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The Cox Committee Report: An Assessment

Alasta ir Iain Johnston, W. K. H . Panofsky,

M arco D i Ca pua, and Lewis R. Franklin

M. M. Ma y, editor

December 1999

The opinions expressed here are those of the authors and do not represent positions of the

Center, its supporters, or Stanford University.


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Introduction

The publication in early 1999 of the unclassified version of the Final Report of the Select

C ommittee on U.S. Na tiona l Security a nd M ilita ry/C ommercial C oncerns w ith the Peoples

Republic of China (known as the Cox report, and hereafter referred to as the report) pro-

voked considerable reaction and concern. The report made a number of specta cular accusa-

tions against both China and several U.S. research and development organizations impor-

ta nt t o U .S. security, such as the nuclear w eapons labora tories and va rious missile and sat el-

lite companies. The language of the report, part icularly its O verview, w as inflamma tory and

some allegations did not seem to be well supported.

Stanford Universitys C enter for Internationa l Security a nd C ooperation (C ISAC) has been

involved in the study o f the internationa l role of nuclear w eapons, nuclear arms contro l, the

role of export controls on high technology items in national security, and the politics and

external po licy of China for a number of years. To severa l at t he Center, the stat ements madein the report w arra nted further study a nd discussion. As a result, four contributo rs with long

experience in one or another of the topics taken up in the report, Alastair Iain Johnston,

W. K. H . Pa nofsky, M arco D i Ca pua, a nd Lewis R. Franklin, agreed to make an assessment

of sta tements made in the report. I a greed to provide coordinat ion, a n introduction, execu-

tive summary, and some editing, and to provide reviewers. Brief biographies of all five of us

are given a fter this introduction.

In the six months since this task was undertaken, a number of assessments of the Cox

report have been published. Inevitably there is some duplication between these publications

and t he present pa per. N evertheless, w e believe there is enough tha t is new o r not w ell

known in this paper to w arrant publication.

The paper consists of four cont ributions. The first, b y Alastair Ia in Johnston, deals w ithC hinese politics, economics, and nuclear doctrine. The second, b y W. K. H . Pa nofsky, deals

with nuclear weapons. The third, by Marco Di Capua, deals with the so-called lab-to-lab

programs, w hich consist of interactions betw een U.S. and Chinese nuclear w eapons labora -

tories carried out under U.S. law and regulations to deal with such matters as safety and

arms-control monitoring. The fourth, by Lewis R. Franklin, deals with missiles. A fifth chap-

ter was originally planned, on the relation between scientific excellence at the nuclear weap-


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* The Na tiona l Acad emies, Na tiona l Security and Scientific Openness, October 1999.

M ICHAEL M . M AY

Center for International Security and Cooperation

Stanford University

ons labora tories and openness to the broad er scientific w orld, but the recent N at ional Acad-

emy of Sciences report o n the subject* ma kes this chapter unnecessary. Tw o o f the contribu-

tors to the present pa per, Pa nofsky and I, also pa rticipat ed in preparing the Na tiona l Acad -

emy report.

As the authors and readers of this paper are well aware, an appropriate relationship be-

tween the United States and China is essential to progress and peace in the coming century.Such a relationship must be based on a realistic, informed view on each side of the capabili-

ties, history, mot ivation, a nd likely evolution of the other. It should also be ba sed, insofa r a s

possible, on a realistic view of ho w China and others view t he United Sta tes. Unfo rtunat ely,

in our opinion, in many instances the report does not contribute to such realistic, informed

view s. Some importa nt a nd relevant fa cts are wro ng and a number of conclusions are, in our

view, unwarranted. These are summarized in the Executive Summary which follows.

We have checked our findings and referenced them wherever possible. In addition to fac-

tual findings, the authors have in places stated their conclusions regarding some policy im-

plications of the findings and of t he Cox report conclusions. C onclusions and o pinions are of

course the autho rs individua l responsibility. We realize tha t no t a ll of the report w as declas-

sified and th us some of the factua l justificat ion for t he report s conclusions may b e classified.

Whether we are right or wrong in our disagreements with the report, we hope that thefollowing analyses contribute in a positive way to the ongoing debate on these important

matters.

We are grateful to ma ny people w ho heard expositions of o ur findings, read dra fts of our

paper, and gave us valuable criticisms. We thank the officials, former officials, and scholars

w ho ga ve us their advice. All errors in facts and judgments of course remain the responsibil-

ity of the authors.

We thank our editor, M egan L. H endershott, a nd C ISACs outreach and publications a ct-

ing manager, Eileen Hughes, for their help.

This paper has been reviewed for classification and found not to contain any classified

material.


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San Leandro, California (19741984), he carried out R&D in flash radiographic electron

accelera tors, nuclear w eapons effects simulat ors, fa st, single-event electrica l measuring tech-

niques, microwa ve sources, and plasma a ccelerat ors. H e w as at ta ched to t he U.S. Na vy as a

Liaison Scientist w ith the London unit of t he Office of Na val R esearch from 1988 to 1990,

w here he ana lyzed R &D developments in Europe and t he Soviet U nion in a period of rapidly

changing political and military environments. H e developed an interest in Asian af fairs a s anundergraduate in engineering physics at Cornell University. He holds a doctorate from

Princeton University (1972). D r. D i C apua may be reached by email at [email protected] or

[email protected].

Lewis R. Franklinjoined t he Center for Int ernational Security and C ooperation in 1992 as avisiting scholar and continues as a research affiliate with the Center. His current research

focuses on international space policies for the postCold War period. A career intelligence

expert on Sino-Soviet missile and spa ce research a nd development, he retired a s a vice presi-

dent in TRW Space and D efense. H e wa s recognized by the CIA w ith its G old M edal Agency

Seal M edallion for contributions to U.S. intelligence technology a nd n at ional security.

Michael M. May is the co-director of Stanford Universitys Center for International Security

and Cooperation and professor (research) of engineeringeconomic systems and operationsresearch at Stanford. Professor May is director emeritus of the Lawrence Livermore Na-

tional Laboratory, where he worked from 1952 to 1988. He was technical adviser to the

Threshold Test Ba n Treaty negotia ting team; a member of the U.S. delega tion t o the Stra tegic

Arms Limitation Talks; and at various times has been a member of the Defense Science

Boa rd, t he G eneral Advisory C ommittee to the AEC, the Secreta ry of Energy Advisory Boa rd,

the RAND C orpora tion Boa rd of Trustees, and the Committ ee on Internationa l Security and

Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences. He is a member of the Council on

Foreign Relations and the Pacific Co uncil on Internationa l Policy, a nd a Fellow of t he Ameri-

can Physical Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science.


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Executive Summary

The Cox Commission of the U.S. Congress was established in June 1998 to investigate con-

cerns over Chinese acquisition of sensitive U.S. missile and space technology in connection

with the launching of U.S. civilian satellites using Chinese launchers on Chinese territory.

The investigations were broadened in October 1998 to include alleged security problems

and possible espionage at the U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories. Some conclusions were

released in January 1999 by the White House together with the administrations response.

The full declassified (reda cted) version of the report of t he Cox C ommission w as released on

M ay 25, 1999.

The Cox Report on Chinese Politics, Governance, and Nuclear Doctrine

In chapter 1 the Co x report provides an introductory discussion of the nature of t he Chinese

politica l system, the decision-making process, a nd t he relat ionship betw een economic devel-

opment and milita ry modernization in C hina. The purpose of t his introductory section a p-

pears to be to establish an interpretative lens through which to view the details of PRC

activities with respect to the acquisition of nuclear, missile, and high-speed computer tech-

nology. The point presumably is to ca st these activities in the w orst po ssible lightthat they

are all aimed at modernizing the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) so as to challenge U.S.

interests, and that this policy reflects the basic preferences of top Chinese Communist Party

(CCP) leaders. Otherwise, it is unclear why the report would include a very general discus-sion o f t he policy-making structures and process in the PR C in a report abo ut t he deta ils of

nuclear a nd missile espiona ge.

To t his end, t he report o utlines the organiza tiona l structure of the PRC and argues, in

essence, tha t a ll sta te, military, and commercial a ctivities in China are controlled by the

C CP politburo. The general problem w ith this section of the report, how ever, is tha t it paints

a picture of an extremely centralized political system where policies across government,


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tion obtained, for example we do not know whether any weapon design documentation or

blueprints were acquired, and that among espionage, contact w ith U.S. a nd other coun-

tries scientists, conferences, and publications, unauthorized media disclosure, declassified

w eapon informa tion, and C hinese indigenous development, the relat ive contribution o f each

cannot be determined.

Significance of Allegedly Stolen Information about the W-70 and the W-88 and about U.S.Nuclear Weapons Computer Models

The W-70 ( neutron bo mb ) w as developed to d efeat massed ta nk att acks witho ut da mag-

ing surrounding tow ns and villages. Its effectiveness in tha t role has been contested. It ha s no

ad vanta ge aga inst cities and other soft ta rgets over standa rd nuclear w eapons. A version

was also developed for an atmospheric nuclear ballistic missile interceptor, the Sprint. It is

essentially irrelevant to the milita ry posture of C hina aga inst the United Stat es.

The W-88 was designed about thirty years ago and is deployed on U.S. missiles carried in

Trident submarines. It fits into the slender multiple independently targeted reentry vehiclesrequired for high a ccuracy. China tested a possibly similar system several years ago . The only

evidence provided tha t the design of t hat w eapon w as derived from informat ion stolen fromthe United Stat es is tha t a C hinese w alk-in agent provided the CIA with a classified PR C

document referencing information related to the W-88. The provenance and sponsorship of

the agent ha ve not been ma de clear. If t he document conta ins informat ion not ava ilable from

public sources, it wo uld provide evidence of C hinese access to cla ssified informa tion , tho ugh

not of w here the alleged leak t ook pla ce.

China has about twenty ICBMs at present capable of reaching the United States. Designs

similar to tha t o f the W-88 could permit M IRVing these missiles or new ones, w hich in turn

w ould ha ve mixed effects on the Chinese stra tegic position, effects discussed a t great er length

in the text. Such designs or o ther compact w arheads could permit more survivable basing for

Chinese missiles, which in turn could provide greater stability in case of a crisis between

China and another nuclear power.

Co mputer models (codes) wo uld add t o the ba sic know ledge related to nuclear w eapons

design, although it must be added tha t C hina has ha d w hat is regarded as a highly competent

nuclear weapon program for thirty-five years or more. The codes, in the opinion of nuclear

weapons designers in the United States, would not be sufficient by themselves to permit

fielding a new design, especially not one that could be deployed without nuclear tests. Such

codes are specialized to the particular user, contain many empirical entries valid for limited

uses, and a re by necessity incomplete.

Security, Counterintelligence, and International Contacts at U.S. Nuclear WeaponsLaboratories

A report by a committee of the Presidents Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB),chaired by PFIAB chairman former senator Warren Rudman, issued in 1999, provided an

extensive summary of the vulnerabilities of the U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories to foreign

penetration. The Rudman report cites a dismal record of resistance to implementation of

security measures on the part of the Department of Energy (DOE) and proposes a major

reorganization in which DOE national security activities would be taken over by either an

autonomous or a semiautonomous agency. Many reasons for this proposal are outlined in


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rockets, or tha t he ever pa rticipat ed in the early U.S. Titan ICBM development, cont rary to

the Cox report sta tement.

Theft and Technology Loss in Satellite Launches and Launch Failures

The Cox commission was originally chartered to investigate the potential transfer of sensi-

tive missile technology to the PRC in the aftermath of three unsuccessful launches of U.S.-

manufa ctured sat ellites on C hinese Long M arch rockets in C hina. H ughes Space and C om-

municat ions Internat iona l, Inc., and Space Systems/Lora l manufact ured the sa tellites. The

central issue w as whether these companies viola ted the cond itions of their expo rt licenses by

providing information to the PRC during subsequent investigations of the launch failures,

and th e PR C t hereby ga ined access to sensitive missile technology. M ost o f the Co x commis-

sion report is devoted to analyzing whether the launch failure investigations led to illegal

U.S. technology transfer and to assessing the consequences.

The Hughes-manufactured (the satellites had been made for foreign civilian customers)

satellite launch failures occurred in 1992 and 1995. The Cox report notes that Hughes

personnel, a fter the fa ilures, provided informa tion o n a erodyna mic buffeting of t he satellite

fairing (provided by the PRC) during the rockets exit from the atmosphere without seekingprior State Department approval to transmit technical information to the PRC or apply for

an additional export license for the failure analysis. The PRC denied responsibility for the

failure, but, after another similar failure, corrected its fairing design. The Cox report con-

cludes that the PRC could use the informat ion provided to improve the reliability o f fut ure

ICBMs, though it notes that the sophisticated fairing design needed to protect satellites

during t he launch a scent is unlikely to b e used o n ba llistic missiles.

The Loral-manufactured satellite launch failure occurred in 1996. Chinese personnel as-

cribed the cause to a fa ult in the rockets inertial measurement unit (IMU), w hich it provided.

Some telemetry data, however, were not consistent with that assessment. The insurer re-

quested tha t an independent review committ ee be formed, in w hich Lora l and o ther Western

experts participated. A Loral employee chaired the committee at Chinese request. The

committees preliminary report was faxed to Chinese participants without Loral securing

prior government approval or an additional export license, a mistake voluntarily admitted

by Loral. The preliminary report suggested a different IMU failure mode from the one ini-

tially identified by PR C engineers, one that w as consistent w ith the telemetry dat a. This wa s

subsequently confirmed a nd corrected. The C ox report concludes that the correction to the

IM U could b e ada pted for use in the PRC s road -mobile missile program, w hich is possible

but not deemed likely owing to differences in the launch and operational environments be-

tw een mo bile missiles and space launch vehicles.

In both of these cases, it appears that the management of the U.S. companies did not

at tempt to obta in a separa te export license to pa rticipat e in these technical discussions and

meetings. Because of ambiguity over government policies, regulations, and jurisdiction, it is

unclear whether the companies were legally required to do so. In some cases, individualmembers of the project teams ma y ha ve unilaterally communicated technical informa tion t o

the PRC without getting prior management approval or having the government review the

material. When these communications came to the attention of the government offices in-

volved, they advised that an export license should be applied for to resolve whether a sepa-

rate accident review license was needed. The U.S. companies then made voluntary disclo-

sures of the information they had. The Justice Department has initiated criminal investiga-


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observed military modernizat ion progra m on the other. H is testimony then speculates as to

how to identify and respond to Chinese military modernization in the futureshould these

w ritings determine futurepolicies of technology development and acquisition. Contrary to

the Co x report, this is not a comment a bout t he alleged subordina tion of economic modern-

ization t o military mo dernizat ion in the 1980s and 1990s.

2.3 The Cox report states: Despite the PRCs public claims, it is estimated that their actualmilitary spending is four to seven times greater than official figures.53

The footno te to this claim abo ut t he size of C hinas milita ry budget is to Frankenstein and

G ill. H ow ever, Frankenstein and G ill do not ma ke this estimate.54 Four to seven times

would put Chinas expenditures in the 400700 billion renminbi (RMB) range. While Chi-

nese military expenditure estimates are very soft, the Cox report uses an extreme and high

range that very few other serious analysts of Chinese spending use. The CIA, for instance,

believes the figure is about tw o t o t hree times the officially announced budget, o r a bout 200

300 billion R M B.55 A 1995 study by the G overnment Accounting O ffice agrees w ith the C IA

estimate of two to three times the official figure.56

The International Institute for StrategicStudies in London puts Chinas military spending for 1997 at $36.5 billion, or about 300

billion RMB at current exchange rates.57 Even the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency (since reorganized as the Bureau of Arms Control and the Bureau of Non-Prolifera-

tion), which provides the highest U.S. government estimate, puts the figure at $5060 bil-

lion; at current exchange rates this w ould be abo ut 450550 RMB . N o serious analyst of t he

PLA believes 700 billion RMB is a plausible figure. At the very least the Cox report should

have acknow ledged the more broad ly held ra nge of estimates.

2.4 The Cox report states: Communist Party Secretary Jiang Zemin, in March 1997, pub-licly called for an extensive, thoroughgoing, and sustained upsurge in the PLAs acquisition

of high technology. This quote is footnoted (no. 27) to the BBC Summary of Worl d Broad-casts, April 7, 1997.

This quote is used to emphasize the PLAs success in getting the top leadership to pay more

a ttention to t he high-technology needs of the PLA.The quo te is a misquote, how ever.In fact,the article tha t the Co x report cites sta tes: To implement C M C C hairman J iang Z emins

instructions on expeditiously w hipping up an extensive, t horoughgoing, a nd susta ined up-

surge of studyinghigh-tech know ledge in the w hole army, the G eneral Sta ff D epart ment

drew up a t hree year plan for ca dres of t he who le army t o study high tech know ledge. . . . 58

C learly, the citat ion refers to instructions from Jia ng Z emin to start an extensive, thoro ugh-

going, and susta ined upsurge in the study o f high-tech weapons in the PLA. C ontra ry to t he

C ox report, this particular citation d oes not sta te that Jiang publicly called fo r an upsurge in

the acquisition of high technology. Studying may w ell be an integral part o f the process of

acquiring new technology, and Jiang Zemin may have called at some point in time for an

upsurge in the acquisition of high technology for the PLA. But in this insta nce, a s in others

in the Co x report, t he footno te reference does not support t he claim in the text.


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create a misleading impression of Chinese politics and economics. This impression or inter-

pretive lens appears to have had its effect, however. As one prominent example, a N ew

Republiceditoria l concluded:

The PRC follow s a Sixteen-Cha racter Policy that , a s the Cox report no tes, ha s been codi-

fied by the central committee. This policy deliberately blurs the lines between state and

commercial entities and military and commercial interests. . . . These are not isolatedepisodes but are part of a coherent strategy aimed at finding a way to use the American

industrial base to build up the Chinese military. The truth is that in a Communist state

such a s China , w here the party remains firmly in control, there can b e no real distinction

between the private and public sectors.98

This quote represents the wholesale acceptance of the Cox reports message. However,

aside from the fa ct tha t in t he United Sta tes and o ther Western democracies the privat e and

public sectors also work together in the military technology area, this characterization of

Chinese politics, as I have indicated here, is simply inaccurate. The security relationship

betw een the United Sta tes and China is likely to be complex a nd d ifficult a t b est, a nd is beset

with important uncertainties. There are certainly many aspects of Chinese military modern-

ization a nd pa tterns in the C hinese use of f orce that are not conducive to max imizing peaceand development in the Asia Pacific region. There is some reason to question, a s well, w hether

there is much basis at the moment for building a strategic part nership w ith the lead ership

of the Peoples Republic of China. But this is no excuse for imprecise writing, sloppy re-

search, and ill-informed speculation.

Notes

1 Note: all electron ic sources from the World Wide Web w ere accessed during the period J uly

15 to August 16, 1999. My tha nks to the follow ing people for their comments on and criti-

cisms of this assessment: Dennis Blasko, Thomas J. Christensen, John Frankenstein, BatesGill, Paul Godwin, Michael May, James Mulvenon, Michael Nacht, Robert S. Norris, Pief

Panofsky, Jonathan Pollack, Edward Steinfeld, and Michael Swaine.2 John D iamond, C hina Spy Furor Ma y Be Overreaction, Associat ed Press (AP), M ay 26,

1999.3 John M . Spratt, Jr., Keep the Facts of the C ox R eport in Perspective, Arms Control

Today(April/M ay 1999).4 Cox report, 4.5 Ibid., 234, footnot e 1.6 Ibid., 4.

7 M y tha nks to M IT professor Edw ard Steinfeld for these da ta .8 Cox report, 5.9 See, for example, Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army after Mao(C ambridge: Ha rvard University

Press, 1987), 4862.10 Cox report, 10.


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42 Jiang Zemin, Report to the 15th Party Congress, Xinhua, September 21, 1997, in FBIS-

CHI-97-266 (September 23, 1997).43 Chi H aotian, Taking the Road of N ational D efense M odernization Which Conforms to

Chinas Na tiona l Conditions and Reflects the Characteristics of the TimesM y Understanding

Acquired from the Study of Comrade Jiang Zemins Expositions on the Relationship be-

tw een the Building of Na tiona l Defense and Economic Development, Q iushi[Seeking Trut h](April 1996), in FBIS-C H I-96-120. Cit ed in Frankenstein, C hina s Defense Industries, 31.44 See Zhu Yuli, Learning from the Thought o f D eng Xiaoping on M ilita ry-C ivilian Integra-

tion o f Industry, Q iushi[Seeking Truth], no . 17 (1 Sept. 1997): 1719, in FBIS-C H I-97-311

(November 7, 1997).45Junshi xueshu yanji u: hui gu yu zhanwang[M ilita ry a cademic research: R eview and pros-

pects] (Beijing: M ilitary Sciences Publishing H ouse, 1995) (junnei fax ing) [Internal military

circulation], 389. Emphasis mine.46 O n the development o f conversion in large a nd medium size defense enterprises, Junshi

Jingj i Yanji u[Military Economic Research] (February 1997): 14. Cited in Frankenstein,

C hinas Defense Industries, 33.

47 Pei Jiansheng, M arket solution eludes remote military -industria l complex, China D ailyBusiness Week ly, 612 November 1994, 7. Cited in ibid., 28.48 Q uotes from C hinese sources are M ilita ry O rganizes Transnat ional Enterprise G roup,

in FBIS-CH I, 9 December 1992, 33. Cited in ibid., 12; G u Jiany i, Junshi Jingji Ruogan

X ianshi Wenti Fenxi [On current problems in military economy], Junshi Jingji X ue[Mili-

ta ry Economic Studies] (June 1995): 3235. Cited in ibid., 12.49 See Frankenstein and G ill, Current a nd Future Cha llenges.50 Frankenstein, C hinas D efense Industries, 18.51 Cox report, 15.52 Testimony of Dr. Michael Pillsbury before the United States Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence, November 1997. Posted on the webpage of the U.S.-Asia Strategy Council:ht tp://w w w.a siast ra tegy.com/testimo ny_pillsbury.html.53 Co x report, 1718.54 Elsew here Frankenstein is only w illing to go as fa r a s to sta te that most a nalysts believe

that the real Chinese defense budget is considerably more than the official figureat least

double. See Frankenstein, Ch inas Military Industries, 14.55 See the CIA Wor ld Factbook 1998a t ht tp ://w w w.cia .go v/cia /pub lica tio ns/fa ctb oo k/

ch.html#mil.56 G overnment Accounting O ffice, National SecurityImpact of Chinas M ili tary M odern-

ization in t he Pacifi c Region. G AO/NSIAD-95-84 (June 1995) a t h ttp://w w w.fa s.org/irp/

ga o/nsi95084.ht m.57 IISS, World M ilit ary Balance1998/99 (1999), 297, t able 46.58 Xinhua , M arch 31, 1997, in BBC Summary of Worl d Broadcasts(April 7, 1997).59 Cox report, 17.60 See Shij ie zhuyao guojia zonghe guoli bij iao yanji u[Comparative research of the compre-

hensive national power of the major countries of the world] (Changsha: Hunan Publishing

H ouse, 1996), 69, 169.


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61 Cox report, 18.62National D efense Whit e Paper(Sta te Council Informa tion O ffice), July 1998, at htt p://

w w w.uic.edu/~ rod rigo/w hite_paper_98.htm.63 Cox report, 241, emphasis mine.64 Ibid., 69, emphasis mine.65 Ibid., 72, emphasis mine.66 Ibid., 84.67 Ibid., 73, emphasis mine.68 According to the Proto type Internat ional D at a C enter set up t o help monitor the C TBT,

and sponsored by the U.S. DoD Defense Threat Reduction Agency, there was no seismic

activity within the latitude and longitude parameters of the Lop Nortesting range (roughly41.141.8N and 88.288.9 E) from Chinas last test in 1996 through December 1998. See

the Reviewed Event Bu ll eti n(a list of g loba l seismic events) a t ht tp: //w w w.pid c.or g./

da ta prodbo x/prod.html. The Washington Timesclaims that an unnamed U.S. official said

tha t the Chinese might have conducted a large underground nuclear explosion tha t w as

carried out in a n evasive w ay by the PRC to a void internat ional detection at their test sitea t Lop N or in Xinjiang province sometime in the first half of J une 1999. See Bill Gertz and

Ro w an Scarboro ugh, Small Nuke Test? Washington Times, June 18, 1999, 9. However,

according to the Reviewed Event Bul letinno detecta ble seismic act ivity occurred in the first

two weeks of June within the latitude and longitude parameters of the Lop Nor testing

range. See also the Nuclear Explosions D at ab ase mainta ined by the Australian go vernment

a t ht tp: //w w w.a gso.gov.a u/info rma tio n/struct ure/isd/da ta ba se/nukexp_query.ht ml.69 The United States and Russia have conducted several subcritical tests since signing the

C TBT in 1996. For example, on t he U.S. subcritical test in July 1997 a t the Los Alamos test

site in N evada see http://w w w.a cronym. org.uk/17sub.htm. On the role of subcriticals in the

maintenance of U .S. nuclear w eapons see the testimony before the Sena te Subcommit tee on

Interna tion al Security, Proliferat ion a nd Federal Services, Oct ob er 27, 1997, at ht tp://

w w w.fa s.org/spp/sta rw ars/congress/1997_h/sh105-267.htm.70 Cox report, 61.71 Lew is and H ua, Chinas Ballistic M issile Programs, 11.72 Co x report, 192.73 The article cited w as mine. See Alastair Ia in Johnston, C hinas N ew O ld Thinking: The

Concept of Limited Deterrence, I nternati onal Securit y20, no . 3 (Winter 1995/96).74 Co x report, 192.75 Ibid., 193.76 Agence France-Presse, August 6, 1996. Most recently, perhaps partly in response to the

Cox report, the Chinese government again officially stated again that China would not use

nuclear w eapons aga inst Taiw an. A Foreign M inistry spokesperson stat ed: We w ill not be

the first to use nuclear weapons and will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-

w eapons countries and regions, let alone aga inst our Taiw an compatriots. C harles H utzler,

C hina Wont Use Nukes vs. Taiw an, Associat ed Press, Beijing, September 2, 1999.77 Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, War and Peace: The Views fr om M oscow and Beij ing

(Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, 1984), 126. One of the most thorough


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A Critique of the Cox Report Allegations of Theft of Sensitive

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Information

W. K. H . Panofsky

1Factual Assessment: Nuclear Weapons

1.1 Context

The Cox Co mmission w as established in June 1998 by H ouse Speaker New t G ingrich pri-

marily to investigate the alleged security and corruption problems associated w ith the launching

of American satellites on Chinese rockets. The investigations were broadened in October

1998 to include alleged security prob lems at the U.S. nuclear w eapons labora tories resulting

in the alleged theft of nuclear-w eapons-relat ed informa tion by the Peoples Republic of China.

The commission released its report in highly cla ssified form in January 1999; public release

follow ed aft er an extensive debate as to w hat part s of the report should remain classified in

order to pro tect sources and method s of U. S. intelligence collection . Thus the commission

with its staff of about fifty individuals dedicated about four months to examining nuclear-

w eapons-related issues.

In ad dition t o t he report o f the C ox C ommission, t here have been numerous other recent

investigations of the alleged leakage of American nuclear-weapons-related information and

of the security ma nagement a t American nuclear w eapons labora tories. A committee for t he

Intelligence Community (IC), headed by Admiral David Jeremiah, completed its investiga-

tion in la te 1998 and an impact sta tement reflecting the alleged nuclear w eapons informa-

tion losses was issued by the Intelligence Community, also late in 1998. In addition, Presi-

dent Clinton chartered a subgroup of four individuals drawn from the Presidents Foreign

Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) to investigate the problems associated with security in


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sources. In contra st, the impact report o f the Intelligence Communit y is much more cautious

in admitting ignorance abo ut deta ils of a lleged losses and abo ut the impact o f such losses on

the present and future performance of Chinese nuclear weapons systems. In this paper I will

critically confront the assertions in the Cox report concerning Chinese nuclear spying. I will

then examine the relevance of the alleged nuclear weapons information losses to U.S. na-

tional security. This approach raises both serious questions as to the factual basis for theextent of Chinese penetration as well as the significance of the losses alleged in the Cox

report.

The Cox Commission maint ains tha t C hinese intelligence-collection effo rts extend great ly

beyond t hose mana ged by the tw o established Chinese intelligence orga nizat ions. The named

agencies are the Ministry o f Stat e Security (MSS) and the G enera l Sta ffs M ilitary Int elli-

gence D epartment (MID ). The report co rrectly sta tes tha t C hinese military a tt achs are intel-

ligence officers but fails to state that U.S. military attachs at foreign (including Chinese)

U.S. consulates are employees of the DIA.

The Co x C ommission claims that the PRC is increasingly looking to PR C scholars w ho

remain in the United States as assets w ho ha ve developed a netwo rk of persona l conta cts that

can b e helpful to the PRC s search f or science and technology informa tion (Vol. 1, C h. 1, p.

41). Even Chinese dissidents w ho left for t he United Sta tes are designat ed as sleeper agents.The Co x C ommission report ma kes largely unsupported a llegat ions abo ut t heft of nuclear

w eapons information, but t he impact o f losses is either great ly oversta ted or not stated a t a ll.

From the point of view of U .S. nationa l security, answ ers to t he follow ing three questions are

crucial, but are not ad dressed in the C ox report:

1. What, if a ny, specific factua l informat ion ha s been compromised beyondwhat is publicly

known, and how important is it?

2. Is the alleged stolen, but no t publicly ava ilable informat ion of sufficient value to the

PRC to lead to new designs that can be fielded w ithout nuclear t ests, which China has

procla imed it w ill not conduct, considering its signa ture of the Comprehensive Test Ba n

Treaty?3. What impactw ould such weapo ns have on the nationa l security o f the United States?

The remainder of this section lists and comments on crucial statements in the Cox Com-

mission report.

A. The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) has stolen design information on the United Statesmost advanced thermonuclear weapons. (Overview, p. ii)

For reasons noted a bove, it is extremely difficult t o judge the significance of a broa d sta te-

ment of t his kind. It is alleged t hat classified info rmation on some thermonuclear w eapons

has been transmitted to the PRC through channels not specified in the unclassified reportother than t he w alk-in agent. N o evidence is presented as to t he extent to w hich that

informat ion goes beyond tha t publicly a vailable, nor does the report give any indication a s

to the extent to which the transferred information has added to that developed by the Chi-

nese indigenously.3 Additionally, no comparison is given as to the relative success of the

diversion to the PRC relative to tha t t o ot her foreign countries.


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B. The stolen information includes classified information on seven U.S. thermonuclear war-heads, including every currently deployed thermonuclear warhead in the U.S. ballistic-mis-sile arsenal. (Overview, p. iii)

The report elaborates only on the W-88 and the W-70. These are discussed further below.

The report stat es w ithout either foundat ion or elabora tion tha t thefts have occurred inrelat ion to other w arheads deployed by the United Sta tes.

C. The stolen information also includes classified design information for an enhanced radia-tion weapon (commonly known as the neutron bomb), which neither the United States,nor any other nation, has yet deployed. (Overview, p. iii)

C hina t ested a n enhanced radia tion w eapon in 1988 but has no t deployed such a device. This

information was well known in the U.S. technical community. The United States tested sev-

eral versions of enhanced radiation weapons and, in contradiction to this statement, has

deployed the W-70 on the Lance short-range ballistic missile and has mounted an enhanced

rad iation w eapon on the Sprint ABM a tmospheric interceptor. D eployment w as restricted t othe continental United States. For reasons discussed separately, this so-called neutron bomb

lacks significant military utility. Therefore the relative extent to which the neutron bomb

developed, but n ot deployed, by C hina used indigenous ta lent or externally a cquired sources

is essentially irrelevant.

D. The PRC has obtained classified information on the following U.S. thermonuclear war-heads, as well as a number of associated reentry vehicles (the hardened shell that protects thethermonuclear warhead during reentry).

E. The Select Committee judges that the PRC will exploit elements of the stolen design

information on the PRCs next generation of thermonuclear weapons.(Overview, p. v)

No information is given which traces Chinas existing nuclear weapons, deployed or

undeployed, directly to identified U.S. classified nuclear weapons sources. It is presumed

tha t the PR C may be engaged in a process aimed at modernizing its nuclear forces. H ow ever,

the PRC ha s signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ba n Treaty (CTBT) and, notw ithsta nd-

ing the lack of ratification by the United States and the Peoples Republic of China, has

stated it will not test in the future as required by the Vienna Convention on the Law of

Treaties. It is therefore difficult to believe tha t it w ill deploy a next generation of thermo-

nuclear w eapons. New designs of the physics package w ithout nuclear testing are ex-

tremely difficult, if no t impossible. There is consensus within the U.S. nuclear w eapons com-

munity that no foreign country, including China, would develop and deploy new thermo-

nuclear weapons of designs entirely based on clandestinely obtained information. Thus thereis no w ay to judge the extent, should C hina field a new generat ion of t hermonuclear w eap-

ons, of the benefit derived from publicly available knowledge, indigenous design efforts, and

clandestinely obt ained informat ion.


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G. The stolen U.S. nuclear secrets give the PRC design information on thermonuclear weap-ons on a par with our own. (Overview, p. vi)

It is extremely unlikely that this statement is true. Current Chinese nuclear weapons designs

are considerab ly less advanced tha n tho se of t he United Sta tes measured by almost a ll avail-

able parameters. It is extremely unlikely that this situation will change drastically, in particu-lar in the absence of nuclear tests. It should be noted that the report maintains that PRC

penetration o f U. S. labs commenced in t he late 1970s. The modern W-88 w as t hen already

developed; the alleged W-88 theft w as therefore of already old U.S. technology. The con-

clusion that PRC design informa tion is on a pa r w ith our ow n is not credible considering

the characteristics of current Chinese weapons.

H. The Select Committee judges that elements of the stolen information on U.S. thermo-nuclear warhead designs will assist the PRC in building its next generation of mobile ICBMs,which may be tested this year. (Overview, p. vii)

A Chineseroad-mobile ICBM, the DF-31, has been initially tested this year. But it is ex-tremely unlikely tha t t he DF-31 w ill at the same time carry a new unt ested w arhead . D evel-

opment of a road-mobile missile would increase the survivability of Chinese land-based

nuclear forces, which in their present fixed-silo form could be targeted by the United States.

Subsidiary stat ements a re made by t he committee regard ing introduction o f small thermo-

nuclear w arheads witho ut a ny evidence tha t w eapons derived from t he stolen W-88 de-

sign will be carried by the delivery systems, in particular without nuclear tests.

I. The Select Committee judges that, if the PRC were successful in stealing nuclear test codes,computer models, and data from the United States, it could further accelerate its nucleardevelopment. (Overview, p. ix)

This statement is hypothetica l. Indeed high-performa nce computers couldaccelerate nuclear

w eapons development in C hina. While this may indeed b e true, it should be not ed t hat the

W-88, which is at this time the most modern warhead on the U.S. submarine fleet, was

developed using computers of much lower capacity than high-performance computers now

on t he open market. The w hole question a s to the extent t o w hich the export of high-perfor-

mance computers can be controlled in the present international markets is discussed in an-

other C ISAC report.4

J. In the near term, a PRC deployment of mobile thermonuclear weapons, or neutron bombs,based on stolen U.S. design information could have a significant effect on the regional bal-

ance of power. (Overview, p. x)

While this statement implies that the relative nuclear strategicbalance between China and

the United Sta tes is not a ffected by the alleged diversions, it states that the stolen informa-

tion could have significant impact on the regional balance. Extensively deployed mobile-

ba sed a nd survivable thermonuclear w eapo ns could indeed aff ect b oth strategic and regional

relations. The question of how the survivability of Chinese nuclear forces affects U.S. inter-


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ests and nuclear stability is complex and needs discussion. Again, the question is ignored of

how new thermonuclear warheads could be developed in the absence of nuclear testing.

Moreover, as discussed in another section of this paper, the opinion is widely held that a

neutron bomb is not a weapon of significant value in tactical combat.

K. Despite repeated PRC thefts of the most sophisticated U.S. nuclear weapons technology,security at our national nuclear weapons laboratories does not meet even minimal stan-dards. (Overview, p. x)

L. Counterintelligence programs at the national weapons laboratories today fail to meeteven minimal standards. (Overview, p. xi)

This allegat ion is meaningless witho ut cont ext. In pa rticular, the term minimal sta nda rds

needs to be defined. Security at our national nuclear weapons labs is in fact high in many

aspects. There are effective guard forces, security clearance checks, automated gates, and so

for th. There is considerab le security a w areness. Counterintelligence programs exist but their

scope seems inadequate to meet the needs. There clearly have been security lapses and im-provements are needed, b ut the q uestion of w hat these are to b e is not addressed in t he Cox

report. M oreover, the question of how a system of security administra tion meeting the highest

standa rds can cover the vast number of people and volume of classified information a nd

materials without undue interference w ith the efficient performance of w ork is not a ddressed.

No te that classified design information o n nuclear w eapons is held not only at the nationa l

w eapons labora tories but is also w idely disseminat ed throughout t he nuclear w eapons com-

plex of the Department of Energy and throughout many parts of the Defense Department

and its contracto rs, in particular in respect to deployed w eapons systems. The Cox Co mmis-

sion does not address security outside the nuclear weapons labs.

Let me compare some of the statements made in the Cox Commission report with the

conclusions of the Intelligence Community on the impact of the alleged losses.The Cox C ommission stat es tha t the Peoples Republic of C hina ha s stolen classified

informat ion on a ll of the United States most a dvanced thermonuclear w eapons (O verview,

p. ii) and the PRC next generat ion of thermonuclear w eapons currently under development

w ill exploit elements of stolen design informat ion (Vol. 1, C h. 2, p. 61). In contrast, the

Intelligence Community sta tes: We cannot determine the full extent o f w eapons informa-

tion obtained, for example we do not know whether any weapon design documentation or

blueprints were acquired.

The Cox Co mmission report alleges that informat ion acq uired thro ugh spying has saved

the Peoples Republic of C hina y ears of effort (Vol. 1, C h. 2, p. 62, 73), but this conclusion

is not supported by evidence and not confirmed by the Intelligence Community. More spe-

cifically, the Intelligence Community concludes that amo ng espionage, conta ct w ith U.S.

and ot her count ries scientists, conferences and pub lications, unaut horized media disclosure,

declassified weapon information, and Chinese indigenous development, the relati ve contr i-

but ion of each cannot be determined. In contrast, t he Cox C ommission discusses only the

a lleged thefts and does not discuss the other sources of C hinese adva nces in nuclear w eapons

technology.


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1.3 Findings Concerning the Alleged Theft of Information on the W-70 and the W-88 andClassified Weapons Codes

The W-70 nuclear d evice exists in tw o versions, one of w hich is an enhanced ra dia tion

weapon. In turn, enhanced radiation weapons amplify the lethal flux of prompt radiation

w hile diminishing somew hat the effects of blast, thermal output, a nd delayed rad iation through

fa llout. The term enhanced ra diat ion can refer either to enhancement of the thermal x-rays of the device or to enhancement of the neutron flux (above 10 MeV) produced. En-

hanced rad iation w eapons amplifying the thermal x-ray flux w ere used by the United States

for the Spartan warhead, designed to intercept incoming missiles outside the atmosphere.

Enhanced radia tion w eapons using increased neutron fluxes are incorporated in a variant of

the W-70 which was deployed in the short-range U.S. Lance missile, and another in an

enhanced radiation warhead (W-66) was deployed in the atmospheric Sprint ABM intercep-

tor. The lat ter applicat ions are popularly designated by t he term neutron bo mb. As noted

ab ove, the Cox report sta tes, incorrectly, tha t [t]he U.S. ha s never deployed a neutron

w eapon (Vol. 1, Ch. 2, p. 61).

The United Sta tes did not d eploy enhanced neutron ra diat ion w eapons overseas a nd d is-

continued the U.S. deployment of the W-70 and any other version of enhanced radiationw eapons af ter it w as bro ad ly recognized t hat such systems lacked military utility. The adva n-

tage on the batt lefield claimed for the neutron bomb w as that its lethal rad ius w ould be

very sharply defined a nd t hat therefore collateral da mage effects associat ed w ith the use of

nuclear weapons could be minimized. The popular notion that neutron bombs would kill

people while leaving buildings standing is untrue. The neutron bomb confers no advantage

aga inst cities and ot her soft ta rgets. H igh-energy neutrons can penetra te heavy ra diat ion

shields. At best, it w as tho ught it could confer an a dvant age aga inst ta nks, destroying them

while not damaging neighboring villages. More detailed analyses taking into account vari-

ability of terrain and intervening absorbers indicated that broader claims were largely un-

founded. M oreover, rad iation a s a w eapon in combat is of dubious value since there is a w ide

range betw een a rad iation d ose which w ill eventually prove letha l and the dose required for

incapacitation.China first tested a neutron bomb in 1988 but never deployed such a weapon. Thus the

a lleged theft of classified informa tion related to the W-70 is essentia lly ir relevant to the

present or fut ure mil it ary postur e of China, eit her strategically or tactically.

The situation concerning the W-88 is more complex. The W-88 is the weapon deployed on

the U.S. missiles carried by the Trident submarines. It was designed about thirty years ago

but is regarded as a modern tw o-stage thermonuclear w eapon. The wa rheads of the Tri-

dent missile carry a number of slender reentry vehicles (M IRVs) w hich are designed fo r high

accuracy because of their relatively high weight-to-drag ratio. The W-88 in turn was de-

signed to fit into such slender ammunitions and to produce a relatively high yield-to-weight

ratio.

China tested a system exhibiting principles possibly similar to those incorporated in the

W-88 several years a go, b ut no evidence is given in any o f the reports tha t the design of t ha t

w eapon w as derived from informat ion stolen from the United States. Its system is believed

to b e larger than the W-88 and is not even remotely a copy o r a knock-off, to use Con-

gressman C ox s term, of the W-88.5

The evidence for the allegation that design-related information for the W-88 has been

stolen derives largely, if no t entirely, a ccording to the C ox report, from a Chinese w alk-in


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agent who provided the CIA in 1995 with a classified PRC document which in turn refer-

ences classified U.S. design information relating to the W-88. The report does not provide

any evidence about w hat motivat ed the Chinese w alk-in to reveal the results of Chinese

espionage, w hich could in fa ct be considered incriminat ing to t he w alk-in agent. The

provenance and sponsorship of the a gent ha ve not been ma de clear. Ho w ever, w hat ever the

explanation for this somewhat bizarre episode may be, if indeed the PRC document wasgenuine and it included classified information about the W-88, and not just publicly avail-

able sensitive information, it would provide evidence that China did access U.S. classified

informat ion on t his wa rhead. N o source of the alleged leakage is given; in view of t he wide-

spread dissemination of information and widespread deployment of the W-88, the source of

the alleged leak has not been localized. In view of the above, some discussion on the poten-

tial impact of this episode is in order.

The present C hinese inventory of nuclear w eapons is estima ted to be:


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It is extremely improbable that a foreign country would or even could copy a specific

design for which partial information was obtained through espionage but where no actual

drawings or prints were acquired. Rather, it is plausible that, if motivated, China could

improve its existing design by employing similar b asic design ideas a nd principles w ith this

information. The result could be a more compact small medium-yield thermonuclear war-

head. This in turn could be used in producing warheads for a multi-warhead missile eithernot individually targetable (MRV) or multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles

(MIRV).

China has neither developed nor deployed multiple warhead missiles. It is of course not

know n w hat China w ill do in the future, but one can conclude that a M IRV-capable missile

could not offer any significant strategic advantage to China in relationship to the United

States in the foreseeab le future. Let me explain the ba sis for this stat ement.

At this time China ha s only about tw enty long-range deliverab le missiles, and that number

is unlikely to more than double within the next decade. China is the only nation among the

declared nuclear w eapons stat es that ha s officially a dopted a no first use policy, tha t is a

policy under which nuclear weapons would be used only after attack against China with

nuclear weapons by others. In its relationship to the United States this is the only policy

China could, as a practical matter, adopt, since the United States has many thousands ofnuclear warheads which could be directed against China. Thus, vis--vis the United States

China can maintain only a second-strike posture as a deterrent since for decades to come it

could no t consider a preemptive nuclear strike under a ny circumstances.

Let us discuss in further detail how the strategic nuclear relationship betw een the United

States and China might be affected if China should decide to MIRV its long-range missiles

capable of reaching the United States. Let us assume tha t for reasons noted above C hina w ill

continue to proclaim, a nd a dhere to, its no first use posture.

Since, predictably, the number of China s missiles capable of reaching the United States

w ill remain sma ll, MIRVing these missiles could enable China to t hreaten a la rger number of

retaliatory targets in the United States. Whether or not that is an advantage is arguable.

As a simple calculat ion

6

taking into account the damage versus yield relationship againstsoft ta rgets and the loss in tota l yield resulting from fractionating the payloa d, to tal damage

expectancy is reducedby MIRVing the available payload. On the other hand, MIRVing

generates a t hreat aga inst a larger number of retaliatory targets and t his might be a barga in-

ing or prestige advantage in a situation of rising tension.

MIRVing its long-range missiles would result in an increased demand on China s weap-

ons-usable fissile materials where China may face some limits. MIRV d land-based missiles

w ould ma ke these a higher-value target to preemptive at tack unless they a re survivably based

i.e., ma de land-mobile. N ote that at this time C hina has d eployed only one SLBM submarine

carrying medium-range missiles and appears to have encountered significant difficulties with

this system. Thus a significant C hinese sea-based reta liato ry fo rce carrying M IRVd strategic

missiles is not expected in the foreseeable future.

Another motivation for a potential Chinese MIRVd strategic force is its ability to pen-etrate the proposed U.S. na tiona l missile defense (NM D ). Ho w ever, this can a lso be achieved

by other cheaper penetration aids such as balloons.

While the above arguments each have limited merit, they partially offset one another and

at any rat e have only minor leverage on t he U.S.-C hina stra tegic relatio nship. Thus the only

real advanta ge of more compact w arheads to China w ould be that, given successful develop-

ment of the associated missile system, they could lead to a more survivable land-mobile


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deployment. This is not a threat t o the United Stat es but provides for a n increase in stra tegic

stability. In summary, even a worst-case projection of the consequence of the alleged com-

promise of the W-88 design would not be a matter of significant military concern to the

United States.

The Rudman report complains that the principal governmental investigations of the al-

leged leakage of nuclear w eapons informa tion ha ve concentra ted a lmost entirely on the W-70and W-88. The allegat ions, and by implication the informa tion tra nsmitted by the walk-in

C hinese agent,7 cover some unspecified classified informa tion w hich does not extend to draw -

ings and complete documents. We do not know the extent to which this information goes

beyond w hat is availab le publicly from unclassified sources, such as the weapo ns design dat a

books published by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). Therefore the extent,

let alone the significance, of these additional a lleged informa tion t ransmissions is impossible

to assess from the unclassified report s, but t he abo ve discussion indicates that the impact on

U .S. securit y is str ictl y limi ted.

Similarly, the importance of the much-publicized episode of the Los Alamos scientist Wen

Ho Lee is difficult to assess. Lee was removed from his job on grounds that he transcribed

classified-w eapons-related computer codes to an unclassified system. N o explanat ion is given

for why he did this and no evidence seems to indicate that the information once transcribedw as in fa ct made a vailable to a foreign country. Lee has not been charged w ith any crime.

The codes in question are the so-called legacy codes which contain information about the

physical processes relevant to the behavior of nuclear w eapons such as high-pressure hydro-

dynamics, radiation transport, etc. They also contain historical information. Clearly such

codes, should they be made available to a foreign country, could add to the basic knowledge

within that country relating to weapons physics design, but the usefulness of that knowledge

clearly depends on the level of erudition already existing there. It is dubious tha t these codes

w ould have materially a ided the C hinese nuclear w eapons program. China has had a highly

competent nuclear w eapons program, and w e should note again tha t it ha s nuclear w eapons

experience of thirty-five years. Such codes wo uld be q uite difficult to interpret but possibly

could assist the Chinese in general background informat ion. They would not be sufficient tolead to a new design, especially not one that could be deployed without tests.

The Cox report also alleges (Vol. 1, Ch. 2, p. 85) that certain U.S. named codes (the

M C NPT, the DOT 3.5, and the NJO YC codes) have been acq uired. Ho w ever, these codes

are open reactor engineering codes available worldwide.

The utility of such codes, either of the alleged stolen classified variety or the identified

openly available material, is of very limited value to a foreign nuclear weapons country.

Classified codes are very specialized, containing many empirical entries and normalizations

which limit their utility to particular designs.

The Cox report a lleges tha t the stolen information w ould make it possible for China t o

develop new nuclear w eapons w hich could enter its stockpile w ithout testing, alleging that it

could not do so otherw ise. This claim is strongly cont rad icted by nuclear w eapons designers

in the United States. In particular, Harold Agnew, a former director of Los Alamos, hasstated categorically that China could not develop new nuclear weapons with or without

testing a nuclear device ba sed on leaked nuclear w eapons informa tion. H e points out tha t no

responsible designer w ould stockpile a w eapon designed from f oreign codes; such codes are

by necessity incomplete and Agnew notes that they mayeven contain deliberate viruses

w hich w ould ma ke the resulting product defective if designed f rom such codes.8


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Whatever the qua ntity and qua lity of nuclear w eapons design information w hich the Chi-

nese may ha ve derived by espiona ge, such designs wo uld have to be developed, w eaponized,

and produced, and, depending on their level of sophistication, would have to be tested.

Therefore the optimum protection a gainst C hina effectively utilizing such informat ion w ould

be the coming into force of the CTBT. While there is not universal agreement on this point,

American w eapons designers generally concur that nuclear w eapons ba sed on existing phys-ics packagescan be maintained safely and reliably under an adequate Stockpile Stewardship

Program (see section 1.5). But a ll agree, how ever, tha t a ny designs incorpora ting new physics

packages should not be stockpiled without nuclear weapons tests.

1.4 Comments on the Criticisms of the Security and Counterintelligence Process of DOE AsApplied to the National Labs

The principal but not the only focus of protecting nuclear-weapons-related information to-

day should rightly be to prevent its release to non-nuclear-weapons states in order to keep

the lid on nuclear weapons proliferation; that is, to limit the number of undeclared or de-

clared nuclear w eapons states. Thus it remains essential t o U.S. national security to mainta in

highly secure ba rriers aro und nuclear w eapons design informa tion a nd to erect the strongestpossible safeguards to protect nuclear-w eapons-usable mat erials.

These conclusions are based on the overwhelming military power of the United States in

both conventional and nuclear weapons. The United States has a great deal to lose should

nuclear weapons proliferate further, but its security is very unlikely to be significantly af-

fected by changes in the nuclear posture of the minor nuclear weapons states (China, the

United Kingdo m, a nd France). The dama ge assessment o f the Intelligence Community ra ther

than the Cox report provides a guide in judging the military significance of the losses that

may have occurred. The limits on the impact of the alleged losses, even under worst-case

assumptions, are discussed in the previous section.

Ho w are we to judge the crit icisms of t he securit y and counteri ntelli gence process of DO E

as applied to t he national labs, in light of the significance of the actual losses, in compari-

son with the opportunities that the American system of open scientific inquiry, including

involvement with foreign scientists, offers to the United States?

The Rudma n report provides an extensive summary of the vulnerab ilities of t he U.S. labs

to foreign penetration which have existed for several decades and which exist today. It cites

a dismal record of repeated criticisms of DOE s security a nd counterintelligence administra -

tion from a variety of sources: reviews internal to DOE, congressional reviews, reviews by

the G eneral Accounting Of fice, and review s by ad hoc bo dies. The commo n judgment of the

Rudman panel is that the impact of these reviews on the implementation of actual security

measures has largely been short -range and tha t many of them have been ignored. The Rudman

panel traces this resistance to change to a number of major structural defects within DOE

and to t he general arroga nce of the scientific and technical community concerned in rejecting

external oversight. Thus the Rudma n panel in purple prose proposes a major reorganiza-tion in w hich the ad ministration o f all na tiona l security activities currently under the aegis of

D O E w ould be incorporated into either a n a utonomous agency reporting to the president or

a semiautonomous agency under a new undersecretary reporting directly to the secretary of

energy. The current political discussions involving DOE, the Congress, and the president s

off ice focus on the latt er alternat ive, but the outcome o f these discussions remains uncerta in

at the time of t his writing.


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To this w riter there is considerable at tra ction to incorpora ting the security functions of

DOE (defense programs, nonproliferation and national security, and fissile materials man-

agement, a s w ell as counterintelligence and security o versight) into a division o f D OE under

direct-line responsibility of an undersecretary. The Rudma n pa nel outlines many reasons in

support o f such a reorganization. O ne very important by-product of compartmentalizing the

security functions w ithin DOE is that this decreases the impact o f tighter security restrictionsw ithin those parts of D OE w here security restrictions are needed in relatio n to tho se part s of

DOE where they are not. One of the serious problems that continues to beset current DOE

practices is in the formulation of DOE-wide regulations, orders, and other controls. The

rules as fo rmulated t end to b e overbroa d: w hile correcting alleged deficiencies in one sector

of the department, burdensome rules are generated w hich impede efficiency in a nother.

In the past DOE has gone through a series of alarms leading to preoccupation with

diverse administra tive deficiencies, such as those in operat iona l reliab ility, q uality a ssurance,

environment, safety and health, and now security. Once deficiencies in each one of these

cases w ere recognized, the general response w as to creat e new orga nizational units, report-

ing to the highest level and specifically dedicated to managing the aforementioned topics.

Yet each one of these items should be an integral part of the culture which is dedicated to

carrying out the technical and scientific w ork of the depart ment, rather than being delegatedto a separate organizational unit. Indeed specified organizations dealing with each one of the

items cited can be very useful if they provide servicessuch as specialized expertise and re-

sources to each operating-line unit and if they ha ve stop w ork or other policing responsi-

bilities to respond to crucial emergencies. But they should not d il ute the li ne responsibil it ies

of the functional operating units.

Imposing czars to a ssume control over such items, be they qua lity assurance, safety and

health, or security, tends to dilute the responsibility of each operating-line department. In

addition, as a practical matter such central control is impossible to exercise efficiently since

the technical substances of the activities to be controlled are extremely diverse. A security

czar as recently established in DO E reports directly to t he secreta ry, w hile of ficers respon-

sible for bo th military and nonmilitaryprograms

report

through channels.

Thus the checksand ba lances between the program needs a nd security o bjectives become inoperative. There-

fore security by achievement, which has served U.S. military power well in the past, takes

second seat to security by restriction, which ultimately is a perishable commodity. The

Rudman recommendations are reasonable and could be implemented without disturbing

significantly the high quality of the work of the parts of DOE that would be affected (and

w hose scientific and technical q uality t he Rudma n panel praises in the strongest terms).

The question remains whether it ma kes sense to reform one sector of D OE activities w hile

many identified defects apply to the department across the board. That pattern is indeed

confusing and the reporting relationships which the Rudman panel decries as they apply to

the defense sector o f D O E also apply to a varying extent to most if not all D OE a ctivities.

For instance, the question raised by the Rudma n panel w hether the Field O perations of fices,

which were created early by the Atomic Energy Commission, retain value today is a DOE-wide issue. Discussing that question is not part of our task today.

There is great inconsistency in the management of many of DOE s activities, many of

w hich have a historical ba sis tha t is no longer valid. The administrat ion of activities directly

related to energy is disjointed, with nuclear energy, fossil energy, and renewables adminis-

tered through completely diff erent cha nnels. This problem is justly at tributed in t he Rudma n

report to the fact that mo st of the activity of the DO E originated from t he fusion of a la rge


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variety of tasks whose responsibility was spread widely across the federal government. Suc-

cessive administra tions a nd energy secreta ries have not succeeded in organizing these diverse

activities into a logical pattern with clearly defined lines of authority and responsibility.

Thus a principal q uestion w hich w ill arise sooner or lat er is whether it makes sense to create

w hat the Rudman panel designates as an undersecretary for stew ardship and w hether there

should not also be other undersecretaries for science and energy and nuclear regulationinstead of a single chief undersecretary as exists today. In fact, a matter not addressed by

the Rudma n panel is the relationship of the new undersecretary fo r nuclear stew ard ship to

the principal undersecretary.

Pending legislatio n9 provides for a new undersecreta ry to discharge responsibility over the

military activities of DOE but does not address most of the other problems addressed by the

Rudma n panel.

Let me add a very abbreviated outline of the elements of American security systems de-

signed to pro tect informat ion w hose release w ould da mage the nationa l security. Such infor-

mation is classifiedin the United States, w ith the level of classificatio n related to the level of

dama ge which w ould a ccrue to the national security if the information w ere compromised.

Protection of information suffers from a basic tension. In a democracy the public has a

right t o be kept informed o n a ctivities of government. This right is enshrined in the Freedomof Information Act, which obligates the federal government to release information bearing

on its actions on request, w ith the exception of informa tion listed in designat ed categories of

w hich classification is one. Thus classification must ba lance the da mage to nat iona l security

w hich w ould result from release of informat ion w ith the publics right to know and w ith the

productivity gains derived from free communication.

The management of classified information implies that several tens of thousands of gov-

ernment employees and cont racto rs are cleared to receive such informa tion, provided they

have a need to know such information in connection with their jobs. Once individuals

have received clearance, they have to be trustedto handle such informa tion in a ccorda nce

w ith regulations w hich govern the handling and storage of classified informa tion and mate-

rials. Technical ba rriers are erected tha t impede unautho rized tra nsfers; such ba rriers makeunauthorized transfers more difficult and can prevent losses by inadvertence. Such barriers

cannot in themselves, how ever, be sufficient to tot ally prevent unauthor ized tr ansfers. After

all, much classified information is contained within the brains of cleared individuals and

thus control of information must always to some extent rely on trust, aside from manage-

ment of materials, documents, and computer programs.

The Cox report, and to a lesser extent the Rudman report, fails to make an adequate

distinction between the purpose of security measures designed to deny opportunitiesfo r

harmful information transfers and those designed to interdictor preventsuch informa tion

tra nsfers. The Rudma n report specifically decries tha t up to this time DO E has no t succeeded

in erecting impenetra ble ba rriers between classified computer netw orks a nd unclassified sys-

tems. While indeed such firewall barriers are highly desirable, they can only deny oppor-

tunity for t ransfer. If t here is a wi l lto divert the relevant information, however, be it carriedon a computer disk, on the written page, or within the head of a cleared individual, transfer

cannot be prevented.

The clearance process is designed to screen out individuals who are likely to give classified

information away. The process cannot be made infallible. During the Cold War, investiga-

tion fo cused on the candidates ideology, principally communist sympa thies and associat ion,

foreign a llegiances of the candida te or his family, and on dependents in the Soviet Union. In


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addition such factors as drug and alcohol use, heavy indebtedness, and others that might

make the candida te subject to blackma il w ere considered. Toda y ideology ha s lost much of

its former relevance while the other factors remain important. However, the future suscepti-

bil ityof the candidate individuals to the lure of money is difficult to predict, as the serious

security breach in the CIA Ames case and other recent cases involving cleared native-born

Americans document.There is, ho w ever, ano ther problem: pro tection o f truly sensitive nuclear-w eapons-related

information is mad e much more difficult by classifying too large a volume of informa tion of

lesser need of protection, and by constantly introducing new areas of restriction, such as

unclassified nuclear information, unclassified naval propulsion information, sensitive in-

forma tion, a nd so fo rth. This may mean that the sheer volume of informat ion w hich must be

protected is becoming so large that even the kind of reorganiza tion propo sed by the Rudman

panel may not in fact prove more successful than previous attempts at reform.

Administration of classified information is the job of a large bureaucracy, considering the

number of people holding clearances and considering the fa ct tha t the Department of Energy

has custody o f more than 200 million pa ges of cla ssified documents, with the inventory held

by t he Defense D epartment being much larger. M oreover, classified info rmat ion in the com-

puter systems of D O E is very great, a nd in the interest of efficiency much of t his informat ionis being managed to permit easy retrieval. Such centra lization of t he computer systems has a t

the same time increased the vulnerability of such systems since access at a single point can

yield a large amount of data.

Accusations of transfers of computer data from classified to unclassified systems have

been made against a number of individuals in a variety of contexts. The motivation for such

transfers can simply be a matter of convenience associated with the difficulties in operating

the classified systems. Whether espionage plays a role in such transfers is a matter which

only a detailed case-by-case investiga tion can determine.

Indeed, d eficiencies in the security management by D OE of classified mat erials have been

identified over many years and covering several administrations, but perf ection in achieving

tr ue securi ty can only be a goal. The basic physical principles of nuclear and thermonuclearexplosives are well known. Much information has been declassified and has been collected

in summary w orks, nota bly in the publications of the NR D C. Thus, w hatever improvements

in guarding classified materials can and should be made, one must recognize that classified

informa tion ultima tely w ill become publicly ava ilable either through leakage or independent

rediscovery. Thus the security of the nat ion must be achieved by a ba lance betw een security

by restriction and security by achievement.

To summarize, many reviews o f the informat ion-contro l systems of t he government, in

part icular t hose by panels of the Na tiona l Academy o f Sciences, have concluded tha t simply

bolstering the security walls around classified information can only be a temporary remedy.

The uniform position o f such review ing bod ies, including D OEs Fundamental C lassification

Review Group of 19951996 chaired by Albert Narath, has been that DOE should build

veryhigh fences around t ru ly sensit ive info rmationwhile resisting the understandable bu-reaucratic forces which urge building diffuse restraints around vast volumes of informa-

tion.


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1.5 International Contacts of the United States Laboratories

In summary, the fo regoing analysis clearly indicates that there have been deficiencies in the

security barriers at institutions under control of DOE designed to impede transfer of sensi-

tive information to other countries and probably as well in the security measures by the

many other agencies of government having custody over such information. While the man-

agement of security can certa inly be improved, how ever, the impact on na tiona l security ofpast transgressions appears marginal and should not be a cause for the type of politically

exploited spy hysteria w hich we are seeing today. But, unfortunat ely, the situat ion is wo rse.

The preoccupation with security induced by the Cox Commission report has led to a stam-

pede tow ard ill-considered measures which ma y in themselves damage na tiona l security to a

greater extent than the alleged spying could do.

Let me enumerat e such negat ive impacts o n: (1) The lab-to-lab progra ms conducted by the

national nuclear weapons labs and (2) the Stockpile Stewardship Program.

(1) One o f the principal security t hreats fa cing this country is the possible leaka ge of nuclear-

w eapons-usable materials from the countries of the former Soviet Union and the emigra tion

of talent possessing nuclear-weapons-related information to countries potentially hostile to

the United States. It can be reasonably concluded that preventive defense stemming such

an outflow of ma terial and t alent is much more cost effective in aiding U.S. nat iona l security

tha n defending against t he possible consequences of such tra nsfers to hostile countries. Thus

a substantial number of programs have been developed which share the common goal of

assisting the countries of the former Soviet Unio n in strengthening their ma terials protection,

control, and accounting (MPC&A) over their weapons-usable materials and in preventing

the brain drain of scientific and engineering talent from the states of the former Soviet

Union into potentially hostile employment. These programs, which include the substantial

effort under the aegis of the Department of Defense called Cooperative Threat Reduction

(CTR), the various centers designed to give financial support to scientists of the former

Soviet Union by employing them in constructive civilian enterprises, cooperative efforts trans-

ferring highly enriched uranium to the United States, and working with countries of theformer Soviet Union in reducing their plutonium stockpiles, are all essential but cannot be

discussed here in detail.

One of the most immediately successful efforts of these programs has been the lab-to-

lab program under which scientists at American nuclear weapons laboratories collaborate

with their counterparts in the countries of the former Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent

with Chinese labs, in strengthening the safeguards against diversion of weapons-usable ma-

terials and in improving the accounting for such materials to make control possible.

H istorically during the C old War, nuclear w eapons and nuclear w eapons materials control

in the Soviet Union were exercised through elite troops acting as guards and couriers for

such materials. At t he same time the Soviet U nion d id no t use technical surveillance instru-

mentation to a significant extent and its standards of accounting were low. With the end of

the Cold War the morale of the former elite guards has deteriorated; some of them are

unpaid and some lack the most elementary comforts. In view of this fact, the previously

neglected efforts to develop and deploy instrumentation for materials protection and im-

provements in accounting have moved to the forefront; U.S. assistance toward this end is

clearly valuable to U.S. security. Such work has been carried out under the aegis of the lab-

to-lab progra m sponsored by DO E, w hich has had substantia l positive results. This is not the


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place for a detailed review of this program. Suffice it to say that roughly half of the institu-

tions in the former Soviet Union where weapons-usable materials are stored have been up-

graded in their MPC&A activities under this program, although the number of actual build-

ings w hich have been improved is a smaller fraction. Accounting is much improved, a nd thus

far no documented examples of actual loss of weapons-usable materials sufficient to make

nuclear weapons have been recorded.A large amount of work along these lines remains to be done. First, the task is far from

completed. Second, the problem of mainta ining the new instrumentat ion by the host countrys

personnel remains a considerab le challenge. Finally, the manufa cture of the instrumentatio n

should be transferred to indigenous sources. All of these goals require continued or even

expanded lab-to-lab contact. This in turn requires frequent visits by Russian, Chinese, and

other nationals to U.S. weapons labs. Impeding such visits or even reducing their frequency

would have a highly detrimental effect.

(2) O f even greater importance is the q uality o f U.S. personnel at the nat iona l w eapons labs.

These labs continue to share the largest part of the responsibility for maintaining the safety

and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. This responsibility is managed under

the Stockpile Stewa rdship Progra m, w hich has two major components. The first component,which may be called core stewardship, involves continuous inspection and some disas-

sembly and reassembly of nuclear weapons designed to uncover and remedy defects. Part of

this program is testing of the non-nuclear components, including such methods as high-

speed rad iogra phy of the high-explosive assembly, testing of the firing and fuzing and o ther

control machinery, and so called subcritical tests. These are designed to pinpoint missing

information about the behavior of nuclear materials at high pressures without release of

nuclear energy. Some of the importa nce of t hese activities has been increased by the cessation

of nuclear w eapons tests, but most such activities are made necessary simply by the aging of

the nuclear w eapons stockpile. For instance, metallurgical changes take place in plutonium

over time due simply to the effects caused by t he accumulat ion o f helium engendered by the

alpha decay of plutonium. Thus the program also includes remanufacture.

The second part of the Stockpile Stewardship Program is dedicated to miscellaneous ac-

tivities which have relevance to the physics of nuclear weapons and to nuclear weapons

design but w hich are carried out largely to mainta in an interesting and creative environment

for nuclear weapons scientists at the national labs.

To sa tisfy this dua l objective of the Stockpile Stew ard ship Progra m it is necessary to re-

cox committee report an assessment

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