt dizzy and had difficulty in breathing, and hecould hardly stand as his knees became shaky, and for that reason, he immediately consulted withphysicians, namely, Dr. Felisa Celestino and Dr. Ricardo Reyes, and the latter advised him to gohome and rest. About two hours afterwards, complainant's legs began to stiffen, his stomach to



harden, his lips to draw back, and his tongue to shrink to his throat, and he could not talk andthought that he was in a serious condition; and so complainant's family sent for Dr. Ricardo Reyes,who advised complainant's wife to rub his body with hot water which produced some relief, after hehad urinated; and the following day when Doctor Reyes returned, complainant explained to him allthat had happened and showed him the remaining four capsules contained in the cardboard box,marked as Exhibit B, on which the prescription had not been written, and Doctor Reyes advised the

complainant not to take any more of said remaining four capsules.

That believing that there must have been something wrong with the medicine which he hadpurchased from the Escudero Drug Store, on February 24, 1941, the complaining witness sent twoof the four capsules (Exhibits E-2 and E-3) to the Bureau of Science for examination => PRESENCEOF A POISIONOUS SUBSTANCE (STRYCHNINE SULPHATE)

CFI – FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE

CA – SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE

SC:

Section 751 of the Revised Administrative Code (1940 ed.) provides as follows:

SEC. 751. Responsibility for quality of drugs. — Every pharmacist shall be responsible forthe quality of all drugs, chemicals, medicines, and poisons he may sell or keep for sale; andit shall be unlawful for any person whomsoever to manufacture, prepare, sell, or administerany prescription, drug, chemical, medicine, or poison under any fraudulent name, direction,pretense or to adulterate any drug, chemical, medicine, or poison so used, sold, or offeredfor sale. Any drug, chemical, medicine, or poison shall be held to be adulterated ordeteriorated within the meaning of this section if it differs from the standard of quality orpurity given in the United States Pharmacopoeia.

And the violation of any provision contained in said section 751 of the Revised Administrative Code(1940 ed.) is punished in accordance with the provisions of section 2676 thereof, which are asfollows:

SEC. 2676. General Violation of Pharmacy Law. — Any person engaging in the practice ofpharmacy in the (Philippine Islands) Philippines contrary to any provision of the PharmacyLaw or violating any provision of said law for which no specific penalty is provided shall, foreach offense, be punished by a fine not to exceed five hundred pesos, or by imprisonmentfor not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court.

It is an elementary rule of criminal jurisprudence that the defendant in a criminal case may be foundguilty of any offense necessarily included in the allegations made in the information, and fullyestablished by the evidence. (Rule 116, section 4, Rules of Court; United States vs. Paua, 6 Phil.,

740; United States vs. Jeffrey, 15 Phil., 391; United States vs. Lim San, 17 Phil., 273; UnitedStates vs. De Guzman, 19 Phil., 350; United States vs. Salvador, 22 Phil., 113; UnitedStates vs. Guzman, 25 Phil., 22; United States vs. Panlilio, 28, Phil., 608.)

Defendant and appellant cannot complain that she has been found guilty of a criminal offense,without due process of law. She had ample opportunity to defend herself against the charges filedagainst her.



With reference to the requirements of "due process of law" as applied to criminal procedure, in thelanguage of the Supreme Court of the United States, generally speaking, it may be said that if anaccused has been been heard in the court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against underthe orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him,with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law,then he has had due process of law. (Rogers vs. Peck, 199 U.S., 425, 435; Twining vs. New Jersey,

211 U.S., 78.)



People v Avecilla

It appears from the records that at about 11:00 o’clock in the evening of December 24, 1991, accused-appellant

arrived at the basketball court located on Dapo Street, Pandacan, Manila, and, for no apparent reason, suddenly

fired a gun in the air. He then went to a nearby alley and, minutes later, proceeded to the closed store about four

(4) meters away from the basketball court. There, he initiated an argument with the group of Boy Manalaysay,

Jimmy Tolentino and Macario Afable, Jr. Afable tried to pacify accused-appellant, whereupon, the latter placedhis left arm around Afable’s neck and shot him pointblank on the abdomen. Afable ran toward the alley and

accused-appellant ran after him. Another shot rang out, so one of the bystanders, Carlos Taganas, went to the

alley and there, he saw accused-appellant and Afable grappling for possession of the gun. The Chief Barangay

Tanod arrived and was able to wrest the gun away from accused-appellant, who immediately fled from the scene

of the incident. Afable was rushed to the Philippine General Hospital, where he eventually expired.

Rtc= qualified illegal possession of firearms

Sc: However, the law on illegal possession of firearms has been amended by Republic Act No. 8294, which took

effect on July 6, 1994. The pertinent provision of the said law provides:

SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or

Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. – The penalty of prision

correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) shall be

imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low

powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm,

ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or

ammunition: Provided , that no other crime was committed.

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall

be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

The crime of illegal possession of firearm, in its simple form, is committed only where the unlicensed firearm is

not used to commit any of the crimes of murder, homicide, rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attemptedcoup

d’etat . Otherwise, the use of unlicensed firearm would be treated either: (1) as an essential ingredient in the

crimes of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d’etat ; or (2) as an aggravating circumstance in

murder or homicide.

With more reason, accused-appellant cannot be convicted of homicide or murder with “the use of the unlicensed

firearm as aggravating,” inasmuch as said felonies are not charged in the information but merely mentioned asthe result of the use of the unlicensed firearm. Accused-appellant was not arraigned for homicide or

murder. Hence, he cannot be convicted of any of these crimes without violating his right to be informed of the

nature and cause of the accusation against him, not to mention his right to due process.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is REVERSED. Criminal Case No. 92-105691, for

Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm, is DISMISSED



Celino v CA

That on or about the 12th

day of May, 2004, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this

Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his

residence an armalite rifle colt M16 with serial number 3210606 with two (2) long magazines each loaded with

thirty (30) live ammunitions of the same caliber during the election period – December 15, 2005 to June 9, 2004 –

without first having obtained the proper authority in writing from the Commission on Elections, Manila,Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW. [5]

Criminal Case No. C-138-04

That on or about the 12th

day of May, 2004, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this

Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession

and control one (1) armalite rifle colt M16 with serial number 3210606 with two (2) long magazines each loaded

with thirty (30) live ammunitions of the same caliber without first having obtained the proper license or necessary

permit to possess the said firearm.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

Upon arraignment in Criminal Case No. C-138-04, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the gun ban violation charge.[7]

Prior to his arraignment in Criminal Case No. C-137-04, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash[8]

contending that he

“cannot be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms x xx if he was also charged of having committed another

crime of [sic] violating the Comelec gun ban under the same set of facts x x x.”[9]

By Order of July 29, 2004,[10]

the trial court denied the Motion to Quash on the basis of this Court’s[11]

affirmation

in Margarejo v. Hon. Escoses[12]

of therein respondent judge’s denial of a similar motion to quash on the ground

that “the other offense charged x x x is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294 x x x.”[13] Petitioner’s Motion for

Reconsideration was likewise denied by September 22, 2004 Resolution,[14]

hence, petitioner filed a Petitionfor Certiorar i

[15] before the Court of Appeals.

By Decision dated April 18, 2005,[16]

the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the Motion to

Quash. Petitioner’s May 9, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration[17]

having been denied by Resolution of September

26, 2005,[18]

petitioner filed the present petition.

The petition fails.

The relevant provision of R.A. 8294 reads:

SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as

follows:

"SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or

Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. — x x x.

"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be

imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter

than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered

powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full






























































automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person

arrested.

"If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall

be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

"If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion orinsurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of

rebellion, or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat.

Petitioner’s reliance on Agote, Ladjaalam, Evangelista, Garcia, Pangilinan, Almeida, and Bernal is, therefore,

misplaced. In each one of these cases, the accused were exonerated of illegal possession of firearms because of

their commission, as shown by their conviction, of some other crime.[34]

In the present case, however, petitioner

has only been accused of committing a violation of the COMELEC gun ban. As accusation is not synonymous with

guilt, there is yet no showing that petitioner did in fact commit the other crime charged.[35]

Consequently, the

proviso does not yet apply.

More applicable is Margarejo[36]

where, as stated earlier, this Court affirmed the denial of a motion to quash an

information for illegal possession of firearm on the ground that “the other offense charged [i.e., violation of gun

ban] x x x is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294 x x x.”[37]

in consonance with the earlier

pronouncement inValdez[38] that “all pending cases involving illegal possession of firearm should continue to be

prosecuted and tried if no other crimes expressly indicated in Republic Act No. 8294 are involved x x x.”[39]

In sum, when the other offense involved is one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, any information for illegal

possession of firearm should be quashed because the illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried together

with such other offense, either considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide,[40]

or absorbed

as an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d’etat .[41]

Conversely, when the other offense

involved is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, then the separate case for illegal possession of firearm

should continue to be prosecuted.

Finally, as a general rule, the remedy of an accused from the denial of his motion to quash is for him to go to trial

on the merits, and if an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by

law.[42]

Although the special civil action for certiorari may be availed of in case there is a grave abuse ofdiscretion,

[43] the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition as that vitiating error is not attendant in the

present case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.








































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