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Crafting a Global Trade Strategy: The U.S. and the WTO Economic Perspectives Volume 5 An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State Number 1

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Page 1: crafting a global trade strategy the US and the WTO

Crafting a Global Trade Strategy:

The U.S. and the WTO

EconomicPerspectivesVolume 5 An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State Number 1

Page 2: crafting a global trade strategy the US and the WTO

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

Crafting A Global Trade Strategy: The U.S. and The WTO

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE ELECTRONIC JOURNAL VOLUME 5, NUMBER 1, FEBRUARY 2000

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In February 2000 members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) voted in General Councilto launch within weeks negotiations on agriculture and services to which they previouslycommitted.

That decision was the first one WTO members made since the December ministerial meeting inSeattle, which failed to initiate a new and comprehensive round of global trade talks.

While the United States is firmly committed to moving forward with new negotiations, itremains unclear whether WTO members will discover the political will to muster meaningfulprogress toward trade liberalization in 2000.

Progress will depend, in part, on the participation of developing countries at a level never seenbefore — and Clinton administration officials are re-examining their positions with thatrealization in mind. It also will require a greater commitment by the industrial countries todismantle trade barriers in their most sensitive industrial and agricultural sectors.

The Clinton administration remains committed to the idea that freer trade should not result inlower labor or environmental standards anywhere. But they are seeking an approach forpresenting these ideas in a way that a critical mass of other countries can accept.

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ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVESAn Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State

CONTENTS

CRAFTING A GLOBAL TRADE STRATEGY: THE U.S. AND THE WTO

❏ FOCUS

PRESIDENT CLINTON ON GLOBALIZATION AND WORLD TRADE 6Excerpts from Address to the World Economic ForumOpen markets and freer trade are the only way open to developed and developing countries alike.

KEEPING MARKET ACCESS ON TRACK 7By David Aaron, Under Secretary of Commerce for International TradeTo launch a new World Trade Organization trade round, the European Union must agree to negotiate its agriculturalsubsidies and reconsider its proposals on investment and competition policy.

INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE: AT A CROSSROADS 10By August Schumacher, Jr., Under Secretary of Agriculture for Farm and Foreign Agriculture ServicesWTO members need to address the obstacles that blocked progress at the December ministers’ meeting in Seattle, includingcomplaints from developing countries that they get few benefits from the current rules.

MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK FOR WORKERS 13By Alan Larson, Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural AffairsThe global trading system can and should work for developed and developing countries alike. A system that gives everyonethe chance to share in the expansion of freedom that the global economy makes possible must include commitment to basicworkers’ rights.

THE LABOR DIMENSION AND THE WTO 16By Andrew Samet, Deputy Under Secretary of Labor for International Labor AffairsA multilateral approach working through the WTO and other international organizations is the best way to address the labordimension of trade. The U.S. goal is to promote improved labor standards worldwide, not to introduce new forms ofprotectionism into the trading system.

INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES INTO TRADE 19By John J. Audley, Environmental and Trade Policy Coordinator, U.S. Environmental Protection AgencyThe United States seeks greater integration of environmental issues and trade policy, but acknowledges that most countriesoppose such linkages.

❏ COMMENTARY

SEATTLE DOES NOT MEAN AN END TO PROGRESS 22By Max Baucus, U.S. Senator from MontanaWhile the WTO regroups, the United States should take specific actions to move trade liberalization forward, includingsupporting China’s membership in the WTO.

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WTO TRADE TALKS: MOVING BEYOND SEATTLE 25By Jeffrey Schott, Senior Fellow, Institute for International EconomicsNo real winners emerged from December’s failed WTO meeting in Seattle, not even WTO critics. Perhaps the biggest loserswere developing countries that depend on a well-functioning trading system.

THE FARM TRADE CHALLENGE: UNCHANGED BY SEATTLE 28By Bob Stallman, President, American Farm Bureau FederationIn any WTO agricultural trade negotiations ahead, U.S. negotiators should insist on starting from the text worked out at theDecember Seattle ministers’ meeting.

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DO WANT A TRADE ROUND — IN THE RIGHT CIRCUMSTANCES 31By Jabulani Sikhakhane, Editor at Large, Financial Mail (South Africa)Developing countries preferred the collapse of the Seattle WTO ministerial to a negotiating round skewed in favor of thedeveloped countries.

FACTS AND FIGURES

A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE WTO 34

POST-URUGUAY ROUND DEVELOPMENTS 35

INFORMATION RESOURCES

KEY CONTACTS AND INTERNET SITES 37

ADDITIONAL READINGS 39

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Publisher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Judith SiegelEditor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jonathan SchafferManaging Editor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bruce Odessey Associate Editors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Wayne Hall. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kathleen HugContributing Editors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Eileen Deegan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Merle Kellerhals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Phillip Kurata

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U.S. Department of StateOffice of International Information Programs

February 2000

TThe Office of International Information Programs of the U.S. Department of State provides products and services that explain U.S. policies toforeign audiences. The Office publishes five electronic journals that examine major issues facing the United States and the internationalcommunity. The journals — Economic Perspectives, Global Issues, Issues of Democracy, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, and U.S. Society and Values —provide analysis, commentary, and background information in their thematic areas. All journal editions appear in English, French, and Portugueselanguage versions, and selected issues also appear in Arabic, Russian, and Spanish. A new English-language issue is published every three to sixweeks. Translated versions normally follow the English original by two to four weeks. The order in which the thematic editions appear is irregular,as some editions publish more issues than others.

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Current or back issues of the journals can be found on the Office of International Information Programs’ International Home Page on the WorldWide Web at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/journals.htm. They are available in several electronic formats to facilitate viewing on-line, transferring,downloading, and printing. Comments are welcome at your local U.S. Embassy (attention Public Diplomacy Section) or at the editorial offices:

Editor, Economic PerspectivesIIP/T/ESU.S. Department of State301 4th Street, S.W.Washington, D.C. 20547United States of AmericaE-mail: [email protected]

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVESAn Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State Volume 5, Number 1, February 2000

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6Economic Perspectives • An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State • Vol. 5, No. 1, February 2000

President Clinton says that open markets and freer tradeare the only way open to developed and developingcountries alike. He disagrees with protestors who want toblock the work of the World Trade Organization (WTO).He also disagrees with those who want to preventparticipation by more parties in WTO decisions.

Following are excerpts from Clinton’s January 29 addressto the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.

“I think we have got to reaffirm unambiguously thatopen markets and rules-based trade are the best enginewe know of to lift living standards, reduceenvironmental destruction and build sharedprosperity. This is true whether you’re in Detroit,Davos, Dacca or Dakar. Worldwide, open markets docreate jobs. They do raise incomes. They do sparkinnovation and spread new technology — they do,coupled with the explosion of internationalcommunications through the Internet, which is thefastest-growing network in history.”

“Trade is especially important, of course, fordeveloping nations. Listen to this — this is somethingthat I think people from the developing nations whooppose the WTO should think about: from the 1970sto the early '90s, developing countries that chosegrowth through trade grew at least twice as fast asthose who chose not to open to the world. The mostopen countries had growth that was six times as fast...”

“Certainly, many of the people who have questionedthe wisdom of open trade are genuinely concernedabout the fate of the poor and the disadvantaged, andwell they should be. But they should ask themselves,what will happen to a Bangladeshi textile worker or amigrant from the Mexican countryside without theprospect of jobs and industry that can sell to foreign,as well as domestic, consumers? What happens tofarmers in Uruguay or Zimbabwe, in Australia,Europe, the United States, if protectionism makes itimpossible to market products beyond their borders?

“How can working conditions be improved andpoverty be reduced in developing countries if they aredenied these and other opportunities to grow, thethings that come with participation in the worldeconomy. No, trade must not be a race to the bottom— whether we’re talking about child labor, basicworking conditions or environmental protection. Butturning away from trade would keep part of our globalcommunity forever on the bottom. That is not theright response.”

“I think those who heard a wake-up call on the streetsof Seattle got the right message. But those who saythat we should freeze or disband the WTO are deadwrong....

“There is no substitute for the confidence andcredibility the WTO lends to the process of expandingtrade based on rules. There’s no substitute for thetemporary relief WTO offers national economy,especially against unfair trade and abrupt surges inimports. And there is no substitute for WTO’sauthority in resolving disputes which commands therespect of all member nations. If we expect publicsupport for the WTO ... we’ve got to get out of denialof what’s happening now.

“If we expect the public to support the WTO the wayI do ... we have to let the public see what we’re doing.We have to make more documents available, faster, wehave to open dispute panel hearings to the public, wehave to allow organizations and individuals to paneltheir views in a formal way. And we all have to play bythe rules and abide by the WTO decisions, whetherwe win or whether we lose.”

“Let me be clear: I do not agree with those who saywe should halt the work of the WTO, or postpone anew trade round. But I do not agree with those whoview with contempt the new forces seeking to beheard in the global dialogue. Globalization isempowering people with information, everywhere.” ❏

FOCUS

❏ PRESIDENT CLINTON ON GLOBALIZATION, TRADE Excerpts from Address to the World Economic Forum

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To launch a new World Trade Organization (WTO) traderound, the European Union (EU) must agree to negotiate itsagricultural subsidies and reconsider its proposals oninvestment and competition policy, says David Aaron, undersecretary of commerce for international trade.

He says the United States must continue to press for a newround: “If we do not, no one else will.”

Other U.S. objectives are securing China’s accession to theWTO, opening markets foreign trade through regional andbilateral initiatives, and building consensus for freer trade,he says.

When we talk of the U.S. commitment to free trade inthis new era, it is important to note just how far back ouradherence to its principles began. Our vision for openmarkets dates back to the first generation of Americanleaders. Tom Paine, Thomas Jefferson, and Ben Franklinwere opposed to import restrictions and expressed theirfavor for nondiscriminatory trade. In fact, Jefferson, anardent free trader, asserted that “free trade, with all partsof the world” was a “natural right” that no law couldabridge. From the Founding Fathers to the “OpenDoor,” increasing market access has been a centralprinciple in U.S. trade policy.

Moving closer to the present, all are aware that the Seattleministerial late last year fell short of launching a newround of trade negotiations. This does not mean thatprogress was not made or that the U.S. trade agenda didnot move forward. During the November/Decemberministerial, we created consensus in some very importantareas. These would include, for example, the need tokeep electronic commerce duty free, a policy approach tothe least-developed countries, trade facilitation, and anegotiating agenda for the services industries.

However, on some other important issues, many relatingto market access, we found ourselves unable to bridge thegaps. Today, our challenge remains keeping the processof liberalization moving forward.

To ensure this, we are pursuing four priority objectives:

• Securing the entry of China into the WTO.

• Continuing market-opening initiatives in othermultilateral fora, such as the Free Trade Area of theAmericas (FTAA).

• Forging a new consensus on the importance of trade.

• Making progress on the agenda for a new round ofmultilateral WTO negotiations.

PNTR AND CHINA WTO MEMBERSHIP

Harnessing China to the global system is crucial. That’swhy China’s entry into the WTO is so important.

Three things are necessary for China to enter the WTO.First, China must complete its bilateral negotiations withEurope and several other countries. Second, we all haveto finish negotiating the protocol of accession. Third, theU.S. Congress needs to pass permanent normal traderelations for China.

We hope the first two steps can be completed promptly,so that we can conclude the third before Congressadjourns this summer. Approving permanent normaltrading relations (PNTR) with China and pushing for itsWTO accession is the single most important step we canmake toward improving American market access abroad.It is really that simple. U.S. markets are already open toChinese goods. By granting China PNTR, we gainsignificant tariff cuts across the board — some as high as20 percent — on virtually all U.S. goods, as well assubstantial improvements in market access for U.S.services.

REGIONAL INITIATIVES

While working through the WTO is our primary focuson market access, we are also engaged in a number ofsmaller fora. One I would like to mention is the FreeTrade Area of the Americas.

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❏ KEEPING MARKET ACCESS ON TRACK By David Aaron, Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade

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The FTAA is a regional, multilateral effort to unite theeconomies of the Western Hemisphere into a single free-trade arrangement. We are working to include in theFTAA agreement on a number of business facilitationmeasures. Last November in Toronto, trade ministersagreed to a package of customs and transparencymeasures that will reduce commercial transaction costs,create a more predictable regional economic environment,and give U.S. companies the information they need tomake sound financial decisions.

These measures include streamlined procedures for thetemporary importation of goods related to business travel,for express shipments, and for low-value shipmenttransactions; dissemination of information on customsprocedures, laws, and regulations; and use ofsophisticated risk management systems to focus customsenforcement activities on high-risk goods and travelerswhile facilitating the clearance and movement of low-riskgoods. We will be cooperating closely with ourcounterparts in the region to ensure that these measuresare fully implemented this year and to develop newproposals that can be put in place before 2005.

A CONSENSUS ON TRADE

Improving market access is largely linked to ourcommitment to the global trading system. Most of usrealize that open markets and rules-based trade are provento raise living standards, reduce global poverty andenvironmental destruction, and assure the free flow ofideas that foster democracy. But if we are to moveforward on the market access initiatives I havementioned, we must engage a growing movement thatquestions the virtues of trade.

The Clinton administration has listened to and agreeswith some of the concerns related to free trade, includingtransparency, labor, and the environment. For example,we agree with those who call for more transparency in theWTO — pushing for an opening of WTO proceduresand the input of nongovernmental parties in certainWTO meetings. On the issue of labor standards, wehave proposed the creation of a WTO working group toexamine linkages between trade and labor. The presidenthas also called on the WTO to do more to take intoaccount how trade agreements affect the environment.

But while we agree with and are addressing theseconcerns, we do not believe that they, along with otherunsubstantiated criticisms, preclude the continuation of

the global trading system. Furthermore, evidence —both empirically and case by case — shows that themajority of anti-trade arguments are both factually andtheoretically invalid. There are four particular examplesthat strike at the heart of the anti-WTO rhetoric.

First, the opponents of free trade claim to want to helppoor countries but at the same time are reluctant to investor trade with them — both of which are crucial to theirdevelopment.

Second, some place an emphasis on spreading democracy,but then ridicule the decisions of democraticgovernments. Many of those criticizing the WTO haveargued that it lacks the accountability and transparency ofa democratic institution. In some instances, the U.S.government has agreed with this assessment, pushing foran opening of WTO procedures and the input ofnongovernmental parties in certain WTO meetings.What many critics overlook, however, is that the majorityof WTO members are democratic governments actingwith the endorsement of their people.

Third, some want to improve the environment, but areopposed to the growth that is essential to create theresources needed to achieve that goal. No one denies thateconomic development often leads to environmentaldegradation. But the fact remains that those countrieswith the cleanest environments are also the mostdeveloped. Most environmental degradation occurs dueto poverty and poor education; the record shows thattrade and investment alleviate these problems.

And finally, critics of the WTO see themselves asprotecting the “little guy” against global corporations bydismantling the very rules the little guy must depend on.Small businesses are our largest exporters and, with theirsmaller resources, rules are critical to them to fight againsttrade barriers and resolve disputes.

Those of us in government and outside must engage inan open dialogue about the importance of trade.Through this dialogue, I have no doubt, the tenets ofopen markets and WTO will prevail.

THE WTO

We remain committed to launching a new global traderound and would prefer to do it as soon as possible. Anew round is desirable, and we are still working to getthere. However, a round will not be beneficial or possible

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9Economic Perspectives • An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State • Vol. 5, No. 1, February 2000

until our principal trading partners prove willing tocompromise and open up sectors of their economies thatthey have traditionally kept closed.

So what can be done to launch a new round? First, theEuropean member states need to authorize the EuropeanCommission to develop a policy on agriculture that willpermit a round to begin. Quite frankly, Europe needs toput its agricultural subsidies on the negotiating table.

Second, the EU has to decide what it wants with regardto investment and competition policy. Investment is anissue the less developed countries do not want to go near.On competition policy, it is clear that the EU no morethan the United States wants its anti-trust rulings second-guessed by 130 other countries.

Third, the United States must continue to press for a newround. If we do not, no one else will. The first step is tomove forward with the WTO’s built-in agenda that everycountry is obliged to address. We need to get proposalson the table in services, agriculture, and industrial goodsthat will dramatize the advantages of a new round.

Admittedly, the list of requirements to launch a newround is formidable. Some countries have opted for a

strategy to pursue bilateral and regional tradeliberalization instead. I believe we also need to moveforward bilaterally and regionally. But in the long run,these are not real alternatives to the WTO. Bilateral andregional trade agreements can spur liberalization and setpositive examples. In the end, however, it is the globalsystem that is crucial.

CONCLUSION

The first generation of American leaders saw theimportance of open markets and free trade. More than200 years later, history and practice have proven that theywere right.

Pushing for a new round in the WTO, granting PNTRto China, and continuing our liberalization efforts aroundthe world are the most significant measures we can taketoward improving market access in this new era. Weneed to take advantage of this timely opportunity tofurther the open trade process so important to theprosperity of wealthy countries and so essential to raisingthe living standards of those that are poor. If we do not,we may miss what is undoubtedly a “win-win” situationfor the global economy. ❏

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The members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) needto address the obstacles that blocked progress at the Decemberministers’ meeting in Seattle, including complaints fromdeveloping countries that they get few benefits from thecurrent rules, says August Schumacher, under secretary ofagriculture.

In an article adapted from a January 5 speech given at the54th Annual Farming Conference in Oxford, England,Schumacher says that agricultural negotiations must resumethis year, as required by earlier agreement, or the credibilityof the entire trading system is at risk.

The United States has already demonstrated leadership ineliminating harmful barriers to freer agricultural trade; theEuropean Union and Japan must do so as well, he says.“This would take courage ... but we can do it.”

The topic I was asked to address is “World Trade Policy— No Turning Back?” That is what I would consider arhetorical question, from the U.S. perspective at least,because that is a correct statement. The United States haslong envisioned a more open, comprehensive,transparent, and stronger international agriculturaltrading system. Although the Uruguay Round, which ledto the formation of the World Trade Organization, was alandmark agreement for the inclusion of agriculture insuch a system, we recognize that we still have, as the well-known U.S. poet Robert Frost once said, “miles to go” tocomplete and fully integrate agricultural reform into theinternational trading system.

That is why we have set several objectives for theresumption of the WTO agricultural negotiations thatbegan in Seattle. For a better trade system for agriculture,we need to do the following:

• Eliminate export subsidies.

• Tighten rules on trade-distorting domestic support.

• Improve market access by reducing tariffs andincreasing quotas.

• Reform state trading enterprises.

• And facilitate trade in the products of newtechnologies, including biotechnology.

We need to welcome new members to the WTO. Wealso need to work closely with developing countries toensure that they are allowed to participate transparentlyin WTO negotiations to widen their access to globalmarkets, while continuing to open their own markets totrade with both other developing country farm exportersand with Organization for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment (OECD) agricultural traders.

THE SEATTLE MINISTERIAL

Like others at the Seattle Ministerial, we weredisappointed that the 135 WTO members did not reachfinal agreement to open a new round of trade talks, butwe are not disheartened. As President Clinton said, “Wemade progress at the Seattle WTO trade meeting,although significant differences remain. I remainoptimistic that we can use the coming months to narrowour differences and launch a successful new round ofglobal trade talks.”

There were a number of reasons why the talks weresuspended. We need to take these reasons into fullaccount so we can move forward. For example, theWTO needs to provide better opportunities for widerparticipation by all members, including developingcountries, in the decision-making process.

Developing countries have complained that they are notaccruing the benefits from trade that more developedcountries are achieving. These concerns need to beaddressed. Reasons for this complaint include trade-distorting agricultural policies in some countries thatplace an immense and unfair burden on developingcountry farmers, and the need for capacity-building inthe developing countries themselves. We are encouragingthe World Bank and its sister agencies not only to help incapacity-building, but also to continue to support

❏ INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE: AT A CROSSROADSBy August Schumacher, Jr., Under Secretary of Agriculture for the Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services

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agricultural modernization and development in thesecountries.

A number of countries in Asia and Europe and, yes,North America still spend a lot of money to maintaintrade-distorting policies to support their agriculture, tothe detriment of developing countries. Indeed, a largeportion of farm income in a number of countries comesdirectly from government support.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

The question on all our minds is where do we go fromhere? I believe that for the credibility of the WTO, wemust start negotiations promptly. Article 20 of theUruguay Round agreement states, “Members agree thatnegotiations for continuing the process will be initiatedone year before the end of the implementation period.”That is why countries are committed under the“continuation clause” to promptly renew negotiations onagriculture and services (commonly called the built-inagenda) this year. If we do not get started now, we riskdamaging the credibility of the entire internationaltrading system — a trading system built carefully, step bystep, for more than five decades.

Overall world trade growth has been expanding at threetimes the level of OECD growth in gross domesticproduct, 9 percent compared to 2.8 percent. World tradein agricultural commodities grew to nearly $270,000million in 1999, from some $200,000 million in 1990.Increased trade in value-added food products has beenparticularly noticeable. In the United States, exports ofvalue-added products have grown 40 percent, from$14,000 million to $20,000 million, during the pastdecade.

It is not just the United States, the European Union(EU), and Japan that will gain from the start ofnegotiations to liberalize agricultural trade. Developingcountries have a lot to gain as well. Without an openinternational trading system, some developing countriesare more likely to face the menace of food insecurity.Without an open trading system, they will not gain bettermarket access for their agricultural products. Therefore, anew trade round is not just an effort for developedcountries, but also for developing countries as well inmaking sure this round gets launched.

In the Marrakesh Declaration at the close of the UruguayRound, developing countries were given differential and

more favorable treatment by developed countries, and itwas agreed that the impact of the Uruguay Round onleast-developed countries and on net food-importingcountries would be reviewed to help them achieve theirdevelopment objectives.

There are tasks we can begin to work on immediately atthe WTO. For example, we need to determine how tomove forward to establish an agriculture negotiatinggroup, which would require that we find a chair. Thisneeds to be done promptly.

We also need to reach a consensus on the trade aspects ofbiotechnology at the WTO. The concept of a workinggroup on biotechnology was a topic of vigorous debate byWTO members at the ministerial. We still think that abiotech working group is the best way to address thisissue. Besides, there are many forums legitimatelydiscussing biotechnology — the Codex AlimentariusCommission, the OECD, the Biosafety Protocol.However, the trade aspects of the agriculturalbiotechnology issue should be addressed in the WTOcontext, as well as bilaterally.

In this regard, President Clinton and EU PresidentRomano Prodi agreed to high-level talks onbiotechnology and to consult with those outsidegovernment in this process. Under this approach, weexpect to address a range of issues, including the approvalprocesses for biotech products and market access issues.In addition, a consultative forum is expected to includescientists, academics, consumers, and environmentalgroups.

U.S.-EU DIFFERENCES

At the U.S.-EU Summit in December 1999, it was clearthat huge differences remain between us. While both theUnited States and the EU agreed that a new roundshould focus on agriculture, services, and market accessand should address developing country concerns, the EUcontinues to insist on a broader agenda that includesinvestment rules and antitrust policies. The EU mustnarrow its agenda. We need to work together to developa manageable agenda so that we can launch the newround.

We remain concerned about several U.S.-EU bilateralissues. In fact, beef and bananas continue to be of majorconcern because they undermine the whole framework ofthe WTO dispute settlement process. The continuing

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12Economic Perspectives • An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State • Vol. 5, No. 1, February 2000

refusal by the EU to comply with the WTO paneldetermination and lift its unjustified ban on U.S.hormone-treated beef has led to the implementation of100 percent tariffs on EU exports valued at $116.8million. In addition, 100 percent tariffs have beenimposed on $190 million of EU products due to the EU’sfailure to implement the WTO decision on the EUbanana regime.

THE WELL-TRODDEN ROAD:TRADE-DISTORTING POLICIES

In contrast to our efforts to address trade-distortingpolicies, the EU continues to be unable to significantlyreform its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The EUhas notified the WTO of about $90,000 million insupport to European agriculture annually, about half ofwhich is trade distorting. Under Agenda 2000 reforms,the EU plans to provide more support under directpayments. And it spends at least several thousand-milliondollars a year in export subsidies. This is the largestsingle distortion of agricultural trade in the world. Letme be clear: The United States does not object to the EUsupporting its farmers. What the United States objects toare the trade-distorting policy choices the EU makes.

Not only do these supports hurt developing countries,but they hurt the EU’s own consumers as well. Thecombination of high tariffs and subsidies means Europeanconsumers pay prices that are significantly higher thanworld prices for food.

The EU recently claimed that the United States providespayments to its farmers that are twice the level of supportprovided to EU farmers. In reality, most recentlyavailable data published by the OECD show that EUproduction supports on average for 1996-98 provide 39percent of EU farm income, while U.S. productionsupports on average for the same period provide only 17percent of U.S. farm income. OECD data also show thatthe EU provides nearly 10 times more productionsupport per acre (0.4 hectare) than the United States does(the EU provides $324 per acre, while the United Statesprovides only $34 per acre).

The EU also provides product-specific, trade-distortingdomestic support to at least 50 different agriculturalproducts, including beef, olive oil, tomatoes, wine, apples,cucumbers, artichokes, zucchini, cherries, clementines,grapes, and peaches. The United States limits itsproducer assistance to about nine major commodities.

For example, the United States provides no productionassistance to its world-class wine industry, whereas in1996-97 the EU provided 1,900 million Euros inproduction assistance and 37 million Euros in exportsubsidies in 1997-98. While EU expenditures have comedown in recent years, policy reforms are likely to doublecurrent EU expenditures on wine in coming years.

Developing countries are looking to the United States,the EU, and Japan for leadership in developing rationalagricultural policy. The United States has shown it bygreatly reducing its export subsidies, especially on grains.What about the EU? High European subsidy levelscontinue to distort international agricultural trade.

THE ROAD LESS TRAVELED

In conclusion, let’s consider Robert Frost’s well-knownpoem “The Road Not Taken”:

Two roads diverged in a wood, and I —I took the one less traveled by,And that has made all the difference.

Our situation now is not so different from what RobertFrost describes. One can remain on the well-troddenroad of protectionism in agriculture, with which we aremost familiar. That road would lead us to years ofnegotiations as we saw in the Uruguay Round, resultingin the continuation of trade-distorting protectionistpolicies, which have adversely affected world prices, theenvironment, and efficient agricultural producers,especially those in developing countries.

Or we can take the road less traveled, the road not asworn or well trodden, and move forward, promptly. Thiswould take courage; courage on the part of the UnitedStates, the EU, Japan, and other nations. But we can doit. If we recommit ourselves, we can conclude a newround. Our joint efforts helped to reshape the post-wareconomy, leading us to the crossroads where we nowstand. Let’s take the road less traveled — it will make allthe difference. ❏

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The global trading system can and should work for developedand developing countries alike, Alan Larson, under secretaryof state, says in an article adapted from a January 5 speechto the Rotary Club of Washington.

Plenty of obstacles to freer trade remain to be worked out,including differences over environmental and labor rightsissues as well as plain protectionism, he says. Still, becauseboth sides want an open, fair trading system — one that lets“globalization work for workers” — they have no choice butto eliminate those obstacles, he says.

It is in America’s interest, I am convinced, that the globaleconomy should expand through increased trade and abroader and freer flow of capital. At the same time, to bedurable, the global economy must be built on a solidethical and political foundation. The global economymust be supported by a global sense of community andanimated by an appreciation of the common humanitythat people throughout the world share. It also must bereinforced by a set of institutions and rules that helpensure that all people, within this country and acrosscountries, can find within the global economyopportunities to expand our freedom and to realize thefull potential God has given us.

And when I speak of freedom, I have in mind the FourFreedoms that former U.S. President Franklin Rooseveltstressed — freedom of expression, freedom of worship,freedom from fear, and freedom from want. We facetough challenges as we attempt to pursue these objectivesat the beginning of a new millennium because thefreedoms that enable people to achieve their potential arespread rather unevenly around the world.

NEW PERMUTATIONS ON AN OLD ADAGE

Many of us have found wisdom in the old adage, “Give aman a fish and he is fed for a day. Teach him to fish andhe is fed for a lifetime.” Today the adage needs to beupdated in several ways.

First, it is not just being politically correct to suggest thatthe adage should talk about both men and women. In

fact, one of the most important lessons of developmenteconomics is the importance of ensuring that women aswell as men enjoy full economic opportunities.

More profoundly, to move beyond a subsistence lifestyle,men and women in developing countries need to be ableto sell their products in the global economy and to buyother products that help them achieve the quality of lifethey value. Here’s where the issues start gettingcomplicated.

First, there is the simple question of protectionism.What if I am a fisherman in a developed country and fearthat my wages will fall or I will lose my job if I facecompetition from a fisherwoman from a developingcountry? Because of her poverty, she may be willing towork longer hours or for lower wages. Is that unfair?Most of us would say that we should not refuse to buythe woman’s fish simply because she is poorer and willwork for less.

The example is not a trivial one, however. At the recenttrade negotiations in Seattle, some countries refused tosupport a tariff reduction proposal called AcceleratedTariff Liberalization, in part because they wished toprotect their fishermen from competition fromdeveloping countries.

The pressure for protection is even stronger fromEuropean and Japanese farmers. One of the biggestproblems in launching a new round of trade talks will beto convince farmers in developed countries that it isinappropriate to use trade barriers or trade-distortingsubsidies to protect their incomes and lifestyles at theexpense of poor farmers in developing countries. Andlest we in the United States feel too self-righteous, wemust acknowledge that lower trade barriers on importedclothing would be of great interest to poor workers inmany developing countries, even as we recognize thatsurging clothing imports would have an adverse impacton American apparel workers, many of whom have feweconomic options outside the apparel industry.

So in our trade policies, developed countries need tofocus on appropriate transition mechanisms and find new

❏ MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK FOR WORKERSBy Alan Larson, Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs

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and better ways to equip our own citizens with the skillsthat allow them to compete effectively in the globaleconomy. We must face up to the fact that this can be aparticular challenge for disadvantaged workers, forworkers with lower educational skills, and for workerswhose work skills are very industry-specific and not easilytransferable to new jobs.

Suppose, however, that we solve this challenge and acceptwithout trade barriers the fish produced by ourdeveloping country fisherwoman. There still may beproblems of over-fishing. If the number of fish caughteach year must be regulated to protect fish stocks, itcould be done on the basis of historical production,which might favor us, or on some other basis. And whosets and enforces those rules?

Still other problems arise. What if we are concerned thatthe woman’s fishing technique results in the inadvertenttaking of a significant number of sea turtles? Does ourconcern about the environment give us the right to refuseto buy from her, despite her poverty, unless she changesher fishing methods? For what it’s worth, existing U.S.law says we do have that right, and a dispute settlementpanel of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agrees,provided we do so in an appropriate way.

Now, let’s assume that the woman fishes with turtleexcluder devices that prevent turtles from being takeninadvertently. Should we buy fish from her even if othersin her country continue to fish in the old way and hergovernment does not require the use of excluder devices?Over the holidays I made a formal determination tocontinue the existing American policy under which we doallow the importation of shrimp harvested from shipsusing turtle excluder devices, even from nations that donot require all their shrimp trawlers to use such devices.

And if these questions aren’t hard enough, let’s talk for amoment about labor practices. U.S. law would authorizeus to ban importation of the woman’s fish if she wasusing slave or forced labor. I’m sure that we all wouldagree that our common stake in ending slave or forcedlabor would fully justify this use of trade leverage, and Iam confident that such action would be unassailable inthe WTO.

But suppose that the woman employs child laborers.Most of us would be concerned about buying productsproduced by workers who are underage, particularly ifthere is an exploitative element in their employment. At

this time, WTO rules do not explicitly authorize acountry to prohibit importation of products produced byexploitative child labor. Some might ask what wouldhappen to such desperately poor children if they were notworking.

In practice, we have had encouraging success in devisingpilot programs that take children out of factories and putthem into schools. In some cases, the jobs they leftbehind have been filled by mothers, many of whom hadnot previously been in the job market. One suchprogram targeting the garment sector in Bangladeshactually boosted the country’s exports, as countriesconcerned about child labor became willing to importwhen the children were in school and not in the factory.The Bangladeshi success has encouraged certain industriesin Pakistan to follow suit. We need to build on thesepositive examples.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Even more complicated issues arise when we consider thequestion of human rights. Democracy and respect forhuman rights are not luxuries that poor countries cannotafford. Rather, they are rights to which all humans aspire,and there can be no true development, for ourfisherwoman or anyone else, without them.

Moreover, democracy and respect for human rightscontribute in a variety of ways to the effective functioningof the economy. They help rein in economicallydestructive corruption or abuse of power, for example, theallocation of fishing licenses only to friends of thepresident. They provide a rational basis for makingdecisions about the amount and types of public goodslike education and public safety that will be provided.Without such goods, the economy cannot effectivelyfunction. That is why the United States is devoting agrowing share of our assistance resources to thestrengthening of the rule of law and why we will continueto speak out about human rights abuses.

Let’s try to take stock of progress in the global economy.The past 50 years have been a time of unprecedentedeconomic growth and prosperity in the United States.Our incomes have grown by about 60 percent in realterms. Measured in terms of their purchasing power, ourincomes are now 27 percent higher than our counterpartsin Japan and 41 percent higher than in Germany.Unemployment is low, and the stock market hasquadrupled in value during the last 10 years.

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Trade has helped fuel this boom. The share of trade inour national economy has doubled in less than ageneration. We are the world’s largest exporter, andexports have produced good jobs; in fact, on average,export industries pay wages some 15 percent higher thanother sectors of our economy.

The basic components of the American model of marketcompetition are being embraced in countries throughoutthe world. This is one of the reasons why prospects forglobal growth have never been brighter.

Developing countries are, to a substantial degree,beginning to share in this expansion of globalopportunity. The countries of East Asia, for example,grew at a rate of over 8 percent a year during the 1980sand 1990s. Far too many people in the world still live inextreme poverty, but the percent who get by on less than$1 per day has fallen from about 25 percent in 1987 toabout 21 percent a decade later.

Other, less strictly economic indicators are also up amongdeveloping countries. Life expectancy has increased from59 years in 1970 to 67 years in 1997. While lifeexpectancy remains too low in the very poorest countries,even there it has increased from 43 years to 52 yearsduring the same period.

CURRENT POLICY INITIATIVES

While conditions in many developing countries haveimproved, they are hardly at a level that is acceptable.

We need to do more to help individuals in the poorestdeveloping countries have meaningful opportunities toparticipate in the global economy. That is why theadministration is working hard to secure congressionalapproval this year of the African Growth andOpportunity Act and the Caribbean Basin EnhancementAct. Each of these bills would provide importantopportunities for poor people in poor countries. Inhelping them expand their economies, we help thembecome stronger economic partners and ultimately bettercustomers.

We have agreed to forgive virtually all of the debts of thepoorest countries so long as they are committed topolicies that will alleviate poverty and provide a solidfoundation for sustained economic growth. We arehelping to fund education programs around the world.We have supported a large increase in education and

social programs by the multilateral development banks.We have launched an initiative to extend Internetinfrastructure to over 20 African countries.

To do everything we need to do to foster peace,democracy, and development, the United States needs todevote the resources necessary to do the job.Unfortunately, our resource commitment in these areashas declined over the years. At present, less than 1percent of the federal budget is devoted to theseprograms. We must do better.

We also need to broaden the trading system to include allcountries willing and able to uphold its rules. TheCongress will have an opportunity soon to make aparticularly important decision to grant China permanentnormal trading rights in connection with its entry intothe World Trade Organization. This decision is notabout endorsement of the Government of China’s humanrights policies; it’s about bringing the 1,200 millionpeople of China into a rules-based system of trade.

EXPANDING FREEDOM

After Seattle, some observers have drawn the conclusionthat there is an unavoidable collision in the tradingsystem between the interests of developing countries andthe interests of those countries, my own included, thatseek to introduce consideration of labor and social issuesinto the WTO. I respectfully disagree.

What both sides of this debate want is a trading systemthat is inclusive and gives everyone the chance to share inthe expansion of freedom that the global economy makespossible. There can be no development worthy of thename that does not involve an expansion of workers’freedom to associate and bargain and a strengthening oftheir protection from gender discrimination, exploitativechild labor, and forced labor. And there can be no socialor labor agenda worthy of respect that does not embracethe importance of lifting the lives of the poorest people indeveloping countries, people whose opportunities are socircumscribed compared to our own.

It will be hard to make globalization work for workers,both here and in developing countries, but we can andwe must. To start, we in developed countries must makeclear, in what we say and do, that our interest in thesocial dimension of trade is part of a commitment to liftdeveloping countries up, not hold them down. ❏

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A multilateral approach working through the WTO andother international organizations is the best way to addressthe labor dimension of trade, says Andrew Samet, deputyunder secretary of labor for international labor affairs. TheU.S. goal is to promote improved labor standards worldwide,not to introduce new forms of protectionism into the tradingsystem, he says.

At the 1999 Seattle ministerial meeting of the WorldTrade Organization (WTO), discussion among WTOmembers showed some significant movement toward arecognition of the need to address the relationshipbetween labor and trade, even as it revealed the continuedexistence of significant differences among members.These differences only highlight the necessity for theWTO, when it resumes negotiations on the future tradeagenda, to provide the basis for its members to considerthe labor dimension of trade liberalization. In the end, ifwe are to move forward successfully on trade opening, thedifferences of Seattle must give way to the developmentof a new shared vision for the way forward on labor.

As WTO members approach this issue in the future, it isimportant to keep in mind the essential purpose of trade.As the preambles to the General Agreement on Tariffsand Trade (GATT) and the WTO state, the purpose ofincreased trade is to raise standards of living and toensure full employment. Trade liberalization is not anobjective to be pursued in the abstract — it is pursued topromote faster economic growth, which in turn can resultin better jobs, improved labor conditions, and higherliving standards. To deny the relationship between tradeand labor concerns is to deny fundamentally the veryfoundation upon which trade liberalization has beenbuilt.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Concerns about labor standards and their impact oninternational economic competition are not new. Thedevelopment of international labor standards in the 19thcentury and the creation of the International LaborOrganization (ILO) in 1919 were centrally related tocommercial considerations. The Treaty of Versailles,

which created the ILO, recognized that “failure of anynation to adopt humane conditions of labour is anobstacle in the way of other nations which desire toimprove the conditions in their own countries.”

The impact on competition of labor standards was alsoaddressed by the 1948 Havana Charter of theInternational Trade Organization (ITO). The draft of thecharter stated: “The members recognize that unfair laborconditions, particularly in production for export, createdifficulties in international trade and, accordingly, eachmember shall take whatever action may be feasible andappropriate to eliminate such conditions within itsterritory.”

The current heightened interest in international laborstandards is, inter alia, related to the globalization process.Accelerated global economic integration provides greatopportunities for economic growth and employment.But it also poses challenges to assure that the broadestnumber of workers benefit from the globalization processand that competition occurs on the basis of acceptedinternational labor standards. To emphasize only theopportunities from globalization, without addressing theconcerns of workers, would be self-defeating and makesmore difficult maintaining the consensus essential topursue a trade liberalization agenda.

PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS

The United States believes that various internationalorganizations can make a positive contribution topromoting labor standards. We have accordingly pursuedthis issue in the Organization for Economic Cooperationand Development (OECD), the ILO, the internationalfinancial institutions (IFIs), and the WTO. We havealso done so through regional and bilateral initiatives.

In 1998, with the support of worker and employergroups around the world, the ILO adopted a new“Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Principles atWork and Its Follow Up.” The declaration introduced anew mechanism to hold member states accountable forproviding basic labor rights, defined as freedom of

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❏ THE LABOR DIMENSION AND THE WTOBy Andrew Samet, Deputy Under Secretary of Labor for International Labor Affairs

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association and the effective right to collective bargaining;the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsorylabor; the effective elimination of child labor; andnondiscrimination in occupation and employment.These are fundamental rights that all ILO members areresponsible for implementing.

The U.S. Congress has supported President Clinton’srequest for additional resources to help fundimplementation of the declaration. The Department ofLabor will provide to the ILO $20 million for a newprogram of assistance to countries to implement andprotect the core labor standards enshrined in thedeclaration. We will provide an additional $10 millionfor bilateral assistance to help labor ministries and otherrelevant government agencies improve labor lawimplementation and operate social safety net programs.

It is also clear that much of the recent concern aboutinternational labor issues has been reflected through theprism of abusive child labor conditions. At its June 1999conference, the ILO adopted a new Convention 182 onthe Worst Forms of Child Labor, defined to include suchpractices as slavery or any form of forced labor; procuringor offering children for prostitution; procuring or offeringchildren for illicit activities; and any work which by itsnature is likely to harm the health, safety, or morals ofchildren. Each ILO member that ratifies the conventionwill be obligated to take immediate and effectivemeasures to eliminate such forms of child labor.President Clinton submitted the treaty ratifying the newconvention to the U.S. Senate in record time, and theSenate acted — also in record time — in giving its adviceand consent. The president signed the instrument ofratification on December 2, 1999, in Seattle.

U.S. TRADE AND LABOR PROPOSAL

During the preparatory process leading to the Seattleministerial meeting, the United States proposed theestablishment of a forward work program in the WTOon trade issues related to labor questions for which WTOmembers would benefit from further information andanalysis. In October 1999, we submitted a more specificproposal for the establishment of a Working Group onTrade and Labor with a mandate to address the followingissues:

• Trade and employment: examination of the effects ofincreased international trade and investment on the levelsand composition of countries’ employment.

• Trade and social protections: examination of therelationship between increased openness in trade andinvestment and the scope of the structure of basic socialprotections and safety nets in developed and developingcountries.

• Trade and core labor standards: examination of therelationship between economic development,international trade and investment, and theimplementation of core labor standards.

• Positive trade policy incentives and core laborstandards: examination of the scope for positive tradepolicy incentives to promote implementation of corelabor standards.

• Trade and forced or exploitative child labor:examination of the extent of forced or exploitative childlabor in industries engaged in international trade.

• Trade and derogation from national labor standards:examination of the effects of derogation from nationallabor standards (including in export processing zones) oninternational trade, investment, and economicdevelopment.

The working group would produce a report for discussionat the next WTO ministerial and would work inconsultation with the ILO, the international financialorganizations, and the United Nations Conference onTrade and Development.

The United States made this proposal for a number ofreasons. First, there is a need to undertake objectiveanalysis and to expand the base of knowledge of therelationship between trade and labor and to substantiatethat trade is a positive force for improved livingstandards. Second, trade, investment, and developmentare not objectives in and of themselves. They are themeans to improving people’s lives and ensuring that theglobal economy works for working people. That meansleveling up, not leveling down, global living standards;encouraging a race to the top, not forcing a race to thebottom. As President Clinton said in his State of theUnion address in January 1999, “We must put a humanface on the global economy.” And third, a multilateralapproach through the WTO, working with otherinternational institutions, will preserve all countries’interests, while giving all WTO members a chance topresent their views.

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We have heard many countries, particularly developingcountries, argue that our proposal to have the WTOconsider trade and labor is a protectionist ploy. Thesearguments are misplaced and plain wrong. If the UnitedStates wanted to pursue a protectionist course, this wouldbe a highly inefficient and indirect approach. The fact isthat President Clinton has pursued open trade and madea case before the American public about the benefits oftrade liberalization.

We are trying neither to impose standards on developingcountries that would hurt their development nor to denytheir competitive trade advantage based on relativelylower labor costs. Our objective rather, is to encouragean open, honest consideration of the relationship betweentrade and labor and to build a new consensus on the bestway forward. Indeed, the implementation of core laborstandards would not hinder the growth and developmentof developing countries. As a major study by the OECDreleased in 1996 found, the implementation of core laborstandards and greater economic growth are mutuallysupportive and reinforcing.

Potentially more harmful to trade liberalization and to thecredibility of the international trading system is theperceived unwillingness of the WTO even to consider thelabor issue. Those who argue that there are no linkagesbetween trade and labor cannot assert that trade isbeneficial for employment and workers at the same timethat they refuse to discuss the relationship. Advocates oftrade liberalization need to be more confident about thestrength of their arguments and be willing to provide fora consideration of the labor dimension.

THE FUTURE

The United States continues to believe that it is vital forthe WTO to address the relationship between trade andlabor. We also remain committed to supporting an open,liberal trading system that benefits all WTO members,including developing countries.

A multilateral approach through the WTO workingtogether with other international organizations is the bestway to address the labor dimension. In the absence of amultilateral approach, pressure will build to advance theseconcerns in ways that may be less preferable for the globaltrading system. Further, failure to address the labordimension in the WTO may lead to precisely the resultthat critics of the labor-trade link say they want to avoid— an increase in protectionist pressures.

Our goal is to promote improved labor conditionsworldwide, not to introduce new forms of protectionisminto the trading system. In this spirit, we recognize thatsome countries may need assistance in adhering tointernational labor standards. That is why the UnitedStates has sought to increase the capacity of the ILO toprovide technical assistance to its members. We have alsoincreased the capacity of the Department of Labor toprovide bilateral technical assistance to ministries of laborin other countries.

We intend to continue discussions and collaboration withour trading partners on mechanisms for building on the1996 Singapore ministerial declaration in which WTOmembers renewed their commitment to the observance ofinternationally recognized core labor standards. Weremain hopeful that a way can be found to address laborconstructively in the WTO that complements efforts byother multilateral organizations and benefits workers andtheir families throughout the world.

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The United States seeks greater integration of environmentalissues and trade policy, but acknowledges that most countriesoppose such linkages, says John J. Audley, environmental andtrade policy coordinator at the U.S. EnvironmentalProtection Agency.

U.S. policy-makers support the steps the World TradeOrganization (WTO) has taken on trade and theenvironment, but seek greater WTO transparency andaccountability, Audley says. The United States also favorsimproved environmental protection efforts worldwide, bettercoordination among intergovernmental organizations, andnew ways to incorporate environmental concerns into tradeagreement negotiations.

Existing trade rules can be used for negotiating agreementsthat combine trade and environmental issues, he says, citingthe effort toward a proposed accord to eliminate subsidiesthat encourage overfishing.

Over the past year, President Clinton has challenged hisadministration to develop a plan to “put a human face onthe global economy” through greater consideration oflabor and environmental concerns in trade negotiationsand more openness in World Trade Organizationproceedings. The president believes strongly that“spirited competition among nations” should neverbecome “a race to the bottom in environmentalprotection.”

However, integrating sustainable development into tradenegotiations is a relatively new concept, one that hassparked anger from some, fear from others. During theDecember 1999 Seattle WTO Ministerial, theadministration worked hard to meet this challenge butfailed to secure the consensus necessary to realize thepresident’s vision. As a result, the United States mustredouble its efforts to work with other countries to builda consensus to integrate the principles of sustainabledevelopment into all aspects of trade negotiations.

TAKING STOCK

The United States began its effort to integrateenvironment into trade by acknowledging that mostcountries reject attempts to link environmental issues totrade negotiations. Some countries believe that linkingtrade liberalization to high standards for environmentalprotection will inhibit the economic growth theydesperately need. Others resist the imposition of a morepowerful country’s environmental priorities as a new formof “environmental colonialism.” Finally, many countriesworry about “green protectionism” — protectionismdisguised as environmental legislation.

The WTO, it should be noted, has already begun tostruggle with the challenge of integrating environmentinto trade. The concluding agreements of the UruguayRound negotiations of the General Agreements on Tariffsand Trade, which created the WTO, included acommitment on the part of WTO member countries topursue economic growth in a manner consistent with theprinciples of sustainable development. The membersagreed in 1994 to establish the WTO Committee onTrade and Environment (CTE), which began to study thetrade and environment linkage. Over the past five years,the WTO has taken several steps toward greateraccountability to the public and balance between tradeand environmental priorities. For example, timely releaseof documents has become commonplace. In addition,the WTO has established informal communicationschannels with civil society: the WTO Secretariat nowmeets regularly with nongovernmental organizations(NGOs) and has engaged in outreach to groups aroundthe world.

While these steps are admittedly modest, their impact onthe WTO’s behavior has been significant. During theSeattle Ministerial, nearly 3,000 NGOs registered toattend the conference, which provided them withunprecedented access to delegation officials andnegotiation updates. These changes have also had animpact on the WTO’s substantive analysis. In a recentwhite paper entitled “Trade and the Environment,” theWTO acknowledged that competitive forces caused by

❏ INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES INTO TRADEBy John J. Audley, Environment and Trade Policy Coordinator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

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trade liberalization can put pressure on environmentalregulations. It recognized that trade liberalization alonewill not guarantee protection of the environment andimproved living standards. It also argued that trade rulesare the least effective means of protecting theenvironment from damages caused by human activity. Itcalled for the simultaneous negotiation of stronger andmore effective multilateral environmental agreements tohelp ensure that trade liberalization and environmentalprotection work collaboratively to promote better andhealthier lives for all people.

One of the United States’ objectives for the SeattleMinisterial was to build upon the progress towardintegrating environment into trade already made by theWTO and its members. We knew that, to be successful,we had to acknowledge the legitimate concerns expressedby some regarding efforts to link trade liberalization toenvironmental protection. Countries should not hidebehind protectionist policies masquerading asenvironmental laws. At the same time, they must notharm the environment in the name of trade liberalization.The path to meet the dual challenge of tradeliberalization and enhanced environmental protectiontakes us forward toward a rules-based trading system thatintegrates fully enhanced environmental protection intotrade liberalization, not backward toward liberalizedcommerce on the sole promise that more trade is alwaysbetter.

PUTTING A HUMAN FACE ON THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

Recognizing the huge task before us, the United Stateshad proposed that countries adopt the following agendafor the environment during the Seattle Ministerial.

Transparency and Accountability: The single mostimportant environmental initiative the United Statesproposed during the ministerial was to improve theWTO’s transparency and accountability for peoplearound the world. Our plan to achieve this goal had twomain components. First, as part of the five-year review ofthe Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), theUnited States sought to achieve the following goals:

• Allow people access to all government submissions.

• Permit affected parties to submit their own opinions tothe dispute panel.

• Provide public access to the proceedings (not thedeliberations).

• Ensure that all panel decisions are publishedimmediately.

The second component of the transparency agenda was tosecure a commitment from the WTO and its members tonegotiate formal avenues for deliberations between theSecretariat and civil society. We offered no specificsolution to this challenge but asked countries to committo work together and create this channel by the end ofthe first year of formal negotiations.

For the United States, access to information and theopportunity to view proceedings is central to our systemof government. Greater openness and accountabilityimproves not only efforts to protect the environment, butalso expands peoples understanding of trade rules andinstitutional behavior. By listening to the advice andcomments shared by interested parties, transparency alsoholds out the promise of improved rules and moreresponsive institutional behavior.

Expand Capacity to Set High Standards: The secondmajor environmental initiative was to address the need toimprove environmental protection efforts worldwide.National and international environmental laws — nottrade agreements — are the most effective vehicles forimproving environmental protection.

The United States initiated two projects to help meet thischallenge. First, we reviewed current U.S. internationalcapacity-building assistance and found that many of thecurrent projects overlap with the more narrow goals oftrade liberalization. Sharing technology and resources tohelp governments better protect their air and watersupplies, produce cleaner energy, and responsibly managechemical materials and hazardous waste have bothenvironmental and trade benefits. Second, we proposedthat the WTO members redouble their efforts to providetechnical assistance to ensure that poorer countries areable to benefit fully from globalization. Working withmany developing countries, the United States proposedimprovements to the technical assistance agreementsigned by trade ministers during the 1996 WTOSingapore Ministerial. The proposal called uponcountries to work with citizens and local technical expertsto prioritize their technical assistance needs. Workingwith other intergovernmental organizations such as theWorld Bank, the WTO and its members would then

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coordinate financial and technical resources to helpcountries meet their trade obligations.

Improve Coordination and Collaboration AmongIntergovernmental Organizations: Related to ourproposal to emphasize technical assistance and enhancenational environmental protection regimes, the UnitedStates proposed that the WTO and otherintergovernmental organizations (IGOs) develop andmaintain better working relations. The WTO is one ofmany IGOs whose work is essential to achieving asustainable future. Promoting greater collaborationamong these organizations will help them share theirindividual expertise and experience, thereby improvingupon their individual policies. In particular, we werepleased with the announcement by the WTO and theUnited Nations Environment Program of theestablishment of a formal working relationship. Topromote stronger relations, President Clinton while inSeattle convened a meeting of the heads of the majorIGOs. Greater collaboration among IGOs is an essentialcomponent of any comprehensive effort to promotesustainable development through trade liberalization.

Integrating Environmental Considerations Into TradeAgreements: The final component of our agenda was todetermine how to take environmental concerns intoaccount throughout the course of negotiating tradeagreements. In the United States, we believe that suchefforts begin with an assessment of the potential effects oftrade liberalization on the environment and livingstandards. Therefore, in November President Clintonsigned an executive order committing the United Statesto perform environmental assessments of all major tradeagreements. In this new approach to trade policy, U.S.negotiation positions will have the benefit of informationdescribing the potential environmental implications ofspecific trade negotiation objectives. The United Statesrecognizes that much work needs to be done before suchassessments can provide negotiators with the kind ofdetail they need to address some of the thorniest tradeand environment problems. Nonetheless, making thispractice part of all U.S. negotiations is an important firststep. The United States also acknowledges that manyother countries have chosen to perform their ownreviews, and we hope that this information will be sharedamong countries as we improve upon the methodologiesof environmental reviews of trade agreements.

While environmental reviews of trade agreements maystill be in their infancy, the United States determined thatthere are ways to use trade rules now as positive vehiclesfor environmental protection. For example, we knowthat properly negotiated trade rules can help eliminatesubsidies that harm the environment and encourageresource misuse and abuse. Therefore, the United Statesidentified as key “win-win” objectives for the negotiationsthe elimination of subsidies that promote overfishing ofour global fish stocks and the elimination of harmfulagriculture subsidies. We are also committed toeliminating tariffs that complicate trade in environmentalgoods and services.

Finally, the United States proposed that the WTOCommittee on Trade and Environment (CTE) serve asthe needed venue for countries to share information ontrade and environmental issues and for exploring ways topromote sustainable development. We did not proposethat the CTE interfere with government-to-governmentnegotiations. Instead, we stressed that, to be credible, theCTE must eventually become a forum where people andgovernments exchange views on emerging trade andenvironment issues to assist in building the consensusessential to help the WTO make difficult trade policydecisions.

A LONG-TERM VISION

Our proposed plan to integrate the environment intotrade policy-making is a long-term vision, which will notbegin to ease the tensions between trade liberalization andenvironmental protection immediately. Governments will(and should) continue to use WTO rules to determinewhether or not another country’s laws are designed toachieve legitimate policy objectives or to protect domesticindustries from international competition. Governmentsshould also continue to take appropriate steps to protectnational and international natural resources to ensure thatfuture generations benefit fully from a healthy planet. ❏

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While the Seattle WTO ministerial failed to launch a newround of trade liberalization negotiations, it did not mark areturn to trade barriers, says Senator Max Baucus ofMontana. While the WTO regroups, the United Statesshould take specific actions to move trade liberalizationforward, he says. These include supporting China’smembership in the WTO, leading the effort to make WTOoperations more open, and vigorously pursuing bilateral freetrade, he says.

U.S. policy-makers should also use this period to seek amiddle ground on the contentious issue of trade and theenvironment, Baucus says. This includes the problems ofinconsistencies between the WTO and some multilateralenvironmental agreements and eliminating environmentallyharmful subsidies.

Now that the hoopla in Seattle is over, it’s time to take acold, hard look at international trade policy and chart acourse for the future. The starting point should be anassessment of what the failed World Trade OrganizationMinisterial showed and what it didn’t show.

WHAT SEATTLE SHOWED ... AND DIDN’T SHOW

The failure to reach agreement in Seattle showed thatWTO members, as U.S. Trade Representative CharleneBarshefsky pointed out, are simply not ready to moveforward on key issues. The European Union is not readyto dismantle its economically and environmentallydisastrous agricultural subsidy scheme. Developingcountries are not ready to address labor standards andenvironmental issues. The United States is not ready todiscuss trade remedy laws.

Seattle also showed that the public can no longer be keptout of decisions affecting the general welfare. On thestreets of Seattle, away from the meeting rooms of theconvention center, I witnessed an expression ofwidespread concern over the fast pace of change. Rapidtechnological advances spark material progress for manyof us, but not for all. These advances can also undermine

important social values that define the American nationalcharacter, values such as respect for human dignity, a safeenvironment, and shared economic opportunities. Whatwe do internationally must reflect these values.

Failure to launch new trade talks in Seattle does not meanthat WTO members will now reverse direction. Someobservers have equated not moving forward withbacksliding on prior commitments. That did nothappen. The failed Seattle meeting does not mark thebeginning of the end of free world trade. Although theycould not agree on new talks, governments did not raisenew barriers. Instead, the current rules, imperfect andopaquely applied, still govern most world trade.

Seattle did not signal a new era in which un-electedprotestors set international policy. The irresponsibleminority who resorted to violence did not derail themeeting. The responsible majority, embracing diversegroups with sometimes conflicting goals, did not stallprogress. With or without demonstrations in the streets,trade officials wouldn’t have agreed to launch a newround of talks. The issues they faced were too new (e-commerce), too difficult (food safety), or toocontroversial (labor). But the demonstrators did pointout that the WTO can no longer operate behind closeddoors. Its small-group-deal cutting methods won’t workin today’s 135-member organization.

NEXT STEPS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Seattle must not mark an end to the effort to increase thefreedom to trade internationally. The WTO’s inability tomove forward must not cause the United States to stop.We need to make progress. There are four specific thingsthe United States should do.

First, we should lock in the trade concessions China hasoffered us as part of its effort to gain WTO membership.These concessions will open the Chinese market to ourexports and, in the process, move China toward a moreopen society. China may never share our values. It hasthousands of years of history that have led it in another

❏ SEATTLE DOES NOT MEAN AN END TO PROGRESSBy Max Baucus, U.S. Senator from Montana

COMMENTARY

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direction. But by exposing itself to U.S. products andservices, it exposes itself to U.S. influence.

Opponents of U.S. trade with China believe that theUnited States can use WTO membership to wring evenmore concessions out of that country. They are wrong.After 13 years of negotiations, China will not make freshconcessions on issues that are important to us, such ashuman rights, labor standards, and the environment.Instead, they will simply take their business elsewhere.We’ll lose out to Europe, Japan, and other countries.

Second, we must open up the WTO. Today,international trade dramatically affects people’s daily livesin ways that were once unimaginable. Trade decisionscan’t be made in secret. We must allow concernedcitizens and nongovernmental organizations to participatein the process. In the United States, we have proceduresfor adopting federal regulations that require thegovernment to give public notice and to take publiccomments into account. The WTO should operate withan equivalent level of transparency.

In this regard, the United States can lead by example. Weshould make the first move by adopting public inputprocedures for U.S. delegations to the WTO. Our WTOactions should have the same level of openness we requireof our domestic regulations. Then we should invite like-minded countries to do the same, thus leading a processto remove the veils from the WTO.

KEEP MOVING FORWARD

Third, we must keep moving forward. In large,consensus-driven organizations such as the WTO, theleast progressive member often sets the pace of change.We can’t let the most reluctant partner dictate the termsof trade. The United States must identify and work withlike-minded countries to move forward whenever theWTO stands still.

The United States should embark on a vigorous programto negotiate bilateral free trade agreements until theWTO is ready to restart the multilateral process. Likelycandidates for a first round are Chile, Singapore, andSouth Korea. These bilateral talks should address issuesof social concern, such as labor and the environment.

Finally, we should continue to use the WTO to advanceour interests. Since the WTO was born less than fiveyears ago, the United States has completed important

agreements on issues ranging from financial services totariffs on high-tech products. We should work within theWTO to eliminate destructive taxes on trade in sectorssuch as chemicals, wood products, environmental goods,and energy products.

TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT

We should use this upcoming period to seek a middleground on one of the most contentious issues addressedin Seattle: the relation between trade and theenvironment. The U.S. effort on this issue was weakenedby the lack of consensus at home on how to proceed. Weneed to build that consensus by identifying commonground between the business community andenvironmental groups and then expanding that commonground.

A good place to start is the real or potential inconsistencybetween the WTO and certain multilateral environmentalagreements (MEAs). Domestically, we should start byopening up the process used to negotiate MEAs.Business and environmentalists agree that this processlacks transparency. Internationally, we must find aprocedure for ruling on MEA compatibility with traderules. Actions taken under a legitimate MEA should notbe subject to a WTO challenge.

There are two ways to go about this. One way is to“grandfather” specific environmental agreements, as wedid in the North American Free Trade Agreement. Wecould start out by providing a so-called “safe haven” forthe Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete theOzone Layer and the Convention on International Tradein Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).The safe haven would protect the Montreal Protocol andCITES from trade actions in the WTO in whichcountries filed complaints charging violations of traderules. The other way is to describe the characteristics ofan MEA that will automatically be protected.

In addition to working on MEAs, we should eliminate alltariffs on environmental goods. Business andenvironmentalists agree on this one. It would reduce thecost of environmental technology — everything fromsewage treatment to catalytic converters to groundwatercleanup. U.S companies are leaders in this field, soreduced tariffs will help increase U.S. exports. I haveintroduced legislation giving the president the authorityto cut environmental tariffs, and I hope to get it enactedwhen Congress reconvenes.

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Business leaders and environmentalists also agree on theneed to eliminate environmentally harmful subsidies. Incases like fishing and agriculture, subsidies encouragepractices that are both economically and environmentallyharmful. Limiting such subsidies makes good economicand good environmental sense. I would like to see thetotal elimination of fishing subsidies. Export subsidiesfor agriculture should also be eliminated worldwide,despite opposition by the European Union. We shouldalso start looking seriously into the reduction of domesticagricultural subsidies throughout the world.

Finally, we should address the so-called pollution subsidy.By this I mean intentionally keeping environmentalstandards weak in a way that distorts trade by cuttingcosts of production for the polluter and making taxpayerspay the difference through higher health andenvironmental cleanup costs. This is a difficult issue.

A subset of this problem is that of PPMs — productionprocesses and methods. How a product is producedaffects the environment. Examples include the way

shrimp harvesting affects sea turtles, and the way timberharvesting affects species, water pollution, and thedemand for recycled materials. The trade rules alreadyallow for consideration of the way in which a good ismanufactured. Rules on intellectual property rights (IPR)are essentially about PPMs. IPR was a tough,controversial subject during the Uruguay Round, but wedealt with it. We should do the same with environmentalPPMs.

I found that the prevailing emotion in Seattle was anger.We need to move beyond that now and continue theimportant work of shaping the forces of globalization tobetter the lives of people around the world. We can’tshape those forces by standing still. We need to keepmoving forward on international trade, especially as itrelates to the environment. ❏

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No real winners emerged from December’s failed WTOmeeting in Seattle, not even WTO critics, says Jeffrey Schott,senior fellow at the Institute for International Economics.

Schott says that perhaps the biggest losers were developingcountries that depend on a well-functioning trading system.He also warns that the longer the delay in global trade talks,the greater the risk that European and Japanese protectionistagricultural policies will face U.S. retaliation.

“If new trade talks are to be revived this year ... WTOmembers will have to exhibit more flexibility in theirsubstantive positions,” Schott says. He recommends as firststeps, prior to the launch of new trade talks, institutionalreforms within the WTO including improved dispute-settlement compliance and more transparent decision-makingprocedures.

The collapse of the Seattle Ministerial Meeting of theWorld Trade Organization (WTO) in December 1999has put a dark cloud over the trading system as we enterthe 21st century. New global trade talks have beenpostponed and will be difficult to launch before theforthcoming U.S. presidential election.

Critics of the WTO have been energized. Blocking thestart of new trade talks is seen as an important steptoward their ultimate goal of restructuring the worldtrading system and eventually reversing existing tradeliberalization. These groups regard the debacle in Seattleas their greatest victory to date, coming on top of therecent collapse of negotiations on a MultilateralAgreement on Investment and the defeat of U.S. “fasttrack” trade negotiating authority, which has hamperedU.S. participation and consequently slowed progress on anumber of bilateral and regional trade initiatives.

The protesters clearly raised a ruckus in Seattle andcomplicated efforts by WTO delegates to negotiate theterms of reference for a new trade round. Time lost toprotests posed additional problems to negotiators alreadyfacing tight time constraints. But, ultimately, the WTOmeeting fell victim to serious substantive disagreementsamong the major trading nations over the prospective

agenda for new trade talks. In that regard, the keydamage to the WTO was self-inflicted.

Despite gallant talk about the value of new trade talks,the leaders of the WTO, the Quad countries (the UnitedStates, the European Union, Japan, and Canada),demanded liberalization abroad but were reticent todiscuss reform of their own trade barriers, which protectpolitically sensitive sectors of their economies. TheUnited States wanted deep cuts in farm subsidies, but itopposed efforts to cut peak U.S. industrial tariffs orreform antidumping rules, and it insisted on talks onlabor standards but not labor services. Similarly, Europeand Japan resisted substantive farm reforms while seekingnew talks on investment and competition policy, andCanada and Europe demanded special exemptions fortheir cultural industries, all of which were opposed by theUnited States. In short, the Quad failed to agree amongthemselves, much less build consensus among WTOmembers on launching new trade negotiations.

If new trade talks are to be revived this year, bothdeveloped and developing countries will have to besatisfied that their priority concerns are being addressed atthe negotiating table. To do so, WTO members will haveto exhibit more flexibility in their substantive positionsand fix the flaws in the WTO’s decision-making anddispute-settlement procedures that hampered progress inSeattle.

Unfortunately, trade officials do not seem to have fullygrasped the problems raised at the Seattle meeting nor thechanges required to promote consensus among the 135member countries of the WTO on the agenda for newglobal trade talks. The WTO’s “built-in” agenda mayproceed on agriculture and services, but anyone who hasfollowed previous Geneva negotiations knows that thesetalks will idle until the major trading countriesdemonstrate their political commitment to broadernegotiations and reform of their own trade barriers.

To better understand what needs to be done, I turn firstto a brief description of “Seattle Losers” and the problemsexposed by the Seattle fiasco. I then discuss what needs

❏ WTO TRADE TALKS: MOVING BEYOND SEATTLE By Jeffrey J. Schott, Senior Fellow, Institute for International Economics

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to be done as a prerequisite to the launch of new globaltrade talks.

SEATTLE’S LOSERS

Trade is often, incorrectly, regarded as a zero-sum game,with winners and losers. Despite the heady rhetoric ofthe anti-globalization forces after the WTO meeting,however, Seattle had only losers (except perhaps theanarchists who were not prosecuted).

The United States lost. The U.S. market is arguably themost open in the world. Our trading partners,particularly the developing countries, would have had tocommit to far greater reductions in their existing tradebarriers than those that would have been required of theUnited States. Instead, those barriers have been given anew lease on life by the delay in launching new WTOtalks. Both the United States and its trading partners willbe the poorer for it.

The European Union and Japan lost as well. Both will beunder less pressure from their trading partners to reformtheir highly protected farm sectors in the near term, butcloser to the expiry of the “peace clause” that buffersthem from WTO challenges of their farm programs. Thelonger the delay in engaging in substantive agriculturalnegotiations, the greater the risk that bilateral farm tradedisputes with the United States will provoke U.S.retaliation in cases where their practices are not incompliance with WTO rules. In that regard, the Seattleoutcome has slowed efforts to remedy the notable flaws inthe WTO’s dispute-settlement mechanism, particularly inthe area of compliance with panel rulings. Ambiguities inthe dispute-settlement provisions have been a source ofsubstantial friction between the United States and theEuropean Union in cases involving bananas and beefhormones, and they have complicated efforts by theworld’s leading trading powers to develop and promoteconsensus among WTO members on an agenda for newtrade talks.

Developing countries were perhaps the biggest losers.These countries are the weakest partners in the tradingsystem and the most dependent on a well-functioning,rules-based multilateral system. Efforts to strengthen thetrading system and to augment the WTO’s trading ruleswere set back by the collapse of the Seattle talks, whichexposed some of the WTO’s most glaring institutionalproblems. Special preferences for the least developed

countries put forward in Seattle were derailed, at leasttemporarily.

Labor unions lost. Their message about worker rights gotdrowned out by the din of the more violent protesters,who also usurped the bulk of the media coverage. Thestridency of their demands in the trade talks,inadvertently reinforced by President Clinton during apress interview in Seattle, compounded fears amongdeveloping countries that the U.S. initiative was designedto punish rather than help them promote trade andeconomic growth. As a result, prospects for includinglabor issues on the WTO agenda are now even moreremote.

WTO critics lost. Stopping the launch of a new round oftrade talks does not undermine existing WTO rights andobligations, nor does it remedy some of the legitimateproblems cited by these critics that would have beenaddressed in the talks. Ironically, blocking themultilateral process has revived some regional tradeliberalization initiatives in Latin America and East Asia.These regional talks involve the very countries that werethe targets of criticism by labor and environmentalgroups. Moreover, while the critics have at leasttemporarily blunted U.S. participation in such talks, thefact that new regional pacts discriminate againstnonmembers means that U.S. firms will suffer losses tosuppliers in other countries whose governments and firmsmay be less inclined to “use” trade to promote labormarket reforms.

PROSPECTS FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2000

It will be hard to revive the WTO round without astronger commitment to reform by the United States andthe European Union of their own trade barriers andacceptance by them of a less ambitious agenda of newissues, particularly with regard to labor. The repercussionsof the Seattle meeting, the forthcoming debate in theU.S. Congress on Chinese accession to the WTO, andthe impending U.S. election are critical factors that maymake it more difficult for the Clinton administration tonegotiate reductions in U.S. trade barriers and make itmore likely that the administration will promoteinitiatives that reflect the concerns of its labor andenvironmental constituencies Thus, it may be difficultfor the United States to reassert its traditional leadershiprole in the trading system until after the election inNovember 2000.

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While it will take time and political will to reachagreement on the agenda for the next round of WTOnegotiations, the task could be facilitated if governmentsundertook initiatives to strengthen the institutionalstructure of the WTO and its capacity to support reformsin developing countries. Three broad issues should topthe WTO agenda for the year 2000: reform of thedispute settlement understanding, reform of the decision-making process, and cooperation with other internationalorganizations to support capacity-building initiatives indeveloping countries.

The first task should be to improve the WTO’s dispute-settlement procedures. Confidence in a rules-basedtrading system depends in large measure on thewillingness of the most powerful trading nations to liveby the WTO rules and to comply with its rulings. Asdemonstrated in the bananas and beef hormones cases,the compliance provisions need to be fixed to ensure thatcountries found in violation of their obligations bringthose practices more quickly into conformity with WTOrules. This is not an issue for the traditional horse-trading of WTO negotiations; rather it should be onewhere all member countries act, prior to the launch ofnew talks, to ensure that the WTO system operatesequitably and efficiently, and thus provides assurance thatrights and obligations developed in new talks will befaithfully implemented.

Second, WTO decision-making needs to be moreinclusive and more efficient. Part of the problem inSeattle was that too many countries with a significantstake in the trading system and the prospectivenegotiations were excluded from the deliberations on theministerial declaration. The WTO needs to develop a

better system for managing the decision-making processamong its large and increasingly active membership thatis more representative and efficient than the current“Green Room” process. That process, selecting a smallgroup of ministers to make decisions for all in a closedsetting, has been aptly criticized for its “back room”dealings.

Finally, the WTO needs to strengthen its ties to otherinternational organizations, particularly the InternationalMonetary Fund and the World Bank, to support effortsin developing countries to improve their economicinfrastructure and administrative capabilities so that theywill be better able to implement economic reforms.Technical assistance is particularly needed in areas such asintellectual property and customs regulation, whereWTO obligations have already been undertaken andwhere countries face problems in fulfilling their Genevacommitments.

Promoting institutional reforms and strengtheninglinkages with other international organizations would beuseful initiatives for the WTO to undertake in 2000.The United States and other WTO members shouldpursue these tasks immediately in order to facilitate thelaunch of new multilateral trade negotiations by earlynext year.❏

Note: The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect theviews or policies of the U.S. government.

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In any WTO agricultural trade negotiations ahead, U.S.negotiators should insist on starting from the text worked outat the December Seattle ministers’ meeting, says BobStallman, new president of the American Farm BureauFederation.

Even so, he says, his organization remains disappointed thatthe text did not employ stronger language about eliminatingexport subsidies. And he warns that keeping language in thetext suggesting that countries can exempt politically sensitivecommodities from broad tariff reduction would bedisastrous.

Stallman, a Columbus, Texas, rice grower and cattleman,was elected president of the federation in January.

Protests by a variety of groups during the Seattle WorldTrade Organization ministerial meeting did not preventthe launch of a new round of trade liberalizingnegotiations. Likewise, neither did agriculturalnegotiations cause everyone to go home without reachingan agreement. However, as someone who hopes that amillennium round of trade negotiations will yield furtherreform of agricultural trade rules, I was doublydisappointed by the prattle that followed the “Battle inSeattle.”

Despite many of the protesters’ claims that the WTO isan omnipotent, sovereign world agency, the fact is it is abureaucracy that operates by consensus of its 135member nations. It is difficult to reach that kind ofconsensus under any circumstances. Given thecomplexity of the issues, it was not surprising that WTOmember countries were unable to reach a final agreementin Seattle.

Similarly, the talks that took place on agriculture weren’tthe culprit. In fact, there was some progress on farmissues during the week of the ministerial. The bigquestion now is whether the agricultural negotiations thisyear will pick up from Seattle’s endpoint or return to thestarting line, which would be a mistake.

It’s important to note that there was an agriculture drafttext on the table — the discussions had not unraveled assome have suggested. As a result, U.S. farm interests willurge our negotiators to use that text as the starting pointthis year. The American Farm Bureau Federation was notentirely pleased with it, but we believe that it can bechanged for the better. Our negotiators should reject anyattempt to start from scratch as the European Union hassuggested since Seattle. We are dismayed that ournegotiators have since indicated they will disregard thefarm discussions in Seattle.

SEATTLE: SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS

I believe there were some positive developments for U.S.agriculture in Seattle.

• The next trade round is scheduled to conclude in threeyears. The Uruguay Round ended up taking seven years.I think most people would agree that the longer thenegotiations last, the harder it will be to get anagreement.

• There did not seem to be much support for “earlyharvest,” that is, the idea of seeking separate, earlieragreements on nonagricultural issues. While the U.S.government favors that notion, most farm groups opposeit. Fortunately, most other countries appear to share thatview.

• There was no reopening of the sanitary/phytosanitaryagreement.

• Animal welfare issues were not included in thenegotiating framework.

But there were also disappointments in Seattle. Foremostwas the lack of progress regarding export subsidies. TheFarm Bureau and most other U.S. farm groups wantcomplete elimination of export subsidies. It is ournumber one objective. However, the Seattle text calledfor “substantial reduction in export subsidies” and for thenegotiations to move “in the direction of progressiveelimination of export subsidization.” The language

❏ THE FARM TRADE CHALLENGE UNCHANGED BY SEATLEBy Bob Stallman, President, American Farm Bureau Federation

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reflects the Europeans’ opposition to eliminatingsubsidies.

It would be a travesty if a new trade round that deals withagriculture fails to seek complete elimination of exportsubsidies. It is a practice used mainly by the EuropeanUnion (EU), which accounts for over 85 percent of theworld’s expenditures for export subsidies. This hurtsfarmers not just in the United States but also in othernations, such as Australia. In contrast, the United Statesaccounts for 2 percent of such spending. Our farmerscannot compete against the EU treasury, and they are fedup with having to try. Export subsidies are unfair andmust be ended. A trade negotiation that hedges on thisfundamental issue will lack credibility with U.S. farmers.

MARKET ACCESS ISSUES

Regarding market access issues, we generally support theSeattle text, which calls for the “broadest possibleliberalization” and “comprehensive” negotiations. Butthere could be a troublesome obstacle with this approach.The text calls for all commodities to be put on the tableat the beginning of the talks and implies that countriescan exempt certain commodities and issues at a laterpoint in the negotiations. This safety valve could provedisastrous. If every country knows from the start that itcan remove politically sensitive commodities from thetalks, the negotiations will surely unravel because therewill be nothing left to negotiate.

Japan has a 550 percent tariff on imported rice. The EUhas a 215 percent tariff on beef. Canada has a 300percent tariff on butter. If we remove our sensitivecommodities from the negotiations, guess which onesthose nations will withdraw. The Farm Bureau has calledfor a trade round that has no exceptions for products orpolicies. Certainly, all countries — including the UnitedStates — will want to have their import-sensitivecommodities protected to the greatest extent possible.And there may be mechanisms agreed to duringnegotiations that achieve it. But we shouldn’t go into anew trade round with all parties knowing they can simplyavoid having to deal with sticky issues by taking them offthe table.

Speaking of sticky issues, the Farm Bureau believes thatbiotechnology should be addressed head on throughnegotiations in a new trade round. We differ with theofficial U.S. position, which is to seek a “working group.”We don’t believe a “working group” will solve any

problem because it is not binding. A working group isbasically a discussion group that will issue a report ofrecommendations to trade ministers. We need a solutionto our export approval problem with the EU forgenetically modified grains. Unfortunately, we believe aworking group would give the EU what it wants — aforum in which to talk the issue to death.

In fairness to our negotiators, I must note that there is noconsensus among the various U.S. groups on thenegotiating group vs. working group issue. There is aschool of thought that since most nations do not yetproduce bioengineered products, they do not have avested interest in a negotiated solution. However, theydo stand to benefit from the technology. Thus, the FarmBureau believes we need a binding resolution onbiotechnology, not just in the WTO, but also bilaterallywith the EU.

MULTIFUNCTIONALITY

The final big issue for agriculture in Seattle centered onthe term “multifunctionality.” Going into the talks, itwas clear that the EU and Japan wanted this term —which would serve as acknowledgement that agricultureserves other societal purposes besides food productionand is thus deserving of governmental support —included in the negotiating framework. We vigorouslyopposed this bid, and our negotiators kept it out of thedraft text. However, the concept is still clearly in play.The text instead said that “non-trade concerns” likeprotection of the environment, food security, economicviability and development of rural areas, and food safetyare to be considered.

Our concern is that these issues could be used as asmokescreen to maintain or expand trade-distortingpractices. We believe that if a nation wants to makepayments to producers to achieve importantenvironmental or societal goals, that’s fine — as long asthey are not used to pay their producers to grow crops orraise livestock. Payments tied to production shieldsproducers from the global marketplace and hurts tradecompetitors.

As many commentators have noted, it will be difficult toget a new trade round launched in 2000. That does notmean, however, that substantive work in agriculturecannot and should not proceed. In fact, negotiators mustcontinue to talk if WTO members are to comply withthe Uruguay Round’s directive (the so-called “built-in

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agenda”) for new negotiations in agriculture and servicesin 2000.

We believe it is imperative that the United Statescontinue to exert leadership in reforming worldagricultural trade. The U.S. market is the world’s mostopen, but support for keeping it open will diminish —

especially among farmers — if other markets remainclosed. Despite what happened in Seattle, we believe thatnegotiations through the World Trade Organizationprovide our best opportunity for creating a moreequitable world trading system. ❏

Note: The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect theviews or policies of the U.S. government.

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Developing countries preferred the collapse of the SeattleWorld Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial to anegotiating round skewed in favor of the developed countries,says Jabulani Sikhakhane, editor at large of South Africa’sFinancial Mail. Some developing countries would likenegotiations to start soon, however, while their positionsremain relatively united, he says. Lacking the resources toparticipate adequately, developing countries oppose acomprehensive trade round agenda of the sort proposed byEurope and Japan, he says.

Were developing countries the major losers of the failureof the WTO’s Seattle ministerial conference to agree on anew trade agenda? WTO Director-General Mike Moorethinks so.

“I feel particularly disappointed because thepostponement of our deliberations means that thebenefits that would have accrued to developing and least-developed countries will now be delayed while theproblems facing these countries will not be allayed,”Moore said at the close of the Seattle conference inDecember.

Although Moore is right about the impact of delayedbenefits, most developing countries do not regardthemselves as major losers from failure of the Seattleministerial to launch the “Millennium Round” of tradenegotiations. For them, the collapse of the talks was abetter outcome than a trade agenda skewed in favor ofthe rich, industrialized countries.

Developing countries would like to see a review of theshortcomings of Uruguay Round agreements, such asanti-dumping, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, andtrade-related intellectual property (TRIPS).

They went to Seattle bitter at the outcome of theUruguay Round of trade negotiations completed in 1993,an outcome they regard as having benefited the rich,industrialized countries the most.

They view the Uruguay Round agenda as being focusedon those economic sectors in which industrializedcountries had a comparative advantage, while doing verylittle to pry open sectors, such as agriculture, textiles, andclothing, in which developing nations can competeeffectively.

As a result of this skewed agenda and the outcome of theUruguay Round, developing countries argue that theyhave had to bear huge costs in implementing the Uruguayagreements, with very little concomitant benefits.

The World Bank has estimated the costs to developingcountries of implementing just three of the agreements at$150 million.

Developing nations argue that industrialized countrieshave been reluctant to reduce their protection of sectorssuch as agriculture and, in manufacturing, textiles,clothing, and footwear. Given agriculture’s dominance intheir economies, most developing countries, especially theleast-developed ones, see freer trade in agriculturalproducts as their best hope for benefiting from worldeconomic integration.

AGRICULTURE PROTECTION

But industrialized nations retain huge fortresses aroundtheir agricultural sectors. The United NationsConference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), inits 1999 Trade and Development Report, says that the 29member countries of the Organization for EconomicCooperation and Development (OECD) spent an average$350,000 million a year in agricultural support between1996-1998, a figure that compares with total agriculturalexports from developing countries of $170,000 million.

“The effect of this agricultural support, whether in theform of direct export subsidies or direct payments tofarmers, is to allow agricultural products to be sold ondomestic and world markets at below cost,” UNCTADsays. “The impact on producers in developing countriescan be significant not only by precluding their entry into

❏ DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DO WANT A TRADE ROUND—IN THE RIGHT CIRCUMSTANCESBy Jabulani Sikhakhane, Editor at Large, Financial Mail (South Africa)

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northern markets but also through unfair competition intheir own markets.”

The UN body adds that if developed countries removedsubsidies and other forms of protection on theiragricultural and manufacturing industries, it would openup $700,000 million worth of export opportunities fordeveloping countries.

Given the political strength of agricultural constituenciesin industrialized nations, especially those of the 15-member European Union (EU) and Japan, these nationsmay find a commitment to the reduction of theirsubsidies and other forms of support for their farmers apolitically difficult decision. But it is such politicallydifficult decisions that industrialized nations must take ifthey are to convince developing countries that they arenot only genuine in their commitment to free trade butthat free trade is beneficial to all.

THE UNCTAD CONFERENCE: A PLATFORM FOR FRANK DISCUSSION

The immediate challenge facing developing countriesafter Seattle is how to maintain their cohesion as theyseek the way forward for WTO trade negotiations. In hisreview of the Seattle talks, South African Trade MinisterAlec Erwin emphasized the degree to which South Africaand other developing countries successfully coordinatedtheir positions on a number of issues.

“It seems to me that the close working relations that werebuilt up between Brazil, Egypt, South Africa, Singapore,and Thailand — whose positions were very close —played a significant role in the actual negotiation processat Seattle,” he said, adding that this cooperation helpedmove India toward more moderate positions.

Erwin kicked off the new year with a visit to India, wherehe met his counterpart, commerce and trade ministerMusaroli Maran, for consultations on how the WTOshould proceed. Erwin is planning more consultationswith other developing countries.

These consultations will culminate at UNCTAD’s 10thconference, in Bangkok, Thailand, from February 12 to19. The UNCTAD conference will also be attended byindustrialized countries, as well as by the heads of theWorld Bank and the International Monetary Fund andby WTO’s Moore.

Beyond providing a forum for developing nations tobuild further upon their cohesion, the UNCTADconference should offer industrialized countries anopportunity to “make peace” with developing countries.In addition, the conference should offer Moore aplatform to touch base with WTO member countries.

While rich, industrialized countries differ in theirapproaches to the trade negotiations, some developingcountries, such as South Africa, argue that developedcountries ultimately have common interests. Hence, theneed for developing countries to maintain, if notstrengthen, their cohesion in moving the trade agendaforward. This also explains why most developing nationsare keen to resume soon, before they begin to lose theircohesion.

Whether that happens depends on how prepared theindustrialized countries — principally the United States,the European Union, and Japan — are to narrow theirdifferences.

One of the major differences between the EU and Japan,on the one hand, and the United States, on the other,concerns the breadth and depth of any new trade agenda.The United States wants a new round to focus onagriculture, services, and market access, as well as addressdeveloping country issues; the EU and Japan want abroader agenda, including investment and antitrust rules,and new disciplines on the use of antidumping laws.

But most developing countries see demands by theEuropeans and Japanese for a comprehensive trade agendaas being unfair because it adds to the heavy burden thatdeveloping countries already carry in terms of grapplingwith the effects of the implementation of the UruguayRound agreements.

COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA DRAWBACKS

A comprehensive agenda has serious implications fordeveloping countries, not the least of which is the burdenit will impose on their already limited financial andhuman resources to conduct negotiations. The 1999World Development Report points out that 19 of the 42African WTO members have no trade representative atWTO headquarters in Geneva. This compares with theaverage for OECD countries of just under seven tradeofficials each. Lack of, or poor, representation ofdeveloping countries in Geneva seriously impedes theirability to participate in the WTO processes.

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As it is, the resources of those developing nations withrepresentation in Geneva are already overstretched by theunusually large number of WTO meetings (an average of46 a week in 1996) and consultations in Geneva.

“This places considerable premium on a country’s abilityto maintain in Geneva a large, skilled and versatiledelegation which can engage in daily meetings andconsultations that ultimately move the WTO process,”say economists Richard Blackhurst, Bill Lyakurwa, andAdemola Oyejide in a paper commissioned by the WorldBank in advance of the Seattle meetings. “It alsopinpoints the significance of learning by doing and thedevelopment of institutional memory, attributes that areconsiderably diluted by inadequately sized delegationsthat also undergo frequent changes in staff composition.”

Furthermore, the WTO’s decision-making processes canwork against countries with limited resources.

“Decision-making in the key organs of the WTO isessentially by consensus within the framework of equalityof members,” according to Blackhurst, Lyakurwa, andOyejide. “This should, in reality, protect the interests ofsmaller and poorer members from arbitrary actions of thelarge and richer nations.

“But in reality, consensus decision-making occurs whenno decision is formally objected to by a member presentat the meeting in which the decision is taken. Clearly,this procedure ascribes considerable importance to havinga permanent presence or, perhaps more accurately, anactive, knowledgeable presence,” they conclude.

Despite the absence of active and knowledgeable tradeofficials both in Geneva and at home, developingcountries remain committed to the multilateral trading

system, which they view as their only avenue forintegrating more closely into the world economy.

They also accept that only integration into the globaleconomy can bring about faster economic growth, greateremployment opportunities, and reduced levels of povertyat home.

In this regard, developing countries are keen to resumenegotiations for a new trade agenda. But given theirexperiences with the implementation of the UruguayRound of agreements, developing nations ask that rich,industrialized countries also commit themselves to thereview of those aspects of the Uruguay Round,agreements which have been shown to have a negativeimpact on developing countries.

In addition, developing countries need convincing byindustrialized nations that demands for a broad-basednew trade agenda, embracing non-trade issues such aslabor and the environment, are as EU trade commissionerPascal Lamy puts it, more than simply efforts to defend alevel of affluence which they [developing countries]regard as a privilege.”

Without these commitments from industrializedcountries, developing countries may reason that a delay indrawing up a new trade agenda is a better evil than a doseof another agenda tilted toward the interests of richcountries. ❏

Note: The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect theviews or policies of the U.S. government.

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FACTS AND FIGURES

1934 — The U.S. Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act(amending the Tariff Act of 1930) delegated to the U.S.president the power to enter into reciprocal agreements tolower tariffs. By 1945, the United States had entered into32 bilateral agreements reducing tariffs.

1944 — An international conference of 44 countries atBretton Woods, New Hampshire, agreed on a globalfixed-rate foreign exchange system and laid thegroundwork for the International Monetary Fund, theWorld Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs andTrade.

October 30, 1947 — Twenty-three nations concluded theProtocol of Provisional Application of the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade (familiarly known asGATT) in Geneva, Switzerland. The first GATTnegotiating round also achieved 122 mutual tariffreduction agreements and provisions for building regionalfree trade or common market zones.

January 1, 1948 — The GATT agreement entered intoforce.

1949 — The second GATT round, negotiated in Annecy,France, achieved 5,000 tariff cuts.

1950-1951 — The third GATT round, negotiated inTorquay, England, achieved 8,700 tariff cuts.

1956 — The fourth GATT round, in Geneva, achievedtariff cuts covering $2,500 million in trade.

1960-1962 — The fifth GATT round — negotiated inGeneva and named the Dillon Round for the chief U.S.trade negotiator, Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon— achieved 4,400 tariff cuts and marked the first time theEuropean Economic Community negotiated as an entityfor individual member countries.

1962 — The U.S. Trade Expansion Act authorized thepresident to negotiate mutual tariff reductions of up to 50percent with other countries. It also established the post

of special representative for trade negotiations in theExecutive Office of the President to lead U.S. tradenegotiation delegations as well as interagency trade policycommittees.

1963-1967 — The sixth GATT round, named theKennedy Round after U.S. President John F. Kennedy,aimed at increasing U.S. exports to European EconomicCommunity countries. The Kennedy Round achievedtariff reductions that ranged between 35 and 40 percent.It achieved an agreement to provide 4.5 million tons ofwheat a year in food assistance to impoverished countries.It achieved the GATT Anti-Dumping Agreement, settingstandards for national rules against exporting goods atunfair prices.

1973-1979 — The seventh GATT round — negotiated inGeneva and called the Tokyo Round — achieved anotherbig cut in tariffs. For the first time the GATT addressednontariff barriers, established codes of conduct for them,and made modest reductions in agricultural trade barriers.The round accorded preferential treatment to developingcountries.

1974 — The U.S. Trade Act of 1974 passed with aprovision requiring the president to determine, afterconclusion of future agreements, whether any majorindustrial country (defined as Canada, the EuropeanEconomic Community, and Japan) had failed to makeconcessions “substantially equivalent” to U.S. concessions.

1986-1994 — The eighth GATT round, the UruguayRound, was launched at a ministerial meeting in Puntadel Este, Uruguay, with more than 125 countriesparticipating. The negotiating agenda included openingmarkets in agriculture and services, restricting subsidies,and protecting intellectual property.

1990 — Stalled by U.S.-European disagreement overagriculture, Uruguay Round negotiations broke down at aBrussels ministerial meeting that was supposed toconclude them. Negotiations resumed the following year.

❏ A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE WTO

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April 1994 — The Uruguay Round ended with 111countries signing an agreement in Marrakesh, Morocco,to establish the World Trade Organization (WTO) as amore-robust successor to the GATT. The round achievedmore tariff cuts on industrialized goods and strengtheneddisciplines on nontariff barriers. Members agreed to phaseout import restrictions on textiles and clothing. Theround achieved modest market opening measures inagriculture and services and protection for intellectualproperty. Most importantly, it established a system ofpanels to resolve disputes between WTO members andrules for enforcing panel decisions.

January 1995 — The WTO, an intergovernmentalorganization with a firmer legal foundation than itspredecessor, began operations. Governing the WTO are anumber of legal texts, most notably the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade, the General Agreementon Trade in Services, and the agreement on Trade-RelatedAspects of Intellectual Property Rights. ❏

Sources: World Trade Organization; U.S. Department of State.

In the first three years after the World Trade Organization(WTO) began operating in January 1995 its membersconcluded agreements for opening trade intelecommunications, financial services and informationtechnology that potentially exceed the value of allagreements reached in the Uruguay Round.

UNFINISHED BUSINESS

Negotiations in four services sectors remained incompleteat the end of the Uruguay Round but were continuedlater.

• Negotiations on the movement of natural persons wereconcluded in mid-1995 with a modest agreement.

• Negotiations on maritime transportation services failedin 1996 and were suspended until broader negotiations onservices resume.

• Negotiations on basic telecommunications servicesachieved an agreement in February 1997 opening marketsin 69 countries accounting for more than 90 percent ofthe world market, estimated at $600,000 million a year.

• Negotiations on financial services achieved anagreement in December 1997 opening banking,insurance, and securities trading sectors in membercountries accounting for more than 90 percent of theworld market.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENT

An Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) foruminitiative to eliminate tariffs in information technologyproducts, which account for 12 percent of all world trade,got a boost from the WTO Singapore Ministerial meetingin December 1996. In March 1997, 43 countriesaccounting for 93 percent of that trade reached aninformation technology agreement (ITA) to eliminatetariffs by 2000 on computers, telephones and many othertelecom products, semiconductors, software, and scientificinstruments. Negotiations on a second agreement, calledITA II and aimed at eliminating tariffs on still moreinformation products, have stalled for two years because ofdisagreements over product coverage.

BUILT-IN AGENDA

The Uruguay Round agreements established a workprogram for subsequent years. Three of the moreimportant issues remain unresolved as the 1999 Seattleministerial meeting failed to advance them.

• Negotiations to improve the WTO agreement ongovernment procurement began in 1998, but thoseinvolved have failed to achieve agreement so far.

• Negotiations on agriculture and services were supposedto have started by 2000. The mandate remains, but so farWTO participants have not agreed on negotiatingagendas.

POST-URUGUAY ROUND DEVELOPMENTS

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MINISTERIAL MEETINGS

• The first WTO Ministerial conference, at Singapore inDecember 1996, initiated studies on trade andinvestment, trade and competition, transparency ingovernment procurement, and trade facilitation.

• The second WTO Ministerial, at Geneva in May 1998,added electronic commerce to the work schedule andbegan preparations for considering further broadnegotiations.

• The third WTO Ministerial, at Seattle, Washington,from November 30 to December 3, 1999, whereministers were expected to launch a new round ofnegotiations, was suspended when no consensus emergedon a negotiating agenda.

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

The crucial difference between the WTO and its GATTpredecessor is the dispute-settlement system that giveswinners of a WTO panel ruling the power to enforce

compliance with the ruling — by imposing economicsanctions if necessary.

Unlike the GATT, the WTO prohibits the losing party ina panel ruling from blocking adoption of the ruling bythe larger WTO membership (meeting as the DisputeSettlement Body). The Dispute Settlement Body andAppellate Body can require the government to correct itsfailure to meet a WTO obligation and can authorize thecomplaining government to take retaliatory trademeasures. ❏

Source: World Trade Organization

Economic Perspectives • An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State • Vol. 5, No. 1, February 2000

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INFORMATION RESOURCES

KEY CONTACTS AND INTERNET SITESRELATED TO THE WTO

NON-U.S. GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Winder Building600 17th Street, N.W.Washington, DC 20508 U.S.A.Telephone: 1-888-473-8787http://www.ustr.gov/

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)1400 Independence Avenue, S.W.Washington, DC 20250 U.S.A.Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS)Telephone: (202) 720-1727http://www.fas.usda.gov/

U.S. Department of Commerce14th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W.Washington, DC 20230 U.S.A.International Trade Administration (ITA)Telephone: (202) 482-3809http://www.ita.doc.gov/

U.S. Department of State2201 C. Street, N.W.Washington, DC 20520 U.S.A.Bureau of Economic and Business AffairsTelephone: (202) 647-7951http://www.state.gov/www/issues/economic/index.htmlOffice of International Information Programshttp://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/wto99/

U.S. Department of Labor200 Constitution Avenue, N.W.Washington, DC 20210 U.S.A.Bureau of International Labor AffairsTelephone: (202) 219-6373http://www.dol.gov/dol/ilab/

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)Ariel Rios Building1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.Washington, DC 20460(202) 260-2090

NTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

World Trade Organization (WTO)http://www.wto.org/

U.N. Conference on Trade and Development(UNCTAD)http://www.unctad.org/

Organization for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment (OECD)http://www.oecd.org/ech/seattle.htm

European Union (EU)http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/wto_overview/index_en.htm

BUSINESS, CONSUMER, ENVIRONMENTAL ANDLABOR ORGANIZATIONS

AFL-CIOhttp://www.aflcio.org/wto/index.htm

American Farm Bureau Federationhttp://www.fb.com/issues/backgrd/trade.html

Business Coalition for U.S.-China Tradehttp://www.business4chinatrade.org/

Earthjustice Legal Defense Fundhttp://www.earthjustice.org/work/international.html

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Friends of the Earthhttp://www.foe.org/international/

Public Citizenhttp://www.citizen.org/pctrade/gattwto/gatthome.html

U.S. Chamber of Commercehttp://www.uschamber.org/frame/frame/frame.html

United Steelworkers of Americahttp://www.fairtradewatch.org/

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ADDITIONAL READINGS ON THE UNITED STATESAND WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

Bhagwati, Jagdish N. A Stream of Windows: UnsettlingReflections on Trade, Immigration, and Democracy.Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1998.

Council of Economic Advisers. America’s Interest in theWorld Trade Organization: An Economic Assessment(Report). Washington, D.C.: The Council of EconomicAdvisers, November 1999.

Destler, I.M. and Peter J. Balint. The New Politics ofAmerican Trade: Trade, Labor, and the Environment.Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics,1999.

Finger, J. Michael and Ludger Schuknecht. Market AccessAdvances and Retreats: The Uruguay Round and Beyond(Policy Research Working Papers, No. 2232). Washington,D.C.: The World Bank, November 1999.

“Focus — Millenium Trade Round” (Special Section).OECD Observer, no. 219, December 1999.

French, Hilary. “Challenging the WTO.” World Watch,vol. 12, no. 6, November/December 1999.

Friedman, Thomas L. The Lexus and the Olive Tree. NewYork: Farrar Straus & Giroux, 1999.

Hufbauer, Gary Clyde. World Trade After Seattle:Implications for the United States (International EconomicsPolicy Briefs, No. 99-10). Washington, D.C.: Institute forInternational Economics, December 1999.

Krueger, Anne O. and Chonira Aturupane, eds. TheWTO As an International Organization. Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1998.

Lovett, William A., Alfred. E. Eckes, Jr., and Richard L.Brinkman. U.S. Trade Policy: History, Theory, and theWTO. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999.

Maskus, Keith E. Regulatory Standards in the WTO:Comparing Intellectual Property Rights With CompetitionPolicy, Environmental Protection, and Core Labor Standards(Working Papers: 2000, No. 00-1). Washington, D.C.:Institute for International Economics, January 2000.

McDonald, Brian. The World Trading System: TheUruguay Round and Beyond. New York: St. Martin’sPress, Inc., 1998

Mazur, Jay. “Labor’s New Internationalism.” ForeignAffairs, vol. 79, no.1, January/February 2000.

Michalopoulos, Constantine. Developing Countries’Participation in the World Trade Organization (PolicyResearch Working Paper, No. 1906). Washington, D.C.and Geneva: The World Bank and the World TradeOrganization, March 1998.

Noland, Marcus. “Learning to Love the WTO.” ForeignAffairs, vol. 78, no. 5, September/October 1999.

Rodrik, Dani. The New Global Economy and DevelopingCountries: Making Openness Work (Policy Essay, No. 24).Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council,January 1999.

Schott, Jeffrey J., ed. Launching New Global Trade Talks:An Action Agenda. Washington, D.C.: Institute forInternational Economics, 1998.

Stiglitz, Joseph F. “Trade and the Developing World: ANew Agenda.” Current History, vol. 98, no. 631,November 1999.

Stokes, Bruce. “The Protectionist Myth.” Foreign Policy,no. 117, Winter 1999-2000.

Tarullo, Daniel K. “Seattle Light.” The InternationalEconomy, vol. 13, no. 6, November/December 1999.

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Crafting a Global Trade Strategy:

The U.S. and the WTO

EconomicPerspectivesVolume 5 An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State Number 1