THE COUNTERTERROR COALITIONS

C. Christine Fair

Prepared for the United States Air ForceApproved for public release, distribution unlimited

Cooperation withPakistan and India

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Fair, C. Christine. The counterterror coalitions : cooperation with Pakistan and India / C. Christine Fair. p. cm. “MG-141.” Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-8330-3559-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. United States—Foreign relations—Pakistan. 2. Pakistan—Foreign relations— United States. 3. United States—Foreign relations—India. 4. India—Foreign relations—United States. 5. Jammu and Kashmir (India)—Politics and government. 6. United States—Foreign relations—2001– 7. War on Terrorism, 2001– I.Title.

E183.8.P18F35 2004 327.73054'09'0511—dc22

2004005187

The research reported here was sponsored by the United States Air Force under Contract F49642-01-C-0003. Further information may be obtained from the Strategic Planning Division, Directorate of Plans, Hq USAF.

iii

Preface

Shortly after the September 11, 2001, attacks, Air Force Chief ofStaff General John Jumper asked RAND Project AIR FORCE toconduct a study entitled “Thinking Strategically About CombatingTerrorism.” This year-long project was divided into four researchtasks, each tackling different but complementary aspects of the coun-terterrorism problem:

• Threat assessment: identifying the character and boundaries ofthe threat

• The international dimension: assessing the impact of coalitionand other international actors on U.S. options

• Strategy: designing an overarching counterterror strategy• Implications for the Air Force: identifying promising applica-

tions of air and space power.

This report is part of a series on international counterterror co-operation, building on the research of the second project task. Otherreports in this series will examine the different functional areas of in-ternational cooperation against terrorism, counterterror cooperationwith Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union, and coun-terterror cooperation with the countries of Europe. Although thesereports address a wide variety of subjects, they build on a commonprinciple: counterterror cooperation occurs across numerous issueareas, including military, financial, law enforcement, and intelligence.An effective counterterror strategy will need to address each of these

iv The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India

dimensions and account for some of the synergies and frictionsamong them.

This report details the findings of building counterterrorismcoalitions with two important states in South Asia: Pakistan and In-dia. The partnerships with both of these states have been critical toU.S. operations in Afghanistan and beyond, albeit for very differentreasons. Specifically, this report examines the following:

• Pakistan’s historic and present cooperation with the UnitedStates

• India’s historic and present cooperation with the United States• The potential of Kashmir to disrupt efforts to engage both India

and Pakistan.

The final chapter of the report discusses the ways in which theU.S. counterterrorism objectives interact and interfere with otherU.S. regional interests. It concludes with five policy options and theadvantages and disadvantages inherent in each.

Publications to date from the project include:

• Nora Bensahel, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation withEurope, NATO, and the European Union, MR-1746-AF

• David Ochmanek, Military Operations Against Terrorist GroupsAbroad: Implications for the United States Air Force, MR-1738-AF.

The research reported here was sponsored by General JohnJumper, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and conducted within theStrategy and Doctrine Program. It was completed in October 2002.Concurrent RAND Project AIR FORCE research is examining themilitary-to-military aspects of U.S. relations with both Pakistan andIndia.

This report should be of interest to the national security com-munity and those members of the general public concerned withSouth, Southwest, and Central Asia. Comments are welcome and

Preface v

should be sent to the author or to the acting program director, AlanVick.

RAND Project AIR FORCE

RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of the RAND Corpo-ration, is the U.S. Air Force’s federally funded research and develop-ment center for studies and analyses. PAF provides the Air Force withindependent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the development,employment, combat readiness, and support of current and futureaerospace forces. Research is performed in four programs: AerospaceForce Development; Manpower, Personnel, and Training; ResourceManagement; and Strategy and Doctrine.

Additional information about PAF is available on our web site athttp://www.rand.org/paf.

vii

Contents

Preface....................................................................... iiiFigures ...................................................................... xiSummary...................................................................xiiiAcknowledgments......................................................... xviiAcronyms .................................................................. xix

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction.................................................................1Narratives of Engagement and Implications for This Report ...............3Preview of the Arguments....................................................4

Pakistan: An Uncertain Partner in the Fight Against Terrorism .........5India: Long-Term Partner in Counterterrorism ..........................6Kashmir: The Impediment to U.S. Bilateral Relations with India and

Pakistan ................................................................6

CHAPTER TWO

Pakistan: An Uncertain Partner in the Fight Against Terrorism ........9Historical Overview of Pakistan-U.S. Relations ........................... 10Pakistan and the United States: Divergent Threat Perceptions and

Objectives ............................................................ 19Pakistan’s Contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom and to the

War on Terrorism.................................................... 27Military and Intelligence Support ...................................... 27Diplomatic Contributions .............................................. 33

viii The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India

Law Enforcement and Internal Security Measures ..................... 33Pakistan’s Strengths, Weaknesses, and Limitations..................... 43

What Does Pakistan Expect from the United States?...................... 54Human Development and Domestic Stability ......................... 56Economic and Financial Rehabilitation ................................ 57Assistance in Fortifying Its Internal Security Arrangements ............ 59Expanded Military-to-Military Ties .................................... 60Pakistan Seeks Recognition of Its Regional Equities ................... 61

Summary................................................................... 63

CHAPTER THREE

India: Long-Term Partner in Counterterrorism ........................ 65Historical Overview of Indo-U.S. Relations............................... 66

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: New Opportunities for theUnited States and India.............................................. 67

India Searches for New Options After the Cold War .................. 69President Clinton Revives Indo-U.S. Relations......................... 74

India’s Contributions to the Global War on Terror....................... 76Indo-U.S. Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement Cooperation ..... 77Diplomatic Contributions .............................................. 79Law Enforcement ....................................................... 81

India and the United States: Convergent Threat Perceptions? ............ 82What Does India Seek from Indo-U.S. Cooperation?..................... 86Summary................................................................... 89

CHAPTER FOUR

Kashmir: The Impediment to U.S. Bilateral Relations with India andPakistan............................................................... 91

Kashmir: A Flashpoint for Conflict........................................ 91Kashmir and Nuclear Weapons............................................ 97

CHAPTER FIVE

Conclusions and U.S. Options..........................................103Policy Options ............................................................105

Option 1: Maintain the Status Quo ...................................106Option 2: Take an Active Role in Resolving the Kashmir Dispute ...107

Contents ix

Option 3: Complete Disengagement from the Indo-PakistaniConflict .............................................................110

Option 4: Side with India .............................................111Option 5: Side with Pakistan ..........................................113

Bibliography .............................................................117

xi

Figures

Map of Area...................................................... Frontispiece1. Pakistan................................................................ 29

xiii

Summary

This report examines U.S. strategic relations with India and Pakistan,both historically and in the current context of the global war on ter-rorism and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The studydocuments the very different motivations for and nature of these twostates’ contributions to the Global War on Terrorism. While Pakistanand India are both important for what they can contribute in a posi-tive sense, each state also has the potential to seriously interfere withU.S. operations in Afghanistan, specifically, and in the war on terror-ism more generally.

Pakistan’s unwillingness to jettison its active role in supporting,training, guiding, and launching militant operations in Indian-heldKashmir and elsewhere (e.g., the Parliament attack in December2001 and the Red Fort attack in December 2000) directly challengesU.S. interests in diminishing the capacity of terrorist organizationsand degrading their force projection capabilities. Moreover, Paki-stan’s prosecution of low-intensity conflict within Indian-held Kash-mir has exacerbated New Delhi’s vexation with Islamabad. This hascompelled India to find new “strategic space” wherein New Delhi canpunish Pakistan for its support of civilian militants and compel it toabandon this policy—while keeping the conflict well below the nu-clear threshold.

India could do more to lessen Pakistan’s threat perceptions, butit apparently does not believe that addressing Pakistan’s equitieswould facilitate a significant degree of normalization of relations.India has much to contribute to the war on terrorism by providing

xiv The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India

intelligence, naval escorts of high-value vessels through the Strait ofMalacca, as well as by providing diplomatic and political support.Equally important, India can contribute to U.S. efforts by notmilitarily challenging Pakistan while Pakistani forces are needed foroperations on the eastern border with Afghanistan.

One of the inescapable conclusions drawn from this work is thatthe intractable dispute over the disposition of Kashmir is and will re-main a critical flashpoint between these two states and poses contin-ual security challenges for the United States and the internationalcommunity. There is little reason to be optimistic that this issue willbe resolved any time soon. In the absence of effective intervention,Kashmir will persist as a recurrent source of intense conflict. Bothstates will consistently depend upon the United States and others toacquire exit strategies from an escalating conflict, to compel the ad-versary to make concessions, and to find support for the political anddiplomatic position of the state in question. The ongoing disputeover Kashmir frustrates and complicates the efforts of the UnitedStates to pursue relations with both states independent of each other.

The December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament stemmedfrom the dispute in Kashmir and precipitated the largest Indian mili-tary mobilization of forces since the 1971 war. The confrontationpersisted on the Indo-Pakistan border for most of 2002 and served asa staunch reminder that the war on terrorism does not mitigate orameliorate other salient U.S. regional interests (e.g., missile and nu-clear nonproliferation, nuclear non-use, and diminishing the prospectof Indo-Pakistan conflict). Rather, the gravity of these ongoing con-cerns became more apparent during this prolonged period of forceaggregation.

The significance of the Kashmir dispute and its consequencesfor regional stability suggests that some sort of intervention may besalubrious for all. To this end, this monograph presents a number ofpolicy options on how the United States can proceed in crafting poli-cies toward India, Pakistan, and the persistent security competitionover Kashmir. Specifically, this report proffers five different options:

Summary xv

• Maintain the status quo of pursuing relations with both coun-tries and playing the role of crisis manager on an as-needed ba-sis.

• Take an active role in resolving the dispute, acknowledging thatin the near term neither state will likely be satisfied with this ap-proach and that the assertion of U.S. and other national equitiesin this dispute may complicate near-term engagement with bothstates.

• Effectively signal that the United States will not intervene in re-solving any dispute that may arise between the two actors. Thiswould essentially deprive the two of a convenient exit strategyand encourage a different path to escalation and de-escalation.

• Explicitly side with India, acknowledging that in the long term,India’s interests and futures are more consonant with those ofthe United States and that Pakistan is likely to continue to festeras a source of internal and regional insecurity. This approachwould seek to “contain” Pakistan while expanding the strategicrelationship that is developing with India.

• Align with Pakistan’s position on the Kashmir issue and othersecurity concerns pertaining to India. This alternative approachassumes that over time India and the United States, as “naturalallies,” would evolve as is inherently in the interest of bothWashington and New Delhi. This option requires dedicated at-tention to rehabilitate Pakistan and to endow it with security re-quired to discourage it from misadventures. It also demands for-tifying Pakistan’s civilian institutions, rehabilitating itsmacroeconomic outlook, and investing in its stock of humancapital. Provision of security guarantees are also likely to beneeded to alleviate Islamabad’s multifaceted threat perceptionvis-à-vis its large neighbor to the east and uncertainty with thepolitical future of its unsettled neighbor to the west.

Each of these five options is discussed in the final chapter alongwith an exposition of the various costs and benefits of each option interms of U.S. pursuit of counterterrorism coalitions as well as theother U.S. regional objectives. We recognize that these are extreme

xvi The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India

options, and that, in reality, the most practical approach will likelydraw elements from several of these varied proposals.

xvii

Acknowledgments

The author is greatly indebted to those officials within U.S., Indian,and Pakistani private and public institutions who shared their insightsand experiences with her during her fieldwork. The research couldnot have been conducted without the help of these individuals, whowere generous with their time and who took great interest in thisproject. The author also gratefully acknowledges her RAND col-leagues, such as Ted Harshberger, David Shlapak, and the projectleader, Nora Bensahel, for their extremely helpful comments on ear-lier drafts of this document. The author also thanks Pete Lavoy of theNaval Postgraduate School for his thorough and thoughtful review.The author alone is responsible for any errors, misjudgments,mischaracterizations, or other inaccuracies that may persist in this re-port despite the best efforts of the above persons.