No. S226645

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent,

ACLU OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Real Parties in Interest.

After a Judgment of the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District

Court of Appeal Case No. B257230

REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO FILE AMICI CURIAE BRIEF

OF LOS ANGELES TIMES COMMUNICATIONS LLC; MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, INC.; GANNETT; FIRST

AMENDMENT COALITION; CALIFORNIA BROADCASTERS ASSOCIATION; AND CALIFORNIA NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION IN SUPPORT OF REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST

ACLU OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA AND ERIC PREVEN; BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE

Karl Olson (SBN 104760) RAM, OLSON, CEREGHINO & KOPCZYNSKI LLP

101 Montgomery Street, Suite 1800 San Francisco, CA 94104

Tel: 415-433-4949 Fax: 415-433-7311

Email: kolson@rocklawcal.com

Attorneys for Amici

No. S226645

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent,

ACLU OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Real Parties in Interest.

After a Judgment of the Court of Appeal of the State of California,

Second Appellate District Court of Appeal Case No. B257230

REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO FILE AMICI CURIAE BRIEF OF LOS ANGELES TIMES COMMUNICATIONS LLC;

MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, INC.; GANNETT; FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION; CALIFORNIA BROADCASTERS

ASSOCIATION; AND CALIFORNIA NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION IN SUPPORT OF REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST

ACLU OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA AND ERIC PREVEN

Karl Olson (SBN 104760)

RAM, OLSON, CEREGHINO & KOPCZYNSKI LLP 101 Montgomery Street, Suite 1800

San Francisco, CA 94104 Tel: 415-433-4949 Fax: 415-433-7311

Email: kolson@rocklawcal.com

Attorneys for Amici

1

To: THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE

AND THE HONORABLE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE

CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT:

This case is a matter of vital importance to Californians, including the

media and non-profit amici identified below, who monitor government spending

and operations, and cover litigation involving public agencies. The County of Los

Angeles asks this Court to give it a blank check to spend millions of dollars of

taxpayer money secure in the knowledge that the taxpayers who foot the bill will

never see the invoices shedding light on how public money was spent. Amici

submit that the required narrow construction of statutes barring access to records

calls for rejection of the County’s position.

No prudent individual spending his or her own money would pay an

attorney invoice without having some description of the work done, but the

County of Los Angeles wants a blank check to be the law. The County’s position

– taking an overly-expansive view of the attorney-client privilege in a case

involving none of the policies giving rise to the privilege, and ignoring the strong

public policies (and this Court’s recent jurisprudence) allowing the public to

monitor public spending – would deny the public access to redacted invoices

reflecting the amounts public agencies spent on litigation, reversing the prevailing

practice for decades of public agencies releasing redacted bills to the news media

and the public in response to CPRA requests.

The public release of redacted invoices has enabled news organizations to

do important watchdog reporting on the legal costs borne by taxpayers to fix the

damage wrought by scandals such as what occurred in the city of Bell. As the Los

Angeles Times reported, “While municipal corruption and mismanagement cases

have led to millions of dollars being stolen from city coffers, the biggest toll is

often the enormous bills from attorneys who are paid by the hour to clean up the

2

mess, according to a Times analysis of municipal legal bills across California.

‘Unfortunately, that’s the double-headed monster whenever you have

wrongdoing,’ said Jose Pulido, the new city manager of Temple City, where legal

costs roughly doubled after the mayor and other officials were convicted of

soliciting bribes from a developer.” Sewell and Garrison, “Corruption can leave

cities with enormous legal bills,” Los Angeles Times, April 18, 2012,

http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/18/local/la-me-city-attorney-spending-

20120418. The County would block the public from access to this vital

information, even though agencies easily can protect client confidences on

attorney invoices through redactions – as occurs every day in the federal and state

court systems when litigants submit redacted invoices in statutory or contractual

fee-shifting cases.

For these reasons, and those set forth below, amici curiae – a coalition of

media and non-profit organizations who care about the spending of public money,

and the ability to monitor government operations1 – respectfully urge this Court to

grant permission to file the accompanying amicus brief on the merits in support of

real parties in interest.2

Dated: February 11, 2016 By: /s/ Karl Olson________________ Karl Olson RAM, OLSON, CEREGHINO & KOPCZYNSKI LLP Attorneys for Amici Curiae

1 The amici include Los Angeles Times Communications LLC;

McClatchy Newspapers, Inc.; Gannett; First Amendment Coalition; California Broadcasters Association; and California Newspaper Publishers Association.

2 Pursuant to California Rule of Court 8.520(f)(4), amici state that no party

or counsel for any party authored the proposed amicus brief in whole or in part, and no party or counsel for any party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of the brief. No person or entity made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of the brief other than the amici, their members and the undersigned counsel.

No. S226645

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent,

ACLU OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Real Parties in Interest.

After a Judgment of the Court of Appeal of the State of California,

Second Appellate District Court of Appeal Case No. B257230

AMICI CURIAE BRIEF OF LOS ANGELES TIMES COMMUNICATIONS LLC; MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, INC.; GANNETT; FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION; CALIFORNIA

BROADCASTERS ASSOCIATION; AND CALIFORNIA NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION IN SUPPORT OF

REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST ACLU OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA AND ERIC PREVEN

Karl Olson (SBN 104760) RAM, OLSON, CEREGHINO & KOPCZYNSKI LLP

101 Montgomery Street, Suite 1800 San Francisco, CA 94104

Tel: 415-433-4949 Fax: 415-433-7311

Email: kolson@rocklawcal.com

Attorneys for Amici

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................1

II. INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE .................................................................2

III. THE COURT OF APPEAL’S DECISION DISREGARDS THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION, CONFLICTS WITH EARLIER PRECEDENT, AND WOULD PREVENT THE PUBLIC FROM MONITORING PUBLIC SPENDING. .......................................................4

A. The Court of Appeal Disregarded the Constitutional Mandate to Narrowly Construe Statutes Limiting Access and Broadly Construe Statutes Promoting Access...........................4

B. Consistent Precedent Has Held That Invoices Are Not Privileged. ......................................................................................11

C. Access to Invoices Allows the Public to Monitor Public Spending ........................................................................................13

IV. IT WOULD NOT BE “ABSURD,” AS THE COUNTY CONTENDS, FOR THIS COURT TO ADHERE TO THE NARROW CONSTRUCTION OF EXEMPTIONS FROM DISCLOSURE SET FORTH IN ARTICLE I, SECTION 3(b)(2) OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION. .............................................16

V. THE COUNTY ADVOCATES FOR A LIMITLESS PRIVILEGE. ........18

VI. INVOICES ARE THE BEST INFORMATION ABOUT SPENDING ON OUTSIDE COUNSEL. ..................................................19

VII. THE COUNTY’S POSITION WOULD HAVE UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES IN FEE LITIGATION. ..............................................20

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT ....................................................................22

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Bighorn- Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil 39 Cal.4

th 205, 214 (2006).…………………………………………………… 17

CBS, Inc. v. Block 42 Cal. 3d 646, 653 (1986)…………………………………………………….. 7

City of New Haven v. FOIC 205 Conn. 767, 535 A.2d 1297 (1988)……………………………………….. 13

City Pages v. State of Minnesota 655 N.W.2d 839, 844-847 (Minn. App. 2003)……………………………….. 13

Clarke v. American Commerce Nat’l Bank 974 F.2d 127, 129-130 (9th Cir. 1992)…………………………………… 13, 17

Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training v. Superior Court (“CPOST”) 42 Cal. 4

th 278, 291(2007)…………………………………………6

Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court 47 Cal. 4

th 725, 743(2009)………………………………………………... 11, 13

County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Anderson-Barker) 211 Cal. App. 4

th 57(2012)…………………………………………… 12, 17, 21

Cypress Media, Inc. v. City of Overland Park 997 P.2d 681, 692-93 (Kan. 2000)…………………………………………….13

Doe 2 v. Superior Court 132 Cal. App. 4

th 1504, 1522 (2005)…………………………………………... 4

Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees v. Davis (1999) 21 Cal.4

th 585, 602 17

International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers Local 21 v. Superior Court 42 Cal. 4

th 319, 333 passim

Mitchell v. Superior Court 37 Cal. 3d 591, 599 (1984)…………………………………………………….. 9

Montebello Rose Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board 119 Cal. App. 3d 1, 32 (1981)…………………………………………………. 9

Northern California Police Practices Project v. Craig 90 Cal. App. 3d 116, 123-124 (1979)………………………………………….. 9

Pasadena Police Officers Association v. Superior Court 240 Cal. App. 4

th 268, 291(2015)……………………………………………… 8

iii

People v. Arias 45 Cal. 4

th 169, 180 (2008)…………………………………………………… 10

People v. Sinohui 28 Cal. 4

th 205, 215-216 (2002)………………………………………………. 17

Recorder v. Commission on Judicial Performance 72 Cal. App.4

th 258, 269-274 (1999)…………………………………………. 17

Sierra Club v. Superior Court 57 Cal. 4

th 157, 166-67 (2013)…………………………………………………. 4

Solin v. O’Melveny & Myers 89 Cal.App. 4

th 451, 457 (2001)……………………………………………….. 9

State Board of Equalization v. Superior Court 10 Cal. App. 4

th 1177, 1187 (1992)……………………………………………. 8

Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court 59 Cal. App. 4

th 110, 123 (1997)………………………………………………. 4

Rules

Evidence Code section 952………………………………………………. 6, 10, 17

Government Code section 6253(b)……………………………………………….. 7

Government Code section 6250…………………………………………………... 4

Constitutional Provisions

Article I, section 3(b)(2) of the California Constitution……………………. passim

1

I. INTRODUCTION

This case involves access to information shedding light on the spending of

large amounts of public money. Los Angeles County spent $118.9 million in

litigation expenses in fiscal year 2015-15, up 24 percent from the $85.6 million it

spent in fiscal year 2013-14 .1 The $118.9 million it spent in the most recent

fiscal year included $59.9 million in judgments and settlements and an almost

equal amount, $59 million, in attorneys’ fees and costs. Yet if the County has its

way, the taxpayers who foot that bill will be deprived of such basic information as

who worked how many hours on what day and at what hourly rate, all because

such a basic thing as attorney invoices would be swallowed by the attorney-client

privilege.

That has never been and should not be the law. The County’s position

defies the required narrow construction of statutes required by article I, section

3(b)(2) of the California Constitution, and it ignores what this Court has described

as “the strong public interest in knowing how the government spends its money.”

International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers Local 21 v.

Superior Court (Contra Costa Newspapers) 42 Cal. 4th

319, 333 (hereafter

“IFPTE”). The County’s position would deny the public access to spending

records, which “‘makes it possible for members of the public to expose

corruption, incompetence, inefficiency, prejudice and favoritism.’” (Id. at 333,

internal quotation marks omitted.)

This Court observed in the IFPTE case, “‘It is difficult to imagine a more

critical time for public scrutiny of its governmental decision-making process than

when the latter is determining how it shall spend public funds.’” (42 Cal. 4th

at

1 “County Counsel Annual Litigation Cost Report – Fiscal Year 2014-

2015,” subject of accompanying Motion for Judicial Notice.

2

334, citation omitted.) The County’s position would block that public scrutiny in

a case which would serve none of the core interests advanced by the attorney-

client privilege. For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the

decision of the Court of Appeal and deny the county’s Petition for Writ of

Mandate.

II. INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Los Angeles Times Communications LLC, a subsidiary of Tribune

Publishing Company, LLC, publishes the Los Angeles Times, the state’s largest

newspaper, and a number of smaller community papers. Tribune Publishing

Company, LLC also publishes the San Diego Union-Tribune. Several recent Los

Angeles Times articles depended on using the California Public Records Act to

obtain fee invoices from public agencies to reveal government spending on legal

fees. These included UCLA’s spending $4.5 million in legal fees to defend a

chemistry professor in a fatal lab fire (http://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-

me-ucla-legal-20141016-story.html) and a water district spending $5 million in

legal fees in 10 months defending a lawsuit brought by local cities over the

district’s pumping rates, which was about $1 million more than what attorneys for

the plaintiff cities charged over five years

(http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-huge-legal-fees-20150513-

story.html).

McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. publishes The Sacramento Bee, The Fresno

Bee, The Modesto Bee, and the Merced Sun-Star.

The First Amendment Coalition (“FAC”) is a non-profit organization

whose members include citizens and media organizations. FAC’s core mission is

to promote the public’s right to know what its government is doing. It has

participated as an amicus in all of this Court’s recent Public Records Act cases.

3

Gannett Co., Inc. is an international news and information company that

publishes 93 daily newspapers in the United States and Guam, including The

Desert Sun in Palm Springs, The Salinas Californian, Visalia Times-Delta/Tulare

Advance-Register and USA TODAY. Each weekday, Gannett’s newspapers are

distributed to an audience of 9 million readers and the websites associated with

the company’s publications serve online content to 95 million unique visitors each

month.

California Broadcasters Association (“CBA”) is the trade

organization representing more than 1,000 radio and television broadcast

stations in the state. Founded in 1947, the CBA promotes the customs and

practices that allow licensed broadcasters to effectively serve the best

interests of their communities.

California Newspaper Publishers Association (“CNPA”) is a non-profit

organization with 907 member newspapers. CNPA has been a friend of this Court

in all of its recent cases involving the California Public Records Act.

The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press is a voluntary,

unincorporated association of reporters and editors that works to defend the First

Amendment rights and freedom of information interests of the news media. The

Reporters Committee has provided guidance and research in First Amendment

and Freedom of Information Act litigation since 1970.

Californians Aware, the Center for Public Forum Rights, is a non-profit

public benefit corporation organized under the laws of California, established in

2004 “to help journalists and others keep Californians aware of what they need to

know to hold government and other powerful institutions accountable for their

actions.” Its mission, rooted in the protections guaranteed by the First

Amendment as well as other state and federal laws, is “to support and defend

open government, an enquiring press and a citizenry free to exchange facts and

opinions on public issues.” Californians Aware has a diverse membership and

4

support base throughout the state, reflected in a board comprising equal numbers

of directors, including lawyers, from the fields of journalism, government service,

and community watchdog advocacy. Further information about its mission and

activities is available at https://www.calaware.org/calaware.

III. THE COURT OF APPEAL’S DECISION DISREGARDS THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION, CONFLICTS WITH EARLIER PRECEDENT, AND WOULD PREVENT THE PUBLIC FROM MONITORING PUBLIC SPENDING.

A. The Court of Appeal Disregarded the Constitutional Mandate to Narrowly Construe Statutes Limiting Access and Broadly Construe Statutes Promoting Access.

Article I, section 3(b)(2) of the California Constitution requires that

statutes limiting the right of access be construed narrowly, and that statutes

furthering the right of access be broadly construed. Given this constitutional

mandate, and the strong public policy favoring access to information set forth in

Government Code section 6250, the preamble to the Public Records Act, “all

public records are subject to disclosure unless the Legislature has expressly

provided to the contrary.” Sierra Club v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal. 4th

157,

166-67.

The corollary of the rule that statutes promoting access must be broadly

construed is that, “The burden is on the agency maintaining the records to

demonstrate that the record in question is exempt.” (IFPTE, supra, 42 Cal. 4th

at

337.)

Similarly, a party claiming the attorney-client privilege has the burden of

showing that the communication sought to be suppressed falls within the

parameters of the privilege. Doe 2 v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th

1504, 1522; Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.

App. 4th

110, 123 [burden of showing preliminary facts necessary to support the

privilege lies with the party claiming it]. Thus, the burden in this case rests upon

5

the County both as the party resisting disclosure of public records and as the party

claiming an attorney-client privilege.

A consistent past practice of disclosure is relevant in determining whether

records should be disclosed. (IFPTE, supra, 42 Cal.4th

at 337 [citing past practice

of disclosing salaries in ruling that named public employees’ salaries must be

disclosed].

There is a long history of disclosure – including in Los Angeles County –

of attorney invoices. Going at least as far back as 1991, Los Angeles County was

producing the costs billed by private firms to the county to defend lawsuits. See

Los Angeles Times’ January 22, 1991 article entitled “$6 Million Spent by County

in Voting Case: Lawsuit: The legal bill in the losing battle will rise because

plaintiffs' costs must be paid. Supervisors defend the expense,”

http://articles.latimes.com/1991-01-22/local/me-627_1_legal-expenses [showing

that Los Angeles County spent $6 million in fighting a voting-rights lawsuit].

The Court of Appeal’s decision thus overturns decades of practice in this state of

turning over redacted invoices, with nary a problem about revealing client

confidences. The Court of Appeal’s decision thus “solves” a problem which

doesn’t exist – revealing client confidences – and endorses keeping secret a

problem that does exist, outside attorneys in some cases spending unusually high

amounts of taxpayer money with little oversight from the bureaucrats who hire

them.

The right of access is most clear, and most essential, when the spending of

public money is at issue. As this Court observed in International Federation of

Professional and Technical Engineers Local 21 v. Superior Court (hereafter

“IFPTE”) (2007) 42 Cal. 4th

319, 334, “‘It is difficult to imagine a more critical

time for public scrutiny of its governmental decision-making process than when

the latter is determining how it shall spend public funds.’”

6

The Court of Appeal here paid lip service to the constitutional mandate of

broad construction of statutes favoring access, but largely ignored it. Instead, it

broadly construed Evidence Code section 952, the attorney-client privilege, in a

way that blocks all access to attorney invoices to public agencies, rather than

simply providing for the ability of public agencies to redact privileged portions of

an invoice such as descriptions of the content of an attorney-client communication

or descriptions of specific topics researched by an attorney.

This Court has rejected such an “all or nothing” – or in this case “nothing”

– approach in Public Records Act cases. In Commission on Peace Officers

Standards and Training v. Superior Court (“CPOST”) (2007) 42 Cal. 4th

278,

291, this Court rejected a broad interpretation of the term “personnel files” which

would shield an entire file from disclosure, observing, “In light of the

Legislature’s policy favoring disclosure of public records, the court [in an earlier

case] concluded it was ‘unlikely that the Legislature intended an all or nothing

approach.’”

Here, the Court of Appeal’s ruling takes an “all or nothing” approach,

leaving the public with nothing in the way of information about how tens of

millions of public dollars are spent. A typical attorney-client invoice contains

virtually nothing in the way of confidential information: it will have pages upon

pages of descriptions of what an attorney did (attended a deposition, made a court

appearance), virtually none of which is confidential. The confidential parts can

easily be redacted, and are redacted in fee motions. For example, if the invoice

says “phone call with client re whether to raise waiver argument,” or “phone call

with client regarding whether x should be part of direct examination,” everything

after the “re” can be redacted but the rest – including obviously how much time

was spent and what the rate is – should be disclosed.

The Court of Appeal’s decision that entire invoices are privileged also

7

disregards the mandate of Government Code section 6253(b) that “[a]ny

reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be available for inspection by any

person requesting the record after deletion of the portions that are exempted by

law.” This – along with this Court’s rejection of an “all or nothing” approach – is

a clear command that redaction, not withholding of an entire record, is the way to

safeguard both any legitimate assertion of an attorney-client privilege and the

public’s ability to see how public money is spent.

The County posits a scenario where an invoice must be 90 percent

redacted because 90 percent contains an attorney’s legal theories and opinions,

and posits another scenario where an opinion letter contains one paragraph of an

opinion and nine paragraphs detailing work performed and demanding payment.

(Answer Brief on the Merits at 26.) With all due respect, the County has dreamed

up hypotheticals divorced from reality. Opinion letters aren’t invoices, and

invoices don’t deliver opinions. A typical invoice describes the work an attorney

has done and tells the client who did the work, on what day the work was done,

how much time it took, and the lawyer’s rate. A typical invoice might have a few

privileged entries describing specific research performed or specific topics

discussed with a client which can easily be redacted, and are redacted in fee

motions. The county’s parade of horribles has only a tenuous grasp on reality.

Both this Court and the Court of Appeal have followed the mandate of

disclosing non-exempt portions of a record while redacting exempt portions in

Public Records Act cases. In CBS, Inc. v. Block (1986) 42 Cal. 3d 646, 653,

involving concealed weapons licenses, this Court explained, “The fact that parts

of a requested document fall within the terms of an exemption does not justify

withholding the entire document.” Thus, the Court held, any information on the

applications and licenses that might indicate when a licensee is vulnerable to

attack could be deleted. (Ibid.) Likewise, in the CPOST case, this Court held,

8

“We consider it unlikely the Legislature intended to render documents

confidential based on their location rather than their content.” (42 Cal. 4th

at 291.)

The Court explained, “[W]e do not believe that the Legislature intended that a

public agency be able to shield information from public disclosure simply by

placing it in a file that contains the type of information specified in [Penal Code]

section 832.8.” (Ibid.)

Likewise, the Court of Appeal in Pasadena Police Officers Association v.

Superior Court (2015) 240 Cal. App. 4th

268, 291, in the context of police

personnel records, held, “Here the trial court properly rejected petitioners’

factually unsupported contention that information regarding the administrative

investigation is inextricably intertwined with the criminal investigation so as to

render the entire report exempt....Where, as here, non-exempt materials are not

inextricably intertwined with exempt materials and are reasonably segregable,

segregation is required.” The limited exempt portions of a typical attorney

invoice are easily segregable from the non-exempt majority of the invoice.

Similarly, the Court of Appeal in State Board of Equalization v. Superior

Court (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th

1177, 1187, remarked, “The Board spills much ink

in defense of the interest of taxpayers in the privacy of information which may

identify them. That is not in issue. Such information may not be disclosed. But

the fact that a public record may contain some confidential information does not

justify withholding the entire document.” (Id. at 1187.) “‘”[W]here nonexempt

materials are not inextricably intertwined with exempt materials and are otherwise

reasonably segregable therefrom, segregation is required to serve the objective of

the [Public Records Act] to make public records available for public inspection

and copying unless a particular statute makes them exempt.”’” (Ibid.) The Court

went on to hold, “Here, the public interest in disclosure is substantial, the manifest

public interest in the avoidance of secret law and a correlative interest in the

9

disclosure of an agency’s working law. On the other side of the equation, the

Board overstates the burden of segregating the exempt from the nonexempt

material. As noted, the record contains exemplars of similar documents the Board

has disclosed in the past with confidential information excised. ... [S]egregation

here would not impose a burden on the Board to inquire from numerous outside

sources whether information contained on the documents is confidential.” (Id. at

1190.)

Many of the rules on segregability derive from Northern California Police

Practices Project v. Craig (1979) 90 Cal. App. 3d 116, 123-124. In that case, the

Court of Appeal held that agencies must endeavor to segregate and disclose

nonsensitive information in records rather than withhold them. Id.

“Undoubtedly, the requirement of segregation casts a tangible burden on

governmental agencies and the judiciary,” the court explained. “Nothing less will

suffice, however, if the underlying legislative policy of the PRA favoring

disclosure is to be implemented faithfully. If the burden becomes too onerous,

relief must be sought from the Legislature.” Id.

Nothing in Evidence Code section 952 or this Court’s attorney-client

privilege jurisprudence mandates or justifies departure from these settled

principles in a Public Records Act case. Evidence Code section 952’s definition

of “confidential communication” states that it includes “a legal opinion formed

and the advice given by the lawyer in the course of that relationship.” The

purpose of the privilege is to “promote full and open discussion of the facts and

tactics surrounding individual legal matters.” Mitchell v. Superior Court (1984)

37 Cal. 3d 591, 599; Solin v. O’Melveny & Myers (2001) 89 Cal.App. 4th

451,

457. The dominant purpose of an attorney’s invoice is to get paid, not to

convey legal advice. (See Montebello Rose Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations

Board (1981) 119 Cal. App. 3d 1, 32 [communications were not privileged unless

10

“the dominant purpose of the particular communication was to secure or render

legal service and advice”; since employer’s labor negotiations could have been

conducted by a non-attorney, communications with attorney relating to the

conduct of the negotiations were not privileged].)

The definition of “confidential communication” in Evidence Code section

952 as “includ[ing] a legal opinion formed and the advice given by the lawyer in

the course of that relationship” is instructive. In the IFPTE case, this Court

considered whether a Penal Code provision exempting “personal data” from

disclosure required that the salaries of peace officers be exempt from disclosure

under the Public Records Act. This Court followed the principle of ejusdem

generis, which restricts a general term to things that are similar to those

enumerated specifically, and which “‘presumes that if the Legislature intends a

general word to be used in its unrestricted sense, it does not also offer as examples

peculiar things or classes of things since those descriptions then would be

surplusage.’” (IFPTE, supra, 42 Cal. 4th

at 342.) This Court held, “Had the

Legislature intended the word ‘personal’ to be employed in its broadest sense, the

listing of examples in subdivision (a) would have been unnecessary; indeed, there

would have been no need to include items (b) through (e), each of which relates to

the individual officer.” (Id. at 342-43.)

As this Court explained in People v. Arias (2008) 45 Cal. 4th

169, 180, the

ejusdem generis rule is “‘based on the obvious reason that if the Legislature had

intended the general words to be used in their unrestricted sense, it would not

have mentioned the particular things or classes of things which would in that

event become mere surplusage.’”

Here too, had the Legislature in Evidence Code section 952 intended to

include something as routine as an invoice within the definition of a confidential

communication, or intended to use “confidential communication” in an

11

“unrestricted sense,” it would not have offered as examples “a legal opinion

formed and the advice given by the lawyer in the course of that relationship.”

Had the Legislature intended to include invoices within the privilege, it

could and would have either placed a period after the words “accomplishment of

the purpose for which the lawyer is consulted” and given no examples, or it could

and would have included “invoices” as an example of confidential

communications. It did neither.

Former Chief Justice George cited the ejusdem generis principle in his

concurring opinion in Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.

4th

725, 743, a case which concerned the attorney-client privilege. Chief Justice

George remarked, “in order to be privileged, the information transmitted between

the lawyer and the client must be similar in nature to the enumerated examples –

namely, the lawyer’s legal opinion or advice.” (Id. at 743, George, C. J.

concurring.) This construction of the privilege is eminently sensible in the

context of this case, involving invoices whose self-evident purpose is to facilitate

payment to attorneys and not to render legal advice.

Given the requirement set forth in article I, section 3(b)(2) of the

California Constitution that statutes limiting access be narrowly construed and

those furthering access be broadly construed, as well as the “ejusdem generis”

principle applied by this Court in the IFPTE case, the Court of Appeal’s broad

construction of Evidence Code section 952 to allow attorney invoices to be

entirely withheld cannot be justified.

B. Consistent Precedent Has Held That Invoices Are Not Privileged.

The Court of Appeal’s decision upset what virtually all attorneys have

always taken for granted and conflicted with another Second District decision

only three years old. In County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Anderson-

12

Barker) (2012) 211 Cal. App. 4th

57 (hereafter “Anderson-Barker”), the Court of

Appeal held that a party to a pending lawsuit against a public entity can obtain

documents under the Public Records Act relating to the attorney fees charged by

litigation counsel for the public entity. (Id. at 60.) In that case, as here, a Public

Records Act petition was filed against the County of Los Angeles seeking access

to invoices submitted to the County by law firms defending it. (Id. at 61.) In that

case, as here, the County argued that the invoices were attorney-client

communications. (Ibid.) In that case, as here, the Los Angeles County Superior

Court rejected the argument that the attorney-client privilege shielded entire

invoices, although the Court ruled that portions of the invoices showing attorney

work product could be redacted. (Id. at 61.)

The County thought so little of its attorney-client privilege argument in the

Anderson-Barker case that it did not challenge the trial court’s ruling with respect

to the attorney-client and work product privileges. (Id. at 62.) Rather, it argued

only that the redacted documents it was ordered to disclose were exempt from

disclosure under the CPRA’s pending litigation exemption. (Id. at 62.) The Court

of Appeal rejected that argument: it upheld the trial court’s finding that “the

dominant purpose for preparing the documents was not for use in litigation but as

part of normal record keeping and to facilitate the payment of attorney fees on a

regular basis. That such documents may have an ancillary use in litigation – for

example, in connection with a request for attorney fees – does not undermine the

substantial evidence before the trial court that the dominant purpose of the records

was not for use in litigation.” (Id. at 67.)

Although the Court of Appeal in the Anderson-Barker case did not

explicitly discuss the attorney-client privilege – because the County in that case

did not challenge the trial court’s ruling rejecting the privilege argument on

appeal – both the result in that case and the Court of Appeal’s reasoning are in

13

direct conflict with Division Three’s now-superseded decision in this case.

After all, as this Court explained in Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior

Court (2009) 47 Cal. 4th

725, 740, and as the ACLU points out in its Reply Brief

(at 14-21), the “dominant purpose” of a communication determines whether the

privilege applies. The Second District Court of Appeal, Division Eight correctly

held in the Anderson-Barker case that the “dominant purpose” of an attorney’s

invoice is simply “part of normal record keeping and to facilitate the payment of

attorney fees on a regular basis.” (211 Cal. App. 4th

at 67.) Division Three of the

Second District here disregarded that common-sense conclusion and reached an

unprecedented result that prevents the public from monitoring public spending.

This Court should reverse District Three’s decision.

Courts in other jurisdictions have consistently found that attorney invoices

are not exempt from disclosure. See, e.g., Clarke v. American Commerce Nat’l

Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129-130 (9th Cir. 1992) (fee statements reflecting general

nature of services performed are not covered by attorney-client privilege and may

be released); Cypress Media, Inc. v. City of Overland Park, 997 P.2d 681, 692-93

(Kan. 2000); City of New Haven v. FOIC, 205 Conn. 767, 535 A.2d 1297 (1988);

City Pages v. State of Minnesota, 655 N.W.2d 839, 844-847 (Minn. App. 2003)

(attorney-client privilege does not completely protect billing records). These

decisions further dramatize the error of the Court of Appeal’s decision in this

case.

C. Access to Invoices Allows the Public to Monitor Public Spending

This Court in the IFPTE case, 42 Cal. 4th

at 333, cited “the strong public

interest in knowing how the government spends its money. As we have observed

in the context of the public’s right of access to court proceedings and documents,

public access makes it possible for members of the public ‘”to expose corruption,

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incompetence, inefficiency, prejudice and favoritism.”’”

As noted above, scandals often cause agencies to hire outside counsel to

defend agencies and to dig into what went wrong: after all, it is easier for a public

official who presided over a mess to hire an independent outside law firm to study

the problem than it is to fire the officials complicit in the problem. The added

“virtue” for public officials in hiring outside counsel is that they often take a lot of

time to do their work, so by the time they finish a report many people have

forgotten about the problem or the scandal. While agencies may legitimately

need to hire an outside firm to figure out what went wrong, the public has a strong

interest in knowing what was done with its money by the outside counsel called in

to probe the problem, whether or not their hiring was appropriate.

As the Los Angeles Times reported, “In Bell, legal expenses rose by at

least $1 million – about 6 percent of last year’s general fund budget – in the year

after the former city administrator and other officials were arrested for allegedly

stealing millions of dollars from the city by giving themselves exorbitant salaries

and benefits. The city attorney projected that higher-than-normal legal costs

stemming from the scandal could continue for two to five more years. In San

Diego, outside legal expenses rose from $1.4 million in 2005 to $10.9 million in

2009 after city officials were criminally charged in two scandals, dubbed pension-

gate and stripper-gate.” “Corruption can leave cities with enormous legal bills,”

supra, Los Angeles Times April 18, 2012,

http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/18/local/la-me-city-attorney-spending-

20120418.

There are many other examples of newspapers that used the CPRA to

track spending on attorneys. See, e.g.,

http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/BART-s-price-tag-for-Grant-shooting-6-

million-3254682.php; http://www.times-standard.com/general-

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news/20130509/humcpr-county-reach-100k-settlement-over-transparency-

lawsuit-humboldt-county-acknowledges-california-public-records-act-violation;

http://www.scpr.org/news/2014/02/03/41912/central-basin-water-district-

drowning-in-legal-fee/; http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/State-PUC-faces-5-1-

million-in-legal-fees-6163404.php;

http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2015/mar/26/cpuc-set-to-spend-52m-on-

defense-lawyers/; http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2015/mar/26/cpuc-set-to-

spend-52m-on-defense-lawyers/. Only access to the invoices sent by outside

counsel can reveal whether, and to what extent, the attorneys who were hired to

study a problem ended up magnifying it by spending way too much time studying

and reporting on the obvious, or whether attorneys defending agencies spent far

more than was reasonably necessary. Invoices may show that inefficient or

inexperienced attorneys spent considerable time when it was not warranted, or

they may show that counsel’s time and expenses were reasonable. Either way, the

public should have a right to see them, with privileged material redacted.

Outside law firms have been accused of employing “scorched earth”

litigation tactics in defending excessive force lawsuits. II PE 5:424. The County

paid $20 million in the 2012-13 fiscal year alone just on litigation expenses in

excessive force cases. Access to the invoices at issue here would reveal whether

“inefficiency” was responsible for such a large expense.

Excessive force cases are by no means the only kind of litigation in which

public entities may spend excessive amounts of money on outside counsel. After

all, when outside counsel are defending public entities, neither the attorney nor

the client has any incentive to economize. Public officials who choose to employ

outside counsel – especially in Public Records Act cases – may be motivated by a

desire to make themselves look good and to avoid the disclosure of embarrassing

documents. (See IFPTE, supra, 42 Cal. 4th

at 331 [“public disclosure of an

16

individual’s salary may cause discomfort or embarrassment,” but strong public

policy supporting transparency justifies disclosure]. And public officials who

choose outside counsel aren’t spending their own money, so the incentives which

private parties have to ride herd on outside counsel aren’t present. Likewise,

outside counsel defending public agencies may have ample incentives to stroke

the egos of public officials and to encourage “millions for defense, not a penny

for tribute” attitudes which feed counsel’s bottom line but may not be in the best

interests of the taxpayers who are footing the bill.

This is by no means the only reason why the public should have access to

attorney invoices to public agencies. Lawyers have been known to be significant

contributors to politicians’ campaigns. The public has an overwhelming interest

in knowing whether a lawyer who contributed to a public official’s campaign was

rewarded with a plum piece of business and proceeded to unnecessarily “churn” a

case which could have been settled cheaply. Disclosure of attorney invoices will

thus, as this Court stated with respect to public employee salaries, make it

possible for members of the public to expose “corruption, incompetence,

inefficiency, prejudice and favoritism.” (IFPTE, supra, 42 Cal. 4th

at 333.)

Disclosure may also reveal “favoritism, or financial mismanagement in state and

local government.” (42 Cal. 4th

at 334.) If the County is allowed to do what it did

in this case – provide no descriptions of the work done by attorneys– there will be

no effective way to see whether tens of millions of dollars have been well spent.

IV. IT WOULD NOT BE “ABSURD,” AS THE COUNTY CONTENDS, FOR THIS COURT TO ADHERE TO THE NARROW CONSTRUCTION OF EXEMPTIONS FROM DISCLOSURE SET FORTH IN ARTICLE I, SECTION 3(b)(2) OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION.

The County’s attempt to ignore the narrow construction of exemptions

mandated by article I, section 3(b)(2) of the California Constitution (Answer Brief

on the Merits at 41-47) fails.

17

As the ACLU observes, constitutional provisions prevail over statutes

where the two conflict. Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees v. Davis

(1999) 21 Cal.4th

585, 602. Courts must give significance to every word in

constitutional enactments. Bighorn- Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil (2006)

39 Cal.4th

205, 214.

The County’s principal argument is that Evidence Code section 952 is

completely unambiguous in its exclusion of invoices from disclosure and that

there is accordingly no occasion to narrowly construe the statute.

The ACLU correctly points out that the phrase “in the course of” used in

Evidence Code section 952 is “inherently ambiguous.” (ACLU Reply at 9, citing

People v. Sinohui (2002) 28 Cal. 4th

205, 215-216.) The Court of Appeal, in a

similar context, held that the term “proceeding” was ambiguous, because it had

different possible meanings, and chose the meaning which best effectuated a

constitutional provision favoring openness in the proceedings of the Commission

on Judicial Performance. See Recorder v. Commission on Judicial Performance

(1999) 72 Cal. App.4th

258, 269-274. Here too, section 952 is ambiguous, and that

ambiguity should be resolved in favor of disclosure in accordance with article I,

section 3(b)(2) of the Constitution.

The County ignores the fact that many courts, both in California and

elsewhere, have concluded that invoices are not subject to the attorney-client

privilege. See cases cited in section III B supra including County of Los Angeles

v. Superior Court (Anderson Barker) (2012) 211 Cal. App. 4th

57, 61-62 [trial

court found invoices not entirely subject to attorney-client privilege, though

portions could be redacted; county did not challenge that portion of the ruling on

appeal]; Clarke v. American Commerce National Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 130 [under

federal common law, attorney billing statements were not privileged; the

statements contained information on the identity of the client, the case name for

18

which payment was made, the amount of the fee, and the general nature of the

services performed’ “[o]ur previous decisions have held that this type of

information is not privileged”; court found nothing in the statements “that reveals

specific research or litigation strategy which would be entitled to protection from

disclosure”] and out-of-state cases. If, as the County contends, the privileged

status of invoices is “crystal clear” and completely unambiguous (Answer Brief

on Merits at 44-46), and if acceptance of the ACLU’s narrow-construction

argument and the narrow-construction mandate of article I, section 3(b)(2) of the

Constitution would lead to “absurd results,” as the County heatedly contends, the

crystal clarity of the statute and the “absurdity” of making invoices subject to

disclosure seems to have escaped a number of courts.

Likewise, the County’s argument that it would be “absurd” for this Court

to make invoices subject to disclosure in the Public Records Act context but not in

other contexts assumes too much. The County has failed to establish that invoices

fall within the privilege even outside the Public Records Act context. Adherence

to the narrow construction mandate of article I, section 3(b)(2) to resolve a

question which may have previously escaped clear resolution both under the

Public Records Act and in other California cases would not be “absurd”, it would

be faithful to a constitutional enactment which came into being with an 83

percent vote of the people for Proposition 59 in 2004.

V. THE COUNTY ADVOCATES FOR A LIMITLESS PRIVILEGE.

The County attempts to downplay the sweeping nature of the ruling it

seeks by saying that “no one contends the privilege extends to every word or

writing exchanged between lawyer and client.” (Answer Brief on Merits at 48.)

But it’s far from clear what would not be privileged under the County’s definition.

The County argues that “any transmission of information” between a lawyer and a

19

client falls within the privilege, including but not limited to a legal opinion or

invoice. (Answer Brief at 49.) Under that definition, even giving directions to a

lawyer’s office or communications about the time of a meeting would fall within

the privilege, since such ministerial communications would involve the

“transmission of information” during the course of a lawyer-client relationship.

Such a broad construction of section 952 is neither compelled by that statute nor

consistent with the required narrow construction of exemptions.

VI. INVOICES ARE THE BEST INFORMATION ABOUT SPENDING ON OUTSIDE COUNSEL.

The county argues that even if invoices are deemed privileged, the

same information may be discoverable by other means. (Amicus Brief at

49-50.)

This argument bears some resemblance to an argument made by

public employee unions in the IFPTE case, which was rejected by this

court. There, the public employee unions argued that disclosure of salaries

alone – without names attached – would suffice to educate the public about

the spending of public money. This court rejected that contention, holding

that disclosure of names along with salaries was essential to enable the

public to monitor public spending, because it might reveal “corruption,

incompetence, inefficiency, prejudice and favoritism.” (42 Cal.4th

at 333.)

The court cited several newspaper articles to make that point. (Id. at 334.)

Here too, disclosure of invoices is essential to enable the public to

see whether money paid to outside counsel has been well spent. After all,

the purpose of an invoice is two-fold: to get the attorney paid, and to let the

client know what the attorney did to earn the fee. Gone are the days when

an attorney might send a corporate client an invoice reading simply “for

services rendered, $25,000.” Clients rightfully expect and demand an

20

itemization of who did what when and how many hours it took to do it.

In the context of spending on counsel by public agencies, the real

client is the public, the people whose taxes foot the bill. If the County gets

its way and invoices are shielded, the real client will be deprived of the

ability to see invoices, and will essentially be writing blank checks. That

would no doubt be convenient for the bureaucrats who decide to hire

outside counsel, but that sort of taxation without representation has never

been the norm in this country and should not become the norm now.

VII. THE COUNTY’S POSITION WOULD HAVE UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES IN FEE LITIGATION.

The County brushes aside the ACLU’s concern that recognition of

an absolute privilege would have undesirable consequences in fee litigation.

(Answer Brief at 50-58.)

The ACLU has the better of the argument. The County spends a lot

of time arguing that parties seeking fees won’t try to hide invoices (Answer

Brief at 52) and will suffer the consequences if they do. Maybe so. But the

County ignores the far more common situation where a party seeks fees

against a public agency and the agency contests the claim. If the County

gets its way, an agency would be free to claim that its adversary spent too

much time litigating a case or an issue, or that the rates were too high, and

at the same time, resist disclosure of its own invoices which might reveal

that the agency spent even more time at higher rates. This court should not

countenance such a “heads I win, tails you lose” argument.

CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeal’s decision here narrowly construed and ignored the

Public Records Act, and expanded the attorney client privilege to encompass

invoices whose self-evident purpose is not to communicate legal advice but

21

simply to “facilitate the payment of attorney fees on a regular basis.” (Anderson-

Barker, 211 Cal. App. 4th

at 67.) The Court of Appeal’s decision conflicted with

the result reached by another division of the Second District less than three years

ago. As this Court stated in the IFPTE case, 42 Cal. 4th

at 334, “‘It is difficult to

imagine a more critical time for public scrutiny of its governmental decision-

making process than when the latter is determining how it shall spend public

funds.’” This Court should reverse the Court of Appeal’s decision, to preserve

the efficacy of the Public Records Act.

Dated: February 11.2016 RAM, OLSON, CEREGHINO & KOPCZYNSKI LLP By: /s/ Karl Olson_______________ Karl Olson Attorneys for Amici Curiae N:\Docs\1422-01 County of LA Amicus\Amicus-FINAL County of LA Board of Supervisors.doc

22

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT

(California Rules of Court, Rule 8.204(c)(1))

Pursuant to Rule 8.204(c)(1), and in reliance upon the word count

feature of the software used, I certify that the foregoing REQUEST FOR

PERMISSION TO FILE TO FILE AMICI CURIAE BRIEF OF LOS

ANGELES TIMES COMMUNICATIONS LLC; MCCLATCHY

NEWSPAPERS, INC.; GANNETT; FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION;

CALIFORNIA BROADCASTERS ASSOCIATION; AND CALIFORNIA

NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION IN SUPPORT OF REAL

PARTIES IN INTEREST ACLU OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA AND

ERIC PREVEN; BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE contains 6,801 words,

exclusive of those materials not required to be counted under Rule

8.204(c)(3).

Dated: February 11, 2016 RAM, OLSON, CEREGHINO & KOPCZYNSKI LLP By: /s/ Karl Olson_______________ Karl Olson Attorneys for Amici Curiae

PROOF OF SERVICE County of Los Angeles Board of Supervisors et aL y. The Superior Court

of Los Angeles County No. 5226645

I, David Blum, state:

I am a citizen of the United States. My business address is 101

Montgomery Street, Suite 1800, San Francisco, CA 94104. I am employed

in the City and County of San Francisco where this mailing occurs. I am

over the age of eighteen years and not a party to this action. On the date set

forth below, I served the foregoing documents described as:

REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO FILE AMICI CURIAE BRIEF OF LOS ANGELES TIMES COMMUNICATIONS LLC; MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, INC.; GANNETT; FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION; CALIFORNIA BROADCASTERS ASSOCIATION; AND CALLFORNL& NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION IN SUPPORT OF REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST ACLU OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA AND ERIC PREVEN;BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND PROPOSED ORDER; DECLARATION OF KARL OLSON IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE OF LOS ANGELES TIMES COMMUNICATIONS LLC; MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, INC.; GANNETT; FIRST AMENDMENT COALITION; CALIFORNIA BROADCASTERS ASSOCIATION; AND CALIFORNIA NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION IN SUPPORT OF REAL PARTIES lIN INTEREST ACLU OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA AND ERIC PRE VEN;

on the following person(s) in this action addressed as follows: SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST

X BY FIRST CLASS MAIL - I am readily familiar with my firm's practices for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service, to-wit, I deposited with the United States Postal Sen'ice this same day in the ordinary course of business the said correspondence in a sealed envelope, postage prepaid.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of

California that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration

was executed on February 11, 2016, at Saikrancisco California.

David Blum

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SERVICE LIST

County of Los Angeles Board of Supervisors et aL y. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County

Office of the Clerk (LASC No. BS145753) Honorable Luis A. Lavin Los Angeles Superior Court Case 111 North Hill Street Los Angeles, CA 90012

Frederick Bennett Los Angeles Superior Court 111 North Hill Street, Room 546 Los Angeles, CA 90012

Peter Eliasberg ACLU Foundation of Southern California 1313 West 8th Street Los Angeles, CA 90017 Attorneys for Real Parties in InterestACLu of Southern Cal jfornia and Eric Preven

Barbara Ravitz GREINES, MARTIN, STEIN & RICHLAND, LLP 5900 Wilshire Blvd., 12th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90036 Attorneys for County of Los Angeles Board of Supervisors and The Office of County Counsel Sally Suchil Los Angeles County Bar Association P.O. Box 55020 Los Angeles, CA Attorneys for Los Angeles County Bar Association: Amicus curiae

Stephen Louis Raucher Reuben Raucher & Blum 10940 Wilshire Boulevard, 18th floor Los Angeles, CA Attorneys for Beverly Hills Bar Association: Amicus curiae

Office of the Clerk California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District, Division Three 300 South Spring Street Second Floor, North Tower Los Angeles. CA 90013

CFAC 2701 Cottage Way#12 Sacramento, CA 95825 Attorneys for Cal jfornians Aware The Center for Publie Forum Rights : Pub/Depublication

Jennifer Brockett Rochelle L. Wilcox Colin Wells Diana Palacios DAVID WRIGHT TERMAINE LLP 865 S. Figueroa, Suite 2400 Los Angeles, CA 90017 Attorneys for Real Parties in InterestACLU of Southern California and Eric Preveis Mary Wickham Roger Granbo Jonathan McCaverty 648 Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street Los Angeles, CA 90012 Attorneys for County of Los Angeles Board of Supervisors and The Office of County Counsel

Steven Samuel Fleischman Lisa Perrochet Horvitz & Levy LLP 15760 Ventura Boulevard, 18th floor Encino, CA 91436 Attorneys for Association of Southern Cal jfornia Defense Counsel : Amicus curiae

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