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Running head: Industrial Policy
“What Lessons can Industrial Policy in Japan and China give to Myanmar?”
Nao HamamotoInternational Relations Master’s Program
McCormack Graduate School of Policy and Global StudiesUniversity of Massachusetts, Boston
May 18, 2016
Industrial Policy
Section 1. Abstract This paper examined previous experiences of industrial policy in Japan (1945-1982)
and China (1945-1980s) and offered lessons for Myanmar. In Myanmar, although there are
possibilities to develop its economy, there are also problems which hinge economic
development. Applying lessons from Japanese and Chinese industrial policy to Myanmar might
be able to solve these problems and develop its economy. Analyzing experiences of Japanese
and Chinese industrial policy and economic situation in Myanmar, this paper provided three
policy recommendations: the model of industrial policy to protect and promote particular
industry, the model of raising revenue for industrial policy, and the model of industrial policy
to develop professional education system and technology.
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Section 2. Table of Contents
1. Table of Contents---------------------------------------------------------------------------------p.3
2. Introduction---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------p.4
3. Background and broader context of industrial policy------------------------------------p.9
4. Theoretical/Conceptual Perspective----------------------------------------------------------p.14
5. Experiences of industrial policy---------------------------------------------------------------p.22
A. Japan-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------p.22
B. China-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------p.30
6. Impacts of industrial policy--------------------------------------------------------------------p.41
A. Japan-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------p.41
B. China-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------p.48
7. Lessons from industrial policy-----------------------------------------------------------------p.54
A. Japan-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------p.54
B. China-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------p.56
C. Common lessons-----------------------------------------------------------------------------p.58
8. Economic and political situation in Myanmar---------------------------------------------p.60
9. How to apply the common lessons to Myanmar Policy recommendation------------p.73
10. Conclusion-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------p.79
11. Reference-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------p.82
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Section 3. Introduction
Is industrial policy effective for leading economic growth? The question is one of the
most important questions in international relations because industrial policy can be a solution
for many serious problems, such as economic crisis, poverty reduction, and economic growth
in developing countries.
However, it is impossible to determine definitively whether industry policy is effective
for leading economic growth. That’s because there are a lot of other variables which have an
effect on economic growth, such as history, economic situation, industry, timings, company,
and leaders of government. However, it is possible to learn some lessons from cases of
previous industrial policy regardless of whether industrial policy is effective for leading
economic growth or not. Therefore, the most important question should be “what lessons can
experiences of industrial policy give to next generation?”
Therefore, this paper analyzes some cases of previous industrial policy in Japan
(1945-1982) and China (1945-1980s) to learn lessons for Myanmar. The reason why this paper
picked two main developed countries, such as Japan and China, to analyze their previous
industrial policies and learn lessons is that these countries are the second and third highest GDP
countries and these countries have a great history to lead high economic growth. In addition,
these two countries had different kinds of industrial policy after World War II. The
characteristic of each industrial policy may offer lessons for developing countries, such as
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Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and so on.
There are three reasons why this paper picked Myanmar to apply lessons from
analysis of previous industrial policy in Japan and China. First, agriculture still accounts for a
large percentage in the composition of the country’s GDP. The composition of GDP by sector
of origin in Myanmar is agriculture: 36.1%, industry: 22.3%, services: 41.6% (World Fact
Book, 2015). Therefore, there is a high possibility to develop industry and services more by
industrial policy. Second reason is that Myanmar has a great possibility to develop its economy,
such as national resources, labor, and population, so industrial policy might help Myanmar to
develop its economy (Ida, 2005, p. 218).
Finally, the most important reason is that Japan and China have “competitive
economic relations with Myanmar in the background of dynamic regional political and
economic changes in Asia” (Hong, 2014, p.1). According to Hong (2014), “both China and
Japan view Myanmar as a country of strategic importance and as a place where huge economic
profits can be made” (p.19). The history of Chinese relations with Myanmar is longer than that
of Japan. China has a geographic advantage, while Japan has great economic power which is
the world third largest. Additionally, “Japan attempts to internalize and apply "Western
standards" (such as respect for human rights, liberal democracy, and free-market based
economy) to its relations with Myanmar. The resurgence of Japanese interest and influence in
Myanmar, together with the positive roles being adopted by the US, India and the EU, may
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mitigate China's prominence in the country and help Myanmar resume the neutralist stance it
held during the Cold War” (Hong, 2014, p.19). Therefore, China and Japan have competitive
relations about Myanmar.
However, they do not have to have competitive relations and “Myanmar's foreign
relations need not constitute a zero- sum competition between China and Japan. The two
countries offer Myanmar different types of engagement” (Hong, 2014,p.19). The engagement
which both China and Japan offer can help Myanmar to develop its economy and it may be
better for Myanmar to get various suggestions about economic development from not only
China but also Japan. There are different lessons from experiences of industrial policy in China
and Japan which can help Myanmar to develop their economy. Based on these, it is really
interesting to examine how to apply lessons from experiences of industrial policy in China and
Japan to Myanmar. Therefore, Myanmar is an appropriate country for this analysis to lessons.
(i) Defining industrial policy
Defining “industrial policy” is one of the most important things for analysis of
industrial policy. Moreover, “defining industrial policy is not easy primarily because defining
industry is no longer straightforward”, and because there are many definitions of industrial
policy (Bianchi and Labory, 2010, p.303).
At first, this paper examines some different definitions of industrial policy. According
to Matsumoto (1999), industrial policy is to take a way to lead or regulate resource allocation
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for protecting and promoting particular industry (p.620). Aiginger (2007) said that “industrial
policy is a ‘set of activities which create a favorable environment for business and for adapting
production to changing domestic or international demand’” (p.300). Kagami (1991) claimed
that the definition of industrial policy is that government intervenes into private enterprise by
policy to cope with a failure of market (p.4).
According to Cho et al (1996), “industrial policy can be defined, narrowly, as a
government economic policy that aggressively influences a specific industry or group of firms
to strengthen international competitiveness or lower economic concentration” (p.62).
According to Ono (2005), industrial policy is a policy for developing countries to catch up with
developed countries by protecting and promoting particular industry. Industrial policy is also
policy for developed countries to intervene into a market directly for reinforcing productivity
for particular industry and international competitive power (p.50).
Based on these, this paper defines what industrial policy is. This paper adopted the
definition of industrial policy by Cho et al (1996). However, this paper added some elements
from the definition of industrial policy from Ono (2005) because the definition of industrial
policy needs to include what it is, why and how it is needed. Therefore, in this paper, the
definition of industrial policy is “a government economic policy that aggressively influences a
specific industry or group of firms to strengthen international competitiveness or lower
economic concentration by making, promoting, and protecting market and industry” (Cho et al,
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1996, p.62 and Ono, 2005, p.50).
(ii) Defining economic growth
Next, this paper considered what economic growth is. According to Simon (1973),
economic growth is defined as “a long-term rise in capacity to supply increasingly diverse
economic goods to its population, this growing capacity based on advancing technology and
the institutional and ideological adjustments that it demands” (p.1). This paper adopted this
definition of economic growth because it is really clear definition and it covers “capacity based
on advancing technology and the institutional and ideological adjustments that it demands” (p.
1). Besides, thinking of what industrial policy is, it is really important to decide how to
measure economic growth. This paper adopted Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a
measurement of economic growth. According to OECD (2016), “domestic product covers
different indicators of national accounts with a focus on Gross Domestic Product (GDP). GDP
is the standard measure of the value of final goods and services produced by a country during a
period minus the value of imports.” For instance, during a business boom, consumption is
increased and companies tend to be able to increase capital investment for increasing
productivity. As a result, GDP is increased. On the other hand, when economy turns down after
the business boom, people and companies reduce consumption and GDP is decreased. The
reason why this paper adopted GDP as a measurement of economic growth is that GDP shows
how much the value of goods and services is produced in each state and it is deeply related to
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economic growth. Therefore, this paper used GDP as a measurement of economic growth.
In this paper, section II shows background and broader context of industrial policy.
Section III provides literature review. Section IV examines experiences of industrial policy in
Japan and China. After that, section V examines what the impacts of industrial policy were in
Japan and China. Section VI discusses economic and political situations in Myanmar. This
section also discusses how Myanmar is similar/ different from Japan and China from 1950s to
1980s. Section VII analyzes lessons for Myanmar from experiences of industrial policy in
Japan (1945-1982) and China (1945-1980s) and provides policy recommendations. This
section analyzes lessons for Myanmar from experiences of industrial policy in Japan and China
from 1950s to 1980s and provides policy recommendations. Section VIII concludes this
research.
Section 4. Background and broader context of industrial policy
Since World War II, “many developing countries have opted for policies aimed at
promoting new infant industries or at protecting local traditional activities from competition by
products from more advanced countries” (Aghion, 2011, p.13). These policies developing
countries tried to implement for leading economic growth and developing their economy are
now referred to as industrial policy. Industrial policy has been accepted internationally since
“The Industrial Policy of Japan” (1972) and “The Aims and Instruments of Industrial Policy: A
Comparative Study” (1975) were published (Ono, 2005, p. 38). The concept of industrial
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policy is really related to Japanese economic growth after World War II. Therefore, before that,
there was no concept of industrial policy in Britain and the United States (Kobayashi, 1984, p.
296).
Since industrial policy has been accepted internationally, a lot of states tried to
implement industrial policy of their economic purposes. In broader context, market failure is
the target of industrial policy (Rodrik, 2008, p.2). Not only developing countries but also
developed countries need to implement industrial policy because each has its own economic
problems and market failures. Market failure covers a wide range of economic problems, such
as financial crisis, trade disputes, disparity of wealth, unemployment, pollution and so on.
Market failure exists in each state in all over the world and it keeps in step with the times.
Therefore, every age it may be needed for each state to implement industrial policy and
industrial policy is one of the most important policies for economy. That’s the reason why
industrial policy was focused by government in all states.
Industrial policy should be various. There are many different cases of industrial policy
in the world because each state and region has different economic and political background and
faces different market failure. Therefore, each state and region has different history of
industrial policy. For example, “East Asian countries like Korea or Japan, rather than
advocating import substitution policies, would favor export promotion, which in turn would be
achieved partly through tariffs and nontariff barriers and partly through maintaining
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undervalued exchange rates” (Aghion, 2011, p.13). In East Asia, there were many valuable
cases of industrial policy. Japan had great experiences of industrial policy from the early 1950s
through the 1980s. From the 1960s through the 1980s, Taiwan and South Korea had
implemented industrial policy. Industrial policy in each country contributed to the development
of their economy, and the core of an East Asian industrial policy model was built. Each
government, in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, “promoted research and development,
through direct and indirect subsidies to R&D activities carried out by private firms, setting
research priorities and identifying particular sectors for favorable treatment, and establishing
national labs and special public-private research consortia. In some sense, these ‘innovation
policies’ would seem to have the greatest justification in terms of promoting activities in which
social returns may exceed private returns” (Noland and Pack, 2008, p. 86).
Japan’s defeat in World War II influenced Japan a lot. The productivity of Japanese
manufacturing industry was decreasing. The General Headquarters of the Allied Powers (GHQ)
implemented three big reforms. The three big reforms were the dissolution of Zaibatsu which is
that “by the 1920’s a zaibatsu contained a nucleus parent company(usually a holding
company), that was owned wholly by a family or a kinship group and formed an enterprise
group whose subsidiaries operated in a wide range of industries”, the emancipation of farming
land, and the democratization of labor (Lynn, 1989, p. 10). The three big reforms gave Japan
the framework for economic growth after World War II. During this period, from 1945 to the
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middle of 1950s, the rebuilding and independence of Japanese economy is the most important
theme. Japanese government tried to develop industries and reinforce international
competitiveness (Matsumoto, 1999, p.5,6). During next period, from the middle of 1950s to
1960s, Japanese nation's standard of living was low. Japanese government was not able to
avoid intervening into private business. Therefore, during this period, many industrial policies
were implemented by Japanese governments. There were also a wide variety of purposes for
industrial policy. As a result, many industries, including automobile industry, were developed
during this period. Since 1960s, economic situation in Japan has improved, and the Japanese
position in global economy has been increased. Japanese government tried to implement
industrial policy to increase the social satisfaction for people in Japan. As a result, Japanese
government needed a diversification of industrial policy (Matsumoto, 1999, p.6-14).
Since 1970s, Japanese nation's standard of living had been stable. During this period,
Japanese exportation had been reinforced. Although Japanese international competitiveness and
economy were able to be increased enough, new problems, like environment problem,
appeared (Nagaike, 2004, p.263). Besides, Japanese government focused on the development
of technology rather than protection of particular industry. Then, Japan could develop its
economy through these things, and now Japan has grown to top three highest GDP countries
(Matsumoto, 1999, p.6-14).
Next, this paper shows Chinese background and broader context of industrial policy.
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Since the founding of modern China in 1949, the history of Chinese economy can be divided
into two periods. First period, 1949-1978, was the ideological period of a planned economy by
Chinese government. Second period was the period of a market economy and high economic
growth by Chinese economic liberalization since 1978. Since 1953, China put the economic
plan system which was from Soviet Union in practice. The economic plan system was that
Chinese government made a plan and purpose of their economy every five years, and they tried
to develop their economy following the plan. Before 1978, China had not been related to global
market because they closed the country to foreigners. On December in 1978, Chinese
government made a basic policy for economic liberalization. They decided that a first priority
was economic development, and the decision made economic growth in China faster and
higher. This reform tried to introduce the agricultural production system, to revitalize business
management, to increase efficiency of business. Besides, Chinese government introduced the
separation between government and private enterprise, the elements of competition, and the
mechanism of market. These attempts by government were connected with high economic
growth in China.
During the period from 1981 to 1985, the rate of economic growth reached double
figures. In 1984, Chinese government tried to slow down economic growth by the policy which
economized government spending and finance. During the period from 1986 to 1990, the role
of market economy was recognized because of some strategies. However, these reforms slowed
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down because of Tiananmen Square Incident, which was the armed conflict between the
Chinese police and the demonstrators trying to democratize society or organizations in
Tiananmen Square. During the period from 1991 to 1995, socialist economy was established
by communist party in China, so Chinese government made much account of resource
allocation which utilized the mechanism of market based on Chinese macro-control policy.
Then, high growth of Chinese economy started again (Chin, 2006, p.4,5). This section
provided background and broader context of industrial policy, especially in Japan and China.
Next section, this paper offers a literature review of industrial policy.
Section 5. Theoretical/Conceptual Perspective
The arguments of industrial policy can be divided into two groups of scholars.
(i) First group
First group of scholars claims that industrial policy has no positive effects on leading
economic growth. Based on analysis of previous experiences of industrial policy, this group
concluded that industrial policy did not work successfully and it had no positive effects on
leading economic growth due to one main reason. The main reason is that there were many
factors, which were related to economic growth, other than industrial policy, and there was no
evidence which can prove that industrial policy was successful in economic growth and has
positive effects on leading economic growth. It means that it is impossible to prove that
industrial policy has positive effects on leading economic growth, so this group claimed that
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industrial policy has no positive effects on leading economic growth.
Kagami (1991) also claimed that industrial policy has no effect on leading economic
growth. He said that Japanese economic growth after World War II would exist even if
industrial policy was not implemented because Japanese economic growth was supported by
many factors, such as Japanese educational system, good relationship in business, culture, and
great human resources. He claimed that there are many problems of industrial policy. First,
only industry which government chose to protect and develop can be developed, but others
cannot. Second, when government implemented industrial policy, they did not tend to think
about supporting industries. For example, if government wanted to develop their computer
industries, they needed to focus on development of technology and educational system for
engineers rather than protecting particular industry. Moreover, globalization has changed
global economy. It is impossible for each state to care about only its economy in each state
because each state needs to think of the global economy and other states economy as well as
they do for themselves. From this point of view, industrial policy, which government in each
state implements for its own economy does not have effects on leading economic growth.
Besides, he claimed that industrial policy has no effects in especially developing countries
because of many factors, such as educational system, human resources, financial system,
political situations, stability, and the role of government.
Yoshiro Miwa and J.M. Ramseyer (2002), who are advocates of Marxism, examined
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industrial policy, especially Japanese industrial policy after World War II. Based on their
analysis, they claimed that industrial policy was not effective for leading economic growth.
The argument is that industrial policy worked effectively and contributed to leading economic
growth is just social common belief, which is “Tsunen” in Japanese. They claimed that there is
no evidence to prove that industrial policy was successful in leading economic growth
effectively. Besides, they stated that Japanese ministries and government offices which
implement industrial policy did not have effective policy steps to be able to influence industry
and companies in Japan. Additionally, they showed that Japanese government was circumspect
in implementing industrial policy after World War II, so many industrial policy were not
implemented. Finally, they indicated that industrial policy did not have clear and specific
policy purpose and policy steps. Based on these, they claimed that industrial policy was not
really implemented.
(ii) Second group
Another group of scholars claims that industrial policy is effective because the cases
of industrial policy can provide “lesson” for future even if scholars cannot prove industrial
policy has positive effects on leading economic growth. This group picked up previous
experiences of industrial policy to examine how, why, and when government implemented
industrial policy and to analyze possible effects on economic growth and how it worked for
economy. Based on these analyses, this group gets lessons which can be applied to developing
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countries. This group tends to think that the lessons from previous experiences of industrial
policy are valuable because the lessons can be applied to economies in developing countries
now or in the future economy.
Bailey David, Lenihan Helena, and Singh Ajit (2009) analyzed and considered lessons
“to be learned (positive and negative) by the smaller African economies from both Irish and
East Asian industrial policy experiences” (378). They did not discuss whether industrial policy
is effective for leading economic growth. However, they analyzed previous industrial policy
experiences to learn lessons for future. They picked Ireland and East Asian countries to learn
lessons, and they picked African countries to be applied the lessons. The reason why they pick
these countries is that size of countries and economic situations are similar among these
countries. Based on their analysis, they argue that “there is need for a more ‘holistic’ approach
to economic development which inter-alia focuses on the development of domestic
entrepreneurship and indigenous firm expansion more generally as well as emphasizing the
importance of other supply side factors” (378). Additionally, they claimed that cooperation is
more important than “relying on state direction in the operation of industrial policy” by
analysis of Ireland model. “The Irish model has some benefits in that it can also be seen as
more democratic and has protected workers’ rights during the development process, in contrast
to the dirigisite East Asian model” (378). Based on these, their recommendation for the small
sized of African countries are “integration and sufficient overseas development assistance
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(ODA) for infrastructural development” (378). They also suggested that financial system in the
African economies need to be changed by intervention of government.
Hosono (2015) examined five cases of industrial policy to learn lessons. “These five
cases are: (1) the automobile industry in Thailand; (2) the transformation of the “Cerrado” in
Brazil from barren lands to a source of high-productivity agriculture; (3) the garment industry
in Bangladesh; (4) salmon farming and processing industry in Chile; (5) the upgrading of
Singapore’s industrial sector from labor to knowledge intensive” (p. 53). According to these
five case studies, there is a point in common among five case studies as one of lessons. The
point in common is that “effective institutions accomplished the role of facilitator or catalyzer
of transformation” (p.95). “First of all, many of them had been created for specific purposes
and had long-term visions and missions. Second, most such institutions regarded public-private
interaction, consultation, or coordination to be of the highest priority, as was seen in the cases
of Thai automobile industry policymakers, the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation,
Bangladesh garment industry policymakers, the Chile Foundation, and Singapore’s Economic
Development Board and Standard, Productivity, and Innovation Board. Third, most of these
institutions adapted flexibly to changes in the global market and phases of industrial
development” (p.95,96). These five cases are really interesting to learn lessons because these
five cases are more specific than case of industrial policy each country implemented.
Therefore, lessons learned from these five cases are also more specific.
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Larry (1990) argued that “the government’s selective industrial policies have
contributed importantly to Korea’s rapid achievement of international competitiveness in a
number of industries” (p.41). He concluded that industrial policy had been able to contribute to
the success of Korean economic growth because of “Korean’s exceptional record of realizing
export success in a wide variety of industries as well as in the strong overall performance of its
industry sector” (p.54). In addition, he tried to get lessons from Korean experiences of
industrial policy. He focused on experiences of industrial policy in Korea in the late 1970s. He
suggested five lessons. First, “the overriding objective of the intervention must be the
achievement of dynamic efficiency in the sense of attaining international competitiveness
within an explicit medium-term time horizon” (p.57). Second, “information relevant to judging
potential comparative advantage must be sought continuously from every possible source”
(p.57). Third, “detailed industry-specific strategy should be reformulated as needed to reflect
the accumulation of pertinent information and experience acquired during the course of
implementation” (p.57). Fourth, “only a small number of industries should be targeted at any
one time, so as not to spread source and specialized technical and entrepreneurial taken too
thinly” (p.57). Finally, “the government’s intervention should not overly constrain the
exploitation of comparative advantage in well-established industries” (p.57).
Noland and Pack (2008) also tried to get lessons from the experiences of industrial
policy. They examined the experiences of industrial policy in East Asian countries, especially
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Japan, Korea, and Taiwan to learn lessons for the Middle East today. They wondered if policies
like industrial policy in East Asian countries from 1950s to 1980s would lead to the same
outcomes in the Middle East. They claimed that it is difficult for the Middle East to adopt East
Asian Style industrial policies because of the international financial institutions, such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the multilateral development banks, and the global
trade regime, like the World Trade Organization (WTO). These two factors are the main
differences between East Asian countries and the Middle East today. Besides, there are two
costs for adopting East Asian Style industrial policies: “encouragement of corruption, and
discouraging the acquisition of skills in the financial system” (Noland and Pack, 2008, p.95).
Although there are the costs, there are positive lessons too. For instance, they learned lessons
like what the Middle East needs to improve for developing their economy from the comparison
between East Asian countries and the Middle East today. They claimed that there are gaps
between them, so the gaps are the one the Middle East needs to get. According to Noland and
Pack (2008), “the relative gap is the smallest with respect to macroeconomic stability, and
appears to be larger with respect to microeconomic and institutional factors and the quality and
relevance of education” (Noland and Pack, 2008, p.98).
This paper chose second group because of two reasons. First, one of the reasons is that
it is impossible to decide whether industrial policy had positive effects on leading economic
growth although previous industrial policy experiences can provide lessons for future.
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According to Pack Howard and Saggi Kamal (2006), “it is impossible to offer a single agreed
counterfactual to evaluate the success of Industrial policy targeted to individual industries” (p.
283). Masao Asada (2005) also said that it is impossible to evaluate only industrial policy
correctly. That’s because purposes, objects, and ways of industrial policy have been changing
by economic, social, and international requests. Therefore, other factors which can influence
economic growth, such as economic and political situation, government, and so on, should be
considered to evaluate industrial policy. It means that the most important thing is not
evaluation of industrial policy but when, why, and how industrial policy was implemented.
According to Bianchi and Labory (2010), “industrial development paths are indeed specific to
countries and cannot be repeated. Industrial development paths depend on the more or less
recent history of the territory, on the social structure, on economic organization and on the
effective institutional governance of the country. The combination of these factors determines a
historical situation that cannot be repeated, and must be addressed by using instruments that
may have been used in other contexts, but have to be adapted to the local context” (p. 325).
Government in a state cannot copy industrial policy in other states because situations that
industrial policy implemented were different. However, the government can get and use some
lessons from the experiences of the industrial policy to their new policy making.
Second, researching previous industrial policy should be for future economic growth
and developing industries in developing countries from the first outset. Even if experiences of
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industrial policy in the past were failure or success, it would be sure that there are significant
lessons from these experiences. The most important thing is that how to make and implement
industrial policy now, so lessons from previous industrial policy experiences are the one
scholar need to analyze. Therefore, this paper analyzed some cases of previous industrial
policy in Japan and China to learn lessons for Myanmar. This paper also considered how the
lessons can apply to a case of Myanmar.
Section 6. Experiences of industrial policy
A. Japan
Japanese industrial policy is one of the most important and successful experiences of
industrial policy. In Japan, industrial policy was mainly implemented from 1945 to 1982.
Japanese industrial policy tried to build up key industries in the short run for economic
revitalization after World War II. During 1950s, the purposes of Japanese industrial policy were
the promotion of industries of acquiring foreign exchanges and promising industries, and the
protection of industries. During 1960s, Japanese government tried to reform the industrial
structure to change protective trade to free trade. During 1970s, Japanese government had to
cope with serious environmental problems and trade disputes which were caused by increasing
international competitiveness and high growth of Japanese economy.
The post-war period from 1945 to 1982 in Japan can be divided into four parts: “(i)
1945-1950 The reconstruction period, (ii) 1951-1960 The industrial catch-up period, (iii) 1961-
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1972 The high growth-rate period, and (iv) 1973-1982 The oil-shock period” (Kagami, 1995,
p.125). This paper discussed experiences of industrial policy in Japan following these four
parts.
(i) 1945-1950 The reconstruction period
After World War II, private enterprise had limitations for economic revitalization, so
Japanese government needed to implement strong industrial policy (Nagaike, 2004, p.270).
Japanese government adopted four policy measures in this period. First policy measure was
constructing the foundation of economic revitalization. Second one was “rationing of
commodities” (Kagami, 1995, p.125).Third policy measure was “price control (including
subsidies to balance the gap between administered prices and production costs)” (Kagami,
1995, p.125). Finally, fourth policy measure was “loan rationing by the Finance Corporation
for Reconstruction” (Kagami, 1995, p.125).
The first policy measure is the most important because it can make “rationing of
commodities” increase too. In this period, “priority production method” is the most famous and
important industrial policy in Japan. According to Hori (2007), the priority production method
was implemented from 1946 to 1947. The priority production method was the method to invest
labor, resources, and money in particular two industries intensively to start up industrial base,
such as electricity, coal, iron, steel, and chemistry for economic revitalization in the short run
(Nagaike, 2004, p.263). Because of the priority production method, Japan was able to construct
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the foundation of economic revitalization (Nagaike, 2004, p. 270).
The third and fourth policy measures are also important. In 1948, J.M.Dodge who was
U.S. economic adviser made a recommendation which is called the Dodge line. “It intended to
wipe out many government controls and make more use of market mechanisms in order to
fight against inflation. A very tight budget was introduced, new loans by Reconstruction
Finance Corporation which ‘was established during the Hoover administration with the
primary objective of providing liquidity to, and restoring confidence in the banking system’
were cut and various subsidies were also abolished according to his recommendation”
(Butkiewicz, 2002). In April, 1949, a new exchange rate was set at 360 yen per US dollar
(which remained in effect until 1971), ending the multiple exchange rate system (Kagami,
1995, p.125).
This period is really important for high economic growth in Japan. In this period, Japan
was under American occupation. Japan had been under American occupation from the end of
World War II in 1945 to April 28 in 1952. After Treaty of San Francisco came into force on
April 28 in 1952, Japan recovered complete sovereignty. A lot of things, such the Constitution
of Japan, educational system, trade system and so on, were provided under American
occupation. Therefore, Japanese industrial policy in this period was influenced by American
occupation. Japanese industrial policy in this period built the basic foundation for high
economic growth. Besides, it can be said that the idea of Japanese industrial policy in this
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period is the basic idea for all industrial policies in Japan.
(ii) 1951-1960 The industrial catch-up period
In this period, Japanese government started to implement industrial policy for
rationalization of industry, and industrial policy for promoting particular industries, such as
synthetic fiber, automobile, synthetic resin, petro chemistry, machine, aircraft, and electrics had
been implemented (Nagaike, 2004, p.263). “During the last half of the 1950s, such industries
as synthetic fiber, plastics, petrochemicals, elections and general machinery were considered
“growth industries” suitable for promotion. The automotive and heavy electric industries were
highly protected by tariffs and import quotas. In addition, high-technology imports were
encouraged to catch up with advanced countries. On the other hand, coal had gradually been
replaced by petroleum” (Kagami, 1995, p.127).
The particular industries of measures for the promotion were chosen by two criterions:
income elasticity and long term productivity. Although synthetic fiber industry and
petrochemicals industry were new industries at the time, Japanese government enacted Five-
year plan for promoting synthetic fiber industry in 1953 and the measure for promoting
petrochemicals industry in 1955. As a result, preferential loan from government financial
institution, the short term repayment for equipments, reduction of taxes on imports, and the
deduction from exports were applied to synthetic fiber industry and petrochemicals industry.
Especially, the measure for promoting petrochemicals industry had three main purposes:
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Industrial Policy
maintaining raw materials for synthetic fiber and synthetic resins, promoting import
substitution for ethylene productions, and reinforcing international competitiveness for main
chemical materials (Matsumoto, 1999, p.623) Japanese government protected and promoted
other modern industries, including automobile industry, heavy electrical industry, and machine
industry. These industries were broad-based industries, so it was needed to develop technology
of company which provided parts. Therefore, the Act on Temporary Measures for machine
industry was enacted in 1956, and the Act on Temporary Measures for electronics industry
in1957. Japanese government thought that the modern industry should be protected as infant
industry. Especially, automobile industry can have broad based relationship between
investment and production and produce a lot of employments. Japanese government enacted
the Foreign Exchange Act in 1949 and the Foreign Investment Law in 1950. These laws limited
imports of some imported products and supported independence of domestic private enterprise.
In 1952, Japanese government enacted Enterprise Rationalization Promotion Law which was
like original form of Japanese industrial policy. In the field of finance, Japan Development
Bank was established as governmental financial agency in 1951 (Nagaike, 2004, p.263). In
1952, Japanese government decided to protect automobile industry. Therefore, to protect the
domestic market from foreign cars, Japanese government tried to do three things to protect
automobile industry. First, Japanese government limited investments from foreigner, erected a
tariff wall, and applied the automobile tax to foreign cars. Second, Japanese government
26
Industrial Policy
promoted technology imports from advanced countries. Third, low-interest financing system
and preferential treatment about finance were proceeded by mainly Japan Development Bank
(Matsumoto, 1999, p.625,626).
During the last period from 1945 to 1950, Japan built the basic foundation for high
economic growth under American occupation. On the other hand, Japan built the basic
foundation for industries without American occupation. It was valuable for Japanese economy
to choose and develop the particular potential industry, especially automobile industry. It was
able to contribute to high economic growth. At the present time, Japanese automobile industry
grew up and it represents not only Japan but also automobile industry in the world.
(iii) 1961-1972 The high growth-rate period / 1973-1982 The oil-shock period
From this period, Japanese economy had improved. Many industries in Japan were at
a level with advanced countries, like western countries. In 1961, the Industrial Structure
Council was established to make clear about the course of industrial structure and proceed
industrial policy for reinforcing the priority industry based on the course of industrial structure.
On the other hand, the new problem as reinforcing domestic industries which can correspond to
liberalization emerged. Japanese government announced Liberalization Plan for Trade and
Foreign Exchange in 1960, so Japanese government tried to change the protective trade to free
trade. As a result, the rate of liberalization was over 90% in 1963 (Nagaike, 2004, p.263). Japan
joined IMF (International Monetary Fund) in 1952 and GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs
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Industrial Policy
and Trade) in1955. Therefore, Japan was not able to avoid liberalization although Japanese
government had resisted liberalization strongly for a while. Finally, after the rate of
liberalization was over 90% in 1963 (Matsumoto, 1999, p. 626). According to Kagami (1995),
Ministry of International Trade and Industry’s “intervention peaked during this period,
endorsed by an unprecedented rate of growth and the confidence that Japan had succeeded in
the industrialization of heavy and chemical industries. However, as previously noted, its
influence has since gradually weakened as the private sector has expanded and come to
participate in the open international economy” (p.128). However, Japanese international
competitiveness was getting strong because of liberalization. Besides, weakening the influence
of government intervention means that the private sector can get power to become independent
from government.
There are three points about industrial policies in this period. First, “rescue packages
were provided for declining industries affected mainly by the change in economic conditions”
(Kagami, 1995,p.129). Second, “the government announced the “Basic Law for the Prevention
of Public Nuisances” in 1967 to fight against pollution and other negative effects of
industrialization”(Kagami, 1995,p.129). Third, “trade friction issues emerged as Japan
penetrated international markets”(Kagami, 1995,p.129).
However, in this period, serious environmental problems were recognized. According to
Kagami (1995), industrial policies influenced environmental problem and Japan’s participate in
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global economy.
In the industrial policy during 1970s, the important point of the intervention into
industrial organization in Japan was shifted to the promotion of development technology.
Therefore, the industrial policy during this period had two aspects: the protection and
promotion of particular industries and the intervention into corporate activity. In August, 1971,
after Nixon shock the exchange rate of the yen was 308 yen to the dollar. “President Richard
Nixon stunned the world by closing the gold window (ending the ability of foreign central
banks to convert their dollar holdings into gold) and slapping a 10% surcharge on imported
goods. These policies were designed to prevent a run on US gold reserves and reverse the
deterioration in the US balance of payments by getting other countries to revalue their
currencies, as well as head off protectionist pressures in Congress. Together with domestic
wage and price controls to reduce inflation, these surprise actions became known as the ‘Nixon
shock’” (Irwin, 2013, p.29). The first oil shock happened in 1973, so Japanese government
cannot avoid changing industrial policy. Therefore, Japanese government had to change the
position of industrial policy which tended to be protective and restricting. Japanese government
also changed the position pursing high economic growth to the new position utilizing high
economic growth. Besides, the industrial structure, which is a relationship and construction
between industries or in nation’s economy, changed from heavy chemical industry to
knowledge integrated type industries in Japan.
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Industrial Policy
The new industrial policy in 1971 regarded four industries as the priority industry:
R&D intensive industry, high-degree manufacturing industry, fashion industry, and knowledge
industry (Matsumoto, 1999, p. 628). Especially, R&D intensive industry had three advantages.
First advantage was “to avoid duplication of investments by each member company in the
consortium” (Kagami, 1995,p.130). Second one was “to share results of R&D among member”
(Kagami, 1995,p.130). Finally, third advantage was “to make product markets competitive”
(Kagami, 1995,p.130).
During 1960s, Japan can accept liberalization and make international competitiveness
in Japan stronger. Although the influence of industrial policy was getting weak, Japanese
economy can be developed by the private enterprise. Therefore, the purpose of industrial policy
changed from focusing domestic market to supporting for industries and private enterprise with
potential to move in on the global market. Additionally, during 1970s, the industrial policy
focused on development of technology. That can support high economic growth and the high
level of living. It can be said that development of technology has made Japan what she is.
B. China
The Chinese government implemented industrial policy from 1945 to 1980s. The period
can be divided into 4 stages. First stage was the restoration period of productivity (from 1949
to 1978). Second stage was the adjustment period of industrial structure (from 1978 to 1985).
Finally, third stage was the transition period of systematization of industrial policy (from 1986
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to 1988). (Chin, 2006, p.6,7). In this paper, the transition period of systematization of industrial
policy includes 1989/ Tiananmen Square.
(i) The restoration period of productivity (from 1949 to 1978)
In this period, powerful, centralized planned economic system was undertaken. The
Chinese central government had the absolute power to make a decision about a distribution of
investment fund, labor, and material (Chin, 2006, p.6). Therefore, the intention of policy by the
Chinese central government was reflected in the allocation of investment. There are two main
characteristic of Chinese industrial policy in this period: priority policy for heavy industry and
planned economy, and location of industry (Kuchiki, 2000, p.17).
a. The priority policy for heavy industry and planned economy
China created planned economic system and adopted priority policy for heavy industry
during the First five year plan from 1953 to 1957. That was because China followed the model
of the socialism in one country from the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union assisted China in
planned policy, technology, and funds (Kuchiki, 2000, p.17). As a result, from 1953 to 1965,
the Chinese central government focused on development of heavy industry, such as steel, coal,
electricity, and machine to create a foundation of industrialization (Chin, 2006, p.6). The First
five year plan was the most successful plan of those implemented before Chinese economic
reform in 1978. However, problems of priority policy for heavy industry showed up. One of
the problems was that priority policy for heavy industry was overdone, so it had a bad
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influence on economy, like a decline in consumption. From 1995, the Chinese central
government tried to review priority policy for heavy industry. Mao Zedong also claimed that
priority policy for heavy industry had problems. He suggested three points. First, agricultures
and light industry were more important than heavy industry, so agricultures and light industry
should be more focused. Second, it was better to exploit existing industrial infrastructure in
coastal area. Third, military industry should be restrained. However, these suggestions were
never reflected in policy making (Kuchiki, 2000, p.17-19). Besides, Mao Zedong advocated
Great Leap Forward which “was China’s alternative to Soviet-style development, an attempt to
leap ahead in production by reorganizing the peasantry into large-scale communes and
mobilizing society to bring about technological revolution in agriculture” (Peng, 1987, p.639).
It increased the output of production of crude steel to 107 million tons in 1958. As a result,
after 1958, the rate of investment for mining and manufacturing industry as a whole was
increasing (Kuchiki, 2000, p.17-19).
b. The location of industry
Before 1978, another important characteristic of Chinese industrial policy was location
of industry. Considering national defense influenced in the location of industry. When China
was established, location of industry was in coastal area, so the rate of production of crude steel
in coastal area was 68%. However, during the First five year plan from 1953 to 1957, the rate
of production of crude steel in coastal area was 37%. The location of industry changed from
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Industrial Policy
coastal area to inland. There were three reasons why the location of industry changed coastal
area to inland location. First, the location of basic materials industry had to be in the producing
center of mineral resources. Second, the Chinese central government tried to narrow the gap
between coastal area and inland area. Third, the reason was the national defense. While the
First five year plan had been making, the Korean War was going and the Constitutional
Nationalist Party in Taiwan was planning countermove to China. Therefore, the Chinese central
government avoided locating industrial area in coastal area (Kuchiki, 2000, p.23,24) The first
and second reason should have been more important than the third reason. However, the third
reason was the most important for Chinese government. The national defense should not be
related to industrial policy because it should be connected with politics. This characteristic of
Chinese industrial policy in this period showed that industrial policy in China was influenced
by political factor rather than economic factor.
From 1964 to 1971, industrial policies which consider national defense were the most
important and pursed further. At the time, China faced the problem of deterioration of
relationships with the United States and the Soviet Union. One of representative industrial
policies from 1964 to 1971 was called Third Front Construction which the Chinese central
government tried to establish the base for heavy industry and military industry in inland for
national defense. Based on Third Front Construction, the Chinese central government tried to
promote energy industry, basic materials industry, machine industry, and military industry. As a
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Industrial Policy
result, the Chinese central government needed to put a lot of investment fund into this
industrial policy, and light industry and coastal area were declining (Kuchiki, 2000, p.25).
Because of Third Front Construction, employment and wages were increased and basic
commodities, such as food and cloth, were in short supply. In 1972, the Chinese central
government started exploring for new industrial policy. There were two measures the Chinese
central government came up with. One of the measures was arrangement of Third Front
Construction. Another one was to import petrochemical plants, such as chemical fertilizer,
synthetic fiber, ethylene, from the United States and Japan. From 1976 to 1978, priority policy
for heavy industry was reactivated. Based on the plan which was made until February in 1978,
implementation of 120 projects, including electricity, coal, steel, and so on, was planned. This
plan was all-inclusive, but this plan produced the expansion of budget deficit and trade deficit.
Therefore, this plan was reviewed in the end of 1978. Although there was the problem of
priority policy for heavy industry which commodity was in short supply, it was not changed
until the end of 1970s. One of the reasons of that was political situation in China. There was no
leadership which can change industrial policy in the Chinese central government (Kuchiki,
2000, p.27).
In this period, political factor influenced industrial policy a lot in China. Not only
priority policy for heavy industry but also Third Front Construction was influenced by political
factor. Especially, national defense had a big effect on industrial policy. Although industrial
34
Industrial Policy
policy should be for economy, Chinese government implemented industrial policy for not only
economy but also national defense. Therefore, industrial policy in this period did not work well
for developing their economy on the whole because light industry and coastal area were
declining and basic commodities were in short supply.
However, these industrial policies, such as priority policy for heavy industry and Third
Front Construction, had also positive effects. For example, priority policy for heavy industry
can develop heavy industry in China. Usually, developing heavy industry is really important
for developing the economic foundation. Besides, employment and wages were increased
because of Third Front Construction.
(ii) The adjustment period of industrial structure (from 1978 to 1985) and the
transition period of systematization of industrial policy (from 1986 to the end of
1980s)
According to Eun and Lee (2002), “since the mid 1980s, the Chinese government has
paid special attention to industrial policy, which had often been regarded as the secret of
Japanese and East Asian economic growth.” (p.6). In this period, there were four main points
of industrial policy in China: the priority policy for light industry, the policy considering
energy and transportation are important, dealing with overlapping investment, and industrial
policy in 1989.
a. The priority policy for light industry
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Industrial Policy
The third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China was known as the start of Chinese economic reform. It expanded the outline of priority
policy for heavy industry and the priority policy for heavy industry was greatly decreased.
According to Kuchiki (2000), the procurement prices of food increased by 20%. The bonus
payment was adopted in cities, and wages was increased in 1979. Since 1978, real wages had
increased by more than 6% per year for three years (p.28). Increasing the procurement prices of
food and the real wages changed the basic mechanism of priority policy for heavy industry.
This mechanism, which was created in 1950s, was that the control of the procurement prices
and the real wages helped company to get much benefit, and the Chinese central government
can siphon off the benefit and save it to invest in heavy industry. The control of the
procurement prices and the real wages was able to reduce savings which the Chinese central
government needed to collect from people and increase the national disposable income. If the
national disposable income can increase, the demand of commodity also can be increased.
Therefore, the Chinese central government came up with the industrial policy which gave light
industry and textile industry priority in planned distribution of investment, foreign exchanges,
and raw fuel. It was said that there were two merits of implementing the industrial policy. One
of them was that development of consumer industry can contribute to the unemployment
problem in cities. Another merit was that increasing a supply of commodity can increase the
nation’s standard living (Kuchiki, 2000, p.28). In the last period, light industry was declining,
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Industrial Policy
basic commodities were in short supply, and the nation’s standard living in China was reduced
because of failures of the industrial policies at the time. However, the priority policy for light
industry in this period was able to improve these problems. It was valuable for Chinese
economy to implement the priority policy for light industry.
Although the industrial policy contributed to developing of consumer industry and
increasing wages, there were two factors to help the industrial policy success. One of them was
that the Chinese central government adopted partial market mechanism. The market
mechanism is “the workings or processes of the free market, e.g. the setting of prices by the
forces of supply and demand, esp. when viewed as sufficient in themselves to regulate the
economy without the need for state intervention” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2000). Another
one was that investment rate did not decrease although the Chinese central government reduced
government saving (Kuchiki, 2000, p.28).
b. The policy considering energy and transportation are important
Since 1982, Chinese government implemented the policy to selectively distribute money
into transportation infrastructure and energy industry. However, the revenue financial source
for the policy was the difficult problem because government savings that the Chinese
government could use directly had been decreasing quickly. Therefore, the Chinese
government came up with the national surcharge for construction of energy and transportation
industry that the Chinese government collected tax from local government, state-owned
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Industrial Policy
enterprise, and so on, and used the tax for construction of energy and transportation industry.
According to Kuchiki (2000), from 1983 to 1985, the Chinese government intended to increase
investment for construction of energy and transportation industry by 12 billion yuan, 12 billion
yuan of them from the national surcharge for construction of energy and transportation
industry, 8 billion yuan from bank loan and national finance. In fact, 36.1 billion yuan was
collected by the national surcharge for construction of energy and transportation industry, and a
total of 180.7 billion yuan had been collected by it until 1995 (p.31-33). Therefore, it can say
that the national surcharge for construction of energy and transportation industry was effective
in fundraising investment of construction of energy and transportation industry. After that, the
policy to collect money by national surcharge was used frequently. For instance, the national
surcharge was used for railway fright transportation, the construction of roads, and so on.
However, many institutions, including local government, used the national surcharge for
many different things, so that imposed a burden on people and companies. As a result, from
1994, the Chinese government started to improve the situation, like changing fundraising from
the national surcharge to from tax (Kuchiki, 2000, p.31-33).
c. Dealing with overlapping investment
After 1980s, market mechanisms worked partially, and the number of companies
which entered the market increased. The Chinese government regarded that as overlapping
investment, and they thought that consolidation of companies was needed. Besides, the
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Industrial Policy
Chinese government thought that it was needed to segregate state-owned enterprise from
private enterprises because state-owned enterprises should not compete in getting materials and
markets (Kuchiki, 2000, p.34).
However, it is a matter of course in market economy that many companies try to enter
market of industries which have a possibility to increase demand. As a result, if competition
happened in market and inefficient companies go bankrupt, it is better because it means that
efficiency of industries is increased. The Chinese government thought that this phenomenon
was negative because of the view of a planned economy (Kuchiki, 2000, p.34).
The policy to deal with overlapping investment implemented in each industry. There
was one of the examples of it. A lot of production line of color television was innovated from
Japan, so the Chinese government issued the circular that the innovation of the production line
cannot be permitted without permission from the Chinese government. The innovation of the
production line virtually was prohibited (Kuchiki, 2000, p.34).
d. Industrial policy in 1989
Industrial policy in 1989 was so important in China because of two reasons. One of
them was that the industrial policy can be the compilation of industrial policy during 1980s.
Another reason was that it was first time in China to implement the industrial policy which was
named “industrial policy.” The industrial policy in 1989 tried to solve five problems of the
industrial structure. First, one of the problems was that there is a lack of productivity of basic
39
Industrial Policy
industries, such as agriculture industry, energy industry, transportation industry, and materials
industry. Second, there is a lack of high level machining ability. Third, each area cannot display
their superiority because of industrial location. Finally, fourth problem was that the level of
market concentration was so low, and cooperative relationship for productivity between
companies was not organized well because industrial structure was dispersive. To solve these
problems, the industrial policy in 1989 pursued especially three things. First, protective
industries and specified industries were put further up on a list in each department of
government, such as productivity, investment, improvement of technology, and import and
export. Second, each department of government and local government proceeded distribution
of investments and investments of foreign capital following the list. Third, bank tried to do
withdrawal of capital from specified industries, and bank financed protective industries.
Finally, the Chinese central government tried to give favorable treatment to protective
industries in tax, transportation, and policy for price (Kuchiki, 2000, p.36).
In this period, the industrial policies were more effective than the industrial policies in
the last period because of two reasons. First reason is that Chinese government tended to use
what they learned from the failures of industrial policies in the last period for the industrial
policy making in this period. Second reason is that the priority policy for light industry, the
policy considering energy and transportation are important, and the industrial policy in 1989
were effective on building economic foundation which can be a base of high economic growth.
40
Industrial Policy
Besides, how to fundraise investment is one of the most important problems in developing
countries. The way of fundraising investment in China like the national surcharge for
construction of energy and transportation industry can offer lessons for developing countries.
Section 7. Impacts of industrial policy
A. Japan
Industrial policy in Japan influenced Japanese economy positively and negatively.
According to Nagaike (2004), during 1945-1959, one of the most important effects of
industrial policy was the construction of foundation for economic revitalization. Based on that,
it was easy for Japan to develop manufacturing industries. After World War II, it was really
difficult for private enterprises to develop the foundation for revitalizing economy in Japan.
Therefore, governmental interventions into private enterprise, like implementing industrial
policy, were needed. It can be said that industrial policy contributed to the construction of
foundation for economic revitalization. It means that industrial policy can lead high economic
growth. Besides, there were many successful cases of R&D projects which were preceded by
industrial policy. It was related to development of technology in Japan. The high technology
was so helpful for development of Japanese economy (p.270).
Industrial policy in Japan influenced in composition of GDP. The composition of GDP
by industries in Japan is showed in Figure1 (Japanese National Economic Counting, 2014).
Additionally, the composition of GDP by manufacturing, agriculture forestry and fishers, and
service industry in the high growth rate period and the oil-shock period is showed in Table
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Industrial Policy
1(Japanese National Economic Counting, 2014). As shown in the Figure1, the rate of
manufacturing industry was 25.9% in 1970, 26.0% in 1980, and 28.2% in 1990 (Japanese
National Economic Counting, 2014). The rate of manufacturing industry had increased, and the
rate accounted for a large percentage. It can be said that manufacturing industry was able to be
the most popular industry in Japan because Japanese government implemented industrial
policy to protect and promote manufacturing. Besides, as indicated in the Figure1, the rate of
service industry was 14.5% in 1970, 15.4% in 1983, and 17.1% in 1998. The rate of service
industry had increased especially from 1980s to 1998 (Japanese National Economic Counting,
2014). The service industry was the one Japanese government promoted after manufacturing
by industrial policy, including R&D projects. Based on the cases of manufacturing industry and
service industry, it can say that the industries, which the Japanese government focused on and
industrial policy implemented for, were developed. The industries which the Japanese
government focused on should be the one Japan needed for economic development. The
industries were developed on the Japanese government’s purpose, so it can say that industrial
policy worked positively for economic development. Therefore, it can say that industrial policy
is effective for developing industries based on the cases of manufacturing industry and service
industry.
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Industrial Policy
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982Agricultural forestry
and fishers5.1 4.7 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.6 4.2 3.9 3.7 3.6 3.3 3.2 3.3
Manufacturing 25.9 26.0 26.2 27.3 26.9 24.8 25.9 25.6 25.0 25.8 26.0 26.0 26.1
Service industry 14.5 14.6 14.8 14.2 14.2 13.7 13.2 13.6 13.3 14.0 14.3 14.6 14.9
Source: Japanese National Economic Counting, 2014
1961-1972The high growth rate
period1973-1982 The oil-shock period
(%)
Table 1. The Composition of GDP in The high growth rate period/The oil-shock period
According to Kagami (1995), there are four positive points from Japanese experiences
of industrial policy. First, it is interesting that Ministry of International Trade and Industry
“protected infant industries during their initial growth periods (forward protection) but also had
to protect them after facing subsequent difficulties (backward protection). Also, expenditures
for backward protection seems greater than those for forward protection” (p.131). Second,
“infant industry protection was also applied in the case of knowledge intensive industries (to
compete with foreign monopolies) since the private return sometimes diverges from the social
return due to externalities and the special characteristics of the industry” (p.131). Third, “the
government determined methods for the transmission and feedback of information. Council
related activities helped private sectors eliminate information gaps in technology, markets,
policies, future prospects and so on. Council thus played a vital role in the exchange of
information much like a switchboard connecting all branches of institutions” (p.131). Fourth,
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Industrial Policy
“industrial policy is always influenced by the changing would. Policy responses for
externalities such as pollution and environmental destruction are one example and trade
frictions are another” (p.131).
Additionally, when Nixon Shock and Oil Shock happened, Japanese economy was
thrown into crisis. However, at the time, industrial policy was able to find a way out of a
difficult situation (Nagaike, 2004, p.270). Japanese GDP growth is shows in Figure 2 (World
Development Indicators, 2016). As indicated in the Figure2, Japanese GDP growth was -1% in
1970 and -1.2% in 1974 because of Nixon Shock and Oil Shock (World Development
Indicators, 2016). However, Japanese GDP growth was recovered in 1972, 1973, and after
1975 because of industrial policy. During 1960s, Japanese GDP growth was the average of
Japanese GDP was 10.4%, and it is so high. Besides, industrial policy had positive effects on
the GDP at market prices (current US $) in Japan. The GDP at market prices (current US $) in
Japan was $44.3 billion in 1960, $209.07 billion in 1970, $1087 billion in 1980, $3103.7
billion in 1990, $4731.2 billion in 2000, and $4601.5 billion in 2014 (World Development
Indicators, 2016). The GDP at market prices (current US $) in Japan has increased, especially
from 1970s to 1990s.
On the other hand, at the same time as high economic growth, environmental
problems were getting serious. Especially, industrial pollutions, such as Yokkaichi asthma,
Minamata disease, and Ouch-ouch disease, were so serious problems in Japan. Besides, Oil
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Industrial Policy
Shock made people consider the necessity of saving energy and resources. Because of these
environmental problems, Japanese government established the standard for environmental
problems which was the severest in the world. As a result, Japan can improve these serious
problems, and Japanese technology for environment is among the highest in the world
(Nagaike, 2004, p.270). Industrial policy led to not only positive effects, like high economic
growth, but also negative effects, like environmental problems. Although there was negative
effects of industrial policy, such as environmental problems, Japan can learned how to improve
it and how to deal with the problems, like establishing the standard for it. That can be one of
positive effects. That’s because improving problems which show up with economic
development is really important. It is needed to solve many problems showed up in the 21st
century, such as energy problem, declining birth date, and so on.
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Industrial Policy
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0
Figure 1. Composition of GDP by industry in Japan 1970-1998
10) Service industry
9) Transportation and Communica-tions
8) Real estate
7) Insurance and Financial
6) Wholesale and Retail trade
5) Electricity, gas, heat supply and wa-ter
4) Building
3) Manufacturing
2) Mining
1) Agricultural forestry and fishers
Source: Japanese National Economic Counting, 2014 46
Industrial Policy
1960
1963
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
2011
2014
-10
-5
0
5
10
15Figure2.Japan GDP growth (annual %) 1960-2014
Japan
Source: World Development Indicators
1960
1963
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
2011
2014
$0
$1,000,000,000,000
$2,000,000,000,000
$3,000,000,000,000
$4,000,000,000,000
$5,000,000,000,000
$6,000,000,000,000
$7,000,000,000,000
Figure. 3 GDP at market prices (current US$) in Japan
Japan
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Industrial Policy
Source: World Development Indicators, 2016
B. China
All in all industrial policy in China was effective in economic growth. Although some
industrial policies did not work well, the Chinese government tried to improve the industrial
policies whenever they found problems of these policies. The improvement was really effective
in economic growth because they can learn lessons for next policy from the improvement. For
example, the priority policy for heavy industry influenced Chinese economy negatively. Based
on the failure of the priority policy for heavy industry, the Chinese government tried to review
the policy and make new industrial policy which focused on light industries. There were three
more failures of industrial policies: Third Front Construction, the policy dealing with
overlapping investment, and the industrial policy in 1989.
a. Third Front Construction
This policy was implemented for national defense, so this policy was wasteful from
the economic view because of two reasons. First, location of factory was chosen by reason of
national defense, so the Chinese central government ignored economic efficacy to choose the
location. Second reason was that a lack of investment and a deterioration of equipment
happened in coastal area. On the other hand, there was also positive effect. The positive effect
was that the policy persevered in the gap between inland and coastal area by development of
infrastructure in inland (Kuchiki, 2000, p.26).
b. The policy dealing with overlapping investment
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Industrial Policy
The policy dealing with overlapping investment was not effective on developing
Chinese economy. The policy impeded competition among companies in the market. As a
result, the emergence of companies which had competitiveness in global market was declined.
Actually, overlapping investment is usually valuable in economy because it can increase
industrial efficacy (Kuchiki, 2000, p.35,36).
c. The industrial policy in 1989
The industrial policy was effective on first problem which there is a lack of
productivity of basic industries, such as agriculture industry, energy industry, transportation
industry, and materials industry. Because of the industrial policy, the productivity of basic
industries had increased. It was unclear if the industrial policy was effective on two problems
because it was difficult to examine the impacts on these problems. One of the problems was
that there is a lack of high level machining ability. Another problem was that each area cannot
display their superiority because of industrial location. Moreover, the industrial policy was not
effective on fourth problem. That’s because the level of market concentration was not able to
improve enough (Kuchiki, 2000, p.37.38).
Although there were some failure cases of industrial policy, they always improve their
policy. Therefore, industrial policy in China had positive effect on economic growth and the
GDP at market prices. Chinese economic growth rate has increased. Chinese GDP growth
shows in Fugure4 (World Development Indicators, 2016). The Chinese GDP growth was
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16.9% in 1969 and 19.4% in 1970 (World Development Indicators, 2016). After 1970, the
Chinese GDP growth had been maintaining positive growth until 2014 except in 1976. Besides,
the GDP at market prices (current US $) in China shows in Figure 5 (World Development
Indicators, 2016). The GDP at market prices (current US $) in China was $59.2 billion in 1960,
$91.5 billion in 1970, $189.6 billion in 1980, $359 billion in 1990, $1205 billion in 2000, and
$10354 billion in 2014 (World Development Indicators, 2016). The GDP at market prices
(current US $) in China has increased from 1960 to present.
1960
1963
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
2011
2014
-30-25-20-15-10
-505
1015202530
Figure 4. Chinese GDP growth (annual %) 1960-2014
China
Source: World Development Indicators
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1960
1964
1968
1972
1976
1980
1984
1988
1992
1996
2000
2004
2008
2012
$0
$2,000,000,000,000
$4,000,000,000,000
$6,000,000,000,000
$8,000,000,000,000
$10,000,000,000,000
$12,000,000,000,000
Figure5. GDP at market prices (current US$) in China
China
Source: World Development Indicators, 2016
Besides, according to Chin (2006), the industrial policy in China was effective on the
industrial structure in China. Since 1978, the industrial structure in China changed with
economic growth (p.9). Additionally, the industrial policy influenced in the composition of
GDP. The composition of GDP by sector in China shows in Figure 6 (China Statistics Press,
2016). According to China Statistics Press (2014), the composition of GDP of agriculture was
1027.5 million yuan in 1978, 1371.6 million yuan in 1980, 5062 million yuan in 1990, 14944
million yuan in 2000, 40533.6 million yuan in 2010, and 56957 million yuan in 2013. The
composition of GDP of agriculture had decreased from 28.1% in 1978 to 14.6% in 2003.
According to China Statistics Press (2014), the composition of GDP of industries was 1745.2
million yuan in 1978, 2192 million yuan in 1980, 7717.4 million yuan in 1990, 45555.9 million
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yuan in 2000, 187383.2 million yuan in 2010, and 249684.4 million yuan in 2013.The
composition of GDP of industries had increased from 48.2% in 1978 to 52.2% in 2003.
According to China Statistics Press (2014), the composition of GDP of services was 872.5
million yuan in 1978, 982 million yuan in 1980, 5888.4 million yuan in 1990, 38714 million
yuan in 2000, 173596 million yuan in 2010, and 262203.8 million yuan in 2013.The
composition of GDP of services had increased from 23.7% in 1978 to 33.2% in 2003. The
industrial policy also influenced in employment structure.
The number of employees had increased from 499 million people in 1985 to 737
million people in 2002. Additionally, the rate of employees of agriculture had decreased from
62.42% in 1985 to 50% in 2002. The rate of employees of industries had increased from 48.2%
in 1978 to 52.2% in 2003. The rate of employees of services had increased from 23.7% in 1978
to 33.2% in 2002. As a result, a lot of employee moved from agriculture to services. It means
that the dual economy structure in China changed to modern economy structure, so Chinese
had been industrializing. Besides, this result can show that the three situations, such as the
foundation of agriculture was weak, the unbalanced development of industries, and low level
of service industry, were improved by the industrial policy which the Chinese central
government had implemented for almost 25 years (Chin, 2006, p.9).
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197819791980198119821983198419851986198719881989199019911992199319941995199619971998199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010201120122013
0 50000 100000 150000 200000 250000 300000
Fugire 6. Composition of GDP by sector in China 1978-2012
services
industries
agriculture
(1000 million yuan/ 1yuan = almost $ 1500 million)
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Source: China Statistics Press, 2014
Section 8. Lessons from industrial policy
A. Japan
There are three lessons from Japanese experiences of industrial policy.
First, in developmental initial stage of economy or restoration period after war, it is
effective for developing industries and economic growth to proceed industrial policy by
government for reinforcement of competitiveness of particular policy. Based on the analysis of
developmental stages and competitiveness for each industry, it is needed to classify industry
under two types: protective industry which should take protective policy and other industry
which was exposed to market principle and competition principle. After that, government can
know which industry they need to protect and promote and they can plan and implement
industrial policy for the industry intensively (Nagaike, 2004, p.270). The way to protect and
promote industries is the most important characteristic of Japanese industrial policy. The
Japanese government was able to use the way to protect and promote industries which had a
possibility of economic growth at the ideal time. Choosing industrial policy and time is really
important as well as what industrial policy was implemented. However, according to Nagaike
(2004), protecting and promoting the particular industry should be temporary and it is
important to put the particular industry into competitive market after the certain period which is
implementing industrial policy to protect and promote the particular industry. That’s because
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the basic thought of industrial policy is to help industry and company to perform autonomous
management (p.270).
Second, it is effective on economic growth to focus on development of technology
after building the construction of foundation for economic revitalization. The Japanese
government shifted the purpose of industrial policy from building the construction of
foundation for economic revitalization to developing technology. The shift is one of the most
important things for high economic growth in Japan because the development of technology
can support and promote high economic growth. To promote the development of technology, it
was needed to advance educational institutions and research institutions. Advancing
educational institutions and research institutions had a positive effect on human resources.
That’s because advancing educational institutions and research institutions can give people
high skills and provide high quality human resources. Based on these, industrial policy which
focused on the development of technology was necessary for high economic growth in Japan.
It is valuable for developing countries to implement the industrial policy which focused on the
development of technology like Japan did.
Third, the longer industrial policy is implemented, the weaker international
competitiveness will be. One of problems of Japanese industrial policy was to lose timing of
stopping industrial policy because Japanese government protected the particular industries too
long (Nagaike, 2004, p.270). Although industrial policy can help the particular industries to
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develop, the particular industry cannot rely on industrial policy forever. After a certain period,
the particular industry needed to develop individually without industrial policy. Besides, if the
government protected the particular industry too long, it is possible that other industries cannot
be developed because the government focused on the particular industry to develop. According
to Nagaike (2004), there are two important things governments should do for developing
economy and industries. One of the most important thing governments should do for
developing economy and industries is not to intervene into private enterprise too much but to
create the environment which private enterprise can do corporate activities freely by
implementing industrial policy moderately. Another one is to equip infrastructure for industries
because it is really difficult to do that by only private enterprise (p.270)
B. China
There are two important lessons from Chinese experiences of industrial policy in
general. First, industrial policy should be the policy which can make the best use of advantages
each state has. The Chinese government tried to implement industrial policies which can make
the best use of advantages China had. It can be learned from the policy considering energy and
transportation are important. In the policy considering energy and transportation, the Chinese
government tried to use their advantage: population. In 1982, the Chinese government decided
to focus on development of energy industry and transportation infrastructure. However, the
Chinese government did not have enough savings to use for development of energy industry
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and transportation infrastructure at the time. Therefore, the Chinese government introduced the
national surcharge for construction of energy and transportation industry which was that the
Chinese government collected tax from people, local government, state-owned enterprise, and
so on, and used the tax for construction of energy and transportation industry. As a result, the
Chinese government was successful in increasing investment for construction of energy and
transportation industry. In addition, 36.1 billion yuan was collected by the national surcharge
for construction of energy and transportation industry, and a total of 180.7 billion yuan had
been collected by it until 1995 from 1983 (Kuchiki, 2000, p.31-33).The policy was really
effective on increasing investment for industries and infrastructures the Chinese government
focused on. It can say that the policy can contribute to economic development. Therefore, it is
really effective on economic development to implement industrial policies which can make the
best use of advantages each state has.
Second, Chinese central government tried to implement industrial policy for
development of regional industry. Chinese industrial policy covered wide range of industry,
such as heavy industry, light industry, industrial infrastructures, finance, and so on. Especially,
it is really important point that Chinese central government tried to implement industrial policy
for development of regional industry. For example, one of purposes of Third Front
Construction is to persevere in the gap between inland and coastal area by development of
infrastructure in inland. It is really important for China to persevere in the gap between inland
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and coastal area because China has big country and it is easy for China to have the gap.
According to Hashida (1997), implementing the industrial policy to develop regional industry
is one of the most important differences between Chinese industrial policy and Japanese
industrial policy. This lesson can apply to states which has big country. Besides, even if state
has small country, regional disparities are really serious problems. Therefore, this lesson is
really important.
C. Common Lessons
There are two lessons from experiences of industrial policy in both Japan and China in
common. First, both the Japanese government and the Chinese government implemented
industrial policies for the construction of foundation for economic development and promotion
of basic industries at first. To develop economy in developing countries, it is really important to
build the construction of foundation for economic development and promote basic industry
because of two reasons. First, developing countries can start developing their economy since
they have these two elements, the construction of foundation for economic development and
promotion of basic industries. Second, industries in developing countries cannot be developed
without these two elements. Both Japan and China was able to be successful in building the
construction of foundation for economic development and promoting basic industries by
implementation of industrial policies. Besides, based on these two elements, Japan and China
grew their economy and kept high economic growth. Therefore, the importance of the
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construction of foundation for economic development and promotion of basic industries can be
learned from experiences of industrial policy in both Japan and China in common.
Second, the most important lesson from experiences of industrial policy in both Japan
and China in common is to implement industrial policy for the right purpose and at ideal time
considering background each state has, such as culture, political and economic background,
advantage, location, and so on. It means that these questions, what right purpose is, how to
implement industrial policy and when ideal time is, are so important. These are really
important because there is no industrial policy which can work well in every state. Therefore,
the government in each state needs to make and implement industrial policy considering its
own background. Japanese industrial policy and Chinese industrial policy were different.
However, each industrial policy was successful because both of them fit the background they
had. For instance, Japanese industrial policy fit Japanese culture. Chinese industrial policy fit
political background in China. Therefore, it is needed that government in each state
understands and analyzes the background in each state well and makes industrial policy which
can fit the background. Besides, to implement industrial policy successfully, it is needed to
implement industrial policy on right purpose at ideal time. The government needs to analyze
and consider what right purpose is and when ideal time is. It is the most difficult, but it is also
the most important. Although answers for these questions, what right purpose is, how to
implement industrial policy and when ideal time is, cannot be replicated from experiences of
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industrial policy in advanced countries, how important these are and how to analyze the
situations can be learned from the experiences.
Section 9. Economic and political situation in Myanmar
GDP at market prices (current US $) in Myanmar is shown in Figure 6 (World
Economic Outlook Database, 2015). According to World Economic Outlook Database (2015),
GDP at market prices was $7.454 billion in 1998. GDP at market prices in Myanmar was
increased from 1998 to 2014, so GDP at market prices in Myanmar was $63.135 billion in
2014. Since 2000, the GDP growth rate in Myanmar has kept high GDP growth rate. The GDP
growth rate in Myanmar from 1960 to 2014 is shown in Figure 7 (World Development
Indicators, 2015 and IMF World Economic Outlook Database, 2015 for Data from 2005 to
2012). In 2008, the GDP growth rate in Myanmar was 3.6% because huge cyclone “Nargis”
influenced in agriculture and the recession in neighbor countries had effects on the rate (Sekiya
and Ito, 2011). After that, the GDP growth rate in Myanmar recovered. Based on the high GDP
growth rate, one can say that there is a great possibility to develop economy in Myanmar. What
points can be specific possibilities to develop economy in Myanmar? This section provides the
possibilities of economic development in Myanmar. In addition, this section shows the
problems of economic development and future issues.
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1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
$0
$10,000,000,000
$20,000,000,000
$30,000,000,000
$40,000,000,000
$50,000,000,000
$60,000,000,000
$70,000,000,000
Figure 7. GDP at market prices (current US $) in Myanmar
Myanmar
Source: World Economic Outlook Database (2015)
1960
1963
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
2011
2014
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20Figure 8. Myanmar GDP growth (annual %) 1960-2014
Myanmar
Source: World Development Indicators (2015), and IMF World Economic Outlook Database (2015) for Data from 2005 to 2012
(i) Possibilities of economic development in Myanmar
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According to Ida (2005), there are three possibilities of economic development for
Myanmar: human resources, natural resources, and domestic market growth (p.219).
a. Human resources
Myanmar may benefit from a “demographic dividend” with a large share of the
population engaged in productive work and supporting a smaller share of older and non-
working people (Tanaka, Spohr, and Amico, 2015, p.43). According to Kano (2014), there are
cheap and good quality human resources in Myanmar. The population in Myanmar was
56,320,206 people in 2015 (World Factbook, 2015). In the scale of this population, modern
industries can be built. Comparing with countries in Greater Mekong Sub region which is the
countries along the Mekong River, such as China, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, and
Myanmar, the population in Myanmar was virtually the same as the population in Thailand and
Vietnam which are already developing. The population in each country in Greater Mekong Sub
region shows in Table 1.
Country PopulationChina 1,365,485,388Cambodia 15,708,756Laos 6,911,544Vietnam 94,348,835Thai 67,976,405Myanmar 56,320,206
Table 2. The population in each country in Greater Mekong Sub region
Source: The World Factbook (2015)
In addition, the working-age population in Myanmar will increase until 2030. The
working-age population in each country is shown in Table 2. Based on its population,
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Myanmar has abundant human resources.
(unit: million)2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
From 2010 to 2030 From 2010 to 2050Thai 47.68 48.4 45.11 40.01 35.29 -5.4 -26
Vietnam 62.31 68.4 70.77 69.54 64.73 13.6 3.9Laos 3.81 4.77 5.8 6.7 7.24 52.2 90
Cambodia 9.07 10.66 12.33 13.73 14.22 35.9 56.8Myanmar 35.75 39.63 41.49 41.42 39.31 16.1 10Philippine 57 70.24 82.45 94.47 104.58 44.6 85.3Malaysia 19.08 22.79 25.09 27.18 27.84 31.5 45.9Singapore 3.74 4.33 4.29 4.26 4.19 14.7 12Indonesia 156.83 182.75 200.9 207.95 209.97 28.1 33.9
ASEAN10 395.6 452.29 488.57 505.58 507.7 23.5 28.3Bangladesh 96.31 115.69 128.73 135.5 134.43 33.7 39.4
China 999.57 1003.95 987.57 909.45 849.89 -1 -15Japan 81.19 73.67 68.91 61.03 55.16 -15.1 -32.1Korea 35.22 35.89 32.89 29.7 27.11 -6.6 -23
Source: UN, World Population Prospect: The 2012 Revision
Rate of Change(%)
Table 3. The working-age population in each country
Moreover, wages are comparatively low in Myanmar although recently wages have
been increasing. This can be an advantage for economic development because it is possible that
many companies from developed countries will try to advance in Myanmar.
The high literacy rate is also related to good quality human resources in Myanmar.
According to UNESCO (2015), the adult literacy rate, population over 15 years in Myanmar is
93.09%. The rate was higher than Cambodia and Laos. The adult literacy rate, population over
15 years in Cambodia is 77.19% (UNESCO, 2015). In Laos, the adult literacy rate, population
over 15 years is 79.86% (UNESCO, 2015). Besides, in 1980, the adult literacy rate, population
over 15 years was 79% in Myanmar, 65% in China, 67% in Indonesia, and 69% in Malaysia.
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(UNESCO, 2015). In 1980, Myanmar had higher literacy rate than many other developing
countries. The reason why Myanmar can keep high literacy rate is the spread of temple
elementary school (Kano, 2014, p. 62). Literacy is one of the most important things to develop
the economy. Therefore, one can say that Myanmar has a possibility to develop economy.
According to Kano (2014), although Myanmar’s human resources are abundant, a demand of
employment is still weak because of the economic underdevelopment. That’s because of a ban
on import of products from Myanmar was lifted with conditions in the United States in 2003. It
is difficult for companies from other countries to advance into Myanmar because they cannot
get enough benefit if they cannot make inroads in the United States market from Myanmar
(p.62). Myanmar needs to make the best use of abundant human resources which is one of the
possibilities to develop economy. Therefore, it is needed for using the human resources to
reinforce a demand of employment. However, according to Tanaka, Spohr, and Amico (2015),
“the country suffers from a number of key deficits in its labor market structure. A large share of
workers is underemployed and thus are not able to contribute their full energy to economic
output. Moreover, the workforce is relatively under-educated and low-skilled. And finally, the
creation of an organized workforce is still in its infancy, with most workers engaged in various
types of informal work and with a trade union movement that is only recently reviving after
years of the suppression. Labor disruptions due to strikes may pose a concern for foreigners
seeking to invest and take advantage of low wages” (p. 43). Although human resources in
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Myanmar has possibilities to develop their economy, there are many problems which have to
be improved.
b. Natural resources
Myanmar has abundant natural resources. There is Andaman Sea in South of
Myanmar, so Myanmar is endowed with resources of agriculture, forestry and fisheries, such as
rice, sesame seeds, beans, shrimp, and teakwood. Myanmar is also endowed with natural
resources, like gold, oil, natural gas, coal, silver, zinc, and tungsten, and jewelry, like ruby and
sapphire (Ida, 2005, p. 220). According to Clark (1999), “Myanmar is a resource-rich nation
that lacks the necessary capital and expertise to develop domestically and must rely on foreign
investment and technology if it is to increase resource development, production, and
utilization. Although in the future, the country may be able to rely more on Asian investors in
these sectors, at present this is uncertain. In particular, many of the primary investor nations
(France, the U.K., the U.S., Japan, Australia, and Canada) have some constraints on investment
in Myanmar that, under certain circumstances, may be strengthened and expanded” (p.787).
Therefore, natural resources is one of the strong possibilities to develop economy in Myanmar.
c. Domestic market growth
There is a possibility that domestic market will be developed because of cheap and
good quality human resources and abundant natural resources. According to Ida (2005), there
are three industries which have strong potential: simple labor-intensive industry, capital-
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intensive industry, and agro industry.
1. Simple labor-intensive industry
Simple labor-intensive industry, such as apparel manufacturer and assembly operation
of electronics product, has strong potential in Myanmar because low wages can be utilized in
simple labor-intensive industry. In Myanmar, there is no basic materials industry and parts
supply industry, so procurement cost for raw materials tends to be expensive. Therefore,
Myanmar needs to focus on industry which labor cost is higher to make the best possible use of
low wages. Besides, purchasing power in domestic market is still low, so it is better to establish
an export-oriented economic structure (Ida, 2005, p.221). Based on these, it is needed for
Myanmar to accelerate free trade agreements with other countries. The free trade agreements
can help Myanmar to develop Simple labor-intensive industry.
2. Capital-intensive industry
Next, capital-intensive industry which utilizes abundant natural resources also has
strong potential. However, Myanmar cannot use natural resources enough to develop economy.
According to Than (2005), “in terms of value-added output, Myanmar's energy sector is still a
small part of the overall economy. In 1990/91, the earliest financial year for which separate
sectoral data is available, the energy (oil & gas plus electricity) sector's contribution to the
country's GDP was only 0.99 per cent, whereas the electricity sub-sector alone accounted for
0.68 per cent. A decade later, in 2000/01, the energy sector's share rose to 1.6 per cent, while
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electricity's share came to 1.09 per cent”(p.284). In Myanmar, mechanizing and building
equipment were not developed enough. If these things are improved, there are possibilities to
expand a scale of productivity and promote work efficacy. Additionally, the food processing
technology in Myanmar is still low, so processed foods which have high added value, such as
snacks, alcohol, and fish paste, cannot be produced in Myanmar. However, if the food
processing technology in Myanmar is getting higher, it is possible that capital-intensive
industry in Myanmar can be developed based on abundant natural resources (Ida, 2005, p.221).
3. Agro industry
A domestic demand of agro industry can be expected because the composition of GDP
by sector of origin in Myanmar is agriculture: 36.1% and the rate is still high (World Factbook,
2015). Therefore, the government also focuses on agro industry. Specifically, food industry,
manufacture of farm machine, and fertilizer production can be a core of industrial
development. Especially, manufacture of farm machine can contribute to development of
machine industry. Agro industry is important for economic development in Myanmar (Ida,
2005, p.222) According to Sekiya and Ito (2011), to develop industries which have strong
potential, industrial policy which can make the best use of these potential factors is needed.
Especially, it is so important that industrial policy should be connected with attracting foreign
direct investment.
As a result, Myanmar has some great possibilities of economic development. Although
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there are some great possibilities of economic development in Myanmar, Myanmar is still
developing country and is not able to develop well. Next, this paper discusses what problems
of economic development and future issues are.
(ii) Problems of economic development and future issues
There are two main causes which economic development in Myanmar did not work
well: preparation of industrial infrastructure and education.
a. The underdevelopment of industrial infrastructure
According to Ida (2005), the underdevelopment of industrial infrastructure, especially
for electricity, communication, and transportation, hinders economic development in Myanmar.
1. Electricity
The condition of electricity is quite inadequate in Myanmar. “Lack of reliable power
supply is a main obstacle of industry in Myanmar cities. Similarly, water supply and sanitary
system is very crucial for product hygiene of most agricultural processing industries. In
addition, telecommunication system (telephone and internet) is necessary for production
coordination and business activities” (Rudjanakanoknad and Limsathayurat, 2015, p. 2,3).
Kudo (2007) did a survey about electricity in Myanmar. As a result, “69 firms among the 139
respondents answered that they had experienced power interruptions more than three times a
day and that these had often lasted for more than three hours. Therefore, most manufacturers
had to use their own and/or share generators. Out of 141 garment factories, 134 factories had
used their own or shared generators” (Kudo, 2007, p.13). Additionally, the toll collection
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system of electricity does not work well. Almost all citizens do not pay electricity charges, so
the government cannot collect fees. Therefore, the government cannot improve power facilities
and power distribution equipment in Myanmar because they cannot collect money for it. It is
needed to improve the toll collection system of electricity and use money from the system to
improve the condition of electricity (Ida, 2005, p.228).
2. Communication
According to Ida (2005), the underdevelopment of industrial infrastructure for
communication hinders economic development in Myanmar. The number of household fixed-
line phone is still low. In 1996, mobile phone was spread, but the users are limited because the
fee of mobile phone is expensive (p.229). The number per 100 population 2012, mobile and
internet users shows in Figure 8 (UNICEF, 2013). Based on Figure 8, The number per 100
population 2012, mobile phone were 11.2(UNICEF, 2013). The number does not have many.
On the other hand, the number per 100 population 2012, mobile phone were 132 in Cambodia
and 120.3 in Thailand (UNICEF, 2013). Although these two countries are still developing
countries, the users of mobile phone are a lot. Comparing with these countries, the diffusion
rate of mobile phone in Myanmar is so low (UNICEF, 2013). Since 2002, limiting browsing
web page was abolished and people can see every web site in the world (Ida, 2005,p.229).
However, according to Figure 8, the number per 100 population 2012, internet users was 1.1.
The number was so low comparing with other countries. It is needed to improve the low
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diffusion rate of mobile phone and internet in Myanmar because it can be one of causes to
hinder activities of foreign business in Myanmar.
Myanmar Thaiand Cambodia Japan China0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Figure 9. Number per 100 population 2012, mobile phones and Internet users
Mobile phonesInternet users
Source: UNICEF (2013)
3. Transportation
The underdevelopment of industrial infrastructure for transportation is one of the most
important problems in Myanmar. The development of industrial infrastructure for
transportation is imperfection because Myanmar got into financial trouble and foreign aid for
Myanmar had been stopped in 2003. In Yangon, the rate of paved road is high. However, the
rate of paved road on the whole is so low. The rate of paved road was 11.85% in 2005
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Moreover, surface condition is so bad, so it may cause transportation of precision instrument to
have trouble. Regarding train, although there is the government managed train in Yangon, the
train is old and poor quality. The marine transportation is also old and poor quality. Therefore,
transportation in Myanmar did not reach the level (Ida, 2005, p.229,230). The
underdevelopment of industrial infrastructure for transportation tends to hinder inland transport
and foreign trade. If the underdevelopment of industrial infrastructure for transportation is
improved, inland transport and foreign trade can be promoted more. It can be related to
developing their economy.
b. Education
Education is one of the most important factors to develop economy because education
influences in quality of labor and makes potential ability of economic growth higher. Although
literacy is high in Myanmar, professional education and higher education are not popular in
Myanmar. Therefore, there are few labors that have skills. There are two problems which are
related to education: low rate of school attendance and poor professional education.
1. low rate of school attendance
The primary school and secondary school participation, net attendance ratio (%) from
2008 to 2012 shows in Figure 9 (UNICEF, 2013). According to UNICEF (2013), the rate of
primary school participation in Myanmar was 89.8% in male and 90.6% in female. The rate
was high. However, the rate of secondary school participation in Myanmar was 58% in male
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and 58.6% in female (UNICEF, 2013). The rate was lower than the rate of primary school
participation in Myanmar. This can be a problem for the economic development in Myanmar
because it is difficult for people to get skills to work if they graduate from just primary school.
Male Female Male FemalePrimary School Secondary School
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Figure 10. Primary School and Secondary school par-ticilation, Net attendance ratio (%) 2008-2012
Myanmar
Source: UNICEF (2013)
2. poor professional education
Thinking about labor in Myanmar, it is important to make more opportunity that
people can get professional education. According to Kano (2014), many excellent students in
Myanmar tend to go to university to study in the medical department and department of
technology. However, there are few vocational schools for workers and engineers, so there are
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few opportunities that workers and engineers can get professional skills without university
(p.68). The situation should be improved because Myanmar needs labors that have skills to
work. It can be related to the economic development in Myanmar.
To deal with two main causes which economic development in Myanmar did not work
well: preparation of industrial infrastructure and education, it is really needed to implement
industrial policy. If implementing industrial policy can solve problems Myanmar has,
Myanmar can develop their economy more and more. Therefore, Myanmar needs lessons about
industrial policy from past experiences of it. Next section examines what lessons from
experiences of industrial policy in Japan and China are.
Section 10. How to apply the lessons to Myanmar (Policy recommendation)
A. The model of industrial policy to protect and promote particular industry
First, the model of industrial policy to protect and promote particular industry is really
effective on economic growth in Myanmar. Myanmar does not have industries which can
maintain the state and the construction of foundation for economic development in Myanmar is
really weak. The government in Myanmar does not have enough savings to invest a lot of kinds
of industries, so the government in Myanmar needs to choose particular industry and protect
and promote the particular industry. If Myanmar can be successful in protecting and promoting
the particular industry, the development of the particular industry can make the circulation of
money to be better. The circulation of money is really important because GDP at market prices
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can increase and business would be better.
After World War II, the Japanese government implemented industrial policy, such as
priority production method, to protect and promote the particular industry. It can say that the
industrial policy helped Japanese economy to develop until what it is today. The model of
industrial policy to protect and promote particular industry can be applied to Myanmar as the
lesson from experiences of industrial policy in Japan. That’s because Myanmar has potential
industries, like simple labor-intensive industry, capital-intensive industry, and agro industry.
Moreover, there are abundant natural resources and great human resources in Myanmar.
Therefore, it is easier to apply the model to Myanmar.
This paper recommends the industrial policy to protect and promote capital-intensive
industry, especially natural gas, because of two reasons. First, natural gas is main export
product in Myanmar. The natural gas revenues show in Figure 11. According to IMF Country
Report No. 15, 268 (2015), “natural resource exports accounted for 70 percent of national
exports, or about 11percent of GDP in2012 /13, with natural gas alone making up 40 percent of
the total (US$3.6billion). Natural resources are the country’s prime source of foreign exchange
earnings and a major attraction for FDI, and contribute significantly to the government budget.
With 10 trillion cubic feet of proved gas reserves in 2014, Myanmar ranks 38th in the world
(US Energy Information Administration) and is the largest natural gas exporter in Southeast
Asia. The recently completed onshore and offshore oil and gas bidding rounds bode well for
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future production” (p.3).
Figure 11. The Natural Gas Revenue
Second, infrastructure development is necessary for protecting and promoting capital-
intensive industry, especially natural gas. The underdevelopment of infrastructure can be one of
the problems to hinder economic development in Myanmar. Promoting infrastructure
development can make the construction of foundation for economic development in Myanmar
stronger. Besides, promoting infrastructure development can increase employment
opportunities. Therefore, it can say that the model of industrial policy to protect and promote
particular industry is really effective on economic growth in Myanmar.
B. The model of raising revenue for industrial policy
Second, the model of raising revenue for industrial policy from experiences of
industrial policy in China can be applied to Myanmar. To implement industrial policy, like
developing infrastructure, the government needs huge funds for investment. In 1982, the
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Chinese government implemented the policy considering energy and transportation are
important, the Chinese government faced the financial problem because they did not have
enough savings for the policy. There is a possibility that the government in Myanmar will face
the financial problem like China had. To solve the financial problem, the Chinese government
came up with the national surcharge for construction of energy and transportation industry. The
Chinese government made the best use of their advantage: population. In Myanmar, population
can be one of their strong advantages. Besides, Myanmar has a strong advantage as well as
natural resources. Therefore, the model of raising revenue for industrial policy from
experiences of industrial policy in China can be applied to Myanmar. Fund is one of the most
important things to develop economy in developing countries. It is more important for
developing countries to build the system of fundraising for industrial policy by themselves than
being dependent on aid from advanced countries.
This paper recommends raising natural resources revenues. The tax revenue in 2014
shows in Figure 12.
Figure 12. The Tax Revenue in 2014
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Source: Myanmar Selected Issues, Asia and Pacific Department in International
Monetary Fund, IMF Country Report No. 15, 268, 2015
“Given Myanmar’s extremely low tax yield compared to peer countries (Figure 12),
natural resource revenues represent a vital source of income for the country. In order to realize
the revenue potential of this endowment, there is a need to review current practices to identify
weaknesses and address them based on international best practices. In particular, the fiscal
regime for natural resources should be revised to maximize the stream of net government
revenues; the fiscal framework should ensure a smooth and sustainable path of public
investment in development; and the institutions and procedures in support of these efforts
should ensure transparency, accountability and good governance to minimize revenue
leakages” (IMF Country Report No. 15, 268, 2015, p.5). Therefore, raising natural resources
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revenues is really effective on raising fund. Myanmar can make the best use of their advantage,
which is natural resources, if they tried to raise natural resources revenue.
C. The model of industrial policy to develop professional education system and
technology
Finally, the model of industrial policy to develop professional education system and
technology learned from experiences of industrial policy in Japan can be applied to Myanmar.
Myanmar keeps high literacy rate and has cheap and good quality human resources. However,
professional education system is weak in Myanmar. Therefore, many people cannot get high
skills to work. It may be related to the underdevelopment of economy. If the industrial policy
for development of professional education system and technology can improve technological
skills, level of not only technology but also human resources will be increased. The
development of professional education system and technology can contribute to economic
development. Besides, improving labor’s skill can increase employment opportunities of labor
in not only Myanmar but also the world and activate the consumption activity and the
circulation of money. In addition, to implement industrial policies, like promoting R&D, for
economic development, educational institutions and research institutions can be improved.
Improving educational institutions and research institutions can also improve educational
standard in Myanmar, so it is possible to increase labors that are active around the world. It can
make Myanmar be globalization and give Myanmar international competitiveness for global
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market.
This section discusses how to apply the lessons to Myanmar. However, the most
important thing is to implement industrial policy which can fit situations in Myanmar.
Therefore, it is needed to understand and analyze the situations more and more when the
government in Myanmar tries to make and implement industrial policy. That’s because the
situations are always changing.
Section 11. Conclusion
This paper examined previous experiences of industrial policy in Japan and China and
got lessons for Myanmar. In Myanmar, there are three possibilities to develop its economy:
human resources, natural resources, and domestic growth industry. Although there are these
possibilities, there are also problems which hinge economic development. One of the problems
is the underdevelopment of industrial infrastructure, especially for electricity, communication,
and transportation. Another problem is low quality of professional education system.
Based on analysis of Japanese industrial policy from 1945 to 1982, there are three
lessons from Japanese industrial policy. First, in developmental initial stage of economy or
restoration period after war, it is effective for development industries and economic growth to
proceed industrial policy by government for reinforcement of competitiveness of particular
policy. Second, it is effective on economic growth to focus on development of technology after
building the construction of foundation for economic revitalization. Third, the longer industrial
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policy does implemented, the weaker international competitiveness will be.
Moreover, based on analysis of Chinese industrial policy from 1945 to 1980s, there
are two lessons from Chinese industrial policy. First, industrial policy should be the policy
which can make the best use of advantages each state has. Second, Chinese central government
tried to implement industrial policy for development of regional industry.
There are also two common lessons from Japanese industrial policy and Chinese
industrial policy. First, both the Japanese government and the Chinese government
implemented industrial policies for the construction of foundation for economic development
and promotion of basic industries at first. Second, the most important lesson from experiences
of industrial policy in both Japan and China in common is to implement industrial policy on
right purpose at ideal time considering background each state has, such as culture, political and
economic background, advantage, location, and so on.
Based on these, this paper provided three policy recommendations. First policy
recommendation is the model of industrial policy to protect and promote particular industry.
Second one is the model of raising revenue for industrial policy. Finally, the most important
policy recommendation is the model of industrial policy to develop professional education
system and technology.
This paper examined only two cases of industrial policy, Japan and China, but it is
needed to examine cases of industrial policy in many countries. That’s because each state has
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its own industrial policy on its purpose. Therefore, next research needs to examine previous
industrial policy in a lot of countries.
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