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America Before Pearl Harbor
Nye Committee• Officially known as the Special Committee on Investigation of
the Munitions Industry– Headed by Senator Gerald Nye of ND– Set up in 1934 to investigate the causes of U.S. involvement in World War I
• The report concluded that wartime loans and sales to the Allies was a major factor in getting the U.S. into World War I
• Documented the huge profits that arms factories had made during World War I & implied that the “merchants of death”not only profited from the war but got us into it
• Led to the various Neutrality Acts
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America Isolationism & Pacifism• In 1935, historian Walter Millis published his best‐selling Road to War: America, 1914‐1917– Gave rise to a demonology that “merchants of death,”aided by false Allied propaganda, had tricked America into war in order to make money
• On 6 April 1935, 50,000 WWI veterans held a peace march on Washington
• On 12 April 1935, some 175,000 college students staged a 1‐hour anti‐war strike
• A 1935 Gallop Poll found that 70 percent of the respondents agreed that intervention in the Great War had been a mistake
Neutrality Act of 1935
• Imposed an embargo on arms and war materials to all parties in a war
• Declared that American citizens traveling on ships of warring nations do so at their own risk
• Set to expire after 6 months• Invoked in the Italy‐Ethiopia War
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Neutrality Act of 1936
• Renewed the provisions of the Neutrality Act of 1935
• Forbade all loans or credits to belligerents• Did not cover civil wars, such as the one in Spain from 1936 to 1939
• Did not cover oil or dual‐use civilian‐military items like trucks
• Loophole enabled U.S. companies to sell more than $100 million to Franco
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Neutrality Act of 1937• Reiterated the provisions of the earlier acts• Extended them to include civil wars as well• Had no expiration date• Forbade U.S. ships from transporting any passengers or goods to belligerent nations
• Forbade U.S. citizens from traveling on the ships of belligerent nations
• Allowed the President to permit on a ‘cash and carry’basis the sale of materials and supplies to belligerents in Europe as long as the recipients paid in cash and transported the goods themselves
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Neutrality Act of 1939
• Allowed the sales of arms to belligerents on a ‘cash and carry’ basis
• Repealed the Neutrality Acts of 1935 and 1937
• Barred American citizens and ships from entering war zones designated by the President as such
• Charged the National Munitions Control Board with issuing licenses for all arms imports and exports
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Reactions to World War II
• Americans greeted the outbreak of war in Europe with the following emotions”– A strong desire for the U.S. to stay out of the war
• 90% opposed U.S. entry into the war– A desire that the Allies would win the war
• 80% expressed a wish that the Allies win the war• Only 1% expressed a desire for a German victory
– A fear that that neither desire would be fulfilled • The War led to two distinct lobbies which advocated opposite policies concerning the conflict
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Fall of France
• The Fall of France in June 1940 came as a great shock to the American people– Provoked a fear that the U.S. was now vulnerable to attack– Led to U.S. rearmament
• The Two‐Ocean Navy• 50,000 planes• Large‐scale expansion of the Army
– First peacetime draft
– Led Roosevelt to seek a third term– Led the Republicans to nominate Wendell Willkie over Robert Taft for President
– Led Roosevelt to propose Lend‐Lease
Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies
• Organizational Notes– Formed in May 1940– Included 125 local chapters with regional offices in Chicago,
Chapel Hill, San Francisco, and Boston– Held numerous rallies and distributed 2 million copies of printed
matter– Included a whole host of eminent Americans
• Policy positions:– Advocated U.S. military materiel support for Britain as the best
way to keep the U.S. out of the war– Opposed the Neutrality Acts– Supported the destroyer deal & the draft– Supported Lend‐Lease
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America First Committee
• Organizational Notes– Established in September 1940 by Yale Law student R. Douglas Stuart & Yale undergraduate Kingman Brewster
– Had 800,000 at its peak in 650 chapters• Was a collection of pacifists, anti‐Semites, German‐Americans, Communists, and Roosevelt‐haters
– Headquartered in Chicago– Headed by Sears executive Robert E. Wood– Had many celebrity members, including several U.S. senators
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America First Committee ‐ 2
• Policy positions:– Supported the Neutrality Acts– Opposed Lend Lease on grounds that it weakened U.S. defenses at home and threatened to involve the U.S. in war abroad
– Believed the U.S. Navy and two oceans could protect the U.S. from invasion
– Believed that a large scale military buildup and intervention in World War II would create a garrison state that would be destructive of American liberty and lead to future subsequent wars
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The End of Neutrality
• The Lend‐Lease Act of March 11, 1941 – Allowed the U.S. to sell, lend, or give war materials to allied nations fighting the Axis
– Was considered by Hitler an act of war – Led to German submarine attacks on U.S. merchant ships in war zones
– Eventually led to an undeclared naval war between U.S. destroyers and German submarines
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The End of Neutrality ‐ 2
• April 1941 – U.S. forces occupy Greenland• April 1941 – U.S. Navy begins patrolling the Western Atlantic
• July 1941 – U.S. forces occupy Iceland• July 24, 1941 – In response to the Japanese occupation of Indochina, Roosevelt:– Freezes all Japanese assets and credits– Embargoes the sale of scrap iron and petroleum to Japan
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The End of Neutrality ‐ 3• Following the attack on the USS Greer on September 4,
1941, Roosevelt:– Sought virtual repeal of the Neutrality Acts– Declared that U.S. naval forces would “shoot‐on‐sight” any German submarines
• On October 17, 1941, the USS Kearny was hit by a German torpedo with 11 KIA and 22 wounded
• Following the sinking USS Reuben James on October 31, 1941, most of the provisions of the Neutrality Acts were repealed in November 1941– U.S. merchant ships were armed and allowed to enter belligerent ports
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The Road to Pearl Harbor
On to Pearl Harbor• After the American response to the Japanese occupation of
southern Vietnam and Cambodia, the Japanese saw war as inevitable
• On 17 October, Hideki Tojo became Prime Minister while simultaneously serving as Army Minister and Home Minister– After that, war preparations went forward at a fast pace
• On 5 November at an Imperial Conference, the proposed war plans for the Pearl Harbor, Southern, and perimeter island operations were approved
• It was decided that unless a diplomatic settlement was reached by 25 November, the war would begin on 7 December.
Hideki Tojo
Why War with the U.S.• Inability to resolve the conflict over China
– The U.S. sought to preserve China’s territorial integrity and independence while Japan sought to conquer China
• The decision of the Japanese to take advantage of WWII to seize the possessions of France, Britain, and the Netherlands – To create a base for operations further south– To cut China’s link to the outside world in order to force an end to the
war• This led to the U.S. embargoes which put Japan in the position of
either submitting to US demands or going to war• The Japanese belief that they needed to seize the Philippines and
to neutralize the U.S. Pacific fleet
Japanese Strategy for War with the U.S.
• Japanese Military leaders believed that America was incapable of fighting a long, protracted war of attrition and that a decisive Japanese victory early in the war would cause America to settle for a negotiated peace that left Japan in control of the areas she conquered – This implied quick seizure of Southeast Asia and an island perimeter from which the Japanese could hold off the Americans
– It also implied a decisive sea battle in the western Pacific in which the U.S. fleet would be destroyed as it came to the rescue of Guam and the Philippines
Japanese Strategy ‐ 2
• On 7 January 1941, ADM Isoroku Yamamoto argued that this ambush strategy had three major defects:– It left the initiative to the Americans at a time when the American fleet was growing in power over time as new ships came on line
– Any operation against Malaya and the Dutch East Indies would divert major components of the fleet away from a Western Pacific battle
– The strategy assumed that Japan would have a fleet superior to, or at least equal to, the American Pacific fleet.
Japanese Strategy ‐ 3
• Instead, Yamamoto proposed a different plan – Destroy the American fleet on the very first day at Pearl Harbor
– Seize Malaya, Singapore, the East Indies, and the Philippines
– Construct a chain of fortified bases along a perimeter of Pacific islands
– Allow the Americans to suffer a war of attrition trying to take these islands
Defects of Japanese Strategy
• Yamamoto’s Plan (which is what the Japanese adopted) had several conceptual and strategic defects– Achieving the total surprise necessary for success was a very iffy proposition
– Even if the attack was successful, it would lead to a long war that Japan could not hope to win
– It erroneously assumed that the Pacific Fleet was a threat to the flank of the Japanese attack to the South
– It ignored the implications of attacking a shallow port on a Sunday
Two Other Strategic Considerations
• As an island nation dependent on the movement of strategic resources from a newly‐conquered empire via ship over a distance of many miles – Japan went to war with a merchant marine barely equal to the peacetime requirements of the Japanese economy; it was not adequate to the task of wartime
– Both the Japanese Navy “attrit and attack” and the Yamamoto “sneak attack” strategies left the Japanese Navy with a force structure incapable of protecting Japanese merchant shipping from attacks by American submarines
War in the Pacific
From Pearl Harbor to Midway
Pearl Harbor – October 1941
Attack on Pearl Harbor ‐ 1
• On 7 December 1941, planes from the Japanese First Air Fleet (Kido Butai) attacked Pearl Harbor– The Japanese force consisted of 6 aircraft carriers with 414 airplanes, 2 battleships, 3 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 8 tankers, 23 submarines and 5 midget submarines
• The Japanese Fleet (Kido Butai) avoided detection by sailing through the Northern Pacific area not traveled by commercial shipping because of the storms brought about by the prevailing Westerlies
Route of the Kido Butai
Attack on Pearl Harbor ‐ 2
• The first attack wave of Japanese planes were picked up on radar but were assumed to be incoming B‐17s – The first wave consisted primarily of dive bombers, fighters, and torpedo bombers – one to attack the airfields and the other to attack the battleships
– The second wave consisted mostly of bombers which bombed both the subsidiary airfields and the ships not accessible to the torpedo bombers
• U.S. aircraft were parked wingtip‐to‐wingtip in the middle of the main airfields because GEN Walter Short feared sabotage rather than a possible Japanese air attack
Attack on Pearl Harbor ‐ 3• The Japanese attack in two waves did the following damage– 4 battleships sunk– 4 battleships heavily damaged– 3 cruisers damaged – 3 destroyers damaged– 2 other ships sunk– 3 other ships damaged– 188 aircraft destroyed– 159 aircraft damaged– 2,402 KIA– 1,247 wounded
Attack on Pearl Harbor ‐ 4
• The attack cost the Japanese relatively little– 4 midget submarines sunk– 1 midget submarine beached– 29 aircraft destroyed– 64 KIA– 1 POW
Attack on Pearl Harbor ‐ 5• After the return of the first two waves, there was a big
debate on whether to launch a third strike– The attack planner, Minoru Genda, and the attack leader,
Mitsuo Fuchida, wanted to go after the oil tanks, docks, and support facilities
– But ADM Chuichi Nagumo decided different for several reasons• He was worried about being attacked by the American carriers• He was worried about possible heavy aircraft losses• The planes would have had to be refueled and rearmed and the resulting turn‐around time would have meant they would be coming back to the carriers at night
• The task force lacked the fuel to remain in Hawaiian waters muchlonger
• He believed he had completed his mission
Attack on Pearl Harbor ‐ 6
• For the Japanese, it was a great tactical victory but a strategic disaster in several ways– First, Pearl Harbor meant that the U.S. would enter the war as a nation united and determined to fight on to victory
• This was a type of war Japan could not win
– Second, the Japanese ignored the tank farms, dry docks, and ship support facilities vital to both naval operations and ship repair
• This enabled the U.S. Navy to both recuperate from the Pearl Harbor attack and conduct the carrier operations that led to victories in the Battle of the Coral Sea and Midway
Attack on Pearl Harbor ‐ 7
• Third, it ended the sway that the battleship admirals had over the U.S. Navy – Before Pearl Harbor, the admirals saw the battleship as the queen of the fleet and aircraft as useful primarily for scouting
– After Pearl Harbor, even the traditionalists had to concede that the Aircraft Carrier was now the queen of the fleet
• Finally, even if left alone, the U.S. Pacific Fleet would have been unable to interdict the Southern Operation because of the lack of the necessary oilers and support ships
Aerial View of Pearl Harbor at the beginning of the attack
Japanese aerial photo view of the bombing of Pearl Harbor
USS Shaw exploding at Pearl Harbor
One Major Effect of Pearl Harbor• Led Adolf Hitler to declare war on the United States on 11
December 1941• This was Hitler’s second major mistake of 1941 – both of which
combined to eventually doom the Third Reich • Why did Hitler do it?
– Hitler believed that after defeating the Soviet Union, his next war would be with the United States
– The problem with defeating the United States (which meant invading the U.S.) was the U.S. Navy which had to be sunk before Germany could invade
– For this, Germany needed a blue‐water Navy which would take time to construct
– Japan, however, had a blue water Navy & if the US Navy was sunk in the Pacific by Japan, it would make an eventual German invasion of the U.S. much easier
Did Roosevelt Know Beforehand?• There have been several conspiracy theorist historians
who claimed that Roosevelt knew of the Pearl Harbor attack beforehand and let it happen so as to get the U.S. into the war
• There is no proof that Roosevelt knew beforehand and much evidence against it– While American leaders knew the Japanese were going to
attack, they did not know that Pearl Harbor would be an object of the attack
– Roosevelt was much more concerned about stopping Hitler than fighting Japan – A war with Japan would trap him in the wrong war
– Roosevelt could not have known that Hitler would declare war on the U.S.
News of the Attack
• Most of the American public found out about the attack in bits and pieces over radio news broadcasts
• Many found out when athletic and cultural events were interrupted by PA system announcements
• At Griffith Stadium, where the Washington Redskins were playing the Philadelphia Eagles, a crowd of 27,000 remained in the dark even though the PA system began calling on various generals and admirals plus the Resident Commissioner of the Philippines to report to their offices
Pearl Harbor to Midway
Early Defeats
• With Japan controlling the air and sea over the Western and Southern Pacific, the Allies suffered numerous defeats– December 1941 – Fall of Guam, Wake Island, and Hong Kong
– January 1942 – Fall of Manila and Rabaul– February 1942 – Fall of Malaya, Singapore, and Sumatra
– March 1942 – Fall of Java and the rest of Indonesia– April 1942 – Fall of Bataan– May 1942 – Fall of Corregidor
The Doolittle Raid• With the war going badly, Roosevelt felt a need to strike at Japan by bombing Tokyo– The only way this could be done was by putting long‐range bombers on a carrier
– On 2 April, the Hornet left port with 16 B‐25s on its flight deck
– On 18 April, the planes had to be launched earlier than planned so while they could bomb Japan, most could not reach bases in China
• The importance of the raid lay in its impact on a Japanese naval high command debate over future war strategy– The raid led to a Japanese decision to attack Midway
Japanese Expansion prior to Midway
Midway ‐ 1
• Two factors drove the Japanese to attack Midway– The desire to avoid a repetition of the Doolittle Raid– The desire on the part of ADM Yamamoto to provoke a decisive battle with the U.S. Navy carrier fleet
• Thanks to Navy cryptanalysis, the U.S. knew about the attack ahead of time
• Attacks by Midway‐based aircraft on the Japanese invasion fleet convinced ADM Nagumo that an airstrike on the island was necessary– While the airstrike did a lot of damage, the Japanese felt another airstrike was necessary
Midway ‐ 2
– As a result, the returning Japanese planes were being refueled and rearmed with bombs
– When the rearming and refueling action was in process, the Japanese discovered that American carriers were nearby and that American planes were en route
– ADM Nagumo then ordered that the carrier planes be rearmed again with torpedoes
– It was while the deck of the Japanese carriers were crowded with refueling planes amid piles of bombs which were being removed and torpedoes which were being loaded that American planes found the carriers
Midway ‐ 3• While the Japanese defensive fighter screen was able to shoot down most of the attacking torpedo planes without suffering any hits, they had prevented the carriers from launching any planes and caused many CAP planes to run low on fuel and fly down to near sea level
• This made the Japanese carriers vulnerable to American dive bombers which scored ten hits on the Kaga, Akagi, and Soryu with devastating results
• While planes from the Hiryu were able to sink the Yorktown, planes from the Hornet and Enterprise were able to find and sink it
Japanese Carrier Akagi
Effects of Midway• With their carriers lost, the Japanese were forced to call off
the invasion of Midway• The Japanese lost 4 of their 6 large fleet carriers, over 300
planes, hundreds of experienced pilots and air crews, and over 3,000 naval crewmen – losses not easily replaced
• The losses at Midway prevented any new major Japanese naval offensive in either the South Pacific or the Indian Ocean
• It opened the way for an American counter‐attack in the Solomon Islands
• With the threat to Midway and Hawaii removed, it made it possible for the U.S. to follow the Europe First strategy
Aerial view of Midway from the SouthEastern Island, then the site of Midway's airfield, is in the foreground. Sand Island, location of most other base facilities, is across the entrance channel. Picture was taken in November 1941
The War in the Atlantic
The British Merchant Marine
• In 1939, Britain needed to import 55 million tons of goods by sea to support its way of life– She depended on her ocean trade for half her food, most of her raw materials and all of her oil and gasoline
• It had a merchant marine of 3,000 ocean‐going vessels and 1,000 large coastal ships – a total of 21 million gross‐register tons
• Merchant marine manpower totaled 160,000• The Germans estimated that if they could sink 700,000 tons a month, they could force Britain out of the war
4 Phases of the Sub War1. From the outbreak of the war to the fall of France
– U‐boats operate only in the North Sea and around the British isles
2. After June 1940 to April 1941– U‐boats operate in the Eastern Atlantic and along the African coast
3. From April 1941 to December 1941– U‐boats operate in the Central and Western Atlantic and Arctic Atlantic (after June 1941)
4. After December 1941– U‐boats begin to operate along the Atlantic coast of the U.S. and in the Gulf of Mexico
German Subs• Submarines were not really true underwater ships
– When submerged they could go only 7.5 knots per hr and only for a limited time since they could only use battery power
• They could be outrun by most surface ships– On the surface, they could go 17.7 knots per hr
• They had to spend most of their time on the surface so that their diesel engines could recharge their batteries and they could get to their designated attack areas in time
• The most common German sub, the Type VII, had a radius of 8,000 miles and carried 11 torpedoes
• In 1942, the newer Type IX, came on board. It had a radius of 13,450 miles and carried 22 torpedoes
Sub Tactics• Since the German Navy had few reconnaissance planes, the Germans had to use submarine scouts to locate Allied conveys and then use radio signals to direct other subs to the convoy where they could attack as a wolf‐pack
• Typically, German subs would attack convoys at night, submerging only when they were being pursued by escort ships– During the day, they would attack the convoy submerged
• One thing that helped German subs locate convoys was the fact that the Germans had broken the British convoy codes
Convoys• The best way of dealing with subs was to have the ships form convoys that were protected by destroyer escorts and overhead planes– Merchant ships and tankers were helpless at sea if not in a convoy
• About 2/3rd of the ships sunk were out of convoy – these were either stragglers from the convoy or ships that had just left port
• Despite convoys, the Allies suffered a heavy loss of ships until early 1943 as noted in the subsequent chart
• After a series of Allied innovations, Allied shipping losses greatly declined while German submarine losses greatly increased
Allied Merchant Ship Losses
Ship Sinkings by Ocean Region
Ship Construction and Ship Losses
U‐boat Losses
Year 1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
U‐boats Lost
9 24 35 86 243 249 120
CumTotal 33 68 154 397 646 766
The Cost of the War in the Atlantic
• From September 1939 to May 1945, the Allies lost 2,452 merchant ships and tankers in the Atlantic and 175 escort warships– Merchant tonnage loss was nearly 13 million GRT– The British lost 55,800 merchant seamen; the Americans 9,400
• The Germans lost 766 out of their 1156 commissioned U‐boats and 25,870 out of their 40,900 U‐boat crewmen– 63 percent of the men were KIA and 75% became casualties – 66.3 percent of the U‐boats were lost
• The German sub casualty rate far exceeded that suffered by any other service arm of any combatant country in the war
Notes on Losses
• It was not until February 1943 that Allied ship construction tonnage exceeded that sunk by German submarines in the same month
• It was not until September 1943 that Allied ship construction tonnage exceeded the tonnage of all Allied ship losses – I.e Those sunk by German subs, German surface ships, Axis mines, and marine accidents in which ships capsized, ran aground, or collided with an obstacle or another ship
What Won the Battle of the Atlantic
• The Allied use of airplanes and escort carriers (CVEs) • The Allies had broken the German Navy code by use of
Enigma• The Allies found out that the Germans had broken the
convoy codes and developed a new code that the Germans never broke
• The Allies developed a seaborne radio locator system • The Allies developed an Air to Surface Vessel (ASV) radar
capable of locating submarines on the surface of the ocean• The Allies developed a type of sonar that could detect
depth as well as range and bearing• The development of the Leigh Light for aircraft
Effects of the War in the Atlantic ‐ 1
• Before mid‐1943, when the Germans were winning:– Forced the British standard of living down to near‐subsistence levels
• In 1942, British imports dropped to a third of their peacetime level– Precluded an Allied invasion of Western Europe in 1942 & 1943– Prevented a North African invasion on a scale sufficient to rapidly
seize Tunisia, thus prolonging the North African campaign into 1943– Limited the amount of Lend‐Lease aid that could be gotten to Russia– Created tensions between the Western Allies and Russia over the
issue of a Second Front• Led to massive merchant ship construction programs
– Revolutionized ship construction techniques and procedures
Liberty Ship
USS John W. Brown – Pinup Art
Effects of the War in the Atlantic ‐ 2
• After mid‐1943 when the Allies had to a large extent neutralized the German submarine menace:– Allowed for large‐scale movement of troops and supplies to
England, making possible the Normandy invasion of 1944– Allowed large amounts of Lend‐Lease aid to flow to Russia
• Gave rise to the field of Operations Research which used statistical analysis of available data to make military and convoy‐handling decisions– Used to determine the optimal size of convoys & optimal color of
aircraft– After the war, Operations Research began to be applied to all sorts
of business problems, ranging from routing of buses & planes to supply chain management to personnel scheduling