cps sec sg sg2017 conf_iran
TRANSCRIPT
CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEM SECURITY IN SMART POWER GRIDS
Ahmadreza Ghaznavi
Researcher at Iran Telecommunication Research Center
PhD Student at Yazd University
Fall 2017
Outline…
■CPS Introduction
■CPS Security Issues : a Review
■Smart Grid as a CPS
–Smart Grid Cyber-physical Security
2
CPS INTRODUCTION
3
4
Cyber-Physical Systems or "smart" systems are co-engineered interacting networks of physical and computational components.
NIST
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are engineered systems that are built from, and depend upon, the seamless integration of computational algorithms and physical components.
NSF
large complex physical systems that are interacting with a considerable number of distributed
computing elements for monitoring, control and management which can exchange information
between them and with human users.
CPSOS
CyPhERS
complex systems that are able to control and coordinate physical and organizational processes on a local and a global scale via the use of information and communication technology.
5
Typical CPS Features
■ Monitor and control physical and organizational or business processes
■ Be a large-scale system with different - and even conflicting - goals spanning different application domains
■ Require integration of different technical disciplines and different application domains
■ Require a high degree of dependability
■ Involve substantial user involvement/interaction
■ Continuously monitor and optimize its own performance
■ Adapt and evolve constantly in response changes in the environment, through real-time (re)configuration, deployment or (de)commissioning
■ Require hierarchical decision systems with a high degree of autonomy on local, regional, national, and global level
■ Be a distributed and interconnected systems of systems
6
7Jin, Wenjing & Liu, Zongchang & Shi, Zhe & Jin, Chao & Lee, Jay. (2017). CPS-enabled worry-free industrial applications. 1-7.
8
9
https://www.researchgate.net/post/What_is_the_difference_between_internet_of_things_and_cyber_physical_systems
CPS and Embedded Systems
■ An embedded system is a self-contained system that incorporates elements of control logic and real world interaction.
■ Unlike a CPS, however, an embedded system is typically confined to a single device, whilst CPSs may encompass many constituent systems and devices.
■ Embedded systems typically have a limited number of tasks to complete, with software and hardware elements designed specifically to achieve those tasks, typically with very limited resources.
■ A CPS itself operates a much larger scale, potentially including many networked embedded systems or other devices and system as well, including human and socio-technical systems.
10
CPS & IoT
11
CPS and the Internet of Things (IoT) have significant overlaps.
The IoT is a vision of the future where many millions of devices are connected
over the internet, allowing them to collect information about the real world
remotely, and share it with other systems and devices.
IoT and CPS share many challenges, but there are some distinctions.
IoT has a strong emphasis on uniquely identifiable and internet-connected
devices and embedded systems.
CPS engineering has a strong emphasis on the relationship between
computation and the physical world (e.g., between complex software and
hardware aspects of a system).
If a business works with IoT, particularly if it includes interacting with the
physical world via with sensors and/or actuators, it can probably be
classed as CPS.
12https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/correlations-among-iot-wsns-m2m-cps-ahmed-eldweik
13https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/correlations-among-iot-wsns-m2m-cps-ahmed-eldweik
14https://www.slideshare.net/vsr0001/4th-industrial-revolution-is-beyond-cyber-physical-systems
15
16http://www.leisenberg.info/2017/06/16/digital-transformation-industry-4-0-and-the-internet-of-things-attempt-of-a-clarification-for-smes/
17
18
19
CPS and Systems of systems
■ CPSs and SoSs also have many shared interests.
■ Many CPSs are comprised of independent constituents, and, like SoSs, CPSs also tackle challenges of coping with dependable emergence, evolution and distribution.
– However, although it is often the case that CPS constituent systems are independent, it's not a defining characteristic for a CPS.
– Likewise, although it's often the case that SoSs do incorporate elements of computation as well as real-world interaction, this is not a defining property of an SoS.
■ If a business works with systems of systems, particularly if it includes interacting with the real world via sensors and/or actuators, it can be probably classed as CPS.
20
21https://pages.nist.gov/cpspwg/
A SoS is an integration of a finite
number of constituent systems which
are independent and operable, and
which are networked together for a
period of time to achieve a certain
higher goal
Systems of Systems Engineering: principle and applications. Jamshidi, M., ed., CRC Press, 2009
• Large, often spatially distributed
physical systems with complex
dynamics
• Distributed control, supervision and
management
• Partial autonomy of the subsystems
• Dynamic reconfiguration of the
overall system on different time-
scales
• Continuous evolution of the overall
system during its operation
• Possibility of emerging behaviors.
Cyber-physical Systems of Systems
22
In 2017, NSF is working closely with multiple
agencies of the federal government, including:• The U.S. Department of homeland security (DHS)
• Science and technology directorate (S&T);
• The U.S. Department of transportation (DOT)
• Federal highway administration (FHWA), and through
FHWA,
• The U.S. DOT intelligent transportation systems (ITS)
• Joint program office (JPO);
• The national aeronautics and space administration (NASA)
aeronautics research mission directorate (ARMD);
• Several national institutes of health
• the U.S. Department of agriculture-national institute of food
and agriculture (USDA-NIFA, hereafter referred to as NIFA).
Key goals are to identify basic CPS research directions that are common across multiple application domains, along with opportunities for accelerated transition to practice.
23
24
25
CPS Courses content example
26
27
CPS Security Courses content example
28
Cyber Security for Embedded Controls in Cyber Physical Systems
Paper Submission Deadline – Jan 15th 2018
Security of Cyber-physical Systems and Industrial Control Systems and Networks
Submission Deadline Friday, 29 September 2017
29
1st IEEE International Conference on Industrial Cyber-Physical
Systems (ICPS-2018)
Saint-Petersburg, RUSSIA, May 15-18, 2018
30
4th ACM Cyber-Physical System Security Workshop (CPSS 2018)
Submissions Due: Jan 20, 2018 (GMT) Incheon, Korea
31
Call for Papers
32
Special Issue: Cyber-Physical Systems in Smart Grids: Security and Operation
Submission deadline: Feb 28 2017
33
Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy
Special Section on Cyber-Physical Power Systems (CPPS)
Paper Submission Deadline: Nov. 30, 2017
■ Cyber-Physical European Roadmap & Strategy
34
Project Deliverables
WP6 - Agenda and Recommendations
D6.1+2 - Integrated CPS Research Agenda and Recommendations for Action
WP5 - Status and Potential
D5.1 - CPS: State of the Art
D5.2 - CPS: Significance, Challenges and Opportunities - Appendix
WP4 - Technologies
D4.2 - CPS Technologies
D4.1 - CPS Methods and Techniques
WP3 - Markets
D3.2 - Market and innovation potential of CPS
D3.1 - Structured CPS market model
WP2 - Characterization of the CPS domain
D2.2 - Structuring of CPS Domain: Characteristics, trends, challenges and opportunities associated with CPSD2.1 - Characteristics, capabilities, potential applications of Cyber-Physical Systems: a preliminary analysis
http://cyphers.eu/project/deliverables
• Projects :
SCUBA
TTTech
DESTECS
2PARMA
WIBRATE
EMBOCON
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/policies/cyber-physical-systems
35
D2.4 State-of-the-Art and Future Challenges in Cyber-Physical Systems of Systems (2016)
36https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/csd-cpssec
• Rapidly develop cyber security
technical guidance for critical
infrastructure sectors facing CPS and
IoT challenges
• Conduct this effort in collaboration with
key government, infrastructure and
industry partners
• Transition guidance in a sustainable
way so security is an integral part of
CPS and IoT designs
• When appropriate, produce reference
implementations and risk-assessment
tools to promote the inclusion of
security in CPS and IoT devices.
37
CPS Public Working Group
CPS PWG Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) Framework Release 1.0
https://pages.nist.gov/cpspwg/
CPS SECURITYICS and Smart Grid
38
39
40
IT and OT Convergence
Extends IOT in
Industry
(IIOT) (CPS)
41
https://www.fourquadrant.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/gartnet_hype_cycle_IoT.gif
42
https://www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/7-technologies-underpin-the-hype-cycle-for-the-internet-of-things-2016/
43https://www.itworldcanada.com/article/gartners-top-cybersecurity-macro-trends-for-2017/388025
44
OTITMuch more of
security knowledge
and practice and also
motives to breach
OT security
Challen
gin
g??? Cybersecurity had
not been the matterNot preparedness
1. Trust and privacy
2. Security(Confidenti
ality / Integrity / Availability)
1. Trust and privacy
2. Safety
3. Security(Availability/
Integrity/ Confidentiality)
Physical security
Cyber security
Cyber-Physical security
Cyber security
+
1. Use of COTS
2. Remote access
3. Productivity
4. Business alignment5. ……
IT and OT Differences
https://www.novotek.com/en/solutions/cyber-security-for-production-and-process-networks/vast-differences-between-it-and-ot-cyber-security
IT OT
Dynamic Deterministic
Data is king Process is king
Gateways are everywhere Fewer gateways
Confidentiality is priority 1 Control is priority 1
Throughput matters Throughput is secondary
Patch Tuesdays Patch ….decades!
ICS and OT are used interchangeably because ICS is the enabler
for operational technology systems used in industrial applications.
ICS in CI and Security Breach Domino Impact!!!
Corporate Security – Head of Information Security-G.Caroti
https://www.slideshare.net/CommunityProtectionForum/it-vs-ot-ics-cyber-security-in-tsos
ICSs are heart of critical interdependent infrastructures and every security incident can result in a disaster threatening lives.
ICS in CI and Security Breach Domino Impact!!!
Interdependencies:
• Physical
• Geographical
• Cyber• Logic
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/ics-scada-dependencies
Communication network dependencies for
ICS/SCADA Systems-Enisa -2017
Automation Hierarchical Purdue Model
Industrial control system (ICS) is a general term that encompasses several types of control systems and associated instrumentation used in industrial production technology
• supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) systems,
• distributed control systems (DCS),
• process control systems (PCS),
• process control domains (PCN),
• programmable logic controller and programmable
automation controller systems (PLC/PAC), and
• Building automation and control systems (BACS).
• remote terminal units(RTU)
• Intelligent Electronic Device (IED)
ICSs Zones and functionalities
https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/secure-architecture-industrial-control-systems-36327
Secure Architecture for Industrial Control Systems
ICSs Vertical Communications
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/ics-scada-dependencies
Communication network dependencies for ICS/SCADA Systems-Enisa -2017
ICSs Horizontal Communications
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/ics-scada-dependencies
Communication network dependencies for ICS/SCADA Systems-Enisa -2017
Security Breach: How?
Communications protocols
Physical and OT Elements/process
Cyber and IT Elements/Functions
Humans
Weakness/Vulnerability(physical/logical/combined)
Impacts?Risks?
CPS Security based on IoT layer Model
53
a new architecture has been updated, as in Wu et al. (2010) which comes with five
layers: business, application, processing, transmission and perception. Cyber physical systems security: Analysis, challenges and solutions, 2017
54Cyber physical systems security: Analysis, challenges and solutions, 2017
55
CPS Security Framework
Ashibani, Yosef, and Qusay H. Mahmoud. "Cyber physical systems security: Analysis, challenges and solutions." Computers & Security 68 (2017): 81-97.
CPS Model
56
(1) communication,
(2) computation and control(3) monitoring and manipulation.
• Each one of these capabilities has different security
implications that may result from the interactions of the
component’s parts and their capabilities.
• Thus, we propose to view any CPS from three aspects:
cyber, cyber-physical, and physical.
57
CPS Model
58
Vulnerabilities Categories (800-82 rev.2)
Vulnerabilities Categories
Policy and Procedure.
Architecture and Design
Configuration and
Maintenance
Physical
Software Development
Communication and Network
59
60
Secure Cyber-Physical Systems: Current Trends,
Tools and Open Research ProblemsAnupam Chattopadhyay 2017
CPS SECURITY VULNERABILITIES
■ a vulnerability appears in:
– cyber, cyber-physical, and physical vulnerabilities.
■ the causes of existing vulnerabilities in general CPS:
– Isolation assumption : “security by obscurity”
– Increased connectivity :
■ In fact, most ICS attacks have been internal until 2001; after that most of the attacks originate from external (Internet-based) sources.
■ ICS and smart grids are connected to control centers which are connected to the Internet or some business-related networks
– Heterogeneity:
■ COTS, third party, and proprietary components are integrated to build a CPS application.
■ Multi-vendor products integration
■ the internal details of the integrated, heterogeneous components are unknown, and thus they may produce unexpected behavior when they are deployed
61
Vulnerabilities Categories (800-82 rev.2)
Policy and Procedure.
• Inadequate security policy for the ICS
• No formal ICS security training and awareness program
• Absent or deficient ICS equipment implementation guidelines
• Lack of administrative mechanisms for security policy enforcement
• Inadequate review of the effectiveness of the ICS security controls
• No ICS-specific contingency plan
• Lack of configuration management policy
• Lack of adequate access control policy
• Lack of adequate authentication policy
• Inadequate incident detection and response plan and procedures
• Lack of redundancy for critical components
Architecture and Design
• Inadequate incorporation of security into architecture and design
• Insecure architecture allowed to evolve
• No security perimeter defined
• Control networks used for non-control traffic
• Control network services not within the control network
• Inadequate collection of event data history
Configuration and Maintenance
• Hardware, firmware, and software not under
configuration management
• OS and vendor software patches may not be developed until significantly after security vulnerabilities are found
• OS and application security patches are not maintained or vendor declines to patch vulnerability
• Inadequate testing of security changes
• Poor remote access controls
• Poor configurations are used
• Critical configurations are not stored or backed up
• Data unprotected on portable device
• Passwords generation, use, and protection not in accord with policy
• Inadequate access controls applied
• Improper data linking
• Malware protection not installed or up to date
• Malware protection implemented without sufficient testing
• Denial of service (DoS)
• Intrusion detection/prevention software not installed
• Logs not maintained
Vulnerabilities Categories (800-82 rev.2)
Physical
• Unauthorized personnel have physical access to equipment
• Radio frequency, electromagnetic pulse (EMP), static discharge, brownouts and voltage spikes
• Lack of backup power
• Loss of environmental control
• Unsecured physical ports
Software Development
• Improper Data Validation
• Installed security capabilities not enabled by default
• Inadequate authentication, privileges, and access control in software
Communication and Network
• Data flow controls not employed
• Firewalls nonexistent or improperly configured
• Inadequate firewall and router logs
• Standard, well-documented communication protocols are used in plain text
• Authentication of users, data or devices is substandard or nonexistent
• Use of unsecure industry-wide ICS protocols
• Lack of integrity checking for communications
• Inadequate authentication between wireless clients and access points
• Inadequate data protection between wireless clients and access points
64Cyber-Physical Systems Security – A Survey, Abdulmalik Humayed, Jingqiang Lin, Fengjun Li, and Bo Luo
Top 30 Identified in ICS-CERT Assessments 2016 Fiscal Year
REF. ICS-CERT Annual
Assessment Report FY 2016
(based on the NIST 800-53)
SCADA Vulnerabilities • Non-existent monitoring process
• Deficient traffic content understanding
• Staff inexperienced in cybersecurity related topics
• Operating System Vulnerabilities
• Slow / lack of updates
• Remote Processor operations
• SCADA Software basic and modest security features
• Inappropriate applications installed on critical SCADA host
computers
• Lack of knowledge regarding the devices
• Authentication weaknesses
• Unauthenticated PLC / RTU network connections (Vendor
purchasing to embed security features)
• Remote access supervision
• Interconnection management (SCADA network and the business
network)
• Wireless connections
• Available public information
• The wrong belief that SCADA systems have the benefit of security
through obscurity
• The wrong belief that SCADA systems are isolated• Physical security
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/ics-scada-dependencies
Communication network dependencies for ICS/SCADA Systems-Enisa -2017
The State of SCADA/HMI Vulnerabilities
Stuxnet Attack on an Iranian Nuclear Plant
• the likely state-sponsored worm did so by targeting the Siemens WinCC engineering software, which provides
HMI-like functionality• Reports state that as many as one-fifth of Iran’s centrifuges were damaged by Stuxnet
The Ukrainian Power Grid Attack
• the attacker was able to connect via VPN and used remote access solutions to disable systems via the HMI.
The HMI represents the main hub for managing the critical infrastructure.
68
Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid
March 18, 2016
69
1. Identify all connections to SCADA networks
2. Disconnect unnecessary connections to the SCADA network
3. Evaluate and strengthen the security of any remaining connections to the SCADA network
4. Harden SCADA networks by removing or disabling unnecessary services
5. Do not rely on proprietary protocols to protect your system
6. Implement the security features provided by device and system vendors
7. Establish strong controls over any medium that is used as a backdoor into the SCADA network
8. Implement internal and external intrusion detection systems and establish 24-hour-a-day incident monitoring
9. Perform technical audits of SCADA devices and networks, and any other connected networks, to identify security concerns
10. Conduct physical security surveys and assess all remote sites connected to the SCADA network to evaluate their security
11. Establish SCADA “Red Teams” to identify and evaluate possible attack scenarios
12. Clearly define cyber security roles, responsibilities, and authorities for managers, system administrators, and users
13. Document network architecture and identify systems that serve critical functions or contain sensitive information that require additional
levels of protection
14. Establish a rigorous, ongoing risk management process
15. Establish a network protection strategy based on the principle of defense-in-depth
16. Clearly identify cyber security requirements
17. Establish effective configuration management processes
18. Conduct routine self-assessments
19. Establish system backups and disaster recovery plans
20. Senior organizational leadership should establish expectations for cyber security performance and hold individuals accountable for their
performance
21. Establish policies and conduct training to minimize the likelihood that organizational personnel will inadvertently disclose sensitive
information regarding SCADA system design, operations, or security controls
REAL-WORLD CPS ATTACKS ■ In general, publicly known attacks are rare
■ attacks that have been realized by experimentation or in real life are considered.
■ CPS attacks maps into six-dimensional description:
– attacked object (Influenced Element),
– the resulting changes on the attacked object from the attack (Influence),
– indirectly affected components (Affected Element),
– changes on the CPS application (Impact),
– how the attack took place (Method),
– preceding attacks needed to make an attack successful (Precondition)
70
71
Threats Sources
Bot-network operators
Criminal groups
Foreign intelligence
services
Hackers
Insiders
Phishers/
Spammers
Spyware /malware authors
Terrorists
Threats sources
72
ADVERSIAL ACCIDENTAL
Environmental STRUCTURAL
Threat Types
- Individual
- Outsider
- Insider
- Trusted Insider
- Privileged Insider
- Group
- Ad hoc
- Established
- Organization
- Competitor
- Supplier
- Partner
- Customer
- Nation-State
- User
- Privileged User/Administrator
- Information Technology (IT)
- Equipment
- Storage
- Processing
- Communications
- Display
- Sensor
- Controller
- Environmental Controls
- Temperature/Humidity
Controls
- Power Supply
- Software
- Operating System
- Networking
- General-Purpose Application
- Mission-Specific Application
- Natural or man-made
- Fire
- Flood/Tsunami
- Windstorm/Tornado
- Hurricane
- Earthquake
- Bombing
- Overrun
- Unusual Natural Event (e.g.,
sunspots)
- Infrastructure Failure/Outage
- Telecommunications
- Electrical Power
Source: NIST 800-82 rev.2 Appendix C
SANS Study 2017 : Threats Vectors
SANS: Securing Industrial Control Systems—2017
18% in 2016
35% in 2017This is also an indication of the
movement toward (IIoT)
73
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/ics-scada-dependencies
Communication network dependencies for ICS/SCADA Systems-Enisa -2017
ENISA Study: SCADA Threats
74
THREAT LANDSCAPE FOR INDUSTRIAL AUTOMATION SYSTEMS IN THE SECOND HALF OF 2016 (Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT)
76
August 2016
77
78ICS-CERT 2016 Fiscal Year Report
ICS-CERT Annual Vulnerability Coordination Report 46% in 2015
79
80
Influenced ElementInfluence Affected Element
Cyber-Physical Systems Security – A Survey, Abdulmalik Humayed, 2017
81Cyber-Physical Systems Security – A Survey, Abdulmalik Humayed, 2017
SMART GRIDCombined Cyber-Physical Security
82
83A Survey on Smart Grid Cyber-Physical System Testbeds
Mehmet H. Cintuglu, 2017
84
Smart grid
AMI
Microgrid
Energy Internet
• Future Renewable Electric Energy Delivery and Management (FREEDM)
TRANSMISSION GRID
Some of the most important CPSs in smart grids
85
AMI
86
87
88
Electric power transmission system
89
Internet of Things-aided Smart Grid: Technologies, Architectures, Applications, Prototypes,
and Future Research DirectionsYasir Saleem, Student Member, IEEE, Noel Crespi, Senior Member, IEEE, Mubashir Husain Rehmani, SeniorMember, IEEE, and Rebecca Copeland
Smart grid (SG) architecture
90
Cyber-Physical Electrical Energy Systems: Challenges and Issues, Xingyu Shi,
2015
91
Beyond Smart Grid—A Cyber–Physical–Social System in Energy
Future
YUSHENG XUE, State Grid Electric Power Research Institute,
Nanjing, China, XINGHUO YU, RMIT University, Melbourne, Vic.
3001, Australia
92
Internet of Things-aided Smart Grid: Technologies, Architectures, Applications, Prototypes,
and Future Research DirectionsYasir Saleem, Student Member, IEEE, Noel Crespi, Senior Member, IEEE, Mubashir Husain Rehmani, SeniorMember, IEEE, and Rebecca Copeland
93
SG from a CPS viewpoint
Smart Grids: A Cyber–Physical Systems Perspective
By Xinghuo Yu, 2016
94
CLASSIC MODELS OF SECURITY: Bell-La Padula model (BLP)
pro
hib
ited in
form
ation flo
ws
• Military model
• An actor can read down in security levels or write up
in security levels to other actors or to objects,
essentially forming a security lattice.
• The BLP model allows for an actor to lower their
security level to be able to communicate with an actor
or object at a lower level.
• The actor that has lowered its security level must be
trusted not to divulge higher level information to the
lower security
level.
• Using BLP it becomes difficult to arrange a System
Control Center but A valuable configuration of a
modern electric utility
95
• It is more important to protect the control
system from the business than the
business from the control system.
• BLP also requires that all other control
systems are in the same security level,
otherwise they cannot share information.
A reasonable assignment of security in the SCADA system under the Bell-La Padula model.
96
CLASSIC MODELS OF SECURITY: Biba mode
• Commercial model
• A high integrity level can write down to a
low integrity level, but it cannot read from the
lower integrity level.
• In an electric power system, if the control has
higher integrity than the business processes, it
is free to write information to the business, but
cannot accept commands from it without
lowering its integrity level to that of
the business.
• Actual utility operation fairly well for
centrally-administered AMI and Transmission
system
A reasonable assignment of security in the SCADA system under the BIBA model.
• The integrity of the control system is
higher than that of the business
network.
• All other control systems are in the
same security level, otherwise they
cannot share information
97
SECURITY PARTITIONS IN THE SMART GRID
Can Security models support DSM and AMI in smart grid?
A duality present in electric power systems, and in cyber-physical systems, in general.
In reality, some of CIA are bidirectional
The Stuxnet attack was able to succeed because there was only one information and control path
In a metering environment, spoofed meter readings could appear perfectly normal to the control system, but be
incorrect (such as overreporting or underreporting electric load)
Additional information is needed to locate such attacks such as using the physics of
the system to inject high-frequency signals into an electric grid to detect faulty nodes
by finding a mismatch between expected and measured impedances.
All readings that the System Control Center received were consistent with any possible
correct operating mode of the centrifuges—the attack was nondeducibly secure
Left partition
z is nondeducible from the point of view of the right partition
98
Multiple security domain nondeducibiity model (MSDND)
The ability of an attacker or defender to observe if a system state is true or false
Overlapping security domains with SD(A), SD(B), SD(C) as individual
houses, SD Support as the shared power infrastructure, and SD
Governance that oversees all the houses, but not inside the houses.
A modern neighborhood in which information and power is
shared and displayed via an electronic Leader Board.
99
Noninterference Model
If we think about a System Control Center in the left
partition and an observer in the right partition, for such
a system to be noninterference secure requires that no
actions in the left partition ever cause something to
be observed in the right partition.
100
Threat assessments of power systems
• Vulnerability assessment of a power system is, in many ways, easier than that of a purely cyber system, if
cyber-physical security is consider together, rather than as a separate cyber overlay of security
The integrity of a cyber-physical power system has a rather basic measure, keep providing service.
voltage stability or available transfer capacity metrics
• spoofed readings from power line flows can disrupt information flow and go undetected
• a false data injection attack can make intelligent modifications to the measurements delivered to a
SCADA system and fool state estimation
• A topology attack can falsify switch and breaker signals to trick the bad data detection algorithm
into working with the wrong physical topology
101
Traditional Assessment CPES Future Assessment
• At transmission layer
• Based on SCADA and PMUs
• Sensitive to valid measurements,
communications and
computations
• At Distribution layer
• Based on IEDs
• Intrusion detection and monitoring
correlation and validation
• Contingency analysis after identifying
risk scenarios
• Control implementation at transmission
layer as an escalation procedureA Review of Cyber-Physical Energy System Security AssessmentRasmussen, Theis Bo; Yang, Guangya; Nielsen, Arne Hejde; Dong, Zhaoyang
Published i
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
A Cyber-Physical Resilience Metric for Smart Grids
Friedberg, I., McLaughlin, K., & Smith, P. (2017).
112
113
114
115
116
117A Survey on Smart Grid Cyber-Physical System Testbeds
Mehmet H. Cintuglu, 2017
CPPS Research in Smart Grids
118
119
Internet of Things-aided Smart Grid: Technologies, Architectures, Applications, Prototypes,
and Future Research DirectionsYasir Saleem, Student Member, IEEE, Noel Crespi, Senior Member, IEEE, Mubashir Husain Rehmani, SeniorMember, IEEE, and Rebecca Copeland
120
Ahmadreza Ghaznavi
Researcher at Iran Telecommunication Research Center
PhD Student at Yazd University
Fall 2017