crim bar notes 2014

8/11/2019 Crim Bar Notes 2014

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MSU (IIT) BAR OPERATIONS 2014 CRIMINAL LAWKEY DOCTRINES AND JURISPRUDENCE

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

EX POST FACTO RULE

The prohibition on ex post facto law applies solely to penal

laws.Basis: Art!"# 21 $% RPC

It cannot prohibit the retroactivity of procedural laws such as

one that prescribes rules of procedure by which courts

applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice.Basis: Art!"# 22 $% RPC (IRRETROSPECTI&ITY

RULE)

PRINCIPLE OF 'ENERALITY

Penal law is binding on all persons who reside or sojourn in the

Philippines whether citien or not.Basis: Art!"# 14 $% NCC Art!"# III(1) $% 1*+

C$,-tt.t$,

PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIALITY

The law is applicable to all crimes committed within the limitsof Philippine territory.

Basis: Art!"# 2 $% RPC

PRINCIPLE OF PROSPECTI&ITY/PROSPECTI&ITY RULE

The law should have only prospective application! except if it

is in favorable to the o"ender.Basis: Art!"# 21 , 22 $% RPC Art!"# III(22) $%

1*+ C$,-tt.t$, Art!"# 4 $% NCC

#octrinal application: It applies to:

administrative rulings and circulars

judicial decisions

Basis: Art!"# * $% NCCLegis interpretatio legis uim obtinet

3In the construction and application

of criminal laws! where it is necessary that


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the punishability of an act be reasonably

foreseen for guidance of society.Lex pospicit non respicit

$The law looks forward not

backward.

In case of doubt between the mala prohibita doctrine andthe prospectivity rule in the adjudication of cases! the latter

should prevail because all doubts must be resolvedpro reo.

EUIPOISE RULE

%hen the evidence of the prosecution and the defense are

e&ually balanced! the scale should be tilted in favor of the

accused because of the presumption of innocence.

In !ubio pro reo5 %hen moral certainty as to culpability

hangs in the balance! ac&uittal on reasonable doubt inevitablybecomes a matter of right.

FINALITY OF ACUITTAL RULE

The 'tate with all its resources and power should not be

allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for

an alleged o"ense! thereby subjecting him to embarrassment!

expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing

state of anxiety and insecurity! as well as enhancing the

possibility that even though innocent! he may be found guilty.


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T"E RE#ISED PENAL C$DE

(A!t N$5 6*17 - A8#,#)

%$$& $NE'#,#r" 9r$:-$,- r#;r,; t"# , t


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Art!"# 65 D#@,t$,-

A>."" :5 P#$9"# '5R5 N$5 17012 A9r" 2007

(An unlawful act was done with unlawful intent.)

D#"8 '5R5 N$5 142++6 J,.r 2* 2006

(When the victim dies, intent to kill is conclusively presumed from

the act of killing which is clearly unlawful. But where the victim

survives, intent to kill becomes a specic criminal intent which

cannot be presumed but must be proved.)

ACTUS NON FACIT REUM NISI MENS SIT REA

The act cannot be criminal unless the mind is criminal. This doctrine applies only to dolo.

L"8$-$ :5 SB '5R5 N$5 L3640* 402 A.;.-t + 1*7

(A felony reuires criminal intent.)

P#$9"# :5 P.,$ '5R5 N$5 +4+1 F#>r.r 1+ 16

(Where motive is relevant! the act may give rise to variant crimes.)

P#$9"# :5 M!$ '5R5 N$-5 4370 J." 1 1+

(Where the identity of the assailant is in dispute, motive becomes

relevant, and when motive is supported with su"cient evidence for a

conclusion of guilt, a conviction is sustainable.)

P#$9"# :5 A;" '5R5 N$5 140+4 O!t$>#r 1 2001

(#nce malice is proved, recklessness disappears.)

F!t- The accused &uarreled with his wife over her working aslaundrywoman and his drinking habits. The son! )ichard! interfered and

for that reason! the father got his shotgun and shot his son. The son died.

+ather interposed the defense that he was cleaning his gun at the time

and he accidentally s&ueeed the trigger and the gun ,red. Because of

the freak accident! his son was hit while he was about to go upstairs.


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I--.# %hetner or not the facts point to accident! reckless imprudence or

parricide.

R.",; The father is convicted of parricide. -o accident in the case

because from the declaration of his wife and son! he purposely shot his

son. #uring the ,ght where the son tried to pacify him! he actually wentto the room to retrieve the gun. (n accident is an occurrence that

happens outside the sway of our will! and although it comes about

through some act of our will! lies beyond the bounds of humanly

foreseeable conse&uences. It connotes the absence of criminal intent.

The act of cocking the gun and aiming it in front of his son shows the

intent to ,re.

P#$9"# :5 C$r$: '5R5 N$-5 *66+63+4 J." 7 16

($iscernment is relevant to intelligence, not to intent.)

$- :5 CA '5R5 N$5 10741 Mr!< 10 14

(%n the absence of evidence to prove insanity, the legal presumption of

one&s sanity stands.)


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Art!"# 45 Cr8," L>"t

P#$9"# :5 P,t$ '5R5 N$5 671 N$:#8>#r 21 11

(#f the same gravity or severity, the penalty is not mitigated.)

P#$9"# :5 F"$r#- 272 SCRA 61

('raeter intentionem does not apply to culpa intentionem* denotes

intent.)

P#$9"# :5 A!.r8 '5R5 N$5 11+74 A9r" 2+ 2000

(+he perceived delay in giving medical treatment does not constitutee"cient intervening cause since the victim&s death is still due to the

inuries in-icted by the oender.)

P#$9"# :5 Mt$,; '5R5 N$5 14020 J.,# 21 2001

(+o hold a person liable for the death of another, the evidence must

establish beyond reasonable doubt that accused&s criminal act was

the pro/imate cause of such death.)


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Art!"# 75 D.t $% t#r 4 200+

(%t is the duty of the court, whenever it has knowledge of any act which it

may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, to report

to the 0hief 1/ecutive, through the $epartment of 2ustice, the reasons

which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the

subect of legislation.)

&""$r#,t# C-#

(+he court can likewise recommend to the 0hief 1/ecutive to e/ercise his

authority to grant e/ecutive clemency in the view of the harshness of the

law.)


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Art!"# 5 C$,-.88t# %r.-trt# , tt#89t# %#"$,#-

P#$9"# :5 Pr#H '5R5 N$5 **046 D#!#8>#r 1

(When the cause of the non3performance of all acts necessary for the

commission of the oense is other than the oender&s spontaneous

desistance, the felony is attempted.)

P#$9"# :5 M,;8,;

(Without proof of penetration, the crime committed may still

constitute attempted rape or consummated acts of lasciviousness.)

P#$9"# :5 D#" Cr. '5R5 N$5 120** A.;.-t 11 1+

(%n the attempted phase, the overt act must be an e/ternal one which

has a direct connection with the felony.)

&".#,.#" :5 P#$9"# '5R5 N$5 101** J.,# 21 200+

(By the denition of Article 456, theft can only be attempted or

consummated. %ts element is complete from the moment oender

gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity todispose it.)

FACTS %hile a security guard was manning his post at the open parkingarea of a supermarket! he saw the accused! (ristotel /alenuela! hauling apush cart loaded with cases of detergent and unloaded them where hisco$accused! 0ovy *alderon! was waiting. /alenuela then returned insidethe supermarket! and later emerged with more cartons of detergent.Thereafter! /alenuela hailed a taxi and started loading the cartons inside.(s the taxi was about to leave! the security guard asked /alenuela forthe receipt of the merchandie. The accused reacted by 1eeing on foot!

but were subse&uently apprehended at the scene. The trial courtconvicted both /alenuela and *alderon of the crime of consummatedtheft. /alenuela appealed before the *ourt of (ppeals! arguing that heshould only be convicted of frustrated theft since he was not able to freelydispose of the articles stolen. The *ourt of (ppeals a2rmed the trialcourt3s decision! thus the Petition for )eview was ,led before the 'upreme*ourt.


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ISSUE%hether or not the crime of theft has a frustrated stage.

?ELD-o. (rticle 4 of the )evised Penal *ode provides that a felony isconsummated when all the elements necessary for its execution andaccomplishment are present. In the crime of theft! the following elementsshould be present: 567 that there be taking of personal property8 597 that

said property belongs to another8 57 that the taking be done with intentto gain8 5;7 that the taking be done without the consent of the owner8 and5


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Art!"# +5 W


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Art!"# *5 C$,-9r! , 9r$9$-" t$ !$88t %#"$,

P#$9"# :5 T"$- '5R5 N$5 16*6*7 J,.r 1 2001

(When the proposal is accepted, it becomes conspiracy. +he

essence of conspiracy is community of criminal intent.)

B#r 14 11

(7ere knowledge, acuiescence to or approval of the act without

cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to

constitute one party to a conspiracy absent the intentional

participation in the act with a view to the furtherance of the

common design and purpose.)

S.>!$ :5 SB '5R5 N$5 L3701+ A.;.-t 22 1

(%mplied conspiracy is one that is deduced from the mode and

manner in which the oense was committed.)

P;"-, '5R5 N$-5 1612 16*1

(8ecrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful

conspiracy. 0onspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the

accused before, during and after the commission of the crime,

showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design.)

P#$9"# :5 Cr,; '5R5 N$5 14*42432+ D#!#8>#r 11 2006

(0onspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree

e/pressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith to

pursue it actually.)

P#$9"# :5 Mr,$, '5R5 N$5 0+23+6 J." 1* 11


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(+he degree of actual participation in the commission of the crime

is immaterial in conspiracy.)

P#$9"# :5 T;.8, '5R5 N$-5 160702306 M 24 2001

(As long as the acuittal of a co3conspirator does not remove the

basis of a change of conspiracy, other conspirators may be found

guilty of oense.)

P#$9"# :5 C>"", '5R5 N$5161*0* F#>r.r 2002

(A conspirator may be liable dierently if there is present a

circumstance personal to him.)

B.-t""$ :5 P#$9"# '5R5 N$5 10+1* M 12 2010

(9or conspiracy to e/ist, there must be a conscious design to

commit oense.)

ARIAS DOCTRINE

(ll heads of o2ces have to rely to reasonable extent on

their subordinates and on the good faith of those who

prepare bids! purchase supplies! or enter into negotiations.(ny executive head of even small government agencies can

attest to the volume of papers that must be signed.

P#$9"# :5 D#-$ '5R5 N$5 12++74 A.;.-t 1 1

(%n the absence of previous conspiracy, unity of criminal purpose and

intention immediately before the commission of the crime, or community

of criminal design, the criminal responsibility arising from dierent acts

directed against one and the same person is individual and not collective,and each of the participants is liable only for the act committed by him.)


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Art!"# 105 O=#,-#- ,$t -.>H#!t t$ tr.r 24 200

(A felony cannot be comple/ with an oense penali:ed by a special

law.)

P#$9"# :5 D# P '5R5 1042++

(%n entrapment, it is necessary that a buy3bust operation occurred

otherwise it will be considered in case of doubt an instigation which is

an absolutory cause.)

P#$9"# :5 Mt#$ '5R5 N$5 1+4+* J." 2* 200*

('olice o"cers involved in a buy3bust operation are presumed to

have performed their duties regularly. But this presumption can beoverturned if clear and convincing evidence is presented.)


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Art!"# 115 J.-t%,; !r!.8-t,!#-

P#$9"# :5 L$9# '5R5 N$5 1++602 A9r" 1 200

(;nlawful aggression must be such as to put in real peril the life or

personal safety of the person defending himself or of others being

defended and not an imagine threat.)

P#$9"# :5 Ar" '5R5 N$5 160+0* O!t$>#r 22 1

(+he presence of large number of wounds in-icted on the victim and

the severity thereof disapprove self3defense they belie the claim ofincomplete defense and indicate not the desire to defend but a

determined eort to kill and belies the reasonableness of the means

adopted to prevent or repel an unlawful act of an aggression.)

P#$9"# :5 '.t." '5R5 N$5 117266 F#>r.r 22 1

(+he proportionateness of self3defense does not depend upon the

harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such inury.)

STAND 'ROUND W?EN IN T?E RI'?T

(pplies when aggressor is armed with weapon and is

especially more liberal if the person attacked is peace

o2cer in the performance of his duty.

This superseded the PRINCIPLE OF RETREAT TO T?E

WALL which makes it a duty of a person assailed to retreat

as far as he can before he meets the assault with force.

P#$9"# :5 Nr:# '5R5 N$-5 L36643+ A9r" 20 1*6

(%n defense of property, killing is not ustied. +here must be, in addition,

the necessity to save another life.)

DOCTRINE OF SELF3?ELP

0usti,es the act of owner or lawful possessor of a thing

to use force necessary to protect his proprietary or


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possessory rights. =e must however exercise this right

at the very moment that he is being deprived of his

property. %hen possession has already been lost! he

must resort to judicial process in reclaiming his

property8 otherwise! he could be liable for coercion.

T>.#, :5 SB '5R5 N$-5 106701306 F#>r.r 1+ 1+

(1ven if the order of the superior is illegal, if it appears to be legal, and

the subordinate is not aware of its illegality, the subordinate is not liable.)


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Art!"# 125 Cr!.8-t,!#- "t

P#$9"# :5 D,$ '5R5 N$5 *62 N$:#8>#r 1 12

(7ere abnormality of the mental faculties will not e/clude imputability.)

R# R5A5 644 , r#"t$, t$ 8,$rt

Ort#; :5 P#$9"# '5R5 N$5 1710*7 A.;.-t 20 200*

(What is controlling with respect to the e/emption from criminal

liability is not he age at the timeof the promulgation of udgment but his

age at the time of the commission of the oense.)

R# P#$9"# :5 A;" , Art!"# 6 (!!#,t)

DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR C?ANCE

>ne who has a full control of the situation has the

last clear chance of avoiding the accident.


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Art!"# 165 Mt;t,; !r!.8-t,!#-

P#$9"# :5 P;" + SCRA 7+0

('rovocation is immediate if no interval of time elapsed between theprovocation and the commission of the crime.)

P#$9"# :5 P"" '5R5 N$5 +770* J.,# 10 14

(When an oended party -ees from his aggressor, the latter has no

reason to pursue and attack him.)

P#$9"# :5 I;,- '5R5 N$5 140714317 S#9t#8>#r 60 2006

(+he benet of immediate vindication of a grave oense cannot be

considered in favor of the accused when he had su"cient time torecover his serenity.)

P#$9"# :5 CA '5R5 N$5 10616 F#>r.r 26 2001

(+he acts of the accused were done in the spirit of revenge and

lawlessness, for which no mitigating circumstances of passion or

obfuscation can arise.)

Tr '5R5 N$5 167771 O!t$>#r 2+ 2000

(Added a fourth reuisite of voluntary surrender that there is no

pending warrant of arrest or information led.)

F!t-(ccused$appelants (mpie Taraya! 0onar ?strada and (rly *antuba!

all are relatives! were charged for the crime of murder &uali,ed by

treachery for the death of 'alvador )eyes. 'alvador )eyes was killed on

the night of 'eptember 9;! 6@@


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Barangay Tanod (rmando Bilara stated that #avid (ngeles3 brother had a

,st,ght with 0onar! implying that there might be a di"erent reason as to

#avid (ngeles3 insistence on 0onar3s involvement in the killing. #omingo

#ecena also testi,ed that on the night of the killing he saw 'alvador hit

(mpie with a pipe which (mpie luckily avoided. #omingo added that

(mpie! to defend himself hacked 'alvador and ran away. #omingo stated

that he also ran back home out of fear and only found out of 'alvador3s

death the next morning. 'P>9 ?mmanuel Aartine testi,ed that (mpie

did surrender himself at the police station on >ctiber @! 6@@C. (mpie

admitted on killing 'alvador but contended that he did so out of self$

defense and said that his cousins had nothing to do with it. 0onar and (rly

both had alibis. Trial *ourt ruled against accused appellants for murder

and appreciated the &ualifying circumstance of treachery. (ccused

appellants appealed! arguing that (mpie should not be charged with

murder since he have done so only out of self$defense plus 'alvador wasalso armed with a pipe that night! which dis&uali,es treachery in the case.

They further asserted that (rly and 0onar were not co$conspirators in the

killing of 'alvador )eyes. They were implicated by #avid (ngeles! 0r

claims which were not supported by clear evidence. +urthermore! they

insisted that (mpie be allowed to avail of a mitigated sentence since he

surrendered himself at the police station at his own will.

I--.#- 6. %hether or not 0onar and (rly were co$conspirators in the

killing of 'alvador. 9. %hether or not (mpie3s voluntary surrender made

him eligible for a mitigated sentence.

R.",;6. -o. ( conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an

agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it.

It does not re&uire that such agreement occurred for an appreciable

period prior to the commission of the crime8 it is su2cient that at the time

of the execution thereof! all accused had the same purpose and were

united therein. The *ourt ruled that #avid (ngeles3 testimony was not

persuasive as to the participation of (rly and jonar in the crime. There had

been no certainty as to their action to show a deliberate and concerted

cooperation on their part as to likewise render them liable for the killing of'alvador. Prosecution evidence failed to convince the court as to its

su2ciency with moral certainty that there indeed had been conspiracy

among accused$appellants. Thus! The *ourt ac&uitted 0onar and (rly. The

*ourt also ruled that! there being no positive and direct evidence to show

that the attack was sudden and unexpected! treachery as a circumstance

to &ualify the killing to murder cannot be appreciated against (API?.


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There is treachery when the o"ender commits any of the crimes against

the person! employing means! methods or forms in the execution thereof

which tend directly and specially to insure its execution! without risk to

himself arising from the defense which the o"ended party might make.

Treachery as a &ualifying circumstance re&uires that the o"ender

deliberately employs means of execution which deprives the person

attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate. (mpie thereforecould only

be charged with homicide.

9. Des. (s to the issue of (mpie3s voluntary surrender! the court

emphasied that for one to avail of mitigating circumstance for voluntary

surrender! the following re&uisites must be present: 567 the o"ender had

not been actually arrested8 597 the o"ender surrendered himself to a

person in authority or to the latterEs agent8 57 the surrender was

voluntary8 and 5;7 there is no pending warrant of arrest or information

,led. %hen (mpie surrendered! a pending warrant of arrest had already

been issued. =is arrest by that time was already imminent.

D# r '5R5 N$5 1+2*62 A9r" + 200

(0ontrary to Tara'a Case! 0lassied that the mere ling of

information and

Petitioner ,led a special civil action in the appellate court which a2rmed


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the decision of the )T* and ruled that all the mitigating circumstance of

voluntary surrender were present.

I--.#%hether the court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting

to lack of jurisdiction when it appreciated the mitigating circumstance of

voluntary surrender of the accused.

R.",;The mere ,ling of an information andGor the issuance of a warrant

of arrest will not automatically make the surrender Hinvoluntary. (s

distinguished from the earlier cases! upon learning that the court had

,nally determined the presence of probable cause and even before the

issuance and implementation of the warrant of arrest! eren already gave

himself up! acknowledging his culpability. This was bolstered by his

eventual plea of guilt during the arraignment.

P#$9"# :5 A8;., '5R5 N$-5 74644347 J,.r 10 14

(=oluntary surrender can be appreciated even if the accused turned

themselves one week after the crime. +he fact is they voluntarily

surrendered to the police before arrest could be eected.)

P#$9"# :5 A!.r8 '5R5 N$5 11+74 A9r" 2+ 2000

(+he oender himself should surrender. %f it was his superior who

surrender him to the custody of the court, such is not the voluntary

surrender contemplated by law.)

F!t- The appellant shot the victim who later died. (fter charges were,led and his commanding o2cer was told of the incident! he was orderednot to leave camp! where he surrendered.

I--.#%hether the accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance ofvoluntary surrender.

R.",;The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intentof the accused to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally tothe authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes tosave them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search andcapture. In this case! it was appellant3s commanding o2cer whosurrendered him to the custody of the court. Being restrained by one3ssuperiors to stay within the camp without submitting to the investigating


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authorities concerned! is not tantamount to voluntary surrender ascontemplated by law.

P#$9"# :5 M#,$ '5R5 N$5 L3*0*47 Mr!< 14 14

(+he accused must be acuitted if the only evidence of guilt is hisimprovident plea due to the prodding of his lawyer.)

Art!"# 145 A;;r:t,; !r!.8-t,!#-

P#$9"# :- ',$ '55R5 N$5 1646+6 F#>5 2* 2001(>o law provides that the e/cess rape or homicide should be aggravating

circumstance.)

P#$9"# :- F#r, O!t5 12

(0onspiracy is neither aggravating nor ualifying but is a manner ofincurring collective criminal liability among every co3conspirators in an

eual degree such that the act of one becomes the act of all.)

R$r;.#- 1 P 2000

(%t is not necessary that the accused enters the dwelling of the victim tocommit the oense it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his

own house, although the assailant may have devised means to perpetratethe assault from outside the house.)


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P#$9"# :- O,; J,5 60 1+7

(>ighttime is absorbed in treachery if it is part of the treacherous meansto insure e/ecution of crime.)

P#$9"# :- M,,-" '5R5 N$5 **+72 J." 6 12

(1vident premeditation is not inherent in robbery with homicide. %n suchan oense, the permediattion must relate to the killing and not to the

robbery.)

P#$9"# :- R#>8$,t, '5R5 N$5 12761* A9r" 16 1

(+he essence of treachery and the une/pectedness of the attack upon theunsuspecting and unarmed victim who does not give the slightest

provocation.)

P#$9"# :- A"!r '5R5 N$-5 4+2732 J." 2012

(When it is shown that the attack was not made with alevosia the numberof the assailants and simultaneity of the attack upon a defenseless person

may constitute abuse of force.)

P#$9"# :- L,!


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Art!"# 1+5 Pr,!9"-

D$!tr,# $% I89"# C$,-9r!

The voluntary and indispensable cooperation of the o"ender is aconcurrence of the criminal act to be executed. *onse&uently! he is a co$conspirator by indispensable cooperation! although the common design orpurpose was never bottled up by previous undertaking

P#$9"# :- Pr.,;$ '5R5 N$5 127*12 N$:5 2* 1

(Where the words uttered did not make any great dominance or

in-uences on the oenders were already determined to commit theoending acts, the utterance will not make the utterer an inducer.)

S$tt$ '5R5 N$5 100*63*4 Mr!< 2 1

(+he participation of the cooperator must be indispensible to thecommission of the crime. %f his participation is dispensable, that is, with or

without his participation, the oense will be committed, the liability isthat of an accomplice.)

P#$9"# :- T>.-$ '5R5 N$5 116+0* O!t5 2 1

(7ere presence at the crime scene or sole relationship with the otheraccused does not make one a co3conspirator.)


24/55

Art!"# 1*5 A!!$89"!#-

P#$9"# :- D# r '5R5 N$5 12* A.;5 1* 1

(A lookout who was not part of the conspiracy but participated only aftersuch decision was reached incurs criminal liability as an accomplice.)

P#$9"# :- L!$ SR5

(0onspiracy is not a reuirement as the accomplice is not a principal, butsupplies material or moral aid to the principal in an e"cacious way.)


25/55

Art!"#- *13*75

P#$9"# :- B"">r# '5R5 N$5 10**+1 N$:5 1 1

(An a"davit of desistance is merely an additional ground to buttress theaccused&s defenses, not the sole consideration that can result in

acuittal.)

Pr#-#,t" A ?$! C$88tt## $, B#


26/55

Art!"# 75 O>";t$, ,!.rr# > 9#r-$, ;r,t# !$,t$,"9r$,

T#-$r$ :- Dr5 O% Pr-$,- * P


27/55

Art!"# 10031065

P#$9"# :- T##


28/55

(+he employer&s liability for the criminal negligence of his employee issubsidiary in nature and is limited only to civil indemnity.)


%$$& T($CRIMES AND PENALTIES

Art!"# 1145 Tr#-$,

A,-t!$ L.r#" :-5 Er>#rt$ M-'5R5 N$5 L340 J,.r 60 14+

(keyword title! @aurel vs. 7isa)

F!t- (nastacio aurel ,led a petition for habeas corpus and contended

that a +ilipino citien who adhered to the 0apanese occupation forces!giving the latter aid and comfort! cannot be prosecuted for the crime ofTreason under (rticle 66; of the )evised Penal *ode! based on thesuspended allegianceJ theory! or that the sovereignty of the legitimategovernment in the Philippines and the correlative allegiance of the +ilipinocitiens thereto was suspended.

I--.# Aay a +ilipino citien be exempt from being prosecuted for Treasonduring the 0apanese occupation! on the ground that his allegiance to thelegitimate government was temporarily suspendedK

R.",; -o. In a )esolution! the 'upreme *ourt declared that a citien orsubject owes an absolute and permanent allegiance L which consists inthe obligation of ,delity and obedience L to his government or sovereign.This absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused with the&uali,ed and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to thegovernment or sovereign wherein he resides! consisting in mereobedience to the laws of the government or sovereign. +urthermore! the*ourt said that this absolute and permanent allegiance is not abrogated


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or severed by enemy occupation! because the sovereign de ure is nottransferred thereby to the occupier! as was held in the cases of 0o im0ham vs. =alde: +an eh and $i:on (C 'hil. DD4) and 'eralta vs. $irectorof 'risons (C 'hil. E6C). 'ince the sovereignty itself is not suspended andsubsists during enemy occupation! the allegiance of the inhabitants to

their legitimate government or sovereign subsists! and therefore there isno such thing as suspended allegiance.The invaders had the powers of a de facto government. They may

change existing laws or make new ones: but only when the exigencies ofthe military service demand such action! that is! when it is necessary forthe occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection ofhis army. =owever! the occupant has no power to repeal or suspend theoperation of the law of Treason! which is essential for the preservation ofthe allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government.

ranted! this absolute and permanent allegiance does not re&uire apositive action from the citien! but only a passive attitude or forbearance

from adhering to the enemy8 but the occupant cannot compel the citiento adhere and give aid and comfort to him. 'uch action is not demandedby the exigencies of the military service! nor necessary for the control ofthe inhabitants or the safety and control of his army. Aost importantly! todo so would be tantamount to practically transferring temporarily to themthe allegiance of the citien. If an inhabitant of the occupied territory werecompelled illegally by the military occupant through force! threat! orintimidation to give him aid and comfort! the former may lawfully resistand die if necessary as a hero! or submit thereto without becoming atraitor.

Therefore! (rticle 66; of the )evised Penal *ode was applicable to

Treason committed against the national security of the legitimategovernment! because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were stillbound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation.


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Art!"# 1245 Ar>trr D#t#,t$,

P#$9"# :-5 F"$r#- #t5 "5'5R5 N$5 114** M 61 2001

(keyword title! 'eople vs. 9lores)

F!t- >n the night of 'eptember 9@! 6@@9! 'amson 'ayam was drinkingbeer at a local store in Barangay Tabu! Ilog! -egros >ccidental. =ereinaccused$appellants (aron +lores! 'ulpecio 'ilpao! and ?dgar /illeran! whowere members of the *itien (rmed +orce eographical Mnit 5*(+M7!were at the same store drinking beer. 'ayam joined the accused$appellants at their table. 'ometime later! all of them left and wenttowards the direction of the Cth Infantry Brigade #etachment=ead&uarters. It was the last time anyone ever saw 'amson 'ayam.'ubse&uently! a criminal complaint was instituted against herein accused$

appellants. The )egional Trial *ourt of Nabankalan! -egros >ccidental!Branch 46! gave credence to the evidence of the prosecution! and heldthe three accused$appellants responsible for 'ayam3s disappearance.They were convicted of the crime of Nidnapping and 'erious Illegal#etention under (rticle 94C of the )evised Penal *ode.

I--.# #id the trial court err in convicting the defendants of Nidnappingand 'erious Illegal #etentionK

R.",;Des. The 'upreme *ourt! in a decision penned by 0ustice Dnares$'antiago! held that the accused$appellants cannot be charged with or

convicted with the crime of Nidnapping and 'erious Illegal #etentionbecause the ,rst element of said crime is that the o"ender must be aprivate individual. In the case at bar! the accused$appellants weremembers of the local *(+M at the time the alleged crime wascommitted8 they were not private individuals! but public o2cers. (s such!the 'olicitor eneral submitted that the accused$appellants could only be


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liable for the crime of (rbitrary #etention under (rticle 69; of the )evisedPenal *ode.

=owever! the 'upreme *ourt explained that as far back as the case of;.8. vs. 0abanag (6 'hil. FG, FH), it was held that in the crime of (rbitrary#etention! it is essential that there is actual con,nement or restriction of

the person of the o"ended party. The deprivation of liberty must beproved! just as the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of hisliberty must also be established by indubitable proof. #etention is de,nedas the actual con,nement of a person in an enclosure! or in any mannerdetaining and depriving him of his liberty.

In the case at bar! the 'upreme *ourt found that while the prosecutionwitnesses testi,ed to seeing the accused$appellants with 'amson 'ayamwalking toward the direction of the detachment head&uarters! there wasno shred of evidence that he was actually con,ned there or anywhereelse.

ikewise! there was no proof that there was actual intent on the part of

the accused$appellants to arbitrarily deprive 'amson 'ayam of his liberty.It is necessary that there must be a purposeful or knowing action byaccused$appellants to restrain the victim by or with force! because takingcoupled with intent completes the crime of illegal or arbitrary detention.

That 'amson 'ayam was never seen or heard from again cannot bethe basis for the trial court to render judgment convicting the accused$appellants. The 'upreme *ourt stated that in fact! it has no bearing in thiscase because it is not one of the elements of the crime of arbitrarydetention. *onse&uently! only one relevant circumstance was proved! i.e.,that accused$appellants were the last persons seen with 'amson 'ayam.=owever! said circumstance does not necessarily prove that they

feloniously abducted him! then arbitrarily detained him.


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Art!"# 1275 D#" , tn 'eptember 69! 6@@C! the CthA*T* of iloan issued anorder! denominated as #etention #uring the Pendency of the *aseJ!committing the petitioner to the jail warden of *ebu *ity. +ive days later!or on 'eptember 6C! 6@@C! the said court ordered the release of thepetitioner after he posted bail. >n 'eptember 94! 6@@C! the petitioner,led a complaint before the >2ce of the >mbudsman for delay in thedelivery of detained persons. =e contended that the *omplaint ,ledagainst him before the A*T* was a surplusage! and did not interrupt therunning of the period prescribed by (rticle 69< of the )evised Penal *ode!considering that under the )ules it is the )egional Trial *ourt that has thejurisdiction to try the case for violation of ).(. -o. C46F against him. (ssuch! upon the lapse of the thirty$six hours given to the arresting o2cersto e"ect his delivery to the proper )egional Trial *ourt! they were alreadyguilty of violating (rticle 69


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0udge of the A*T* issued the *ommitment >rder! he was acting contraryto law since by then there was no basis for his continued detention.

I--.# %hether or not the arresting o2cers and the A*T* acted contraryto law! resulting in a failure to deliver the petitioner to the proper judicial

authority.

R.",; -o. The 'upreme *ourt! in a decision penned by 0ustice onaga$)eyes! declared that the A*T* in this case was a proper judicialauthorityJ contemplated under (rticle 69< of the )evised Penal *ode.

(rticle 69< is intended to prevent any abuse resulting fromcon,ning a person without informing him of his o"ense and withoutpermitting him to go on bail. Aore speci,cally! it punishes public o2cialsor employees who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shallfail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within theperiods prescribed by law. The continued detention of the accused

becomes illegal upon the expiration of the periods provided for by (rticle69< without such detainee having been delivered to the correspondingjudicial authorities.

The words judicial authorityJ as contemplated by (rticle 69< meanthe courts of justices or judges of said courts vested with judicial powerto order the temporary detention or con,nement of a person charged withhaving committed a public o"ense! that is! the 'upreme *ourt and othersuch inferior courts as may be established by law.3J

It is undisputed that a municipal court judge! even in theperformance of his function to conduct preliminary investigations! retainsthe power to issue an order of release or commitment. +urthermore! upon

the ,ling of the complaint with the Aunicipal Trial *ourt! the intent behind(rticle 69< is satis,ed considering that by such act! the detained person isinformed of the crime imputed against him and! upon his application withthe court! he may be released on bail.

In the case at bar! the petitioner himself acknowledged this powerof the A*T* to order his release when he applied for and was granted hisrelease upon posting bail. Thus! the very purpose underlying (rticle 69n the contrary! Philippine penal lawspeci,cally punishes any public o2cer who! not being expresslyauthoried by law or regulation! compels any person to change hisresidence.J

Art!"# 1645 R#>#""$, / Art!"# 165 C$,-9r! , Pr$9$-" t$C$88t R#>#""$,

T


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evidence showing that at about the time of these armed attacks!=ernande established and became the president of the *ongress ofabor >rganiations 5*>7! which was a trade union division under thePNP. The trial court also found that right before the onset of the armedattacks! the PNP had declared a revolutionary situation8 the *ommunist

Party went underground! and decided to intensify the =AB militaryoperations for their political purposes. In this regard! evidence was shownthat top$ranking leaders of the PNP had communicated to =ernande!warning him of his tendencies for careerism! and of leaning more towardsdealing with leaders of the -acionalista Party instead of following the PNPorganiational structures. =e was then made to choose between goingunderground! or to ,ght legally. It was shown that =ernande did notchoose to go underground and join the armed resistance! but to ,ghtlegally through propaganda and assemblies! and to continue his headshipof the *> and his being a *ity *ouncilor. Based on all of these! it was thecontention of the prosecution that =ernande unlawfully and did then and

there willfully and feloniously help! support! promote! maintain! cause!direct andGor command the =AB to rise publicly and take up arms againstthe government! for the purpose of removing the territory of thePhilippines from the allegiance to the government and laws.

I--.#- 567 %as =ernande guilty of )ebellionK 597 #oes membership inthe *ommunist Party of the Philippines 5PNP7per se render =ernande orany *ommunist guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion under (rticle 64of the )evised Penal *odeK

R.",; 567 -o. The 'upreme *ourt! in a decision penned by 0ustice

abrador! declared that the *ourt did not agree with the trial court inimplicating =ernande as a co$conspirator by virtue of his meremembership to the PNP. The seditious speeches of =ernande took placebefore the PNP went underground. -either the trial court nor the 'upreme*ourt was not able to ,nd any evidence to infer the fact that =ernandetook part in the deliberations declaring the existence of a revolutionarysituation! or that he had gone underground. In fact! the evidence showedthat =ernande refused to go underground and preferred to engage inwhat they considered as the legal battle for the *ommunist cause. -eitherwas he a member of the PNP3s ?xecutive *ommittee! or the 'ecretariat! orof the Politburo of the *ommunist Party8 so no presumption can arise that

he had taken part in the accord or conspiracy declaring a revolution.The 'upreme *ourt ratiocinated that the practice among top

*ommunists! as declared by the trial court! was that if they intended toactually join the rebellion! they would go underground! which meantleaving the city! disappearing from sight! andGor secretly joining the forcesin the ,eld. The acts of =ernande fall under the category of acts ofpropaganda! but did not prove that he actually and in fact conspired withthe leaders of the *ommunist Party in the uprising or in the actual


37/55

rebellion. (nd his refusal to go underground because of his politicalcommitments created in the 'upreme *ourt a reasonable doubt that itwas not his *ommunistic learnings but his political ambitions thatmotivated his speeches sympathiing with the =uks. +or this reason! the*ourt held that the evidence submitted failed to prove beyond reasonable

doubt that he conspired in the instigation of the rebellion for which he washeld to account in the criminal case.597 -o. The 'upreme *ourt elucidated that the advocacy of

*ommunism is not to be considered as a criminal act of conspiracy unlesstransformed or converted into an advocacy of action. In the very nature ofthings! mere advocacy of a theory or principle is insu2cient unless thecommunist advocates action! immediate and positive! the actualagreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an agreement forged to useforce and violence in an uprising of the working class to overthrowconstituted authority and seie the reins of government itself. Mnlessaction is actually advocated or intended or contemplated! the *ommunist

is a mere theorist! and not yet an advocate of seiing the reins ofgovernment. (s a theorist! the *ommunist is not yet actually consideringto engage in the criminal ,eld subject to punishment. >nly when the*ommunist advocates action and actual uprising! war or otherwise! doeshe become guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion.

The mere fact of =ernande3s giving and rendering speechesfavoring *ommunism would not make him guilty of conspiracy! becausethere was no evidence that the hearers of his speeches then and thereagreed to rise up in arms for the purpose of obtaining the overthrow ofthe democratic government.

>n the other hand! membership in the =AB implies participation in

an actual uprising or rebellion to secure! as the =uks pretend! theliberation of the peasants and laboring class from thralldom. Bymembership in the =AB! one already advocates uprising and the use offorce! and by such membership he agrees or conspires that force be usedto secure the ends of the party. 'uch membership! therefore! even if thereis nothing more! renders the member guilty of conspiracy to commitrebellion punishable by law. (nd when a =uk member! not content withhis membership! does anything to promote the ends of the rebellion likesoliciting contributions! or acting as courier! he thereby becomes guilty ofconspiracy! unless he takes to the ,led and joins in the rebellion oruprising! in which latter case he commits rebellion.


38/55

MSU (IIT) BAR OPERATIONS 2014 CRIMINAL LAW

KEY DOCTRINES AND JURISPRUDENCE

SPECIAL PENAL LA(S

15 P5D5 762 A,t3Pr! , A,t3?;>#r

PEOPLE OF T?E P?ILIPPINES 9",t=399#""## :-5 RO'ER P5

TULIN&IR'ILIO I5 LOYOLA CECILIO O5 C?AN'CO ANDRES C5 INFANTE

C?EON' SAN ?ION' , JO?N DOES !!.-#399#"",t-5'5R5 N$5 111+0 A.;.-t 60 2001


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F!t- AGT Tabangao! a cargo vessel owned by P->*! which was then

carrying P;F.;94A worth of kerosene! gasoline and diesel oil! was sailing

near the coast of Aindoro and was suddenly boarded by pirates! herein

accused$appellants. The pirates ordered the crew to paint over the name

AGT Tabangao the name alileeJ. The detained ship was brought to

'ingapore! where the vessel -avi Pride was waiting for the unloading of

the cargo. This was supervised by accused$appellant =iong. (fter

unloading! the detained vessel travelled back to the Philippines where the

ship3s complement were released. The chief engineer of the crew reported

the incident to the coast guard. (fterwards! a series of arrests were

e"ected in di"erent places. (n information charging the accused$

appellants with &uali,ed piracy or violation of the P# n the other hand! under Presidential #ecree -o.


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clauses of Presidential #ecree -o.


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re&uesting 'tate of a consistent pattern of gross! 1agrant or mass

violations of human rights.

65 P5D5 1* - 8#,# > R5A5 *24 D#!r## C$%,; t


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The victim was rushed to the hospital but the injury sustained was fatal.

The victim subse&uently died due to cardiac arrest. The ,rearm used by

the appellant in shooting #iosdado Iroy was not licensed! the appellant

was not a duly licensed ,rearm holder as veri,ed from a consolidated list

of licensed ,rearm holders in the province! and was not authoried to

carry a ,rearm outside his residence. (ccused$appellant was convicted for

the crime of murder under the )evised Penal *ode! and for violation of

P.#. 6O44.

I--.# %>- accused$appellant will be in double jeopardy if convicted

both for murder under the )evised Penal *ode! and for violation of P.#.

6O44K

R.",; -o! accused$appellant can be convicted for both. The elements of

illegal possession of ,rearm in its aggravated form are di"erent from the

elements of homicide or murder! let alone the fact that these crimes arede,ned and penalied under di"erent laws and the former is malum

prohibitum! while both the latter are mala in se. =ence! the fear that the

majorityEs construction of the subject provision would violate the

constitutional bar against double jeopardy is unfounded.

PEOPLE OF T?E P?ILIPPINES 99#""## :-5 WALPAN LADJAALAM MI?AJIL "- WARPAN 99#"",t

'5R5 N$-5 1614371 S#9t#8>#r 1 2000

F!t- +our Informations were ,led against appellant %alpan adjaalam

in the )egional Trial *ourt of Ramboanga *ity! three of which he was

found guilty! to wit: 67 maintaining a drug den in violation of 'ection 6


43/55

illegal possession of ,rearm and ammunition in violation of Presidential

#ecree -o. 6O44 as amended by )epublic (ct. -o. O9@;8 and 7 direct

assault with multiple attempted homicide.

I--.# %hether or not such use of an unlicensed ,rearm shall be

considered as an aggravating circumstance.

?#" -o. 'ection 6 of )( O9@; substantially provides that any person

who shall unlawfully possess any ,rearm or ammunition shall be

penalied! :unless no ot+er crime -as committe!;. +urthermore! if

homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed ,rearm!

such use of an unlicensed ,rearm shall be considered as an aggravating

circumstance. 'ince the crime committed was direct assault and not

homicide or murder! illegal possession of ,rearms cannot be deemed an

aggravating circumstance.

45 R5A5 17 T


44/55

entered his plea of guilty to avail the bene,ts of ,rs time o"enders.

'ubse&uently! he applied for probation but was denied. In his petition for

certiorari! the court said that probation and suspension of sentence are

di"erent and provisions in P# 4F or )( @;; cannot be invoked to avail

probation.

I--.# %>- petitioner can apply for probation.

?#" The Probation aw shall not apply to those convicted of drug$

tra2cking or drug$pushing regardless of the penalty imposed by the *ourt

and regardless of the minority of the o"ender for the law does not

distinguish! and because of the intent of the law to impose a harsher

penalty on the pusher. =ad it been the intention of the legislation to

exempt from the application of 'ec.9; the drug tra2ckers and pushers

who are minors and ,rst time o"enders! the law could have easily

declared so.

PEOPLE OF T?E P?ILIPPINES 9",t=399#""## :5 LO ?O WIN'"- PETER LO LIM C?EN' ?UAT "- ANTONIO LIM ,

REYNALDO TIA SANTIA'O #%#,,t-5 LO ?O WIN' "- PETERLO #%#,,t399#"",t5

'5R5 N$5 **01+ J,.r 21 11


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F!t- Peter o! together with co$accused im *heng =uat alias (ntonio

im and )eynaldo Tia! were charged with a violation of the #angerous

#rugs (ct! for the transport of methamphetamine hydrochloride!

otherwise known as HshabuH. The drug was contained in tea bags inside

tin cans which were placed inside their luggage. Mpon arrival from

=ongkong! they boarded the taxis at the airport which were apprehended

by *I' operatives. Their luggage were subse&uently searched where the

tea bags were opened and found to contain shabu. >nly o and im were

convicted. Tia was discharged as a state witness! who turned out to be a

Hdeep penetration agentH of the *I' in its mission to bust the drug

syndicate.

I--.#%>- the search and seiure was legal.

R.",; Des. That search and seiure must be supported by a valid

warrant is not an absolute rule. >ne of the exceptions thereto is a searchof a moving vehicle. The circumstances of the case clearly show that the

search in &uestion was made as regards a moving vehicle. Therefore! a

valid warrant was not necessary to e"ect the search on appellant and his

co$accused. It was ,rmly established from the factual ,ndings of the court

that the authorities had reasonable ground to believe that appellant

would attempt to bring in contraband and transport within the country.

The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance

activities on the suspected syndicate! of which appellant was touted to be

a member. (side from this! they were also certain as to the expected dateand time of arrival of the accused from *hina via =ongkong. But such

knowledge was insu2cient to enable them to ful,ll the re&uirements for

the issuance of a search warrant. 'till and all! the important thing is that

there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search! which must

still be present in the case.

PEOPLE OF T?E P?ILIPPINES 9",t=399#""## :-5 CARLOS BOCO ALEJO , RONALDO INOCENTES CRU !!.-#399#"",t-5

'5R5 N$5 12+ J.,# 26 1


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F!t- (ccused$appellants were convicted for attempt to sell regulated

drug without authority of law during a buy$bust operation done by s

members of the #istrict (nti$-arcotic Mnit! ?astern Police #istrict 5#(-M$

?P#7. #uring the buy$bust operation! the marked money was only shown

to the accused$appellant! and was not received by the latter.

I--.# %>- accused$appellants can be tried and convicted of

consummated sale under 'ection 6< of the same law! which the

prosecution evidence tried to establishK

R.",; ( person charged with attempt to sell regulated drug without

the authority of law may be convicted for consummate! sale. ( mere

attempt to commit a felony is surely subsumed in the full execution

thereof. 'ec. 96 of this act covers attempt and conspiracy. ( mere attempt

to commit a felony is surely subsumed in the full execution thereof. To

attempt is to commence the commission of a crime by overt acts. If onehas been proven to have completely carried out all the acts necessary to

commit the crime! he has certainly been proven to have executed the

initial act re&uired in an attempt.

PEOPLE OF T?E P?ILIPPINES 9",t=399#""## :-5 NORBERTODEL MONTE 'APAY "- OBET !!.-#399#"",t

'5R5 N$5 1+40 A9r" 26 200*


47/55


48/55

%itnesses are granted immunity under P.#. 6C9.

5 R5A5 601 A,t3'r%t , C$rr.9t Pr!t!#- A!t

?ILARIO JARA&ATA 9#tt$,#r :5 T?E ?ON5 SANDI'ANBAYAN ,T?E PEOPLE OF T?E P?ILIPPINES r#-9$,#,t-

'5R5 N$5 L371+0 J,.r 61 1*4


49/55

F!t-The accused informed the classroom teachers of the approval of

the release of their salary di"erentials and to facilitate its payment

accused and the classroom teachers agreed that accused follow$up the

papers in Aanila with the obligation on the part of the classroom teachers

to reimburse the accused of his expenses. (ccused incurred expenses and

he divided said amount by the number of teachers! but the accused

received more than the rightful amount.

I--.# %hether or not petitioner 0aravata violated ).(. F6@.

R.",;-o. There is no law which invests the petitioner with the power to

intervene in the payment of the salary di"erentials of the complainants or

anyone for that matter. +ar from exercising any power! the petitioner

plated the humble role of a supplicant whose mission was to expedite

payment of the salary di"erentials. In his o2cial capacity as assistant

principal! he is not re&uired by law to intervene in the payment of thesalary di"erentials. (ccordingly! he cannot be said to have violated the

law aforecited although he exerted e"orts to facilitate the payment of the

salary di"erentials. 'ec 5b7 of )( F6@ refers to a public o2cer whose

o2cial intervention is re&uired by law in a contract or transaction. 5in his

o2cial capacity has to intervene under the lawJ7.

ARTURO A5 MEJORADA 9#tt$,#r :5 T?E ?ONORABLESANDI'ANBAYAN ,

T?E PEOPLE OF T?E P?ILIPPINES r#-9$,#,t-5'5R5 N$-5 L371073+2J.,# 60 1*+

F!t-This is a case of an engineer who has negotiated with the house

and lot owners for the construction of a road and the complainants


50/55

alleged that they were divested of a large proportion of their claims and

receiving payment in an amount even lower that the actual damage they

incurred.

I--.# %>- petitioner is guilty of violation of ).(. F6@.

R.",;Des. 'ection cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the

corrupt practices of any public o2cer declared unlawful. Its reference to

any public o2cer is without distinction or &uali,cation and it speci,es the

acts declared unlawful. The last sentence of the par 5e7 is intended to

make clear the inclusion of o2cers and employees of o2ces or

government corporation which under the ordinary concept of public

o2cers may not come within the term. It is a strained construction of the

provision to read it as applying exclusively to public o2cers charged with

the duty of granting licenses and permits or other concessions. Petitioner

,ts s&uarely with the enumerated elements.

+5 R5A5 +0*0 A,t3P".,#r A!t

JOSEP? EJERCITO ESTRADA 9#tt$,#r :-5 SANDI'ANBAYAN(T


51/55

F!t- 'ection 9 of ).(. -o. CFOF 5(n (ct #e,ning and Penaliing the

*rime of Plunder7 as amended by ).(. -o. C4


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%attere! (oman S'n!rome

HBattered %oman 'yndromeH refers to a scienti,cally de,ned

pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms found in women living

in battering relationships as a result of cumulative abuse.

PEOPLE OF T?E P?ILIPPINES 99#""## :-5 MARI&IC 'ENOSA99#"",t5

'5R5 N$5 167*1 J,.r 17 2004

F!t-This case stemmed from the killing of Ben enosa! by his wifeAarivic enosa! appellant herein. #uring their ,rst year of marriage!Aarivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter! Ben changed andthe couple would always &uarrel and sometimes their &uarrels becameviolent. (ppellant testi,ed that every time her husband came home

drunk! he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. %henever beatenby her husband! she consulted medical doctors who testi,ed during thetrial. >n the night of the killing! appellant and the victim were &uarreledand the victim beat the appellant. =owever! appellant was able to run toanother room. (ppellant admitted having killed the victim with the use ofa gun. The information for parricide against appellant! however! allegedthat the cause of death of the victim was by beating through the use of alead pipe. (ppellant invoked self defense and defense of her unborn child.(fter trial! the )egional Trial *ourt found appellant guilty beyondreasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an aggravatingcircumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death. >n

automatic review before the 'upreme *ourt! appellant ,led an M)?-T>A-IBM' A>TI>- praying that the =onorable *ourt allow 567 theexhumation of Ben enosa and the re$examination of the cause of hisdeath8 597 the examination of Aarivic enosa by &uali,ed psychologistsand psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed herhusband8 and ,nally! 57 the inclusion of the said experts3 reports in therecords of the case for purposes of the automatic review or! in thealternative! a partial re$opening of the case a &uo to take the testimony ofsaid psychologists and psychiatrists. The 'upreme *ourt partly grantedthe M)?-T >A-IBM' A>TI>- of the appellant. It remanded the case tothe trial court for reception of expert psychological andGor psychiatric

opinion on the battered woman syndromeJ plea. Testimonies of twoexpert witnesses on the battered woman syndromeJ! #ra. #ayan and #r.Pajarillo! were presented and admitted by the trial court and subse&uentlysubmitted to the 'upreme *ourt as part of the records.

I--.#-:6. %>- appellant herein can validly invoke the battered womansyndromeJ as constituting self$defense.


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9. %hether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben enosa.

R.",;6. The *ourt ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she isaUicted with the battered woman syndromeJ.

( battered woman has been de,ned as a woman who is repeatedlysubjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man inorder to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concernfor her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form ofintimate relationship with men. +urthermore! in order to be classi,ed as abattered woman! the couple must go through the battering cycle at leasttwice. (ny woman may ,nd herself in an abusive relationship with a manonce. If it occurs a second time! and she remains in the situation! she isde,ned as a battered woman.J

Aore graphically! the battered woman syndrome is characteried bythe so$called cycle of violence!J which has three phases: 567 the tension$

building phase8 597 the acute battering incident8 and 57 the tran&uil!loving 5or! at least! nonviolent7 phase.

The *ourt! however! is not discounting the possibility of self$defensearising from the battered woman syndrome. +irst! each of the phases ofthe cycle of violence must be proven to have characteried at least twobattering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner.'econd! the ,nal acute battering episode preceding the killing of thebatterer must have produced in the battered person3s mind an actual fearof an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that sheneeded to use force in order to save her life. Third! at the time of thekilling! the batterer must have posed probable $$ not necessarily

immediate and actual $$ grave harm to the accused! based on the historyof violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether!these circumstances could satisfy the re&uisites of self$defense. Mnder theexisting facts of the present case! however! not all of these elements wereduly established.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle ofviolenceJ supposedly characteriing the relationship of Ben and Aarivicenosa. -o doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellantfailed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past! shehad gone through a similar pattern. -either did appellant pro"er su2cientevidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.

In any event! the existence of the syndrome in a relationship doesnot in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusivepartner. ?vidence must still be considered in the context of self$defense.'ettled in our jurisprudence! is the rule that the one who resorts to self$defense must face a real threat on one3s life8 and the peril sought to beavoided must be imminent and actual! not merely imaginary. Thus! the)evised Penal *ode provides that the following re&uisites of self$defensemust concur: 567 Mnlawful aggression8 597 )easonable necessity of the


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means employed to prevent or repel it8 and 57 ack of su2cientprovocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Mnlawful aggression is the most essential element of self$defense. Itpresupposes actual! sudden and unexpected attack $$ or an imminentdanger thereof $$ on the life or safety of a person. In the present case!

however! according to the testimony of Aarivic herself! there was asu2cient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and herfatal attack upon him. 'he had already been able to withdraw from hisviolent behavior and escape to their children3s bedroom. #uring that time!he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even theimminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. =e was nolonger in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion andobfuscation were! however! taken in favor of appellant. It should beclari,ed that these two circumstances $$ psychological paralysis as well aspassion and obfuscation $$ did not arise from the same set of facts.

The ,rst circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and theseverity of the battery in1icted by the batterer$spouse upon appellant.That is! the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in herpsychological paralysis! which was analogous to an illness diminishing theexercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of heracts.

(s to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon animpulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion andobfuscation! it has been held that this state of mind is present when acrime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passionprovoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so

powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance! thefollowing re&uisites should concur: 567 there is an act! both unlawful andsu2cient to produce such a condition of mind8 and 597 this act is not farremoved from the commission of the crime by a considerable length oftime! during which the accused might recover her normal e&uanimity.9. ->. Because of the gravity of the resulting o"ense! treachery must beproved as conclusively as the killing itself. Besides! e&ually axiomatic isthe rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a &uarrel!treachery cannot be appreciated as a &ualifying circumstance! becausethe deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to haveanticipated aggression from the assailant. Aoreover! in order to

appreciate alevosia! the method of assault adopted by the aggressor musthave been consciously and deliberately chosen for the speci,c purpose ofaccomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that mightbe put up by the party attacked.

The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to havenaturally produced passion or obfuscation. The acute battering shesu"ered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer$spouse! in spite of thefact that she was eight 5O7 months pregnant with their child! overwhelmed


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her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state! whichovercame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and that of herunborn child.

The 'upreme *ourt a2rmed the conviction of appellant forparricide. =owever! considering the presence of two 597 mitigating

circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance! the penalty isreduced to six 547 years and one 567 day of prision mayor as minimum8 to6; years O months and 6 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimumpenalty hereby imposed upon her! the director of the Bureau of*orrections may immediately )??('? her from custody upon duedetermination that she is eligible for parole! unless she is being held forsome other lawful cause.

crim bar notes 2014

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