counter insurgency operations manual

8/8/2019 Counter Insurgency Operations Manual

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INTRODUCTIONO

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( i cnera l S i r F rankK i t son

DRAI. 'T

CHAPTER

COUNTER- INSRGENCY PERA'T IONS

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SECTION I : DI IF INI I . IONS

INSUI I .GI iNCY

l A nu lnber 1 'de f in i t ionsx is t o r hc cr rn nsurgencynda l thoughlanyha l , cbec t r evc lopcdver hcyears ,mos thave onta inedhcsarne eye lements : io lence ,r

a t eas the hrea t f v io lence ; ubvers ion ;ropaganda;nda po l i t i ca l im

L An insurgencyasbeendef ined s ol lows:

Theuctionsof u minoritygroup v,ilhinu s/atev,hct rc intenton./orcilgpolitic,crlc'hange y meun.s .fu ntixlureoJ.subt,er.ston,ropagantlaancJmililurl:p're.r.sura,ui.ming o crsuudeor inlimic/cttehe hroudntct.s.s.f eopla o accep/ rtrc,htL',nu c.

l Recen lrendsn insurgenc iesave ha i lengednte l lcc tua l lyheassLr rnp t ionsr

construcIn thisandotherdef init ions. AI 'o AAp 6 def ines n r.rsurgcnc!S tnrttgtrtti.seclovemenl imecl t theotterthrow / ctcon.\'lit lttedovernment.Most recently.NA'|O andAIICA stud; 'groups aveproposed light ly l i f feient ef ini t ronso r.ecogrr izethe ran-s -na t iona la tu re f insurgenc ies ,nd her o f ten a ry ing nc l imi ted b lec t i i , es .I encc .ns r - r rgencvasbcen ecent ly c i lned s o l lows .

I t t .s ' t r rgencv.s rcct tnpc/ i l ictnnt ,olt , ingt l eu.sl nenon-slulemovcntcnt . \ . i1gnl:un\ thct l nclt tda iolencc tgain.sln e, \ ' tubl i . \ 'hedtuthr; r i l .1, /otchicvt :pl i t igct lcnun,qL'.

I n th isdc f in i t ion ,he b l lowtng anbenotcd :

a lnsurgencvs no ta mover ren t r peop le . t i s a compet i t ion ,t r r , rgg le .rcon l l i c t . t is a rnan i fes ta t ionf war .

b. I t must nclude t least nenolt -state- ]ovemento cl i f fcrentratet f ior lwarsbetween tates.

D c v c l o p e d y h eWa rS t u d i e s e p a r i m e n tf Roya lM i i i t a r yAcaderny , a n d h u r s t ,sc t u o r c dn U KArn ryF i c l dM anua l o l I C o r r r b i n e c ir m so p e r a r n s .Pa r t1 0 ,C o u n t e i - l n s u r g e ; c vp e i - a t i o n s .

l ) c f l n i t i o r rs i e r e l o p e dv a coun t e r - r nsu rgcncvt u d y r o u p u r i n gUSM C J o i n t l r b a nW a i l . i o r 0 ( ) 5

( ' l r a p: L l 5

an?n r?n t r_ { nnnnn t



DRAF'f

I h ec s t a b l i s h e du t h o n t v e ed c tu c c e s s a r i l l ' b eheg o v c r n n r c n ti ' t h cr ra t icn ub. ]ec to an nsurgency .t cou ldbea oca lau thor - i t y ,ren tporarvmi l i t a ry u thor i t y , r a govenuten t 1 'a h r rd a r t y

l n s u r g e n c i e see k o l i t r c a lh a n g c .i kea l l v a r s . r L th ep o l i t i c a l a l u r co f insurgencys so npor ta r r tl shoLrLdeernphas izedn thede l ln j r ion ,' l ' he

change oLrgh toL i ld c govcrnmen lo l lapse ,l , p ica l ly n ob 'Jec t ivel1950 - 60so m m u n i s tn s u r g c n c i e s .r a l esse rb j e c t i v eu c h ss c l l ' -c le te rmina t ionr re lease f po l i t i ca l r i soners .

COT]NT[] ]. NSUI{GENCY

5 Counter- insurscncvs dei lnedas ol lor .vs

' fho.s'ctnil itary, paramilitary, polit ical, cconomic, p.sychologic'al nc l t ' i t ' ic crt,t ion.s

Ittkt tt lo dcft,ttt tn insltrgt'nt '-V.J

6. Cout r te r - insL l rgcncyhus nvo lvesmuchmorc han i rnp lymi i i t a ry c t ion . t rsamul t i -agencypproachhatscekso no ton lyde fea the nsurgentshemsc lvcs .u t herootcauses f-, ndsupport or . he nsurgcncy.

SECI . ION 2:. I I {E

CONTINUUM OF OPEI IATIONS AND OPERATIONAL( ' A ] \ I P A I C NT H E M E S {

CENEI I .AT,

1 Campargnsndsubord ina tepera t ionsf ien equ i remi l r ta ry brceso opera tee ' l ' ec t ive lyc rosshespcc t rum 1 'con f l i c t .onduc t w idc ange Imi l i t a ryac t iv i t iess i tnu l taneor , r s ly .nd rans i t ion u ick ly ro rnonc ypeo i 'opera t iono anothert i rap i t l l yc l tang i i t g pera t iona lnv i ronments . onrmandersnus t eab le o v isua l ize ou,acampa ign r opera t ion i l l l i ke lycvo lveover i rnc n l igh to f chang ing i r curns tances .

. fHI I CONTINUT- jMOF OPEITATIONSFI I .AMEWORK

t i Theconcept l -a con t inuum f opcra t ionsdent i f iea numbcr f campargni re r lesand provides fral lcwork for

cornmandcrso understandhecomplexity f theopera t iona inv i ronmentnd he ranner n wh ich r iss ions ont r ibu teo a las t i t rg cacc .o r a t leas t o an env i ronn len tn wh ichconf l i c t s d imin ished. hecont inuum l '( )11eat ions t - rns is t sl f ouraspec ts :

\ ,^, I-O Ar\P (r' ' l

h i ss e c t r o nr as e e r r u n r r l a r i s c di o m r v o( o n t i n u u r r f O p e r at i o n s r c . j e c re a n tF i n a ll e l r r c d i o r h eABCA docurnen t .

s o u r c c sN A I 'O AJ ) 2 a r r d 13CA r r n i e s r o s r a r t l l e

R e p o r t 0 L l - 5 .he N r \ - f Odocum cr . t tas c cnd c r i v e d nC

( ' h a p ; f r l 5

A n a n t t n t o n n n n n t



D R A F T

thespe t run t i con f l i c t :

p redomrnantopera t iona iever ) an ipa ignhemes ,̂ c lL rd ingoL in tc r -ins rgency ;

t ypcs f tac r icaLpera t io rso f f 'ens ivc .le f 'ens i 'ends tabr l i t y ) :rd

s : rnu l taneusconduc t f 'd i f f e ren types f tac t ica l Dera t io . s .

COT]NTER- INS RGENCY WITH IN TH E SPECTRUM O . 'CONT' I -C ' f

9- l 'he

spcc t runrf con f l i c t s a backc l ropbr a l l opera t ionspc l esc r ibes5ec l l \ ir on lnen tn wh ich heyoccu t ' . 'hcmaind isc r imina to rs he eve lo f v io lcncc

i r l vo lved .vhrchangesiom peacefu ln te rac t ionmongs tn te rna t iona llayerss ta tes .corp t l ra t ions 'GOs) , h roug i tow- leve i on f l r c t s ,o gcnera l a r see igurc ) . Mi l i t a r l ,I t t r cespcra tehroughouth isspec t rL im.

F igure1 . The Spec t rum f Conf l i c t

l 0 At onccndo1 ' the pec t rumsa conc l i t ionf s rab le eace i th i t t leo r nov ' to le t lcc'he n i l i t a rymigh tbe nvo lvedn peacet iu re i f i t a ry ngagenret (pMI r )dcs ignedo shapeheenv i ronmenthroughra in ing .ss is tancerogranrmes , . jo i r tcxc rc isesndco-ord ina t ion , '1 'hei i i t a rywi l l I i ke lyworkwi tho ther gcnc ies

I l As s tab le eace egenera tes ,io lence .r at eas the hrea t f i t . nc reasess woof Inore ac t ions onte ntoconf l i c t .Mi l i t a ry pera t ionsre lo rn ina tcdy peace L lppor r .a r ld n so lne ases uts ide owers na1,n te r jec tn order o I imi t i re on f l i c i . , eace

'

s t t l lp t l r tpera t io t lsi l l inc lude range f campa igns .ionr ow eve lpeacekecp ipucrnrorc t renuoL lscacc n lb rcemcnts

l l I t 'a s i tL ra t ionorscns ,n nsurgencytayerup t .Th isn ta l , invo lveign t f i can li r t t ra - r in te r -s ta teio ience , utw i l l la i l shor t f la rge-sca le ,onvent rona lpera t io rs .

[ -he r i ] i t a rvo le ,ou ldbccounter - insurgencyco lN) , r v i th hegoa lo f reduc i 'gV io lencei rd rans i t ingo peace uppor t , i t hsuppor t ingo l i t i ca l pdeconorn ici . i t ia l i ves Aga in ,hemi i i t a rywou idbe vork ingn co-opera t ionv i tho ther senc iesaddres ing l - reron- rn i i r t a ryspec tsf thesccur i t y nv i ronmcnt ,L rchsgovcr .nmcr tr .conn.

c l

b

C .

d

Absolu te eace/peacefu ln terac t ion Ab s o lu e /

g e n e r a t a r

( ' h r p I : - 1 j



i l

DI {AFT

l - l' l ' hc

fa rendo1 ' the pec t run leesn te -s ta te on l l i c t , ] rerehemalormi l r ta r ri l c l l \ ' l t ) ' L So t l l b a t p c r a t i o n s ,f ' conduc t cdu c c e s s f u l l r , .a j o r o m b a tv i l lbea b l c or cducehe cve i t ' r ' i o l e n c cn d h em i l r t a r y ' so l e a n h en r a n s j t i o no l e s sn t enscopcru t io r r s .

dea l ly ,h is , v i l l ven tua i lyvo lve o peace iu ln te rac t jon ,

1 -+ Mi l i t a ryopera t ionso no tnecessar i l yo hrough progress ionlong hes l lecLr l l l r lne i t i r e r i rec t ion .Opera t ionsyp ica l ly tar t ome\ \ ,hercn the r ic jd lc f ' t hcspcclr t lm.totat eitherend. There naybe dif ferent er. ,elsf conf l ict n di1'1-erentar lso1'a s i r lq lcheat rc f opera t ions ,r evenwi th ina . jo in t pera t ionsrca . ndced,eve ls fcor l l ' lc t l laY aryover i rncwi th ina s rng ie rea , n genera l ,- ropcc i f i c per .a t ionx is t sat . j r s t nepo in to1 ' th is pec t rum. ea l i t ys more omplex :a l anyone ime hcrc -na1,bca i luman i ta r ianr is is n one ocat ion . n nsurgencyn another . nd n tenseigh t ingbc t rvecnbrces earby , l l r v i t h in hesame rea f opcra t ions . imi la r ly , t a i r l , oneI t l ca t ionheremay be housc- to -houscigh t ing neday . o l lec t ion f lb rcns ic v idenccLirc tcxtdav.and estorat ion f electr ic i ty ndwatersr-rppl ieshc day aftcr . In other

u ords . u l l spec t rL r rnpe a t ions i l i bc conduc tedin ru i taneous lyndsequent ia l l y .

P R E D O M I N A N T C A M P A I G N T H E M E S

l- - \ As a c t tn f l i c t a r ies r changesver imc hecharac tc rf a campa ignar r ed i f f l cL r l to de f ine rec ise ly , nd t i s ike ly o evo lve , t w i l l cons is t f a w idevar ie ty ftac t ica l c t iv i t iesha tw i l l a lsovarywi th i rne . t i s poss ib le eve f the iesso iden t i l y ,anddcscr ibc r cdorn inan themes t hecampa ig r r /opera t iona leve l .

l -hecharac te rf thc

carnpaign nd he cmphasis n dif ferent act ical ct iv i t ics ary accorci ingo the herreMajorcombat s dcn t i f iab ly i f f e rcn than ounte r - insLr lgcncy ,ndbothd i f fe r tonrpcace uppor t .D i f le rcn t z impe ignhernesemand i f e ren t pproachcs .i l le ep t o rccpackagcs .ndd i f f -e ren tmphas is n var iousac t ica lasks .For example , a jo r ombat

u i l l invo l r , cnore l tens ive pera l ionssuch sat tacks ) , h i lecounter - insurgenc i ,r l lco t ls is t l ' Lnore e fe s ivcand n fo rmat ion pcra t ions .nc lud ing rv i l - rn i i i t a ryo-opcra t ionasks onduc ted t the ac t ica lcve l . - lovn ,cver ,omeac t iv i t ieseg fb rcep r o t cc t r on )r e o m m o n o a i l .

i 6 T h e c a n t p a i g nh e t c i s a L r s c l u ll i u s t l a l : r , eo o l 1 b r o m m a n d e r s . n dc j i c t a t c sh ep t ' cdo r t t i l i a l t i) ' peo f ope t . a t i on c i ng conduc t cd t anv one r i rncw i t h i n a o i r t rc t ' r t t l t na i l dc r ' sreac f ' ope t ' a t i ons I t w i i l gu i desL rch e i a i l sas f b rce packapes . ne ra t i ona l

"I n onemomenl n time, our servicememberswill be eeding and clothingdisplaceclrefugees providing humanitarian assistance. n the next moment, heywilt ie holcjinghvo warring tribes apart conductingpeacekeeping perations. Finatty, theywill befighting a highly lethal mid-intensitybattle. Al t on the sameclay,allwithin three cityblocl<s. t will be what we call the threeblockwar."

General harles . Kruiak,USMC

( h a p l . : 1 r 1 5

A0202305-4-000005



DIlAFT

appr t )achesr ld ac t ica lasks . ' f hear ioLrsl iemes anbep lo t ted long hcspec t r l i i ,- r jcon l l r c to r c f lcc t hcgenera levc lo l . r , io lencei - the antpa ignsec - . tgurc) .

l l

- fhc

carnpa ignhen le lso rov ideshepr inc rp leshatgoyernheconduc t f 'opera t tonst shoL l ldnd ica tchccommandcr 'sn ten t v i th e ipec io theusco f fo rcc rc lgencra l u idc l inesorassess ingheprogrcssf thecampa ign .t has rnp l r ca t io rsi r rlb rce t ruc t r r res .l loca t tonf resour . . r , b r . . p ro lec t io r i ,nd ac t rca lasks ss igncc iosubord i t la te. Each as i f f e r ing r inc ip lesf fb rce pp l rca t ionndde i red nds ta tei

he burnra. jorhcmes re:

ci

peacet imc i I i t a ry ngagement ;

peace uppon;

cour r te r - insurgency ;nd

major ornbat pc ra t ions .

F ' igure . PredominantCampa ignThemcs,

I u Peacc t i l l l c i l i t a ry ngagcment ,eace uppor t ,oun te r - insurgency ,r r c lna j rcombat road ly or respondo inc rcas ingcveLs f v io icnce long he lpec t rum f

'

' A i r ' i t e d l i J i t a r ; ' i n t c r v e n r i o nsuch sa n o n - c o m b a t a n tv a c u a t i o nu r d c r t a k i n q ,u t s no tc o n s i d e r e dc a r . n p a i g nh e r n es ee Jp 2 ) I ls p c c t r u i r lf c o n l i c t .

0 p c r a t l 0 n )sa no p e r a t i o n a lcve lI n a ) / ccu r tan vp o i n to n h c

C' i rap 5 / l . i

A0202305-5-00000



I ' r , r i i

I ) I {AF'f

ton l l i c t I ' he rc s a rey 'ad is t inc t leakbet r i . ' eene\ /es and hemes. l t hor , rghhere raybc , \dc i i t iona l l ) ' .he fema) / ed i f f ' e ren teve ls f con f l r c t ndd i f fe rcn t ampargnhcnrcsr lc r .osseograph icreas , nd n sonre ases .ve u , i t i r jn . ;o in t pc ra t tousrea .

19. Prcdorn inan tan ipa tgnhemes ave nany ver lapp ingharac te r is t i cs .o rveverlr sposs ib )eo d isc r r rn ina temong heur y charac tc r iz inghe evc lo f po l i t i ca l i sk .lesor t r ccomrn i tment .f f ec t ought , harac tc rf ' combat , nd y ,pe f enemy acec l

20 Carnpa ignhemes hou id. rot econfusedv i th ac t ica l pera t ions ,asks rac t iv r t ies

fac t ica ltasks rc hespec i { ic pp l r ca t ionf c loc t r ineo so lve pec i f i cac t ica l

proLr lerns,tnd reoftcnuse to assign nissior-rso subordtnates. ampaignhemes, sar l t l c , re oo genera lo L lsen ass ign ing iss ions .Rat l ie r ,heyc lesc r ibehebroad enera lcond i t ionshatex is t n an a rea 1 'opera t ions ,o t hedeta i ls f execu t ionor subord ina tcs

I l . Wh i lcd i l ' f e ren tampa ignhcmes equ i re ign i f can t ly i f -e ren tcnera lapproacheso a g iven onf l i c t ,t is s t i l iposs ib leha tac tua l ond i t ionsaced t any i r r c

or p iace ur inga campa ign ayvarya long l iespec t ru rnf con l l i c t .Forexample ,hurnan i ta r i : inid nay s t i l lbe a f ca tu re f ma jo rcombat , nc l na t tack ga insLbc l l ige ren ts ay benecessaryur ing cace uppor t .A l though ubord ina teiss ions rayrcqu i re pp ly ing ther ac t ica l - leve lr inc ip les ,a re nus t c aken ot o con t rad ic thelog ico f theovera l i ampa ign . o rcxample , n a t tack onduc tedur ing counter -rnsL l rgencYampa ign ay L rseac t ica l r inc ip les f theo f fens ivc , ut hedcc is ionoconduct he attackand he manner n whioh t is done,shor-r ldot contradicthe broaderpr inc ip les f counter - insurgency .

l 'ac t ica lac t ions hou ld lways e ocLrsed .o fac i l i t a te

tnov i t t go a lower eve lo f con f l i c t . t i s rnpor ran to rea l izeha tus ing o rce anpoten t ia l l y 'L rnderminerea t ion f thecond i t ions ecessaryo Iower he eve o1 'con f l i c t .

. fY I ' I IS OF OPERATIONS

2) .' l ' he

broad ange f tac t ica leve lopera t ions ,asks ndac t iv i t ieshata re. und t r c t cd, r c a l i s e u c c c s sn c a r r t p a i g nr ed i v i J c r ln t o h r e e r o r r p i n g sr c a t e g u r i c . ,i i s b l lows :

b

of fens ivc pera t ions ;

c ie fens ivepera t ions ;nd

s tab i l i t y pera l ions .

l l . These ypcso f tac t ica leve lopcra t ions ,oge ther i th ac t ica lasks , esc r ibehcto ta l ac t ica l c t iv i t y nde f iakeny a rn i l i t a ry o rcewi th ina campa ign . ach ype sgu ided y 'a se to f 'p r inc ip les .

fhesetypes f opera t ionsre ur rher roken or .vpn to

subord ina te-vpes f tac t ica i pera t ionssec i igLr re) .

l -+ . Notc tha teac i r ubord ina teypccons t i t u t csnd iv idua lac t ica lasks A1 ar tackt l t av : t l t - t s is1f a suppor t \ ' f i r e askandc lear ingask . i ' l t i l c u r lan i ta r ia i tss is tancc

( ' h a p : ( r i 5

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I )RAFT

r a ] ' seeon e L i b - u n i tr s t r iu t r n g o o dan dano t hc rn e o n d u c t i r gi n r e d r c a rr i n i c' \ ga in .i t i s rnpor tan to no te hat n any -vpef campa ignherne .heseac t jca lasks rarbcconduc tedimu l taneous ly .o rexample ,ne ub-un i t aybeconduc t ingn

at tack .ano ther aybeconduc t ingccur i t l , f anarca hrough eh ic je hcck o in ts , nc j no lhc rn ray ed is t r ibu t ingmergency a te r nd at ionso e fugees

t;ou-r o*,;o";-=1Cont ro l ndSecur i t yl )

Exp lo i ta t ion

Pursr- i i t Feint

D e l a y Suppor to Demob i l i sa t ion ,

Demons t ra t ion

Disarmamcnt ndRe in tegra t ionDDR)

Suppor to Sccur i t , vec to rRe lb rm SSn)

Of fens ive pera t ions

Ar rack Ra id

Rcconnaissance Link-up

Secur i t y Re l ie fo f

Mcc t ing ngagement

Dc fens ive pera t ions

Dc1'encc

Enab l ingAc t iv i t ies

Ret i rement

[rncirc led orce

Withdrawal

Advance o Contact

Re l ie f f T roops n Cornbat

Obstacle reaching/Crossir

Notes :

l . controlandsccur ity efers o theestabl ishmentf a safeandin whichot l ternon-mil i tary gencies ayoperate ndassiststrategic bject ives.

secure nv i ronnrc l t t ,in theoperat ionalncl

...--_-''..__--_-J

Suppor to in f ias t ruc tu rendGovcrnancci l l inc ludemi l i t a ry esour .ccse inguscd o suppof l iv i l inf rastr lrctLrrend heapplicat ion f mil i iary esour.cea.dpcrsonnc lo es tab l ishnd/o r onc lL rc tn tc r im r n i t ia lgovenranceasks .I l xa rnp lesf govemanceasks nay nc ludeunn ing choo ls .s tab i is5 ingarkc tplacesincl ct ingasmayors ndpubiicof f ic ials

Ass is tanceo other genc iese fe rso ' i l i t u ry ass is ta 'ceo spcc i f i c genc ies .hclping hem o reach perat ional bject ives.orexample, - , i l i to.yor. . , maybcal locatedo assist lect ion rganisers ith secur ity nd ogist ical upport

F igure '' I ' ypcs

o f 'Tac t ica l pera t ions nd subord ina tc l r . res

Break-ou1

C J r a p 7 i : 5

A n . ) n o a n E t n n n n 6



DRAI'"f

] -HF-CONTINTJU} , I F OPERATIONS 1\ , IODEL

l - i' l - hc

th ree on tponeiso1 ' themode l o r hccor r t inuun f opcra t ionshat a r , ,e

bcen e l lned thespec t run f con f l i c t , rec lominantampa ignhemes, nd ypes f( ) l l c ra t lonsu t r - t s torvbecombinec iv i th he our - th en ten t ,imr - r l t ane i t y ,n o therrvords , r - r r ingcar lpa ign i th rn hc spec t ru rnf con f l j c t . ven ts i l l r nc ludc leuren tslthe hre t1 'pcs f tac t ica l pera t ionsccr . r r ingimr - r i t aneous ly

fheab i l i t y o v isua l iz ,e

th is v i l la . ss is tomtnauderso th o ba ianceesoL l rcesnd o unders tandorvopera t ionsrvi l l i rnpact lpolt rne not l ier nd he uturc,

16 . z \ campa igns a ser ies f 'opc ra t ionsead ingo a des i red nds ta te , ncchar : t c t c r is t i cf l vh ich s usua l ly i ' r e rea t ion f a s ta tb lecace . n ordcr o p rogresstowardsheends ta te , ommanders ustcon t inua) lyssesshccharac tens t icsf thecampa ign nd,assuccessr fa i lu re f a g ivenphase l the campa ign nfo lds . d jus the

l l red t r tn inan tampr rgnherne Ad jus t ing hccampr ignhcme n turnad jus tsbcus .reso t l r ces .i rec tedasks , ndsoon. A campa ignl ra t cg ins sma" jo rcombathou lc leven tua i l ) ' l cado pcace L lppor tnd ina l ly o peace t i r len i l i t a ry ngagemcnt .

fhe

campa lgn ay no t nc lude ounter - insurgency .u tcommandersustno tover lookhatposs ib i l i t y ndmustp lanaccord ing ly .t i spar t icL r la r lyrnpor tan tha topera t ion .scondt t c tednder g iven ampa ignheme hou ld ons iderhose spec tsl ia t v i l l1 'ac i l i t a teI r lovere l l t o a lower eve lo f con f l i c t nd t seqLr iva len tampa ignheme. ' f hc rcv i l lbel l lstances hcn shof i erm act ical uccess i i l have o besacr i f iccdn ordcr o suDDorlthe onger enn goa ls f s tab le cace nd hcwe l l -be ing f thepopu)ace .

?7 . Wi th ina campa ignhenre , L i h rce ypcs i 'opc ra t ionsreconduc teds t t t - t u l taneous lysee igure ) . A l though omemaybc sequent ia l ,uch san a t tack

lb l lowed y defence , anyoccur oncur ren t ly .ro rexample :

a w i th ina majorcombat ampa ignheme. fb rcemaybeat tack ingn orrearea , e f ' cnd ingn another ,nd condr . r c t inguman i ta r ianss ls ta l r ccp ath i rdarca :

b of f -ensiveperat ionsn partof theareawith stabi l i tyoperat ions onducted ylbl low-on orces, nd

o l opera t ions aybe re in fo rcedthe eadcombat orccs r by

d u r i n g p c a c e u p p o : 1a n i p a i g n .c - , r n p r i s i n gn a i n l v r a b i l i t yc r j rt i c s .thc re naybea rcqu i remento suard i ta lpo in ts dc fens ivepera t ion) .

at tack rccalcit rant lernentanol ' fcnsivc perat ion) r secure blockolbu i ld i r rgscordon ndsearch s tab i l i t y pera t ion)ur ing hear res t 1 'aua r c r i n r i n a la s t a b i ) i t ype r a t i t - ' n . ) .

l8 I i t shor l . . , r ' i t l t ini r t ua l ly nvcampa ienherxe , omrnanCcrsus lbeor .eoared3cot td r t c tL r i l pcc t rum pera t ions, i t ha v ic l l , t omov ing o i . r ,a rc lshemorep .u . . fu l endo lthc spcc t r r -u r - r1 'con f l i c t . heba lancc mong ypcso f tac i i ca l pera t ionsivesca t t rpa igntspredorn inan tharac te r : ma j r combat arnpa ignhentc nay ons isL

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opea t i ons ." i

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Figurc4 , The cont inuum of opera t ionsModer : An I i lus t ra t iveE,xampre

29 '' lhc

rnoc leo f thecont inuum f opera t ionsl lus t ra tesh iscombina t ionfst tnultancousffensive' efensive,ndstabi l i ty perat ions. hecombinat ion r-rdalanceo1 ' thcl i r ce ypes f opera t ionsi l l change

wi th hecampa ignheme.Any opera t io r rs acombinal ion 1-of fecc'defence, ndstabi l i ty asks ondirct lc l imultaneously. 5erc la t ivcve igh t iven o each hroughhea l loca t ionf resourcesnd hc ask rgan iza t ioni sdcpcndcntn hepredominantampa ignhemc.

l0 wh i le d i f f e ren types f opera t ions aybeconc juc tec limu l raneous ly ,hcw,eg6tass ignedo cachw, i l l h i f twr th ime,bo thwi th ina carnpa ignheme nc l e twcencampa ignhemcs . dea l ly , ampa ignhemes i l l sh i f i i or t r ig t - r . ,eve ls { ' con l l r c tolo rvc t ' l cVc ls .u t hc i 'maya lsogo n thcoppos i t c l i r cc t ionf con f l i c tnc reaseslL r r i r rgt l iec i r rnpa ign . gcodcxample f th iswas heesca la t iopf theopera t ic , . ,nSo 'a l iat io tnpe ccsL lppor to counte- insurgenc ,va i thoLrghf 'avery imi ted lu ra t ion) ,

' l when opcra t ing tanvpo in ta long hecon l inuum,ommanc le rsndsra l ' f \ hoLr lc icons ider ow' to reventheesca la t ionf v io lence y theadversary . u r ingpeaccsupp( ) f t .b r cxarnp le ,pc ra t ions us tbeconduc ted i tha v iew o prevent ingsca la t i t - r 'to an nsur_eecvor to major o rnbat .

l l I l ccogn iz inghang ing i r cumstancesr cond i t ions .spec ia ly oncs h l t r cqu i rec l lansco then laJorheme f a campa ign ,s bo than n lc l lec tL ra lswc l l asan nre l l igencccha i lenseTh i . ss par to f thear to1 'war , he n te l l igenceys te ln us tbc a t tunec jo .a rc j

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l ' - r t l k t - r r .nd ica to t : sish i l i s .andccmmandcrsnc l ta l '1s us tbeab lc o n tc r .p re thekert t ld t ca to rsl ta t horv 'a h i f t s ak ing lace . ominandcrsnds ta f f s n i is t henact n achang ing t lv i ronn ten t ,i t hc r o prcvent sca la t tonl ' v io lcnce r fac i l j t a te sh i l t o a

io rver ,evc io f v io lence ,n such wa) / ha t hes i tua t ions nanageab ley the orces tl r a l r d .

S E C T I O N3 : O V E I T V I E WO I . I N S U R G I T N C I E S ND C O U N ' I E R -I N S U I l G E N C I E S

i i . , ' \ t i t s n ros t bas ic ,a t ' i nsurgencys an r - rp r is ingr insur rec t ion ga ins t : r1cs tab l ishcdbr rno f au thor i t y , o r rna l ly go \ / c lnment ,ccupy ing u thor i t y . ro i iu ls t r l l c tu re . a r ious i tua t ions ayg ive ise o an nsurgencynda s ing le nsurgencynayhave evcra loo tandcont r ibu t rngauscs .n gencra l ,heysp l ing rom c l issa t i i lo . t ionu ' i t ha soc ia l t ruc tu rer governrnentr rangement ,nd hebe l ie f

ha ton ly v io lence nc lsubvers io t tanbr ingabout hedes i red nd us t i f ied hanges i th ina reasonab lyr ie i 't r nc i a m .

14. Althoughsome nsurgents aveexploitcd ew opportunit iesncl ained ighpro f i l csn rccent imes , nsurgenc ieshemse lvesrenoth ing ew.

- [ 'heyarea method

used y a d isa f fec tcdndcommi t ted roup hatknows heycannotw in on the le ldo fba t l le ga ins t super io r ,onvent iona l i l i t a ry orce , nd hey here fo reesor toasy t r rne t r icc t ionshata t tackhewi l l andmot iva t ion i the s ta tus uogoventmentndsocety .

Insurgencies re not a new phenomenon.nsurgents ffectivelycaused he withdrawalofRoman roopsover 2000 yearsag o iom what s todayGennanyand Scotland.TheRomanErnpireha d overextendedtself and was seenas acking egitimacywith the ocalpeoples peopleswho were not averse o util izing violence n,altering he politicallandscape.Likewise, the Jew'ishnsurrection hallengedhe rule of Romanauthority nthe Middle East.

l5 I lach nsurgencyvi l l have tsown setof causes nd tsaim or desireclpcJ-srareSontc nsurgenc iesi l l s tenr rorna po l i t i ca l , oc ra l nd /o r e l ig iousdco logy hatc t lv is ions n tnprovedeven top ian) ta te f a f fa i r s ,he ca l iza t ionf wh ic | . ius t i f i cshe

Ltse 1-subvers ionnd orce Other nsurgenc iesi l l s te rn rom ea lo r perce iveds t ' i cvanceshathavcnot been at is f iedy peacefu l eans , h i leo thers , i l lbeconducrcd

l r t l r co t t r p le t ei s c u s s i o nn ho w c o r l n r a n d e r sna y s e h e r n o d e l f t h cc o n t j n u u n r1 ' c p e r a t i o r r sou . r r c l ca n r p a i g n s ,e f ' c ro N A - l - OAJ I , 2 .

I ) c vc loped y t hc Wa r S l L r d i e s e p a r t r n c n tf R o v a lM i i i l a r y , c a d e r l y , a n d h L r r s r .sq u o t e i i rUK\ r : l r r ' r r e l dM a n u a lVo l I C o m b r n c d r m sO p c r a t i o n s ,a r t O ,C o L r n t e r - l n s u r g e n c v)p e. a t i o r r s I ) c i i r r i t i c r tsd e v e l o p c d v a coun t c r - i nsL r r ! en oyt u d v r c L t l t L r r i n g. . lSM Co i r t r j r b a nW a r r i o r 0 U - 5\ , ' \ l -o AAI ) 6

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0\ 'apanrcLr la froL lpha ts r rnDlv. i i shcso ga inpo \ \ , c r -bu tannor o so nroL lghlcq i t r rna tceans r convent iona ise f mr l i t a r , v -o r ' ; c r S t i l lo thers . , r , i l i r i . , n - i - . " ,ndc 's i r cbr ndependencef a d is t i r r c t

a t rona l i t yr cu l tu rcack ingLs r in aLr to r ro rn l , .l t l su rgenc iesren ]o rc1 ike1yo occur n s ta tes 'herc here re nhcren tac ia l . u ] iu ra l .r c i ig rous ,r deo iog ica liv is ionshat ead o a Iack f na t iona lohcs ion ndwcax .i r l c f f i c ie r l t .rns tab le .r unpopu la ro \ /e rnmets Adc i i t iona lac to rs ,uch scor rL ip t ionandex te rna l g r ta t ion ,nay ac i l i t a ten nsurgency .

l6 In o the rvords , any nsurgenc icsi l l c ieve lopLr t f i - a i ledr fa i ) ing ta teshat1) r i lo addrcssr sa t is ly hebas ic eeds f ther popu lace .hcse ccc lsv r l ld i l - 1 'c rdepend ingpon hc eg ion ndcu l tu renvo lved , L r tn gc r re ra l j l l inc ludehebasrce ssen t ia lsf a s tab lei f -e ,espons ib leovernment ,e l ig iousreedom ndccononrcviabi i i ty. I t is f iom sr:ch ert i le nvironmentshar nsuigenciesi l l of tcngrow.

17

' l ' he

a imor des i red nds ta te f the nsurgency ay bcqu i t c x t represLrcSs 6ccrca t ronf a newsta te ndsoc ia l ons t ruc t , thersmay imp ly seek o sc ize owe .cxpeJ lb re ign ower ! r acqu i r c pec i f i c u t imi ted o l i t i ca l , t uon tug . ,r co . t ro l .whatevcrhca in t ' he nsurgcn tshcrnse lves-ee lha t1h . i r . uur . , nc iim jus r i l . yhcusei l f v io lencc ndsubvers ion ,ndeven hcuseof te r ro r is rnga ins thec iv i l ian onu lace'sorne ases .

Th e riseof radicalNativeAmericanorganizations,uchas he Mohawk warriorsociety,canbe viewed as nsurgencle9 lt h specificand imitedaims, Althoughthevo ot eekomprereontr'orr h. #;.:;;#.ffiil?]lili il';.lit"""particular olitical concessionsn their eldtionship

with national overnmentsandcontrol either vertor covert) f pol i t ical f fairs t a local/ reserve. ,FirstNat ion") evel, hrough he hreat l , or useof, v iolence.

38 '- l ' he

tac t ics scd y nsurgentsv i l iva rywi th each ampa ignncl i t ua t ion .l 'hcv

r i ' i i l cc r ta in lyl l c ludc io lence r at hevcry eas the h rea t f v io lencc .SuU, , . r . r ; n , . , , . , napropagandaave rad i t iona l lyeen sed o grea t f f ' cc t .Mos t ecen ly , nsLLreer t sl vecxpJo i tednassned iao convey he i rmcssage,ropaganda,hrea t nc l apab i l i t ieso ala rgc ud icnce .

l -he t ' seeksuppor tn te rna l lyndex te rna l ly ,ndo f ienmask lnanc ia l

ca l l lpa lgnsi th { 'acadesf char i tab ler po l i t i ca l rgan isa t ions .ense rban cr ra in , i , rlbcc . rp lc l i t cdn order o a t tack rgh a lue arge ts ,n f l i c tmass asua l t res ,ndh idc hcr r

o\ \ 'n lresence.Unfortunatcly, any nsr lrgenciescsort o the act ic f terror isnr s il l leanso rca l izehe l ropera t rona inds t ra teg icnd . Insurgentsi l l a lso xp l . i t het t rheren tveakncssesf ' t he oc ie ty nder t tack , a r t i cu la r lyibera l emocrac ies .n orc le r .l ( )sL lppor the l ropera t ions . he i rp ropagandai l l con t inua l lya in t hemse lvess 5cVic t in is f a r lun jus t oc ia l r power t ruc tu re ,nd he i rac t ions i l l o f ten eek o provokear lovcr-react ionror l governn.]entorceshatcanenhanceheir mage s hcyict irn

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l9 I t l su rgenc ieSla l r beconduc tedn ru ra l reas .n L i ibar rr cas , r rnborh .i t t s u r g e n c i e sv i l l a l s o r oss a t i o i - L a lo r d e r s . ; r su r gen t sa ybaseh e m s c l v e sc r o s sni t t le r t ra t iona lo rdern a svmpathe t icount r . ) / ,r t he ! rnay ave an-na t io : ra lin t s nd

therebrcconduc the i ra t tacksn more hanonegeograph icrea .Dur ing hc Co idWarCor r tnun is t xpans iono l lowed h is r rode l .nd e en t ly ad ica l e l ig io r - r s- r love l ren lshave eurons t ra tedhc i rg loba l each ,

-10 Insurgenc iesave ormal ly een bcLrsedn ga in inghcsuppor t f a s ign i f i can tpor t ion l -apopu lace ,dea l ly ma jo r i t y .

fhosewho do no t a l l y o thecause re

sub i 'e r tednd nt imida tedntoa t eas t i len t uppor t . nsurgenc iess r . ra l l ya in hc i rg rea lcs tuccessmongs tha t egrnentf t hepopu la t ionhat s d isa f ' f -ec tedrd isa t lva r t taged,.e. hosc . vho avega inedhe eas t ion thecur ren t oc ia l rgan iza t ion .l : ven f the na jo r i t y f thepopuJat iona i ls o evcn tua l lya l ly o rhes ideo f thct t l su rgents ,hc r rsurgentsin tp ly ave o rnake c fend inghes ta tus uo ooexpens iverd i f f i cu l t i t r hc secur i t yb rces ,hegovenrmentsoucerncd ,nd hegenera l opu lacc .

,An nsurgcncys . there fo re ,f i cna ba t t le 1 'w i l l s .

+ . Opcra t ionsonduc ted i th ina counter - insurgencyampa ign im o dc1 'ea tpinsurgencyhroughmi l i t a ry , a rami l i t a ry ,o l i t i ca l , conomic ,sycho log ica l .ndc iv i lact ions.Act ionsnot only arget he nsurgent, ut more m por lant ly,arget hesupport othe t t surgentnd he oo tcauseshathave ed o co l lec t ive issa t is fac t ionnd us t i f y hct t r surgents 'c t ions . r ro therwords , hemi l i t a ry lays u tonepar t n a counter -i t t su rgencvnd heent i re ampa ign i l l invo lve widevar ic t y f o ther genc ies .

42. Thtrs he mil i tary 's ole, n generalen'r ' rs,v i l l be o provide hc secr-rrcrameworki r rw l r icho theragenc ies aywork o so lve hesoc ia l rob lems t he oo to f theinsurgency . l t i r oughhemi l i t a ry 's o le s imi ted , hemannern wh ich t

conduc tstsrcspons ib i l i t iesi l l in f luenceheovera l l nv i ronmentnd uccessn a l l f ace ts f thccarnpa ign .o r example , heavy-handedesponseo insurgentc t iv i t i cs i l l beexp lo i tedbv thc nsurgents' ropagandandunderrninehc rustof the ocaIpopulacen thesccur i t yb rces .

'r+i. A governme t iacingcan herebre be cxpectedoc , ' e l i t i o r ra r t nc rs s i s t i r r gt .

an nsurgencyn its own terr i tory s underdirect hreat. ndbear h igher iskandaccept igher asua l t ieshana

+4.' l ' hc

overa l l f f ec t oughtn a counter - insurgencys r rot hedca th r cap tu re 1 'i t t su rgents .u1 lo re i rnpor lan t ly .heprov is ion f secur i t yo thepopu la t ion ,hc

reduc t ion 1 'popu la ruppor to r he nsurgencvhroughefbrm. nd hecr - r t t ingf ' t hei t t su rgcn t ' sx te rna links .- l - yp ica l

measures1 'e f fec t ivenessrcnumbcrs f v io lenri r r c iden tsnd he evc lof popu la r l lppor t b r hegovernn tcn t .

4 -5 . A l thoLrgh- rotpe i f - i ca l l yes ignedbr such ourmi t rnen ts ,i l i t a ry or . ccsaveo l ie t rbecnuscd o conduc t ounte r - insurgency 'campa igns .h is s genera l ly ue o thcle r "e l f ' r ' io lence l fu red y thc t r surgent -s ,nd he csu l t ingequ i rcmentor . a r te

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l lun lbersi ' i ve l l -a rmcdtoops o denv i re nsu i 'qen tsighva lue argers .ro tcc t5cpcpL i laccncgovernn- ien t ,ndseek utanc i es t rovhc nsurgents, l ienreccssar \ , .

+6Counter - insurgencys charac teize b t ,a orver reva lencef ' combatha .cxpcc tedn major cmbat ampa igns .h i scombat ccurs r iman ly t hesmal l -un j t

l cvc l ' c sec t ion ' Ja toon .r company , l t hoLLghnrger .rgon iza t ionsray ourc t imcset t l vo lved

lhera te f resourceonsunpt ionsa lso ower han n maj r combat , l t hoLrgh

the ampa ignsa who lc s ike ly o astmuch onger . i th severa lears e ing yp ica lI 'hLrshcoveral l esourceequirements usualiy igher. Certainlyhepoli t ical , . .1. i. , ,nrolco t l t n t tmet o f thenat ion Lrppor l inghe ounte- insurgecyandpr -ov id inghe esoLr rcesnr r - r s teendur ing .

17 An over r id ingu t rdamenta lf counte r - insurgencypera t ionss hatmi i r ta rvl i r r ces laya keybutsuppor t ingo le n thecanrpa ign .i i s un l ike ly , r - ru fi . . onn i . , * i i rbcsucldenlyndedwith a majormil i taryvictoryagainsthe nsr,r rgents,ho arcof te'

1 )ce t ingndsca t t c redn srna l l , landes t inec l ls . l t hough therc reexarnp lesfi r l su rsenc icsndcounter - insurgenc ieshathavc esr - r l t ccJ lnjec is ivcn i l i r a iy uccesseslc g Castro's uban evolut ionn the ormcr ase, nd hedefeat f ' theNort lrWestRebc l l ionn t i re a t te rcasc)he ong crmso lu t ionst i l l equ i rec io l i t i ca l nc l co lo rn icl . I ]casures.

'1 l l ' I I insurgcnc icstem rompo l i t i ca l nd oc ia l i ssa t is fac t rons ,nd deasbr soc ia lchangc,hen heycanonly be ef fect ivelyoughtwith rcfcrenceo cl ivcrse'actorsuchaspo l i t i cs , conomics ,o l i ce apab i l i t y ,oc ia l t ruc tu re ,u l tu re ndpsycho log l , ,longrvit i imi l i tarypower. Flencc, nycounter- insurgencyustcon.sistf a mult i-_; ;nng;,mult i-agencypproach t hc strategic,perat ionalnd act ical cvels.Thc causes"andsYlnptolnst .e. ymptoms uchas he nsurgentshemselvesnd heirpopular

upport)tnustbe addresscdhrougha combinat ion f k inet ic ndnon-kinet ic i fects, lonj' ' ' a r i o u s l i n c s o f ' o p e r a t i o n .F o r e x a m p l e , w h i l cp o l i c e a n d m i l i t a r y ar e c o - o p e r a ti n g i n t h e

scarchor nsurgent ascs.nternat ionalndnon-govemmentalidorganizat ionsi longvvithmil i tarysuppor l)may be dcvelopingmprov-d nfrastructuren Jisadvantagcd,.banareas hi lc he government, i th help iom a suppor l ing estern emocracy, ,, Iyb"rc fb r rn ing ec t ionaws o addressome nder ly ingissa t is lac t ionbr heg.n . rn lPopuiat iotr 'n short ,although if ferentmethoclsndaimsmaybc Lrseclt c l i f l -crentcvelso lau thor i t l . l l r n r - r s tebounc l y a un i t yo f purposc ,ha t s , io c le l ' ca the nsurgencvar ld l scaL lses igure i l lus t ra teshevar iousines 1 'opcra t ion ,n an ntc r lo .L i . , gs - \ ' s tenf 'ac t ion ,bcLrscdn ach icv inghepo l i t i ca l nds ta te .

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I t e ; i : r e l t l c s l l L t L r i t l c n i l i t u l ro l t e r ( i r r r . t sr r r r ll r ei e r r t h i n r e ) u n t ( . 1i r l \ t t l . ! c r t e, t l t t r c t l i t i n c d r t un t i r rd e c r i c i c s .l n t r t r r t i r r i c s . r osc r l i n cr r l e s

t r t l i c t t l l t t el J i r l l , r r rr r s l r c ns r , r r gc r t ec so l ' t h c r i c l c l l cr l ' t l t ci r s l un t r r l rc r n l r i n r l i t l r p t j. ' i ' l c L i i' r r r i l t r ( ' o t t r r t t i r r t t l t lt r . n t i c sl l cn r ) l c ccss i r r i ] r ' sL r uc t r r r u t l9 l l t l r r l ' ! , 111 [ u r . -i r t s t t t ' . - encra t t le .However , uch pera t ionsrenot hepurv iew f spec ia l r e l i t erni l i taryor para-mil i taryorces althoughhey nayhave oles o play aswell) . I { isroryI tas emonstratedhat he mostsuccessfulounter- insurgencyperat ions avcbeenconducted y non-doctr inaire,onvent ionalevenconscr ipt) nnies hathavcdeployeclr . v i t h i rnp l l ' a u id rng c to f p r inc ip les ,cve lop inghe i r ac t ics s hes i tuar iop ecarneitndet 'stood. aramourt to the success f the ni l i taryport ionof thecampaign asbeentheab i l i t yo f o f f i ce rs o exerc isehe i rcommand i th iccdom, )ex ib i l i t y ndco l f i c iencecvcn dow'n o t l te orryestevcls,using ngenuit l l ncl esourccfulnesso take he batt lc othe nsurge t t t sn onehand, l , h i l s t t t e rnp t ingo reso lvehe ootcaL lsesn theother .l r rdeed,hose t t r ibu tesf a reg imcnta l ys tem conf ic lencel fo rdec ihccomnrandernrcn lo lc i t t t a t ic lns ,a rn i l ia r i t y mong ornradesndacrossanks , nc l e i iance 1 sura l lL t t l i tcvc t l e , c l i t t n )c t ions have rovc r r ros Ie f ' f ec t iven counter - rnsurgencyo p c r a t lns .

49 .

' 1tn t ta s n t / , r t ' , t , - l n /e n r r ' t . ) .Co n f l i c tA Co r t tp c t ru ! i t , e n i t l . t ' . s r . : . .d i t e d b y

i i r s * , e l l . 3 r - a s s c ; , ' se i ' e n c e ) u b l i s h e r s . o r o n t o . I 9 8 9 .

D a v i dC l t a r t e r sndN l u u r i c c

( ' l r a p l . + / 1 5

A n a n t t n E 4 i n n n n { t



I )RAF ' I

"successful qrri,rs ar epractical men.'they

rend o usewhat works. Ancjtnsurgency

orks. Insurgents avedefeatedhe us in vietnam.

colonel[R-etd).X.Hammes,SMC, why Study mair ars?,,,nartI larsJournol,Yol (Apri l2005): ,3

50'[ -he

commitment f western lcmocracicsncl i l ianceso thestabi l izat ionf.la i led r fa i i ing ta tes nd hedes i reo l imi t g loba le f fec tsf insurgencresn anerao f\ \ capons

f mass es t ruc t ioneanshatgovernrncn tsi l l c lep loy oth r i l i t a ry orccsandcr iv i l iangenc ies ,ogc ther ,n ordc r o addresshesehrea iso rcgrona l ndg loba ls tab i l i t y Not on lymus tcomtnandersnders tandhemi l i t a ry 'so le n a countc r -Insurge l lcyarnpa ign ,L r theymustbeab le o unc le rs tandl iekey olep layed y other

: : : ' l : i . : : . 1": l f "*al l agencies ,ork ogethern a unrtyol.purposco dcfcar nsurgcncics

l r n o l t e l l ' c a 1 1 s c s .

( ' h a p 1 5 i 5



i . L J

DRAFT

CHAPTER

DESCRIBINGN INSURGENCY

' What he sraeli.soondiscoveredwashatArafathad ransformedloosefederationfarmed roups ntoa campLexconomicrganization.cting ikea legitimatetate, hePLOgeneratednnual evenuen excessfthegrossnational roduit ofa number fArabcountries,ncludingJordan.hankso thiswindfalt t effectivelyanGaza ncl heLlestBank"

LorettaNapoleoni, error ncorporaled; racingNeltyorks.ewYork:Seven tories ress.005:(upr is ing)n December987.

SECTION : GENERAL

theDollars Behind he Terror

65, on the outbreak f the ntifada

I Causes.An insurgency ay spr ing rom manycauses; owever,heclassiclnsurgency suallybeginswith thepercept ion f oppression ue o poli t ical, ocietal ndeconomic r ievances. hen hese ercept ionsecome uff ic ient ly mot ive,eadersmayemergewho areable o organise rotest r resistance,nd nf luence eople o r iskimpr isonment ndevendeath n order o resist heestabl ishedrder.

2. Aim. An insurrect ion i l l a im to gain headvantage f powerwithina givenpoli t icalcontext n order o real ise ocio-economic,ultural, el igious ndgeographicgoalsor somecombinat ion f these,

3 Characteristics. Each nsurgencys uniqueand will therefore ave ts own setofcharacter ist ics.l though nsurgencies ay share imilarcharacter ist ics,achwil l haveexceptional eatures. or this reason,Cold War-styie ntelligence nd planning emplateshave educedutility. In conventionalmanoeuvrewarfare, he known structure f militaryformationsand evidentpatternof troopconcentrationn specific errainoftengavevcrygood ndicat ion f intent .For example,heconcentrat ionf Army levelbr idging ssetsna MechanizedDivis ion'sareaof responsibi l i tyront ingon a r iver,with two ArmouredDivis ionsmoving nto assembly reasn the mmediate epth, revery good ndicat ionsof thepreparatory hases f a del iberate ssaultiver crossing. n insurgent ovcmentwil l probablyusea cel lularstructure i thin which hecel lsdo not conform o a Datrernamongst r within themselves. ot tcthclcss.l t l toush tuch .r-r t l 'cprnit lcx.hc nte t of 'insurgents ascd n struclul 'esanbe r lcternr incd.rttrerarnple, u.stait reclbservat ionmay revealcertain e1lsinkedwith specif ic ct iv i t ies uchas nformat ion perat ions,kidnapping r bank obbery,Nonetheless,sa secur itymeasure,nsurgents ayalterort ransform ells or specif icoperat ionsn a randommanner. heonekey attr ibuie, Sichdist inguishesnsurgencyrom mostother ormsof conf l ict , s the nsurgent 's im o1'fo rc ing o l i t i ca l hange.

4 . Trans i t iona lNatureo f Insurgenc ies .nsurgenc iesremore ike ly o occur nstateswith inherent ocialboundar ies, hose acial, ultural, el igious, r ideologicai

ch 2 ' . t17

A0202306-1.00001



DRAFT

drlferencestsrupt at ional ohesion,nsurgencieshr ive n statesacking f f ic ient ,s tab le . r popu la r o \e nments ,ond i t ionshatareaggrava tedy economic eakness .corrupt ion, r foreign gitat ion. l though ar iousnsurgencytoclcls xist , ervinsurgenc iesi t nea tJyu toany ig idc lass i f i ca t ion .uch s ura lo r u rbau . en in is t rMaoist .Ef fect ivensurgents i i l takeprevious ampaigns' lessonsndadaptthemothe i r u 'npar t icu la reeds . o rexample ,n rhe1990s . amas ro f i t ed 1 , the LO's lossdue o Arafat 'sal ignmentwith Saddam ussein ndhis relat ivelymoderate ol ic iestoward srael. heSaudis utof f money o thepLO, whichcausedhem o loscinf luence.Whilenot esseningts ant i- lsrael[ance, amas voided upport inghe raqidictator . alest inianseganooking o Hamas or leadership y theendof the 1990s,Flamas ascarrying ut mostof the erroract iv i ty n Israel.srael i ources laimed hatin the 6 months eforeMay 2002,Hamas eceived 135MILLION (uS) from SaudiArabia o meetexpcnses,

5 Assessinghe Insurgencl, .Examininghecompleteangeof character ist icsi l lt issist commander ndstaf f n predict inghe nsurgents'ampaign lan.Prcvious

experience ndhistorical esearchmay providevaluable uidance, owever, he key to anapproprtateesponseemains n object ivemil i taryest imate: eeannexA for a l istoffactorshatshould econsidered.rsscnt ial lv.osupport pcrat ional iapninq.hcest imate i i l ident i fy he nsurgency'sauses,heextent f i ts ' internalandexternalsupport,ncluding he basisof the nsurgents' ppealo the argetpopulation,motivationan ddepthof iocal commitment, nd he ikely weapons nd acticsCOIN forcesmavface.

6. Forms of Insurqencv.As establ ishedbove,t i s vital o mil i tarysuccessorcommanders nd staffs o fuily understandhe natureof the nsurgency. o thisend,si x

main forms of insurgency avebeendefined,which ar e isted n the foilowins table.

Anarchist Intent s to destroy he system. herear enormaily no plans o replace nyform of governmentwith anothersystem. he mostpotent ial ly

dangerousorm of insurrections thatof the anarchist roupwhich setsou tto eliminateal l poiiticalstructuresand hesocial abr icassociatedi ththem.

Beingverysecret ive,uchgroups emainsmaliandlackingpublic support.

Given he rising hreatofterrorismbased nWeapons f MassDestruct ionheirpotent ial

des t ruc t ivenesso soc ie tycannot e over looked.2

Thishasbeen een ecent lvln two var iants: ommunist(Malaya,Vietnam), nd

LorettaNapoleoni,Terror ncorporatedTracing he Dollars behind he Terror Netvorks.Ne w york:SevenStor ies ress , 005:72-73 ass im.:

F 'or xample , he US Senate uc learPro l i fe ra t ionurvey ssesses70 percent hance fnuc lear / rad io log ica ler ror is rn i th in hedecade. n l ineht tp : / / lugar .senate ,gov / repor ts ,NpSurvey ,pdf .A c c e s s e d6 J u l y 2 0 0 5 .

c h 2 ' . 2 t 1 1

Comment

Egali tar ian Seeks o impose entral ly ontrol ledstructures nd nstitutions. vmobil iz ing hepeople masses).o

A n ^ n 6 - n



DRAFT

I - radit ional ist

p lov loe quar l t )

al l state esourc

S..ktto *". t1n a f i n r a l / n r i n r n o

n r p r l i n r r c n B e n

n f t h e . e o i ^ .

/ rn he ts t r rbut ronl

,".k t"I vaiuesootedn the- . d ] " ^ l ^ - i - - . 1 l " i . r ^ . . ,. r r J L r l w l w S t z r u , r i t J ! v 1 )

Ba 'a th rs tSyna, raq)

-

l n ls ypeoI rnsurgencvoften ncites imilar

movements isewhere. eenrecent ly s slamic ihad(Egypt)or I lezbol lah(Lebanon)

Separatist Seekso remove hemselves,nd he

area n which they ive, from the

controlof the remainder f the state

T h e l n m n f n n l i t i n a l

systemadopted ysuccessfulnsurgentsar ies

enormously. mongst he

examples re heTamils(LTTE) in Sri Lanka

Reformist This form of insurgen cys similar otheseparatistype but more moderate,

in that nsurgentgroups ight for

political, economicor social eforms

andpossiblysome orm of autonomy,

without dramaticallyaltering he

oolitical statusouo.

Fight ingby MexicanIndians 1994) n thatcountry 's outh s a recent

example.

Preservationist Seeks o maintain hepolitical status

qu o because fthe relative

advantagesvai lable. hese

insurgents ight non-rulinggroups

and he goverrrment, herenecessary,

in order o frustrate nv moves

towardschanse,

Canbe seen n theAfrikaner Resistance

Movement n apartheidSouthAfrica, and Northem

Ireland'sProtestant

paramilitarygroups.

SECTION 2: THE SCOPE, CONTEXT AND LIMITATIONS OF INSURGENCY

7 Strategies. Insurgent eaders regenerallywell informed,astuteand willprobablystudy he essons f previous ampaigns f insurgency. lobal ly,becausepopuiar nsurgent t rategiesont inue o provide nspirat ion ndassistanceor diversegroups, heprofessional evelopment f intei l igence ndoperat ions taf fshould ncludestudy n this area.Analysisof an nsurgent 'st rategic pproach aspract icalappl icat ion,

including he product ion f doctr inalCOIN guidance. ourbroadstrategic pproachesaresLrggestedelow, he elements f whichmay be combined y the nsurgents:

a. Conspirator ialStratesy. The oldest nd east omplicated f thestrategieseatures mallcel lsat tempt ingo releaseheenergy f adisalfected ociety. enerat ing "spontaneous"pr is ing y means f boldarmed c t ion . h iswas hes t ra tegy sed y theBo lshev iksn 1917,wherein e1' ointsarese zedanda decapitat ingtr ikemadeagainsthe

C h 2 : 3 1 1 7

A n 2 n ? ? n A _ ? n n n n , r o



c .

DRAFT

govemlngeg lmc,n r tsmodern ar ian t .he nsurgentslace rea t i lb r ti n t oe x p l o i t j n g e d i a o v c r a g e

ProfractedPopular War ThisMaoiststrategy eeshree ,phases,, :

st rategic efenceorganizat ion),t rategic qui l ibr iumlguenii lawarfare)andstrategic f fensiveopen att le) , ulminat ingn theleizureof pol i t icalpower.Thisstrategy ssumeshat hecausewil l at t ract ver- increasingnumbers f supporters.ts act icsnvolvea mix of pol i t ical ct iv i t l , ,tenorismandguenillawarfare,with the formeralwayspredominating.Thestrategy asbeenmostappl icablen rural, easant_ius. , tenvironmentsn situat ions heregovemment ontrol s weakor non_existent . i t iesandurbanrzat ion ayprovidea similarspace cededofoster hegroMh of this ypeof insurrcct ion,

Urban Insurgencv. n itspure orm hisstrategynvolves heapplicat ionof organized r imeand enor ism n a systemat icnd uthless anner. hisstrategy, ore han heothers, ims o provoke repressive i l i taryresponsehatwil l a l ienate volat i lemass f theurbanpoorandmovethem o revolt . t rel ies r imar i lyupon uthlesserror act ics ugmentectymediamanipulation o generate n ai r of panic,erode hemoraleof thepol i t ic ians,headministratorsnd he udiciary, hepoliceand hearmy,with theaimof inducing cl imate f col lapse. he nsurgencynt ic ipatesthat he governmentwill thencapitulate r be provoked -nto ctoptingrepressive easuresnd,above l l , causing loodshed. gainst uchrepression,he nsurgent ppears s he peoples, rotectoi

Mil i tarv Focus. In contradict ion i th almost l l insurgent trategres,hison eplaces riority on military, rather hanpolitical,suc-cess.t hasbeenascr ibedo thecuban eadershipFidelandRaulcastro,and ,che',

Guevara). ssuming hat he populationwill flock to thewinningside, tworks only when the governments weak,hasbeendiscredited, nd acksreliable,effective,armed orces,Be aware ha tother ypesof insurgentgroups ppear y seeking well-publ ic ized i l i ta$ui. . r , ear lyon,soasto gainpopularsupport;an d

Liberat ion Strategy. Whilstmany nsurgencies aybe ocused nnat ional imsand hecreat ion f a new state, ome nsurgencies

aysimplyaim at heexpulsion f what s viewedu, un o.. . ipyingauthor i tyor nat ion(s) .n manypeace upport r stabi l is ing perat ions-. ingconducted y a coal i t ionwith an rnternat ional lyanct ionedmandateadisaffected lement oftenone ha thas os tpower)ma y resort o aninsurgency trategyn order o disrupt heeffor ts o stabi l ise r cementhenewpoli t icalorder.

d .

e .

C h2 :4 / 1 7



DRAFT

causedhea l te ra t ionf Span ishovernmento l icy . 1 ,con t ras t ,heLondon ombincsrvere robably ounterproduct ivencl nl1, ervedo st i f ienBr it ishnat ionaj esolve.

13 ' Contex to f the nsurgencv .Beyondheseourbas icenets , success lu io lNprogrammustalso onsiderhe nsurgency'sontext , ircumstancei l l o{ tendictatewhatan nsurgent an,andcanrot ,do.Forexalnple, everal pr is ingshatslavishly

::fl: lr"r]:r:r,-t:lussia or cuba weredism.alaiiules The Spartacistevolts n Germany

\ tY v) ,andLhe uuevar ra 's t temptsnBo l iv ia 1961) a i led iven hat deo log ica) lybascd ampaign lansdid not i t thesocio-pol i t icalontext f"G.rrnuny ndBoliv iare pect iveiy.Nonetheless,populat ion,hat s dissat isf iedith itscondit ionsn generalandholds hepercept ion f a weakgovernment,anprovide ert i le oi l or a ski l lcdinsurrect ionaryeaderwith a popular ause ndcomietent rganizat ionalupport . wel lled andorganizednsurrectionmay, f the government ommands wide measure fsupport nd ca n ely on its security orces, evolve nt o a protracted, ttritionalwar. Suchanattr i t ion ampaign ay st i l l

succeedf the nsurg.n.y.ungradually rode hewil l ofthegovernment 'supporterst andpersuadeublicopinionairongst ts foreign l l ies hatthegovemment 's auses hopeless.

14 . FactorsAffectins. The factorstenets f the nsurgencytselfandwil lcarefullyapplied.

l'hefactorsare:

affectingan nsurgency an be as mportantas hecontribute ignificantiy o theend results f

Protracted ar ' Although a weakgovemmentmay falr quitequickry o awell organized ebellion,or evenovernight o a coupd'dtat,u ,trunggovernmentma y only be defeated y a war of attrition.Time is on the side

of the nsurgent. ural territorysupports gradual ccupation f acountry,as demonstrated y Mao Tse-tung n china. arihough an urbanguerrilla's nability o occupy erritoryca nbe partiallyoverJore byestablishingno-go" areaswith in cities, hestrategyl, -o." one of'war-weariness, conomicprivation,an d he nabilityoith. gou"-ment tosuppresserrorism, ha non winningan overallmilitaryiictory to achievevictory.

choiceof Terrain.Given he eiat ivewcakness,n rerat iono thegovernment 'standing rmy,an nsurgentorce s compelledo makebestuseof terrain. s recent ly otecin oneacademicu*.y, , . . . .without theabi l i ty o seize ndhold rerr i tory r to win quickvictory, pu. . and imebecame eaponsather hangoals."3 hen canadian roopshrstarr ivedin cyprus,bel l igerentorces n bothsides nade est ossible seof theTroodosmountains nd urbanNicosia n order o coniinueoperution..

b .

' John hyandThomasW Col l ier ,,Revoiut ionaryWar, , , akers

Ox f o rd , l a rendonress ,986 : 39 .

c h 2 . . 6 ^ 7

2

of Modern Strategt, peter paret, ed



" . thcguer r i l la ' s rea tes tdvantagesrehi sper [ec t nowledge f an

area wh ichheh imse l f as hosen) nd tspo ten t ia l .nd hesuppor tg ivenh im by the nhab i tan ts . "o tu rn h isde fea tntoa v ic to ry , he

counter insurgentus t ccogn isehat th is o ta l ependencepon er ra in

andpopulat ions also heguenil la 'sweakpoint ."

RogerTrinquier,Modern lVarfare;A French Viewof COIll. New York:

Praeger, 964: i ted n RobertR. Tomes, Relearning ON Warfare,"

Parameters ,p r ing 004. 8-19 .

DRAFT

Intelligence. he nsurgencyhreatpicture s vastlymore complicatedha n

most other ormsof conflict n the sense hat hereareno "templated"solut ionso the ntel l igenceroblem.Unlikeconvent ional arfare,where

mass ires andmanoeuvremay potentiallysubstituteor comprehensive

intelligenccandplanning,neither nsurgency or COIN can afford hat

luxury.For he nsurgent,hebestsource f intel l igences a sympathiser

working for the government, referably n security-relatedmployment.'fhe

mediamay alsocontribute o the nsurgent's nformationgathering

process, i ther nadvertent lyr intent ional ly.

Establishment f an AlternativeSociety.The nsurgents im to impose

their altemative iew of society,motivatedby natio nalist, eligious,or

politicai beliefs.Nationalismpresents n emotivecall to patriotism o

replacea government ot portrayedas ruiing n thecountry'sbest

interests. n insurgents' esire o restructure ociefyalongmore

fundamentai istel igious ines s increasinglyommon.Poli t ical

mot ivat ions, panning oth eft - and ight-wing deologies,ompetewith

the simpledesire or power,asa cause f insurgencies.epending pon

the political factionan d he current nternational i tuation, nsurgentsmay

therefore eceivesupport rom sympathetic ations n termsof diplomatic

support ,he supplyof weapons, nd rainingassistance.onverseiy,

internalsupportmay alsocome n the form of wide spread riminal

act iv i ty,which wi l l I ikelyhave o be addressedn any COIN plan.

In a recentbook,LorettaNapoleoniputs orward he conceptof a"state hel l" o establ ish nalternat ive ociety s ol lows: The result

o f a processhroughwhich armedorganizat ionsssemblehe socio-

economic nfrastructuretaxat ion, mployment, ervices, tc.)of a statew i t h n r r r l ^ en o l i t i c a l n n o / n n t p r r f ^ r v n n s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i n n ) I n t h eY r ( l r v u L L l r L P v r r r r ! s r

course f thebook heauthor onsiders umerous xamplesncluding

th e ChristianMiiit ia in Lebanon, he FuerzasArmadasRevelucionarias

de Colombia FARC),Hamas, he slamicMovement f Uzbekistan,

thcNor thern I I iancen Afghan is tan .hePLO andSamedhroughout

theMiddlc Eastandelsewhere.nd astbut not east heTaliban n

Afghanistan.

LorettaNapoleoni,Terror IncorporatedTracing heDollars Behind

c h 2 . 1 i l 7

1 heTer ro rNe l . , vo rks .ew York : SevcnSior ies ress ,2005:5-R0 - ' r l l- - - Ar r . r r l t?nA_7 nnnnt?



DRAFT

External upport As ment ioned reviousry.nsurgenciesi l lat lemptouse hevar ious weapons" t ts disposal. he eadership r l l a im ro wage

insurgency n poir t ical, conomic, ropaganda,ndmil l tary rontssimultaneously,oreign upports enl istedor the nsurg.n.y,whileeveryef for t s made o discredithegovemment t homeandabroud. mrl i tarystruggle f "hit & run" tactrcs i l l be conducted,otent ial ly ugmentedvtenoristattackswhere he nsurgent eterminesheirutility. ,{ i activity sdesignedo overturn nd embarrasshe state o thepoint where hecol lapse fauthor i ty ndcontrol ccurs.

concurrentAct iv i ty As for anyeffect ive rganizat ion,iv i l or mil i tary,theability to conduct ts rangeof activities imultaneously nhancesheeffectiveness

f its overalloperations ith thecoroliaryeffectofheighteninghepublic 'spercept ion f i ts cohesion ni"upubir i ty. n otherwords, he nsurrect ionhat ooksandacts ike a competent aral lel tate,idcologies side, ouldbecomchestate.

I5. weak Points.Thereareusuallymanypotent ial eakpointswithin aninsurgency, articr-rlarlypparentn theearlydaysof a.urnpuign, hatar evulnerableosome or m of attackanddisruptionby COIN forces:

Secrecv' Any groupplanning o use orceandviolence o prosecutetsaimsmust adopta secretive, onspiratoriarpproacho theirpranning ndactions.This ma y a'ida degree f glamourandattractiv.n.r,

to potentiairecruits. stal inandLeninarest i l l bet ter nown o historyby their , ,nomsde guerre," ha n heir realnames.) hi s secrecy, owever, un ,oonbecome ounterproductivey affecting he necessaryreedomof'action,lower ing onf idencen othersimilar nsurgent roups, ndcourcieadi lylead o seriousmisunderstanding ithin the organisation. here sabalance o be struckbetween too secretiu.on dclandestine pproachoinsurgency ctions, nd he need o avoidundueattention y tireauthorities r rival groups Some nsurgenciesav eattemptedo minimizethedif f icult ies y creat ing morepubr ic, oi i t icalarm. .orexanrprerhcrei s he I IA 's assoc ia tedinnFe in :

Q4iningsunport.

Gainingpopularsupport or th ecause an be adifficult an dsensitive eriod n theearly ife of an nsurgency.f thepubiicly acceptedeason or risingagainst he governmJnil-,u, ppeal hernsurgency hould hrive.Variousgroupings nd actionsmay holddif fer ingopinions, equir ing if ferentechniques,ncluding ossiblecompromises nd/or ntimidation, o gain heir support. nd-iiference,ant ipathy, nd ikely fearof governmentepr isal i l l urrohave o beovercome. ubl ic i ty ramat ical lymprovesheprospect f gaining

C h2 : S l I l



d .

C ,

f

DRAFT

popu la r uppor l , ven adpub l ic i t y anspread ord hat here s 3 grou ; ). ^ " i " r i - ^

" . 1 ^ i ^ h^ o r c v n 2 n d r p c n r i t m e n l '

1 g ) l J L t l l B l w . l l l L i l t d l l e A P s l I u - ! ! / u . L r r r ! . r . .

SecureOperat ingBase. nsurgentsequire secure ase rom which oopera te . e lec t ing oca t ion is tan tromact iv i t y en t res avhc

potent iai lymoresecure or he insurgett ts,ut nral 'alsoput l tentoutof

touchwith thepeople ndvulnerableo isolat ion. loseproximity ikel; ,

easeshe secur ity orce asks f survei l lance.nf i l t rat ion, nddestruct ion.

Establ ishing n operat ing ase n a border egioncanof lenprovidea

temporary, r perhaps ermanenl eadquarterseyond heauthor i ty f the

state;

Funding. Al l insurgenciesequire omedegree f funding n order o

acquire he staples f conf l ict :weapons, mmunit ion,oodandmedicines.

Lack of sufficient unds could imit the scopeof an nsurgency nd nhibit

it s prospects f success. his is a weaknesshat he stateauthorities ouldutil ise o their advantagef it is recognised. nlessa friendly nationor

individualsback he nsurgency,undingcanbe found n criminal

activitiessuchas narcotic rafficking, obberies, nd extortion.While

drugs n particularhaveproven o be a more enduringsourceof income

thanbankrobber ies,t br ings hemovementntocontactwith unrel iable,

vulnerablegroupswho could attractundueattention rom the authorities.

On the otherhand,externalsupportmay alsohavea poiitical price hat

couldaf fect he overal laim ofan insurgency,

The Problem of ChaneineAims. Clianging ims s not somuchof a

problem at the startof an nsurgency ut hasa potentiallydamagingeffect

once an insurg ency asbeen n operation or some ime. Changingaims s

a common occurrencewhen an nsurgencys still coalescing.nitial

operat ions ay change he out lookof some nsurgents i th somequest ion

as o the pr iceof the overal la im part icrr lar lyf secur ity orcesuccesses

spread oubt about he cause r the nsurgency'seadership. seemingly

generous ompromiseofferedby the state o the nsurgents ouldprove

divisive; nsurgent eadersma y have o apply ruthlessmeasureso ensure

that unity and secrecyar epreserved. hangingaimscan be further

problemat ic iven he aforement ionedecrecy, hich may spark

misunderstandingndsuspicionhroughouthe nsurgency;

Sett ing he Pace.Control i ing hepaceand iming of operatronss vital othe success f any campaign,Given that nsurgents an control he startof

operat ions, ndhavesomemeasure f controlover subsequentct iv i ty, t

is surprising o note hat many nsurgencies ave ailed o capitalize nopportunit ies, r haveal lowed hepaceof events ndscope f act iv i t iesobe dictated y the state uthor i t ies. ncemomentum s lost , hestrategicinit iat ive eturns o the stateLeavinghe nsurgency xposed; nd

C h2 :9 1 1 1

A0202306-9-00002



0

SECTION :

DRAFT

Informers.whi le informers avesomet imeseen nf i l t ratednrornsurgente l ls ,t is fa rmorecommono ach ievc uccessy persuad ingI l re nsLr rgen lo become n nformerTh is s someonel readyn the

organizat ion,r s a l ink between iandest ineel lsand heirpubl icaccomplices,uchas hecour iers, ut-outs, r suppi iers.here s nothrngmoredemoral iz ingo the nsurgentshan o fear hatof oneof therr rustecipeoples giv ing nformat iono thegovernment.nsurgenteaders i l l tryto st i f le nformers y ruthless xemplary unishmcnts.

INSURGENT WAYS AND MEANS

INSURGENT TACTICS

16. General.Thedeliberateromot ion f adverse ublic i tyagainst overnmentagencies nd security orces s essential nd complementary. hi s aspect asproven noreeffectivewith the growing rcnd owardspolitical groupsusingcivil libertiesandhumanrights o lower the olerance f the public fo r harsherCOINrn.urur.r.

'fheinsurgents'

claim to legitimacy s based n their declared bility to improve he positionof tileoppressed. he essentially iolentnatureof insurgencies oves n two concurrentcomplementary aths,one destructive nd he otherconstructive, s ollows:

a. destructive ctions reclearlyaimedat overthrowing he cstablished rderandcreat ing cl imate f col lapsen thestates. uthor i ty. estruct ivcact iv i t iesncludc;

( l) subversion,

(2 ) sabotage f the economic ramework,

(3 ) terrorismand guerrillaactivity,an d

(4 ) largescale ombatoperations;

b. the constructive ffort,meanwhile, imsat creating norganizationosubsequentlyeplace he established rderat a suitablemoment.

17. Subversion.Subversivect iv i tyat temptso underminehepoli t ical, conomicandmil i tarystrength f a state, .v i thoutesort ingo theuseof forcebythe nsurgent.Thesemay provokeviolent countermeasures

o be denounced s an over-reaction v theauthorities, iscrediting he government. ubversionakesmany forms.suchaspenetrat ingxist ing ol i t icalpart ies ndorganizar ions,nddevelopingrontorganizationshat canhave he appearancefchallengingandOefying ne authorityofgoverrlment. n insurgencywili seek o win supporters ithin the govemment, speciallythesecur ity lements,n order o discernutureplansandpossibly nyother."onor, .and lnancial nformat ion. hese real l useful or an nsurgencyo exploitasapproprrate.paf i icular lyn theear iydaysof an nsunect ion.

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DRAFT

18. Insursen t n fo rmat ionOpera t ions . ropagandas a ke1, lement f subvers ion .

I t inc ludes ub l ish :ngn fo rmat ione t r imenta lo thegovemmenl r secur i t yo rces .hesn 'ear l jnoFr t r r rnr , -S.he thern leo l " a lsede" ipnedo r rndern incrus t ndconf idencc

1n ne goverrunent,

19. PassiveResistance. epending pon hesociety n which he nsurgencys

operat ing, assive esistance ay be a useful act ic. t is moreeffect iven l iberalsociet ies, ivenan author i tar ianegime's bi l i ty o crush uchopendissent. xamples fpassive esistancenclude vithdrawing abour rom public services, bstructinghe aw,or s i t - ins n publicplaces,

20. Sabotase.Sabotages disrupt ive ct iv i ty hat ur thershe nsurgents' interests.t

may be act iveor passive.

b

Active sabotage ees nsurgents et out to disrupt mportantservices,

functionsor industrialprocesses y violentmeans.Targetsmay be

selected t random or political or economic mpact,or theymay fit into awider tacticaiplan with the aim of increasing eneral onfusionand ying

down troops n the staticdefence f installations. uitable argets nclude

br idges, oads, elephoneines,or dispersed i l i tary ogist ics ites.Targetswhosedestructionmight causemassunemployment nd herebylose he goodwill of thepeopleare n general voided.

Passive abotages generally imedat causing isorderanddisruptionby

deliberate rror,contrivedaccident, bsenteeismr strikes.Th e targetcanbe industry,public services, upplies r troops,whereaction s usuallyplannedon a wide scale hroughpolitical ront organizations. at asabotages facilitatedby the universalityof computersn government,

business, nd ndustrial ontrol systems. hesecanbe carried hroughcyberat tackor by havingan nsurgent r sympathizerhysical ly amagethe system.

21. Terror ism. T'error ism,n i ts standardormulat ion f "ki l l ing one o int imidatethousand"s an ever-presentechnique ithin nsurgencies.lobal ly, error ist t tackssecnr o be ncreasingn f requency, iolence, nd number f fatal i t ies. errorcanbe usedtac t ica l lyo prov idc ub l ic i t y o r the nsurgent ovement ,oercehegovernmentn to

changing ol ic iesor surrendertng,ndmaintaining iscipl ine ithin he nsurgentmovement.Ubiquity of mediaand nternet ras impli f ied he nsurgents' hal lenge l 'communicat ingheirmessage. ontemporaryerror ists implypass ideotapeo asuppor l ive ewsout let ,and here s no doubtabout he nsurgents' laimedmot ivat ions.

"The chief c laim used o ust i fy terror ism s that f oppressedroupswere equiredto abstain,from iolence directedat civiiians;,their,poli ticalausewould becondemned o fail ure.In,th6l'face f oppreSsi bn ndsupeiior orce, errorismrat ional izestselfas he only strategyhat can ead heoppressedo vicrory."

Michael Ignatieff, The LesserEvil Polirical Ethics n an Age of Terror. Toronro;(:F

a4\AltEroup,2004. x.

2



DRAFT

22. Fund Raising.The nsiu'gerts 'costs br weapons, edicines, ol i t icalbr ibes u6thc ikeareoften eryexpensive. n indicator f a developingnsurgency hgLr lc ithereforenclude und-raising fforts. n the earlystages,hi s will p-UuUty be covertan dcriminal,suchasbankrobbery.Subsequently,he politicaiorganization ithin theinsurgency i l l take on the askof extract ing id romwell- inient ioned,hantable nd

philanthropicrganizat ions,nd rom sympathizersbroad. ome riminalorganizatronsblur he ine betweenawbreakingan d nsurgency. or example, he Cali drugcartelfundsan nsurgencyn Colombia hroughnarco errorism hi t hasspin-offeconomicbenef i tso the ocalgrowers f thecocaplants.o oreviolentmethodsmay lcludc, heextortingof ransom ro m individuals kidnapping), r from governmentsLijacking), ndperhapshe enforcedevying of taxeson intimidated ections f the population. ;inall1,,ashasbeendemonstratedy thePLO and heFARC,a mature nsurgencyandevelopparal lel ocio-economicrder,whichmayattain levelof pol i t ical egit imacyn theeyesof the ocalpopulace reaterhan hatenjoyed y the egalgovernment.

23. weaponsand Equinment. nsurgentsend o usebasicweapons hoseessentials avenot changed er y muchsince he i 940s.Beyondsimpleavailability,select ion r i ter ia rebased poncompactness,ethal i ty ndsimpleoperat ing ro. .du. . r .The followins shouldbe noted:

b .

Personalweaponsar eprincipallypistols, arbines, if lesand weaponswitha high rate of fire. In recent imesweapons nd bombshavebeenminiatur ized, xplosives ardero detect ndmore ethal, ccompaniedya dramat icncreascn improvised xplosive evices.

Insurgentseneral ly aveaccesso a completeange f combat upponweapons. niper i f lesut i l is ing rrnour-piercingmmunit ion rebeingsecnmore rcquent ly.mprovised orrars reeasy o makealth, . ,uglrreusual ly naccurate ndunrel iable, ost require

ome orm of

, , f lat

bed,,for t ransportat ion.cquisit ion f mii i tarymortars ndammunitronsignif icant lyncreasehe ange nd ethal i ty f suchweapons. pG-typeant i-armour eapons rol i ferate. ortable ir defencemissi les oseasignif icanthreat. he merepossessionf ai r defen. . * .uoonr.

2

'Lore f taNapoleon i , er ror ncorporated;Seeespec ia l ly hapter "The N, lac roeconomicsf Ter ror , , , p

I3 -29 andChapter "The Pr iva t iza t ion f Ter ror " ,Pp 3 l - 48.Napoleon i xamines ndcara logueshemethods ndef fec ts f var ious nsurgentmovements 'inkages ,f notout r ight nvo lvement . i th narcot rcst rade ndother ormsof para l le l oc io-economict ruc turendac t iv iw.

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. : i a J

DRAFl'

par . t i cu la r ivANPAI )S,by an nsurgentroupwi l l d is rup t he

goverr imentseof hel icopters.

c . Exp los ivesn la r ious o rmsare avoured eapons f insurgents . i l i t a ry

mines , o than t i -personne lndant i - tank .re requent ly t i l i sed y

insurgent. hey have hedualpurpose f hampering ounter nsurgency

forces'ef for tsand err i fy ing he ocalpopulat ion.nsurgencyorces re

increasrnglysing mprovised xplosiveDevices lEDs). fhe

effect ivenessf theseweaponss well knownandexper l isen their

manufacture ndhandling s of tenof a highorder.Sophist icatcdnit iat ing

der ces , n r i - l i f t ing rec l i rn isnrs ,nd nnovat iveac t ica l lacement

( i r r c l r rd i r rgec( ) r )dr rvI IDs)arebecomingommon. ur ther , ny nc iden t .

bomb or hoax canbe usedas a bait to kill security orcesand EO D

special ists. ecent)1, .he sLr ic ideomber asemereed sa paft icular l \ ,

ef ' lbct ive veapon.he sLr ic ic ' leornbers n el ' lect plccis ion r,eaponhata soclcmonstratcshc tst t t 'gcnc\"ct tmmtnt t t

d. Sophist icatedhemicai, rological,adiological,r nuclearwcaponswil l

l ikely remainbeyond he capabil i ty f insurgent roups.Since herelease

of Saringas n Tokyo subway n 199 5, hepotential or insurgentso use

crudeCBRN devicesmust be considered. ucha capabilitywould be

expected nly in an nsurgentgroupalready mploying errorist actics.

INSUITGENT TACTICS IN A RURAL ENVIRONMENT

24. Rural insurgency emainswidespread s he allocation f land, water or other

scarcemineral resources ontinues o providea realor perceived rievance, articuiarlyin areaswhere here s a burgeoning opulation. nsurgent aseswill be establishedn

remoteareas f ten n dit f icut l erraiu rnouutains.Lrngles.brest . tc. ) . rom which

attacksmay be aunched veraswide an areaaspossibleo disperse carce ecur i ty

resources. heseact ionsmay be mistaken or bandit ry;underhepretext f protect ion

against uchbandit ry, solated i l lageswil l be preparedor det 'ence,ncluding he

discreet learance f fields of fire, Other ndications hata campaign s developing

includehoarding upplies,rainingandarmingof vi l lage self -defence" roups, nd

increased vidence f local nt imidat ion ndcoercion.

25. In i ts ear lystages, rural nsurgencyel iesuponsmallbands ssemblingor a

l imited at tack, robably gainst remoteand nadequatelyuarded

arget.As themovementgrows to the stagewhere t can commandsignificant upport rom the ocal

populat ion, o ts object ives i l l becomemoreambit ious nd arger orceswil l be

necessary. he relat ive trength f insurgent andswil l always lace hem at a

disadvantageis- ir -v ishesecur ity orcesand hey wil l seek o avoida pitchedbatt le;

thcrr act icsare herefore ased n mobil i ty andsurpr ise, eneralLysingambushes nd

exp los ives .

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DRAFT

?6 Ruralpopulat ionsrevulnerableo terror ism nd nt imrdat ion ndveryquicklyafcc l ing f insecur i t yanspread round who le eg ion , uch nt imrda t ions commonrvithin ural nsurgenciesecausef thepopulat ion'selat ive hysical

solat ionrom hepro tec t iveecur i t yo rces .

27. Ambush s themostwidelyused nsurgentact ic. t is part icular ly f fect iveagainstoadmovement, special ly hen hegroundmakes t dif f icult or thegovernmentforces o move of f the roadand akecover. n addition o snipingandmassecliresambushes,here s a growing rend n ambusheseatur ingEDsandsuicide ombing

INSURGENT TACTICS IN AN URBAN ENVIRONMBNT

28 . With the degree f urbanizationncreasing lobaliy,encountering rbantnsurgenciesi l l l ikely expand. rbancivi l izat ions suf f ic ient ly ulnerableo provide

relatively mall nsurgent orceswith theopportunity o create natmosph.r. oiseriousalarmand nsecurity ufficient o discredit he government.

29 lnsurgents o not normally lan o occupy ndcontrol enitoryalthoughheymayseize mallareasor a l imited ime o establ ish presencerom which heyco-uldsubsequentlyeceivesupport, acking heability to occupy erritoryon a significantscale,nsurgents i l l a im o make he government 'sosit ion ntenabley engender ingstate f war-weariness,rustration nd angeragainst ovemment mergencymeasures.Under uchcondit ions,hepeoplemay ral ly o anyorganizat ionr leaderwho offersstabi l i ty.

30. Citiesand ownsprovidegreatscope or insurgencies.he conccntration f alargenumberof people n a relativelysmallareaprovides over or the nsursents.

Moreover, he needsof a greatcity, related o the complexityof urban ivingiherebyintemrptionof powersupplies, on-coliection f rubbish, uttingof f water,-etc ouldsoonbring a community o its knees.However, he nsurgentmay only find support ncer lain reas f the ownsor cit ies,

31. The urban nsurgent anoperatemoreboldly thanhis ruralcounterpartor thesereasons, nd his tactics eflect his. ntimidating he ocal population, sseen n ruralinsurgencies, lso occurs n urbanenvironments,n this sefting, opulationdensitylaci l i tateshe, insurgents 'udacrty;heyareable o readi lydisappearmongsthepopulace. owever, his oo s another ouble-edgedword, opulat ion ensitymay also

beused o advantage y the counterinsurgentorces n therecruitment nd placemcnt fagents nd n the stealthy nfiltrationof patrols.

32. The readyavai labi l i ty f largenumbers f peoplemeanshata crowdcanbeassemblednddemonstrat ionsngineered, i th comparat ivease;hese an henbernanipulated.he presence f womenandchildrenwil i normallybean embanassmentothesecur ity orces, anicular l f f thedernonstrat ions stagemanagedo cause verreact ion y thesccur ity orces gainst ucha group.

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DRAFT

INST-, .GENT COMMUNICATIONS

33. Given hepo i i t i ca l imsandsecre t ivca lu re f insurgency ,ommunica t ings

cr i t i ca l . on tac t mongs the nswgentss accompl ishedhrough mal isurep t i r iousgroups, r cel ls.Theymakeextensive seof sccuremethods, uchasdead- let terrops rcoded raf f i t i . In addit ion o themethods elow, he nsurgents i l l a lsousepoli t icali i terature uchasmanifestos. agazines,osters ndcircularsn order o communicate.Today,modernmass ommunicat ionsaci l i tatehe askof the nsurrect ionaryeader ndsupport ing adres. hey cangainsecure ommunicat ionsithin heirorganizat ion ndstage roadappeaiso the mass udience rovided y thepublic.Therefore, modernmil i taryseeking o defend ts parent r foster ociety,mustbepreparedo exploitmodernmediaand deny its use o an opponent.Currently, nsurgents reknown to employmodemcommunicat ionss ol lows:

a. Cel lular Telephoneand Hand Held Motorolas. The mobilephone ndthe ICOM havebecomeubiquitous n the developingworld. Insurgents

use hem for comm unication nd deception. eiled speech nd alseinformationareused o compensateor andevenexploit the opennatureof these ypesof systems;

b. Radio. Radio s an ncreasingly sedcomponent f controlaswell asameansof passing nformationor propaganda. nderground adiostationsmay disseminate ropaganda r ordercrowdsout for demonstrati ons.They may alsous e adio frequencieso detonate ombs;

c. Television. Almost every nsurgent rouphasused elevisiondirectly opromote heir cause, r indirectly,ensuring ha t ncidentsarenewsworthyenough o be reportedon television. t i s no coincidenceha t he steep isein terroristand nsurgentactionhas akenplaceat the same ime as hegroMh in television.The distributionof video apesalsoenormouslyenhances n nsurge nt ause, s seenby the inkagebetweenal-Qaeda ndthe al-Jazeera edianetwork:

d. The Press.Codedmessages ay be ncludedn newspaper

advert isements,r t ic iesn magazines,r on posters r circularso conveyinstruct ionso cel ls, erhapsn conjunct ion ith the dead etterboxsystem.Suchmessages ay be used o pass nformat ionwhen ime rsnot

essent ialor the execut ion f an operat ion r to inform an nsurgent f thet ime and datea pre-plannedttack r incidents tn he steoed'end

e. Internet. The World Wide Web s beingused ncreasingly ithininsurgencies.ot only can t be used br propagandaurposes, ut alsoasa tool to pass long error ist nd nsurgentechniques ndprocedures.Insurgents re ncreasingly ubl ishing heirversions f eventsn order oa t t rac t uppor t ndshow he i r t reng th . f ten hrough ideo l ipso f anacks

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DRAFT

on secur ityorces r k i l l ingsof kidnapped overnmenrupporters.uchr.vebsiteshusbecome primarysource f intel l igencesanalysts eekrndicatorsf insurgent orale, oms-de-guerre,ar ious act ions, nd hermotrvators r deologies, hichmay henbeuseful or negot iat ionsrPSYOPS arget ing.

"Therewa sa concerted ffort o takedown he al-Qaida itea few yearsag oand tkeptpopping p.The srael isr ied o do t with theHezbollah ire and l nrnmnrerJwar of escalation. he resultwasa Iive-and-let-live entalifv."

BruceHoffman,RAND, wastrington, ited n Jim Klane, ,Insurgency-friendly

sitesProne o Hoaxes,"online, hftp://cnews.canoe.ca,February 005

SECTION 4: OUTLOOK

34 , A quick review of the nternational cene n any givendaywill confirminsurgencys on the ncrease. hostof groups ndstatesaresing t to alter hepoli t icallandscape. ve r the asttwo decades,he numberof intemationalerrorist ncidents asrisen rom 200 per year o over800.This increasen the ncidence f insurgency emainstrueeven f the ight ing n Iraq s discounted.nsurgencyeemsikely o.emain hemostprevalent orm of conflict andsource f humansuffering or the oreseeabieuture.

35 . Insurgency asbeena potent orce hroughout he Cold War, a period ha t sawbothSuperpowers

efeated y insurgents,not decisivemilitarydefeaton the battlefield,but becausehc political andeconomic ostswere oo high o sustain urtherinvolvement.The endof the Cold War created n unstable ecurity nvironment ha tsupportedhe growthof insurgent onflict. n paraliel, echnological dvances nd heloweringof nationalbaniershavecreatedmany morevulnerabiiit ies, hich the nsurgentcanexp. loit . eveloping ommunicat ions ean hat hemedia even hose lements f i twhicharepotent ial ly ' f r iendly ' tohestate uthor i t ies)anbr ing he mpactof nsurgencyinto homesworldwide an d ive. Thusproviding he nsurgentwith a free ntematioialpublic platfonn,with insurgents riven o seekevergreater pectacular ttacks o makenews,September 1thbeinga casen point ,As a result , iv i l andmil i tary eadershinanbe subjectedo enormous ressureso act,based n thedubiouswhimsof media-informed ubl c opinion.

36. The r ise n ruralandurban nsurgencieslready oted s being ncreasinglyinf luenced y the release f longsuppressedthnicand eiigiousensions. alkannat ional ism ruptedntocivi lwar, hebrutal i ty f whichshockediberaldemocracies.oth esouth, hespread f radical undamentalismnt o Algeria,

furkeyand Egypt

contr ibuteso regionalnstabi l i ty.

Web

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DRAFT

37, The con f l i c t sn Afghan is tannd raqare i t ed sgr ievances1, 'a rowing ideo f

Is lamicextrcmists. dded o this hreat s growingevidence f shadowy inksbetweenr ^ * ^ - i ^ t r - r : c a t i n o s cm e k : n d o f ' n t e r n a t i o n a l

f o r m g f i n c r r - o n . r - vn " o h t h v! r r v l t ) l

S l U u P ) ) l l l u l - * , . ^ . D - - , l l L g l l l 4 L l U l l d L l U l l l l U l l L l ) u . 5 U l r L ) : . L , e B i l L U )

t hose vhodo no t necessar i l yhare imi la r a lues r nsurgentims .

38. The recent xplosion f rel igious xtremism asbecome real hreal o Canada.tthreatens tability n severalNofihAfrican states, round he rim of the former SovietUnion,partsof SouthEastAsia,andsomeof our NATO All ies. t is mostobviousthroughout he Middle East.Fearsof violence n many of these egionshasaddedapotent ial ide of exi lesand efugeeso theconcems f regionalnstabi l i ty.

39. To theextent hata radical ized ovement onst i tutes danger o Canada relsewhere,he bestway to counter t is to understandhe ntel lectual ndorganizat ionalmechanismsn which he adherentsperate.While hemii i tarymustbe preparedoexecutehe "Defence"port ionof thegovernment 's3D" pol icy,ef fect ive ounter-measuresnustbeginwith comprehendinghe hreat, ecausedeas, ven hose hatdistor l eal i ty, anonly be foughtby other deas.

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tlLl.

Annex D R A F T

CL'LTURAL ACTOR.SI

GENER-AL

I . CulturalFactorsar edynamicaspects f society ha t have hecapacity o affectmil i taryoperat ions. hey nclude eligion, thnicity,anguage,ustoms,alues,pract lces,ercept ionsndassumpt ions,nddr iv ingcausesike economy ndsecur ityAll these actorsaffect he hinkingandmotivationof the ndividualor groupandmakeup thecultural enain2of the battlespace. ot all factorsar eapplicable*to il operations,andaddit ionalactorsmay be consideredsnecessary.his is irng s not exhaust ive.

CulturalFactors.

General.

a. Socio-culturalsystem

b. Culturalhistory

c. Shameandhonourconceptsd. Tribal/Clan/Group ynamicse. Urban/rural ivideI Soc ia lden t i t yg Ro leo f re l ig ionh. Geopoli t ical oundar iesi. Formalpol i t icalsystemj Poli t ical arr ies

k. Nat ional

i . Representat ives

ii. Ministries/Deptsl . Regional

i. Representatives

i i . Municipal i t ies/Deptsm. Loca l

i . Representat iven, For eachgroupconsider:

i . Wheredo theyget heirsecur ity?i i . Wheredo theygetgoods, ervices ndwages?

ii i . What deologiesesonate i th them?iv. who are he radit ional uthor i ty igures hey ook o for direct ion?v. Who ar c hey all ied vith?

v i , What s mpor tan to rhcm?vii . Culturalnarrat ives

o. For each eader:

'Exce rp tromABCAcu l t u ra l wa reness ro j ec tream F ina lRepo r t ,M arch 005 . Cu l t u ra le r ra i n .Cu l t u res s im p l y no t he r lement f e r ra i n .Cu l t u ra ie r ra i n a ra l l e l s

geog raph l ce r ra i no r m i l i t a r y ons i de ra t i ons both n f l uenceec i s i ons . u l t u ra le r ra i n resen t sba t t l espacebs t ac l es ndoppo r t un r t i es .

1 t 6

an,)nt ' tn7_{ nnnnz,



Annex DRAFT

r . Wheredoes is authort ty ome rom?

ii . Coercive orce?

1 i i . Economicncent ive ndd is incen t ive?

iv . Ideo logy?

v. Char isma?

v i . Trad i t iona i u thor i t y?

vi i . Who is he al l iedwith?

vi i i . What are he easonsor thatal l iance?

p. Outside nf luences

a. Foreigngovemments

b. Relat ionship ith border ountr ies oreignNGOs

c. Internal lyDisplaced ersons

d. Foreign roups non-cr iminal)

e Misc

i. GenderRoiesi i . V is i t ing

i i i . Greet ings

iv. Interact ions

v. ShowingRespect

v i . Work

vi i . Gif ts

vi i i . Taboos

ix. Weddingsand Funcrals

x. Blood money or related oncept)

3. Ethno-Religious roups.

a. Primarygroupsb. Religiousstructure

i. Patronage etworks

i i . Char it ies

c. External inks

d. Tribes/Clans/Groups

i. Sub-Tr ibes

i i . Sub-c lans

e . Fami l ies

f . Non-tradit ional roupings

g. I roreachgroupconsider:

i . Wheredo theyget heirsecur ity?

i i . Wheredo theygetgoods, ervices ndwages?ii i . What deologiesesonate ith them?

iv. Who are he traditionalauthority igures hey look to for direction?

v. Who are hey al l iedvvith?

vi. What is important o them?

vii . Cuituralnarrat ives

h . Foreach eader :

i . Wheredoeshis author i ty ome rom?

2t6

ao2f i)?o7 2.000n35



A n n e x DRAFT

i i . Coerciveorce?

i i i . Economicncent ivendd is incen t ive?i v . Ideo logy?

v. Char isma?

vr. Tradit ional uthor i ty?v i i . Who s hea l l iedwi th?

vi i i . Whatare he easonsor thatal l iance?i. Patronagectworks

4 . Secur i t v .

a. Pol ic ing

b. Judicial ystem

c. Penal ystem

d. Cr iminalact iv i t ies

i. Narco-traffickingi i . Blackmarketi i i . Smuggling

iv . Routes

e. Commodit ies

[ . Frontcompaniesg. Intimidationand extortionh. Kidnapping, heft,murder,etc.i. Ordnance nd miiitary suppliesj Unexploded rdnance vailablek. Weapons, xplosivesmarketsl. Weapons muggling outes

5. Economy.

a. Importsandexportsb. Social solat ionegacy

c. Agriculture

d. Bartereconomye. Trading ompaniesf . Businessaw, banking, ontracts,nsuranceg. Employment atesand mpacton population/perceptionsh. Labour orcc occupation nd demographicsi. Localbusinessesndcompaniesj Income emograph ics

k. Major sourcesl . Percapita ncome

m. Coali t ion overrrmentrojectsn. Natural esources

6 . Serv ices .

a. Hospital ndcl inics

i. Avai labi l i tyof advanced ervices

3/6



JLa

A n n e x D R A F T

i i . Number , uaL i t l nd ype

b. Educat ion f staf f

c. E,ducat ioni . Qua l i t yand ype

ii Numberof schools ndavai labi l i ty

i i i . Ages aught ,ypes

d. Govemmentwages

e. Water

f , Sewer

i, Age andquali tyof system

ii. Opensystem ndhealthef fects

i i i . Map of sewers

e. Electr ic i ty

i . Avai labi l i tyby zone,by Ki lowatper/hour

i i . Sources ndproduct ion lantsi. How are heplants owered?

ii. Distributionnetworksand administration

b . Subs id izedoods

i. Gas

i i . Cookingoi l

i i i . Food

iv. impactof changen subsidies

c, Government mprovementprojects

i. Ongoing,planned

ii. Ratesuccess

d. PublicSafety

e. Armed Force

7. Infbrmat ionEnvironment.

a. Formal communication

b. Broadcast edia

c . Pr in tmed ia

d. Newspapers

e. Freedom r lack hereof

i. Trust in tiremedia

i i . Connect iono govemment r opposit ion

f Fliers,ftandouts

g. Outdoormedia banners, ds)h. Websites nd nternet vai labi l i ty

i . Informat ionCommunicat ionj Impactof Internet y zone

k. Author i ty igures Family, el igious, roup)

L Rumourcentres teashops.markets,axis)

m. Telecommunicat ions

n. Cell phonenodesandavai labi l i ty

o.' fext

messaging apable?

4t6



rfi,I

A n n e x DRAFT

p. Ava i lab i l i t y nc l seo f emai l

B . Ma- io r esources ,a. Drinking watcr

b. Reservoirs

c. Pumping tat lonsd . P ipe l ines

c. Water reatment lantsf . Oil and uel

i . Sources

i i . Pumping tat ionsi i i . Pipel ines

iv. Refineriesg. Gasstat ions

i. Distr ibut ionocat ionsh. Agr icultural

i . Inigat ionpathsj Chemicals

k. Communicat ions

l . Telecom ystems

m. Intemet afes

n. Courier outes

9. Key Individuals.

a. Religious

b. Tr ibal

c. Communityd . Po l i t i ca l

e E,ducators

f. Medical

g . Bus iness

h. Mil i tary

i. For eachgroupconsider:

i . Wheredo theyget heirsecur ity?i i . Wheredo theyget goods, ervices ndwages?

i i i . What deologiesesonate ith them?iv. Who ar e he raditionalauthority igures hey ook to fo r direction?v. Who are

heyal l iedwith?vi, What s important o them?vii. Culturalnarratives

j . Foreach eader :

i. Wheredoeshi s authoritycome rom?i i . Coerciveorce?

i i i . Economicncent ive nddisincent ive?iv. Ideology?

v. Char isma?

5/6



A n n e x D R A F T

vi . Tradit ional uthor i ty?

v i i . Who s he a l l ied , ' i t h?

vir i . Whatare he easonsor thatal l iance?

A n o n t a n T a n n n n 2 o



D R A F T

CHAPTEI ] .3

COIN PRINCIPLES

"Thef rs t thing that mu.st e apparentwhencontemplating|te rortof crction yhich tgavernmentfacing insurgencychouldake, s thal lhereca n be no such hingas a ptrreiymilitarl' solutiortbecausensurgencys no tprimarily a military activity At the,sctmeinte

there s no such hingasawhollypol i t ical olur ion ither, hortof surrenrJer,ecctuselhe verT'facl ha t a stateof insurgency xist.smplre.sha t violence s involvecl hich v,iLl

huve o be counteredo some xtent t leastby theuseofforce. ' ,

Gencral ir FrankKitson, ef lect ing ponhis exper iencesrom campaignsn Kcnya,Malaya,OmanandCyprus.

SECTION 1: OVERVIEW

l. No insurgency asbeen ucce.ssful lyoughtanddefeatedn a purcrymil i tarvmanner.ndeed,mil i tary orces laya key,but n many acets, upport ingole pol i t rcal,social, conomic, sychologicalndmil i tarymeasures l l have heir oleln restor ingheauthor i ty f a iegit imate overnmentndaddressinghe ootcauses f the nsurgency.Al l secur i tyorces including hemil i tary)act n support f , and n harmonywit i , c iv i lauthor i tyn a rni l ieu n which here s much ess ertaintyhan n convent ional ar. n aconvent ional ar, t is obviouswho conductsheactagainst nenemyposit ion.n aCOIN campaign, owever, he nsurgents,heirsupport nd heirmot ivat ion, l l have obeattacked ith a myriadof assets ndcapabil i t ies.hat s,a mix of k inet icandnon-kinet icef fectsmustbe appl ied hatwil l includemil i tary orce, ol icearrests,

reconstruclionn poor urbanareas nd nformationoperations,o namea few.

2' At issuewithin a COIN, part icuiar lyn the ear iystages,s thatwith a lackofsufficient nformation,decisions ave o be macle ffectingsignificantaspects 1,pol i t ical, conomic ndsocial i fe n thecountry.These ccisions ave cpe.cussionsora nation ar beyond ts borders, oth n thediplomatic ield an d n theail-imnortantsphere f pub l ic p in ion .

3. Althoughmil i taryandstrategicheor ie cont inual ly volve, neconstantregardingnsurgency ndcolN is thebatt le o win andhold popular upport ,n thetheatre f operat ionsndat home. That s,not only does hecoi lect ive uUri.s l lpporthave o be won andmaintained ithin hearea r nat ion

uncierhreat, ut me populace fthose at ions ontr ibut ingo theCOIN-mustcont inueo supporthemission iai maywell cont inueor years n end. Thus,operat ions t al l levelsmustbeconducted ith thrsstrategic oal n mind.

4. Tradit ional ly,nsurgentsavehada head-startn thecampaign. hi le hegovernment ashad o f irst discern thre t.and hen ormulate nappropnareesponse,within he uleol lar .v. he side hatcanorganiseirstanddeveiop tai lor-mad"tru, .gythat s ef fect ive ndattract iveo theseneral opulace i l i beat a ignif icantadvantage,

C h a p : 1 i 4



DRAFT

Thus , n order or govemmentsndmi l i t a r ieso o rgan iseu ick ly . t i s nva luab leo havea setof general r inciplesor theconduct f a COll.J ampaignhatcanbe used o designandconduc thecampa ign . t mus t , owever , e ememberedhatpnnc ip ies reguidel ines nly andmustbe empered y a real ist ic st imate f the situat ion ndanappra isa lf thevar iab lcs ndpoten t ia l responses .o lu t ionsanxot e emplarednd heoperat ionalnvironmentmustbe aken nto account.

5. Pr inciples f fer he civ i l leadershipnd heheads f al l agencies,ncluding heIn i l i t a ry ommander ,o tha s ta r r o in tandusefu l ignpos ts . hen ineCOIN pr inc ip lesproposed rearrangednto a iogicalsequencendprovidea government ndmii i tarycommanders ith a general attemon which to baseand review strategy nd operationalplans.Like al l pr inciplesheyshouldbe appl ied ragmat ical ly ndwith commonsenseto suit hecircumstancesecul iaro each ampaign. he assessmentf the situat ion i l lindicatewhereapplicat ion f a pr inciplemay not be possible at east emporar i ly) , here

theymay conf l ic lor where here s over lap. s with the pr inciples f war, heymustbebalanced i th one another ndal l operat ions ustbeexamined gainsthem.Underpinning he principlesare he guidelines f minimum necessaryorce andlegit imacy f al l act ions.

6. The nine principles or the conductof a COIN campaign re as ollows:

a. effectpolitical primacy n the pursuitof a strategic im,

b. promoteunityof purposeo co-ordinateheact ions f parr ic ipat ing

agenciesincluding overnment achinery) ;

c. undcrstandhecomplexdynamics f the nsurgency,ncluding hewiderenv i ronment ;

d. exploit ntei l igence nd nformat ion;

e. isolate he nsurgentsrom theirphysical ndmoralsupport ase;

f applypowerdiscr iminatelyo inf luence umanwi l l ;

g . neu t ra l i sehe nsurgent ;

h . sus ta in ommi tmento expend o l i t i ca l ap i ta l nd esourcesvera ongper iod;and

i . conduct onger ermpost- insurgencyianning.

Chap3. 2 l l1

A nrn??nR-t _AnAna4



DRAFT

SECTION : EFFECTPOLITICALPRIMACY N THE PURSUITOFASTRATEGICAIM

' 7I t n tus t eunders toody a l l ha tan nsurgencysa po l i t i ca l robJemhar annor

becountered y a singlemeans,Oncean nsurgencyasbeen dent i f ied,hegovernment(aLong ith its suppor lers) ustdecide ow o stop, eutral iser reverseheconsequencesf suchan nsurgencyThismust nclude n ef fect ive, ro-act iveesponseto hcv io lence nd nt imidar ioncnera tedy the nsurgents .pa f l ronr mrned ia teshort- term ct ions,manyof whichwi l l be akenwith theadvice f themil i tary orcecommander,hc government ust ormulateong-term ol i t ical ims hatwil l be backedby pol i t ical, conomic ndsocial rogrammes. iven hisoverarchingim, hesecur ityfbrcesmustconduct he ir partas a supporting rogramme. COIN plan nvolving hepolice,mil i tary, ocal ly aisedmil i t iasandcoali t ion ecur ityorceswil l implementhis.r

8. Pol i t ical r imacy nderpins ON as t legit rmisestratcgic,perat ionalndtact icalact ions. l lact ions ol low thepoli t ical eadandsuppoft tsstrategic im.Withina coN, thespecif ic t rategy etermines hich nstrument f power di plomat ic,informat ional, i l i taryor economic)s the ocusof ef for t ,andwhichagencymay havethe eadat operat ionalnd act ical evels. hiswil l change ver imeas heCOINoperat ion ndsituat ion volve.

SECTION PROMOTBUNITYOF PURPOSB O CO-ORDINATE HEACTIONSOF PARTICIPATINGAGENCIBS

CONTROL AND CO-ORDINATION

9. Funct ions o be Co-ordinated.' fhe

COIN ef for t equires mult i- facetedndmult i-agency pproach nitedby commonobject ives ndendstate,Many of theseagencies avedifferentphilosophies,modusoperandi,and methods.Unity of commandacrosshisarray' ismpract ical. l thoughunityof cf for t s mostdesirable,t toomaynotbc achievable. nity of purpose owever,mustbe achieved ndall agencies ustagreeto work ovrardsh iscommon urpose . he dca l s for thegover runcn to g ivconcperson r errl l responsibi l i tyor the direct ion f the governmentarnpaign,l lowingdif i l -erencesf opinionbetween gencieso be resolved y an mpart ialdirector. hi iethiscouldbea soldrer, ontrolwi l l l ikely bevestedn a pol i t ic ian r civ i l serv 'ant .n anycase, c rvi l l be rvorking o str ictgovernment uidel ines ndoveral l ontrol. dcai iv,joint command ndcontrol t ructure i l l be achieved.

10. SingleCommand System. n a single ommand onstruct ,hechairman rdirector f t l - ie o-ordinatedf for t s n overal l ommand f thecampaign.n thissystem,po l icyandexecut iveu thor i t r re es ted n a s ins le o rnmander .sua l ly mi l i t a ryof f icer,with senior iv i l sen, icepol iceandsubordinate i l i tarycommanderssadvisersThesys temequ i res pe cept ive ndchar ismat icteam ui ld ine) ommanderndwi l i

Secur i t yo r c e s n c l u C e :i l i t a n ' :c c a l i t i o n r i l i t a r , vc r ces ; , a i i o n a lo l r c e ; o c a l p o ) i c c ;n d o c a l l yr e e . " i t e d < r r n n n r f f n r - - r

Chap3: , : i1



DRAFT

f unc t ion garnsr re la t ive ly ncompl ica tednsurgencyhrea t .Not rv i ths tandrngh is

nr i l i tarv ead, hecommander i l l be act ing n behalfo f thegovernment ndu' i l l havea

var ietyof mi i i tary andcivi iranadvisers.

1 . The Commit teeSystem. Under his system, ommit tees re omed at he

strategic,perat ional nd act ical evelsn ordcr o co-ordinate l l act ionskinet tcand

non-kinet ic)o counter he nsurgency.he civ i l administrat ionrovideshechairman f

t l r e o i n tn n e r r l i o n c h i l e h en o l i c e n d ' h e r m e d o - c e s ' n v i 6 i g e m b e r so hev a r i o u s

operat ions ommit tees t each evel n theadministrat ivendcommand ierarchy.

Decisions re aken oint ly and mplemented y thechairman ndmembershrough heir

own c iv i l se rv ice , o l i ce ndmi l i t a ry ommand.At var iouseve ls ,hccommi t tecs ay

also nclude ead administratorsrom variousnon-govelrtmental rganisations 'fGOs)and nternational odiesprovidingsupport o the operation suchas heLN specral

envoy,LINHCR co-ordinator, tc).The structure f the commifteesmustbe flexible and

altered o suit he circumstancest hand.While he commit tees t var ious evelswil lguideandco-ordinate perat ions, i l i tarycommanderst al l levelsmustbe preparedo

exploit leet ingopportunit iesn order o do damageo the nsurgency ovement.n

simple enns, ime may not exist o referpotent ialmil i taryact ions ack o a commit tee.

Any mrlitary action a ken,however,must be fully in concertwith the overall strategy f

the COIN operation, se heminimal forcenecessary nd support he campaign

object ives.

12. Personali t ies.Given he nter-agencyspect f COIN operat ionsnd he need

for the military to work hand-in-hand ith its civil ian andpolicepartners,many of whom

will have ittie understanding2f how the military operates,he role of individual

personali t iesecomesmagnif ied.Any system f controlandco-ordinat ion ustbe able

to adapt o the personali t iesf those nvolved.Mil i tary commanders ustselect heirI ia ison ff icersandcommit teemembers ith care, xploit ing hosewho canachieve

progresshrougha balance f char isma, ersuasionndgraceful orceof personali ty.

Commanders ustbe able o real isehat hey hemselves ay not be hemostsuitable

individuals o conduct ai ly face-to- faceperat ions ndco-ordinat ion ith theirc iv i l ian

counter-partsnd hcreforemustselect hemostsuitableepresentat ive.

13. Assistance o Al l ies and ForeignPowers. When mil i taryprovides ssistance

to a foreign state, he fbrcesassigned ill necessarily e subordinateo that government

in order o preserve he host nation'ssovereignty nd he government's redibility n the

cyesof i ts populace. he forceswil l l ikely be obl iged o adopt heco-ordinat ionystem

of thehostnat ion.

GOVERNMENT PLANNING

14. Assessmentnd Es t imate f the S i tua t ionand Mi l i t a ry Adv isors .When he

so\errurrents determining hich of i ts object ives anbestbe at tained i th the helpof

tExpe r iencea s h o w n h a tsom e o v e r n m e n to l l t i c a le a d e r s ,i v i l a d m i n i s t r a t o r snd t a f f f NGOs w i l l

n o t o n i yh a v e a cka n u n d e r s t a n d i n gf h o w h em r l i t a r y u n c t i o n s n do p e r a t e s ,u tw i l l h a v e i g n i f i c a n t

r r i s c o n c e p t r o n sn de v e n o l dh o s t i l i t i e so r v a r d sh em i l i t a r l ' , n d h u s e v e r y e l u c t a n to c o - o p e r a t e .

Chap3. 4114

a n2n2?nR d.nnnnd?



DRAFT

thearmed orccs,hemrl i tary ommandersndadvisers i l l beable o expiain heforces' apabil i t resnd imitat ionsn thecontext f thepart icular mergency. 1anaiysis f thesituat ion hould eveal heareasn which hegovernment

ld theinsurgentsremostvulnerable. hese ulnerabi l i t iesre ikely o be spread ver heent ire ol i t ical, conomic, ociai, ndsecur ity pectrum, heaim wi l l be o ident i fy hosegovernmentuinerabr l i t ieshatarebest uitedo mil i tarydefensrvectron nd hosevulnerabi l i t iesf the nsurgentshataremostsLiscept ibleo offensivemilr taryact ion,

15 Allocat ionof Pr ior i t ies. Theco-ordinatedat ional lan hatemergesrom hcabove st imate hould ddresshe pol i t ical, conomic, ocial ndsecur ity o. . t .ur .Determininghe ypeof insurgencyacedwil l highl ight wo pr ior i t ies:jeni i f icat ion t 'where he nsurgents btainmost of theirsupport; nd dentification f the goverlmentact ionshatwi l l achievemeaningfulesults uickly,For example, nurban nsurgencywill requiredifferentpriorities o a ruralbasednsurgency.

fh enational riorities-needo

beaddressedt hisstage f theplanning rocess. nce heoverarchingr ior i t ies reident i f ied, theral locat ions f tasks nd esources i l l fo l low, o include:

a. roleand esponsibi l i t iesetween overnment epartmentsndmil i taryoffices n order o avoidduplication f effort,gapsandpotential onfllct;

pr ior i tyof act ionbetweenhesocial, conomic,mil i taryandcivi ladministrat ionields;and

pr ior i t ieswithin each ieldof act iv i ty social, conomic, i l i taryandcivi ladministration). us tas hemilitary will apportion heireffortsacrossheoperationalunctions command,Scnse, ct , shield,Sustain), o oo must

the civil, policeandotherauthorities etprioritiesacrossheirownorganisat ionsnd inesof operat ion.

SECTION4: UNDERSTAND HE COMPLEXDYNAMICSoF THEINSURGENCY,NCLUDINGTHE WIDBRENVIRONMENT

' fhe dynamics f an nsurgencynay nclude:

17. The var ious nter-relatedynamics f an nsurgency i l l prescnt rofoundintellectual hallengesor commanders ndstaff. Given he argenumberof valables al\ r 'ork seeChapter , AnnexA), i t may verywell be mpossibleo predict hesecondaryand ertiaryeffectsof specificactions.Stil l, effortmustbe expendedo understandhesevar iables nddynamics t handandhow best o tackle hem.

1 8 .

a , cause whatmakes he nsurgency t t ract iveo theuncommit ted;

central deaof the nsurgenc,vthismaybean deoiogl, r a strategicndstate;

armsof the nsurgencl long erm.short erm.advert isedncl idden;

C h a p : 5 i 4



DRAFT

d. organ isa t ionndcapab i l i t iesleaders ,adre , ombatan ts .uppof i ase

andpoli t icalwings;

e , ex te rna l uppor t mora l , l r ys ica l ndconceptua l ;

f . methodology strategiesnd actrcs; nd

g thewiderenv i ronment po l i t i ca l , conomic ,oc io logrca l ,nd echn ica l

19. For everydynamicwithin an nsurgency,he inesof operat ion ithin he

campaignplan must anticipate nd counter he evoivingdynamicsof the nsurgency.

SECTION 5: EXPLOIT INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION

20. The Overarching Importance of Intelligence. in order o truly understand n

insurgency nd ts dynamicsand,once his hasbeendone, o attack ts weaknesses,

intelligenceand nformationmust be exploited n a systematic nd horoughmanner.Al l

individuals oncerned,iv i l ians, ommandersnd soldiers f al l ranksmustunderstand

the oveniding importance f intelligencen activelydefeating n insurgency, t wilL

supportdirect military actionagainst nsurgents, uidenon-kineticeffects o attack he

root causes f the nsurgency, nd allow for successo be measured. t appliesat the

operational nd actical evels.

2 l . Operat ionalLevel Applicat ion - Local Knowledge. Knowiedge f the country,

its ethniccomposition, ulture, eligionsan dschisms, he political scene ndparty

leaders,he clandestine olitical organisations nd heir undercover rmedgroups, heinfluenceof neighbouring tates nd he economy,provides he essential ackdrop o

understandinghe nsurgency ut his akes ime to bui ldup. Suchbackground

informat ion s essent ial ecausehedevelopment f intel l igenceelieson an abi l i ty o

discern attems f changen behaviour.The hostnat ionpoi iceand ts ntel l igence

service houidbe hepr ime agenciesor providing at east he background)nformat ion

and ntel l igence, i th the bestsource eing,natural ly, member f the nsurgencytself .

22. Tact ical LevelApplicat ion, Withoutaccurate,ct ionablentel l igencehe

se urity forcesconduct andom, neffectiveoffensiveoperations, hich tend o produce

very it t leposit iveandmuch negat iveeact ion mongsthepopulat ion. he ensuing

negative media reporting urther benefits he nsurgents.Furthermore,roopsconducting

routine rameworkpatrolling end o loose heir focusandmotivation,with the result

of len being he conduct f patrol l ing orthe sakeof patrol l ingtself . Tact ical ntel l igence

requirementshouldbe pushed own o the owest evels ndal l sources, pecial ist nd

rout ine rameworkpatrolsal ike,shouldbe givenspecif icnformat ionalequirementso

gather,Furthermore,pecial ists herever ossible, hould epushed own o the ower

(sub-un i t )ac t ica leve ls o ha t heymay remain espons iveo the i r n te l l igence

requireme ts i 'h i le ulf i i l ing thoseof the unitsand ormat ions.

C h a P , 16 1 4

A n t n n t n o a n n n n r t r



DR{FT

?3. The ac t ica leve I pp i ica t ionf in fo rma i ronnd ntc l l rgencei l l a l lou ,a rgeNamedAreasof Interest"1\ tAIs)o be reducedo pointNAIs andeventual lyo Tar:getAreas

f InterestTAls) fbr subsequentrecision tr ikes.For example,, l iMl\ jT ieportsnlay ndicate gangand heirsuspectedeapons ache re ocatedn a neighbourhoodcontaining 0,000 ccupants.atrols ndother ources,hrough pecif icasks ncj tater linformat ionequiremcnts, ay educe hisareaNAI to u ,p. . i f i . c i ty blockor - iousc.Thiswil l eventual ly ecome TAI thatcanbepassedo operat ionstaf fandcommandcrsfor subscqucntct jon, n thiscase. surgical ordon ndsearch perat lon,

24 ' The samecanbe said egarding nformationexploitation or non-kinetic ffects.HUMINT reportsor interrogations ay indicate ha tan nsurgencys recruitingmembersfrom a particular uburban egion.Furtherexamination nd collection egardini hi saremayreveal hat t is anethnic nclavewith highunemployment. ence, ihiru. !u1noybecome TAI for theapplicat ion f CIMIC andother nio Ops esourcesn order ost imulate evelopment nd nclusion f thjsenclave.Fol lowluppatrols an n t imegaugethepublic eact iono suchmeasures,n short , ntel l igencer ives act ical perat ions,l imitscol lateral amage ndmeasuresuccess.

25 . The In te l l igence rgan isa t ion . t shou id eexpec tedhat n te l l igenceorganizat ions i l l have o growconsiderably.deal ly, he ntel l igencerfanisat ionshould tartexpandingn lockstepwith the nsurgents'developinghreat i lnevitably,however,here s usual iyan embarrassingnterval efore heexpanded rganisat ionbecomes ffect ive,

SECTION 6: ISOLATE THE INSURGENTS FROM THEIR PHYSICAL ANI)MORAL SUPPORT BASE

26. Three Facetsof [solat ion. The aim heremustbe oisolatehe nsursentsndtheirmovement, hysicai ly,ntel lectual iyndmoral ly. Al l agenciesnvolvel in the

COIN operationmust understandhi s an dwork within their ow n fields o this end.AIIthree lementsmustbe addressed:

insurgents ustbeseparatedrom heirphysical upport , hich nciudcsrecruits.inances, eapons ndcombat uppl ieshatmay come rominternal ources r sources xternalo thenat ionor resion:

Chap : 7 11



tr.

DRAFT

insurgentsus tbe underminednte l iec tua l lyn the i ra ims .A lega l , iab le

altemat iveo the nsurgency ustbeoffered o members f the

insurgency,heirsupportersnd heuncommit tedn thepopulat ion. and-

in-handwith this s the act hat hecondit ionshatpennit hespread f

the nsurgency,nd ts ust i f icat ionn theeyesof many,mustbe addressed

and esolved ith long-tenn olut ionshatarewell publ ic isedhrough

informationoperations

insurgentsannot e al lowed o be seen o hold he moral igh ground.

The legitimateor desiredgovemment tructuremust be made o be,and

secn o be , nora l ly uper io ro the nsurgencynd t s a l te rna t ivef f c r ings .' fhere

is a great endency y somemil i tarycommanders ndothers

operat ingn a foreignnat ion o pract isemoral elat iv ism, nd hussimply

at t r ibute iolat ions f the uleof law o localcustom ndculture, ven

whensuchviolat ions lear lyunderminehe egit imacy,moralsuper ior i ty

andeffect ivenessf those uthor i t ies. ommandersonduct ing COIN,

and even heir soldiers,must understandhe need o help ensure he

supported ovelrlment emains egitimate nd actsaccordingly.Where

possible, hey must assist n the raisingof standards f conduct, rom the

local evelupwards.Violationsmustbe reported o the military andcivil

chains-of-command. he insurgencymustbe deprivedof anyclaim o

moral superiority.

27. Firm Base. The f irst requirement ay be o securehebaseareas ssent ialo the

survivalof the government nd,state. hese ormally nclude he capital,hepoints f

entry,key instal lat ions nd hoseareaswhich are oyal o thegovemment. he provision

of secur ity n those ital areas ncouragesheir nhabitantso ral ly to the government.

28. Expansionof SecureAreas. Onceestabl ished,ecur i ty orcesexpand utward

from the secure asesn an campaign kin o thespreading f an oi l s l ick. As each rea

is consol idated.oval ocal orceswould beraised o securehe area o release obi le

Chap3: t3 /4

A0202308-8.00004



DRAFT

Iegu la rroopso securehenex ta reawhr le hehos t ta te 's iv i l admin is t ra t ionndoo l rcete -es tab i ishhemse lvesn the ecent lyibera teden i to ry . h is s a we l l - t r ied pproac5ocombat ing n nsurgency.

29 El imina t ion f the nsurgentSubvers ivend Suppor tSys tem.Thesecur i t ylorces'operat ions ust ocuson eliminat inghe nsurgents;subversivendsupportorganizat ions.h is s an essent ialrerequisitco defeat ing nyact ivc nsurgent roup ort l re o l lo rv ingeasons :

b .

thesubversive rganization ontrols he population, enics hegovernmcnt opular upport , preadsropagandanchecked ndpreventswitnessesrom providing nformation;

the nsurgents ontinue o receivcsupplies,ecruits, nd nformationregardinghe security

orces;

once he subversive rganisations destroyed,he nsurgents re orces ooperatemoreopenlyand hu sexpose hemseiveso deliberatemilitarvactions nd arrest: nd

d. subversive lements rrested re he bestsources f informationon thei l legalorganisat ion.heymustbe careful ly andled y special isttaf f .

30. Separat ionMethods. A thoughtful ombinat ion f methods y al l agenciesinvolved s neededo separatehe nsurgentsrom theirsubversive ndsuppJ.tingconstructs:

C .

d

intelligence houldai m at the dentification f subversive ellsandpropagandists. his information houldcome n goodpart rom civil ianpolicesources, ut wherepolice orces ac ka phyiical presencen aremotegeographical

1rea,he void ma y be filled with elements f special

forcesassigned pecific nformation equirements;

security orceprotection or residents nd nformers.This is bestdoneproact ivelyhrough heuseof anonymousip teiephoneines, pecial isthandl ing f sources nd ow levelmeasuressuch s ace nasks)o hidethe dent i fyof informers;

thegradual pread f government ndsecurity orcecontrolover areas:

curfewsand searches f individuals hought o be supportingnsurgenrs;

patrols, mbushes ndvehicle heck oints the atterbestdoneat owIevels or short ntervals n ikely suspects) ;

interdict ion perat ionsgainstheentryofexternal uppl ies

a .

C h a p : 9i 14

A n 6 A A ^ ^ ^



DRAFT

31. Reforming he Government nd I t s Ins t i t u t ions . n manycases ,he

government nderattack ro m an nsurgency equires om e orm of reform n order o

so l id i f y t s eg i t imacy . a in n temat iona luppor l ndwin andmain ta inhesuppof i l i t s

own populace. Government ct ionswithin a moralcontext , uchas,observancef the

iaw, restraintn theuseof force,gaining f popular upport ndthebenef i ts estowed y

thesocialandeconomic spects f the nat ional lan,wil l help o produce favourable

cl imatedomest ical ly nd nternat ional ly iplomacywii l alsobe key n gaining upport

for thebesieged ovemmentan d n denyingexternalsupport o the nsurgents.

SECTION 7: APPLY POWER DISCRIMTNATELY TO INFLUENCE HUMAN

WILL

32, Instruments f nat ionalpower hould e employedo neutral isehepowerof the

insurgency.Often, he ke y will be to pre-emptor supplant he deas hatunderhe heinsurgency. ne of thepr inciplemeans f inf luencinghehumanwil l of the broader

populat ions through ontr ibut ingo thewelfareof society, n thepsychological,ocial

and security ronts.

33 . The exercise f power by an y of the agencies peratingwithin a COIN, mustbe

conductedwith legitimacy ie, within the rule of law) andmust o llow the fundamental f

theminimum useof force. Additionally,disruption o normalcivic life must be imited

to the greatest xtentpossible. hi s must be appliedat the operational nd actical evels.

34. For example, he mposit ion f curfews hould e as imited n t ime andscope s

possible n order to avoid disruption o th e ives of themajorityof the populace,who are

alwaysat r isk of becoming at igued y secur itymeasures.ikewise, t the act ical evel,the conductof a cordonan d searchn privatehomesmay require orcedentry nto locked

rooms. f the ownerscannot ocate eys,evenwhen breachingoolsareproduced,hen

the door should,whenever ossible, e removed rom its hinges. f nothing s found as

wil l of tenbe the case),hedoorcan henbereplaced ithoutdamage.fhis

in tums imits

embarrassmentor the security orcesan d he extraeffort aken o avoid damageso

pr ivateproperty s. o a certain xtent , ppreciatedy thepopulace.t in turn helpsgain

and maintain heir supportandcounter he propaganda ndoubtedly pread y the

ipsurgentsegardinghe secur ityorcesand heirmethods. n short , ommanders t al l

levelsmust understandheapplicat ion f thispr inciple,

SECTION8: NEUTRALISE THE INSURGENT

35. The secur ity orcesof thegoverrrmentr coal i t ionwil lhave a signif icant ole n

the seiectivedestruction, isruptionand dislodgmentof insurgents.Confidence, rustan d

freedomof action (without the need o refer outineandanticipated perationsha t

exploitof ten leet ingopportunit ies,ack o a higher evel(s) f command)mustbe

ar ' fordedact ical ommandersparr icular ly own to sub-unitevel) f thevare o be

:uccess fu ln s t r ik :nghe nsurgentndd is lodg ing im f romhispowerbase

C h a p : 1 0 / 1 4

anrn??nR-1 -nnnndq



DILAFT

36.A1though u l t ip le n i t smaybedep loyedn a CON opera t ion ,c r i t i ca l spec t t

success fu li l i t a ryCOIN s command ndac t ion t the owes t tac t ica ieve l ha t nvo lvesthe

. luniorommanderpiatoon

ndsect ionevel) eading mallpatrolsnto hetnsurgents'rea f operat ions.heaim should e o defeathe nsurgent n, ,homeground" singadequatebut no more, orce han s absoiutely ecessary,roport ional i tymustbe hemeasure ppl iedwhenemployingorce.

37 Al l mil i tary act ical ct ionsmustbe conductecln harmonywith theothcracrronstaken o neutral isenddefeat he nsurgency:meliorat ion f thc causes;eformat ion fthcgovernment nd ocalsecur ityorces i f necessary);nformatron peratronstoexplain hemil i taryact ions); ndsocial evelopment. i thout h ismult i-p.ong.dapproach,i l l ing nsurgents aysirnply ncourage orecovertso the nsurcencv.

SECTION 9: SUSTAIN COMMITMENI.To EXPBND POLITICAL CAPITALAND RESOURCES OVER A LONG PERIOD

38 Insurgencys in manywaysa protractedontest f wi l ls. nsurgentsnderstandthat heydo not have o win a decisive att le, ut have o make hecampaignooexpensive nd dcmanding in termsof t ime,resources,inancialunapoiit"lal capital) orth egovemment, he populace nd/or he government's xtemalsupporterr, o- . ofwhommay be supplying roops o stabilise nd support he state.Not only must hecommitment f the ocalpopulace esustained,ut hepopulat ions f anysupport ingnat ionsmustbeconvinccd o rcmain ommit tedo theCOIN.

39' A sustainedommitmentto heCOIN s underpinnedy unityof purpose cross

widerangeof disparate lements nd organisationsnvolved nttre campaign.Informationoperationswill have o work towards hi saim. Furthennore,ealisticmeasuresf success i l i have o decided ndpromulgatedo hatsuccessfulinesofoperatron ay be ully ident i f ied, roadenedndexploited.

SECTION 1() : CONDUCT LONGER TERM POST. INSURGBNCYPLANNING

40. 1'he equirementor post- insurgencyecur ity nddevelopmentrobably olds hekey o ef fect ively ppiying l lof theother ive pr incipLes. erelyprouiding oi t t remilitary defeatof insurgents oesnot n any way end he governmentequiiement omakesuitableonger- term lans o cnhancehecconomic ndsocial spects f i tspopulat ion nd o ensurehat hepoli t ical auses f the nsurgencyavebeen

eliminated.4l . Th e announcement f bold governmentnitiatives o be started fter herllsurgency asbeendefeated anhavea realandsignificanteffecton winning he heafisandmrnds f thepopulat ion ur inganycampaign. uch nit iat ives hould e esigned tthesame ime as hecomprehensivetrategic lansarebeingpreparedo defeath"ernsurgency. he imingof anystatementbout ongerterm lans ouldbe of crucialtmpoftancendshould e handledn a sensit ivc ndcontrol ledmanner y thestateauthor i t iesn concert , i th he overal l nformat ion perat ions lan.

C h a p ' , I l 1 4



In theBr i t i shDhofar ampa ign1970- i975 ; .heendof insurgentc t iv i t y ccur red

in December 975, ut theauthor i t iesad o work relent lesslyor severalmoreyears o achievecontinued upport rom th epopulationbefore he causes fthe

insurgency ad been uliy rectified.As with subduing fire, the flameshave o be

out and he embers old.before t canbe consideredinished.

DRAFT

SECTION 11 : FACTORS BEARING ON THE APPLICATION OF THE

PRINCIPLES OF COIN

P o p u l a rS u p p o r t

42. Insurgent Aims. An insurgency ims o discredit he government nd ts

policies. t will have spentmuch ime preparing he ground or insurgencywith

propaganda, sing real and contriveddiscontents.When t considershat he government

and/or ts supportingauthorities from an extemalnation)havebeensufficientiy

undermined nd that a significantpart of the population asbeenalienated rom

authority, t will usecoercionand error o reinforce ts propaganda ampaign'

43. Hearts and Minds and Compet it ion or Loyalty. A government ust

convince ts population hat t canoffer a bettersolution,bettergovernment nd abetter

life than he opposing nsurgentsn order o wi n the hearts ndmindsof the population.'fhis

will be a focal point fo r the nformationoperations ampaign.Justas an nsurgency

needs he sympathyor the acquiescencef a sizeable ercentage f thepopuiation osurvivean d o overthrow he government, o th e government eeds he people'ssupport

to appear egitimate n its eyesand o obtain nformation eading o the arrestor capture

of the error ists.Violence, r the hreat f i t , is aimedat hecit izen's ears or his amily

an d freedom o earna wage o feed hem.Whoevercanguarantee citizenssecurity an

oftencommand heiral legiance. n insurgencys a compet it ion etween overnment nd

insurgentor the ndividual 's oyalty. Unless hegovemment anofferreasonable

protection, ndividualsare unlikely to risk their own or their amilies' l ives by

volunteer ingnformat ion.fhe

secur ity orceswil l meetpassiveesistancen addit iono

the act ive esistancefthe insurgents.

44. Government Protect ion. Protect ion f the civ i l ianpopulat ion i l l require

restr ict ions nd measuressearches,heckpoints, ur fews, tc) hatwil l d isrupt ormal

lives and frustrate he ocal populations. heir frustrationwill increase ith time.

Insurgents i i l seek o misrepresentecessarynconveniencessharsh ndoppresstve.

Consequent ly,he government nd ts secur ity orcesmustant ic ipate possible ost i le

publ ic eact ion o i ts secur itymeasures ndprepare rgumentso rebut nsurgent

propagandan order o keep he nit iat ive n thebatt le or thehearts ndmindsof the

p c o p l e .

C h a p 1 2 1 1 4

a n2n2 0R-1 t -nnnn, l



DR-AFT

15 Invo lv ing heLoca lPopu la t ionsn theCampaign .Even n s i tua t ionsn wh ichthe ocalauthol i t ies ndhostnat ion ol ice orces equire ignif icant eform,muche fonshould e made o include hem, vithin hedictate of forceprotect ion ndOpSEC, nthecampaign.t wi l l bui ld heirconf idence,ncourageigher tandardsnd aise herrprof i le n theeyes f the ocalcommunit ies.rkewise,ocalpopulatronshould emadeto feel hat heyhavea vrtalpart o play n counter inghe nsurgencynd eadingo r tsconclusion. heymay evenextend o having emote ommunit iesaise heirown ocaldefenceorces.

fhetrust he communitynit ial lyplace n theirprotectorss repaid y the

trust hegovernmenthows n themby allowing hem o beararms n a common ausc,

46 counter ing Propaganda. nsurgent ropaganda ustbemonitored ndaddressedy a del iberatendmult i- facetedO campaign.Special istdvicewii l have obesought. owever, smuchauthor i ty spossible ustbepushed own o the act icallevels n order hat nformat ion perat ionst hat evelareable o be executedn a t imelyandef ect ivcmamer.A goodapproach ndmessage imed

at hecircumstancesf aspecif icact ical reawi i l be muchmoreeffect ivehananoperat ional- ievelpprovedmessageeliveredateandwatered own o make t asgener ic ndbroadaspossible.Canadian nd coalitionsoidiersmustbe awareof the key role ha t hey play n counteringinsurgent ropaganda, hich will paint hemas oreign,oppressive ccupiers. heirfriendly (butprofessional) isposition,oneanddecorumwhile patrollingamongst helocalpopulation, nd heirabiiity to relate o thepopulace,will quickly rindermi'neha tpropaganda.

POLITICAL AWARENESS

41 . Commanders t all levelsand ndividualsoldiersmustbe awareof theconsequences

f any action heymay take.This s especiailymportant houldanunexpected pportunitypresent tself or in a sudden mergency hen here s no time tc rscekadvice r direct ion rom higherauthor i ty.hosewith a knowledge f thepol i t icalscene rebetter blc o assesshe ikelyef fect f theiract ions n publicopinionanclomake sens ib leec is ron .

48. Al l ranksmustbe br iefed n thegovernment ims, nsurgency imsandpropaganda.n understandingf the issues t stake nsureshatsoldiers now how toreinforcehc government f for t .Furthermore.oldiersmustbe educateds o whatconst i tutesuccessn a COIN,

ACTING WITHIN THE LAW

49. Although error ists nd nsurgcntsse awless ndviolentmethods, aintainrngthat heend ust i f ies hemeans,he secur ityorces annot perate utsidehe aw withoutdiscredit inghemselves,hegovernmentheyaresupport ing ndproviding hedissidentpoi i t icalmachinewith damaging ropaganda ater ial. f the government nd ts secur ityforcesose hemoralhigh ground hepeople aveno incent iveo back hem. Thepoiiceand heannymustact within he aw of thestatewithinwhich heyareoperat ing naU.seeu o bedoingso. n manvnat ions,hepoliceand ocalmil i tarywil l require lose

C h a p ' ,1 3 1 4



DRA.FT

superv is i rnn order o ensurcha t hcyano he i rac t ionsa ] lw i th rn ) r is a ran :e te r .

Leaders t al l levelsmustnot be reluctanto voice heirconcerns i th respecto the

conduct f localsecur ity orces. othon thespotand n their eports o theirchain-of-

command.

MINIMUM NECBSSARYFORCE

50. No more orcemay be used han s necessaryo achieve legaiaim.The amount

usedmustbe reasonablend t mustnot bepunit ive.Once heaim s achieved o more

forcemav be used.

51. The need o useminimum orce s not o bcconfused i th deploying he

minimum numberof troops.fhe

appearancef a force argeenough o containa situation

at the right psychologicalmomentmay convince nsurgents nd otherdissidentshat he

authoritiesare well prepared nd determinedo dealwith lawlessness.

52. As in all operations, ommandersemainmorally responsibleo ensure hat all

ranks can apply heir rules of engagementobustlyand with confidence. n doing so,

commanders nd soldiersalike must recogniseheneed o limit coliateraldamages nd o

only engage learly dentified hreats.nsurgents ill undoubtedlyattack rom the shelter

and screenof civilian populationsand soldiersmustensure hat thcy clearly dentify he

threatbeforeengaging ith deadly orce.Thismustbea key aspect f t raining.

Chap 1414

a n rn r?nR-4 / _nnnnq l



DRAFT

CTIAPTER

STRATEGIC BVEL CONSIDBRATIONSORCOUNTERNSURGENCY

"...thefrstrequiremenrforhesuccessfuloncluclf a ColN campaignsfor thegoyernmenlo set L.tp soundframework v,ithinwhich t can takeplace.

GenerulSir Frank Kitson

S c c t i o n :G e n e r a l

l . In i ts widest ontext , n nsurrect ion i l l bepol i t ical lymot ivated;herefore,hcoverarchingtrategyo defeathe nsurrect ion ustbe pol i t ical.Mil i taryact iv i t ies i l lform a partofthis higherstrategyo a greater r lesser egree epending n thestrength

of the nsurgent orces, lus heir actics, echniques nd piocedures.n othcrwords,atthestrategicevel, hereare ncreasinglyignif icant reaipecuharo COIN. Strategic ndoperational onsiderationsre undamentally ifferent or COIN than or conventiJnalwars: heyrequirecloserco-operation ith ongoingdiplomaticactivitiesan dmoreconsideration f the overarching oliticalobjectives t lower operational nd acticallevelsof command. hey ar eusuallyaboutminimumuseof foice versusmaximumfirepoweran ddestruction. herefore,heyrequire loserandmoreextensive oordinationbetween he military and othergovernmental nd non-governmentalgencies,Nonetheless, hetheror not an nsurgency evelopso thc point where here s majorcombataswith the ChinesePeoples'LiberationAnny in 1947or theAfghan NortternAll iance n2002, heoutcome f a corN campaignvr l lbeprofound.

Sec t ion : GovernmentConcept

The Set t ing

2' Al l iances ndglobalsecur ity rrangementsmprove hesecur ity nvironment yreducing he threatof attackon Canada nd ncreasinghe ikelihoodof support ronrothers.Working 'v i th thercountr iess anessent ial lement f our oreignanddefencepolicy,Wil l ingnesso contr ibuteo al l ies, oth egional iy ndon a moreglobal evel,hasbeen een seffect iven containing otent ial iy nstable ituat ions.hemil i taryhasaproven ole n maintainingntemat ional ol ic ies nd elat ionships.

4' Parr ic lpat ionn intemat ional eploymentss consideredn a case-by-caseasisand t would beexpectedhatmissionswouldhavespecif ic bject ives i th a goodprobabil i ty f success,e of l imiteddurat ion ndbe uily resourced. anadiannterestsandcos1s,isks o mil i tarypersonnel ndexist ing ommitments readdit ionalactorshatmustbe considered.

5. I t is possiblehata nat ional overnlTlenr,an rnsurgentiueat,wi l l request ssistancerom

U6

theLDrr r other eadnation acedwithCanada nd, n theeventof the



DRAFT

Govemment f Canada greeingo sucha request,he Canadian i i i tarymay deploya

force o conductCOIN operatrons.ucha deployment aybe a uni lateral ct ion,

reminiscent f the exercises herein herewereCanadiannfantrybattal ion eployments

to Jamaican the 1970s, r partof a mult inat ional oal i t ion, nder he UnitedNatrons

qLN) or other ead-nat ion rrangements.

6 A nat iona l overnmentr the ,N cons ider ingeques t inganad ian i l i t a ry

assistances ikely o delaysucha requestn thehope hat he exist ing ituat ionwil l

improveso hatoutside ssistancei l l not benecessary.t shouldbeexpected,herefore,

that nsurgency i l l be well establ ishedy the ime Canadianroops recommit ted,

The Pr imacy of Host Nat ion (HN) Polic ies

1. A COIN campaignmustbe conductedn accordance ith an agreed, niversal ly

appl ied, at ional ol icyof theHN. In thecase f a fai led, ai l ingor re-establ ishedtate,an interim governmentmandateand ts military campaignmust be n accordance it h the

mandate ssuedby the UN .

8. Al l actionsand restrictions rising rom strategic olicy affecting he nation, ts

populationand esources,must be carefullyexplained o all people.Similarly' he

operations f the security orcesmustbe seen o stem rom nationalpolicy.

The Primacy of Law

9. The egal rameworkwithin which COIN operat ions ay be conducted i l l

almostcertainlychangc rom situation o situation, ut theprimacyof the aw cannotbe

usurpedby military action.Where he nationalor mandated overnmentmaintainscontrol of the countryor partsof the country, t shoulddeterminehepolicy andpriorities

fo r COIN operations nd he restoration f legitimategovernment.f martial aw or

emergency owersare enacted,hesemeasures ould be emporary n natureand heir

purposemust be clearlyexplained o the peopleof the HN. These actsdictate he

development nddistr ibut ion f a strategic essage y the highest evelof government,

which pervades ow n to the owest actical evel.Furtherrnore,estoration f legal

normalcy s a decisive actor.

Sec t ion : S t ra teg icOb jec t ives

10. Since nsurgencys pr incipal lya pol i t icalstruggle,he ult imate bject ivewil lbe

achieved y a combinat ion f complementarybject ives, nder he overal ldirect ion f

the highest iv i l ianauthor i ty. hese bject ives i l l be achievedhrough:

i)

b

c .

d

po l i t i ca l o l i cy ;o ^ n - ^ - i n ^ n l i n r r 'v L v r r v r . r r ! P v r r v J t

socialprogrammes; nd

secur i t y pera t ions .

2t6

an2n2?nq-?-nnnn66



DRAT-T

rneasuress hepopu iace eeks ecur i t y ndecd, rovok ing n l l - cons ideredesponses

: c lass icnsurgentac t ic .

15. The government ay concludehata combrnat ion f select iveegisiat ion nd

smai l - sca le ,rec is ionecur i t yo rce pera t ionsou lds tand good hance f n ipp ing hei n s r r r o e n c v n t h e h ' r d

' nn r e e t i r - ch n w e v e l c r o s s i n p h a t h r e s h o l d : s s e l d n m e 2 s v a Su u , r r r r q J J ! e

sens i t i v i t yo po ten t ia l omest ic nd nterna t iona lepercuss ionsi rmly nc l ines

governmentowards he deferment f painfuldecisions.

16. Dur ing his hreshold er iod, heGovernment f Canadamonitors hesituat ionn

the strategic nvironment. f it deteriorates,elevantdepartments,uchas National

Defenceand ForeignAffairs, would begincontingency lanning. his would include

keeping he respect ive inisters nformed f possible apabil i t ies,pt ions, nd

restrictions, ithin the contextof the nsurgency's erceived auses ndobjectives. rom

this nit ia lplanning, strategic irect ive ouldbeprepared, ' et t ing ut he government 'spolicy vis-a-visengagementn the crucialareas f:

2 poli t ical, conomic ndsocial ol icy;

strategic nformationoperations; nd

mil i taryest imates ndplans.

11. Althoughsucha scenar ios l ikely o develop radually s heser iousnessf the

threat ecomes bvious, herearea number f issueshatwouldbe part icular ly enef ic ial

to mil i taryplanners, hould hegovernment ive hemearlyconsiderat ion.hese nclude,

but arenot I imited o formulat ing long-term oli t icalaim, ntegrat ing ndexpandinghe

requisitentel l igence nd secur ity ervices,ndcstabl ishing mult i-agencyramework

for theplanningandconductof secur ity ndotheroperat ionsequir ing iv i l , pol iceand

mil i tarycooperat ion. atural ly, ucheffor tswould be expanded houid hesituat ion

cont inue o deter iorate.

Sect ion5: Mil i tary Commitment

18. Guidedby the nat ional t rategic irect ive,he Canadian i l i tarywil i dcvelopa

mil i tary strategy, hich s a subset f nat ional t rategy. hedegree f preparat ion

enabled y this mil i tary strategy ur ing he hreshold hasewil l detenninehe ease fdeployment nd subsequentperat ionsor Canadianroops, he ear l ier hat iaison s

establ ishedetween he CF, govemment gencies,oal i t ion nd ocal orces, nd he

more ntegratedheplanning hathas akenplacebeforehand,hesmoother i l l be he

deo lovment .

'B - C C - 0 0 5 - 0 0 4 / A F - 0 0 0a n a d i a nF o r c e sO p e r a t i o n s a t e c i 0 0 0 - l 2 - 1 8 ; eeC h a p r e r " T h e C a m p a i g n

P I a n " s p e c i a l l y e c t i o n" C a m p a i g nD e s i g n " , r t i c l e 0 1 , T h e S t r a t e g i c. n v i r o n m e n t " :- ,

/ t a

+ / o

anrnr?no- r -nnnnAT



DRAFT

19. The aimof mil i tary ntervent ions to restorehesituatrono thepointwhere hepo l ice rconce ga in b le o main ta inawandorder . xper ienceas hown hat t i seasiero commit heArmy than o extractt , with the isk hat hemil i tary eplaces,atherthan upp lements ,he oca l o rces . ' f h isr tua t ion us tbeavo idedn the nte ies tsfmaintaininghepropcr elat ionshipetween overnment,ol ice, nd hearmed orces, swell aspreservinghe secur ityorces'morale nd herr tanding ith thepopulat iont, .v i l l ave o serve pon he eturn o normalcy,

20. when operatrngn support f a fr iendlygovcrnment,hecF mustbeseen ooperate lear ly n suppor l f thecivi l powerandnot n isolat ion iom it . Thiscanbeaccomplished ore eadi ly f the ocaisecur ityorces re ncorporatedntomil i taryplanningwhenever ossible, nd hecivi l governments seen o be mplement inghoseaspects f pol icy,planning, ndcontrolwhichclosely f fectmil i taryoperat ions. s aroughout l ine, tableof c iv i l andmil i tary esponsibi l i t iess provided san Annex o this

chapter.

Militarv Re sAdviceon theoveral l i rect ion f secur ityforceoperations

Def iningpol icy,part icular etermining:- at which levelsof the government

an dsecurity orcehierarchydecistons n policymatters fvaryingdegrees f importance reto be aken.

limits to be mposeduponsecurityforceplanningandoperations, othovert andcovertpol icy or intel l igence,

andcoordinat ion.

informat ion ndcounter-n d e n n ] i n . r

E s t a b l i s h i n ghe i r l m a c h i n e ryo r i a i s o nwith thesecur ityorces n al l planning nd

rationalmatters

Draf t ingandpromuigat ingegislat ion,i ' . ^ l " . l i - ^i l r L l u u l i l B

s l n s r B c i l u y p O W e f S .

Maintenance

commodi t ies

Themil i tarycontr ibut iono oint /combined

act ion n:- Planning- Intel l igencendsecur ity- Informationandcounter-

propagandaolicy

Assistancen theprovision f securecommLlntcat lons.

Adviceon:

- TrainingExplosiveOrdnance isposal

Equipment nd weapondeve lopm en t .

direct ion

Civ i l Resnons ib i l i t ies

The ormulat ion f thepol i t icalaim and helong-term lanning over ing hedurat ionof military commitmentand ts aftermath

T h e p r o v i s i o n o f c i v i l i n t e l l i g e n c e A s s i s t a n c e * i t f f i

and engineer esoLl rces

(EOD)

5 t 6

of s tocks f essent ia l



DILAFT

Main tenancef essent ia le rv ices

Tab le4-1 :A Compar ison f C iv i l and Mi l i t a ry l {e pons ib i l i t ies

Sec t ion : Wi thdrawa l

21. The withdrawal hase f mil i tarydisengagementayproveprobLemat ic. hi lst

no goverrrmentr miLitary spireso a protracted onf l ict , istoryprovides cant ew

examples f short- l ived ounter insurgencies,here s always hepotent ialhatpubi ic

an t ipa thy , anr fes tn w idespreadppos i t iono a dep loymentnddemandsor

uithdrawal, ould orm a strategic hal lcngeo thc Coverr lment f Canada nd he

mil i tary o maintain he moraleof thepublicandof mil i taryelements eploycd nd n

training o deploy.The key eiementn achievinghese bject ivess a strategic ubl ic

al lalrsprogramme.

22. Potentially,a domesticor international ettlementmay allow fo r a swift troop

withdrawal. Nevertheless,he historyof COIN indicates greater robability hat a

prolongedattritionalstrugglewill ensue.Often he l\l govemmentwill only regain

control of its disaffected erritory area y area.This willnecessitate prolongedmilitary

withdrawalphase.Therefore,asmilitary manoeuvre orce evelsare reduced, t will be of

vitai mportance trategical lyo careful lymanagehe nformat ion perat ionsampaign.

In March1964,hefour-month eriod.

LINFICYP.

Govemmentof Canada greedForty-one years ater,as of this

to deployroopso Cyprusor awriting, heCF s still nvolvedn

6i6

A n t n a o n d ^ n ^ n n E A



D R A F T

CFIAPTEI {5 :

OPERAI ' I ONAI , -LEVF] , I - ONS DEI {ATIONSFO I COUNTERINSURGENCY

li the rtng-terrno/ i t icaloh1cl i t ,e . ;nat ir .st n hent int lof r t l lpctr t ig iput t t .sherav il l be u lendenc'yo odr,tplshorl-lerrn,tcl ocn1ea.tltre.\'n raspon.\'eg il.suycant t.l , t ' r t t t i r Id ( l i I i l \

Sr rRohc r l ' f hon t pson

SECTION I : IN 'TRODUCTION

, f i n ta nd C o m b i n e d s p e c t s l ' C o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y ,

l' I he

p lann ing ndconduc t f COIN at heOpera t iona leve l equ i r cs mi ldse td i f f b ren tf t 'o t t t onvcn t iona la r f igh t ing . i l i t a ryun i t s end o be ra ined , rgan izedld eqLr ippcdbrcOllvct . t t ional'varf ight ing,ccessitat ingreor ientat iono defeatnsurgcncy. OIN-wil l bcconduc tedhrough o in t and ombinec iommand,n t imate lyinkec ji t h . iu i l iun po l i t i ca lac t iv i t ies . ' l ' heh i f i n log ica l mphas isiom des t ruc t iono persuas ionequ i res rca te r warc ressc f in te l l igencend nformat ion .lanners us tcons is ten t lymphas izehemin imLrn ise 1 ' fb rcerather hanmaximum ircpower. l l of thesewil l require greater egree f cooperat ionpdulr i t l 'of ef for t . ,v i th morediverse ange f c iv i l ianandsccur itybrceactorshan s cl lstomarvtr . ) t l tnYwithin hemil i tary

?- . S t rL rc tu ra l ly ,rgan iza t ionst hcopera t iona levc lw i l lm i r ro r hose iv i l andn i l i t a ryar ra l lgen len tsrea tcd t hes t ra teg iceve l , husensur ingont inuedo in t andcombinedntegr i t yth roughouthevar iouseve ls f command. i l i t a ry eaderst heopera t iona levc lu , i l lcop t isuet ' ' ) sstrrehat ni l i tary f for ts etnain ubordinateo poli t ical-c iv i l onstraintsrrcleclLl i lc lnents,l -h isw i l i ho ld ruc egard lessf thesh i f t ing i lb r tandcmphas iss he nsursencvvo lves ,

S ing lcC 'onrmander ys tem

l . l in i t y 'o1 'c f fo r ts fac i l i t a tedy organ iz ingheCOINcampa ign nder s ing leco t r l l t t anc le r .r Commi t tee i rec to r .Whi le heperson oc ics igna teJ royec iv i l ian r rn i l i t a r l , ,i l i s c r i t i ca lha t espons ib i l i t yo rovera l l i r ec t ions ves lec iiope hcadquar te r . sov isors i l ib 'e l radc va i iab leiom al l o f t he e levant ar t i c ipa t inglemcnts , uch s hec iv i l se rv icc . o l r ceand l r i l i t a ry

fhecommat ldc r i l l oversce commi t t cc .s tab l ishcd

o ensL l r cha ta l l p lans r rdac t io l l s rcconduc tcdowards contmon oa l .

( lonrmi t tecSys tc rn

'1 ( )pc ra t iona l -1cve lcommi t teea t ' c b r r le . aga in .mi r ro r inghcs t ra teg ic - lec l co ' rnand.I hcsc or r t -n iL teesi lconduc to in t p lann ing ,n order o ensurehat he ep icsen to t i "esLrbord ina tclcn len tsxec l l t e uch lans n a manncr eep ing i th heoverarch ingaurpa igup la r l

l - heac tua l ommi t t ce t ruc tu rcnd cprcsenta t ionv i l l , ,ary e t r . veennsurce ] rc res .nd

( h 5 : 1 r 1 1



DRr\Fl '

i ; i i i ec i j i l l l i ke l changc s heconf l i c t voLves ,s a t l i t t t t r t L lm.epresenta t ives" r l l nc ludehc

I , lNpo l i t r ca l nc i i v i l au thor i t ies .os l -na t ioul i l i t a ry 'andecur i l v u thor i t les .o l i t i ca l ncc iv i l

t t . o t rpon t r ibu t ingepresenta t ivcs ,loopcont r ibu t ingn i l t t aLyo tnmandersndse lec t ta f f .

sccur i t ; , con t r ibu t r r - rgepresenta t ives ,ndprobab lyn tc rna t iona lrgan isa t ion 'sepresenta t ivcs .

,S A kcy facror n makingsuchan organizat ion ork ef fect ivelys trust .fhis

is of ten

c l i i ' f l cu i ro es tab l ishc ross i f f e r ing u l tu res . orcxamplethemr l i t a ryequ i r cuentor sccL t r l t l '

l nc lexper t isen app l ied io lences poten t ia l l yheant i t hes isf human i ta r ianGOs 'ner : t t ' a l

L ra lspa lcncyndabhor rencef th ings n i i i t a ry .fhe

Cornmi t tee i rec to r , nda l l mc tnbers -nus t

con t i lua l l l , ndac t iye ly t r i ve o ma in ta in u tua l pennesandconf ic lence .

S E C - T I O N : P L A N N I N G A N D E X E C U T I N GT H E C A M P A I G N

0 P E R A T I O N A I , C A M P A I G N P L A N N I N ( ;

( r - lhen inecounter insurgencyr i r r c ip lesdent i f iedor hesuccess fu londuc t f opera t ions ,

asdetai iecln Chapter , mustbe clear lyunderstood,nd ntegratednto dai ly operat ions. '

Devc lop i lg [e mi l i t a ry spec ts f a COIN p landepends r lmany ac to rs , utusua l lynvo lve he

secLrr ing1'a lnn base rom which o operate. nce his s establ ishcd i l i tary orces hor"r ld

tScpseizc he nit iat ive n separat inghe nsurgentiorn hesupport lng opulat iot t ,n order o

suppor thegovernment 'subsequentmb i t ions .

7 .' lhe

long- t c rm b jec t ive us tbebased ponthe nsurgent ' sen t re l -g rav i t y , h ich v i l l

b,e heorganizat ions,ncl ondit ionshatcreate ndsupporthe nsurgency,ndnot ndividual

terror ists r their act tcs. igherheadquartersndnat ional ourcesanprovide aluable

ip te l l ige lce nc l n fo rmat ion ,u t w i l l se ldom eab le o prov iden fo rmat ion f t he equ is i te

qLral iLyo conduct act ical perat ions.-he perat ional lanning rocess i l l therefore edicate

sigl i l icant arnount f ef for t owards cquir inghe nformat ion ecessaryo target he nsurgents'

c cn t r c 1 'g r av i t y .

( ] A M P A I G N O B . I E C T I V E S

8.' [

he a i rno{ ' rn i l i t a ry pera t ionss to ass is the ros t a t ion overnmento re -es t t ib l i sh

cont ro l h roughouthecount ry o hat hec iv i l admin is t ra t ionanexcrc isetspropcr unc t ion .

l 'hcn i l i t a ry co tnmander 'saskwiL ino tbeass t ra igh t fo r rvards s ike lydur ing o t lve r l t io t la i

r var lh rc . [ c Opera t iona l lann ing rocess ust akeaccoL ln tf a rv ide ange f po l i t i ca l ,

ccc tpgur ic ,i v i i anc l ecur i t yn te res ts .hese ea l r t iesrc e f lec tedn theway n wh ichopera t i t lns

aresLrb . jcc to theapprova lo f hec iv i l adr r in is t ra t ionl r roughhe o in t co tnmi t teeys ten l .n

posr ns ta lces .hc opera t iona lianwi l l a im o iso la te ndneut ra l i zehe nsurger r t so th nora l ly

a r - .dh l , s ica l ly , ' t i r roughimu l taneous lyonduc tedndpara l le l o l i t i ca l . oc ia l . nd n i l i t a r l '

a c t r 0 l r s ,( ' c n i r e f ' ( i r av i t v

i i r r n i n sp r i n c i p l e sr e :E f f c c t o L i t i c a lr i r n a c y .r o t r t o t c ' t j n i t . vt

l . ) , r r n r i c s ,x p l o i t r r t e l l i g e n c e ;s o l a t ch e n s u r g e n t s ;p o i yP o r v e r

. - ( . :i r r r C o n r n rt r r en t , nd ,C o r t d c t Pos t - lt su rgenc l ' a nnn g

( I r5 : 2 r l 1

Purposc . n d e r s t a n dh e n s u r q e n c v ' s

D i s c r i r n i n a t e l y ;e u t r a l i z eh e n s i t r g c n t ,

A n r n t 2 ' l n t n n n n A ' l



DRAFT

! ) Thes t ra tegrcen t re f g rav i r l ,. r , i l l e hc eg i t in rac l ,o fhegovernrnent .o thc o n l c s t t c a l l rn d n t e r n a t i o n a l i y .p e r a t i o n a l l y ,v h r i s thc r c s n o tn e c e s s a r i l yn i f o r p i l ,obv ror - r sperar iona l -1e 'e len t re f g rav i t1 , ,

hesuppor t f themasses f thepopu la t ionor he(JLr \ ' c rn l ren t .acqLr i redhroLrgho l i t i ca l c t ion . sa fe nd ecure nv j ronmentnd ocro-ecor tomicrogrammess oneof veryh ighs ign i f i cancct is f rom hisopera t iona len t re fg raV i t ; 'ha t he nsurgentsraw he i r reedom { 'ac t ion ,hys ica l t reng ih ,r v i l l o f rgh t .A l though arnpa ign)ann ing l ls t uppor theoverarch ingf fo r t ga ins the nsLr rsen ts 't ra teg icccn t re f g rav i t y , pera t iona l - leve leadersh ipus t e te r rn inehe e levant b iec t i i u , i ih in he i ra rea f opera t ions .o ten t ia lr i t i ca l i c ldsmay nc lude ies t ruc t ionr c i i s rup t ionf insLr rgep ts ,higher Omntandndcontrol t r l lctures,emoving earof repr isals r . ' - rnngr ihegenera)popu la t i . n , r t hepro ' i s ion f u t i l i t i cs ndmed ica l ic l o soc ie ty t a rqc .

llcr511ctryLtt

10 . F r om h eope r a t i o t r a lcn t r e f g r a v i t y n a l y s i s ,h ep i l l a r s f ' t h c n s u r g c n t s ' c a n r p a i g ncanbe dent i f ied .hegovernmentndsecur i t yo rceshen arge t l rese i l la rsn order o redr rcet l l c nsurgcn ts 'n f luencc r ho ldon hepopLr la t ion ,e t t inghecond i t ionso preva i l ver hci t - l su rgenten t re 1 'g rav i t y .hese ec is ive o in ts rede te rminedhrough s i ra teg icpprecra t lonp'roccss,iom whichwil l f low further perat ionalnd act ical st imates ndplans.

fhemil i tarv

aspec t hou ld brmbutones t randn a coord ina tedssau l tpon he nsurgents 'overa l lims .\Vhi le ni l i tarv brcesmayhavea cr i t ical ole o playdur ing eftain tagei f thecarnpargn,rsovera l lcon t r ibur ioni l l besecondaryndshou ld ekept n pc rspec t ive .

l l Thercwi l l t yp ica l ly e bur ines f opera t ronhat repo l i t i ca l , i v i l ian2 ,ega l inc ludrngpo l ice nc l j t rd ic ia ry )ndmi l i t a ry ,work ing hrough ser ies f se lec tedec is ivc o ln ts ndcoo |d ina tedhrougho in t command f for tso ach ieveespec t iveo l i t i ca l , i v i l ian . o l i ce nc l

nr i i i tary bject ives ulminat ingn theachievementf thecnclstatesdepictedn f igureL Oncet l t e arnpa ignlan s deve iopedt mus tbe ev is i tedont inuous ly ,s n .surgenrc t iJ i t iesnc jte r t ia ry f f 'ec ts i l l causc ec is rveo in ts ndob jec t ivc .so sh i f tbo th n t imeandspace.

2 l : , . l r 'he pL l rpcrsesf brev i t y ,p o l i t r c a lr r C i v t l t a n .n r e a l r n

( ' h . 3 r l i

i t . sc o n s i d e r e dh a l c o n o t r i c

t h c s e \ ' o u l d e 6 u i t i - l a y e r e d

an db u s i r r e s si n e s f ' o p e r a t i o nr e n c l u d c dv i t h l r o s ea nds e c t o r a lu t , , v o u l dv e r l a p .



t)RAF'T

OPPOSI NGC Of C

(,,

\

POLITICAL

F gu e I : l \ lu l t i agencY PProach

I m p l e m e n t i n gh c C a m P a i g n I an

12. Phases . a rnpa ign lan mp lementa t ionayconven ien t lyed iv idcd n toa numbero l '

p ,6ases .l t hoLrghn nsurgency i l t dcve lop neven ly c ross na f f l i c ted oun t ry ,hcnat iona l

i t ra reg ic lanwi l l lay downpr io r i t iesor theprosecu t iouf thc campa ign ,oss ib ly onccn t ra t ing

on seiccted rcas n turn.At the operat ionalevel hephasesn any onearea renot mutualy

crclLLsivc.he COIN requirementsn these if ferent reasnay herefore e understoodhrough

t)rcct inent lY opular three-blockvar"construct .

l l . Secur ing I laseArea . t canbe ant ic ipa tedhat hehos t a t ion overnmer l ti l l have

sLr f l l c ien tonr ro l f i t s cn i to ry o prov ide secure asewhere e in fo rc ingoa l i t io r ron t inger t t s

can bu i lc l p andes tab l ishssent ia luppor t leme ts.Cons idera t ionus lbeg iven o no t

over.burdeni lghehost rat ion;l- r is anbe bcstachievedhrough ncreasedelf -sLrf i lc iency1'

rhedep loy ing n i t s Incorn ing i l i t a ry brmat ionsndun i t s hou ld edep loyed n thesame

geograph ica las is s hehos t -na t io r recur i t yo rces , o r respond ingi th heboundar ies1 ' thc

c iv i l adr l in i - r t ra i ion .r s poss ib lehorvcver ,ha l hes i t t ra l ionasdeter io ra tedo thccx tcn t ha t

p r ) l rea s sa le r t t rn nsu lgen t c t i l ' i t 1 ' ,t t nar ' t here lb rcc ncccssaryo ho ldsorncogts t ic ssc ts

a l lou tc l . . n : i : i t i r c j oun t f y v l i i le roops reco t r l l t t i t t edo secure base rea . ro t t i h issccL t rc

_

( . h 5 r i l

an)o)?10-4 .on0n63



DRAFT

i l r . ca .f o i )ps f 3 dep lo ) ' edn tohos t i j e c t ' r i t o r vo beg in he p roccss 1 ' r c i n t eg ra t i nc5c l a i rda rdp c o p l e t i p t u r e d 1 n e e b e l s

1 1 L s t a b l i s h n r e n t o l ' a F i r m l : o r r . v a r d O p e r a t i o n a la s C ] F a ! l ' l - h i s i s t h e i n i t r a lr o p o l ' o r Jrn hc uche lhu i le . s t ra tegy ,orexample ,t maybe easrb leo cs tab l r shfo rward nera t rona lbasc L t sur tab lerov rnc ia lap i ta l l i i chhas ecomcso la tcdrom hearea t i l lJoy . ,a lo t5ci lovc l 'nment re f 'e rab lyhearea e lec tedhou ld eone v i th rad i t iona loya l r ieso thego\ ' c f l ln len tuherchepopu la t ionv i l i ead i lva1 ly ack o i tso ld a l lep iancencc t l . cc lsec r , r r clrot l tan nsr-rrqcntf f 'ensiveudser ioLrserror ist t tack.

l 'hearea eLectcciustbc o'c t l ' rat a'

bc conso l lc la tec iu ick )y ndused sa base or fu r ther pera t ionses igncdo l jnk L rpi , i r h henra in ase ndcx tenc l overnmcnton t ro lo o thc r reas .

15 . Secur inp Cont ro l led rea .Of f cns ive pera t iousre onduc tcdn order o separa tchci l ls l t rgel l tsiom thcirsLlpportcrs,bodsuppliers,ndsourccs f infornrat ionrr heclcsigrratecla rca . r " r c l lpc ra t ionsre o bebased n ac t ionab le

n te l l igencendsound lann i r rg .iy i iadrn in is t ra t ioni l l t henbe e-es tab l ishedsareas f hos t i leer r i t o ry re ieared f t in r . . , rg .n , r .J 'hcarmY la l 'p rov ideobus t ecur i t y r - rppor to thcpo l ice , r beaskedo hc lp s ra in oca laLrx i l ia rvbrceshatw i l l sL rppor thcpo l icewhen hecoa l i t io r ro rccs . r , i t hdraw. ' l ' heser -esh lycort t rol lcd reashenprovide irrnbasesor fur thersecur itypcrat ions nt i l graduallyheent irecount r ) /s res to redo governmenton t ro l .

16 . I :o l low-on pcra t ions .u rve i l lance ,ased lpon co i re ren tlan , rov idesn fo rmat io l r - rthc nsurgcn ts .on t r ibu t ingi rec t ly o thee f fec t ivenessf fb l low-on pera t ions .h issuppo lsl{ - )118-rangeaidsandpenetrat ionsesignedo destroy pecif icargets, uchas nsurgcntconcc t l t ra t ions .ey nd iv idLra ls ,r supp l ies epressnsurgcn t o ra le udsuppor the r ienc l ly" I l ca r t s ndNl inds" arnpa ign .uch urg ica l pera t ionsre aunchedn lywhen heres

su t f i c icn t lyc l iab lc nddeta i ledn te l l igcnceo make uccesser ta in .

17. Rslqt ionship et*eer . Counter- insurgencycperat iot ls ay bc groLrpednto wo categor ics,el 'ensivcndol ' fensive. eneral i t r , , , , ,descr ibeshcse ategor iesnd he e la t ionsh ipe twe n hemas b l lo rvs :

I ' - i rst lyhere redefensive perat ions. hichare hose esignedo preventinsurgentsiorr disrupt inghe government 'srogramme. econci lyhere reo l ' f -ens ivepcra t ions ,h icharc hose es ignedo roo tou t l re nsurgenrsl l len tseves , . i t i s wor thno t ic ing ow rnpor tan tt i s o s t r ike ba lancc e t r . r ,eent l re r , 1 ' t oor t t l c mp l - ras issp laced n defens ivexeasurcsn order oconcentrateesourcesn theoffensive,he nsr,Lrgentsrcof l 'creclnopporrupity

t t l ach teve asy uccesscs ,h ich heycanLrseo embar rasshegovernmel t udl l le rebv t tdern i inetssuppor t .f , on heo ther and , oo i t t leemphas iss p lacedou o l leus ive pera t ions ,he nsurgentrgan iza t ionc ts igger ndb iggerand never - inc reas ingropor t ion f thecount ry 'sesourcesas o bedevotedo theSecLrr i tyrorce for defensive ounterrneasLrres,o irateventual lyhe nsurgeqtsach ievehe r a imby mak ing t appearha t hepr ice f fu r - theres is tances Gol r [ 1 r .

'I : r i r n kK t s o l . l J t r n c l . if l . ' t , e . . o n d o n : a b e ra n d F a b e , I 9 7 1 .p a . s . t r i . t

( ' h - - i : 1 1 1



DRAF'T

lE . Opcra l io r ra lndTac t ica l, cve ls J 'Cont ro l hc rc ia t ionsh ipe tvveenheopera t rona lnd

t i r c t i ca leve l f con l ro l u r ing ounter insurgenc \ /per r t ionsv i l id r f fe r b r each i tua t io r t ,nd

r r i l l no tbeasc lear u tas s thecase f convent iona la r .Ac t ions t he owes t ac t ica leve l a l t

l r av ,ear each ing pera t iona lndeven t ra teg iconsequence, ndeed,f the es t lwhether

rherc s a po l i t i ca l i r nens ions r ig id ly pp l ied , ver l 'pa t ro is po ten t ra l l yonduc tedt he

"opcra t iona l ' 'evc lbecauseheconduc t f an nd iv idLra lo ld ie r , mp l i f ied y themed ia . an

bccgr le n ssue eqr - r i r ingt ra teg ict ten t ion . thought lessoveor over reac t iont sec t io t l r

p la loon eve l ancas i lyhave ami f ica t ionsbovehe mrned ia tcac t ica ieve i .

SECTION 3: APPLICATION OF MIL ITAI IY DOCTI I . INE

l9 lv{anoeuvr istpproach.While hepast s repletewith examples f a straight forward

att r i t ional pproacho operat ions,he ecord fat t r i t ionalsuccessn counter insurgencys

gepcra l l l , a oorone.L , f fec t ive OIN p laces ueemphas isn he n te l lec tua lndpsycho log ica laspcc ts t 'opera t ions ,o ts imp ly themater ia l .t emphas iseshe ocus n peop le nd deas , ot

o l l y ,on ground.nsurgentohes ions den t i f ied ndat tackedy app ly ing oncent ra tedet

d isc re teorceaga ins t r i t i ca lweaknesses .u rp r ise ,empo. nds imu l tane i t yrcused o

over rvhe lmndunh ingehe nsurgent ,r ing ing bout cornp le teo i lapse f w i l l . ar rd l t i r na te ly

5e lp ipg o c rea tehecond i t ionsorpo l i t i ca l e fea t .t i s wor themphas iz inghat orce s app l ied

se ec t ive iy ; e t ruc t ions a tneans otancnd

20. \4issionComrnand. choing hesent iment f Sir Robert hornpsonhatopenedhis

chapter, OIN successequires l lpart ic ipantso be act ively ware f the ong-term oals nd

thc plan o get here.The mission ommand pproacho leadershipeaff irmshisview.

eniphasiz, ingnfonned nit iat ive hroughouthe orce.This methodologys part icular ly

app l icab leo COIN, g iven hekey olep layed y low- levc l ac t ica l ommanders ; i l i t a r i l y ,( 'O lN is qu i teo f tena p ia toon ndsec t ion onf l i c t .

21 . Successn Opera t ions . ucccsss def ined y thes ta te f a f fa i r s h ichnccds o be

ach icved y theendof a campa ign . incc nsurgencys pr inc ipa l ly po l i t i ca l t r l rgg le .t maybe

t6at 5eclesired im of the governrnental lsshortof victory n a str ict lymil i tarycontext nd

se t t ing . OIN "success" ay equateo hand ing veran nterna l ecur i t y rob lem o thec iv i l

po l icc . r s imp lyno t os ing . f , f o r example ,he n ten t ion f commi t t ingroopss to buy ime n

which o aclclressart icular r ievances,hendramat ic act icalmil i tarysuccess ay in factbe

cc)up tc r -p roc luc t ive , ' l ' r oopsus tbeaware f ' t hemi l i t a ry o leandcommandershou ld e lec t

acc r l ra teleasL l resga ins t h ich o udge heef fec t ivenessf rn i l i t a ryac t ics , round apt t t red

haseven ess ign i f i cancen counter insurgencyhan t does n convent iona le r f igh t ing

N4 i ) i t a r i l ypeak ing .a rnpa ignic to ry nayequateo theconta inmentf thev io len t spec ts1 ' the

i lsL r rgenc ; .o a le r , ,e lvherehepo l ice andca lw i th thern ndsoc ie tyunc t ions or tna l lv .

j l . L )cs r lo rng t l - r c ._ lnsursen ts .n COIN phys ica l es t ruc t ionI the enemy t i l lhasar r

i1 . t1 - .e1 ' , . , , ,. lL - o p lay .At t r i t ionwi l l benecessary ,u t henumber f insurgentsi l lec i hou ld c

: - .otL . r3 : i t a : rs abso lu te ly ecessaryo ach icve L lccess .herever oss ib le ,so f t " ne thodsl l '

l ' r cL i l : ' . l l i z i i t gheenemy - ar res t , hvs ica lso la t ion . r subvcrs io l l- a rc norc ike ly c ladvancc

t t . S . ) . , e.nu tcn t ' sausc .n an era n vhrch t r tensened ia c r l t t iny nddontcs t ic r td n te na t io t la l

( i r i 6 , l l

Ln)n) ' t .4 n-A_nnnnAA



t )RAFT

icu l l o r ' ' c r s igh ti ' i l lbeconrcro re n a t tendance.ound. ldgenrcn tnc j lose on i ro l . , , j l leed obeexerc iscd

] 3 . @ . A t t a c k r n g t h e i n s u r g c n t s ' w i l l ( a n d b y i n f e r e n c e u n i tcohes ion)s ike ly o bemorcproduc t ivehan hys ica l t t ack . a r l r cu la r lyn theear l . vtascs l 'a( 'o lN caurpa igne lo rehe nsurgencyas onso l ida ted .here remanyvva) , su rvh icht rsposs ib leo a t tack nd e izc he n i t ia t i veiom an nsurgentroup .Exper ienccas hown hatacor l lb ina t tonf ac t r v i t iesimu l taneous lypp i ied as hebes t hancc f succcss . - fhehrcem.s tapp l r cab lepproachesnvo lve reempt ion ,is loca t ion .ndd is rup t ront heopera t iona lndt l c t i ca l c v e l

21. Attqrkr lg&lsdp- l] . Any cornbinat ionf theabove ct iv i t ies anbe usclul n shat ler ingthecnc tny 'snora l ndphys ica l ohes ion . ohes ionanbeat tackedhrough oth e tha l ndnon-lc tha l ncans . i repower ayneut ra l i seeynodes r ce l ls . h i lePSYOpS nc l UMIN' l 'C isor ien t .o t r lusend

rans fo rmthers . lass ic o l iccworkwi l l underminenerny ohes ionycv idence ather ing ,nes t , nd ega l c t ion . u rp r iseanbeach ieved,or examplq hroughdevc lop i r rgn fo rmat iony a l l sourceshenac t ing n hecueof in te l l igenceat i re r ingechno logyt : ' r l [ jMINT. I tap id xp lo i ta t ionf th is n te l l igencey e i thc r over t c r ion r rap idconcent ra t io t t1 'combatorcesn toa g ivenarea .sewsonfus ionndd is rup t ionhroughoLr theel lc lny's tr t lcture.hisoccurs n largepar l becausehe cveiof t rustwithir - r ncl nronssrpemvc e l l s sc o m p r o m i s e dnd e d u c e d ,

25' Simultaneitv. l l ef fect ivensurgent trategiesmphasiseimultanety by creat ipgpara l le l o l i t i ca l ndsoc ia l ha l lengesswe l l asmi l i t a ryones .f theuseof s imu l tane i t ysprodttct ir , 'eoI the nsurgent,hen t i s equally ppl icablebr theCOIN e for t .Tact ical lyt canbeach ievedhroughhe es t ra inedndcare fu l l y ons idercdse f 'am ix o f agenc ies ,ndby

gror-rpingor ir ldependentct ion, uchas oint mil i tary-pol iceatrolswith compat ibleconlnrunical ionsorking o a singlcheadqr-rar ters.perat ional lyt is achievedihroLrghhede i "c lopmentl1 'a a r rnon izedampa ig r - rl ana longmul t ip leines 1 'opera t ion .sdcscr rbec iprcr . r r r s ly .

2 ' 6 . i . @ ' A l l C o I N o p e r a t i o n s , i n c o n t r a s t t o c o n v e n t i o n a l w a r f i g h t i n g . a r e

altnost lr lal 's onductcdn a non-cont igr-rousatt lespace.ormostpurposesher.es no reararca . l ia reasequ i re ecur i t y . ecausel the c lose lyn tegra tcda tu rc f the esps lscor i r sLr f {enc} ' ,J iaspec tsf the n i l i t a ry arnpa ignnus t eequa l ly a lanced. - f5ei ' shou ld . , c rL 'e s i le0 tacu la r ,so la tcducccssor oncar rn f gover r iment .u ta sequencef successeshatccnlbr ineo r '" 'orkn cornplementaryays owarda single trategic oal.The carrpaign laps l roLr lc ic d i rec tedn suc l ' r way as o sequencendcoord ina tehec i r s t rnc tines f opera t io .

acc t l rd ingo theovcra l l t ra teg iccqu i rementst he imc . ' f he n ten t s o over laphec ,pe fa tona lp lans f eachwi th heothers .

S E C ' f O N . 1 :K E Y S E C U R I T YF O R C E P A R T I C I P A N T S

l ' h c A r n r r " s t o l e n C O I N

( l h T i l l



D R A F T

)1' lhc

predominantc rv icen counternsurgencys t l ieAru tvaL thoughi r Forces 11en

p^1ars t l ' ongL lppor t ingo lc .UnLessi r c usurgentsre o inec i 1 ' nou ts ide o lve r . v i th

s rgn i l r can tava l nda i r o rces . oun le r insurgencvi l l r emai r - rr iman ly g round orce

respons i l t i i i t y.vr thheother wo Serv icesc t i r - rgaLge lyi r suppor l .Wh i lespec i f i c r r r y ' ro lesr i i l l bc expandcd pon n chapter , heArmy canexpec to beca i led pon , a r t i cu ia r lyt he

t r r c t ica leve l . o employ t s rad i t iona lk i l i s , ang ingrom prov id ing bserva t ronndsecur i t \ o

c los ing, i t h anddes t roy ingheenerny . he sub t le o l i t i ca l uancesnderp inn ing OIN

cpcra t ions ,o r - rp ledi th hed isperscdature f thebat t lespace ,towevcr ,cqu i res rea te r

r r i t ia t i vc nd lex ib i l i t v t hc sub-un i t . ia toon ndscc t ioneve l .

' l ' hel {o leo f Other Mi l i t a rv Arms and Elcments

,urr Supnort

28 . C lanad iani r Force pera t ionsur ing heKosovo arnpa igne tnons t ra tedhepoten t ra l

c f 'advancede hnology or survei l lance,arget cquisit ion ndattack f targcts.l hcse

capab i l i t iesavebcenexpandedpon hrough heuseof UAVs n AI 'ghan is ta r tnd husbecome

a s ign i f i can tnab le r i land opera t ions . a jo r mprovementsave een ch ievec ln redLrc ing

casLralt iesl tdcol latcral amageo infrastructureear he arget rea,which sccondary f f 'ects

tha t1 r 'adr t iona l lyi rn i t cd f fens ive i r suppor tn someCOIN opera t ions .

)9. ( lanada 's x tens ivexper icncen peacc uppor t pera t ionslso nd ica teshepoten t ia l

app l ica t ion1 'a i r owerwhcre he echno log ica lapbetween e l l igeren tsou ldbe a rgel -h rs

vvasl lL rs t ra tedy theuseof CF- l8s o de tc r ndneut ra l i zehee l fec t ivenessf g round orcesn

the ]a lkans . oncur ren t i t h ro ta ry v ia t ion 's urve i l lancendmob i l i t y -suppor t ingo les . :o r

( 'OIN operat ions,ixed-wingaircraf t anprovide he same ypes f support s heydo Jbr

convent iona lpera t ions ,uchas roop i f t and esupp ly , ndphotograph icndv isua lrrconnaissance.ir Force apabil i t resanescalate p to interdict ionnissiot- ts,hen worthwlt i le

t . l rgel.s,rnbe foundalongan nsurgent 'sinesof communicat ion. onetheless,nen)Llst ot

r - rndercs t imateheeneury 's b i l i t y o counterWestcr t rypeat rpower h rough ecept ion .educed

s igna tu rc ndeven o iv cve la i r de i -enceeapons uch sMANPADS.

i0. l - le l i cop tc rsaveobv ious o les or t roop ar ry ing , u rvc i l lancc ,ia ison , nd ac t rca l

he icop te ri f t o l 'assau l troops , u tshou ld lsobe u l ly ncorpora tedn to heovera l l oncept f

c rpc ra t io l t sn a rnanner i rn i la ro o ther ornbat rms.Av ia t ion aubeused n mat ty o les

conrparab leo those ivcn o a rmouredeconna issancceg iments 'u rve i l lance ,o in landarea

reconna issanceimagcry uppor to n te i l igence ,co l tomy f fo rce asks , ndC2.

Ndef$ppsa

I i . \ , 1uch i ' t hewor ld 'spopu la t ionives n l i t t o ra l ta tes nd n a rge oas ta l i t i cs .

t l i c r c lb rc .nar i t ime ons idera t ionsn such i t ua t io r - r si l l havc s ign i f i can tmpac t pon and

j ' f r : i ,nS . : \ a i suppo l t v i i l o n s i s t t p r ov id i r r g p o l i r i c a lt a t e m e n th r o u g h r e s e n c ca t r o l s .

c i t1 i - . r ' c l : t _ :\ sanc t io r . r sndb lockadcs .ndprov id ing o tne egree f suppor to r t roops shore .

) , r1a. s i lps ra1 ,be losc noLrgho prov ide t ime ly , r ighpro f i le ppearanceo demons l la te

s . r i - - : t . , l ic i . , r h rea tenedl l r , ,Cc- -nverse ly .ava l c rces ave heab i l i t i , t o overovcr hehor iz -on

( ' h : 8 r 1 1

40202310,8.000067



D R A F T

l i r rn ro longeder ioCs ,rov id ing , , ' "a rn i i rgo hos t i l c lcmen ls .i , i t h r jn imr - r r lro r ,oca t ion .sde t t ons t t a t ei n S o m a l i a , a n a d i a nav y h i p s a n r ov idc s e u r e oca t i onc r heN a t i o n a lC o n t m a n d l c m e n i . ss r : r i ngo m m u n i c a t i o n se t w e e nhed e p l o y e dn i t s ndN D I I e . 1nadd i t ion , ava i v ia t ion anpoten t ra l l yugmenthco ther e l icop te rpera t ionsn- thea t re ,

i2 A rna . jo rmmedia tedvantagcf Nava l o rces i th roops mbarkedpdava i lab leor counter insurgencypera t ionss ha l he base rea" s sccure ndcos t f fcc t i r . ,eTIrcres no t leed o -Quardhc barracks hcnat sea nd he nsr-rrgentannotnountanl,cf f -ect ivcsur . vel lance f t roop c t iv i t y ndmovement

fheyarc hus ess u lnerab lendmorc lcx ib lc

than roopsocatcdn s ta t ic ases .

Spccal I -orc

33 .- I i re

organ isa t ionf ' spcc ia lro rcesSi r ) rn i t s ,hch ighqua l i t v , e rsa t i l i t l , a ldc t l l l lp rehens ive

ra in ing f thescroops , nd he i r apac i t yo work we l l n smai le rc lupsnaket i re rn a r t i cu la r lyu i tab leor Co lN. Carc hou ld e aken, owever ,ha t heybeLrsedocompJcmenta therhan ep lace onvent iona ln i t s .

i '+ Oneo1 ' the a incharac te r is t i csf mos tSpec ia l o rcess he i r apac i t yo ca f f youra vervra' ide pectrum f tasks anging rom discreet,dvisory is i tsof a few days hrough o apro longedantpa ignnvo lv ing x tendedep loymentsf a comple te qr . rac i ron .he i i i s ipg nc lt rai l l ing ; f local orces asbecome tradit ionalask or somespecialorces roops.

IRegardingheCanadian mbedded raining eam, raining he 1stBattal ion/ ]srBr igade/Afghan at ionalArmy] This s not he irst ime hat heCanadian orces avebeen nvolved n mentor ing oldiers f othernat ions, ut previousaskswereof a much

smallermagnitude.n the ast ew years,ndividualCanadian olcl iers ere nvolved ntrainingw'i th hearmies n SienaLeoneand n theCongo.This ime he21-personeam straining tlent ire nfantrvbattal ion, i th mentors t every evelof thecommand tructure.

Army Lessons earnedCentre, ul let in I 0 ,N o .

35 . Spec ia l o rces 'sk i l l s eve lopedor opera t ionsn convcn t iona la rcanbeapp l iedcqLra l lyl ' f ec t ivc lvn those ounte r insurgencyampa igns here arge reas ave i r i len nc lc rheadvcrsarv 'son t ro l . r i t i shSASopera t ionshroughouthe 19,50snd1960s xenp l i f ieshi sc lcep enet ra t iona t ro l l ing ndsurve i l lanceapab i l i t y anad ian Fpersonne l i i l a lso eca l lcc i non o prov idc xecu t ivendd ip lomal ic lose ro tec t io r - r ;heassass ina t ionf 'a

1 : r t l r r l inc t l tip lonra t icr rn i l i t a ryeadcr o r . r l c irov idehe nsurgentsi tha propagandac)up .

l 6' l

l t e la in cons t ra in tsn Spec ia l o rccs pera t ionsrepersonneL,eac t ioniu re . nc lend t t rance .ecar t sepec ia l o rces reusua l lycw n nur rber , asua l t iesannot ecas i ly rqu ick ly ep laced ecausef the ongse lec t ionnd ra in ing rocess . o reover ,he l tend o ackt ; r c t ica l ob i l i t y . nd equ i re dd i t iona log is t ic L rppor tnccdep loyedn the ie ld .Forexample .i : l hos t it :env i ronmentsrov is ion f r . va te ranpresenr majorp rob lem, sseeun Afghan is ta r r ' sn ) { ) L l n t a i l t s .

( ' h : 9 / l

A l l a ^ n a a n n n n n n ^ 6



DIIAFT

3 , ' S p c c i a lr o r cesr o v i d e n i q u c a p a b i l i t j e sb r C O I N H o r i ' e v e r .h c l ' c a n n l ; , b c

e lcc t ive f those i rec t ingl " reampa ign pprcc ia tche i rpo ten t ia l ,her r i r l i t a t ions . nd hc

p r i n c i p l e so v e r n i n gh e i r m p l o y m e n t .

[ , o c a l S e c u r i ty o r c e s

!olis-q-&r!!

38. the po l icc o ies , nd eve lo f fo rce mployed,cpcnd n thecu l tu re ndpreva i l ing

a t t i t udesf cach ount ry . ome ount r ics a in ta in arami l i t a ryo l ice brces , i t her n a

perntancntasis r asa reselrye,hich canbc feared/hatedn author i tar ianountr ies.n states

r. r , , i rcrcuch orces reacceptableo thepopulat ionheyprovidean mportant elrcf o thepol icc

c tu r ingheear ly tages f an nsurgency ,l low ing he at te r o concent ra tcn c r imcpreve t r t ie r r l .

I f t l r e ac t n a d isc ip l ined ndpro fess iona lannerhey nay avea usc fu l t ab i l i z ingl fec t .

cncorrral l ingnodcrate pinion o ral ly o thegovernment.

-19 . l t i s possrb leha t hepo l ice o rces f a s ta te renoto rgan izedr con t ro l ledn a tnanner

coutnton o l iberaldernocracies.herehavebeenmany nstances henpolice brces avebccn

poor lyorganized,l l equipped, r decidedly ost i le o any onn of cooperat ion it l i the ni l i tary.

Onc mustalsounderstandhe potent ial amif icat ion f using ormer-combatantsspol ice.E,r 'err

i l 'Canad ianeadersh ipas i t t l csay n thedec is ion ,ccount us tbe aken f t heseac to rs hen

p, la r rn ingheovcra l l ampa ign .

Ind iqe ousand r regu la r ux i l ia ryForccs

40. In a l rnos t l l COIN campa ignsovernmentsave t temptedo rnob i l i zei re oca lpopu la t iono pro tec themse lvesy fo rming ux i l ia ryorccs .Whensound ly ased, ens ib ly

c,rganizedndproper ly oordinated ith otherunits, hese orces aveproved ndispensablend

indccd , n occas ions ,hekey o a success fu la rnpa ign .

41. lr is not r ,u 'rusualor regular oldierso be scathing bout heappearance,perat ional

c l ' l i c iency ,igh t ing o ten t ia l nd oya l t y l 'aux i l ia rybrces .'h is a t t i t ude , sua l ly ' s temt t t ing

f lo r l an gnorance f thecharac tc r is t i csf aux i l ia rybrces nda misunders tand ingf the i r

n to t iva t ion .ogc ' .hc rv i tha lacko f apprec ia t ronf thewider ssues t s taken a CIOIN arnpa ign .

r r ta \ t avcunfb r tuna teonsequences .t canh:nder l t eproper eve lopmentf aux i l ia ryorces

and hc i r n tegra t ionn to heovera l l pera t iona llan .A l though henature f these b rces tav

d i f l ' c r e t r veenampa igus ,ommandersnds ta f fo f f i ce rs eed o unders ta t rdhecharac tens t rcs

c ,1 'Lhcsebrccs nd hc cqu i r cmcntsndprob lems ssoc ia tedi th the i r a is ing .

42 . Aux t l ia ry brces ont r ibu ten four na in reas : o tn tn i tment ;nanpower ,n te l l igence .

and. igh t ing k i l l s . ' l ' he ovcrnrncn tampa igno de ca tan nsurgency i l l s r . r cceedn ly f i t

r i , ins he oya l t i , and uppor t f t hepopr i la t ion .heac id es t f loya l t y s whetherhepeop le ' i l i

a c t i vev s L l p p o r l .h cC O I Nc a r n p a i g ni n c eh i sw i l l r n e v i L a b l t ' i n vo i v ei s k .C O l t . xsc r p e n s i r cn

pcrsonnc l .. i t h s r - : cces f 'L r iampa ignsar . , ingsecur i t y 'b rcc - to - insurgcn ta t ioo1- Lpo 20 .1

ALr r i l ia r_ r ,i t r ccs c ipnrcc t hepersonnc lcc lu i re rnen i .l ' hcv

arepar t icu la r ly ,use t i r lo rde fens ivc

( h i i l l l

A r r a n a a 4 n 4 n n n n n a o



DI {AFT

opcra t lons .e cas t l t ghemore r 'ob i lebe l le r - t la inedcgu la rioops ndpo l ice o l o l - j ' cns ivco p c r a i L o n s .r o p e r l yr gan r zedu x i l i a r l ' f b r c e s ' t h o r o L r g hn o w l e d g ef t h e r ro c a l r e a nc l t speop le ons iderab lyasehc n te lL igencerob lenr ,

hevarcmore rke lv o p ickup n fo rmat ionf lo l t l henc tq 'o rk i in fo rma l on lac tshat i nkv i l lagers i t h bothgovernmentnd nsLr rsen , .f i r r ceshan rc cgu la rroops hoarenotna t jvc o thearea r ina l l i r .o tne ux i l ia r r , f o rcesavcspec ia l i zedigh t ing k i l l s ,wh ichcon- ipLemcnthose f thc egu la ro rces .Whi le he l ,havcne i therhe ra in ing orcc lL r ipmcnto opcra teike egu la r o id re rs ,heymayexce l n cer ta in k i l l ss t t ch s lack ing , a t ro l l ing ,bserua t ion ,heuse f g round. ndcommunica t insv i rhhe oca lp o L r l a to

'13 8y the i rncCanad ianorces ep loy ,oca laux i l ia ryorcesmaybeunder ons idc rab leprcssurendd iscouragedy nsurgentuccesses .heywi l l need uppor t ndcncourageuren tsr^ ,e l i s hcoppor tun i t yo p laya pos i t i ve ndcons t ruc t iveo le n opera t ions .s a reas resLtcccssivelyrought ackundergovernmentontrol heywil l behandecjvcr o the ocal

adrr l i r l ist rat ir tnogether i th i tspol iccandarmed orces. hosc ecruited ndcleployecjn atc r r i t o r ia l as is ear he i rhornes l - rou ldeusc fu l ourcesf rn fo rmat ronndmake omnerenrgr r ides r rd . e rhaps .rov idc n le rp rc te rs .

41. Cus toms,mmigra t ion ,o rdc rPo l ice , ndCoas tguardsrea l ldes ignedo con t ro ll l lovelrent crossront iers ndcoast l inesndprevent mugglingWhile l iey enclo coucentratetJreir f for tsatof f ic ial lydesignatedrossing oints hcyalso ncorporare mobilcelement brpa t ro l l ing nrva tchedec to rs .'hese eru icesrcusua l ly e l l acqua in tcdi th f ie den t i t ies ,hab i t s nd outes scd y smugg le rsnd i lega l o rder rosscrs ,h ichan nsurgentrgan iza t io lvvi l l rseo lr lovc roops, rmsandequipmcntnto he hreatenedtate.nsurg"nir .oy also rv tobr ibcor subvcr l l l l c ia ls .Where hcyex is t heyshou id ebrought i t h in hesccr - r r i t yo rccs sc u r l v sP o s s i h l c

( ' h5 1 t / l



DRAFT

C H A P T E R 6

A I I M Y O P E R A T I O N S N C O U N T E R - I N S U R C E N C Y

S E C T I O N : I N ' I R O D U C T I O N

l . Amongs t l l hcvar ious n i l i t a ry sse tsep loyedo a COIN thea t re f 'opera t tons .

rheArmy p lays hecent ra l o le . t s ac t ica lun i t sonduc t l l opera t iona lunc t ions

(C 'o rnmand.ense , c t , Sh ie ld ndSus ta in )h rough xccu t ion f the h ree ypes f

operat ions: f f -ensive,efensive, ndstabi l i ty. ndeed, ivcn henature f COIN

opera t ions ,heemphas isn te rms f t i r neand csourcesi l l bea l loca tedo the at te r .

I In thc conduc t f fu l l spec t rumpera t ions ,n i t sw i l l ca r ry u t ac t ica lasks hat

r r i l l be . n te r rns f the i rpurpose ,hap ing , ec is ive r sus ta in ing ,n suppor t 1 - the vera l l

objcct ivcs ndcampaign.Through heoperat ionalunct ions,heywil l f ind. ix and

s t r ike .Wi th ina s ing le n i t ' sa rea f opera t ions ,nesub-un i t aybedefend ingndus t r ia l

v i tal points.anothermay beattacking recent ly iscoverednsurgentlQ, another

ass is t ingo l ice n conduc t ingnap eh ic le hcckpo in ts ndanother rov id ing ecur i t y

lo r c v i l ia i r on l rac to rsndass is t ingn a ree ns t ruc t ionro jec t .

Operat ions i l i be conductedhrough he appl icat ion f doctr ine, oth

convent iona lpera t ionsoc t r ine nd hatwh ich s spec i f i co a COiN.- l -ac t ics .

techn iquesndprocedures' l 'TPs) i l l bea l te redo meet he hrea t nds i tua t ionnlhearrc. l though act ical perat ions ay be planned ndco-ordinatedt thehighest

lcve ls ,he l 'mus tbecont ro l led ndexecuted t he owes teve ls . n i t sbecome nab le rs

l i r r he i rsub-un i t shat n t l l r nprosecu tehc ac t ica lasksn a dccent ra l i sedu tco-

ordinate Iashion.-he batt le, othphysical ndmoral, s foughtandwon at t l tesect iorr

andp la toon eve l .

SE,CTION2: ESTABLISFI INGTHE FOOTHOI ,D _ PHYSICAL AND MORAL

+. As w, i th nymi l i t a ry pcra t ion ,he i r s tphase f a CON fo rce ep loy rnent i l l

l i ke lvbe o sccurc bo tho ld . un i t / sub-un i t i l l beass igned,onra l ly , , n a rca f

oper i r t ionsAO) in wh ich t r v i l lbe cspons ib lcor heconduc t f f L r l l pec t ru rn

o l r c ru r t io r r s .

j . 1 'h isphys ica loo tho ld hou ld b l low l - re r inc ip lesndcharac te r is t i cs1 ' the

c lc f ' cnce .u rad . lus tedor COIN. ' Th is bo tho ldwi l l becomeat cas tn i t ia t l y ) hebase j

( )pc ra t ionsor theun i t / s r - rb -un i tt shor - r lde oca ted n key er ra inha t v r l la l lou ' the

[ : o r : x a r n p l e .hea rca

l b r c ep r o t c c t i o n r e a s L i l

l o c a l s n t h e r r r u i e d i a t e

( h a p6 : l / i l

w i L lh a v eO P s . t a n d - t o os i t i ons nd n t e r l o c k i n grcs f f i r e

s s b u t u , i l lu n l i k e i y l e a r l e l d s f l l r e n h eu r b a n r e a n d

a r e a n o r d e r o d e n t i f yh e o c a lpa t t c rn f l r f e

- t h a t s .d e f e n s i b l c .

l i a i s o nv i l l c c u r v i t l r

Anonat. l ' l ' t / /rnr l^a ' l



I ) ITAFT

f i ) f ccso responc iap iC l l ' t o nv hrca t r jnc idcn tin the ,AO, o sc izc uc lc ] c i toppo r t un i t r c st l d o p r o t ' i d c co r s t an t r c s e n c en hc , { C . A l l h o u g ht ; t ps rb c

def -ens ib le ,he oca t ronannot ev ie r , , , edsa fb r t ressn a h i l l , emote ndd js ran tio r rt i t c oca i opu lacet mus tbe ,physrca l lyndemot ionaJ ly ,r rongs t6e oca l opu laccI t tdbcc t ln t car to f t heda i ly andscapc . ' l ' heo ld ie rsius tbesee l to rn teqra tc ., i t h hepopLra t ion .

6 Apar t iom hcga in i r - rgf 'aphys icz r loo tho ld ,hc rn r l i t a ryorceml rs t a rnr lo ra l i lo tho ld i th in heAO; tha t s , he b rce nus t vorkqu ick ly o es tab l is l iarcasqrco1 'au thor i t ynd o es tab l ish evc lof t r r - rs tnd onf idencei th thc oca l opLr )a t ion

l Whi ls t hecommander i l l seck utand dent i l y hckey pub l ic iguresp thcarca(po l ice h ie f ons tab le ,oca lmayor ,ndus t ry anagers )n te l l igencepec ia l i s t s( l i t JMINl ' .coun te r - in te l l igencendposs ib ly F)wi l l seek o dent i f y ndco l rac t l i c

act lral owerbrokerswithin thesociai t ructurc. homay be dif ferent rom hcpub) iel igurcs .P la toon ndscc t ion a l ro ls i l l seeko es tab l ishontac t , i thheaveragcc i t i zcnsn thcs t rec tsndvr l lages , ' lhcone nddeureanor . r re tby thepat ro iss r i t i ca l .

8 A cer ta in rnount f r i skmanagementL ls t e aken o a l lo rv a t ro lso se t h isncedcd ro f i le nd o send heappropr ia te.nessageo hepopu lace .

fh iso f course j res

r lotnleal l l iat he roops onduct hemsclvesn a lax manner. l though hepatrol eaclerr lay be a lk ingwi th oca l c l - roo lh i ld ren rshopkeepers ,thermembers i the pa t ro lmaintain secure tancehat rnpl ieshepatrol emains hard arget or nsurgcnts -hrsb lend f opennessnds te rn ro f -ess iona lx te r io rmpres .seshec iv i l ians . ive i her lcon l rdencendunnerveshc nsurgents ,howi l l a lways ewatch ing

9 - l 'h isfoothold ot only begins o reassurehepopulace nddislocatehc nsLrrgenr.bu t t beg inshe ac t ica leve l n te l l igenceo l lec t ion ,ga ins t h ichmeasurest ' succe*i r l l beuse us hccar rpa ign rogrcsscs .

l ( ) , \s thes i iL ia t ioneve lops ther a te l l i t eamps r pa t ro l ases aybeesrab l ished.pc rmane l l t iVr e lnporar i l y ,venat hepJa tooneve l . 'h is p readshe nf luencef thes lc t r r r t rb rccs . L lpponsnte l l igenceo l lec t ionnddrs loca tesheursLr r !en ts .

Uponarr ir "aln Hait i n March 2004,1Coy, RCRestabl ishedheircompanyocat ionnthe centre f theirAO, on themainMSR, acrossrom a public park. Withiniours ofaniving, an OP reporteda civilian ma nbeating woman n the park.Whilst manymayhavesimply dismissedhe matterasa non-miiitaryaffair,or as us t an aspect f Haitianculture, he company ecognisedhe ncidentas irstly a violation of theruleof law. andsecondly, ssimplyunacceptable ehaviourn theirAO . The QRF wasdispatched nd hemanwas apprehendednd detained.The actionand he .uronr= or it, wereexplainedothe ndividualand hose n the mmediate rea.After a quick medical nspection,hedetainee as transportedo thenearest ivil ianpolicestition andpassedo theirauthority.Although t washighlyunJikelv hatanycivi l ianchargesesulted, clearmessageadbeensent o the populace. he security orcesha destabiishedheir physicalan dmora'i ootholdin thearea.n addit ion,he act ionbegantodislocatethenf luaqce f thecr iminal ndinsurgent lementsn the region.That ollowing Sunday, he park wa spopulatedwrthlami l ies ,



DRAFT

S I i C T I O N3 : A T T A C K I N G T H E I N S U R G E N T S , W I L L

ITOLEOF THL ' IACTICAL COMMANDI I I I

I l . l : vcn a t hc ac t ica leve la rnanoeuvr is tpproacho a COIN opera t ionv i l lseek o

shat te rheencrnymora landphys ica l ohcs ion ,a thc r han ursuc iswho lesa le

destruct ion.Commanderst the actrcalevel,af forded onf idence nd reedom f

. . r c t ion .ndsuppor tcdy good ntc l l igcnce i l l , l r roughngcuu i t y nda pro-ac t ive

s tance ,e ab le o underminehepower . u thor i t y ndeventua l ly i1 l ,o f the nsurgent .

12 . Commanders L rs t e ab le o qu ick ly den ti f y ndexp lo i t hose ppor tun i l i cso

pre-ernp t .i s loca tc ndd is rup t he nsurgency ove lnen tnd t sopera t ions . i s suppor tbase nd hepower hat he nsurgcnts oldsover he ocalpopulacemustbe scvcred

Lrs ingl l t heasse ts va i lab le .

l l . ln o rder o besuccess fu ln a t tack inghe nsurgentn hephys ica l ndnora l

p lanes ,he ac t ica l omrnanderequ i res oreasse ts ,ndcpedence ndauthor i t yhauhc

r iou ldnormal ly ave n convent iona lpera t ions .ome xamplesreas o l lows :

a. independencend lexibi l i ty o establ ish nd f possiblc, hair ,operat ional

and n te l l igenceommi t teesppropr ia teo h is eve lo f command i th

NGOs,coal i t ion artners nd ocalpol iceandcivic author i t ies;

b . resourcesnamelymoney) ndauthor i t yo conduc tow- leve lCIMIC andreconstruct ionrojectsn order o create n rnmediaternpact hatwil l . in

turn, einforcc heposit ive spects f the secur ityorce'spresence;

c . au thor i t yo respondmmedia te lyo ca l ls o r ass is tanceiom loca l o l i ce

andsecur ity orces,without efe ence o higher uthor i ty as ongas hc

requirementsal l within theROE, act icalasks ssignedo theunit and

thecampa ign b jec t ives ) ;nd

d au thor r t yo conduc tn fo r rna t ionpera t ionslO) n accordancev i th hc

pLrb l ishedO thernesCommandersrus t eab le o pre cmptand

J is loca tchepropaganda cssagesf the nsurgents .

P R E . E N l P T I O N

l l I ) re -c rnp t ions the ak ingo f ac i ion oas o prevent orne th ingappen ing .n

r n i l i t a r yp e r a t i o n s ,a r l r c u l a r l yO t N ,p r e - e r np t i on. v i l le q u i r eh cs e i z i n g 1 ' a i k e i yi l : c : i l r ! . ppor tun i t v e ib re n encrn) ' can c l , n order o denyh in ran advantageous

e ,L l - sei ac t ion . t a in rs o iden t i f i ' ndexp lo i t he lee t ing ppor tun i t yo rnax i r l i se

:u :p r isc r rd rec ludensurgent c t ion ,fhe

lns r t rgen lsaybe cons tan t ly ,dcs tabi ) r sed1,

C ' h a p : 3 r 3 1

A n r n r 2 , l 4 I n n n n T ?



DIIAF-T

i h c r l i t i a t r r ci ' s e c ' r r i t t ' f o r c ec t i onsn e r u r s f b o l hk r neL t cn c i o n - k i n e t i c; tpp ic t io s ,

l ' 5 Prc -e inp t ions Iac i l i t a tedy asensoro shooterink ha t s rns t i t u tedhroug l rc l t l c t r tnc :echno logv ;ra rn ing ;ndorgan isa t ion .re -c rnp t lvepera t ionsv i l ldepenc ln ap to -ac t ivend espons iven te l l igenceys teu ' l , l inkedi th a rap id ec is ion rak ingp foccssn such way hat hedetec t io r rf anoppor tun i t yan e r rans la tcdn ioasLrcccssr l r . r tcome.

1( i Key o p re -e rnp t ionsa cover l u rye i l lanceapab i l i t y t heun i tanc l ub-unr rle l ' c l .

f h ismaycons is t f d ismountedeconnarssancesse ts ,n ipc r e tachmcntsr r i l le

pJatoon lel.nentsehearsedndequippedor the ask.Cunning seof survei l ia lcewrl lactas r iggers or other orces o deploy o exploit hc 1' leet ingpportunrty.

l7 Lvenovef t ramework pera t ionsanpre-cmptnsurgents .Fore ar lp ie , Srca tsbv nsurgcn tso keep he oca l c i too lslosed andat temptso n t imida tcami l i cso kccp

ch i ld rcn orne) anbepre-cmptedy thep lacementf s tand inga t ro ls t hesc6oo ls ,c t t ch ava 1 p c n i n gi m e , t e a s t n t i l he nsu r gen t ' so o n g e r h a v eh ew i l l t o con t i nuct l r i sb r r n f i r r t i m i t j a t i o n .

l i ln COIN it is f iequent ly hecasehatoneslrccesseads o opportunit icsbrat tot l ter :narrestmay ead o thediscovery f an armscache ndsoon. Special rorces(SI- ' ) ndQuickReact ion orces QRF-s) ustbeavai lable, roper ly osit ioneclndableto exploitunplanned ppor lunit ieso str ikeat he nsurgency. ocat ingheeRps with.sL t rvel la r r ce sse tsfo rexample ,over t ly ,ns ide d i lap ida tedu i ld ingJ i i l ens r_r re .ni ln rncd ia tecsponse. o l ice ndothc r ovc rnmentgcnc ies L ls t ove nqu ick lybch ind

thenr i l i tary orces o rc-establ ishnd etain ontrolancjnf luence.

l ( ) l ) re -empt ionhou ld lso ea goa lo f IO tac t ics . f l ye rhandec lutby par ro lscxpl i t in i l lghepurpose f thesect t r i tyorces nd hcir utureoperat ions i l l pfc-emtltlns t l rgen tropagandahatpa in tshesecur i t yo rces soppressors .. i kc .wrse ,5c i rnc ly ,irnplerrcntat ionf rcconstruct ionro. icctst localschools i l l rob nsursetsof aposs ib le r ic r 'ancehat hecur ren tcg ime a i ls o prov ide or he .u rn t r i ' , c i t i zc r r r y ,andILL t e.

I ) I S I - OC, \ T I ON

: I ( )neo1 ' thel la in imso i f iamework pe at ionss to d is loca tehe nsLr rgcn tpc l

l r i s r r l l r - r cncever hepopu lace is loca t ionen ieshe nsurgenthcab i l i t y c , -b r ingrsst re s th o bcar , ndqoes cyondmere ly ius t ra t ing) re nemy 's lans y rnak ing

"h is

s t r cng thr re levan ty re fus ingo { igh t n h is erms.t r v i l lcons is r f de te r ren . . ndsccr ' t r i l1 'neasu fesuch s : p ro te t ion f vLr lnerab learge ts ;e r ch pera t ions .ver l

-l r a n t e u ' o r kp e r a t i c n sr e h o s e v e r tm i l i t a r y p e r a t i o r r so n d u c t e do e s t a b l l s hsa f e nd c c u r c

c r r v l T o n l r e n t 'v h i c h o n t r i b l r t e so h ed e l e a t f t h e n s u r g e n tn an a rea . B r i t i sh r : ny F i e l dM a n u a l . o Ll , I ) a r t 0 )

- i he ; rp l l - - v i i eh esecu re n v i r o n m e n tn w h i c ho t h e r g e n c i e sna y o n d u c th c i r i n c s f

' l c r l l . o r . . . r : . : 1 . : : . _ . _ - : l p : i t r .

( ' h a p 6 : 3 i



DRAFT

sL l r - \i l l a n c e 1 - o t e n t i a l c u n t i n g f e a s r m e e t i n g l a c e sr p l a c e s t ' r n t i m i d a t i o n ,t t c l

r tp roac t iveC messageha l e in fo rceshe eg i t rmacyf thegovernmcntndsecur i t \

lb rccs . -hccsu l t s

f a de tc rminedf for t o d is loca tehe nsurgent ay no tbc

spec tacu la rndmaynotevenbeapparen to t roops n heground, u tover i r re v i l l ob

the ns i r : 'geu tf the n i : ia t i ve

DISRUP' f ION

11. l ) i s rup t ion cekso a t tackl " rensurgente lec t ive ly .a rge t ing is most rnpor tan t

asse ts ndso hrowing im ntoconfus ion . e l l -execu tedver t n i l i t a ry pera t ionsv i l l

I r c . lpo d is rup t hc nsurgenty th rea ten ingep loy rnentndescapeoutes ,oca t ing rn ts

c lches n t l es t r ic t ing ovements ,,venhe hrea t f aggress iveover t ndover t

opera t ionsanbe ef fec t ive . nsurgentsho knowtha t heyarebc ingac t ive ly L rn tedv i l ll r , - t , ' r r n r n d t n { l c e l h n e r c e , r f n n e r r t i n n c

l 5 [ ) i s rup t ion a l ls lo r ac t ica l wareness ,unn ing nda robus t seo f fb rces .

Comrnandershou ld lsoapprec ia tehat a re ppor tun i t iesaybe be t te r xp lo i ted y

r r thc r genc iesa minoranns lnd or examplc ou ld . f le f tund is tu rbed ,ecome

l ' rL r iuu ln rbush i te br Spec ia l o rces) . pccd nda le r tnessi l l beessent ia l .

)6. ln order o af fectdisrupt iorr ,act ical ommanders ustbe afforded reedorn i '

ac t ion . lommandersannot wa i tau thor i t yro rnh igher che lonsor fearo f los ing n

oppor tun i t v .

APPRECIATING SECONDARY AND 1'ER1 ' IARYEFFECTS

21. ( lommanders ndstaf fmustunderstandhateveryact ionwi l l havesecond nd

thirdorderef fects,On onehand, ro-act iveramework perat ions,obust el ibcrate

operat ions rrd houghtful O lneasures i l l d is locate nddisrupt he nsurgents'presence

and nf lr -Lcncemongst hepopulace nd n turncorrode ndundermineheirconf ldence

and vi l l . On the otherhand, hese perat ions,af i icular lyf they do not mcet he r

i rnmed ia tei rns ndproduce hysrca l igns f succcss , aycause mbar rassn tcn to thc

sccur i t yb rces . nwanted is rup t iono thepopu la t ion nd n tu rnunderminehepLrb l ic ' s

con l ldence ndempathy .Long- tenn L lccessn COIN wi l l depend pon hcse cconc lt rc l

third orderef fects

l ( ) ,

' lh is ss r " r cnaybes t e i lus t ra tedy the o l lowing xample .A cordo t t

o l te r i i t iou f 'a suspec tedeapons ache n thehear t f an nsurgcnLont ro l led

ne ighbourhood,onduc ted i th theass is tancef loca lpo l ice orces ,nay ' rnd

! \eapons . lo rvever ,hesecond nd h i rdorder f fectsmaybe s ign i f i can t nd

bothpos i t i ve ndne at ive fec ts :

theposr t r veeconc la rynd er t ia rv f1 -ec tsav nc luc lche1 'o l lo r r , i r r r : :

andscarch

fe, .vf any

nray ave

C h a p : 5 i 3 l

antnt14, l -E_nnnnTq



D R A F T

( ) n e * ' r n t e l l i q e n c e\ o L l r c ea r c c i c n t r f i c cv i t h i nhce s t a b i i s h r n c i r land iom rv i th in hespec ta to rs,hogathc rcdlu r inghecondLrc tltheopera t ion ;

( l ) i r l su rgenteadcrs rc dcn t i f i cd i ther hrough r res t /dc tep t io r rsrf romev idenceound t hcscenc :

( l ) t heuse f loca l o l i ce brccs tayhave evcra l1 ' f cc ts :

(a ) inc reasehe eg i t imacy f the n i l i t a ryorcesn tha t hevareseen o bervorkingw, ith ocalauthor i t ies;

(b) increaschcprof i lcanci steem f the ocalpolrce orccs(whomaynotbe ve l l - regardedy the oca lpopu la t ions) ;

(c ) lmprovehepro l 'es iona l onduc t f the oca lpo l ice brccby wayo i 'exarnp lend hroughhe ra in ing a luco f theoperat ion;

(4) insurgents,nowing hat hcyand heir csourcearebeiqg oLrgStact ively, re orced urther ndcrgroundndmay even lce hcarea;

(5) thc ocalpopulace egins o i 'eel r lorc ecure nd essaf iaic l f ' thernsurgcntsnd he r powe ; ancl

(6) weapons re orced unherundcrgroundndare ess cacl i lvavai lableo insurgentbrces;

b' . thc ne at ivcef fectsn thisexamplemayrncludehe bllowing:

( ) ernbarrassmentn thatno weapons ere ound;

(2 ) insurgents 'p ropagandaigh l igh tsh is acko fsuccess ndat tenrp tsto demonstratehat hesecur ityorccs reover-react ing,eavy,-handed ncl ot o bc t r r_rsted;

(3 ) i r r t c l l r genceourcesrcco lnprorn ised ;

(4 ) in t c r f 'e renceo the oca lpopu ia t ion 'sa i ly o r i t inenc i tes ngcr ;

( - t ) loca lpo l ice ss is t ing , i th heac t ionoose onf ic jcncencl r .Lrsrnthesecr:r i ty. .orces.

C ' l rap. 6 - l1



b de cnsr i , eomi land nd ont ro l ,a r fa reC2W)

P I l O T E C T I V EM E A S U R E S

' l -5- l 'h rea t

ln manycampa igns ,reas f opeat ion v i l lbenon- l rner andpcrhapst lo t ' t - co l l t iguoL isfheth rea t v r l lbeasvmmet r icndno area anbeassumedo besafcun lesst is searched_anc ihen Lrardc j .ven n a c leared ndconso l jc la tedrca hcit lst t l ents nayst i l l havea few operat ionalel ls hatcan aunch orrbat tacks r carryou tassass tna t ionsheymayat ten lp to re in t roducensurgcn te l ls o aunchcr ro r is tat tacks oth or theirpropaganclaalucand n anattempto fo. .e a redeploymentf.pol ice ncl roops o remove hepressurerom heir 'orces lsewhere. ence, efensivelreasl lrcs ndprotect ionmaybenccessarybr a wide range f people, rreaspd aci l i t jes

i6ECurancc

Protect iveeasures i l l st i l lbe requiredn themostsecure ascareas' l thor-rghhe asksmayeventua) lyehanded ver at Ieastn part) o thecivi lpo l ice l 'a l r x i l ia r ies pr io r i t yw i l l be orce ro tec t ionf thesecur i t yo rces , ase reas .Covcrnmentnd ndus t r ia li t a lpo in ts nd ines f communica t ionsi l l r equ i re

protect ionor theyprovidehighvalue argetsbr the nsurgents. t al l t imesa'ciat al lleve ls ig i lancenus tbes t ressedndenforccd .

i ( r ' I Ja lancc ' ro tec t ivcrcasuresn h igh i skareas re nanpowern tens ivc . anyo lt l ie i tsks re out i t . tcndbor ing, ndsoldiersend o lose heirvigi lance l. terongpcr iods i thou t n nc idcn t .f poss ib le ,roops n such ut ies hou ld c ro ta tcd i ththose n r .o reac t ive pera t ionsndevcry f rbnm's t bemade o keep t ra in ingprog l 'ammco ing .

l7 ob. iect ives f Protect iveMeasures.Protect ivc easurespply o both 6csccLrr i tybrces hemselves,theragenciesn thecarnpaign nJ n. localpopulace.-hcgcnelal bject ivcs f protect ivemeasuresncluciehe ofowinc:

I ) ] I AFT

c . p reve l t td i s rup t i on J ' t he conom ic

i7 . Tasks . Pro t cc t i r m easL l res, v i l l nc l L rdeL rn i t sv i i l bc expec t ec l oconduc t he f o i l o . . , 11g '

a. ensure ecur ity f al l base reas,rcluding irrward perat ing ases ucltemporary ases ,

b . -sccure ont ro l cd areas;

s c c L r r ei n c so f c o r n r n u n i r . l t i o n .

d pre ent supp ly nd e in fo rcementf insurgentn i t s ; nd

l i f c o f thenat ion .

wrde ar ie ty f tasks . ac t jca lcve

( ihap6; 8 _3

A n 4 n 6 4 a / A ^ ^ ^ ^ t ^



DRAFT

l persor ' )ne lro tec t ionorVIPs Th is , , i1 lnc l r , rdeey member -sf thc

governmet ,cer ta in ccur i t yo r ecor l rnandersndv is i t ing ign i ta r ics .t

rnay nc iude he ra in ing f loca l o rcesn th is o le , C losc pro tcc t ron i l l

i i ke lybe condLrc tedrymi l i t a ry o l r ce ndSF roops , vh i le emporary

ou tc r o rdonsmf ,ybeconduc tedy r r reroops ;

[ r , secur i t yo rcc roops . o thon andof f du ty . Admin is t ra t ive oves f

t roops f tenexpose oncent ra t ionsf ' t roops sso f t a rges .Forces , j l l

l i ke y have o bea l loca tcdor hc i rp ro tcc t ion :

c . convoy ecur i t y . ' f he ecur r t yorces i l l beexpec tcdo secure

government ndNGO convoys, swell as heiror . r 'n;

d. largeprotectedoadmovements,argemovernents f unitsor assetsrom

othcragenc ies ,a r t i cu la r lyn theconso l ida t ionf newlysecurcd reas rin a s i tua t ion f non-con t iguousat t le -space ,i l l r equ i re ign i l i can tb rce

a l loca t ion

c . p icke t ing ou tcs nd ines f co rrmun ica t ions . SRsand ines f

conrmun ica t ioni l l a lways c vu lnerab leo a t tack . i ke lyor prev ious ly

used mbush reasmay equ i re icke t ing echno logy anbeexp lo i ted

andpickets ocat ing n dorninat ingerrainwil l be able o actas r iggers

for thedispatch f reservcso either ncrease rotect ion r disrr . rptn

insurgent pc ra l ion :

l- . guarding nstal lat ions,othmil i taryandcivi l ian;and

g. c lear ing a t ro ls r sweepsnormal ly round ixedbases r es tab l ished

MSRs) n order o defcat nsurgenturvei l lancend dent i fypossible

improved xp los ive ev iceslED) .

18 . Countc r -Surve i l lance easures . nsurgcn t roups i l l r e lyon he i rn re rnbers

lb r survc i l lancend n fb rmat ion n theac t ions f HN andcoa l i t i t r necur i t yo rces '

: r c t ions .apab i l i t iesndweaknesses . ucho f th issurve i l lancei l l occur n a fa i r l y

open, ow- techno logyash ionwi th watchers lend ingn rv i th hegenera l ub l ic .

shac low ' inga t ro ls r u ,a lch ing ase a rnps , oun lc r - tneasuresus tbc enrp loycd t a l l

l cve ls .V ig i lancemustbe s t r cssedndprac t isedons tan t ly .o ld ie rs anbe assuredhat

in rn t t s t aseshe i rdepar - tu rcsndmovementsre epor ted . omemethodsnc lude

cha l leng ingusp ic iouse isons r t hose hadowingat ro ls , ndavo id ing a t ro l l ing

pat tens.anduseof c lear ing a t ro ls ,

C ' l r r p : 9 ' 3 1

A n t n t ? , 1 4 o n n n n 7 o



DRAI'-T

Survet l lancey insurgent angs egan ssoonascdn troops rrrvedn l jai t i in ear l1,2004' Observantoldiersn OPsandclear ing atrols uicf ty dent i f ied ndeliminated

watchers.Patrolcommanders etainedndividualswh o werl shadowing atrols,removed temporarily) heirce1l honesand ecordedhe names ndnurnters n thecallingmemoryanddirectory.This nformationwas passedo USMC regimentalandCanadianntelligence talfswho used t to identily he nsurgent rganrsation ndcommand.

DEFENSTVE OMMAND AND CON.TROLWALFARE (C2W)

i9 ' [ ) c fens ivc 2W s used o de y ,negate ,cducc r urn o f i i cnd ly dvar r tage .c l len ly f lb r t s o dcs t roy ' i s rup t , xp lo i t u rcommand ndcont ro l ys tcms.nc lL r i ingts

suppor t ingommunica t ions ,n fo rmat ionnd nte l l igencec t iv i t ies .a fcguard inghcconttnand ystems f thesecur ityorces ndgovernments a lundamentalonsidlerat i ,nas a i lu re o do so s ike ly o resu l tn loss f f recdom f ac t ion nc ln i t ia t j ve .r is -d i r cc t ion f e l ' f o r t , r evenmiss iona i lu re .

r10 [ )e l i : ns ive 2W wi l ] have he b l lowing oa ls

protecthevulnerabi l i ty f command upport ssets.rocedurcsndins ta l la t ionso at tack , ubvers ionr n f i l t r a t ion ;

reduceheeffects f enemydeccpt ion ct ions gainst ur co.rrnandsystems, ar t icular lyhose f thegovernment hich, n seekins

incxpens ive ,ow r iskop t ions , aybemore uscept ib leo c lece"p t io r ;

nu l l i f y hee f fec ts f enemyEW act ions ga ins tr i e d l ycomma'dsys lems;

deny heenem) /heab i l i t y o exp lo i t i i cnd lycommand ys tems;

ens l r reha t heene i ry 'sPSYops are nef fec t ive , a in ly hroLrghdel 'ensiveO plans; nd

br ie f ingroops n nsurgento a i rns udmeans ,n order ha t he 'a reaware f thepossible f f 'ccts n thepopulace nd n order o inoculatethem rom hceffccts f host i le ropaganda.

SECTIoN : oFFENSIVE pERAt ' IoNS cATNING HE INI ' I IATIVE

' l ( ) f f -cns i 'eperar ionsLlppof rhe , i r i tarv 's ey ole nneut rar is inghe 'sr - r rgc.1l ' heyc f t 'ec t iVc l )ake hebat t leo the nsLr rgcn tn orc ie r fe -empt ,l i s loca tenc l is r : , p r

h i rn o f f 'e rs i r zeac t icsv i l l , a ry , L r t ' i l l l i ke l ' inc lL rc lehe o l lo rv rns :

C h a p : 1 0 i 3 1

b .



D R A F T

\ l O s i r pcs l ' p a t r c l sh o L r i dca s s i g n c c lt a n d i n gnd p e c i f i cR s o sL r ppc r ti r c r . c r a l lc ' t t t l l la iu l ll l c - ipec i f i ca l l ylanned pcra t ions .r r . ,enhco \ /e r t a tLr rei 'mos iCOINp a L r o i i i n e 'a t r o l sr cm o r c u l n c r a b l cc a m b u s h

h an hose o n d u c t e dr r o n v e t i o n a loDcr . r t ions .-he1 ,pesf pa t ro l l inghat i ' r l loccLr rn co lN are :

reconna lssanceat ro l

s tand inga t ro ls ;

f iamework atrols; nd

f ight ing atrols.

4 - i Reconna issanceat ro ls .A t t i rneshere i l l bc a spcc i f i cequ i r cmel tb r rheconduc t f a pa t ro lwhose o le urposcs rcconna issance.s in convent iona lpera t ions .they navbeconduc tedspo in t , rea r roL l t ceconna issance.n do ing o, he o l lowr 'gs l r o u l dec o n s i d e r e d :

b .

a . smal l econna issanceat ro lswh ichvulncrable, ar l icular lyf conclucteclor srvarme by crowds;

are e at ivelyweak)wil l bcover t ly . heycanbeeas i ly t tacked

covcrtpatrols avea rcduceclhre t prof i le, voidinsurgcn tsf t hc i rp resencc ,nd lono t evea lhesoLrght;

reconna lssancca t ro ls i t l - rechn ica lequ i rementseg , ou tereconna issance)hou ldnc lude pec ia l i s t such seng" incc rs ,,hereapp i icab le . epend ingpon he ntended iss ion ,t mav nc ludcnrembersf o ther genc ies ,uch sNGOs:

ea r l ywarn i ng o

in l ' o rm a t i on e ing

d the nsert ion f covertpatrols ndops isverydif f icult n clense rrbanareas . ngenu i t y us tbe used o drsgu isehe i r nsc r t ion , h ichca , beconcealed mongst novef loperat ion;

a quickreact ionorce QI{F)niustbeprcparedo extract r reir lbrce hepat ro l ;

l thepat ro lmayassume dd i t rona lespons ib i l i t iessoppor tun i t i csreser tthcmse lves ,uch s hcconduc t f snap eh ic le hcc Ipo in ts

17 ' S tand ingPat ro ls .Thees tab l ishn ien tf a ne t rvork1 'over tndco , , ,e r ttandnrgl la t ro )sccupy ing eypos i t ions rov ides n rnponantneansf acc lu i lngn fo rmat io 'l r nd t t rn ish ing secur i t yo rce resence.-h is n r - r rn i l l ass is tr rc iomin l t ing nar .ea .f

hc asks l loca tedo s tand ing a t ro lsmay nc lude .

( . h a p 6 : 2 i i l



During he deployment o Haiti in2004, intelligence ources t the USMC regimentalevelindicated hat a hardware tore n thewest

end of Port auPrincewas a possibieweaponscachcas he storewa sownddby a known gang eader. his was added o u.o-puny ,u.g.,l ist and rameworkpatrolsassignedo thisarei wereifaskedo search or and dentifv hisstore.Eventually,afterabout20 days ater,a patrol ocatedhe store. The patrolcommander onducted is combatestimate nd after eceivingauthority o do so from theCoy CP, the patrolconducted cordonan dknock operation. othing was foundand wolockshad o be cut during heoperation.t wa sexplainedo thestoremanagerhat f theownerwished,he could eport o the company ocationandhi s ockswoulJbe replaced.Threedays ater, heownerandotherman arrivedat thecampseeking ew iocks,Th e women were,and hadbeen,posingasHaitianNationalPolice,(HNP) fficersandwere istedon the HNP most wanted ist,a copyof which was held n thecompanycp. Theyweredetainedand tumed over to FINIP uthorities.

DIIAI , -T

b e npos i t r ono eac to a t h r ea t r d c v c i o p i n g . s rt L r a L i o nn a p a r t i c L r l a ra rea

r to re in fo rcelhc rpa t ro ls ;

ce lc ran nsurgcn lf iack r sn ip ing pcra t iony sa tu ra t ingnarea ndthrea ten ingheescapeoL l te t 'abombcr r sn iper ; nd

gathern fo rmat ionnd nte l l igencch loLrghhe ssue f s tand inqndun iqLrcRs

'19 . F igh t ingPat ro ls ' Thepurpose f f igh t ing a t ro lss o d is rup t he nsurgenrldhisairns.As in other ormsof warfare uccessannot eobtained / def 'ensiv.

"n1.oru. . ,

aione- l 'hc

aim is to br ing roopsnto contactwith the nsurgentsn favourablccrms.fheessent ia lre - requ is i tes good, ccura tendspecr f r cn fo rmat ionesard inche

p lanned b jec t i i ' c , h ichmaybeobta inedrom a var ie ty f sourcesnc luc l ing"po l icendnr i l i t a ry o l lec t ion ,echn ica iensorsnc lud ingrnagerv ,IUMINT sources .re onna issance,tand ing nd ramcrvorka t ro ls ,rack ing nd, omet i rne.a luckyco l l t ac t . n c lose er ra in , here t is se ldom oss ib leo se t n a s tea l thy

anner cordor . rs t t cccss i r " r l l y ,f igh t ing a t ro l asa be t te r hance f scor ing sL lccess . ' l ' hea t ro lmaybeab le o sc ta has ty mbush r rushan nsurgentase .Uscdud ic ious lyo f fens ivepat ro l l ingt is anexce l len t ayo f keep ing mal lg roups f enemy n themove. nducr rga scnse f insecur i t yndd is loca t ingnsurgentlans .

Therewereoccasionsn Malayadur ing heBrit ishArmy CON, when alkingandcookinggaveawaycommunist error istposit ionsndon theJebelAkhdarn the ate1950s,hesmeilof bad

L insLugent anitation rovideda timely ..varning f theenemy's roximity for approachrngnatrols.



DI].AFT

Q U I C K R E A C T I O N F O R C E S

50. QLrick eact ion orccs QI{Fs)are ormedat the act ical eveis n order o: react o

theunexpec tcd ;xp lo i t ppor tun i t iesnd ucccss ,ndsuppor t / re in fo rcchrea tenec ireas

and i iend ly b rces .

51 . In add i t iono suppor t ingn i l i t a ryorces ,here v i l lbe a requ i re t len to p rov ide

rapidsupport hroughaQRF

to localsecur ityorces nd nst i tut ions. lven n dense

r-rrbanreas, iv i l ianpol icestat ions ndotherof f icesof localauthor i t iesan 'eel solated

arrd hrcatcned. n rural areas, ol iceoutposts ndborder tat ions revulnerableo attack

dLrco their solat ion. t is rnportanthatsuch ocal orces e rnade ware he mil i tary

l ir rccs rc wil l ing to, andcapable l ' ,coming o theiraid, apidlyandeff 'ect iveiY'.

Without hisconf idence,heywil l be unwil l ing o undertake perat ions ndnray lee

f iorn heirposts, hereby l lowing nsr:rgentso destabi l isen areaandunderminehe

governmenton t ro l .

52. L, ikewise, oal i t ionmil i tary orces, perat ingrom smallplatoon-sizedases r

patrol l ing t the sect ion ndmult iple evel,wi l l at certain imes equire einforcementr

extract ion.QRFsmustbe ready o respondo suchcal ls or support .QRFsmayalsobe

rusedo exp lo i tb r ie foppor tun i t ieso s t r i ke t nsurgentsr to securen te l l igenceinds .

5 i .. l - hus ,

QRFsmustbe dent i i led ndhe ld n

c lc tachmcntsr to exp lo i t oss ib le uccesses .[he

shou id ons iderhe o l lo rv ing :

read inesso go o thea ido f th rea tened

p lann ing f QRFs n a COIN opcra t ion

theestabl ishmentf f ixedcomrnunicat ionsr le nsbetwccn he brccand

those oca lsecur i t y lemen lssuch spo l ice os ts )ha ta rewi th in hc

un i t ' sAO and or wh ich heun i t s re espons ib le

a l te rna t iveoutesmustbeprac t isedn order o reducehe isko1 'a rnb i r sh

l ' rom nsurgcnts ho havedelibcrately lannedo at tack he rel ieving

forcc:

thea l loca t ion f a rmouredeh ic lesLAVs, e tc ) o theQRF wi l l inc rease

rnob i l i t y nd1 'o rccro tec t io r r .l -here

is a poss ib i l i t yha t he n ta l 'b re

b locked n au approachoute r ambushed i t h an t i -a r t rour/e pons :

C i h a p 61 5 i 3 l

an,) i )2,4, t _4E_nnnnnq



DI{AFT

theuse f hc l lcoprc rsbr rap idmo\ ,enren ts o f ten hebes t p i ion br ar : j c linse f t io . u ta re u l re rab le o al l 1 ,pcsi f i r canc l raynotbeab le , l a r i lin dense rban

nv i ronmenrs ,

{ M B U S I I E S AN D R A I D S

' t " i Ambr - rshesr rd a ids ake hc bat t l c o he nsurgcn tnd anhave ign i f can tc i t -ec tsr rp re -e rnp t ingnd l is rup t inghe nsurgent .t mus tbekept n rn ind hata l thoLrcht t r i t t t . \ ' o1 - ther inc ip )esnd ac t ics f ambi ishcsncJa idswi l l app ly n a COiN. res l r i c t i veI tO[ : nay rec ludehe n i t ia t ion f dcad ly orcewi thoLr tpec ihc ause nc l hus hel.s l l rgents or-r ldave o begiven hc oppor lunityo surrender.

' i i Anrbushcsreusua i ly e l ibera teu tc jn i l s nus t edcve lopedo enab le sec t ro l ror patrol o tnove apidlyandquiet ly ntoanambush osit ionwhen ts eadelementspor

Insurgentorce moving Ambushesmay bc conductedn areas ncler ove1nlrentcon t ro l r n areas t i l lunder hecont ro l f insurgents .a idswi l l bc conduc tcc lga ins ri t lsurgentamps r strong oints n areas otyet under hecontrol f govcrnm.ni?o, . . . ,

i6 . I - . ncountersreusua l ly r ie fanc l t c lose ange. ndcr hemost avourab lec i r cu lns ta t lces .here heent i r c nsurgentorce s caught xposedn heopep, t n ray cl l r l ss ib lco ca l lon hem o sur rcndcr ,n wh ich ase r isoners ayprov ide a luab lci t l lo r tna t io t r .

l ' h ismaybc hecase f an nsurgentos i t ions so la tedncj anbe

cornp te y surrounded.

)7 ' A tnbushcsnd a idsmaybc conduc tec li thanycombina t ionf the o l lo rv inL ,a i r n s :

thedes t ruc t ionfan insurgentorce ;

thecapture r k i l l ing of a wantccjnsurgent;

thecapturc r destruct ion f weapons ndccluiprncnt;

ga in ing f in t c l l igece ;

detcrr inghe nsLrrgent'rom rsing narea; nd

prevcnt inghc nsurgentsiom approachi 'gi icnci l .v osit rons.

L A R C E S C A L E O P E R A T I O N S

iS l t l cases ' he rean i nsu rgency on t ro l s a rgea reas f ' t hccoun t r ys i c l e6e rebc i sI l t a r " a i scand dep ioya s i zeab ie b rcc . SL rch s i t ua t i on s n ros t i kc l y to occu r whc r . ehcvh rLve ccess o a f l i e r rd i l . , ne t ghboL r r i ngoun t r ywh i ch t heyuseas a havcn o assen rb l e .t r a i r r n c l q u i n .

C h a o : 1 6 / i



- i 9 l d c a l l r . u c h

rc la t ive ' l's r la l and

r r r , rn rbeoJ ' re sor - r s .

DRAF-T

l b rces hou ld eengagednddes t royedn bat t i c vh i lc hc t 'a rc

before heyposea major hreat. ' l -hisnaynotbe easibleor a

6 0 .

the h rea ts ike ly o deveop n a remote reawh i le hehos t overnment

fbcLrscsn secur ing i ta la reas lose o thecap i ta l ,hemain ownsand

t h e i r u r r o u n d i n ge l l - p o p u l a t e dn d c o l t o m i c a l i yr r t p , r r t t n tt L r a l r c t s :

thchos tna t ionmayhave e i therhe roops va i lab le o r hcmcans f

p ro jec t ingorce vera cons iderab leis tancentoa remote ndposs ib iy

ru ioun ta inous ,ung le cg ion ; nd

theremay a lsobea r isk ha toperar t ionsn heborder f a s t ro t lger.os t r le

ne ighbour ayprovokc n unwantcdn te rvcn t ionn hepre te r t h: r t her-reghbour ing ountry 's orders avebcenviolated r i ts secur i ty

thrcatened.

- l- i rerearea numberof pre-requisitesbr the success f a large-scaleperat ion:

a . Good n te l l igence . he oca t ionsf un i t s , eadquar te rsndkcy leaderss

as mpor tan t s heknowledge f theenemy 's os i t ionsndsecur i t y

scrccn.Equally rnportants good ntel[gence n the nsurgent 's

suppon ing o l i t i ca l nd og is t ic rgan iza t ion ;

lsolat ion. The area hosen or theoperat ionmustbe solated s muchas

possible o prevcnt nsurgenteinforcementr exf i l t rat ion.f the escape l 'smallpart ies annot e stopped,heenemy hould ot be able o evacuate

lbrmedunits.Enemyescapcoutcs houid, s ar aspossible, e blocked;

and

Surpr iseand Dccept ion .Obta in ing urpr isere entshegrea tcs t

p rob lem. repara t io r r sndprc l iminarynoveshat annot e h iddcn nLrs t

bed isgu ised . a t ro l l ingo obta in n fo r tna t ionhou ld ecar r ied ut t ras

manyareas sposs ib le ,. r , i t ho obv ious tuphas isn hcsc lcc ted rea .

Rumours f poss ib le pc ra t ionslannedo take lace lsewi - re reay be

f-ednto the nsurgentntel l igence rganizat ionhrough hannels hich he

insurgents reknown o trust . reintsmay be aunchedn sucha lnanncr s

no t o a rouse usp ic ionss o the oca t ion f the ea lopera t io t t ,t sa i t r s

and ts ob jec t ivcs .

( r5 , Thc exccu t ion f suchan opcra l ionequ i resap id ep loy rnento enc i r c lchc ura i r r

enen lv b rccs . nsurgentorce shou ld o t ust be sur roundedy a cordon, h ich s

l i ke lv o pro\ re oroLrsn lhc bes t i r curns tances ,u t oca ted ndp inned own. Once

sur rounc lcd .rsorgan iz -cdndbrokcn p. hc nsurgentsnus t epursucde lcn t )ess ly ,

( ' h a p . 1 1 1 3 1

A.O20231 17-000087



( t6 . Sr : ccessus tbe b l lo r i , edy ,sLrpnor trganrz .a t tonnd ep lac ingtpeop len theareamustbepro tec tedc c l l s r by n s u r g e n tr a i n o r ces

DIlAF'f

r o o t i n q L t th e n s u r g e n t s ' p o L i t i c a lnd o g r s t i crv i th hehos t ovc rnment 'sdnr in is t ra t ion .

l -he

f ronr u tu re ovcr t ebe ln f i j t r a t iony i t spo l i t i ca l

SECTION7; STABIL ITY OpEITATIONS

GENT' I {AL

68. Stab i l i t y pera t ionsrea keye lement f theCont in r lum f Opera t ionsops t r l r c t .ar ld t lgethcr i th ol ' f -ensivenddefensivc pcrat ions,rcpertof thaiebband le, . r . ,bctr ' r 'cenif ferent ypesof tact icalasks hatconst i tutehecampaign.6TSey naybedef l r reas b i lows :

il n opera/ion /hat imposes',s'ecuritynd c'on/rol over un ctrcrr ,hile empl6yingnril irury capahilit ie,s o resrore .servica.stnd supporlcivil ictn ugcrcies,,:, r

()7-taru/ionsin u'hich 'security.forces combining military, pcrramiliturl.,, un 4pglicc/tttt 'c.11 arry ou l operalion.sfb r lh e re.storationan d maintenance of'ordar unl.stubi / i tv .o

6L). Stabi l i ty asks f ten nclude equirementsbr reconstruct ionndhumanitar ianid.at td rcnotun ique o COIN campa igns .dea l ly , i l i t a ry esourcesndcapab i l i t iesrel i r rno t cc l r - r i r cdor thcse espons ib i l i t ies ,u t heymayhave o besoLrscd .Wi tS espcc tIo hespec i f i c mp loyment f mi l i t a ry orces ur ing COiN. The o l lowings tab i l i i y

tasks rekey o theconduc t f COIN:

a cont ro l f movement ;

c rowdcont ro l pc ra t ions ;nd

search pera t ions .

CO: \ 'TROt ,OF MOVEMENT

71. lLequ i rementor the Cont ro lo f Movcmcnt .Cont ro i l movement-s v i ta laspec t iCOIN opera t ions .l t hough t canbeh igh ly is rup t ive ndpanpower n tens ivc .I t s lecessaryo d is loca tendd is rup tnsurgcn tc t iv i t iesnd e-assurehepLrb l ic\ Io l ' cment on l ro lmeasL l resanbeh igh ly nconven ien to thegenera l L rb l ic ld a porn to f con te r l t ion .here fb re .henccd or henrmus tbec lear nd vel adver t isedin rc rms 1purp( )se ,i ce oca t ion nd ime) hroughhe O p lan ldea l iy , heyarcconc luc tedncor r - j t inc t ionv i th he oca lpo l ice .

S eeC h a p r e r

r \ B ( 'A P rc . c t ' l - ca r - - r ,C T C a p a b i l i t y r - o u p ,r a i t i en i r i o . , J u l y2 O O 5I ) r o p o s e da n a i t i a nra f t e f l n i t j o n .u ne 0 05

( hap 6 : I 8 , -1



DRAFT

1) . Pr inc ip lcNIc thods .Before heyare rnposec lteas l r resus tbe d iscLrssed

bet r i , ccnhcc iv i l au thor i t res ,hepo i ice nd hemi i i t a ry o make ure heenforcemen ls a

p lac t ica l ropos i t ionnd hat henccessar l ,po l icendso id ie rs reava i lab leo pu l henr

in toe f 'ec t .l -he

pr inc ip lemethods f movementon t ro i re:

a r oad l o c k s ;

b . check o in ts bo th nap ndde i ibera te ) ;

c tral ' f ic ontrolpoints; nd

d . cur fews .

73 . A ims. Cont ro l l ingmoveuren t ayhave nyof the b l lo rv ing i rns :

a. pe rnitsecur i ty orces o cnforcehc aw, hus ncreasing ublic

conf idencen the government 'sbi l i ty o protect hem;

b disrupt nsurgent roups ndplansby rnakingmovelrrent i f f icultand

precluding o-ordinat ion etrveennsurgent el lsandgroups;

c. dominate n area o prevent rowds iorn gather ing nd o deter rost i le

ac t ron ;

ci. control he movement f crowds hatdo [orm andprevent heir einforce-

m e n t ;

c . in t c rcep t ndd iscouragehe l lega l love tnen tf a rms, xp los ives .

med ica l upp l ies nd ood;

f ' sealof f an area o prevent he ntroduct ion f weapons, xplosivcs nd

subvers iveropaganda atela l ;

g . a r res t an ted ersons ;

h recordmovemer l to de tec t a t te rnsndobta in n fo rmat ion ;nd

fac i l i t a tehemovement ndopera t ionsf thesecur i t yo rces .ro rexa tnp le .

par to f 'anouter o rdon f a de l ibera teper l t ionmay nc lL rdctcmporary

road-b lock .

i 1 . \ ' e h i c l cC h c c kP o i n t s VCPs ) , I n r . he o n c l u c tf V C P s n a C O I Nope r a t i on .hc

l i r l l o v v i n co i n t s h o u i d ec o n s i d e r e c i :

C h a p 6 : 9 / l l

A n o n t a , t , l i o n n n n Q o



.:

I )RAFT

modern omn. ]L l t i ct i u dev ce ,par t icu lr l , cc l u a r r : c lcphones .v i a l c tinsurgentseek ingo avo id hcVCp to i tsprcsencei t l i inminu tes i . i t ses tab l ishmenthus l - reseo f snap cps at hesec t ioneve l u t nloca t ionor ve ; ' shor t e r iods nd hes imp lc topp ing f susp ic iousveh ic lesnd r rd iv idLra lsr l l do morc o pre-emptn i ld is rup i insurgenrsthan ong- te rm CPs, nd

VCPsprov idcmcmbers f thcpub l ic hcoppor tun i t yo passn lo rmat io 't o hesccur r t vorcesv i thou ta is inghesLrsp ic ionf insurgents- roopsconduc t ingCPs n i - r s tepreparedo rcce ive uch nfbrmat ionr toprov rdehe nfornant v i tha con lac t .

75 ' P l : rnn inghe Cont ro lo f Movement .Largc ca le r con t lnL loL lsrovc l ren tcon t l 'o i-neasurcsi l l r equ i re uchcons idera t ion ,

lann ing nd o-ord ina t ron .- ike lypub l ic cac t ion us tbe aken ntoaccount unng hep lann ing tageAg l ta to rsv i l lbcquick o erploitanyadverseeact ion nd henecd oranyuna'voidablerksonre|cslr ict ions hould eant ic ipatedncl xplainedo weaken ost i le ropaganda.l-concc ived €asureshat cad o theco l lapse1 'pub l icc rv ices us tbeavo ided .'hec t lmtn i t t eeys tcm x is tso d iscusshese lans ncJhc i r ike ly onscquences .s rundl l lan nLts tebased n good nte l l igence ,h ich nvo ives lose,a 'son r th hepo l ice .fhe

conceptxus tbesuppor tedy a spec i f - r cO p lan .

CROWD CONTROL OPERATIONS

76' ( lrowdsandviolentdernonstrat ionsreoftena feature I insurgenciesrc]are

c'asi ly xploited y insurgentsor thcirown cnds.Crowds nci esr.r l t ingiotsunderminethe lver i t l l ecur i t y i lua t ion .veakenhegovernmcnt 'son t ro l nddes t roy iv r lin l iastruct. r re.

77 In sp i t co f mcasureto prcventt , c rowds iav a l lya round par t icu la rssue noa'ssemble,sual ly n urbanareas,n f iont of governnrentf f ices, ecurr tyorcccarnps rin pLrb l icpaces .hec iv i l po l icemaybc unab leo copewi th hes i tua t ion ndmi l i t a ryass is tanccna) / e equ i red .hes ize f a c ro r . vds no nd ica t ioni ' i t sa t t i t uc le . ia rgct r t . tcon ta tn inQ an; 'c r - t r lousn lookers ay bc c loc i lc , rn t i l g i t a to rseg in o n f lL renccr t A smai lc rou 'draybepeacefu l r i t rnaybea cor rcen t ra t io ] rf t hose i th cx t re rneVic$ 's . ' l ' hcr i l i t a ry ommandern hespotmus tusch isown uc lgments o hor . vo dea lr r t l r r r ) p l r r l i c u l l r i t r u t i o n .

78 ( l rowdcont ro l pera t ionsCCO) equ i re pecra lra in ingn spcc i f i c. ' l l ) sandc( lu lpmsnt .

l -heseshou ld o tbe acqr : i redn- the- jobnc lmus tbe nc lydedn a l l p re -

dcp loymcr l tra in ing .n thea t re .egu la rra in ing chedu leshoLr ldnc lude co re f iesher .l - i kewise . Co spec i f i c qu ipment Lrs t epos i t ionedorward i th ac t ica l L rb -un i r s ,l i r rv io lcn lc ro rvds angathc r , i t h i t t leno l ice . L r r thern to re ,vhen herc s a th rea t t .e o lvd onf l -on ta t ion ,hemcreappearancef p roper l l ' p repa ledfoops an6e lpd issLradethecror^ , . c1l 'oururn ine rc lcn i .

( ha p : 2 0 / 3 1



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DRAFT

S I i A R C t I O P E R A T I O N S

79. Gcncra l , As secur i t yb rcesmpose ont ro l verurban nd u ra la reas ,earch

r )pc ra t ionsecome mains tay f thesecur i t y nv i ronmentA l though heyhavc1obe

conduced i th duecons idera t ion ,heycan eap ewardsn terms f f i r s t , econd nd h i r c i

o rder f f ec ts .

3 ( ) . Purposc .l -hc

purposc f search pcra t ionss o r so la te se lcc tcd rea 1 ,

dcp loy ing cordon, i t her y s tea l th r a t such peedhat he n tended uar r ) i as io

chanceo esczrpc ,nd hensearch ingt thorough ly .fhc

ta rge t reamaybe a s ing le ousc

r ) l ' an r . t t i r ei t y b lock .Obv ious ly ,hemoreprcc isehe arge t rea anbe, hebet te r .

8 l . A i rns . Search pera t ionsrcconduc lcd henever oss ib le i t h po l ice

au thor i t ies .'he maybeconduc tcdn o rder o :

a. capt l l re .r ,antedersons, capons, ommunicat ionevices, ropaganda

mater ials ndmeans. xplosives r documents;

b. disrupt nsurgent ct iv i t ies;

c. el irninatensurgent ct iv i ty n a specif ic ocal i ty, ar t icular ly i th a vieiv

to expanding control led rea;

d. gainevidenceo suppoft rose ut ions r to prove inkswith expatr iate

comtnunit ics nd raudulentund rais ing chemes, nd

e. gain nformat iono suppor l uturcoperat ions.

87 . in conduc t inguchopera t ions i th he oca lpo l ice ndother o rces , PSEC s

csse t ial. t rs not uncontrnonor localsecur ity orces o be nf i l t rated y insurgentsr to

c o n t a i n i n f b rm a n t s w h o p a s s th e i n s u r g e n t si n f o r m a t i o n .f t h i s i s a c o n c e r n f o r m i l i t a r y

cornmanders, ethods houldbe used o conccal hc nature ndareaof theoperr t ion

Lrn t i lhe as tminu te

8U' l 'he

es tab l is i rmentf ' t he ordon rrd hesearch rc wo separa tec t iv i t i cs u ta rc

rnounted s onc operat ion. ecauschesearch artof theoperat ions r,rsual ly lcngthy

t f la i r rha td rs rup tshe r feo f a loca l i t y , o rdons ndsearchcshou ld n ly be n toun ted t rre iab len fo rmat ion , ser ies f f ru i t less pera t ions e re ly l iena teshepopu la t ionror . t - r

t l r cgovernment ndprov ideshe nsurger r ti th unnecessaryropaganda.

8( ) . C lo rdon ndsearch pera t ionsrenoteasy o execu te ,ue n goodpar t o i re

d i f ' l i cu l t y f c los ing hecordon oqu ick l l t ha t he nsurgcn tsaveno chanceo escape,t

is easier oposit iona cordon n oper-rolur t ry vitha good oadnetworkancl . l i th hehelp

o 1 ' h e l i c o p t c r s .n c lose e r r a i nj L r n g i c .r b a n ) t s v i r t u a l l ym p o s s i b l eo p o s i t i o n n d

A020231 21 000091



I)ItAI.-T

I t r r k tD cc r r i o t r ccausc . t ' r ove r ren ts res t i i c t ed . u r l d i ngs reconnec t eC .va t chc rs ravscc l l c f o r ccs om ingand a l e i l he t a rge t rea . ndobse rva t i e rnraybe r cs t r j c t edo a f ' c r ii n e t r e s ,

90. DLr r ing OiN,cordon ndsearch pera t ions,v i l l f tcnbeconduc tedased nI I t ,JN'4lNTources.nformat ionrom nfbrmants rLlst e reated.r , i thaut ion t is alrvai,sposs ib leha tan nfo rmant ays imp ly .v isho "se tup" a loca l iva lo r maywrsh o leac ithcsccu l i l v b rccsn toanambLrsh .

S E C T I 0 N 8 : M E A S U R I I SO F S U C C B S S

93. Wi th in heCont inuum i 'Opera t ions ,vera l l uccesss genera l ly easuredyprog fcsslong hespec t rumf con f l i c t owardsheendof less io lence .Whi ls t h isho lc lstruc br COIN' thcrccanbe much iner ndicat ionsf successsoperat ionsreconcluctcdovcra per iod f ' t i r ne . ven hough hcmeasurementf overa l l uccesss o f i r r t c res to a l ll cvc ls , t ra tcg ico tac t ica l , anyo f the nc l ica t ionsi l l be neasuredt he ac t ica lcve l .

( )4. At thestar lof anoperat ionand deat ly .ecordedta t is t i ca l l y .r neud c hc o l l o w i r r g

thestart -statef thesecur ity i tuat ion hoLr lc lc notcd.Indicatorso beexaminedn a spccif . icrea r iay

nunrber f murdes o r k i l l ings ,

number f ins r - r rgen tt tacksn governmcntu i ld ings ,e rsons.dsecur i t yo rces ;

c . number f - v io len tnc iden tsndgenera l eve lsf c r rme.

number nd n tens i t y f 'pub l ic cn tons t ra t ions ;

s ta te nc l rov is ionsf -c iv i l e rv icesuch ssan i ta ryo l lec t ioncrv ices .schools pen, overnment f f ices pen;

po l icc ta l io r r ann ing ndequrpp ingnd hepro f i le f 'po l ice lesencenp u b l r c ;

g commerc ia lc t iv i t i cs .a r t i cu la r lyma l l hops ndopenmarkes :and

h. pub l ic c t iv i t iesn u rban reas . a f t i cu la r lyt n igh t .

9 - i . As thc r iss ion rogresses ,u rp rovenrc r r t sn heabovend ica to rsv i l l nd icarchcr lTeas t t ref s t t ccess . IMIC teams ndpat ro is anbea l loca tedpcc i f i cRs hat reasL l res L r c hnd ica t o r s .

Chap6 22, /3

40202311-22-OOOO



I )RAFT

96. Succcss ,ha t s , mprovementsu thec iv r ls i t ua t ion ' i i lno toccur vcn l )o \ / c r

r .eg ion .n rp rovementsnay ccur n onearea , vh i le n a rea n rvh ichhe ns r - r rgen tsave

r lo rc n l luence ndpowerwi l l bes lower o mprove . ikewrse ,mproveuren tsnayco lne

rnore ap id ly n theday ' t ime.ut hes i tua t ion i l l be worse tn igh t Such nd ica to ls r l la l lo iv hesecur ity orces o focus heil resourcenrore f f 'ect ively

S E C T I O N9 : C O N D I T I O N I N GT H E T A C I . I C A L L E V E L F O R C O U N T E R -

I N S L I R G E N C YO P E R A T I O N S

9J. ( lommandersndso ld ie rs i i kemus lbemade o apprec ia tehed i f f c rcnces

bc t rvcen OIN andconvent iona lpera t ions . ' f h isus tbeg in n the ra in ing o r

t l e p l r , y m c n tndc o n t i n u eh r o u g l r o u theopc r r t i on .t i sve r ym u c h n n t e l l c c t ul l

cha l lengehatmus taccompanyhe ra in ingn TTPsspec i f i co COIN. ' Po in ts ha tmus t

bc cons ideredn educat insun io r eadersndso ld ie rsn COIN wi i l inc lude he

lb l lou , ins :

cu l tu ra l ra in inghatw i l l in fb r rn t t i t udesowardshec iv i l ianpopLr la t ion .

Soldiers nustbemade o appreciatehe ear, t ress nd rustral ionhat he

civi l ianpopulace i l l feel n t irnes f an nsurgency,urthermorc,hey

mustappreciateheaffect hat heir act ical perat ions i l l havcon the

loca lpopu la t ions ;

junior leaders ndsoldiersmustbemadc o real isehekey mpor lancchat

theyhave n the nformat ion ather ing nd ntel l igencc rocess. very

so ld ie rmus tbe made o rea l isehathe h imse l f s a scnsor sse t .Pa t ro l

cornmanders ustconduct etai led atroldcbr iefs ith thcir roopsand

providedetai led atrol eports o the ntel l igence ndoperat ions taf .Addit ional ly, oldiers equire egular eedbackegardinghe valueand

usefulnessf the nformat ionheyprovide;

commandersndso ld ie rsnus t avemeasuredxpec ta t ionsegard inghe

qua l i t y ndca l ib re f t he oca l ecur i t yo rces .n rnany a i ledor fa i i ing

s ta tes ,he oca lpo l ice nd n rL i ta ry i l i no tbeo f a s tandardomr ron o

manyso ld ie rs . he mus t ea l isehat hese sse ts ,esp i te ome

shortconr ings,avegreat nowledge f the ocal ssues,hreats nd

insurgents ' e thods . u r thc rmore ,o ld ie rs nd un io r eadersnus t e

made o rea l iseha tpar lo f the i rmiss ions o edr " rca tend mprove oca l

to rceswne e necessary ;

lL rn io readers ndso ld ie rs us tbe madc o rea l isehat uccessn

uf rc ra t ionsomes f te ra long in reandcannot emeasured; ,o f feus ivc

ac t ion nd henumber f i nsurgents ade o depar the empora l lane .

Theymustunders tandhatsuccessomes hroughhega in ing nCrna in ta in ingf thepub i ic . r , i l1ver hc o r rgerm;and

S t eC r a l t e r 0 f b r g u i d a n c en C O I N r a r n i n g

( ha p6 : 23 , ' 31

Ln)nt2 .4 4 _?1_nnnna?



DR4.FT

a l l l a n k sm u s t e a l i s eh eo p e r a t r o n a lnc l t r a t eg i cm p L i c a t i o n sh a rrnd iv idua l c t ions t he ac t ica levc icanhave crosshecnt i ; c pc ra t io r rAn over - reac t iono a th rca t r fa i iu reo reac to a s rna l l

i v r l ianemergecycan r r t r ca l lvndermineheopera t ionnd hees tem of thesecur i t y 'o rcesn he n inds f thepub l ic . a t rona l lync ln te rnar io ra l l y

S E C T I O N 0 : C U L I ' U R A L A w A I t E N t i S S

98 Gcnera l .Recent xper ienceas onf l rn redhatanunders tand ing{ ' t he IN,scu l tu res c r i t i ca lo miss ion uccess .u l tu ra l warenessCA) can ec luceat t le f ie lc ll i i c t ion nd he og of wardur ingCOIN,and hus mprove heab i l i t y toaccompl rshheniission.CA gives nsight nto he ntent f insurgenisndothergroupsn thcbatt le-

f Page',hi le reducing ultural r ict ionwith theHN peoples.Addit ional lyCA assistsnbu i ld ingappor t

h i ieprevent ing isunders tand ingshatundcrmlncuppor tb r hesccur itybrces.

99 Def in i t ions .Cu l tu res a broad nddc f ln i t ionse f ine hekey aspec tsf cu l tu re

encompassrngerm,The o l lowingi 0

cu l tu ra l' f e r ra in .

cu l tu re s s imp lyanother ement f te r ra in .Cu l tu ra lte r ra in ara l le lseograph icer ra inbr mi l i t a ry ons idera t ionsbothinf ' luenceecisions. ultural crrainpresentsat t lespaceobstaclesncloppoftunit ie;

b Cu l tu ra l Fac to rs 'Cu l tu ra l ac to rs redynamic spec tsf soc ic t yha t

have hecapac i t yo a f fec tmi l i t a ry pera t ions .hey nc lude e l ig lon .e thn ic i t y ,anguage,us toms,arues , rac t icesndpercep t ionsr i t h . r .factors f fcct hc hinking ndmot ivat ion f the ndividual r urouoancjmakeup hecu l tu ra le r ra in l ' t hebat t lespace .Not a l l f ac lo rs reapplicableo al l operat ions,ndaddit ionalactorsmaybe consicicrecjsnecessary. cross ect ion f lactors hatshould econsicleredbr ni lr raryoperat ionss containedn AnnexA to Chapter ; and

c Cultural Awarenes.sCA). CIA s theknowledge f CulturalFacrors rclanunders tand ingf the i r mpac t n hep lann in !and onduc t f rn i l i t i i r voperat ions.CA resuitsrom bothstanclardizedndspecif ic raining.

l ( )0 Opera t ions .Cu l tu ra l ons idera t ions- rL rs le i r l l y ncorpora tedn to heconducro1 'opcr i i t ious .ommanders us tunders tandhe rnpac t f cu l tu rc n heexe LrL ionl 't her r pera t ionsndp lans nd he rnp l ica t ionsnheren tn the lu idna tu re f thccornp lcxc l lv i ronmet r tresen tedy theCu l tu ra l

f c r ra in .A l l personne l us t ons ic le rL r l t L r ra ll ' e r ra in

c lL lnnghe cassessmentf thebat t le -space ,heamendn ien tf ex is t i rq la rs . ndt ranst iono 'au thor iy lba t t l c andover ,

'Exce rp tromAt scAcu r t u raAwareness ro l ec tTeamF ina lRepo r tNov2004

C 'hap : 221131



DI] .AFI '

1 ( l l C A D u r i n gR e l i e f n P l a c e .A k e y ' p i e c ef t hes u c c e s s f u le l i ei n p i a c e e l u ' e e i r

rac t ica l tn i t ss hecxchange f cu l tu ra ln fon la t ton A Cul tu raLn io rmat ioncmpla te

l i r ruse u r rng OA is a1AnncxA.

l (12 . Tra in ing . Any pre-dep loymentra in ingor a spec i f i c iss ion reamust nc lude

br ic f ings .o , - r . . * inghecu l tu ressuese ievanto theopera t tona irea . f a specr f ic O rs

kr. iorvr-rr ior o deploymcnt.henCA training hould nclude nyaspectshatareLinlque

tg thatpar t icu la reg ion . spec ts f t l iecu l tu re hou ld e o lded ntopre-dep lov tne t r t

l la in rng xerc iscs .SeeChapter 0 . )

SECTION1l : TI{B T'ACTICAL EVtiL COMMIT' [E'E YSTEM

I IS-TABLSFI INGTHE, COMMITTEES

103 Gcnera l . The rnu l t i -agecyaspec t f theCOIN campa ign emands lose ross-

agcncyplanningandco-ordinat ion own o the owest evels.'hc commit tec ystern 1'

cg-ordinat ion rovides br suchco-operat ionn themult i- facetedpproacho defeat ing

the rrsurgcncyn both he shortand ong erms.

l{14. Roles. The comrnit tee ystemwii l mirror hatwhich s bui l t a1 heopcrat ional

level.blt wi l l be affected t an appropr iateevelof civ i l ianandpoliceauthor i ty. n tranl '

cases.hc commit tees i l l be based n geographicalndcivi l ian inesof organisat ion,

sLrchs nun ic ipa l i t iesndcount ies . t t l ie ac t ica leve l , he o leo f thecommi t teevs tc lx

rcmainshesame s ha to f o f ;e ra t iona lcve lor na t iona l ommi t tees .

establ ishmentf pr ior i t ies;

co-ord ina t ionf in te l l igencendsecur i t y ;

co-ord ina t ione tween ecur i t y ndc iv i l ac t iv i t ies ;

jo in t consu l ta t ionnd, s arassecur i t y i l l permi t ,o in t p lann lng ;

r j o in td i rec t ion 1 ' pera t ions ;

utrrangementsor publ icsafety ndprotect ion f publ ic nst i tut ions;nd

d i rec t ion f t i re O po l icyar rd ian .

105 Reg iona l , rov inc ia lAnd Dis t r ic tCommi t tees . u l l y n tcgra tedo-ord ina t ing

cgmr l i t t ees renecessaryt var ious ubord ina te ,ac t ica levc ls .fhese

rv i l lcompr ise f '

rhc cg iona l eprcsenta t ivesf theagenc ieso-opcra t ingn theconduc t f theCOIN.

C h a p : 2 - s131

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; i i * . i l

D R A F T

I 'he omnr t teesv i l lo f ienbebased n boLrnc la r iesl r ) ca l over r lmentoundar iesn reg ions .r -o r , inces

t ha t e f l e c t i v i la d m i n i s t r a t i o nn dcoL in t lcsnd /o r is t l c t s

1 ( 1 6 C l o m m i t t e e c a t u r e s n d M e m b e r s h i p . I n t h ee s t a b l i s h m e n tn dc o p d L r c l1 h et ac t i ca l evc l com m i t t ee ys t em , he f o l l o , , v i nghou idbe no t e l :

t heseo iver e c l commi t teesndanysLrbord ina teo-ord ina t ingoc i icsreusr - ra l l ye fenedo asopera t ionsr ac t ion omnt i t t ees ;

thec l ia i rmans us r - ra l l vhese io ro f l l cc r /ad : r in is t ra ro ri ' t he oca l iv i l ianadrninistrat ionn whose upporthese ur ity orces re ,vorkinqDepend ingn hes ize f thcarea , ccou ldbea rn in is te rpporn te t lb r hepuryose , p rov inc ia l overnor .hecha i rnan f a cour ] t y or :nc i i . c iv i lch ie fexecu t ivef f i ce r r a mayor f a a rge i r y ;

thc oca l o i i cc ndmi l i t a ry ornmandersnd he n te l l igencendsecLr r i t yorganisat ionepresentat ivesi l l forrn hemembership.ocalciv i l ianexper ts aye i therbeu l l members r ' in a t tendance ' ,s heoccas iondemands. oal i t ion1'ormat ionommandersf theappropr iateevelwoLr ldnormaly a t tendheappropr ia teos t oun t ry 's ommi t tees ;

scnior drninistratorsrom var iousNGos operat ingn the egionmaysrton hecommi t teer be n at t cndance.

depend ingpon hecu l tu rc oncerned.oca la t t cndhccommr t tees .

r e l i g i o u scade r s a ya l s o

I 07 ' To tvn ,Ward and Vi l lage eve l .Smal le r ,ess orma l omrn l t t cesreneec lcd.co-o l 'd tna teiv i l ,po l ice , n i l i t a ry nd nte l l igencepera t ionst he ower eve ls , , i t hou tlcopardizinge ur i tyor creat ing cumbesome ureaucracy.his is the evelat wl irchthecampargnlan s n tp lementcds ac t ica leve l c t ion .i mus tbeseeno succecdorc ta j t the oya l t y ndsuppor t f t hepeop le .t i s mpor tan tha t oca l n te res tsrefcprescn tednd hat hepeop le an c la teo governn lcn to l i cy .Fa i lp re t h is evc lwr l lmean ef 'ea t . hechar rmans normal lyheheac l f thec iv i l adrn in is t ra t ion ,oss ib lyl relocal nayor, hechicf adrnirr ist rat ivef l lceror the uralcor-rnci lhairman. her lcn tbersh ipe i lec tshepo l ice , n r l r t a ryndother n lc res tst h is eve l . -hc n i l i t a rvrcprcsenta t lvenaybc a bat ta l ion f company ornmandcr ,cpenc l ingn thesca leinc jueograph ica lrea oncerned.

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C O I N P R I N C I P L E S

lg8 . I t \ \ , i l lbe mpor tan tha ta l l lnc lnbers f ' t l ie ommi t tees ,t w l la tevereve l , 'u l l ; '

u ;dc rs tandhe o leandcapabr l i t iest ' t hc n i l i t a ry lcn ten t . '1 'heyus ta lsoundcrs tand

the i r imi ta t ionsn te rms f resources ,k i l l sandROE. Fur thermore 'heymust

r . ruders ranc ihenat iona l t ra tegy ndcampa ign lan , nc lud inghe i r nd iv idua l o les nd

that9 f ' t hccommi t teetse l f .Many members f thecommi t tee i l l no tbe ami l ia r r even

egmlbrtablewith these ssues ndmil i tarypersonali t ies ustbe preparedo takea

, . \ r h r s e reL . o rm a l om m i t t ees ay no te x i s t , u t hen t r i i t a r yom m ander i l l c o n d u c tn d i v i d u a l

L r ; : i s . r nndc c - c r d i n a t i o n ,ndc a l l o g e t h e r t l h o c m ee t r t r gss n l s sL : en ayw a r r a n t .t

f l . 1 ea , r , e a l n e r o l a d h o cc o - o r c r n a t i o nr a y e e q u r r e dt h ep l a t o o ne v e l h o u l d p l a t o o n e

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M ayo ror se r l l o l l - oca lNCo

o f icers.

L o c a l e l i g i o u s

a u l h o r i l i c s ,

f -ooufNCO

Loca l e l i g i o r r s

aut r i ty .

ch i e f .1 ) i v i s ron ac in r i n i s t ra t i vef f i cer

conrdof I tbr c i ty/ towrr r

; pa ram i l i t a r i I coun t y d r r t i n i s t ra t o r .

Sub -un

co rnd.

( P o s s i b l y l

l eve l n rem o t e

u t eas . ' t ;

Fo rm a t i on

Comd

St a t i on o l i ce

c h e f s ) .

aotnzal 1 27-noo0q7



DI].AF'T

lcac le rsh ipo le n w 'ha tmaybc , n i t ia l r l , , , a ieasr . co l lec t jveducar iont r r l i t a r l 'membe isf thecornmr t tees, i l lhave o becomeami l ia r ^ . , r thl i rn i ta t ionsf the i r o r :n te rpa f igcnc ics .

p r ocess ,, i k e r v i s e ,

theab i l i i ies nd

l ( )9 . N4r l i t a ryoumanders l r s t ememberha t r inc ip les reeas ie ro a f f j rm han oapp l ) ' . an tcu la r lyn a COiN campa ign i th ts nhercn ta r iab les ,ens io rs nd nu l t ip lerscnc ies Thecomr r - r j t t eeys tem i l l he lp o-ord ina tec t io r - isndhar rnon iscreansacrosshevar ious genc ies .n man\ , {a r ledr a i l ing ta tes herc nsurgenc icsv r l li ) ccur .he tewi l l bea iacko f p ro f 'ess iona l lyra incd dnr in is t ra to rsr rc l L l i c r ro f 'ess iona lsv r i l l ackdepth ndex tens ivera in ing . ence . fogressnd nrp lementa t ionf thcl l r rnc ip lcsndp lanwi i l bes lowand equ i re a t iencen hepaf io f the n i l i t a ry .

I l0 l 'he rewi l l bea necd or ac t , nc le rs tand ingnd onrpromises nd iv idua lsnc lt l t€anizat ionsrepersuadedo giveup some f theirpowerand nf luencen thc nterests

o l 'g re te re f f i c iency ndc loser o-opera t ion .

I . 'ACIL I ' I 'ATIONOF TI IE COMMITTEE SYSTEM

I l l Boundar ies .C iv i l admin is t ra t ion ,o l i ce nd n i l i t a ry n i tboLrndar ieshou ld cthcs i tmen the nteres tsf I ia ison , lann ing ndco-ord ina t ion ,nd o avo idopera t iona liLndnte l l igencconf l i c t s nd onfus ion . o l r ce or - rnc la r iessua l ly o inc ide i th hoseo l ' t hc iv i ladrn in is t ra t ion .n cases f d isagrecment ,n i l i r a ry oundar ieshou ld on fb ' .to hcc iv i l / po l ice nes ecausehe at te ra re sua l ly e l l es tab l ishedndwi l l r cma i 'r |hen hc: rrnywithdraws.Occasional ly.t may beexpediento ac1. jstboundar icsr,order o br inga known nsurgcnt rganizat iorr'v i thrni rearea f reiponsibr l i tv f onecornrnande.

| 12 ' Loca t ion f Headquar te rs ndJo in t Opera t ions cn t re . A lo in t opera t io rscc ' l l t r et each eve l f commandn suppor t f t hccommi t teeys lem, rov ideshe oca lPo in t o r theconduc t ndco-ord ina t ionl 'opera t ionsnd br heco i lec t ion fin f 'onnat ion .t a lsoprov ides sccL l re ee t ing lace or hcc iv i l au thor i t ies ,o l i ce ndrr lr l i tary otr l tnandersndhas hestaf fmachineryor disseminat ingecision, n,. , . , . ,p1.-l l len ta t lony a l l hevar io l t so rces ndorgan isa t ionsv i th inhe oca lboundary . therpo in tso no te n thees tab l ish rnentf t heHe and3o in t pc ra t ionsent re re :

i t shoLr lde oca tedf poss ib ie t hepo l ice Ie where o l icc i lesa 'din te ligence re ead i ly ccess ib le ;

i f themi l i t a ryHQ is no tco- loca ted ,ommunica t ionsus tbecs tabr ishedbetr .veenhe wo locat ions;

oPSECwi l l remain r impor tan tons idera t ionhenw,ork ing i th oca lgo \ "cn tmentndpo l ice orce ;

I X I ] CUTI ON O F T H E C O } I M I T T E E S Y S ' I ' E I I I C O M M A N D A N D C O N T R O L

( lr ; iP : 28/3



DRAFl '

I l l Commi t teeDi rec t ives nd Opera t iona lOrders ,- fhe

commi i teeia tner t 'o rk

r r i l l v a n w i t h each i t u a t i o n ,u ts h o u l du na l o n g he o l i o w i n gi n e s :

thecomrn i t teeha i rman r d i rec to r f opera t ionsi l l i ssue po l rcy

d i rec t r veor the mplementa t ionf ' t he - ra t iona indcampa ign lana t ha t

reg iona leveL. r l i t a ry ss is tancen dra f t inghi sdocument aYbc

requ i red . he d i rec t ive hou ld ie ogetherhe ines f opera t ionora ] l

agenc icsnvo lved t ha t eve land n tha t eg ion .t i s ssuedn i t ia l l y sa

gLr id ingocumet t tnd cv ic rvede iod ica l l l ' ;

format ion ndunit cotnmaudcrsssue perat lonalrdershat ef- lectnd

imp lementhecommi t tee o l icyd i rec t ive ndh igh l igh the n i l i t a ry 's

suppor lo each f the ines f opcra t io r r .t t rans la teshcgenera l o l i cy

d i rec t ionnto ac t ica lasks .t n tayneed egu la rev iew ndupdat ing .

regu la r , nda t some eve ls a i ly , pera t iona l ec t ings i l l p rov ide

feedback etween gencies ndallow for co-ordinat ionnd -rpdate

direct ion s equired, nd

d. at theunit evel, heoperat ional rdershould uide heday-to-day

framework perat ions f thesub-units, owever t wi l l require cgular

updat ing art icular lyhe PlRsand Rs.Specif ic rders re hen ssuedor

individualdel iberate perat ions.

l l4 . Command and Cont ro l . Muchemphas isasbeen a idon heneed or

central ized irect ionnddecision-making.owever, he unct ion f the commrttee

s),stelr s essent ial lyo providea forum or planning ndcoordinat ion.he cotnmand

f i rnc l ionemains heprerogat ivend espons ib i l i t yf cachmi l i t a ry ndpo l ice

c t rmnrandeor c iv i l depar tmentead. hese f f i ce rs ndof f i c ia ls i l l beexpec tedo

consu l t neanother e fo re akrng ny n i t ia t i vesr tnak ing nychangcso prev ious ly

agrccd o l icyor p lans .

1 1 5 . R a p i dC o m m a n dR e a c t i o n . he r e , v i l l eo c c a s i o n sh e n q u i c kd e c i s i o ns

needed. erhapso exp lo i ta f lee t ing ppo(un i t y r to fo i lan u r lcxpec tcdnsurgent

i l i t ia t i ve . f ' t heres no t ime or a mi l i t a ry ommandero consu l t i ssupcr io r r h is

comrnit teenembers e wil l have o takea t irnelydecision ndactupon t. Provided hat

a goodundcrs tand ingx is t s mongs themembers f the oca l ommi t tee ndu ' i t h in hc

cha ino f command, nd hatson tehought asbeen iven n how o reac t o lo reseeab lecont ingenc ies ,hecomrnander 'sec is ion hou ld ea sens ib iene . A commander ho

rc l l sh iss r - tper io r ,hepo l iceo f f i ce r nd , f necessary ,hecha i rman f h iscommi t tee l ia t

I re5asdoneaud vhyhc hasdonc t shou ld xpec t ap id uppof i ndco-opera t io r t .

S I I CT I O\ I 2 : E M P L O Y M B N T O F C O M B A T A R M S A N D S U P P O I I TARI V I S

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I )RAFT

l l 6 C c n e r a l , A s p r e v i o L r s l l ' d i s c L r s s e d .h eA r m l , w , l l l l a , vhck ey c l e n l ecc r l ld r - t c tf 'aCOIN As wi thanv ypeof r l i l i t a rycampa ign ,hecombat rnrs i rd L l i rpor ra r t l s ' v i l l l i ha r "e epara teu tmutua l ly r - rppor t ingo ics o p lay . Mi l i t a ry orccs .

rcnc l 'a l l ; ' l hce orverhrea trom nsurgen lshan heydo u ,hen ac ing conve; t t iopa lc l l c l l l \ / . r r r ther tnore ,henature f a COINopcra t ionrca tes h ighdcmandbrso ld je rpa t ro i l ing n . io l tgs thec iv i lpopr - r ia t ronndcor . in t11 , ,hat s yp ica l lyn fan t ryasksI lc t l cc . o r r - in lan t rvrms ' lay c r cqur rede- ro leo undcr takeheseian- rcworkope at ions . egard iessf thcs r tua t ion .L rchn i t s nus t epreparedo conc lL rc therr torr lal ornbatr-rnct ionshould he hreat varranl-1.

l l7 In f 'an t ry .Given he ta tu re f a COIN,vv i thts equ i rementor pe l ,as ive ,v ic jc -s; lread'rarneworkperat ions,nlantryunitswil l be n highdemand. oth rnechanisecjar rd igh t n fan t ry omple tehe i rmiss ions is rnountedin al l operar ions ,ors inp l i ,CON). Vlechanisednfantry ave headvantagef protect ion,nobi l i tyand irepor.ve\ lh i le igh t n fan t ry daptmore ead i lyo c lose er ra in uch surban reas ,ung lc nd

I l loLlntainouserrain.Given henature iCOIN, thc need o move apidly o react .hcsiz-el f AOs and hedoctr ine f cont inual ly xtendrnghe nf luenc.of th. secur itybrccs.cvcrr ighl r- r far-r t ryi i l requircntegralneans f t ransportor thecondnct f f rame orkopera t ions .tegard lessf themeans f t ranspor t ,l l jun io r eadersndso ld ie rs us tL r t lders tandhat uccessn COIN wi l l on lybe ea l isec ly d ismount ingndspend ingin rcarnongs the oca l opu lace .

The 2 RCR deployment o Haiti in2004limited themechanisedifle company o onlyfour LAV II I vehicles enough or on e ifle platoon)and o several ight ruppo.tvehiclesto supportpatrolling 8 x LSVWs * enough oi theremaining latoons).Dispite the actthatHaiti (andespecially ts capital) s themost densely opiitated "gion in ihe world,

the vehiclesproved nvaluable, vehicles ransportedroopsevenshortdistanceso theirpatrolareas o thatdespite he ntense ea tand heavyequipment, oldiers rrived estedand ocused or their patrol.When he company'sAO was madenon-contisuous ndcame o include wo remote owns, heLAVs (in addition o beinguseful ri thecity)provideda high profile presence nd protection or remoteplatoonbases, nd obuittransportation ve rroutesnot alwayssuitable or B vehicies.

I 18 . Armour . Arn tour , nda l l heavy i repower , us tbc usedmost ud ic ious lypC'OINso as o avoid he"DavidversusGoliath"PSYOPS clvantagehis couldgive othcenenty .Nonethe less ,a r t i cu la r lyn h igh n tens i t y OIN opera t ions ,rmoLr ip laysra lL rab ieo lewi th

tscharac te r is t i csf f i r epower ndpro tec t ion . s rnos lCOlN wi l lt l ccL t rn u rban reas ,heemploymentf a rmour n o f fens ivec t ions i l l beak i r r o tha ti r l u rbar t ombat pera t ions .t w i l i ass is tn breach ingt ruc tL l res ,eu t ra l i s ingt rongpr l in t s ndsuppot l ingn fan t ryorces .Whennoternp ioyedn th iscapac i t y ,n . t roop tI lay beernp lovedn f ramework pera t ionsuch spat ro ls ndmovement on t fo l

I 19 . Armoured Reconna issancc ,he nob i l i t y , ro tec t ion ,i reporveandsL l r vc i l lanccapa l - ' i l i t iesha ta reo f f c red y a rmouredcconna issanccbrces rakesher l

( h r 1 -' : j u r I

A.020231 30-00010



DI {AI "T

Lrse fu lb i a i ,a r ie t ) ,o fasks .Apar t romsun,e i l lancendmountec ieconna issanceat roLs

they 'can er fo rm rea ecur i t l , ,ines f communica t ionecur i t l ' ,ou te icke l ing .onvo ,v

cscol- t .nd orm partof a QR.F, mongst ther asks Nonetheless.rmouredrcconna issanceersonne l ustbepreparedo d lsmount nd nterac tv i th he oca i

popLr )a t ionn onCer to ax imisehe i ruse fu lnesss n fo rmat iono l lcc to rsndconf idencc

b L r i l d e r s .

l l0 D ismounted econna issancenclSn ipers . Given he cqu i rementbr

i r r t c l l i g c n c ea t hc r i ngnd hen e e d o c o n d u c to v c r t p c l e t i o n sn c l o s ee r r a l n .

reconnatssaucendsn iper e tachrnentsr l l p loveveryuse fu l .Apar t romgather lng

in {b r rna t ron ,heycanes tab l ishndmancover tOPs hatwi i i t r igger hedep loymentf

. the forces o ki l l or capturensurgentsnddisrupt heiract ions.They canalsoprovrde

ovcr-u,atcltncl rotect ionor del iberate perat ionsuchascordons ndsearches'

l l l A v i a t i o n .A v r a t i o n a s s e t s d e p l o y e d i n a C O l N w i l lr o v c r n o s t u s e f u ln t h e s a m elnanner s conventronalperat ions. part iom troopmovement ndsensorasks,hcy

prov ide a luab le ver -watch ur ing e l ibera tepera t ions .imings ecome ruc ia l s

i 6 e i r a p p e a r a n ce b e f b r e t h e st a r t o f a d e l i be r a t e o p c r a ti o n w i l ln d i c a t e i v e c a r l y

rvarn ingo insurgents .

l?2 . Ar t i l le ry . Prcc is ion apab i l i t iesi l l a l low he i remploymentga ins t i r lpo in t

targcts.When not providingobservat ionnd ire support ,heir orwardobservat ionealns

canactas raison el ls or r i f le companies ndassistn rnanning ommand osts. he

batter iesnaybe employed n framework perat ionsncluding ssistanceith tact ical

level O andproviding orceprotect ionbr f irm bases;

113 Eng incers .Dur inga COIN,eng inees wi l l con t inueo prov ide he i rmob i l i t y ,

. , runr.r - , - , - ,obi l i tyndgeneral ngineer upporto al l forcesn theatre. his wil l include

j i r cus n r l iede tec t ion ndc lear ing f IEDs.Thc i rcapab i l i t iesi l l bea mains tay 'o l

. t i l i t a ry edCIMIC tasks nd he i r mpac t anbesubs tan t ia l .ommandcrsrus t i ve

carc fu l ons idera t iono theba lance f resourcend in lea l loca tede tween IMIC and

sLrpporto the fbrce tse f . A heavyweight ing f resourceso support or the orce icc

( ' lMtC lp ro jec tsmaysend hewrong nessageo t l re oca l opu la t ion .

124 . S igna ls . n add i t ion o prov id ing o tn tnun ica t ionso the brce tse l f ,hcmi l r ta ry

g i l l l te equ i r cdo es rab l ishommunica t ionsi th o ther genc ies ,uch spo l ice . ' f h is

l ray cn ta i i heprov is ion f s igna ls e tachmentso thoseocat ions ,a r t i cu la r lyf

cornrn r . tn ica t icnsre o be securc

l l 5 1 , l i l i t a ryPo l ice .Mi l i t a rypo l icewi l l p rov ide i r cc t ia ison o c iv i i ian o l ice

sL- ry icesl ic n do ingso wi l l beab le o prov ide n accL l ra tessessmentf thecapab i l i t ies

rnd r t t i t uc lesI those o l ice orces .

th e p : 3 1 i 3 1



AnnexA

To Chapter

(r)

0)

(l ) Is therean extant

(m) I f so,what s rhe

'ExcerptromABCA Cul tural wareness

C h a p 6 : - 1 l l

DRdFT

CULTURAL NFORMATION

l General.This empLaterovides ommandersndstaf fwith a guide/checkl isthatident i f ies ey quest ions,ertainingo culturalnformat ionhatmustbe addressedur inga TOA This empiatemayalsobeuseful sa referenceocument ur ing heconduct fa CON. It shouldbe used n conjunctionwith annexA to Chapter (CulturalFactors).

2. Transferof Cultural nformation, Cultural nformation ncluded n this templateshouldbe madeavailable o units,down to the owest evel,preparing o enter he battle-space.As a minimum, he ol iowingshould e addressedur ing heloA:

Leadershirr

i. Who are he eadersn your battle-space?

(a ) What groupsor interests o they epresent?

(b ) What ar e heir personalityypes?

(c ) What s your unit historywith each eader?

(d ) What s your personal ssessmentf each eader?

(e ) What evelof controldoeseach eader xerton his group?

(f ) What evelof influencedoeseach eader avewithin thebattle-space?

What strategies av eyou used o interactwith each eader?

Do some eaders av emoreor lesspower han t appears?

How oftendo you meetwith each eader nd why?

Whatmeeting ormatdo you use,whatworksbest?

(k ) what negotiating rrategiedo you find mosteffectivewitheach eader?

(g )

(h )

successionlan?

plan o managehischange?

Pro jec t eamFina lRepor t ,March2C05



. :. , , * , !& J ,

i : l ' : : - ' :

Anlex A DRAFT'fo

Chapter

t n t \ A h : t s n e c i f l c j n c i d e n t s w : t h v . ' t ' ' r : l q d r t r i n ^ \ i ^ ' r r + n r l - " . .- - u ^ , J L J p ! r l r r ! r r l u r r v r r L J v Y t L I r

) v u ru r r r L r u w r 1 1 6

i r v u rr v u r r r q r !

impacted ourrelat ionship ith each eader ndu'hathaveyou

done o alterpercept ionsased n that mpact?

(o) Whatare hereiat ionshipsetweeneaders ndhow have hose

re la t ionsh ipsmpac tedourmiss ion?

(p) How haveyou af tempted/howo youplan o inf luence

relat ionshipsetweeneaderso alter hebatt le-spacenvironment?

(q) Whatoutstandingssues o you havewith each eader hatma; '

impact hemission/bat t le-space?hat current ontracts re n

forcewith each eader?

(r ) Handoverail meeting eports rom meetingswith leaders savailable

(s ) Handoveral i biographical eportson each eaderas available.

(t ) Handoverall intelligence ssessmcntsn each eaderas available.

2. What are he nfluentialgroups n your battle-space?

(a ) How influential s eachgrouP?

(b ) How doeseachgroup n fluence hebattle-space?

(c )Has each

group had a helpful,neutral, r hostile elationship

with your unit and how ha s hat mpacted ou r mission?

(d ) What strategy ave yo u employed o influence h e behaviour f

eachgroup?

(e ) What specific ncidentswith your unitsduringyour tour have

impacted ou r relationshipwith eachgroupand what haveyou

done o alterperceptions ased n that mpact?

(f ) How doeseachgroup nteractwith othergroupsandwhat

impact have hose nteractions ad on your mission/the

batt le-space?

(g ) What is the sourceof power for eachgroupand how ca nyou

influence hat sourceof power to accomplish ou r mission?

(h ) What outstandingssues o you havewith eachgroup ha tma y impact

the mission? What currentcontracts re n forcewith eachgroupand how do those

contracts nfluence he group o support he mission?

C h a p 6 : - 2 l l

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. , r t , . _ i . i l i l ' . . r : t r r . j -u

Annex ATo Chapter

DR.AFT

( i ) IJorvdoes achgroup it into hecampaign lan?

( j) Whatnon-tradjt ionalshadow" roupsnf luencehebatt ie-spaceutmaynot bereadi lyapparento anoutsider?

(k) Handover l l meet ing eports nd ntel l igenceepof is n each roup

Government

L What s thecurrentgovernment tructuren theslructure iff 'er rom historicaldata?

batt le-spacendhor.v oes his

2. Which elements f government re functioningwell an dwhich are unctioninqpoorly? Why?

3. What actionshaveyouyourbatt le-space?

taken o alter, mprove,or change he govemmentn

4' What govemment ervices o you consider ital to missionsuccess ndwharactions aveyo u taken o ensurehey continue?

5 Ho w much nfluencedoeseachgovernmenteaderhavean d rom where s theirpowerderived? (appointed?elected?ook power hrough orce?)

6' What financial, uppon,or construction ontracts recurrently n forceorsignedwith the govemmentan dhow do thosecontractsnfluenceyour

relationship it hthe government, eople,andgroupswithin thebattie-space?

L In what key ways does he battre-spaceiffer from your pre-deproymentimpressionsndstudies ndhow canwe uuold h.r . mispercept ions?

Batt le-space nvironment

1.Whatare heatmospher ics"sense f thecommunity") f each i l iage, ow.,cit1r, rovince, egion,or otherkey areaswithin your battle-spacend ho w do thoseatmospher icsmpact ourmission?

2. Wherehaveyour unitsencounteredhe mostculturalreact ionsike openhost i l i ty, ost i le estures,ul len ooks.etc.)

to dealwith this friction?

3' Whatare hepercept ionsf yoursoldiers/personnelf thepeople, roups, ncileadersn eachareaandwhy?

lriction? (may ncludeHow have ouat tempred

C h a p 6 : - 3 t 7

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Amex A

To Chapter

DRAFT

4. Whatare hepercept ionsf people, roups, nd eaders f yourq n l d i e r c / n e r < n n n e J n e a c h : r e a a n d w h v '

5. WhataregeneraI ercept ionsr mispercept ionsf your unit hathavehindered

or heiped our abi l i ty o accomplishhemission?How haveyou attemptedo discourage

or encouragehese ercept ions?

6. What are hecultural hot spots"withinyour bat t le-space?ncludeanysite

rvhere ultural riction could ead o a negativencident ha twould detract rom mission

accomplishment. ow can hese ot spots edealtwith to reduce r ict ion?

7. What patterns recommonon the streets nd how do changesn thosepatterns

indrcate hifls n hostility, supportiveness?

8. What othercultural actorsmay impactou r mission? What are he normalworking hours,working days? What daysar echildren n schooland rom what age?

Etc. Ilow does his nformationdiffer from pre-deployment ssessments?

9. What extemalcultural orces, uchas eligious nfluence, mpact behaviour n

your battle-space nd how haveyou reactedo that nfluence? What s the cultural

significance f outsidegroupsand or ieaders n the groupsand eadersn the battle-

space?

Relieion.Lansuageand Customs

l. What are he key religions n your battle-space nd how do you perceive

religious nfluence? How do your culrentperceptions iffer from pre-deploymentassessmentsnd how do you account or thesedifferences?

2. Where are he key religioussiteswithin your battle-space? ow doeseach

rel igious ite nf luence our mission? e.g. no-go"area o reduce r ict ion)

3. What influencedoes eligionhaveon eachgroupand/or eaderwithin the

battle-space?How arereligiousgroupsand eaders inkedwith seculargroupsand

leaders ndhow does hat relationship mpact he battle-space?

4. What political influencedoeseach eligiousgrouphavewithin the battle-space

and how do they exercise hat influence?

5. How does el igion nf luencehe everyday ehaviour, ct ionand ea ct ion f

peoplewithin the bat t le-space?

6 How do rel igious ercept ions ndbeliefs f fect he elat ionship etween our

soldiers, 'personneind he people?How haveyou attemptedo inf luencehose

pcrcept ions nd bel iefs?

C h a p 6 : - 4 1 7

ao?02312-4 .nOO15



i . - , g!-t

AnnexA

To Chapter

horv

rvith

DRAFT

7. What el igiousminor it ie l ive withinyourbatt le_space,to they nteract i th majonty eltgious roupsJndwhathas

how are hey reated,y 'our e la t ionsh ipeen

these roups?

8. Haveyou

minor ity ights) ndgroup?

been orced o inter . lectourselfntoany el igiousssuese.g.how did thatact ion f fect hepercept ionf yourunitwith e;ch

run, ?,Xi::iilJl:,fHl;,T:i$::iTJil"Jffi,:,^ttes candodos

l0 Whatmajorstumblingblocksha s anguage aused etween ou r unrtand hepeople/groups/leaders

11 .What s the availabilityof local ranslators ndhaveyou found hem o betrustworthy'effective, iased/unbiased? ha t actics an you recommend or recruitins.employing, ndmonitor ingocal ranslators?

- - - - - - - ' -D'

12 'Ho w effectivewasyour pre-deploymentanguageraining? What di d you doto improve he anguage apabilityof yourpersonnel uling operations?what phrases rtranslationoolsdid you find the most useful o reduce ultu.ul riction

"uusecly

Ianguage arriers?

13 ' What ocalcustoms avecause he most riction between our personnel ndthepeople? How haveyou adjusted perationso reduce his friction?

l4 Recommend trategieso fol iow ocalcustoms ithoutcompromising issronrequirements.

15.Which ocalcustoms o you recommend ustbe ol lowedwithoutexcept ionan dwhich canbe gnoredwithout causing ndue riction?

16. What customs aveyour personnelollowed ha thave givenyou themostdividend n improvedperception/atmospherics?

Ongoins Cultural Init iat ives

1. What cultural nitiativeshaveyou undertakeno improveperceptrons,educefriction, and gaincompliance r neutrality? What nitiativeswould you ,L"o-nlend fo r

the futureand whatwould you recommend gainst?

2. what cultural xchange aveyou attempted i th groups, eople,eaders?Have heseexchanges eeneffective?

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To Chapter

3. l{ou,ef fect ivehavecivi l af fairs rojects een n inf luencinghebatt le-space?

\\ /hatstrategiesnd act icswouLd ,ou ecommendo improve r makebestuseof ctvi l

af fairs rojccts ndmissions?

4. Wheredo you recommend pplyrng ivi l af fairs rojectsn the nearterrn o

achieve he greatest ffect?

Secur ifyand Armed Groups

1. What cultural nf luence aveyou used, r is avai lable,o coerce ost i le orces

within your batt le-space?

2. What culturaltact icsrel igious atred, tc,)havehost i le orceswithin your

batt le-spacesedagainst ou? How ef fect ive ere hese act ics?How did you try to

counter hem?

3. What are he culturalvulnerabilit ies f hostile,non-hostile, nd supportive

groupswithin the battle-space? re there nherent ultural rictions hat can be leveraged

to reduce heir effectiveness?How haveyo u exploited hese uinerabilit ies o ensure

mission uccess?

4. If yo u are rainingor working with local security orces,what cultural ssues

havehelped/hindered ou r relationships?What trainingstrategies or k bestwithin this

culture?

5. What cultural rictionsexistwithin the security orces ha tundermine heir

ability to accomplish heir missions?How can we reduce ha t friction?

6. How do localsview the security ervices?How do thoseperceptionsmpact

their effectiveness nd how canwe reduce rictions/improve ffectiveness?

7. When and on what day do hostile orcesconductattacks nd why? Is thereany

religiousor cultural significance o these atterns hat canbe exploitedor used n

assessments?

8. What are he crime evels,what typesof crime arecommitted,and what ar e he

reasons ehind crime trends? Are therecultural actors hat we can nfluence o reduce

cr imeor ident i fy cr iminals r cr iminalgroups?How do people ccept r reject r iminal

activity and how haveyou used hat perception o impactcrtme?

Other Issues

1 What are he culturaldifferences etween urai andurbanpopulations nd s

thereany result ing ultural r ict ion? How does his ef fect ourmission?

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2' Are here nyoutstandingebts r .vedo anygroup, eader. r indivrdualn tnebatt ie-space?hat do we oweandwhy? Are we overdue n u,rydebts uchasbloodnloney r contractees?

3 what havewe promised money, ontracts,upport ,mecr ical id,etc.) ogroups,eaders, r individuals ithin ourbatt le-space? hatbenef i twi l l we receivefrom ollowing hrough n these romises ndwhatare heconsequencesf notfollowing through?

4. Which elat ionshipswith eaders, roups,ncl iv iduals)houidwe maintainrvhich nes houldwe end,andwhichones houldwe alterandwhy?

5. What culturalopportunities o yo u see n this ransition?Wherecana ,,freshstart"help an dwherewould it hurt?

6' Which groups, eaders, nd ndividualswill tr y to takeadvantage f ou r relativeignorance f thebattle-spacenvironment?What actions re he y ikelyio takean dwhy? IJow canwe counter heseactions r use hem o our advantage?

7' What are he greatest ulturalchallenges nd dangerso ou r mission? Howshouldwe overcomehese hallenges?

8' What hasbeenyour most successful-culturalactic e.g. requentmeetings,meals, rddel ivery)?Whatwouldyou ike o have r iedbutdidn'tbecause f a lackofresources?

Chap6: A - l l l

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DRAITT

CHAPTER 7

INTELLIGENCE

On the rans fo rmat tonac ing he n te l l igenceerv ices os tSeptember 1, 2001 ' .They

have already learned o regret the emergen ce f ne w intelligence argets thut lack any

concrete orm; aggressivebelief systems not subject to central authorily, shifting

alliances of dangerous malcontenls,statelessmigrants disloyal to any country of

settlentent t is from thosebackgrounds ha l lhe agentsof anti-Western errorism ar e

recruiled.

JohnKeegan,ntelligencen War:Knowledge f theEnemy romNapoleono Al-

Qaeda. ondon. eyPorter ooks, 003: 64

S e c t i o n: Gcne r a l

l . The Need or Intei l ieence. ood rntel i igences vital n anyphase f war. n

counterinsurgency perationst will be n constant nd continuous emand.Sound

intelligence upports ontinuingsuccessn operations equiresteady uccess, hich will

weardown the nsurgentmovement, estricting ts capabilityand e ducing ts morale,

Accurate ntelligencewill permitcommanderso conductoperations ith precision,

reducing he detrimentaleffecton the HN populationandminimizingcasualties mong

friendly forces.The combinedeffectwill be to secure ndmaintain he morale among he

security orcesand raise heir standingwith the civilian population. ffectivean dprecise

us eof kinetic and nonkineticmeanswill earn espect; ital in the campaign or hearts ndminds. ll-directedand ndiscriminate se of forcewill merelyserve o alienate ny FIN

populat ion. t m ay be appreciated,herefore,hatsound ntel l igences a precursoro al l

counterinsurgency perations;t m ust bebuilt up quickly andsustained fficiently rom

the starc f a campaign. glossary f abbreviat ionssed n thisChapters at AnnexA.

2. Intel l igence upport o Operat ions. horough nowledge f the extentof the

insurgency nd hepoli t icalandmil i tary aims,command tructuresnd ogist icnetwork

of the nsurgents houldallow thehost nation HN) government nd coalition orce cr

developa long-term veral lst rategy ndsensiblemil i tarypol ic ies o defeat he

insurgency n thephysical ndmoralplanes. t al l levels,ntel l igence i l l permit

commanderso put the strategy ndpolic ies ntopract iceo al low hedefeat n detai lof

the nsurgents y ki l l ing, captur ing r arrest ingndividuals nddepr iv ing hemof targets,

intel l igence,he means f command nd communicat ion, eapons, mmunit ion, oodand

othersupplies. t t r i t ionof al i these lements i l l reducehe nsurgents'abi l i tyo

r la in ta in hecampa ign . u ide l inesn In te l l igenceuppor to r C2W areg iven n

Annexes andC.

I In te l l iq ,encen Counter - lnsureencypera t ions here s no th ing ad ica l n the

appL ica t ionf the undamenta isf in te l l igenceo a counter - insurgencyampa ign . here

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DR,AFT

are , owever ,h ree spec tsi ra t v i i lcanvgrea te rmphas ishanmrght e hecasenconvent iona lpera t ions

a . Thepredominancef human ntel l igence

The nf luence f thecrvr l ian uthor i ty noperat ionsnd heconsequentonstraintsintei lrgenceather ing.

(r{UMTNT);

counter-ns rgencyandcompl ica t ronsn

Theappearancehat, t imes, perat ionsre n support f intcr lrgcncerather han he everse.

3' The mportance f I {UM|Nf. T'he urpose f intelr igence,n anyphase f war, sto determineheenemy hreat y accuratendt imelyassess"mentf bothcapabil i ty ndintent ions,o hat hecommander aydevelop pran o br ingabout ts defeat.ncounter- insurgencyperat ions,his s equallyh. .u. . ; the nsurgent ustbedefeated,mil i tar i lyor pol i t ical ly, nd hiscanbedoneonly f commandersregivensuff ic ientknowledge f theenemybythe intel l igencctaf f . n situat ions here he nsurgentivesamong he population, crhapswithoutuniformor a recogniruur.military structure, iscapabilit ies nd ntentions re ikely to be determineaarfetf from informatlo,,prouia.aby thepopulat ion nd hose ndividuals bre o move n . lor ' . pro*,- i ty to him.Sophist icatedntel l igence cnsors,rucial n generalu. , no.*ul ly cannotmatch heHUMINT agent, nformer, nformantl,surveillancerom observation ostsor thc reponsf iom rout ine ol iceor armypatrols.- l ' ime-consumingcol lat ion f detai land ainstakinganalysismay then prove he key to unravelingi,npo,iun, rf..t, ortn" insurgcnt,sactivity'Processing UMINT is enhanced

ith the useof r..ent software pplicationssuch s ink analysis ndspreadsheets.

4' c iv i l ian conlra- ! - lntel l igenceather ingn a counter- insurgencycampaign i l l , inal l probabil i ty,ack he reedom hatmay bee-njoycdn convent ionalperat ions.hepr imacy f c iv i l ianpol i t icalcontrol, heialancebetween ffor ts o defeathe nsurgcncyand hose xpcnded n cr imeprevent ion nd esolut ion, Iheuteof law and heneed bradmissible videnceor prosecut ion, i l l a l l constrainit . guth. . ingof intei l igence.Mil i tary ntel l igence taf fsmay well f ind hemselvesn uniamil iar ircumstances,subordinatedo civi l iancontrolandmethods f operat ingrrai- -avhaveconf l ict ing imsandpr ior i t ies.

5 Patrolline. n operationswhere herelianceon HUMIN.f is paramount,hedismountedoldierbecomesheeyes ndears f an ntel l igence rganisat ion.hevalueof extensive atroi l ing ndsubsequente-br ief ing aynot". .uaity eapparento thes o l d i e r ' o r e x a m p l e ' t h e. t r u e a i m m i g h t be t o d w e l o p a p i c tu r e o f ' p a t te r n s o f i n s u r ge n tbehavior vera protracted er iod, ather hanshort- t . i . i . "orrnuissanceor immediareoffensive ct ion Theneed o win thehearts nclmindsof thepopuiat ionn order orveakenympathy or insurgentsnd hus ncreasehepotent iat ow of informat ion,'ayalso ry thesoldier 's at ience ndmorale she indshimselfadopt ing essaggressrvestancehanhe mightotherwise avechosen.

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DRAFT

necess i tYo app ly he nee to knor .v "nnc ip le h i s s v i ta l o r F IUM6;Tsourcepro tec t ion 'ome nte l l igence ,e rhapshat rov idedrom st ra teg icources ,nay o tbemade vaiLableo al l inte l igence taf fs t every evel.For

example,mater ial i th the"Canadian yesOnly" caveatmay bemade vailablerom Canada xclusivelyorCanadianomtnanders.herewil l be a need or special andl ing roceduresor thrs,andother ,mater ia l .n such i r cumstances ,sa min imum, Nat iona ln te l l igencec l l N IC)maybeestabl ished.n support f fui l operat ionst is nccessaryo fbrmanAli SouroeIntei l igenceentre ASIC) withinwhich heremaybe a HUMINT supportGroup

Fsc) 'a cryptologicalSupportGroup CSG), roviding IGNT, or. n vnvr suppo.

Group lSG).Special istntel l igencehould i*uyt bekJpt under lose eviewwherroperat ing i th al l iesas heycanencouragexclusivi ty nd educehemutual rustsonccessaryor e fectve cooperat ion.

I l Straininq ommunicat ionsetworks.nevitabiy, xtensiventel l igenceatanet-workswil l place largeburden n thecommunicat ionsvai lable. hisshould ebornc nmindwhendesigninghe ntel l igencerchitecturei th asmuchusebeingmadeof

exist ing ystems spossible.n a coIN campaign,heusage y intei l igenceorganizations f availablebandwidthwill ouistrip ha tof ai l otherusers ue o theneedfo r accesso nationa.l atabases,mageryproducis nd he outputof national gencies.This s particularly he casewhensatellite ommunications re establishedn the heatre.

Central isedControl

I I TheNeed or Central ised ontrol. ntel l igencessets renormally entral isedtthehighest ppropriateevel of command n order o be availableacrosshc widestpossible reaofoperations. n counter-insurgencyperationsherear e urthertmperat ivesor central ised

ontrol.Where everalntel l igence rganisat ionsreworkingagainst common arget, here s th edanger f overlap.Someauptications alwaysnecessaryn order o improve he evaiuation f informationby it s beingconfi.-ed frommore hana singlesource.

fhedanger ies n therebeinga single our.".exploireJby

more hanoneagcncy ach n ignorance f one-anoth.r . hi , ian lead o falseconfirmation nd , n tum, gives he sourccgreater redibility hanmay be ts worth.There s also heundesirability f wastage f effortand esourc.s.

l3 TheDirector f Intel l ieence.n designinghe ntel l igence rganisat ion,decisionmustbemade o coordinate l l intel l igencetaf f i ,mil i tary nd . iui l iun,HN andcoalr t ion,central ly deal lya singleDirector f Intel l igen.. ' houl j be establ ishedt nat ionalevelwith similarposts t each ower evelof command, erhapshose f civ i l ianadministrat iveuthor i ty r mii i tarycommand epending pon rre ircumstances.

In tegra t ion The Commi t teeSys tem

.14 ,Establ ishing n Intet l igenceCommit tee.TheDirectorof Intel l igencet nat ional

levelshould,deal ly ' . hairan ntel l igenceommirtee. ubordinatentel i i !encecommlt tees'vouldhenmeetat each ower evel.Each ommit teewouldorve l iegranceto thcnexthigher evelwhtch n tum wouldbe responsibleor theeffect ivenessnd

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DRAFT

coordrnat ionf the ntel i igence f for ts f those elor .vhem Commit tees houldmeet

regu la r l r f t hc re s to bea use fu i xchangendd iscussronf in te l l igencenda good

rvork inge l r t ionsh ipe tween iv i l au thor i t ies .o l i ce ndmi l i t a ry n te l l igcnceta f ls

es tab i ished .

15 . Membersh ipo f the n te l l igence ommi t tee .Membersh ip f the n te l l igence

commi f tee hou ld ear ranged utua l ly e tweenhe - lN n te l l igenceerv iccs .

c iv i l ian ndmi l i t a ry . nd hose f Canad ianndother l l ied n te i l igence

staffs.

16. Coordinat ion.The ntel l isenceommit tees hould nsurehat:

a. Civii, police andarmy boundaries re he sameand accordmore with the

civil authorityand security orcecommand ystem.This may not alwaysbe possible;

b. Informat ion nd ntel l igencelow downwards swell asupwards nd

sideways o neighbouring ommitteeswhereappropriate;

c. Representativesf government epartments nd HN experts re co-opted

for specialadvice,with due regard or security. hey might come ronr

customsservices nd coastguards,uch ieldsas he highwaysdepartment,

rail services,nlandwater ransport, ivil engineering,

telecommunications,ower andwatersuppliers nd rom a wider circle of

the HN communitywhich might include armers, usinessmen nd other

traders.

5t23

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DR.AI-T

' I ' heCommi t tee ys tem

11' I i lustrat ion. igure1(( .saaur)dit roru!t r ictgrunr.s '/ i ru or l tgt t ra )) i i lustrateshekindof commit tee ystemwhichmightbedevelopedn a'theatre f operat ions.anadianintel l igenceersonnelmay f ind themselvesunr ingcommit tees t br igadeeveland

i: ; ; 'Individual anadian f f icers hould xpect, l u. puni. ipantsniommitrecsa1 ny

lS Funct ions f an Intel l igenceommit tee. he unct ions f intel i igenceommit teesareas ol iows:

a' At theFrN ever, okecp hegovernment,hecivi l andmir i tarycommanders, r chiefsof stafl,andoperations taffs nformedo1.allaspects fintelligence nd securityoperations nd o facilitate h.

"-.rr*!. ." aprovision f the intel l igenceecessaryor heprosecut ion fa stratesrccampa ign .

b. At subordinateevels,o keep heirparal lel perat ionsommrtteesndthenexthigher ntei l igenceommit teesur iy nform.a *i,n , . i .uon,intcl l igenceor operat ionallanning.

c To adviseoperational taffson securityandprotectivemeasures.

To develop hecoi lect ion ranagainst hich hecol lect ion gencieswi l l be asked.

In te l l igenceallocat ingasksandobtained.

staf fs hrough heG3, o direct hecol lect ion gencies,pr ior i t ies nd rmewithinwhich he nformat ionmustbe

f. Wherepossible,o establ ishommonintel l igencendsecur ity rganisat ions.

procedurcsor al l IN andall ied

g. To provideanappropr iateisseminat ionerviceo commanders.

19' central ntel l ieence taf fs. n a canadian orce, ubordinateo thecommit tees,there hould e a central ised,ntegratetrtaf fcapabie ip.r io.r ,ng col lect ioncoordinat ion

nd ntel l ig€nce equirements anagementccrRM), databasemanagementnd usion unct ions n behalf f al l the ntel l igence taf fs f thatpart icularmission'For his eason'he concept f theASIC wasd"uet6f .a.e, theoutset , spar lofthe ntel l igence lan,clearorders hould e givenon the eveiat which esponsibi l i tyormaintenancef a master atabase i l l beperformed.t is essent ialo prevent very eveio f in te l l igenceta f f unn ing a tabasesn para l le l . l t hough, * i l t never eposs ib leoavoidsomeduplicat ion.ofecord-keeping,here hould ! a minimumof databasesvitha single, rcbably hehighestHN. levelmaintaininghemaster atabasevithsubordrnate.ndother evelssubmit t ing hangeso it in the orm of 'data-changeequests.

6t23



DR-AFT

N{aintenancef a single atabases faci l i tated 1' the pul l" rather han he"push"

method f informat ion etr ieval ndby close ooperat lonetween l l col iectors nd^ - ^ I . + i - ^ 1 - + ^ f f -d l l a l j L l L a l J L 4 L L J ,

20. Command ndCont ro l .Wh i le n te l i igenceommi f teesivegenera l i rec t ion .ay -

ingdownpo l icyanda l lo t r ing enera l ims . o l lec t ionasks ndpr io r i t ies ,hevdo not

exercise ommand.Command ndcontroi emainsheprerogat ivef the commanders,

civ i l ianand mil i tary,overboth heir espect iventel l igencetaf fs nd heir col lect ion

agenc ies .

FactorsAffectin g Organization

23. Whatever he designof the intel l igence rchitecture,he organisatron nd the

sources nd agencies eployed, hereare a numberof factorswhich wil l be common.These must be considered t the outset and plans made for their inclusion n the

structures.

a. Cont inuity. nits shouldbe kept n thesame rea f responsibi l i tyAOR)

for as ong aspossibie. hi s ensuresha t hey become amiliar with the HN

inhabitants,he othersecurity orces, he terrainand nfrastructure. hey arebetter

able o ge t themeasure f their opponents nd hey acquire he a bility to develop

information nto intelligence.n short, hey get a feel or what is normal asa

backgroundagainstwhich to observe he abnormal.

b. Flexibi l i ty.An intel l igence rganizat ions designedo meeta specif ic

situation,bu t it must be receptive o the adjustments eededwhen the nsurgent

threatdevelops n new directions, hemes, trategies nd actics,or the situation

changes n someotherway, Suchchangesn the situationmay make resh

demandsuponspecialist ervices, uchas magery nterpretation r intenogation.

Commanders, nd heir intelligence taffs,mustbe able o respondquickly to new

needsby redeploying esources nd ,where necessary,djusting he functions he y

fulfil1.

c. Informat ionHandling.The ntcl l igence ystem, hatever ts shape,must

be able o copewith an ncreasing mount f informat ion sunits,with growing

exper ience, ecomemoreproduct ive ndbetter ocused.With t ime, t is to be

hoped, hepopulat ion ecomes uff ic ient ly onf idento passmore nformat ionothe secur ity orces. s this happens, uf f ic ientntel l igence-trainedersonnel ust

be made available o collate he additionai nformation,analyzeand use t,

interpret ts meaningand disseminatehe resulting ntelligencen time for it to be

usedoperat ional ly.

(1) Special ists. he t raining of analysts, ource handlers,survei l lance

operators. magery interpreters, inguists, nterrogators nd other

inte l igencespecial istsmust be developed s ear ly as possible f the

7 2 3

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DRAFT

rnev i tab le ho f iage f such sk i r ledpersonne l , h rch ex is t sa i thebegin' ingof anycampargn,s to be overcomeThe careul husbandr;v

o f scarce k i l l s s necessaryhroughour campa ign , ' t par t i cL r la r lyessent ia l t the beg inn ingunt i l more t ra inedspec ia l i s t s ecomeava i lab le .

(2) Liaison. f the intel l igence rganizat ions to u,ork ef fect ivelyandeff ic ient ly,good l iaison betweena1l intel l igence rganisat ionsnclagencies,F{N, al l ied, civ i l ian and mil i tary, is paramount.Thespecial ists eferred o above, are vital elements n establ ishingeffect ive iaisonwith FIN intel l igence gencies. he sensit iv i t ies fsuch ntel l igenceiaisondut ies equire he iaisonoff icer o havewideexper iencef mil i tarycapabil i t iesndknowledge f intel l igence.

(3) Secur it l l ' he need or secur ity, special ly ource rotect ion,must beful ly understood ithin he ntci l igence rganisat ionndamong hoseto whom it is disseminated.he "need o know',pr inciplehas o beenforced nd clearguidei ines iven on disseminat ion,art icular lyoHN, civil anauthorities.

Compos i t ion f an In te l l igence rgan iza t ion

24' Intel l ieence taf fOrganisat ion.here s no f ixedestabi ishmentor an ntel l igenceorganisat ion,or s thereanypre-determinedcaleon which o basets composit ion.t,sizewill be determined y the extentan dnatureof the hreat, he commander'srequirements,hearchitectureecessaryo support perat ionsnd he ntel l igencecol lect ion gencieshatcanbemadeavailable. s no two campaignsreevJr ought nquite hesame ircutnstances,t fol iou,shat he ntel l igence iganizat iono. each"ne*commitment hould e custom-designed,l though asl ampaigns i l l providegr-r idanceandgeneral r inciples here here reuseful aral lels.ne sizeof anyCanadian"contr ibut iono a ColN campaign i l l have o be designcdn consultat ion ith thesenror

8t23

In the mmediateera of canadian onfederation, g64-1g70,the irst canadianlnteliigence ervicewas ormedunderoneGilbertMcMicken,a stinendiarvmagistrate ased n Windsor,Ontario,This periodsaw nurnerous nd confusingalarmsbroughton by the Americancivil wa r and he subsequentenianinsurrectionary ovement an

extreme rish nationalistmovement) ha t raidedCanadawith the aim to inJluence ritiitr policy on Ireland. McMicken ,fruOo.gun12.O r'

--

excellentdetective orcealong he frontier,and wh o hq da wide acquaiitance f spiesand nformers' PrimeMinister Si r JohnAlexander)Macdonald sually n" * ,oi"-about he plansof the Fenians ha n he Fenians id themselves."

Extract and quote rom Donald Creighton,John A. Macdonald; Theyoungpolitician.Toronto: heMacmil iancompanyof canada, td; 1956:3g3,421and 3g_439.



DI{AFT

rntel i igenceff icerand he ntel l igence taf fof theFIN.Almost certainly,he sizeof

intel lrgencetaf fswil l grow as he campaign evelops. heprobableunct ions t would

rnaintainor a counter- insurgencycployment reshowndiagrammatical lyn Figure -

r sca 'add i t iono l iagrun ts '/ i le ) )

l 5 l n t e l l i e e n c e S u p p o n O r q a n i z a t i o n .

intel l igence taf fwould needwascovered

poss ib ien te l l igenceuppor t rgan iza t ion

F-actos Affect ing Integrat ion.

Thek indo f spec ia l i s tuppor tha t hc

in paragraph1 above A diagram howing

is shown n Figure3./ (TBD)

26. Although a single, central ly control led, ntegrated ntel l igenceorganizat iot t

answering o a Director of Intelligence s the deal, he circumstances revailing n a HN

ma y not be conducive o sucha system,particularly f a Canadian ontingent s partof an

international, allied force in which the senior Canadian officer may have limitedinfluence.Where t cannotbe achieved, compromise olutionmust be brokered etween

the interested arties.Th e establishment f a centralized ystemmay be affectedbi' any

or al l of the following factors:

a. The effectiveness,eliability andvulnerabilityof the HN's security orces

and ts intelligence ndsecurityorganization.

b. Willingnessby all parties o cooperate,o share nformationan ddetails

of , perhaps ensit ive, IN sources,ther ntel l igence etai ls nd,

part icular ly t hehigher evels,matters f pol i t icalsensit iv i ty.

The differentpointsof view anddoctrineof the security orces,HN and

all ied,Becausehe HN's secur ityorces,n part icularhepolice,must

continue o live and work among he populationafter he eventual

departure f the allies, he y will be subject o greater nternalpressures

and constraints.t is important hat ntelligence taffsovercome hi s

problemas failure o integratewill seriouslympede he intelligence

effort.

The degreeof authoritydelegatedo officials ateach ev el of the

commandstructure, ational,provincial, egionaland district.

2 '1. ASIC. Whetheror not an intel l igence ommit tees establ ished,he normai ocus

for intel l igence or Canadian orceswil l be the ASIC or i f a joint operat ion,he Joint

ASIC (JASIC),which wil l be ocated longsideheJointOperat ions el l (JOC), orrning

the hub of an1'Joint Task ForceHeadquartersJTFHQ).Within the ASIC wil l be the

senior ntcl l igence f f icer and his staf f ,This vvi l l nciudeCCIRM and the AII Sources

Ce l l (ASC) . n w,h ichus ionandbu lk o f theana lys is i l l be condL ic ted epresenta t ives

o f rhe agenc ies ,o r exampleHSG, CSG and SG,wi l l be loca tedn the ASC. n some

casest rvi l l be necessaryor these lementso be affordedheirown segregatedreawith

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Ln2nt'l ' ,4 ?-q-nnn4 17



DRATT

niorestr lngenlaccess ontrols hanpertain nabo i 'e . ) imi la r onsr ra in tsayapp ly f a NIC,

Task ing

the res tof the ASC (Secparagraph 0(co l loqu ia i l y ,CANIC) , sdep loyed.

28. . Direct ionwil l beginwith a determi_nat ion f thecommander 'sntel l igenceequirementsr as heyaremorecommonlytenned r ior i ty ntel l igenceequirementsPIR). Thesewil l be heproduct f his missionanalysis ndshould e discussed ith thesenior ntel l igenceff iceiwho wil l beable oensurehat heyareaccuratelyocused.t may not bepossible,n theear lystages f acampalgn'o state lear ly hecommander 'sntel l igenceequirementss nsuff ic ienroperationalnformationmay be available n which to plan.Where hi s s thecase, heintel l igencetaf fs ave he esponsibi l i tyf giv inggui iance o commandersn thekindof intel l igencehat heywil l require.Thismay be doneby means f an ntei l igence

est lmate. n intel l igencest imateakes hecommander 's lan,no matter ow broadlydefined, nd comparest with existing ntelligence n the nsurgency. oncurrentwiththe ntel l igencest imate,hestaf fshould pply ntel l igencereparat ionof theBatt lef ield

l lpelThe ntel l igencest imate nd PB together i l l g ive he ntel l igenceraf fa good

idea f the gaps n theirknowledge f the niurgency nldhese an brm thebasis f theinit ia lcol lect ion lan. t is l ikely,par l icular lyn the nit ialstages,hat herewi l l be ashortfall n intelligence. he probability s that herewill be m"ore asic ntelligcnceavai lablehancurrentntel l igence.he preparat ionf an nit iaicol lect ion laiwi l la lsogivesome ndicat ion f thenecessaryol lect ion ssets,nd ntel l igen..ur ihit . . ture hatwil l bc neededor thecampaign.

29' Direct ion o theCollectors. venwhenan ntet l igencerganizat ionasbeenestablished,nformationdoesno t flow automaticallynt o thehandsof the ntelligence

staff'and hen o thecommander.f direction s poor, he ntelligence rganisationmaybe n dangerof collecting argequantities f irreievant nformation.A commandermusrgivehi s intelligence taffcleardirectionanda firm indication f thepriorities o beallot tedo his ntel l igenceequirements.n receipt f thecommander,sntel l igencerequirements,he ntelligence taffwill f irst,with theai d of th e ntelligence simate ancjIPB, dcnt i fygaps n the ntel l igence lready_held.

l 'hesegaps hould e f i l led by iasking

col lect ion gencieso col lect gainsthem. he quest ions-puto thecol iectors reknownas nformationRequirementslR) and heir collettion is piamed carefullyby the ,.nio'.intel l igenceff rcer n conjunct ion ith hisCCIRM staf fwho wil l coordinatehecol lect ion lanand Rs andmanagehe ntel l igenceequirements.he esultantcol lect ion lanmust, n turn,be approved

y thecommander r ior o col lectorse eivrngtheirdirect ion rom he ntel l igencetaf fs. he col lectron lanwil l normallybemaintained n a col lect ionworksheet hichwi l l show heallocatronf ' tasks,n orderofprtor i ty, o individual ol lect ion gencies nd he ime,and orm n which nformat ionsIo De eported.

SECTION 3 - COLLECTION

30 Aspects f Collect ion. hereare wo aspects f col lect ion; xploitat ion, y

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DRAFT

Lntc l l igcnceta t t s f the i r ourcesndagenc iesnd he ime ly 'de l ive rvf co lLec ted

in fo rmat iono in t c l l rgencet l f f s o r s r rbseqr ren trocess tnct t tc

r1t23

A020231 -1 0001



--:: .r ,. ir-ti l

r , ! i l r ' : :

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DR-AFT

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I N T E L L I G E N C EP R C D U C T I O N

CClRlv ' l

MILITARY

INTELL IGENCECompany

5

Weapons

Intel l i igenceUni t

2

1.Joint lymanned. esponsibleor theproduct ion f al l air photographynd magerysupport .

2 Provides pecial ist upport ncluding TOs for jFHQ and ptel l igence taf f 's.3 Electronic arfareSupportMeasuresESM)unit provides IGINT suppoft or JlrHQ.4 Provides ndadministers TJMINT'supportg: AgentHandlers, urvei i lancepersonnel.ointForward nterrogat ioneams JFITfcountry LiaisonTeams ct.T)including e-br iefers, i l i tary

ntel i igence iaisonoff icersir tarr-olnleta ntet lgenceNCOs FNCO) etc .5' Providesntel l igence ndFieldSecur ity taf f for JFHe andsectronsndde-tachmenrsat subordinateevel,cont inuityNCos coNCos at Unit level.

F igure3 In te l l igence uppor tOrgan isa t ion

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DRAFT

i n re l l igence .r , whenappropr ia te .i rec t lyo wcapon ys tems. o l lec t ion i l l bebased

on thecoi lect ion iandrawnup by the ntel l igencetaf fs,nder he direct ion f

commandersnd he ntel l igenceomminees ur ing heDirect ion hase. he CCIRM

staf fwi l l manage ollect ion.

Sources nd Agenc ies

31. LIUMINT. As out l inedabove, he most ef fect ive ourceof intel l igence i l l be

thatder ived rom the directquest ioning f persons hether ormallyor informally. his

is ikely o include he ollowing:

a. Canadian ndCoali t ionMil i tary Sources, hiswil l include l l ranks f the

secur ity orces special lyhosewhose ut ies equire hem o moveamong he {N

popuiat ion, n patrois, n col lect ion f local iy-producedupplies, n iaisonwith

HN authorities, ockers,airportworkers,aid workersand he ike. It is vital that

all suchpersonnel re horoughlybriefedon the gaps n intelligencewhich their

dutiesmight enable hem to fill. They shouldbe made intelligenceaware"so that

they ar e alwaysprepared o report nformationwhich may appear rivial but

which, when added o otherpieces,may be rnportant.Dismountedpatrolsare

critical to collection n COIN operations nd all soldiers resensors;

b. HN Secur ity orces. his wil l includemil i tary,paramil i tary, uxi l iar ies

and eserves. hey wil l be of valuebothon duty andwhenon leave. ike therr

Canadianand Allied counterparts,hey shouldbe encouragedo become

intelligence ware.Attemptsshouldbe madesystematicallyo brief thosegoing

on leave ocally and debrief hem on return.

c. Military Surveiilance. II the usuaiconventionalwa r surveillance ources

suchas ObservationPosts OP),mountedan ddismounted atrols, econnaissancc

units,ai r reconnaissance,nd roops upplementedy special ist urvei l lance

equipment,ar eequally useful n counter-insurgencyperations. hey mustbe

taskedandbriefedwith greatcarebecausensurgents peratemore covertly hana

convent ional nemy.Unitswil l f requent ly e askedo mountoperat ions

specif ical lyo obtain nformat ion r to give cover o other ntel l igence-gather ing

operat ions,or example,he nsert ion r retr ieval f covertOPs.

d. CovertSurvei l lance. pecial orces SF)havea long historyof successntherole of stat ic overtsurvei l lance nd he exploitat ion f the nformat ion hich

they obtain.The useof SF for intelligence-gatheringnd directactionmust be

careful lycoordinated. hen SF aredeployed,t wi l l be normal or there o be SF

liaisonoff icers nthe HQ of the ormat ion o which hey areassigned.

e. I r regularForces. nits may alsobe raisedocal ly rom thepolice, he

Fllr l 'sarmyand rom fr iendlysect ions f the civ i l ianpopulat ionor thepurpose f

de lens ive r o l fens ive pera t ionssa ins :nsurgents .e fens ive pcra t ionsnc lude

t 3 t 2 3

Anrn r? , . |1 -4? -nnn4?, 1



N D ^ T Tt r l \ n 1 1

i nd ica ted

J LfN PoliceForces.HN Policcarean exceLlentource f informat ion ut

theymustbehand ied i th grea t ens i r iv i t r . a remustbe aken o t o dup l ica tcthe nformat ion ol lect ion rom police f f icers eingundertaken y theirown

in te l l igenceta f f .Po l ice qu iva len tsre ery ike ly o behand l inghe i r wn

sourcesmong hepopu la t ion .t is p robab leha t herewi l l be a s t rong e luc tance

to disclosehese ourceso intel l igencetaf fs, ut heir asking, nd he

in lb rmat ionheyprov ide , hou ld ecoord inarednd used y thecent ra l i sed

intel igencemachinery.

k. HN Populat ion. ndoubtedly,heHN populat ion i l l , i f systemat ical ly

exploited,be he bestsourceof HUMINT. Greatcaremustbe taken n developing

the HN populat ion ssources ndclose oordinat ion ith HN intel l igence

agencies,hePolice ntel l igence ranch n part icular , ustbe ananged f

difficultiesare o be avoided.The insurgents ay usebogus nformants o plant

false nformationor uncover he source-handlingetwork,HN informants hould

be given the opportunity o contact he security orcesconfidentially.This ca nbe

done by making confidential elephoneinesor PostOffice Box numbers

avaiiableand by keeping outinemiiitarypatrols n cioseproximity to the

population.Doing so will permit a budding nformant o pass nformationwithout

unduly drawingattention o himself.All militarypatroismust be trained o talk to

HN peopleasa matterof course.Peoplewho havegoodcause o fear eprisals

should be given he opportunity o contact he security orce with information, or

example,at road blocks or on cordonand search perations, here heir

interviewsca nbe concealed nder he guiseof interrogation, he intelligence

organisation ill be capableof developing system or making contactwith, orbeingcontacted y. sympathizers.

l. Informersand Agents.Much of the useful nformation,which reacheshe

inteliigence taff,will come rom informersandagents. srnallnumberof well-

placedand eliable gents anprovide nformat ion f valuewell beyond heir

cost ,part icular lyf aimedat thepivotalpoints n the nsurgents'command.f

agentsare able o penetrate he top levelof the nsurgents' ommandand control

organizat ion,nformalionmay beprovided n thedevelopment f theirstrategies,

the dent i f icat ion f important eaders,he system f l ia isonbetweenhemil i tarywing and he nsurgent oi i t ical eadershipnd hemethods f acquir ing

resources. t lowerechelons,nformers reuseful n providing nformat ion n,

for exarnple, ersonal i t ies,act ical lansandweapon aches. t these evels,fcontinuity s to be rnaintained,t is important hat he agentnetworkexpands t asimilar rate o that of the insurgentmovement, therwrseheir relativevaluewilldiminish,Theproblemwith act ingon nformat ion upplied y an ndividual ssource-protect ion.n an nsurgent rganisat ionhecircieof knowledges keptsmall . f an nformer epo(s the moveof a weapon o a new hide, or example,perhaps nly three nsurgents avebeenmadeaware, hecour ier , he commanderand hcquar te rmas ter .subsequent ,mmedia te pera t iony rhesecur i t yo rccs

| 5 /23

4020231 -1 -0001 3



DRAF'I

to recoverheweapon igh t a iseTh iscou ldthesouice,Caremust, herefore,e exercisedtheHSG soughtwhenplamingoperat ions.

ser ious lyeopard izehesecur i l y frn suchmatters nd headvice f

m' In HUMINT terms, n agents a person pecif icai lyecruited nd rained,placed n a host i ie rganizat ionndwho is tasked it l i informat ion ather ing ntheorganizat ionf whichhe s pan - a control ied ource. n informer s a personwho,perhaps ninvited, assesnformat iono anopponent bout is organiz ' t ion- anuncontrol ledource. n informants onewho giues nformatron a casualsoulce.

32. Coordination. henever UMINT sourcesre o bethatali HUMINT collectiongenciesperatingn the heatreeach ther. his iaisonsvital oensure:

exploited t is imperat ivecf fect iaisoncloselywith

a. De-conf l ict ion. o source hourd verberunby more hana singreagency' f a singiesourceworks or more thanon eagency, t is possiblJthathi sreportscan'unwittingly,confirm hemselves. his falseconfirmation, ometimescalled alsecollateral, swell asbeinga danger o the ntellig.n.. p.o..rr, .uncause he source o gaingreater redencehanhis worth,puri ..ror., iitn"situationbecomes nown to the nsurgents,hey ca nexploit he falsecollateral tthe expense f the security orces.

b. veracity.There s always he risk of a source,f not properlyhandred,producing nformationwhich is unreliable, r evenactingus ' ,loubl. agent.Taskingmust be rigidly controlled o reduce he ikelihoodof this ruppJningReliability

of sourcesmustalwaysbe evaluated it h greatcarean d ecordsmaintained y rheHUMINT agency.

c ' Secur ity. hesmaller hecirc leof people nowing he dent i ty f a source,th e saferhe canoperate.f sources re o be maintained, ndconfiden.. ,fr.na,source-protection us tbeeffective, nd be seen o be effective

33' OpenSourcentel l iqence.ntel l igencc er ived rom open ourcesOSNT) isplayingan ncreasinglymportantole.Nowhere, owever, i t t t t . roleof themediabemore mportant han n counterinsurgency.he act ions f thesecur ityorceswil l bescrut inrsedloselyandwil l playa majorpar l n formingpublicopinion.Relat ions iththemediaarenot rhedirect esponsibir i tyf the ntel l ig; ;cestaf f . hey shouldremember, owever, ha treporters an getaccesswheresecurity orcesoftencannot.Furthermore, ress eamsar eoftenou t and about or protracted e'ods. A warmrelat ionship,ui l t up betweenntel l igencetaf fsand ndividualmembers f thepresscorps an eapdividendsn the orm of low- level nformat ionMany Canadianournal istswil l cover hecampaignor an extended er iod, is i t ing hecountry or,perhaps ixweeks t a t ime before eturningo Canadaor oneor two months.f an ntel l igencetaf fdevelops suff ic ient elat ionship ith individualmembers f a media eam, nformat ionmightbe for thcomingn retum or, perhaps, sanit ized pdate, r a secur ity r iefon their

t o t z i

A n a n ^ ^ '



DRAFT

rerurn o he hear re Iopera t ionsMed ia epor is hou ld luaysbe eparded i thcauLton

Thev re ike ly o nc lude b ias o some an icu la r u rposeather hanbea s t ra rgh t

repon ing f unabr iCgedr une labora tedac ts . ommandersay have een hemorn ing

newson television bout hecampaignmmediately efore eingbr iefed y thestaf f .T h i c e r n i . e r r i 1 " h l , ,

r ^ ^ r , ^ ^ ' ^ f f - L ^ , i - ^ 1 6 r e c n n n d t r - l n r e q q r e n o r t q r a t h e r t h a n l e a d, , e a o o s l a l l s a v l n g . - . - . - r . - - - . , - - l n g

n r r s r r h i e c r sf r h e i r L ^ - - : ^ ^ " i + L" - c ^ r ' ' p 3 1 s e s u l t s .n t e l l i p e n c e f f i c e r s h o u l d a k er r J U U J I v L J w l L r l u I t l l l U U J l l l B w l L l l U l r r U r L u r r s s u

steps o avoidbr ief ings evelopingn thisway.HN media, n part icular , i l l havea r, ' i ta i

role o play n the hearts ndmindscampaign nd ntel l igcnce taf fcanexpect o piay a

part n this with the Info Ops andPSYOPSstaff

34. Open-Source ublicat ions.n addit ion o thecurrent eport ing f news eams n

theat re ,here s l i ke ly o becons iderab lepen-sourcea tc r ia l roduced r io r o he

campaignwhich wil l go someway to meet ing ntel i igencetaf fs ' equirementsor basrc

intel l igence, his can nclude nternet, t lases,ncyclopedias,ravelbooks, tat ist ical

summaries nda hostof other eferencesroduced y thespecial ist - interestress

cover ing he armed orces, hepol i t ical, conomic, eographicali tuat ionsnside he

country.

35. Insurgent seof theMedia. t mustbe rememberedhat he nsurgent ovement

will also attempt o make use of the media o s pread ts own views and discredit hoseof

the government nd hc security orces, ntelligence taffsshouldattempt o catalogue

insurgentpublications; hey can sometimes evealaspects f the nsurgentshat are

otherwiseunknown.

Imagery Intel l igence

36. Imasery ntel l iqence sa Source.ntel l igence er ived rom imagery, IMINT),w,il l play an important oie in counter-i nsurgencyperations. overagewill include

imagery, anging rom map-qualityprints rom airborneplatforms,both satellite nd

aircraf t , omeof very high resolut ion,o thermal magery TI) , and nfra-red IR),

pictures. I i rnagerys excel lent t detect ing odieswhrcharewarmer han heir

surroundings,uchaspeople oncealedn dense ol iage, r a warrnvehicleengine. I{

imagery s capable f detect ing isturbed oil ;valuable or detecting ur iedarms aches,

commandwires or booby rapsand EDs.Collect ion lat formswil l include atel l i tes,

strategic ircraf t , act ical ir reconnaissanceTAR), hel icoptersndUninhabited

AirborneVehicles UAV). OPsandother econnaissanceroops anexpect o be

equippedwith hand-held ameras, ideo ecorders, I equipment,adarand mage

intensifiers ll). Coordinationof IMINT is the task of an ISG, normally ound fromw,ithin he resources f the J2 Imagery at NDHQ There will be a constant emand or

photographic overage f areas f operat ions.he ISG wil l be able o provide

intel l igence er ived rom the analysis f al l k indsof imagery.Much analysis i l l be

done,however, ot on "wet f i1m", hat s photographicegat ive r pr int .but on 'sof1

copy", m ages n a computer crccn.Althoughpr intsof images anbe madeavailable,

careshouldbe taken o ensure hat hey aredemanded nly whennecessary,or example

asbr ie f ing ids .Pr in ts hou ld o t be demandedsproo fo f in te l l igenceepor ts sa

t 1 t 2 3

A.0202313-17-0001



DR-AFT

nlat ter f course. he ime aken o interpretesults f an MNT task s consrdcrablrle gthened henpr intsof the magery,re ecuired,

S igna lsn te l l igence

37. Signalsntel l igenceSIGINT). nsurgcnt roupswil l , however, avea need ocommunicate ndwhen heydo via anyelectronic edium heyarevulnerableo intercept, esides er iv ingntel l igencerom communicat iols(COMNT), SIGIN'f analysts i l l exploitemissionsrom radars ndotherclectronic mit ters. hisciectronicntel l igenceELN'f) , canenablehedetect ion f , for example,adio-controlevrces ndmissi ie ontrol, uidanceand arget-seekingadars.WhereSIGNT collect ions envisaged, SG *i l lbe avai lableo coordinatets col lect ion nd o interprethe esultswithin heA S C .

EW Detachments. W Detachments iil provideuseful nformationandintel l igence y exploit ingnsurgent eaknessn modern ivi l and act icalcommunicat ions.

Special ised unct ions

38 Batt leDamageAssessmentBDA). BDA provides nassessmentf thedegree feffectiveness f Canadian perations nd engagementsgainst he enemy. t is useiul osupportheest imat ion nd PB processesy enabling pdateso enemyorderof bat t le(ORBAT)and hestate f enemy nfrastructure.talso uidr n determiningheeffectofthcPSYOPS ampaisn.

39. Sensit ive iteExploitat ionSSE).SSEpersonnel. SEsupports number f funct ionsMP by ident i fy ing nd ecover ing vidence.

is an act iv i ty hat equires pecial lyrainedsuchasLegalandCIMIC. I t also uDDorts

SECTION 4 - PROCESSING

40' Processinssa Discipl ine. heprocessingtage f the ntel l igenceycle ncor-porateshc work of the ntel l igencetaf f n col lat ion, nalysis,ntegratronr synthesrs,and nterpretation f information. The processing taffwiil normallybe trainedintel l igenceperators, f ten rom ail three erylces,upportedy special istsn thecol lect ion iscipl ines.Whereappropr iate,pecial istsrom otherarmsandservices i l ljo in theanaiyt ical taf f , or example, ngineerntel i igenceperators, i th theirspecialrstknowledge f' particularly, errain,explosives nd outeconstructron. mmunitiontechnicians i th their raining n explosives,inng devices ndweaponnspect ion re

1! leto developweaponsntel l igencen conjunct ion i th thepolice orensic cient ists.

Thisdiscipl ine, ased n such echr iques sweaponmatching, i l l be able o tracewcaponso theirsources f supply, o rounds heyhave ired,explosives nddetonatorsto theiror iginandsoon.

tB /23

40202313-18-00016



DRAITT

41' l ' he

ASIC.Thebes t esu l t sv r l lbeobta inedrom hosente l l igencergan isa t ionsnh ich are u l l y n tegra ted ,o rk o a cent ra l l y -agreedo i lcc t ion lan .employ f fec r rve

CCIRM per .sonne l .us ion nddatabase anagers ,na iys tsndother n te l l igencespec ia l i s t sndapproachhe i r task n a s t ruc tu red .b jec t ive ndsysremat icay .

42. Fusion,Oneof the cr i t icaltasks erformedn theASC is thatof fusion.This s thecol lat ion f reports nd nformat ion rom theseparate,ingle-sourcegencies, UMNT,SIGINT and MINT, into a singleassessment.achagency roducests own view o1'anevent r ac t iv i t y nd epons t to the n te l ) igcncetaf [ Th is s knownas s ing le -sourcep ic tu re ompi la t ion" . he fused ssessment ,ha t s , heassessmentade y thecomparison f more hanone single-sourceeport , ecomeshe"recognisedact icalground, or marit ime, r air ) ,picture". The recognisedrcture i l l beproduced t helevel with responsibility or reporting,usually he eveimaintaining he database s t isthere hat thebroadest iew will be .This thenbecomes heauthoritative iew which

forms hebasis orassessmentsy al l subordinatentel l igencetaf fandwil l bedisseminated pwards,downwardsand o the flanks n the form of intelligencesummariesINTSUMs),which areoftenpictor ial.

43 . Databases .One of the fundamenta ls f e f fec t ive rocess ing s themain tenanceof an e f f i c ien tda tabase. n a COIN campa ign here w i l l be ap le thorao f smal l ,apparen t ly ns ign i f i can t nd unconnec ted ata . On ly e f fec t iveco l la t ionand cross- re fe renc ing i l l enab leana lys ts o assess he s ignr f icance find iv idua l iecesand make bes t use o f them.

SECTION 5 - DISSEMINATION

44. Responsibi l i ty. isseminat ion f intel l igenceo subordinateommanderss theresponsibilityof the Director of Intelligence t the highest evel and of the seniorintel l igence ff icersat subordinateevels.Where ntel l igenceommit tees reestabl ished,individual ntel l igence hiefsof the separateervicesepresentedi l l acceptresponsibi l i tyor br ief ing heir own commanders.

45. Use of Intel l igence rchitecture.t should e emphasisedhat ntel l igencehouldflow, not necessarilyn a hierarchicalmanner,as s the casewith ordersalonganoperational hainof command,but quickly and efficiently, rom whomeverholds t towhomever eeds t. This wi l l mean hat,on occasion,t wi l l bypass ome evelsofcommand. his is great ly idedby theuseof informat ionechnology.NTSUMs shouldbe disseminatedt regular ntervals. hese anbe supplementedy detai ledeports n

specif ic opics, or example, nsurgentORBATs or incidents, s equired. s withintel l igenceepor l ing n any phase f war, caremustbe aken o avoid circularreport ing" n which partsof a summary rom one ntel l igencetaf fareplagiar isednanother nd eturnedo the or iginator sapparent onf irmat ion f theor iginal.Thisprob lcm s par l i cu ia r ly cu tc n combined pera t ions here hed i f fe ren t a r iona lauthor i t iesnclude eports rom third part iesn theirown summaries. hebestdefenceagainst his s clcarorders or repor l ingauthor i ty nda thorough nowledge, n theparto f in te l l igencef f i ce rs , f thesources ndagenc iesva i lab leo a l l he n te l l igenceta f f s

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DRAFT

providlng epcf is or the heatre,

17 . Secur i t v .Whi le n te l l igences o f useon ly n the hands f opera t iona lec rs ron-

makers,ts disseminat ionhould e closely ontrol led. ource-protect ionustaiways ea proir i ty. I f a source s at r isk, ntel i igencehouldbe sanit ised r disguisecin suchaway as to concea l ts source , ccess o in te l l igencen suchc i r cumstanceshou ld erestr ictedo thosewith a real need o know. Secur ityof intei l igencemust alwaysbebalanced gainsthe value o be gained rom its disseminat jon,gencies eneral ly avestr ictguidel inesor disseminat ionf intel l igencen an emergency, erhaps .r ,henivesare at r isk ' Intel l igence ff icersneed o acquaint hemselves i th these ,act ion

on',procedureso hatemergency isseminat ionan akeplacewith theminimumof delav.

SECTION 6 - TRAINING

48Pre-Deploymentraining. l l personnelnvolved n theDirect ion,Collect ion,ProcessingndDisseminat ionf intel l igencehould eploy o the heatre avingmade

thorough reparation. hey mustbe ciearon their ole n the ntelligence rganiiation ndhavehad he opportunity o rehearsehe ssueswith which theywill bedealing,withthose o whom theywill be working.Senior ntelligence fficers, n particular, houldtake he time to examine he orthcomingoperation gainst he undamentals fintel l igence, hich are hesame or anyphase f war. t is necessaryo order heirthoughts n architecturesnd nteiligence upport n sucha way ha i heycanseeclearlywhat nfrastructure il l be necessaryo meet heir ai m of supportinghe commander,splan.Thosepersonnelwith a role which willrequire them o effect iaisonwith otherauthoritiesn Canada houldhavehad heopportunity o makecontactwith them, odiscusshe ssues nd,particulariy, greeon themeanswith which theywill

communicate.deal ly, heyshould ave heopportunityo exercise sinssimilarcommunications ystems eforedeparture.

49. Backeroundntel l igence. i l i tary staf fshould e as horoughly r iefed spossible n the situat ionn the heatre f operat ionsefore eployment. N MIcompanies i l l beable o assist i th individual ndunit raining n ntel l igence atters,currentaffairsand otheraspects fthe insurgency.

50. Speciai ist k i l ls.Mil i tary staf fwith special istk i l lsshould nsurehatasmuchtraining spossibles donepr ior o arr ival n theatre, roblems remucheasiero solve,part icular lyhose nvolving echnical quipment,n a benign nvironment hereextensrveupport aci l i t ies xist hanafterdeniovment.

51. Intel l isence t Unit Level.Further spects f unit ntel l igencendsecur ityt raining recoveredn otherParts f theArmy FieldManual,

SECTION . DIFFICULTIES ACINGAN INTELLIGENCEORGANISAl ' I0N

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52 Non-Operat ional .equireent.Although he mmediateequirement l the staf iof

a campatgn i l i be o r theex is t ingn tc l l igenccrgan isa t iono expand ndprc - rduce

intel l igenceo suppor l ommandersor mrl i taryandpoiiceoperat ions,t wi l l have o

conr inueo prov ide rher t ra teg ic ,o l i t i ca l ndeconomicn te i l igence .he nte l l igence

organisat ion i l l be severely t retchedn the expansion hase nd he ecruitment f

addir ional taf fmay give he nsurgentsn opportunityo inf i l t rate heiragents,

53. Secur it -yf theExpandedOrganizat ion. inding, ndvett ing, uitable ersonnel

andprevent ingnsurgent enetrat ionf a rapidlyenlargingntel l igenceystemwil l

present ifficultiesand risks.The difficultiesmay be overcome y effort andcooperation.

The r iskshave o be accepted ith openeyesandminimizedby goodsecur ity.

54. Pol i t icalDirect ion.Pol i t ical irect ion f intel l igences a sensit ive at ter n a

democracy ecause f publicly demanded hecksandbalanceso ensure hat t i s not

abused o promotepersonal, artyor factional nterests.n a more authoritarianegimethe government 's ontrolof intel l igences closelyguardedo ensurehat tretainsa

monopolyof power. n either ase, seniormemberof thegovernment sual lyexercises

direct ion.While at a pol icy or higher ommand evel, hepr inciple s to central ize

intel l igence. t the act ical evel,wheresub-unit ommanders reexpectedo exercise

initiative, he complex natureof operationswill havea "dispersing ffect"which will

appearike a form of decentral izat ion.pplying hepr inciple f mission ommand, he

central ized irect ion f intel l igence olicyandoverarching lansneed ot st i f le he

init iat ive ecessaryo counter n nsurgency. ompanyor CombatTeamCommanders

will have o bevery awareof localpolitics and n futurewill probably equirean

intel l igence rocessing apabil i tywithin heirheadquarterslement. onetheless,f not

central ly irected,his manifestat ionf tact ical nit iat ivemay erode ontrol n three

respects.

a. Disseminat ion f lntel l igence. he number f peoplewho haveaccesso

sensit ivessues i l l increase,huscentral isedontrolof the ntel l igences more

difficult. Therewill be created pportunities or subordinates,ewly in receiptof

intelligence o take advantage f it or to be suborned

b. Collect ionMethods.Methods sed o col lect nformat ion anno longerbe

control led igidly rom central overnment. UMINT mustbehandled t the

lowest evel.Agenthandlersequire hekind of FiN knowledge hich demands

that hey ive n closeproximity o thosewith whom heywork.

c. Decisions n the Threat.Morc important iy,here s the ncreasen an

individual 'sopportunit ieso exercise alue udgements s o whichpeople nd

what groupsare o be considered threat o theHN and who shouldor shouldno t

be targeted. f ten here s not only a legaldiv iding ine between proscr ibed

insurgent rganizat ion nd ts egit imate ol i t icalpartybut alsobetweenhe

insurgents nd heir sympathisers.

55. Increasen Mil i tary Inf luence. funherdif f icult l ' ,which nsurgent ropagandists

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exp lo i t ,s ha t hed i lu t ron f h igh- leve lo l i t i ca l on t ro ls exacerba tedy the ncreasedinf luence xercisedver he ntei l igenceystem y thesecur ityorces, he charge,however njust i f ied,hat hesecur ityorces re hereby

nvolved n pol i t ics unL. udamagtng ne.Theobvious etort , hat heArmy is alreadynvoived o theextent hat tsuppor ls legit imate overnment gainstawlessnsurgents, i l l not convince l l Therelat ionshipetweenhegovernment,he udiciary, hesecur ityorces nd ntel l igenceshould e ndrvrsible situat ionn which he ntel l igencerganisat ionnd hesecustyfbrces reanswerableo separateuthor i t ies;overnment,egional, l l iedor fact ionaihas o be avoided.

56 lnf luence f ForcignAll ies. n combined perat ions,hechargemaybemade, ndexploited y the nsurgents,hat hegovernments under hecontrolof foreigners.'heresultant ensitivityma y cause he governmento placegreater estrictions n thefreedom f act ion y theal l ies hanmightotherwise e hecasc. hismight nclucle

restr ict ionsn ntel l igence-gather ing,art icular ly ensit iveol lect ionn theHUMIN'pandSIGINT f ields.

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MSTAR Manportable un'ei l lance nd'fargetAcqursit ionRadar

NIC Nat iona ln re i l igencee l l

N IST Nat iona l n te l l igenceuppor t eamOSNT Open-Sourcentel l igence

PIR Prior i ty ntel l igence equirement

PW Pr isoner f War

RI I RequestFo r Infonnation

RIC Reconnaissancentei l igence el l

SAM Surface-to-Air issi le

SITS SecondarymageTransmission ystem

SF Special orces

SIGINT Signals ntel l igence

SIW Speciai istntei i igence ing

TAR TacticalAi r ReconnaissanceTI Thermal magerY

UAV UnmannedAerial Vehiclc

UGS UnattendedGroundSensors

I InitedKingdom Military IntelligenceSupportCANADAMIST :

I ermlnal

WI S Weapons ntelligenceStaff

2-A1

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DRAFT

ANNEXB TO CHAPTER

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORTFOR C2W INA COIN CAMPAIGN

In t roduc t ion

1 Thecomponentsf Command ndControl C2) are heCommander ndhisstaf f .including issupport ingntel l igencerganisat ion,ommunjcat ionsndinformat ion ystems. l l eiements f theC2 process re mportant ,argeiyinseparablendcontr ibuteo thesuccessfulutcome f theCommander 's-plan; heyarealso ulnerableo attack, y prevent ing n nsurgentcommanderromeffect ively ontrol l ing isorganisat ionontr ibutcsirect lyto the colN principleof separatinghe nsurgent rom hi s support.

2'-fhe

natureandextentof all source ntelligenceequired or the planningan dexecution f c2w operationss shown n the subsequentaragraphs.

Intel l igence o Support OPSEC.

2. Intelligence upport or OPSECplanningmust ocuson the capabilit ies ndlimitationsof the nsurgentsntelligence athering ystem, n order o reducethevulnerabilityof friendly C2 assets nd nstallationso attack.Counter-intelligence esources il l be concentratedn the security hreat.HumanIntelligence HUMINT), signals ntelligence SIGINT) an d mageryIntelligence IMNT) ar e mportant o assesshe effectiveness f the OpSECplan .

Key information/intelligenceequirementso supportopSEC ar eat ArLnexC.

ln te l l igenceo Suppor tPSYOPS

A PSYOPS eamshouldwork verycloselywith theAll Source ntel l igence ellto planPSYOPS nd o integratehesewith theotherC2W funct ions. s partof PSYOPS t may benecessaryo conceal spects f f r iendlydisposit ions,capabil i t iesnd ntent ions. PSECmay herefore e essent ialo thepSyopSplan.Equally,

t may be desirablen support fpSyopS

to reveai ertainaspects f f r iendiydisposit ions,apabil i t iesnd ntent ions. SyOpScanalsobe used o supportDeception.

Basicpsychologicalntel l igence on thecultural, el igious, ocialandeconomicaspects f the argetcountry/population nd ts governmenvieadershi p,communicat ionsndmedia is produced ur ingpeacer imen the onnofBasicPsychological tudies BPS).Dur ingoperat ionsheBpS aresupplementedy current sychologicalntel l igence, hich s provided v

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DRAFT

PSYOPS na lys ts ork ing n a G2 lJ2 e l l '

The resultant sychological ssessmentsredif ferent rom ntel l igence

assessmentsecausehe y use nformationand ntelligenceo identify target

audiences ithin the opposing orce,an d hose actors ha taremost ikeiy to

influence heir attitudes ndbehaviour n favourof th e Commander'smission

The conditionsand attitudes f targetgroupsar e ikely to changeas he

situat ion evelops. urrentAl l Sourcentel l igence,n paf l icular IUMNT

and SIGINT, is therefore ital, both n theplanningphase, nd hen

throughout he executionof PSYOPS, o assesshe effectiveness f current

campatgns,o relnforcesuccess nd o re-allocateimited resources,f the

desired f fect s not beingachieved.

Key information/intelligenceequirements both fo r planningan dexecuting

PSYOPSan d or ensuring hathe nsurgent's sychological perations re

ineffective ar eat Annex C.

Intel l igence o Support Decept ion

5. Deceptionaims o presenta deliberately alsepicture o those n an insurgency.

Deception s highly complex, n particular hoseaspects hich seek o exploit

insurgentC2 assets, nd t demands ecurityat thehighest evel. OPSEC s

essentialo Deception n order o conceal hoseaspects nd ndicators hat

would allow the nsurgent o determine he realitybehind he Deception.

6, EW playsan mportant ole in supportof Deception ot hby targetinghostilecommunications nd by identifying hoseElectronicSupportMeasures ESM)

elements the ability to interceptandanalyse ur own communications

which it may be essentialo leave ntactas he conduit or electronic

decePt ion .

1 Intelligence upports eceptionplanners y analysing n nsurgent's

reconnaissanceapabilit ies nd dentifyinghrsperception f the battlefield,

includinghi s own deceptiondoctrine, actics/procedures,apabilit ies nd

intentions.This requiresan insight nt o an nsurgent ommander's ay of

thinking, ncluding he estimate rocess'

8. During the executionof deceptionoperations, ll Source ntelligence, articularly

oninsurgentmovemenVdeployments,s required o monitor he nsurgents

response nd o determinewhether he deception perations achieving ts

aim. In analysinghis ntel l igence, t tent ionmustalsobe paid o possible

insurgentdeception lans o protecthi s ow n operattons'

9. Ke1, nformat ion/ intel i igencecquirementso plan/executeecept ion perat ions

and o reduce he effects f insurgent ecept ion ct ions gainstr iendlyC2

4 .

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ANNEX C TO CF{APTER 1

KEY INFORMATIONINTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

FOR C2WOPSEC1. Capabi l i t iesof insurgents tocol lecVprocess/analyseinte l l igence.2. Intel l igencein parl icuiar IGINT, UMINT)on nsurgentntell igencebjectivesandachievements.3, Factors,uch sculturalbias,hat ouldnfluencehe nsurgent'snterpretationfi n t e l l i o p n c e o e i n e d

4. Assessmentf host i le ounter-C2 apabil i t ieso al low C2W plannerso make

priorities or targetin lC2-protectionmeasures.

5. Counter-intelligence n the security hreatposedby agents f foreign ntelligence

scrvices.6. HUMINT (from counterintelligence,he nterrogation f prisoners r captured

insurgents) nd SIGINT on the effectiveness f OPSEC.

PSYOPS

7. Detailed nformationon cultural, eligious,social,economicandpolitical

peculiarities f the countryand region.

8. InsurgentC2 architecture.possibly inkedwith hostile orcesoutside he countryi

theatre) .

9. Background nformationon popular adio/TV programmes ndpersonalities,

periodicalsnd

cartoons, nd mportantholidays,historicaldatesand eligiousanniversa-

r ies .

I 0. Assessment f the systems, specially ommunications ndbroadcast ystems,

usedby the nsurgent o elicit support rom thepopulace, nd mechanismsor political

control.

I l. HUMINT is frequently he key to successful SYOPS, ocusingon the target

group'sattitudes, lliances, nd behaviour o identify:

a. Vulnerabi l i t ies ndsuscept ibi l i t ies.

b. The leadership tructure, ey communicators nd heir relationshipwith the arget

group.

c. Psychological rof i lesof keypol i t icaiandmil i tary eaders. uch of this canbe

obtainedn peacet ime y FAClDefence ttaches,

d. Al i agencies uitable or conveyingmessageso selected udiencesndbr ingingmaximumpsychological ressureo bear.

e. Impact on unintended udiences.

f . Flost i le ropaganda,nalysingt for counter-propagandanddefensive SYOPS.

g. Ascertain he react ion f the nsurgento f r iendlyPSYOPS.

12. Assessment f any insurgent SYOPSdoctr ine/capabil i tyndpropaganda/publ ic

informat ion echr ioues.

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Decept ion

13' Assessmentf thecapabilr t iesnd imitat ions f the nsurgentntel l igenceoilec-t ron/analysisystem.

I4' Prof i les f key eaders/mil i taryommanders,nciuding nalysis f theirdecisron-makingprocessesnd dent i f i at ionof bias s/preconceivedJ.cepr ions.l5 Assessmentf thehost i le ecept ion octr ine,act icslproceduresndcapabil i ry.l6 ' Currentntel l igencen the nsurgent 's RBAT, orcedispor it ions ndanychang-es/redeploymentsa result f decept ion perat ionsto gauge uC..r ,of thedecept ion).

E W

l7 Ident i fy r i t ical ommunicat ionsndnon-communicat ions2 nodes or exploita-tion (ESM) or electronic ttack jarnming/DirectedEnergywe apons DEw),l8 '

Ident i fyanyhost i le lectronic i r defence ystemiithat recrucial o thesuccessof airlaviation perations)or eiectronic ttack6ammingn)nW;.19 ' IdentifyhostileESM systemsha tareexploitablJn supportof the deception lan.

PhysicalDestruct ion

20 ' Identification f hostileC2 systems in particularntelligence ollectionassets),thecommunications rchitecture f thosesystems ndthe acilit ies ha thouse hem..fhisshould ncludean assessmentfthe degree fredundancy.2l ' Assessmentf thevulnerabi l i ty f host i leC2 ryr t". , including he ole heyplaytn supportinghe eadership nd military capabilit ies,n order o identifycritical/vulnerable ystems spotential argets.

22' Identification nd ocationof the defensivemeansused o protecthostileC2systems

23 ' Inteliigence in particular MINT or SIGINT) to assist n anybattlefield amageassessmentf insurgent 2 targets nce hey havebeen ubjectedo attack.24' Intelligence n any nsurgent ffensive apabilityand argeting riorities.

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Defens ive 2W

25. Intel l igence n any nsurgent 2W organisat ion,octr ine/operat ingrocedures,capabil i t iesndpotent iai ulnerabi l i t iesunngdif ferent tages f mil i taryoperat ions(both n peace ndwar).

26. Counter- intel l igencen foreign ntel l igence ervices.27. Target ingntel l igence n host i le f fensiveC2W assets.

28. HUMINI- on nsursent 2W intent ions.

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CHAPTER 8

TNFORMATIONOPERATIOI.]S

Insurgencys ultimatelye war of ideas,,.Recognizinghisact, successfulcounterinsurgentsavedevoted smuch firt to defeatingheenemy'spropoganda s heyhave o defeating isghters. Lltinninghewar of ideashasoftenbeen hedecisiveineof operationsn successfulounterinsurgencycampaigns.'

Lt. Col.JohnA. Nagl, (/SA

SECTIbN I: INTRODUCTION

I . Thecentreof gravityof anyCOIN campaigns the ndigenous opulation.Historyhasshown hat nsurgentsequireonly the ndifference f apopulationo operate uccessfully. hustheprimary argetof info ops n COINoperationss thatportionof thepopulationhat s mildlysupportive, eutral,or hostile o the nsurgentmovement. bsenta neutralor friendlyenvironment,nsurgentsannotoperate r thrive.

2 COIN operations re essabout heapplication f physical orce han he nfluence fperceptions' he useof Counter-Commandctivity (CCA) in COIN operations il l remainimportant, articularly n an environment here he nterdiction f eleitronicsignalso IEDs iscritical o forceprotection.However, t is the nfluence ctivities f info ops,deined as .anyactivity,be t physical r cognitive, hose rimary urposes to influence ill'that willcomprise hebulk of info ops n a COIN campaign.

3. Influence ctivities eek o predispose,enuade, onvince, eter, isrupt, ompel r coerceapprovedargetaudiencesy promotingdesiredhemes ndmessages,heseactiiities mayuseoneor morecapabilitiesependentpon hedesired ffect,Al l activities reatenfluence; veryaction, owevernnocuous eeming, il l havean nfluence n he arget udiencen a COINcampaign- hepopulation.

4. Thegovernment's verall nformation ampaignwill concentraten the wo broadaimsof

winning hepopulation's upportandconfidence, ndconversely,owering hemoraleandeffectivenessf the nsurgents nd heirsupporters, omedegree f succeJs ith the frrstaimmaybe a prerequisiteor progresswith the second.-eadenhip t all commandevelsmustbeaware f thepsychologicalmplications f and hecorrelationetweenhepolitical, hemilitaryand hemoralaspects f the campaign.n particular heyshould akecare hataction n onesphere, espite romising quick etum, oes ot eopardisehesuccessf theother wo spheresandso of thecampaign sa whole,An opporrunityo ambush particularnsurgenteadermayhaveserious egativeepercussionsf theattackncludes nacceptableollateral amaee.

I ohnNagi, A BenerWar n lraq,- rmedForcesournal,August006

Ch8: 1 /18



: : r

5, Theprimarynfluence ctivity apabilitiesrePsyOps,A,Presenceosture ndProfile

(ppp),CINIIC,Deception,ndphysiialdestruction.ll activities ust emutually upporting'Thecomplexityf the rnfoopscampaignil l besignificantnd s acontinuousetof

operations,s such,he G3 s responsibleor nfo opsplanning nd oordination. oreover,

bicause ll successfulOINcampaignsave ossessedetailedhematic irectionrom he

strategicndpoliticalevels,he nfoopscampaign ust e ntegratedorizontallyndvertically

acrosJ ndupanddown hechain f command.hus,hedestructionf an nsurgentafe ouse

andseizure f a munitions achemaybecombined ithaCIMICcoordinatedroject hat

providesesourceso anNGO,publicisedy PsyOpsn-theatre,ndPA ntemationally,

protected y arobustsecurity iement isplaying strong eterrentosturco the enemy uta

irienOly.nO .lpfulpmfile o thepopulationn aneffort o ncreaseostgovemmentegitimacy

andestablishsafeenvironmentor economicevelopment.bviously,uch series f

operationsequires ubstantiatnter-agencyooperationn bothplanning ndexecutiono be

successful.

SECTION2: PRINCIPLESOF APPLICATION

1. Commander's irection ndPersonalnvolvement

6. Thecommander'senonalnvolvementrivesnfoOps, ndexercisesontroloverall nfo

Opsactivitywithin a framework f timelydecision-makingnd onsultationp anddown he

chainof command. ollowingmission nalysishecommanderormulatesisunifying heme,articulatedn hisstatedntent. Tacticalevelplannings based n hat ntent,with itsdefined

end-statendsupportingffects, ndharmonisesnfo Opsactivities ith otheractivities.

Without heguidance f the commander'snifying heme nd ntent,he nfo Opseffortwill

lack ocusandwill not achievehedesired ffectsn harmony ithother ctivities.Messages

will become onfused ndcontradictory.

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i- DIL{F'II

7. The mportancef infoopsmustbeunderstoodndcomrnunicatedy thecommandero hissubotdinates.lacingaith n influence ctivities ayseem ounter-intuitiveo thecommander,however,t is essentialhat hiscognitiveeap s made; o successfulOINcampaign asbeen

conducted ithouta sophisticatednd ntegratednfoopscampaigneven hought mayno thavebeen escribedssuchat he ime),Moreover,hecommander us tundentandhatinfluence ctivitiesmay eside utside f some old ier'scomfort

zone,'Theconfidenceo trustin andproperly mpioy nfluence ctivities il l onlyoccur f thecommanderemonstratesisown faith n non-physicalctivities. ecausef this, hecommander ili need o be ntimatelyinvolved n the nfo opscampaign.

2, CentralisedPlanningandDecentralised xecution

8. Theprinciples f centralised lanning nddecentralisedxecution pply o Info Ops at allcommandevels.However, entnlisedexecutionmaybe requiredor certainypesof targetedinformationactivities,whenall involved orceelements re equiredo adhereigidly to aplan,or whenstrategic ssets reused, heapprovalevelandprocessor PsyOpsmessagesustbeas ow andstreamlined spossiblen orderensuremessagesre imelyand elevanto theenvironment t hand.

3. Early Involvementand Timely Preparation

9 Info Opsplanningmuststartearly,becauseothplanningandexecutionake imeand esultscanbe slow o emerge.Hence,a Commander'sntentanddirectionmustbe viewed ight fromthestart n relation o Info Opscapabilities ndbe maintainedhroughouthe planningprocess.

Targeting taffandadvison,suchasPsyOps etachmentommanden, eed o UeRrttyinvolvedin theplanning rocesso integratenfo ops within the overallplan.

10 .Conceprualizingndproviding esourcesor nfluence ctivitiess ascomplicateds heplanningworkrequiredor physical ctivities. ecent OINexperiencesf our alliesdemonstratehat nfo opscampaigns re ar moreeffectivewhen nfo opsplannenareamongsrthefint on theground n-theatre.Wheneverhesecurity nvironment llows,key penonnelinvolved n info opsplanning hould eamongstheearliest lementseployed s trlsenablesan earlyandaccurate ssessmentf thegeneralmoodof thepopulation. his actshouldbereflectedn logistics lanning.

4. CloseCo-OrdinationandSequencing

11.Theverynatureof Info Opsand he arge,divene argetsetmeanshat hereneedso be veryclose ntegration,ertically ndhorizontally, ithinacommandn terms f creatingcomplernentaryffectsn support f common bjectives.heprinciple f close o-ordinationandsequencings arguably f greatermport n a COINcampaignhan n anyother ypeofmission ecausehere s an adversary ho'ssolepurposes thede-legitimisationf thehostgovemment nd riendly orces.Contradictory essagesr naccuratenformation il l

Ch8: 3 /18



L. ' l ' ppq1 i ' 1

undermineredibii i ty nd egit imacynddogreat ann,A11nfoOpsplans ndactivrt ies ust

be coordinated,e-conflicted ndsynchronisedp,downandacrosshechainof command ith

othermilitary,politicalandcivil activitiesn order hatoneactivitydoes otcompromise,egate

or diminish hedesired ffectof another. hi s s the esponsibilifyf thecommander,ssistedytargeting taffandsubordinateommanden. hesmoothntegration f influence ndphysical

activities s criticai o maintaining nessagend heme ontinuityacross ll government nd

cooperatinggencies.

5. Timely Counter-InfoOps

12.Even he mosteffective nfo Opsplanswill befrustnted n executionf deliberate ctions re

not taken o counter he Info Opsactions f theadversary. significant ortionof theplanning

shouldbe dedicatedo thepreparationor reactiono enemy nfo Ops.Therearenumerous

recentexamples f a militarily weakeropponent ffectivelyconducting n nfo Opscampaign

thathas nfluencedoreignandndigenous opulations. ailure o adequatelyounter he

enemy'sstory n a timely and credible ashion anundermine ot only apublic'smorale, t can

alsobolsteran enemy'spopularity,andrallypublicopinionagainst hemission. nfo ops

planningmustdedicatecsourceso monitoringenemy nfo Ops and emain lexibleenougho

countererroneousnformationdisseminatedy an adversary.Timelinesssparamount ecause

the fint story eleaseds oftenthe story hatgets hegreatest istributionandattention.Measures

must be taken o counter he propagandaf adversariesnd o reveal heir falsehoods.

r3. A numberof factorsserve o leave he nitiativeof Info Ops n thehands f the nsurgent.

First, the nsurgentwill haveno rnonl or legalcompunctiono useonly the ruth n an Info Ops

campaign.Second,modem nformation echnologiesnablehe rapidandbroaddissemination f

text, audio,video,andphotographicmaterial.Thismeanshat he newscycle s now muchshorter han n previouserasand hereforeeactiono enemypropagandaannotwait even24

houn. Third, becausehe nsurgentwill beoperating n 'hometurfl his sources f intelligence

will be superb.Combined, his serveso leave riendly orces n a defensive tance,orced o

monitor ocaland ntemationalmediaandothersources f information n order hat falsestories

canbe rapidly counteredwith accuratenformation.Thiswill likely be an unfamiliarstanceor

friendly forcesaccustomed nd rained o seize he nitiative n operations. espite his,

offensive nfo Ops argeting he key linesof operations f the nsurgentmust akeplace

simultaneouswith defensive nfo Ops.Only by careful dentification ndanalysis f the enemy's

Centresof Gravity and tngical Linesof Operation an riendly orcesconduct ffensive nfo

ops.

tq. Given hepewasivenessf the ntemational ediaand nformationechnologyhatenables

the real-time issemination f information, A will playa substantialole n helping o limit the

degree f intemational uppofian nsurgentorce equireso gain egitimacy nd esources.

N{oreover,PA will piay a critical role n counteringnsurgent ropagandaargeting hewill of

the Canadian ublic n thehopeof undermining omestic oliticalsupportor a mission, his s

critical: ntemational pinioncanbe undulyand mmediatelynfluenced y enemypropaganda,

PA must herefore e considered n ntrinsic artof the nfo opscampaign lan.

Ch8: 4 /18



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population hat ndirectly nabiehesurvival,movement,ndactions f an nsurgencyn an

effort o rum hesento active upporten f thegovemment.he esultwili bea hostile

operating nvironmentor the nsurgent. second rder ffectof thismaybe theundermining f

an nsurgent's ill due o the nability o increaseubiicsupportorthe cause,

8. Establishing ndMaintaining Credibility

20. In order or Info Ops o be successfuln creatingnfluences,hat s, n operating n the

moral/cognitive lane, he source f the nfo Opsmusthavesignifrcant redibility n theeyesof

thetargeiaudienie. Pooror non-existent redibilityhasbeen dentifiedas a primarycause f

failureof Info Ops from Kosovo o Afghanistan.Whether sources seekingo generate upport

from an indigenous opulation r convinceenemy roops o surrender,he ackof credibilitywill

hinder success.For eximple,an ndigenous opulationwith strong eligiousandculturalbias

againstwestern roopsmay distrustmessagesreated y westerners.

2r. Credibility will take ime to developand s intimately ied o the actionsof a military force

and he hostgovemment. hepresence, osture, ndprofrle PPP)of a forcewill havea

significant mpact on credibil ity.Depending n thespecific ontext, forcemayneed o show

strength, eciiiveness, riendliness, r a limited footprint,or several f theseat once.The

credibitity of a forcemay have o be establishedn a planned,ncrementalashion.Evenwhen

possessing redibility, ndigenous roxiessuchassocial, eligious, r political eaderswho have

iredibiliti with targetaudiencesndare sympathetico themissionshouldbe used o broadcast

desiredmessages.t *ust be rememberedhatallactionsshould einforce he perception f host

goverrrmentegitimacy,credibilityandcompetence;he useof indigenous oiceswill further his

soal.

Everyactionof the soldiermustbeconsideredartof InformationOperationsndmustbe

judged or potentialunintendedffects.The simple ctof picking nrits rom an orchard r

vegitables rom a fieldby resting oldiers analienate villagedependentn hatproduceor

winter survival. Withoutasking emrission f the arnerandofferingsuitable ompensation,

this seemingly armless ctcouldbe misconstruedndused y anadvenaryor propaganda

purposesie. 'thewealthywestemnvaden areittle or theaverageerson ndsteal our

food'). Every actionhaseffectsandall soldienmustundentandhe epercussionsf evenhe

mostbenign ct.

9, PerformanceandEffectsMonitoring and Assessment

22.A,swith any military activity, theresultsof informationoperations reassessedsing

measur€s f performanceare hingsdoneright?)andmeasuresf effectivenessare heright

thingsbeingdone, o createhedesired ffects?) reemployed,

23. Measures f performanceMoP) for info opsare elativelystraightforward s heyarewith

otheroperations ndactivities. heyrefer o themechanismsf planning nd mplementation.

They canbe viewed n the samemanner s hedelivery f indirect ire: reactionimes;qualityof

Ch8 : 6 /18



i _ r L _ 1 .

! ] !

DILAI.IT

product: orrectdentif icationndassessmentf target; nd uitabil i tyf engagementeans,onamea few.Measuresf Effectivenessefer o hedesired ffects ndwhether r not heactrvitiesonductedreatedheeffects.

24.Thesuccessfulrosecutionf InfoOps elies ncontinuous onitoring ndassessmentfthe shortand ong-term ffects f inter-relatedctivities.his s achievedy collection f all-sourcentelligencendother eedbackn he nfoOpsactivities. easuresf Effectiveness(MoE)mustbe ncludedn the nfoOpsplanandare ntegratedn the nteiligenceollectionactivities. articular ttention hould epaid o changesn theadversrry', i otheraudience'swiil andactions,ncluding uch tems schangesn theattirude f thecivilianpopulation,poiiticaiactivity,andexpressionsf unrest. lso,changesn an adversary'srpuUititymaybeused sa MoE,suchas educed fficiency, isorganisationndslower eactionso events ndspecific ctionsn responseo deceptionr destruction,

25. t mustbe clearly ndentoodha t nfluence ctivities ay akea significant mount f timeto takeeffect. n somecases, ffectsmay not become pparent

ntil well afteran ndividualunitor colrlmander'sourhasended.Short-term upport nd riendlinesshouldnotbe mistakenorconfidencen thegovemment.Winningover he rustof the argetaudience ill take ime andconsiderableffort,Changesn behaviourmay akeplaceovera engthyperiodof timeandbeimperceptible. or example,heeffects f a radiobroadcastampaignmay akeyearso becomeapparent. dditionally, t is verydifficult to develop causalink between single nfo opsactionand argetbehaviour, venwhendirectmessagesreusedat the actical evel. Forexample, hangesn drivingbehaviour roundmilitaryconvoysmaybe due o severalconcomitantacton: PsyOps roductsprevious seof wamingshots, r past ncidents fcivilian casualties henproximity o a suicide ombing argeting oalition orces esultedncollateral amage.Despite hese iffrcultiesMoE arecritical o gaugingheusefulnessf Infoops.

26,MoE arerelativelysimple,objective ndmeasurableor Counter-Commandctivity andInformationProtection ctivitiesbased nthestated im or desired ffectof theactivityplanned.Forexample,f anattacksuccessfullyestroys targeted dvenaryC2 system et theadvenarycommander anstill effectively ontrolhis subordinates,hen heeffectivenessf theactivitywaspooreven hough he attack.rr .y haveconducted soundattack hatdestrovedthe argeted ystem.

zz . With influence ctivities, oE areappliedo activities ndchangesn hecognitive lane.Givenall of the ndividual ndenvironmentalariablesn thehuman ecision-makingrocess,developing easuresf effectivenessMoE) or nfoopson hecognitive lanemry ti oneofthemostdauntingntellectualasksacinga commander.nfluence ctivitles eeko workthroughextemal

and nternal ilten in order o eitherpenuade r dissuade nd husaffectbehaviour ndaction.Hence,heplanning ndconduct f these ctivitiessanart requiringhecommander's ubjectiveeel for theirpotential ffect, Theresults f thesenfluence ctivitiesrequire sdefined setof indicatonaspossiblen order o detect hangesn perceptions,attitudes ndbehaviours ndneed o accountor theeffectof the nformation-filters.

28. MoE will varysignificantly etweenmissions ndevenwithinmissions. ommanders ustclearlydefine he end-state nd deallyany milestonesn thepath o thatend-state. oE, usingwhatevermeans remostappropriate, easurend ndicate rogressn the arget udiencetowardshatend-state.MoEsmustbe ailoredo thespecifics f notonly heoverall hange

Ch8: 7 /18



'. lf .r - f i , l i ' i i \l

: . i :!_r i j i r i

, t . J t , i _

i , i i ' r5ruq1.1,

desired, ut o the environmenl,ha t s, heconmander's rea f operationsAO)' Becausef

the ntangibleacton involved nd hesubjective ature f influencing,he MoE mayverywell

be subjective, t east n part,andbecauseehaviournfluences he aim, hey equire

significant mount f tirne o determineffectiveness.herefore,heymustbe assessedsa set

routine o attempt o recognise hanges,rendsandslightyetsignificantndicaton.The

commander xercisesudgement s o whenanadjustmentr changeo anactivityagainst

targetmustbe made n reactiono behaviounl hangesn the arget udience.

29, Somebasic undarnentalsxist ha tcanaid n thedevelopmentf usefulMoE:

a. Causality,2 dehnitive ause ndeffect elationship us tbe established

betweenhe activityand heeffectattemptingo be measured. herehas o be a

reasonableikelihood hat heplanned ctivitywill createhedesired ffect.

Secondly, ommandersnd nfo opsstaffmustbe able o assessny otherextant

facton tiratmaybe causingheeffectother han heirown activities,Likewise,

theymust ascertainf themeasured ffect s merelycoincidental

b. euantifiable.3 An MoE thatcanbe counted elps o remove omeof the

subjectivity hatplaguesMoEson themoralplane.Quantihcation llowsaccurate

trendmeasurement.or example, uringa tour n Iraq,2 BCT, lt'Armoured

Division monitoredandcountedocaland ntemationalmediacovemge f events

in 2 BCT's AO asa MoE. This allowedpositiveandnegativerends o be

identifiedwhichhelped o discern heeffectivenessf ongoing nfo ops'a

c. Observable nd Attributable.Thisprinciplemay seem bvious, owever,when

dnfting MoEsconsiderationhouldbe given o thepossibility hatall of the

variablesnfluencingan activityandchangen behaviour annotbe observed. he

MoE mustbe able o recognise trendor change ndconftrm he connection r

attribution o theactivity,For example,f thepresence r absence f negativegraffiti isbeingusedasan nformal ndicatorof support or a campaign nd

military force n an urbanarea, bservenwill ideallybe able o ascertain:ts

timing, that s, when t wasdone; ts attribution o a particular roup(political,

criminal,military) and heirmotive,andwhether t represents minority or

majority viewpoint; ts attributionn termsof cause, articularly f it appears sa

reaction o a specificeventor action;and, ts ocation n relation o the culfural

make-upof theenvironment.

d. Correlated o DecisivePointsand Objectives.Justasactivities replannedo

reach equentialecisive ointsalonga line of operation , oEsshould e

selectedo correlateo theachievementf eachdecisivepoint andshouldbe

reflectiveof the evelof employment.Althoughstrategicnfo opsrequire

2For a detailed iscussion f causality eeWill iamS. Murray, A Wili to Measure," arameters, ol.31,No'3'

Aurumn2001.CarlislePA: USAWC.Pp.134-14'73The quantifiable,observable, nd imeliness rinciplesareadaptedrom LtCo1.David Grohoski,StevenSeybert,

ard Marc Romanych, Measures f Effectivenessn the nformationEnvironment,"Military Intelligence

ProfesstonalBul ler tn,o i .29,No.3,July-September2003.ortHuachucaZ:US Army nte l l igenceenter.pp2-

1 6 .'Bake.,

Col. RalphO. ,Th e DecisiveWeapon: BrigadeCombat ea mCommander's erspectiven Information

Operations,"lI i l i tary Review,May-June 006.FortLravenworth S: US Combined rms CenterfuSCGSC'p.13-

32.

Ch8: 8 /18



' i ' ] 1 - l f ; 1 , : \ 1 , r ,;

' t ' ' ! R l I i r i _DRAIi'f

measureshatoccur hroughouthe engthof a campaign,manyMoEsat theoperationalnd acticalevelwill measurehe ncremental r'ogresshroughsequentialecisive oints.

e. Flexibilfy. AlthoughMoEsshould e draftedat theplanning tage heyshouldremainunder egular eviewandcommandenmustbepreparedo adjust hemasrequirtd.MoEs must eflectmutable onditionsn an AO. They mustevolveasamission rogrcsses,articularly sdecisive oints re eached ndsecured.Similarly,MoEs are ikely not ransferablerommission o mission.Even f amission akesplace n thesameAO thepassagef time will force econsiderationof MoEspreviously mployed.

f. Collection.Thecommander ustpossesshecapabilitieso collect heintelligence ecessaryo employa MoE andprovide hedirectionandguidanceodo so. Plansmustbe made o collectandassess oEs hroughall units n theaffectAO. Secondly, ollectionmay be assistedy otheragencies,

owever,absent formal commandelationshiphismayhave o bedone nformally.Notwithstandinghis,non-military gencies ayprove o be an effectivegauge fprcgresshrough nfo ops.

g. Relativity. Improvements ought n a givenenvironmentnustbe relative o thespecificenvironmentand o what s considered omral or thatparticularenvironmentand culfure.Expectationsor situationalmprovementmustbereasonable iventhe startingstateand he normalstateof thatparticularenvironment. t is imperative hat a baselinemeasurementf the overallenvironment n the AO be established s earlyaspracticablen the campaignplanning.Absenta comparative aselinet maybe mpossibleo accuratelydetennine

he effectiveness f lnfo Ops.Somechangen the environmenrmayoccurquickly; for example n mmediate rop n crime n a particularneighbourhood ay result rom hepresence f regular atrols.However,systemic mprovementsmay requirea substantial mountof time andbemeasuredn multipleyeamor evendecades.husmeasuring n ovenll drop ngangandcriminalactivity throughouta theatremustbemeasuredn relation othe levels hat existedunderpre-campaign ircumstancesndcould takeyean toachieve. urthermore,ystemic hangewill be he resultof numerousconcomitantactors.Expectationsor change nd herelatedMoE shouldbe setas ncrementalmilestones o hat mprovementanbe measured nddemonstrateds angibleprogressver ime.

30' Developing ppropriatemeasuresf effectivenesso assessnfo opson thecognitiveplane sa very difficult task.Willpower,perceptions,ndbeliefsare ntangible ariableshatdefy simplemeasurement. bservingandmeasuringrendss oneof thesurestwaysof gauginga target'satirude.Trends, owever, equirea definable aseline nd hiswill be a coiptJx but crucialinitial task.Difficultiesaside, ccurateMoEscanmake hedifference etweenmeetinedesiredobjectives r endinga mission n frustration.

Ch8: 9 /18



n-Rarrr

SECTION3: Characterist icsf Propaganda'

: t A substantialroportion f a COIN nfo opscampaign il l concentraten refutingnsurgent

propaganda,luJ it is useful o illustratehemajorcharacterislicsf hsurgent ropagandao

better nfbnn he commander f how o constructhemes ndmessagesha twill supporthe

desiredoutcomewhile undermininghemessagesnd hemes f theenemy.Deconstructinghe

themesof enemypropaganda llows hecommander ndstaffa betterundentanding f the

enemy's inesof operation ndwhatcounter-measuresill bestundenninehe enemycampaign'

Thecharacteristicsllustnted belowarebroadlyapplicableo all insurgencies'

32. Insurgencies resupported y a closelycoordinatedndmutuallysuppofiingriadof political

goals,propaganda,nO titit"ry action.Like info ops,propagandaan akeseveralormsand

will be reinforcedwith action.Wordswill be supportedy deeds ndviceversa.The nsurgent

causes advanced redominantly y discreditinghe government ndsecurity orces, educing

public morale,andvilifying pro-govenrment edia.nsurgents ill utilizeanygovernment

mistake,especiallynciOentsn which hepoliceandmilitary maybe seen o haveover-reacted.DemocratiC ovemments re husmorevulnerableo hostilepropagandaecause f thevalue

placedon freedomof speech,

3r, Propagandamust be effectivelycounteredf a COIN campaigns to be successful. ike all

info opi, Jounter-propaganda"qui*r a unifiedmulti-agency pproachhroughouthe evelsof

commandandmust nciudepolitical directionon approvedhemes ndmessages.nrpagandas

effectiveand cannotbe ignored. t is throughpropagandahat headversaryolstenhispopular

support,gains ecruitsandmaterial esources,ndultimatelyseeksegitimacyandcredibility.

34. All propaganda ontains omekernelof truth,howeverminiscule,which is distorted o play

upon hepreconceived otions,attifudes, ndperceptionsf the argetaudience swell as socio-

pbtiticat rends hathave edto discontent. dvenary nfo ops arget he samesegments f the

indigenous opulationas riendly nfo ops-the neutralor wavering ortions rom which

supporten anbedrawn,

35,Therearea numberof overarchinghemeshatcharacterisensurgent ropaganda. lthough

someof these hemesbecomemoreprevalent san insurgency volves,he hemeswill likely be

usedsimultaneously,argetingdifferentspecificaudiences,ailoredo suit he ebband low of

the struggle.

Righteousness.he nsurgentauses rightandustand upportedy thedivine.

This hemes oundedn faithand deasatherhan act'

Hatred.Thegovernmentr opposingnternationalorce spainted sheretical rmorallyandspirirually ornrpt. incehegovemmentpposeshe ighteousnessf

the nsurgentause ndhassoughto suppresshepeople,t and ts agents re

desewing f hatred nddeath.

5The erm propaganda'is used ere n thepejorative ense. he vastmajoriry f thissections adaptedro m

BrigadierMauriceTugwell 'sdoctoral issertationevolutionary ropaganda ndPossible ounler-Measures

(l-ondon:King's College,University f London,March1979).

Ch8: 10/18

A.

B .



Inevitableriumph, ecauseaffair,he ruurgencyanonlyachieveictory. his hemes

ideologies.

,DRAF-T

the trugglesportrayedsa moral nd ighteousend r triumph,egardlessf the ime equiredohighlightedn con{lcts nvolvinsundarnentalst

D. Allegirnce' "You arewith us or against s."Although nsurgenciesnly require heambivalence f thepopulationo existand hrive,propaganda ill leavenouncertainty bout heultimate equiremento supporthecause. his hemeseeksopaint hoseopposinghe nsurgencys raiton,cowards, r unfaithfui,

E. Moral Certainty. Used o bolsteractivesupportersf an nsurgency,his themeseekso implant he notion hat hemoralhigh-groundieswith th.i*urgrnt and hatall actscommitted y supporten re ust,both egallyandspirirually.

F. Terror.Although enorism s a tactic, he herne f terror sused n insurgentpropagandao coerce ssistancerom hecivilianpopulation nd o enforce iscipline

within an nsurgency. his hememustbe supportedy violentactionwhich mayU"limited n scope ut cancauseerroroutof all proportibno theact tself.

G' Martyrdom. Also knownasglorification f heroes,his hemewill highlight heactionsof insurgentsandglorify the fallen o bolster nternalmoraleariA ripresstirecivilianpopulation.

H. Praiseof violence.violence sportrayed sa spiritually leansing.

I. Justified Reaction.All actions re ustifiedasnecessarynd ust reactionogovemment uppression.

J' Long War. lnsurgencieso notsucceed vemightand n order o sustain upport,tis necessaryo reinforce henotionof inevitable riumphby communicatinghat thestrugglewill be longanddifficult andmayspan evenllgenerations.his i oftenportrayed n religious erms o exploitbelief in the ranscendentalatureof thedivineand he afterlife o givestrengtho religiouslymotivatednsurgents.

K. Guilt. This theme s directed t heenemygovemment ndsupporters.Itwill playupon he sensitivities f thepopulations f liberaldemocracier.^Today,his hemesheavilyexploitedusingmodern ommunicationsechnologieso pubiicise ealandcontrivedncidents.

L. Bad Faith. This themeseekso undermine ttempts y thegovemmento reachoutto insurgent upportersnd o portraygovemment fforts olmprove he ot of nepeopleas a fagademeant o dupe hepeople.

M' Security Force Incompetence. his hemewill try to demonstraten nabilitvof thegovemmento providea safeandsecure nvironmentswell asan mpot.n.a to ,,opthe nsurgency. his themewill be supported ith violentactionsargeting ecurityforces hemselves swell assegmentsf thepopulation.

Ch8: 11/18



i 1, )

N, Legit imacy.Insurgenciesil lult imately ttempto developegit imacyhrough oth

deeds ndwords.An example f this s Hezbollah'sntemattonalropaganda

campalgnn theSummerof 2006and he mmediatenfusionof reconstruction id nwar-devastatedeighbourhoodsn Lrbanon mmedialeo thecessationf hostilities

with Israel. he goalwas o demonstrateoth he llelitimacyof.theenemy,Israel,

and he powerlessnessf thesecular ovemmento prolide for theneeds f the

peoPle.

O. Credibility. The ultimatepurpose f propagandas to establish redibility n theeyes

of the civiiian populationwhichwill inevitably ead o outrightsupport'

36.The goalof counter-propagandas therefutation f insurgent ropagandand o presenthe

truthful irstification or inelegiti*u.y andcredibilityof thehostgovernment. ffectivecounter-

propagandas required o convincebothdomestic nd ntemational eutrals ndsupportershat

ihe mirsion is legltimate.Publicopinionmustbe consideredhroughouthe campaign y all

levelsof command,ncluding he politicalelement.Clearly,PA will playa leading ole n

communicatinghe truth to tie intemational ublic.Theeffort o counterenemypropaganda

mustexplaingovernment trategy ndgoalsfpresentacts,andexposehe allaciesor theenemy

message nd he llegitimacyof enemymotives'

SECTION 4: Information OperationsActivities n COIN

37.The primary nfluenceactivitiesgrouped nder he nfo ops monikerare:psychological

operationspsyOps),public affain (FA),^civit-military ooperationCIMIC), presence-profile-

pbrru.. (ppp), and j"c.ption. PsyOps,PA, andDeception aveoffensiveanddefensive ses'

All, save or ppp arediscusseOn Aetait n their respective anuals,whichshouldbe read n

conjunctionwith this chapter. he specificusesof eachactivity n a COIN campaign rediscussedn thissection.

A. PsychologicalOperations PsyOps)

:8. The primarypurposeof PsyOpss to influenceheperceptions, ttitudes ndbehaviour f

selectedndividualso, group, n iccordancewith Info Opsobjectives'PsyOpss oneof thefew

toolswithin lnfo Ops tiatnasinfluence' asa first ordereffecton thecognitiveplane.Unlike

pA, which simply irovides information or disseminationy others,PsyOps etains irect

controlovercontentand dissemination f a messagend ocuses n a specific argetaudience'

psyOps s notpropagandan thepejorative ense;CF PsyOps nly disseminatesruthful

rrrr.g.r. Bffective"PsyOps.qui*, timelyprovisionof resourcesuchas inguistic,support,

graptrics ndprint.up.bitity, andvariouselectronic roadcasting eans.Mediums or the

broadcast f messagesnclude ace-to-face ontact, rint,radio, elevision,oudspeakeN,he

intemet, axes, agers, ndmobilephones.

39,psyOps s oneof themostcost-effectiveomponentsf a COIN campaign' oordinated ith

other nfo Opsactivities ndanti-insurgentperations,syOps, roperlyappiied, anensurehat

rhe ndigenous opuiation eceives ndcomprehendsheactivities f the CF and hehost

gou.**rnt. Strategiceveldirection, ndclose oordinationetween ll commandevels re

Lquired to seamies-slyntegratehemes,messages,ndactions. ll messages ustbe reinforced

with actionbecause eeds ndwordsmustnot becontradictory.lose oordinationoes ot

Ch8: 12118



DR-{tf'I,

indicate requirementor rigidcontrol;heneed orconsistencyn theme ndmessage ustno tbe regarded sa requirementor micromanagementf subodinates. lthough hedistributivemeans naybe similar,hepurposesf operationalnd acticalevelPsyOps iffer, t is only

throughseamlessntegration ndcoordination f PsyOpsntotheovenil iampaignplan hat'informationfratricide' anbe avoided.

+o Canada oes ot conduct.strategicevelPsyOps. A is usedat hestrategicevel ocommunicatenformation. he nabiliry o limit the argetaudience recludJsheuseof psyOpsat thestrategicevel.At theoperationalevel,PsyOps re ypically irected tmodifying eneralattitude ets earedowardsong-term ehaviour odification.ypically,hi swill involve omeform of rationalargumenthatmaybe forcefullyor subtlypresented. n example f a forcefulmessage ouldbe continued ublicising f public nfiastructure rojectsn aprovince.Anexampleof a subtlemessage ouldbe hebrcadcast f popularmusic argeting 5-25yearoldsto emphasisehat eligiousdealsand iberalsocieties renot ncompatibli.Inm"ny ways,operationalevelPsyOps anbe viewed n marketingermsasbuildingbrand ecognition.nessence,hemessages trying to builda relationshipetweenhe argetaudience nd hebrand.

4r. At the acticalevel,PsyOpswill prcsent concisemessage earedowardsmodifyingspecificbehaviours.he argetaudience il l be morespecific hanat theoperationalevelandemotiveand ationalargumentsmaybe used n themessage.he goal s to cause targetaudienceo act, atherhan o thinkaboutand ationalize message. xamples f tactical evelpsyopsare eafletsnforminga villageof an mpending peration rpostenhungalongpopularthoroughfaresemonstratingafedrivingbehaviour round militaryconvoy.

42. A nuanced nderstandingf thesocio-cultural nvironmentn whichPsyOps reconductedis essentialo success. ereawarenessf thesocio-cultural ilieu s imufficient or thoseinvolved n theconception, esign, ndapproval f PsyOps roducts. ribalrelations realsoa

necessaryonsideration.rbanoperationsold hepotentialor vastlydifferentsocio-culturalconstructsn differentneighbourhoods.syOps roductsmustbe speiificalty ailored o thetargetaudience. he potential or unintendedffectss great f anerror n taigetaudienceanalysiss made.A poorproduct s worse hanno productat all.

hnmediately rior 9the .*plannedo communicatehepurpose f themissiono theAtgnan- gople.The'nisi leaflet tratwas o beused icturedB-52sbombing green alley.The eaflet, lrnostdenticalooor ur.Oin the 1991GulfWar againstraqwasdeletedrom hecaurpaignt he astminuteoutofconcemhat he.pamphletouldcreateheperyeptionhat heAfghan eo,pteerebeingtargetedor retributionor 9/11 Further onfusionver hepropeiuseof Uotnnedissemination ethodleafletbomblets)nd

heurgetaudiinci (p5yops lanhendesignedheleaflet or a tactical, otstrategic pplication)ighhghtshe equirementorcoorUi*UJo"oOheneedo tailorkyOps productso specifrc udienies,

Source:Christopher'an\'levlav of PsychologicalpoattonsLessonsearned rom Recent perattonalExperience,asbinglonDC: NationalDefense niversity ress,september005, .71.

Ch 8: 13 /18



.1 , : , i : , ' Il , l . . - ' , . . ' i : - , , i r i' l : - ' D r u U . f

43. Time s anuncertain ily.On theonehandPsyOpshemes ndmessageseed o be asting

andcontinuouso makean mpression. n theotherhand,over-prolongedxposureo a single

messagemayresult n boredomand nitation.Considerhe annoyancef a commercialhatone

views oo often on television; t is as ikeiy to provokeanavenion o theadvertised roductasmuchas t will inducea desire o purchasehatproduct.Fine udgments neededo draw he ine

betweenhe advantageso be gainedromtheconsistent xploitation f a factor themeand he

dangers f saturation. he audiences not srupid.

+q.Politicaland military ovenight mustensurchatPSYOPSandsupporting ctivitiesare

consistentwith thehost nationandCanadianoliciesandconform o anyspecificpolitical

guidance. he psychologicai imension f counter-insurgencys so mportant hata PSYOPS

itaff officer shouldbe nomirnted n all formationheadquartenand ndeedany Canadianbattle

grcup working within a MultirutionalBrigade.Within a Canadian rigade-Group,his

ippointment *ill no.-ally fall to a mernberof the operations taff,who will work directly with

the ntelligence taff.This staffoffrcermustbe a permanentmember f theheadquafters,s

opposedo an augmentee, ho hasa thorough nderstandingf thecommander'sntentions, econversant ith staffprocedures,

B. Public Affairs (PA)

45.The aim of Public Affairs is to protect hecredibilityand egitimacyof operations nd

promotewidespreadundentanding, herebygainingsupport or military operationswhile not

tompromising-EssentialElementsof Friendly lnformation (EEFI).It communicatesnformation

to audiences, hrough the mediumof local,nationaland ntemationalmediaand other

cornmunicationmeans.An imporlant acetof anymilitary operations to communicatehe

principal themesand rnessages hile providing a clearandcompleteundentandingof the

bperation,whilst maintainingOPSEC, Although PA is primarily focusedoninforming and

educating udiences,ts impict is muchwider. t is thercfore ssentialhat PA staffand hoseof

other nfo Opscapabilitieswork closely ogethero ensurehat a coordinatedmessages

delivered o the intendedaudiences. articular ttentionmustbepaid o local andregionalmedia

and o othermedia sourceshatare nfluentialwith indigenous opulations. o avoidgiving the

false mpression hat themediaarebeingmanipulatedn anyway, a distinctionmustbe

maintained etweenPSYOPSandPA, however,his doesnot obviate herequirement f PA to

be fully integrated nto theInfo Opscampaign.

46. In COIN operationst is essentialo conduct nedia elationsn apositivemanner. hey must

projectan accurate nd balanced icfureof therole of thesecurity orces n general ndof the

CF in particular,and demonstratehepracticalcontributionCanadian oldien are making to the

solutionof a diffrcult and requentlyhazardousonflict.Creating ndmaintaining positivepublic imageof the Anny includes ountering otentiallyhostilemediaactivity.

+7, Operational ublic affairs s a G3 staff unctionand should ecoordinatedt the evel of the

highest ormationheadquartenn the heatre f operations. rblic Affain Officen (PAffO) are

responsibleor all aspects oncerninghe authorization f suitable acilities or themedia, he

nominationof units to hostvisitors,and herequirementor escorts ndother esources.

48. In periodsof intenseoperational ctivityor during major ncidentshePAf0 sectionmay

needadditionalsupport,particularlyn urbanareas.Sub-units houldbepreparedo help the

PAfro personneln termsof escorts,movement nd he controlof themedia. f thePAffO off,rce

Ch 8: 14/18



is to provide nauthoritative,onsidered,onsistentndcrediblenformation ewice,hepressoffice must eceive romptandaccuratenfonnation romsubordinateeadquartenndunits. tmustalso eceive arlywarningof projected perationsogetherwith clear rutructions n how

to dealwith mediaenquiries, referablyn the ormof aquestion ndanswer rief.49. In manyaspects,ealingwith themedia s no different n a COIN campaignhan n anyotheroperation.Whenspeakingo themedia,and n accordanceith security egutations,ndividualsshould estrict hemselveso matters f factat theirown evel.No statemerushouldbe madeconceming overnmentolicies, oliticaldecisions,r on opics ikely o bepolitically ensitive.Similarly, o speculativetatementshould emade.

50.A largenumber f ournalists epresentingheprcss,adio,and elevision anbe expectedoreP9.ton COIN operations.o facilitateaneffectivewo-waypassagef information nd ominimizeunnecessary ediaqueries, tanding rders hould iur guiOancen the imitsof theinformation hatmaybe disclosed. eforeany nformations passedo themedia t mustbeclearedor release y theappropriate

ilitaryagency, .g.,G2, G3,and heappropriate ostnationauthorities, r policeauthoritieswhere his s applicable.

51.No unnecessaryindrances to be offered o a oumalist's reedomo operate.It s in theintercsts f law andorder hat hepress houldhave acilitieso exposeenorism,actsofviolence,and he ntimidationof civilians.A member f themediahas he same ights, ibertiesandobligations nder he aw asany othercitizen.

52' If anon-scene ommanderelieveshat hemediaareprejudicing ecurity uringanoperation,he mattershouldbe dealtwith by persuasion,dmonition, , ur a last esort, ndonlyif a criminaloffence s suspected,y physical estraint r arrest.t is possiblehatreponersmaydelibentelywishto exposehemselveso danger gainst

headviceoitr. security orces. f thiydo not yieldto persuasion,clearwamingmustbe given,n frontof witnesser, i th. possibleconsequencesf theiractionsand hat heymustacceptesponsibilityor themselves.

oTakenromAAP6, Theus military efen o CIMICasCivilAffain (cA).

Ch8: 15/18

"Youhaveno nfluerrce ith thepressf youdonot alk o them...Not talking o thepresss theequivalent f cedinghe nitiatiVe opre nsurgents,ho were]quiteaOept ispinniog ,

-

mromutlon nadverse ays o furtherheir,objectives." ,

C. Civil Military Cooperation CIMIC)

53.Civil-Military Cooperations definedas: "coordination ndcooperationn support f themission,between ommandersndcivil actors,ncluding henationalpopulation nC ocatauthorities, swell as ntemational, ationalandnon-govemmentalrganizationsndagencies.fCIMIC is a coordination nd iaison unction hat acilitates perationsn relationo civilauthorities ndnon-militaryorganisationsnd eads o activitieshatsupportocalauthorities.



i l . r = i i / - , . i - , i r : t l i - i i , ] , . l . - . . ] j i , i r l i i l i : , ; r 1 p - 1 1 . ,

' , ' , - - Ii , , ' ' , _ , i t ' l : : - i , - l l . . ri r l : a l D n a F t

Because f theirability o tnform,demonstratend nfluence ndeven o-opt,CIMIC related

activit ies rea key rp.rt to the nfonnationperationslan' CIMIC s centnl o anyCOIN

campaign ecausiheperception f hostgovernmentompetenceustbe reinforced' he

perception f competences tied o securiiy nd heability o provide or theday-to-day eeds fthepopulace.mproving hesocial, hysical, ndeconomic eli-being f thepopulaces a

..ni*i goalof anyCOIN mission. hus,CIMIC actions imed t nfrastructureevelopment,

reconstructionndassislanceo governancerecrucial o achieving uccesS'

54.CIMIC providesnformationn the ormof physical vidence f the egitimacy, redibility,

and competlnceof thehostgovernment.CIMIa will comprise significantproportionof the

,deeds'thatmustsupporthJwords'of a campaign.ailureo follow hrough npromisesmade

will alienatehepopulation nddamage redibility, aremustbe aken hatexpectationsreno t

createdn thepopulation hatcannotbe met.CIMIC related ctivities herefore eed o be

coordinatedwithin theoverall nfo Opsplan, n termsof impacts poncivil audiences,heir

leaders nd heir nformationsystemsn-ordero ensurehatactivitieswork to supportoverall

objectives.CIMIC facilitatesooperationbetweenmilitary forcesand hecivilian environmentby:

(l) Consideringndassessingocial, olitical, ultural, eligious, conomic,

infrastrucfural ndenvironmentalacton n supportof military operations

andobjectives.CIMIC staffshouldbe avaluable ource f informationo

intelligence taff n creating knowledge aseof theenvironment' ut

CIMIC cannotbe perceived s ntelligence athering ssets.

(Z) Liaisonandcoordinationwith domestic gencies, overnment fficials

andelements f power, ntemational rganisationsIos), andnon-

goverrlmentalrganisationsNGOs).

(3) Forgingan effective elationship etweenmilitary and civilian authorities,organisations,gencies ndpopulations'

55. It is critical thatCIMIC projects eflect heneeds nddesires f thepopulation'Moreover' t

is pointless o build a schooformedical facility thatcannot e staffedor funded.A satisfied

population s abenignpopulation.CIMIC is a mostuseful ool to addressheunderlying auses

bf in insurgencyasit has^theotential o directly nfluence heday-to-day ivesof thepeople'

During he 1899-1902 hilippineWar,CIMICformeda significant ortionof theUSArmy

rtot.fy to gain he supportblttt"populationnsouthern,uzon. he mprovementf civil

gou.rirrr.ri, thebuildingandoperationf schoolsnd heprovision f medical ervicesnticed

ihepopulation ack o tft'.viliages rom unglerefuges. hestrategyntegntednativepolice

andviilagepresidentesr*yorr) intotheeffort.This ncreasedupportor the USmission ndisolatednJi^u.g.nts fromthepopulation. epantedrom heirsourcesf foodandother

provisions ndharassedy consiantUSpatrols,he nsurgentsere obbed f the nitiativeand

iorced o attackUSoccupiedownsandvillagesn adesperatendultimatelyunsuccessful

attemptodefeatheUSstrategy. lthough ot ermed'CIMIC' t he ime, he mprovement

of theday-to-dayivesof thepopulace as nstnrmentalo thesuccessf thisCOINcampaign'

Source: rianMcAliisterLinn, hi us ,l,rmy ndCounterinsurgencyn thePhilippinel/ar, 1899-1902'hapel

Hill NC:University f NorthCarolina ress,989, .164'

Ch8: 16/18



i - i ) i i i rr i \ r l l t

: I l : i l i l - l D: I : i | + ?El . i l r - i l i . l r' r .

l i : i \ r S i ] i - l ' i

DRAFT

SS.Deceptions a broad oncepthatspansactical amouflageo sophisticatedtrategicevel

operations,eception lso ncludesheplanting f infonnation'Deceptions defined s hose

measuresesignedo mrsieadheopponenty-marupulation,.distortion'r falsificationf

evidenceo inducehim to react n a mannerhat s prejudicialo hisLnterests'nsurgents

constantly ttempto cause nover-reactiony goue"ntntntorces'Forexample' n nsurgent

couldplant alse ntbrmationwhichcouldcause novelTeactionr inaccurateargeting'

SS,Whiledeception ims o gainsurprise ndmaintain ecurity,ts mainpurposes re o givea

commanderreedomof actioir o operatey deluding nopponent S o CF actions' nd o

misleadhe nsurgentntoadopting disadvantageousourse f action,whichcanbe exploited'

All typesof deception i,n o impt"a't false dea n theopponents indandall deception

presupposesffectivecounter urveillancendOPSECo preventheenemy romobserving

genuine ctivity.

SECTION5: Conclusion60. Thesuccess f anycounterinsurgencyampaign .inge;

9ltht support f the ndigenous

population. heprimarycentre f gravity s ttreneutnland riendlyportions f thepopulace'

Info Ops nfluenceu.riuirl., witl c-omprisesignificant mount f theactivitieshata military

forceundertakesn a camPaign

6t. Informationoperationsorm an ntegral artof anyoperationallan n all of itsconstituent

activityareas. ff activityareasequireiur"-tttplanning.Themostcomplexplanning ccurs

with inJluence ctivitier, nrt is, hose ctivitieshat equire onsiderationf theeffects cross

widespectrum f targetaudiencesndenvironmentalystems' ndentanding ow to influence

thoseaudierrr., "ffis careful onsiderationy commanden ndstaff' All activities reate

influences nd huscommanderstall levels,evendown o the owest actical evels'must

undentandme tastini impresrions nd amiircations,e heypositiveor negative,ntentional runintentional,hataliactivitiescreate n targetaudiences'

Ch8 : 18 /18



DRAFT

CHAPTER

SUSTAINMENT

SECTION1: SUSTAINMENT RINCIPLES ND PLANNING

1' Princioles.ustainmentoctrinesexplainedn LandForce ustainment.heplncrplesof sustainmentn coIN argno differentiornlhosen other ypes f operations,ithoughhereare hangesf emphasisn their pplicatron.heprincipiesre.

a. Foresight;b. Economy;c. Flexibi l i ty;d. Simplicity;e. Cooperation;f. Self-sufficiency;g. Visibi l i ty;h. Responsiveness;ndi. Survivabil i ty.

2' Factors ffectingSustainment.omemodificationso normalCSSpractice nd

ll:t_tdut.tarenecessaryo allow or thecircumstancesnderwhichCOINoperationsake

Drace :

a . Disoersion.Non-contiguous eployment f th esecurity orces n small

detachmentsve r a wide area ncreases ifficulty in th eprovisionof support.Theremay be a tendency o fragment nd disperse SS units o supportwiderydeployed ecurity orceelements. owever, h. ,upportof isolated ub-units ndplatoonsmay be a problembetter olved y increai inghe evelof serf-sufficiency.Nevertheless, om edispersion f cS S ,riit, rnuybe inevitable ndcrthe"hub andspoke" ystem.

Secur itv.Therewil l be a hostof secur i tyhreats:

(1) A surfaceo air missi ie ndsmallarms hreatmay complicateheprovision f replenishmenty air .

(2) Dependencen local esources/ labouror such hingsas,construct ion,purchase, torage nd perhaps istribution, dds o ihe overallsecurityproblem,

b .

TheNat ionalSupport lement NSE)and ts stat ic nstal lat ionshould esited n anarea ecured ndprotected,ommensurateith operat ionalndgeographicalactors.f thescale nd ntensity f theopcrat ion anant heestablishment f forwardsupportgroups FSG) heir e]ements re ikelv to

t8

(3)



DRAFT

be moreat risk andwill requiremoresecurity orceeffort to defend hem

While a safe rea s desirable,ase f accesso theNSE,pointsof entry

(POE)or convenienceor onwarddistr ibut ion ay be hedetennining

factors.

Air Supporl.Th e greater he amountof ai r and helicopter ift that s

available he more t will be possible o cut out intermediate aseswith the

advantage feconomies n ground esources, uardsand heatre ransport.

Wherepossiblehe useof a sea asedNSE would easehephysical

securityandprotectionof these ulnerablenstaliations

Operational ecuritv.Caremust be taken hat CSSpreparations o not

prejudice he securityof informationandpians.Sudden ncreasesn stock

levels,exceptional mounts f road, ail and air movement, he arrivalof

new CS Sunitsn certainareas nd he ocalpurchase f unusual temsare

just someexampies f changesn a normaipatternof replenishment hich

might betraya futureoperation.A combination f secrecy,nsofaras t is

possible o hideCS Spreparations, ndconvincingdeception lanshelp o

preserve ecurity.Discretion n dealingwith contractors nd akingcare

not to discuss perationalmatters, specially utureplans, n the hearingof

local abourar eessential,f elementary recautions re o keepou r

intentions ecret.

Manpower. BecauseCOIN operations remanpower ntensive herewill be

pressure or eco nomy n CSSmanpower. While, on the onehand, ow ratesof

expenditureof combatsupplies educe he CSSburden, he dispersed eployment

mentioned n sub- paraa above ncreasest. Manpower imitationsmay ncreasedependence n local abour.

Multi-national Forces. Canadawill most ikely deploy aspart of a multi-nationai

security orce. This could lead o potentialcoordination nd standardization

problems.

CSS Reconnaissancelan

3 . Reconnaissance arty.Points o noteare hat:

b .

The recoruraissancearty sent o a new theatrewil1be organized n a oint service

basis.Th e party will aim to make early contactwith the HN government hroughthe local diplomatic epresentativen order o assesshe resources vailable n the

theatrean d to provide an estimate f the requirements, hich must be sentou t

from Canada.

The reconnaissancearty must nclude a strongCSS elementheaded y a

sufficiently seniorofficer, who is fully awareof the kind of operation nvisaged

and of rheCSS equirementso support t. He should ave heauthonty o arrange

(4)

(s)

)Lt .

q

7,8

A020231 -2-00019



DRAFT

liaisonwith the IN andall ies, o takedecisions nd o make ecomniendat ionsotheTaskForceCommander nd, hrough hediplomat ic taf l to theHN ministryof defence

c' Theear l ier he econnaissancear ly s sent ut and hesoonerCSSpreparat ionsfo r thearrivalof our forcesar emade he bener.

4 ' S t r a t e g i c R e c c e '4 L o g s t a f fa n d t h e J S G w i l l c o n du c t t h e s t ra t e g i c r e c c e .T h e C S Selement f thereconnaissanceartymustmakearrangements ith thehJst govemment orfac i l i t iesandprocedureswi th regard to thereceptionand log is t icsuppor to fourfo rces .

Thefol lowingpointsmustbe considered:

b .

Liaison. iaisonproceduresor coordinat ingSS requirementsith the N, anyotheral l iesandCEFCOMmustbe establ ished.

Accommodation ndRealEstate. he estimatedequirementor operational ndlogisticaccommodation nd ea lestatemustbe given o theFIN'sministryofdefence s soonaspossible. he proceduresor obtainingaccommodation nioan,by requisit ion, y leasing r by purchase ustsimilar lybe workedout withtheFfN'sauthoritieswith all possible peed. he availabilityof local abour,buildingmaterial, ervices eiectricity,warer, ewage, tc )mustbe ascertainedquickly.

Provisionof Resources. he capacities f theHN or Coalitionpartnerso providecombatsupplies, ervices nd consumertemsmustbe determined eforefrnalizingwhat must be brought n from canadaor neighbouring ountries.

Infrastructure.Availability andcapacity f HN infrastructurencluding:

(1) PortFaci l i t ies. . longside erthing, ischargeates singexist ingunloading acilit iesan dstorage ccommodation t andnear he mainnortof entry' Unloadingand ighterageacilit iesat smallports. Inlandwatertransport.Roadan drail exits.Liaisonwith theharbourauthorities.

(2 ) Airports. Agreement n themain entryairfieldand availabilityof forwardairfieldsor airstrips_inonjunctionwith the ai r forceelement f therecomalssancearty. Agreement n aircraf t cheduleseadins o aplanned lo w of reinforcementsndsupplies.

(3) Railroads.

(4) RoadSystem.

Anival of cSS Units.Thebuildup of cSS unitsmustbe plannedo supporthecombatelements s hey arrive, aking nt o account he assistancevailable ro mthe FIN.

c

d .

l8

A n a n t t a o . ^ n A r ^ ^



DRAFT

f . Account ing. herewii l bea need or f inancial taf fon any aovance arty.

Agreementwith thehostgovernment i l l be needed n the ol iowing opics:

( 1) Costshar ing.

(2) Account ingProcedures.

(3) The need or banking aci l i t ies.

5. OperationalRecce. The TaskForceJ4lG4will conductan operationalevel recce o

detcrminehe fol lowing:

a. Bases, Detailedplanning or theestablishment f CSS nstallations,nedical

facilit iesand he sitingof unit campsneeds o be concurrent.n conjunctiorrwiththe ntelligenceandoperations taffs t will be necessaryo draw up a plan for the

provision of protection rom blast,mortarbombs,RPGsand shells or key or

exposedheadquarters,nstallations,solated ases ndpositions.

b. Allocation of Main SupplyRoutes. n a countrywith a limited roadnetwork t

may be necessaryo allot time blocks or the road movementof resupplyconvoys

and routine roop movements.

c. Level of self-sufficiency equired.Basedon the deployment f the Task Force

elements, asic oad quantitiesmust be established'

d. EquipmentSupport.The equipment upportplan must begeared o providingspecial equirements:

( I ) Enhancedelectronic epair acilit ies o dealwith extra adios,CCTV

systems, larmsandEW equiPment.

(2 ) Modifications o vehicles, $, armouring'

(3 ) Operational tocksmust be estimated nd maintained s,unlike PKO,

therewill be vehiclecasualtiesn significantnumbers,

Security. The G4 mustwork with the G2 and G3 to establishhe securityplan for

CSS elements, onvoys ndact iv i t ies.

Labour.Detai led equirements ustbe developedor each nstal lat ion ndarea n

termsof ski l ledandunski l led abour.

48

an2n?a1R-4-onnl 1



DRAFT

SECTION : SUSTAINMENT NDRESoURCES

Sustainmentvstem. n developinghesustainmentystemheG4 staf fmust:

Decide n thestock evels o beheld n thesupport roup ocatrons nd heself -sufficiency evel of units o provide or :

( l) The predictedntensity f operat ions;

(2) A cushion f reserveso meet ntenupt ionsn the eplenishmentystem yrnsurgent ctionand;and

(3) Thechanging ependencyfunits.

Demandcommodities hrough he nationalLoc or contract hrough he N an dwork out a movementan ddistribution lan o transportmaterial io m theentrypoints o the base nstallations.

organizedistribution or commoditiesn theoperationai reas nd ailocatedependencyor unitsbased n thenearest r mostappropriate ourceofsupply.

Arrange ai l transport, oad convoys, nlandan dcoastalwater ransport, ixed orrotarywing airlift or ai r dropping.

Traffic controland outeprotection; t will be necessary,n conjunctionwith theG3 staff, to arrange:

(1) Escorts ndpickets;

(2 ) "Road opendays', n high risk areas; nd

(3 ) Avoidanceof a routineandpredictable attemof convoymovementsnareaswhere here s high risk of insurgent ttack.

f' Unit responsibilityor themovementof material rom the distributionporntsorCSS nstal lat ionso theirown areas. nitsmayrequire el icopteri f t or evenpackanimals n difficult country.

1. . SA is cr i t icai o sustainmentn COINoperat ions. nemy orceswil l l ikely put a highpr ior i tyon destroying r disrupt ing SSelements.CSSunitsdown o the owest evelmusthave heabil i ty o react mmedlatelyoenemyactionor changing upport equirements.

8' Air Replenishment.ixedor rotarywing aircraf tmaybecome hemethodof choice orreplenishmentor the ol lowine easons:

d .

y8



DRAFT

a Forces anbe suppL iedn inaccessrb lereas vo id inghenecess i t yor a

vulnerable urface uPplv oute;

b. Troopsarebefter ble o movewith l ightscales f equipment, nencumberedith

echelon ransport ,husexploit ing hepr inciple f f lexibi l i ty o give hema good

levelof tact icaimobil i ty;

c. Subject o thecapacity f theair l i f t esources,eather nd errainair replenish-

ment s quicker hanoverland esupply;

d. Reserve tocksca nbe reducedan dheld centrallyallowing the establishmentf

fewer but larserbases ituated n moresecure reas;

e. Reducing hedependency n surface outes essenshe risk of ambush ndcuts

the convoYProtection ommitment;

e. Rapid casualty vacuation mprovesa woundedsoldierschances f survival,

improving morale;

g. The urgentneedsof the civilian popuiation n isolatedareas anbe metquickly;

h. Air Dropping.This method s lesseconomic ha nair landed esupplybut s often

necessaryn very brokencountrywhere herear eno landingzones, ven or

helicopters,without engineerwork. The penaltiesor air droppingare hat he

recoveryof parachute quipmentmay be difficult or impossibleand heremay be a

risk that the supplies all into enemyhands;

i. Landinq StripsandHelicopterPads.Theseshouldbe constructedwhenever

possiblean das soonas possible o economisen airlift;

j Cooperation, here s a need or closecooperation etween he CSS,operations

and air staffs; and

k. Anti-Aircraft Threat.SAMs andsmallarmsmay posea serious hreat estricting

the useof air suPPlY.

9 . SeaBased og is t ics . BD.

10. Useof Local Resources. hi le the maximumusemustbe madeof local esourceso

reduce he CSS lift resources eployed rom Canada,caremustbe takenno t to cause hortages

in the hostcountry's homemarketan dconsequent rice ises,although his may have o be

balanced gainit he advantageso be gained y boost inghe ocaleconomy, f thecivi l

population suffers rom shortages nd nflation the tnsurgents ii l be handeda readypropaganda

weapon.

1 1 . S e c u r i t y .

68

aoz0.2318-6-00n13



DRAFT

b.

Insurgentnf i l t rat ion f Labour, t mustbe assumedhathost i le ntel l igenceagents i l l inf i i t rateocal abour. t wi l l bedif f icult

or incoming nitsandsecur ity ect ionso dist inguish etweenoyalanddisloyal lements. o reducetheporent ialhreato base nstal lar ions,orts, irports,oads nd ailwaysreliancemustbe placedon goodunit and nstallation ecurityand an efficientlocalvet t ing ystem. hemethod f vef t ingmustbc agreed ith thehostgovernment hosepoliceand security nitsma y be argely esponsibleor itsi m n l e m e n l a f i n . T h or r r rprurrrvr lLolrurr 'rrcSlStemmaynever e oolproof ndmeasures ustbe akento guardvulnerablenstailationsiom tenoristattackand o prevent hc leakase fp lans nd nten t ions .l l so ld ie rs ,spec ia l l ySS roops mploy ing iv i l jans .mustbe carefullybriefedon sccuritymatters;

Protection f Labour.Labourmustbe protectedrom insurgent ttackand

int imidat ion.f theLIN cannot rovide uitable rotect ion,ddit ional ombat nitsmay have o be deployed n an escortandprotection ole;ancl

Instal lat ions.SS nstal lat ions ustbesuitably ited or secur ity nddefence.andeffectiveiyguarded.n thebestcase he HN willprovide protection. this snot possible, xtracombat roopsmay have o be providedbecause SSunitsdono t havesufficientpersonnelo carryout their unctions nd guard hemselvesexceptagainst he ightestof threats.Nevertheless,SS trooDsmustbesuff ic ient iy el l t rained n combat k i l ls o beable o defendthemselves.

PERSONNELECTION :

Moraie

12. Soldiersand heirFamilies.Troopswill often beoperatingn small groups or longper iodsn tryingcondit ions. oldier 'samil iesmaybe woniedby press ov-eragef act ionandcasualtiesn the areaswhere he soldier s stationed.Whenu cu*piign lasts oi a considerabletime, ack of progressmay discourage oldiersand heir families.Thi insurgentsmay rry roaggravate discouraging ituationwith a propaganda ampaign.With or wiihout hostilcpropaganda'umoursspread ndmay be difficult to dispelor refutewhen roopsar edeployed nsmalldetachmentsvera widearea.

l3 Promot ingGoodMorale,Whilemot ivat ing oldiers ith goodandsound easonsbr theArmy's intervent ionnto heCON operat ion nd heneed or cont inued,at ient ommitmentsthe duty of the commander nda functionof leadership t all levels, ertarn thermeasures anbe aken o help maintainmorale. They include:

a. Reliable nformationservices,nternetan dnationalan d ocalnewspapers;

b. A quick and requentmail service o an d ro m home;

c. welfare elephonesnd nternet afes t reasonableates r free:

78



d. Satei i t teelevision nd adio eceivers lusDVD andvideos;

e. Gymnasium quipmentn protected reas hereoutdoor ecreat ions not

feasible:

f. Local leavecentresn secure nd attractive urroundings,f possible n a

temperate limate,andperiodichome eave;and

g. A rapid and efficientsystem ornotifying relatives f deathsand casualties s

they occur.

Medicai

14 . SmallDetachments nd Wide Deployment Providingmedicalsupport or smallan dwidely scatiereO .tu.h.n*tt placesa strainon themedicalservices' he problemcanbe

alleviated y:

a. Refresher raining or all ranks n first aid;

b. Training at leastonememberof isolated etachments n the TCCC course nd

providiig TCCC trainedsoldierswith additionalmedicaisupplies;

b. Providingsufficientcombatmedical echnicians;

c. provision fo r quick casualtyevacuation n all operations,ncludingarmoured

ambulances, ipecially n urbanareas r on routessubject o snipingan d EDs;

d. Using helicopterso evacuate asualties irect o hospital;and

e. Ensuring hat al l ranks eceivea comprehensiveealthbriefingbeforedeploy-

ment.

15 . Acclimatization.Units despatched n operations verseasmust be acclimatizedo the

local conditionsand their workloa-d djustedon initial deployment.Se eLand Forcesustainment

Chapterg fo r the adjustments eededo meetparticular peciaienvironments, uchas ungle an d

desert.

Manning andMiscel laneous

16 . InterpreterSupport. n a theatrewhereEnglish s not the primary anguage,t will be

necessaryo engage nterpreterso communicatewith allied orcesand he civil population.

B8

A n ^ n i O , { d O n n n , { A C



DR-AFT

CHAPTER O

COUNTER-INSURGENCYRAINING

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

I . Training or convent ional arfare rovides sound asis or theconduct f CONoperations.However, n preparationor COIJrl,here s a requirementor additiontraining hat s campaign r mission pecif ic. he t raining ndpreparat ionscross l lranks s as much ntellectual s t is physical.No t only do unitsandsub-units ave oundertake kill training n preparationor th e ikely tactical asks urbanpatrolling,cordonandsearches,ehiclecheckpoints)bu t theyhave o be rained n the principles

unique o coIN, the mportance f the support f thecivilian popuiace nd heimportance f local cultureand socialdynamics.

2. It must be remembcredhat doctrine or COIN operations il l provideguidingprinciplesand methods or the conduct.The mostsuccessful rmies n COIN ooerationshavenot treateddoctrineasdogmabut haveafforded ommandersrustan dconfidenceand reedomof actionwithin the allocatedmission, SoundTTPscanbe dentifiedandpractised rior to any deployment, ut TTPs will changed apidly n a theatreofoperations, s he nsurgents ome o learn he TTPs usedby security orces,and viceversa. Commanders t all levelsmustbe flexibleanddynamicand essonsearned t thelowest evels assed uickly or wider mplementat ion.

SBCTION 2: OPERATIONAL LEVEL, JOINT AND COMBINED TRAININGAND PREPARATIONS

3. The mil i tary s only oneof potent ial lymanyagencieshatwil l be used n theconduct f a COIN. At thcear l iest pportunity, l lagencies, iv i l ianandsecur ityorces,should ome ogethero conduct. iointraining. n some aseshemil i tarymay have otake he ead n the education f agenciesessknowledgeablen th e conductof COIN.This trainingca nbeginwith seminars nd conferencesnd develop o actual ieldexercises. tanding ointsof contactandpositions or liaison eams anbe iclentifiednmuchof this traininq.

4. All security orceelements esignatedor COIN operations houldcome ogether

at the earliest pportunity.Trainingshouldbeginwith seminars ndwargames or Gadersandprogresso tact icai ield exercisesor al l levels.

5. Training n simulated nvironments nd n the field shouidencompassullspectrum perat ions.Hence, TXs should,whenever uitable, nsurehatscenar iosref lect he cont inuum foperat ions nd he equired hangeso forcestructures,act icsand ntel lectual hal lenges.or example, scenar io aybeginwrthentry ntoa majorcombat ampaign nd henprogresso an nsurgencyituat ionhatwil l require greater

t 0 - 1 t 4



,* , Jant

DRAFT

balance etween ffensive, efensive ndstabi l i ty perat ions. his rvi l l orcec o m m a n d e r sn d o l d i e r st a l i e v e l so a d i r r s th e i r l a n s . r d e ' sT T P sa ndm : n d s e t sn

order o re f lec t hescenar io .

6. Trainingwith coalitionpartnerswiLi eadily dentify differencesn approachesandmethodsn a COIN operat ion ndwii l ident i fypotent ialor l ia ison osit ions,

part icular lyn the ear iystages f a campaign.

SECTION 3: LESSONS DEI.{TIFIED DURING CAMPAIGNS

7 It is vital that asactualcampaigns rogress,essonsdentified,often at thecostof

lives,are captured, ssessed y doctrinestaffs,schoolsand rainingsystems, nd are hen

implemented ervasively.This will require ormal and nformal reportingmethods, he

submission f detarled fter-action eports, heir widestdissemination, nd staffvisits ooperational heatres.Formal links between essons-learnedtaffs,doctrinewriters,

trainingauthorities nd rainersneed o be established ndexploited.

SECTION 4: TRAINING PRIOR TO UNDERTAKING COIN OPERATIONS:

8. Training plans n preparation or a COIN operation houldconsider nclusionof

the ol lowins:

a. training n TTPs for COIN operations, ith greatemphasis n the sub-unit

level,probably n a non-contiguous attle-space. he remust be an

emphasis n unior leader raining.Computerbased raining n simulated

environments offers very little benefit for sectionandplatooncommanders. heir skillswill only be truly developedwhen leading heir

subordinateshroughphysicaland ntellectuai hallenges,angingquickiy

across he full spectrumofoperations;

b. instruction n the causes nd conditionsof the nsurgency nd inks to the

motivationsof the non-committed opulace;

c. instruction n the nsurgent perationalechniques,heir TTPs, structures

andequipments. l l forces, art icular lyhose f theechelons, ustbe

madeawareof , and rained n, thepervasive, symmetric hreat hat s

posedby insurgent orces;

d. accl imat isat ionndenvironmentalraining, ef lect ive f theplanned

operat ionalheatre;

e. cultural raining egardinghe ndigenous opulat ionso be encountered,their customs, aws, beliefs,etc, ncluding heir motivations or supporting

or not-support inghe nsurgency;

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special istraining equiredo expandhe orce apabil i t iesn urbano p e r a t i o n s .n r e l l i g e n c ep e r a r i o n s ,S y o p S ,C I M I C , he o ca

language(s),ealth spects,EDsandmines;

thesk i l l s equ i redor HUMNT co l lec t ionhroughramework ar ro l l ing .Soldiers nd heircommanders us tunderstandhe mportant ole ha ttheyplay in gatheringnfonnationan d ntelligenceor the development fTAIs andmeasuresf success;

intensive raining o ensure hysical itness, s roopsacclimatisemorequickly f theyare n goodphysical ondit ion ponarr ival in he heatre

intellectual raining or all ranks o ensure hat heyal l understandheuniqueaspects f a colN campaign,he potentialoperational ndstrategicmpacts

hat ow leveldecisions nd actions anhave,and heneed o influence he will of the Iocalpopulation;

ROE raining;

media raining;

crowd controloperations. he useof cco equipment which cancausedeath f not usedcorrectly)andcco rrps cannotbe earnedn theatre, tthe im e of its employment. t mustbe part of pre-deploymentrg andrefreshedn theatre: nd

J .

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l .

m. training eams rom unitsalready n theatre, everseechnical ssistansevisits (TAVs) or us t retumed rom theatre houldbe used o train on thelocalsituationandup-to-date Tp s and hreats.

SBCTION 5: IN-THEATRE TRAINING

9 When deployedon operations,rainingmustcontinueand commandersmustensure ha t hey aliocateappropriateime,resources nd supervisiono it. Commanciersshouldensure ha tregular efresherrainingof TTPs andequipments conductedntheatre,hroughout he mission. n addition,commanders nditaff shouldconsider hefol lowing:

reconnaissancendadvance art iesmustquicklyassessheoperat ionaland actical situation nd dentifyan y aspectsn training ha t roopsmayh e v e n n t v c t e n r r e r o d n r f h q t . p n l i " o f t r o o t d r - * * l ^ ^ ^ ; ^ t i . t ^ ^ - ^ . 'r r d v e u u r ) c r r u v c l c u u r r r r d , rs r l r r i l cB r t r a r c r m p h a s i s . I f t h g s e r a i n i n grequirementsannot e metpr ior o deployment,hen heymustseektrainingvenues or the units o use ollowing theirarrivalbut prior tooperat ionalommitment. emporary at t le choolsmaybe esiabl ishedythe n theatre orce o provide raining o troops,on new enemyTTps orequipment, hichwasnot avai lablen canada.Staf fplannersmustbalancehe raining eedwith theneed o at east egin o under lake

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tact ical perat ionsn support f thebesieged uthontyanda coaii t ion

commander .

b. commandersmay precedeheirmain bodiesand be attachedo units

aiready.commit tedo operat ions.he essonshey earn an henbe used

to hone inal trainingor guide n-theatreraining,

c. physical i tness raining hould ont inuen theatre;

d. troopsshouldbe givenregular ituationupdatesn termsof the overall

missionandcampaign. hey shouidbe briefedon what measures re

proving successful nd he yshouldbe given eedback s o th eusefulness

of the ntelligence hat heir patrolsar eproviding.This will keep he

troopsmotivatedan d ocused n the success f the mission.

10 . Units engagedn counterinsurgencyperations houldundergo ontinuous

trainingat all levels, o ensure hat basic ndividualandcollectiveskills aremaintainedo

a high tandard. Particularattentionshouldbepaid to th emaintenance f individualskil ls

duringperiodsof low activitY.

SBCTION 6: CONCLUSION

I i. Good tactical raining will prepare oidierswell in the conductof a COIN

operation.At the same ime however,commandersmust ensure hat all ranks,particularly

those n daily contactwith the populace, nderstandhepervasive hreatposedby

insurgents, nd thevital importanceof gainingand holding he supportof th e ocal

populace.

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SUGGESTEDREADNG IN COTNTER-INSURGENCY

1. BardE, O'Neil , 1990, nsurgencyndTerror ism InsideModernRevolut ionaryWarfare, rassey's, ew York.

2. GalulaDavid., 1964,Counterinsurgencylafure; Theoryand practice,NewYork: Praeger.

3. Jul ianPaget. , 967,Counter- lnsurgencyampaigning,FaberndFaber imited,London.

4. Kitson,General ir Frank. ,19J7, Bunch f Five, Faber ndFaber imited,London,

5. Kitson,Frank.,1971,Low Intensityoperarions. subversion,nsurgency,Peacekeeping,ondon: FaberandFaber.Limited, ondon

6. Nagei,JohnA., 2002,counterinsurgency essonsfrom Malaya to vietnam;Learning o Eat soup with a Knife,westport,conn., andLondon:praeger.

counter insurgency operations manual

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