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Action BM0605: Consciousness: A Transdisciplinary, Integrated Approach

First CONFERENCE,Joint Working Groups Meeting& 3rd Management Committee

November 20-21, 2008

Hotel Express Holiday InnAkkerhage 2, 9000 Gent, Belgium

WG1 : Fundamentals: T. Bayne & J.-M. RoyAdvancing our understanding of the concept of consciousness

WG2: Technologies: A.K. Engel & J.-D. Haynes Advancing the technologies and data analysis used to assess brain function

WG3: Paradigms: R. Balas Advancing the behavioural methods used to assess conscious states

WG4: Implications: S. Laureys & K. Vogeley Assessing the ethical and societal implications of neuroscientific findings about

consciousness

Local Organizer

Axel CleeremansConsciousness, Cognition & Computation Group

Université Libre de Bruxelles 50 avenue F.-D. Roosevelt CP 191, 1050 Bruxelles, Belgium

Tel. +32 2 6503296 - Fax. +32 2 6502209 - [email protected]

COST Action BM0605Consciousness: A Transdisciplinary, Integrated Approach

EUROPEAN COOPERATIONIN THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFICAND TECHNICAL RESEARCH

http://www.tsd.be/mario/site3/cl-1.html

mailto:[email protected]







BM0605: Joint WG Meeting & First Conference, Nov 20-21, Ghent (Belgium)— 2

First Scientific Session: Program Overview

THURSDAY 20 NOVEMBER 200809:30 – 18:00

08:30 – 9:00 Welcome & registration

09:00 – 9:30 IntroductionAxel Cleeremans, chair

09:30 – 10:00 Coffee break

10:00 – 12:30 Independent Meetings of WG1-4

WG1 (Fundamentals)WG2 (Technologies)

12:30 – 13:30 Lunch & Poster session

13:30 – 16:00 WG1 (Fundamentals, ctd’)WG3 (Paradigms)WG4 (Implications)


16:30 – 18:30 3rd Management Committee Meeting

18:45 Bus to Ghent Centre

19:00 Evening guided visit of Ghent Centre

20:15 Social Dinner


Second Scientific Session: Program Overview

FRIDAY 21 NOVEMBER 200809:30 – 17:00

09:00 Welcome

09:30 – 10:30 First Keynote Lecture: A neural stance on ConsciousnessVictor Lamme, UvA, The Netherlands


11:00 – 11:30 WG1 (Fundamentals) Plenary PresentationConsciousness as environmental mediationAdrian Cussins, NUC, Colombia

11:30 — 12:00 WG2 (Technologies) Plenary PresentationMeasuring Consciousness: From Behaviour to NeurodynamicsAnil Seth, Sussex, UK

12:30 — 13:00 WG3 (Paradigms) Plenary PresentationVarious unconscious influencesRobert Balas, Poland

12:30 — 13:00 WG4 (Implications) Plenary PresentationClinical and ethicals implications of disorders of consciousnessSteven Laureys, Belgium

13:00 – 14:30 Lunch & Poster Session

14:30 – 15:30 Second Keynote Lecture: Feelings of control: Conscious intention and sense of agency in human volitionPatrick Haggard, Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, U.K.


16:00 – 17:00 Joint discussion & conclusions

19:00 Bus to city centre

19:30 Dinner


First Scientific Session: Working Group Meetings

THURSDAY 20 NOVEMBER 2008

WG1: Fundamentals (J.-M. Roy & T. Bayne)Acting Chairs: R. Chrisley & T. Froese

“Specifying the content of consciousness: Toward a scientific phenomenology”

As with any science, a science of consciousness requires an ability to specify its explananda (facts, events, etc. to be explained) and its explanantia (states, facts, events, properties, laws, etc.) that do the explaining. Conscious states (experiences) may be expected to play both of those roles. A science of consciousness, then, has a double need for a way to specify experiences, and to do so precisely, systematically, canonically and communicably. At least part of what is essential to most, if not all, experiences is their content — the way the experience presents the world as being. This group will discuss the fundamental issue of how the contents of consciousness are to be specified. How can images, virtual reality systems, new elicitation methods, art works, novel uses of language, technologies, et al, be used in a systematic way so as to enable a scientific study of consciousness?

10:00 — 10:30 Specifying the content of consciousness: Toward a scientific phenomenologyR. ChrisleyCentre for Research in Cognitive Science (COGS), Dep. of Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK. Tel: +44 (0) 1273 678581 or +44 (0) 1273 678195, Fax: +44 (0) 1273 877873, E-mail: [email protected]

10:30 — 11:30 Title TBAA. CussinsDep. de Filosofia, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia. Tel: +57 (1) 316 5000 Ext. 16872, E-mail: [email protected]

11:30 — 12:00 Pain and contentE. MyinDept. Wijsbegeerte, Universiteit Antwerpen, Antwerpen, Belgium. Tel: +32 (0) 32204337, Fax: +32 (0) 32204420, E-mail: [email protected]

12:00 — 12:30 Images are not words, and there is a Cartesian theaterM. StamenovBulgarian Academy of Sciences, Bulgary, [email protected]

12:30 — 13:30 Lunch & Poster Session

13:30 — 14:30 Title TBA B. SmithSchool of Philosophy, Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK. Tel: +44 (0) 20 7631 6383, Fax: +44 (0) 20 7631 6564, E-mail: [email protected]

14:30 — 15:00 Discussion

15:00 — 15:30 The enactive torch: A technological bridge between eidetic and empirical psychology


T. FroeseCentre for Research in Cognitive Science (COGS), Dep. of Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK. Tel: +44 (0) 1273 872948, Fax: +44 (0) 1273 877873, E-mail: [email protected]

15:30 — 16:00 Consciousness, Imagery and Music W. DuchDepartment of Informatics, Nicolaus Copernicus University, Toruń, Poland. Tel: +48 56 622 1543, Fax: +48 56 622 1543, E-mail: [email protected]




WG2: Technologies (A.K. Engel & J.-D. Haynes)Acting Chair: A.K. Engel

“Dynamics of Consciousness”

The group will discuss how the spatiotemporal dynamics of neural populations and, specifically, large-scale interactions among brain areas are modified during changes of states or contents of consciousness. The discussion will also address the methodologies needed to uncover the dynamics of networks involved in the generation of conscious states, using noninvasive methods in humans and multisite recordings in non-human primates.

10:00 — 10:25 Local gamma dynamics and visual awarenessC. Tallon-BaudryCNRS LENA UPR640, 47 Bd de l'Hopital, 75651 Paris cedex 13, FRANCE, tel +33 142 161163, fax: +33 145 862537, email: [email protected]

10:25 — 10:50 The gamma-band on BrainTV

J.-P. LachauxINSERM U821, Brain Dynamics and Cognition, 69675 Bron Cedex, FRANCE, tel: +33 4 7213 8913, fax : +33 4 7213 8901, email: [email protected]

10:50 — 11:15 The estimation of cortical activity and connectivity from high resolution EEG recordings F. BabiloniDept. Physiology and Pharmacology, Univ. "Sapienza" Rome, Italy, tel: +39 328 7697914, fax: +39 06 51501467, email: [email protected]

11:15 — 11:40 To do or not to do: The functional neuroanatomy of intending to do something or not M. BrassDept. of Experimental Psychology. Ghent University, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent, BELGIUM, tel: +32 92646401, fax: +32 92646496, email: [email protected]

11:40 — 12:05 Cortical neurodynamics estimation: MEG simulation and empirical studiesS. SupekDept. of Physics, Faculty of Science, Bijenicka cesta 32, 10 000 Zagreb, CROATIA, tel: +385 1 4605569, fax: +385 1 4680336, email: [email protected]

12:05 — 12:30 (Un)consciousness through coherence A.K. EngelDept. of Neurophysiology and Pathophysiology, University Medical Center Hamburg- Eppendorf, Martinistr. 52, 20246 Hamburg, GERMANY, tel: +49 40 42803 6170, fax: +49 40 42803 7752, email: [email protected]





WG3: Paradigms (R. Balas)“Various manifestations of unconscious influences”

This group will discuss various influences of unconsciously processed information on explicit judgments. With special focus on methods used to assess awareness the topics covered will include implicit learning, evaluative condtioning, priming as well as neural bases of consciousness.

13:30 — 13:55 TMS in disorders of consciousness N. LapitskayaComa Science Group, Cyclotron Research Centre/University of Liège, Belgium and Hammel Neurorehabilitation and Research Centre/University of Aarhus, Denmark, Allée du 6 août n° 8, Sart Tilman B30, 4000 Liège, Belgium, tel.: +32 4 366 23 16 or 36 87 or 85 55, email: [email protected]

13:55 — 14:20 The discrepancy between audiovisual temporal order and simultaneity judgements. A research proposal M. BinderInstitute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, al. Mickiewicza 3, 31-130, Krakow, Poland, tel:+48 12 663 24 59, fax: +48 12 663 24 60, email; [email protected]

14:20 — 14:45 How to know the content of non-reportable consciousness V. LammeCognitive Neuroscience Group, University of Amsterdam, Room A626 Dept. of Psychology, Roeterstraat 15, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Tel: +31 20 5256675, fax: +31 20 6391656, email: [email protected]

14:45 — 15:10 Intuition: How unconscious roots bear conscious fruits S. TopolinskyDepartment of Psychology II, University Wuerzburg, Roentgenring 10, 97070 Wuerzburg, Germany, tel:+49 (0) 931 312285, fax: +49 (0) 931 312812, email: [email protected]

15:10 — 15:35 The feeling of warmth scale, post-decision wagering and confidence ratings as a measure of knowledge access in artificial grammar learning task M. WierzchonInstitute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, al. Mickiewicza 3, 31-130, Krakow, Poland, tel: 48 692 438 841, fax: 48 12 623 76 99, email: [email protected]

15:35 — 16:00 Conflict adaptation effects in implicit sequence learningL. JiménezDepartment of Psychology, University Santiago de Compostela, Campus Sur, Santiago de Compostela, Spain, tel.: +34 981 56 3100 Ext 13914 , fax.: +34 981 528072, email: [email protected]




WG4: Implications (S. Laureys & K. Vogeley)“Clinical, societal and ethical implications of disturbed consciousness”

The study of consciousness raises substantial clinical, societal, and ethical implications. We here focus on the study of altered states of consciousness, to consciousness in pathological cases (such as vegetative state), to the design of new ways to study resting state activity, and to a consideration of the ethical and societal implications of the findings. Consciousness research is especially interesting with respect to so-called altered states of consciousness, which provide another important window to the contents of subjectively experienced conscious states. These comprise disturbances of the level of consciousness (e.g.sleep, anesthesia, vegetative state, coma) or of the content of consciousness (e.g. hallucinatory or illusory experiences).

13:30 — 13:55 Imaging the Brain at restS. RomboutsLeiden Institute for Brain and Cognition, Postzone CS-2, P.O. Box 9600, 2300 RC Leiden, The Netherlands. tel: +31 71 5264404, fax: +32 71 5248256, email: [email protected]

13:55 — 14:20 A Perturb-and-Measure Approach to study Consciousness M. MassiminiUniversita degli Studi di Milano, Milano, Italy. email: [email protected]

14:20 — 14:45 Clinical and ethical challenges for brain-computer interfaces A. KüblerDepartment of Psychology I, University of Würzburg, Marcusstrasse 9-11, 97070 Würzburg, Germany. tel: +49 931 31 2836, fax: +49 931 31 2831, email: [email protected].

14:45 — 15:10 Clinical and ethical challenges for artificial manipulation of of consciousness: Deep Brain StimulationD. De RidderFaculteit Geneeskunde, Vg. Neurowetenschappen, Universiteit Antwerpen, Universiteitsplein 1, 2610 Antwerpen, België. tel: +32 3 821 45 40, email: [email protected]

15:10 — 15:35 Social Cognition and the default mode of the brainK. VogeleyKlinikum der Universität zu Köln, Kerpener Str. 62, 50924 Köln, Germany, tel: +49 221 478 87155, fax: +49 221 478 3738, email: [email protected]

15:35 — 16:00 How conscious is the resting state? M. BolyComa Science Group, Cyclotron Research Centre, University of Liège, Sart-Tilman-B30, 4000 Liège, Belgium, tel: +32 4 366 23 16, fax: +32 4 366 29 46, email: [email protected]


Poster Presentations

THURSDAY 20 NOVEMBER 2008 — 12:30-13:30FRIDAY 21 NOVEMBER 2008 — 13:00-14:30

WG1 (Fundamentals)

- No posters presented in this WG -

WG2 (Technologies)

P2-1 Occipital gamma power and visual maskingTalis BachmannUniversity of Tartu, Tallinn, ESTONIA

P2-2 Functional connectivity in the resting state default network reflects the level of consciousness in brain-injured patients: an fMRI study in brain death, comatose, vegetative, minimally conscious and locked-in states M. Boly1,2, A. Vanhaudenhuyse1, L. Tshibanda3, M-A. Bruno1, P. Boveroux1,4, Q. Noirhomme1, C. Schnakers1, A. Demertzi1, D. Ledoux1,4, B. Lambermont5, G. Moonen2, R-F. Dondelinger3, C. Phillips1, P. Maquet1,2, S. Laureys1,2

1Cyclotron Research Center, 2Neurology Department, 3Radiology Department, 4Anesthesiology Department, 5Internal Medicine Department, University of Liège, BELGIUM

P2-3 The study of attention in adults using event related EEG componentsSilvana Markovska-Simoska1, Nadja Meier2

1Bioinformatics Unit, ICEIM-Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts, MACEDONIA; 2Brain and Trauma Foundation Grison Switzerland, University of Berne, SWITZERLAND

P2-4 Searching for behavioral signs of consciousness: a study on blinking to visual threatA. Vanhaudenhuyse 1, J. Giacino 2, C. Schnakers 1, K. Kalmar 2, C. Smart 2, M-A Bruno 1, O. Gosseries 1, G. Moonen1, S. Laureys 1

1Cyclotron Research Centre & Neurology Dept, University of Liège, BELGIUM; 2JFK Johnson Rehabilitation Institute, New Jersey, USA

WG3 (Paradigms)

P3-1 The cerebellar electrocortical activity in wakefulnessJ. Podgorac, Lj. Martac, G. Grbic, M. Culic, G. Kekovic, S. Sekulic*Institute for Biological Research “Sinisa Stankovic”, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, *Medical Faculty, University of Novi Sad, Novi Sad, Serbia

P3-2 Unconscious rule applicationFilip Van Opstal, Wim Gevers, Magda Osman, Tom Verguts, ULB, Belgium

P3-3 Contingent negative variation – an electrophysiological parameter of learning in subjects with high anxiety


Sanja Mancevska, Liljana Bozinovska, Adrijan Bozinovski1, Department of Physiology, Medical Faculty, University "Ss.Cyril and Methodius", Skopje, 1 American College, Skopje

P3-4 What the recovery of structure-from-motion can tell about the adaptive brain: cue combination and sensory conflictNadeja Bocheva, Institute of Neurobiology, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia, Bulgaria

WG4 (Implications)

P4-1 Dissociating Neural Correlates of Detection and Evaluation of Social Gaze. A. Georgescua, B. Kuzmanovica, , S. Eickhoffb,c, N. J. Shahb,d, G. Bentee, G. R. Finkb,d,f, K.Vogeleya,d

aDepartment of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, University Hospital ColognebInstitute of Neurosciences and Biophysics — Medicine (INB3), Research Center JuelichcDepartment of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, University Hospital AachendBrain Imaging Center West, Research Center JuelicheDepartment of Psychology, University of ColognefDepartment of Neurology, University Hospital Cologne

P4-2 Vegetative and the minimally conscious state: Ethical considerationsAthena Demertzi, Cyclotron Research Centre, University of Liège, Belgium


Abstracts

Keynote Lectures

K1A neural stance on ConsciousnessV.A.F. LammeCognitive Neuroscience Group, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Behavior is considered the gold standard of consciousness: when someone says he is conscious, he is, and when he says not, he isn?t. However, this makes it impossible to find the neural mechanism of conscious experience per se. We will always conflate consciousness with cognition. Therefore, arguments from neuroscience should be allowed to shape a definition of consciousness, together with, yet in some cases overruling behavioral evidence. I will show how such a neuro-behavioral definition of consciousness makes it possible to dissociate consciousness from cognition, explains the key features of conscious experience, and opens up a path towards solving the hard problem.

K2Feelings of control: Conscious intention and sense of agency in human volitionPatrick HaggardInstitute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, U.K.

The capacity for voluntary action is seen as essential to human nature. Yet neuroscience and behaviourist psychology have traditionally dismissed the topic as unscientific, perhaps because the mechanisms that cause actions are unclear. New research has identified networks of brain areas, including the preSMA, the anterior prefrontal cortex and the parietal cortex, that underlie voluntary action. These areas generate information for forthcoming actions, and also cause the distinctive conscious experience of intending and controlling one's own actions. Volition consists of a series of decisions regarding whether to act, what action to perform and when to perform it. Neuroscientific accounts of voluntary action may inform debates about the nature of individual responsibility.


WG1 (Fundamentals)

ORAL PRESENTATIONS

T1-1 Specifying the content of consciousness: Toward a scientific phenomenologyRon Chrisley Centre for Research in Cognitive Science (COGS), Dep. of Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK. Tel: +44 (0) 1273 678581 or +44 (0) 1273 678195, Fax: +44 (0) 1273 877873, E-mail: [email protected]

The central themes of the workshop are introduced. After motivating the requirement, in a science of consciousness, for a means of specifying the content of particular experiences, standard ways of doing so, and their limitations, are examined. In particular, the inability for conceptual, linguistic specifications, such as "that"-clauses, to capture the non-conceptual content of experience are reviewed. Alternative means of specifying the content of experience are considered and evaluated with respect to several criteria, including precision, communicability, objectivity, and projectability.

T1-2Title TBAA. CussinsDep. de Filosofia, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia. Tel: +57 (1) 316 5000 Ext. 16872, E-mail: [email protected]

-abstract forthcoming –

T1-3Pain and contentErik MyinDept. Wijsbegeerte, Universiteit Antwerpen, Antwerpen, Belgium. Tel: +32 (0) 32204337, Fax: +32 (0) 32204420, E-mail: [email protected]

Can the conscious experience of pain be understood by a specification of its alleged content? According philosophers who subscribe to intentionalism, it can. These philosophers think the qualititative feel of pain is identical to what is represented by states of pain. Two recent intentionalist proposals for the specification of the content of pain exist: one according to which pain is mainly about the registration of internal damage, another according to which the content of pain is imperative rather than descriptive. Relying both on data and theory in current pain research and on philosophical argument, it will be shown that neither intentionalist option works. Both intensionalist approaches fail to do proper justice to the fact that pain has an anticipatory function: it often functions to avoid initial damage, rather than that it has a purely registrational or restorative function. Another major stumbling block is that the affective-motivational aspect of pain, acknowledged in most current pain theories as an essential factor besides a sensory-discriminative aspect, resists any analysis in terms of content, be it registrational or imperative. From this case study of intentionalism and


pain, the conclusion will be drawn that explanatory role of the notion of content in any theory of experience will be much more limited than theorists of intentionalist stripe have hoped for. This should be not seen as problematic, however, because, so it will be argued, the case of pain indicates that a theory of conscious experience should be descriptive rather explanatory.

T1-4Images are not words and there is a Cartesian theatreMax StamenovBulgarian Academy of Sciences, Bulgary, [email protected]

The most popular folk model of the way we ‘have’ mental contents is along the lines of a Cartesian theatre. Philosophers of mind have presented barrages of arguments against it, esp. after the appearance of Dennett (1991). These arguments are based on a certain set of (mis)conceptions what this model is supposed to represent and in what way(s). The first problem with the Cartesian theatre is that it represents on a par with each other (in a single image) both the subject and object of consciousness. The second problem with it is that it implies that the object of consciousness (the explicit mental content) has structure symmetric to that of a sentence describing it. The third problem is related to the way of mapping of the structure of consciousness to that of a sentence with embedded (via recursion) that-sentence in a report about it, etc. If the Cartesian theatre has many flaws, why is it proposed here as a model of consciousness with potential heuristic value? The point of this paper is that the structure of consciousness, the structure of the explicit mental content and the structure of language must not and do not coincide. The best way to show and appreciate the similarities and differences between them is a model along the lines of a Cartesian theatre.

T1-5Title TBABarry SmithSchool of Philosophy, Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK. Tel: +44 (0) 20 7631 6383, Fax: +44 (0) 20 7631 6564, E-mail: [email protected]

-abstract forthcoming –

T1-6The Enactive Torch: A technological bridge between eidetic and empirical psychologyT. Froese Centre for Research in Cognitive Science (COGS), Dep. of Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK. Tel: +44 (0) 1273 872948, Fax: +44 (0) 1273 877873, E-mail: [email protected]

The method of eidetic intuition (Wesenschau) was an important aspect of the early phenomenology of Husserl. However, the essences which are intuited in this manner, namely by a kind of imaginative ‘free variation’, are not only difficult to obtain in practice, but also necessarily limited by our imagination in principle. Moreover, such ideal essences have little implication for developing our understanding of the


circumstances related to our factual existence in the world. Thus, as the phenomenological tradition developed further, especially in terms of recognizing the importance of embodiment and situatedness, it became crucial to develop a methodology that was more adequate to the concreteness of actual existence. One popular approach, pioneered by Merleau-Ponty and continued by others today, is to turn to empirical psychology in order to analyze case studies of pathological conditions. These represent a kind of ‘factual variation’ of human existence which can help us to determine essential aspects of consciousness that would be difficult (if not impossible) to simply intuit imaginatively. However, this methodology also poses significant difficulties to the phenomenological tradition, especially in terms of its inherent lack of researchers’ first-person access to the phenomena in question, and thus the impossibility of proper intersubjective verification. Here we propose that certain technological interfaces, such as the Enactive Torch (Froese & Spiers 2007), can provide a way forward by enabling a systematic variation of (perceptual) lived experience that can potentially be available on a first-person basis for all interested researchers. Moreover, it points to a way of capturing experience by means of a practice based in sharing technology rather than linguistic specification.Froese, T. & Spiers, A. (2007), “Toward a Phenomenological Pragmatics of Enactive Perception”, Proc. of the 4th Int. Conf. on Enactive Interfaces, Grenoble, France: Association ACROE, pp. 105-108

T1-7Consciousness, Imagery and MusicW. Duch Department of Informatics, Nicolaus Copernicus University, Toruń, Poland. Tel: +48 56 622 1543, Fax: +48 56 622 1543, E-mail: [email protected]

One of the key aspects of high musical or artistic talent is the ability to hear or see imagined tunes or visual object with the "mind's eye". The Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) [1] measures such ability, but its auditory analogue has not been developed. Statistics on how many people are non-imagers is still controversial as most people rely on Galton's 1880 paper [2]! Experiments that search for neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) [3] need to take the results of such tests into account, as it is quite likely that people with vivid visual or auditory imagination will show correlations between conscious perception and neural activity also in their primary sensory cortices, while people that lack such imagination will not show any correlations.The inability to consciously imagine pitch and timbre of sounds is reflected in the Evoked Response Potentials (ERPs) in the auditory cortex [4]. Although it may be connected to associative auditory agnosia [5], it is more likely that it is due to a simple lack of sufficiently strong feedback connections leading from associative cortices responsible for memory and imagery to the auditory cortex. This seems to be a new form of amusia that may be called "imagery amusia". Cognitive model of musical processing ignores the feedback from associative memory to the sensory cortices [6].Learning to play music is difficult for people with imagery amusia. Although consciously they may not know what sound will be produced by pressing a particular key, they can correctly recognize wrong notes, as if they had good musical recognition memory, but no recall memory. Moreover, the inability to repeat simple melody without many trials to find correct notes does not prevent some of them to create interesting improvisations, indicating that recall memory and plans for sequences of actions to produce a melody are correctly formed in their brains. Without internal feedback the only way to learn about these plans is to produce music and hear it. Thus people with imagery amusia are not much more privileged to have conscious insight into their own brains then


external observers. Perhaps this situation happens more often than we are willing to admit, with a whole range of problems related to the inability of consciously interpreting our own brain states, and the need to express and recognize them through bodily actions. Better understanding of these issues will have far reaching implications for education, assessment of talent, and correlation of brain activity with conscious experiences.

[1] Marks, D.F. (1995). New directions for mental imagery research. Journal of Mental Imagery, 19, 153-167[2] Galton, F. (1880). Statistics of Mental Imagery. Mind, 5, 301-318[3] Metzinger, T. (Ed.) (2000). The Neural Correlates of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.[4] Janata, P. (2001). Brain electrical activity evoked by mental formation of auditory expectations and images, Brain Topography, 13(3), 169-193[5] Stewart, L., Von Kriegstein, K., Warren, D.J., Griffiths, D.T. (2006). Music and the brain: disorders of musical listening, Brain, 129, 2533-2553[6] Peretz, I., Champod, S. & Hyde, K. (2003). Varieties of Musical Disorders: The Montreal Battery of Evaluation of Amusia. Annals New York Academy of Sciences, 999, 58-75


WG2 (Technologies)

ORAL PRESENTATIONS

T2-1Local gamma dynamics and visual awarenessCatherine Tallon-BaudryCNRS LENA UPR640, 47 Bd de l'Hopital, 75651 Paris cedex 13, FRANCE, tel +33 142 161163, fax: +33 145 862537, email: [email protected]

- Abstract not yet available -

T2-2The gamma band on BrainTVJean Philipe LachauxINSERM U821, Brain Dynamics and Cognition, 69675 Bron Cedex, FRANCE, tel: +33 4 7213 8913, fax : +33 4 7213 8901, email: [email protected]

This presentation will be an opportunity to show latest results and developments of human intra-cerebral encephalography in relation to consciousness research. There will be a discussion on the functional role of high-frequency neural activity (gamma-band activity, above 40 Hz) and its possible importance for the emergence of conscious experience. We will also introduce a novel approach, called BrainTV, that allows immediate display of gamma band fluctuations in real-time, as subjects go by their daily activity. We will argue that this system provides a convenient way to fusion first-person (subjective experience) and third-person (brain activity) perspectives to push further the neuroscience of consciousness.

T2-3The estimation of cortical activity and connectivity from high resolution EEG recordingsFabio BabiloniDept. Physiology and Pharmacology, Univ. "Sapienza" Rome, Italy, tel: +39-328-7697914, fax: +39-06-51501467, email: [email protected]

Different functional connectivity methods for the estimation of cortical connectivity from neuroelectric and hemodynamic measurements have been applied on common data set in order to highlight similarities and differences in the obtained results. Such methods include Directed Transfer Function (DTF), Partial Directed Coherence (PDC) and direct Directed Transfer Function (dDTF). Comparisons will be made between these estimators in order to understand if, for a same dataset, functional connectivity estimators could return the same cortical connectivity patterns. In addition, connectivity patterns estimated with the use of only the neuroelectric information or the information from the multimodal integration of neuroelectric and hemodynamic data were compared. Results suggests that the estimation of the cortical connectivity patterns performed with the employed methods (DTF, PDC, dDTF) returned essentially the


same information. Light differences in cortical connectivity between the patterns estimated with the use of multimodal integration were noted when compared to those estimated by using only the neuroelectric data.

T2-4To do or not to do: the functional neuroanatomy of intending to do something or notMarcel Brass Dept. of Experimental Psychology. Ghent University, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent, BELGIUM, tel: +32 92646401, fax: +32 92646496, email: [email protected]

The question how we can intentionally control our behaviour has an enduring fascination for researchers from philosophy, psychology and neuroscience. Recently, brain imaging techniques have provided new insights into the functional and brain mechanisms involved in intentional action. However, the literature is rather contradictory and does not reveal a consistent picture of the functional neuroanatomy of intentional action. Furthermore, an important aspect of intentional action has been so far widely neglected, namely the decision whether to act or not. This decision process is crucial for the intentional control of our behaviour because it allows us to form intentions without necessarily implementing them. I will propose a heuristic model that distinguishes different components of intentional action. Furthermore, I will present some recent research on the intentional decision to withhold an ongoing action.

T2-5Cortical neurodynamics estimation: MEG simulation and empirical studiesSelma SupekDept. of Physics, Faculty of Science, Bijenicka cesta 32, 10 000 Zagreb, CROATIA, tel: +385 1 4605569, fax: +385 1 4680336, email: [email protected]

Neuromagnetic recordings provide a real time extracranial measure of neuronal activity. Cortical neurodynamics estimation, however, requires modeling approaches and, as it has been shown by our previous simulation studies, was found to be critically dependent on the location estimation accuracy and the use of an efficient global minimizer. We will present numerical simulations using a semi-automated Calibrated Start Spatio-Temporal (CSST) algorithm assuming up to 7 focal and/or extended cortical sources exploring neurodynamics estimation accuracy and strategies to optimize it. Our latest empirical MEG results using multi-start CSST spatio-temporal localization indicated a distributed cortical network involved in face processing that was face stimulus features and task dependent with a pronounced intersubject variability.

T2-6(Un-)Consciousness through CoherenceAndreas K. EngelDept. of Neurophysiology and Pathophysiology, University Medical Center Hamburg- Eppendorf, Martinistr. 52, 20246 Hamburg, GERMANY, tel: +49 40 42803 6170, fax: +49 40 42803 7752, email: [email protected]



It has been proposed that synchronization of neural signals may be involved in several processes indispensable for awareness, including arousal, perceptual integration, attentional selection, and working memory. Indeed, recent evidence from both animal and human studies demonstrates specific changes in neuronal coherence and, moreover, the emergence of fast oscillations with frequencies in the gamma-range during these processes. These results suggest that assessing neuronal coherence may be of critical importance for “measuring consciousness”. The presentation will focus on changes of coherence under anesthesia and in bistable stimulus paradigms. While the former suggests that neural coherence may provide an important variable for measuring changes in levels of consciousness, the latter indicates that it may also be useful for predicting changes in the contents of conscious states.

WG2 (Technologies)

POSTERS

P2-1Occipital gamma power and visual maskingTalis BachmannUniversity of Tartu, Kaarli puiestee 3, Tallinn, ESTONIA, tel: +372 6271891, fax: +372 6271889, email: [email protected]

Low-level visual discrimination was tested in two masking experiments online with EEG recording. Time-frequency functions of gamma band activity recorded from occipital electrodes were found for correct/aware trials as contrasted with correct/unaware trials. Target awareness in shine-through masking with extremely short target-mask SOA was associated with enhanced peristimulus (including prestimulus) gamma power. Target awareness in standard metacontrast masking with an intermediate SOA was associated with decrease in gamma power at the post-stimulus delays compatible with mask-signals arrival to cortex. Results can be interpreted in terms of different roles gamma-activity plays depending on differences in spatiotemporal setup of target and mask stimuli; results are also compatible with masking theories assuming substitution of target by mask in visual awareness – either by reentrant intracortical operations or by thalamocortical temporally delayed modulation.

P2-2Functional connectivity in the resting state default network reflects the level of consciousness in brain-injured patients: an fMRI study in brain death, comatose, vegetative, minimally conscious and locked-in states M. Boly1,2, A. Vanhaudenhuyse1, L. Tshibanda3, M-A. Bruno1, P. Boveroux1,4, Q. Noirhomme1, C. Schnakers1, A. Demertzi1, D. Ledoux1,4, B. Lambermont5, G. Moonen2, R-F. Dondelinger3, C. Phillips1, P. Maquet1,2, S. Laureys1,2

1 Coma Science Group, Cyclotron Research Center, University of Liège, Liège, (Belgium); 2 Neurology Department, CHU Sart Tilman Hospital, University of Liège, Liège, (Belgium); 3 Radiology Department, CHU Sart Tilman Hospital, University of Liège, Liège, (Belgium); 4 Anesthesiology Department, CHU Sart Tilman Hospital, University of Liège, Liège, (Belgium); 5 Internal Medicine Department, CHU Sart Tilman Hospital, University of Liège, Liège, (Belgium)


Address of first author: Coma Science Group, Cyclotron Research Center, Sart-Tilman, B30, Liège, BELGIUM, tel: +32 4 366 23 62, fax: +32 4 366 29 46, [email protected]

OBJECTIVES: Test if the integrity of resting-state connectivity in the default resting state network would differ in different pathological alterations of consciousness. BACKGROUND: The ‘default network’ is defined as a set of areas, encompassing posterior-cingulate/precuneus, anterior cingulate/mesiofrontal cortex and temporoparietal junctions, showing more activity at rest than during attention-demanding tasks. This network has been involved in higher cognitive functions. Studies have shown that it is possible to reliably identify this network in healthy volunteers in the absence of any task, by resting state connectivity analyses. Thirteen acutely brain damaged patients in brain death (BD; n=1), coma (5), vegetative state (VS; 3), minimally conscious state (MCS; 3) and locked-in syndrome (LIS; 1) and 12 healthy controls were included. For each subject, a 10 minutes resting-state fMRI acquisition was performed. Data were analysed using independent component analysis and statistical parametric mapping. A goodness-of-fit analysis compared individual patients’ maps with the control group’s default network. RESULTS: Mean goodness-of-fit scores for individual default network components were respectively 1.25 for controls, 1.22 for LIS, 1.15 for MCS patients, 0.79 for VS and 0.77 for coma. In the BD patient, no cortical spatial map could be identified. Significantly less connectivity was observed within all areas of the default network for coma and VS patients as compared to controls. LIS and MCS patients were not significantly different from controls. All default network areas connectivity were shown to be linearly correlated with the degree of consciousness impairment (as reflected by Coma Recovery Scores) of the patients. CONCLUSION: Our data show that fMRI default network connectivity is decreased in brain-damaged patients, in linear proportion to their degree of consciousness impairment.

P2-3The study of attention in adults using event related EEG componentsSilvana Markovska-Simoska1, Nadja Meier2

1 Bioinformatics Unit, ICEIM-Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts, MACEDONIA; 2 Brain and Trauma Foundation Grison Switzerland, University of Berne, SWITZERLAND

The attention can be determined as a selection operation, aimed at processing the relevant sensory information more accurately. Using ERP method, it is possible to separate stages of these processing and to show how they are modulated by attention. The aim of this work is to present the influence of visual and emotional stimuli on attention, analyzing the behavioral parameters and event related EEG components. The sample consisted of 80 adults (50 normal and 30 with attention deficit-ADHD). The neuropsychological testing was completed using Amsterdam Neuropsychological Testing battery (ANT; De Sonneville) and CogMed working memory testing tool (Klingberg). For the neurophysiological testing Psytask administered visual and emotional continuous performance tasks (VCPT and ECPT) were used. Comparing the performances between the two CPT’s it is found that there is significantly poorer performance (more omission and commission errors, longer reaction time and higher variation of reaction time) in ECPT than in VCPT in both groups, which could be explained by influence of emotional stimuli on attention and information processing. Also, smaller P400 NoGo amplitude in ECPT in ADHD than in controls showed emotionally induced impaired “selfmonitoring” in ADHD.


P2-4Searching for behavioral signs of consciousness: a study on blinking to visual threatA. Vanhaudenhuyse 1, J. Giacino 2, C. Schnakers 1, K. Kalmar 2, C. Smart 2, M-A Bruno 1, O. Gosseries 1, G. Moonen1, S. Laureys 1

1 Coma Science Group, Cyclotron Research Centre & Neurology Dept, University of Liège, Liège, BELGIUM; 2 JFK Johnson Rehabilitation Institute, New Jersey, USA Address of first author: Coma Science Group, Cyclotron Research Center, Sart-Tilman, B30, Liège, BELGIUM, tel: +32 4 366 23 62, fax: +32 4 366 29 46, [email protected]

OBJECTIVES: Determine if blink to visual threat is a sign of consciousness. BACKGROUND: At present, there is no consensus on whether blinking to visual threat heralds consciousness (i.e., is incompatible with the diagnosis of the vegetative state - VS) or is a purely automatic reflex. The aim of our study was to test how frequent blinking to visual threat is observed in VS patients and to evaluate its prognostic value. We studied 91 VS patients who were evaluated using the Coma Recovery Scale Revised (60 in New Jersey and 31 in Liège; mean age was 43±20 years SD). Etiology was traumatic in 41 and non-traumatic in 50 patients (i.e., anoxic encephalopathy (n=27), ischemic or hemorrhagic stroke (n=12), metabolic encephalopathy (n=8), and tumor (n=3)). Nineteen patients were studied in the acute (mean interval 15±6 days post-insult), and 72 in chronic setting (3±5 months post-insult). Blink to visual threat was defined as a blink following presentation of visual threat on at least 2 trials with either eye. Outcome at one year for traumatic and three months for non-traumatic cases was assessed using the Glasgow Outcome Scale. RESULTS: Forty-six out of the 91 patients showed blink to visual threat: 9 died (2 traumatic), 20 remained in VS (8 traumatic) and 17 emerged from their VS (10 traumatic). Out of the other 45 patients, 6 died (1 traumatic), 28 remained in VS (13 traumatic) and 11 emerged from their VS (7 traumatic). CONCLUSION: Blinking to visual threat is not at all exceptional in vegetative patients. Moreover, its presence does not foretell consciousness nor recovery of consciousness in severely brain-injured patients.


WG3 (Paradigms)

ORAL PRESENTATIONS

T3-1Transcranial magnetic stimulation in disorders of consciousnessN. LapitskayaComa Science Group, Cyclotron Research Centre/University of Liège, Belgium and Hammel Neurorehabilitation and Research, Centre/University of Aarhus, Denmark

Background: Transcranial magnetic stimulation using paired-pulse technique allows to study the excitatory and inhibitory system of human motor cortex non-invasively. Previous studies suggest that a degree of functional integrity of the corticospinal pathways is present in a number of post-coma patients who suffered severe brain injury, even in those who are judged clinically to be in a non-responsive state. However, it remains unclear whether cortical excitability could be correlated to the level of consciousness and the degree of the underlying structural damage in patients with severe brain injury. Aim: In our study, we compare electrophysiological data with structural evaluation of the underlying brain tissue in patients with impaired consciousness due to severe brain injury. We hypothesize that there is a continuous decrease in intracortical and intrahemispheric inhibition from healthy subjects to minimally conscious patients, and to vegetative patients. Methods: We investigate cortical excitability in patients in minimally conscious and vegetative state due to severe brain injury. Three paired-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation paradigms are performed over the motor cortex in order to investigate: (1) cortical inhibition and facilitation (conditioning and test magnetic stimuli are applied to the motor cortex with different interstimuli delays); (2) short latency afferent inhibition (conditional electrical stimulus is applied to the periphery nerve and test magnetic stimulus is applied to the contralateral motor cortex); (3) transcallosal inhibition (conditioning and test magnetic stimuli are applied to the different cerebral hemispheres). Results: The preliminary results on transcranial magnetic stimulation in patients with disorders of consciousness will be presented at the meeting.

T3-2The discrepancy between audiovisual temporal order and simultaneity judgements. A research proposal.M. BinderInstitute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland

The psychophysical measure of the perception of simultaneity - the point of subjective simultaneity (PSS) - can be derived from simultaneity judgments (SJ) or temporal order judgments (TOJ). In audiovisual version of these tasks subjects usually hear pairs of clicks and flashes with varying intervals between them. During SJ subjects are required to report whether the pairs are “synchronous” or “asynchronous”, while during TOJ they decide which of the stimuli was perceived as first (e.g. “light first” or “sound first”). While results of research on SJ usually show that in order to be perceived as simultaneous, the light stimulus has to lead the audio stimulus, the estimates of subjective simultaneity for audiovisual TOJ tasks give much more varied results. Some


researchers explain these differences by suggesting that both procedures engage different sets of cognitive operations. The aim of this research project is to verify this assumption by measuring neural activity associated with both tasks. It will involve analysis of the EEG event-related potentials recorded during administration of SJ and TOJ tasks. Data provided by this technique can point at the probable cognitive mechanisms engaged in both tasks as well as their neural correlates. Since perception of successiveness and temporal order of events are among main temporal aspects of conscious activity, the results of this research can also provide insights for the study of the neural correlates of consciousness.

T3-3How to know the content of non-reportable consciousnessV.A.F. Lamme, Cognitive Neuroscience Group, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Some make a distinction between so called phenomenal (P-) and Access (A-) consciousness. The latter is easy to probe, it is what you can report about at will via language or button presses etc. But how to probe P-consciousness, which is a stage that by definition precedes access and reportability? We have studied A- and P-consciousness by looking at what remains of it once the stimulus is removed. A-consciousness then converts to working memory, while P-consciousness converts to iconic - or maybe better called phenomenal – memory. Phenomenal memory thus forms an ideal window on a stage that is otherwise not accessible. Since the sheer existence of P-consciousness is highly debated, a fruitful research agenda would be to verify whether P-consciousness shares sufficient properties with A-consciousness to grant it true phenomenal content, or whether it is better grouped with the fully unconscious. Results will be shown to support the first.

T3-4Intuition: How unconscious roots bear conscious fruitsTopolinski S., Department of Psychology II, University Wuerzburg, Germany

In intuitions concerning semantic coherence participants are able to discriminate above chance whether a word triad has a common remote associate (coherent triad) or not (incoherent triad). These intuitions are driven by increased fluency in processing coherent triads compared to incoherent triads, which in turn triggers a brief and short positive affect (Topolinski & Strack, in press). The present work investigates which of these internal cues, fluency or positive affect, is the actual cue underlying coherence intuitions. In Experiment 1, participants liked coherent word triads more than incoherent triads, but did not rate them as being more fluent in processing. In Experiment 2, participants could intuitively detect coherence when they misattributed fluency to an external source, but lost this intuitive ability when they misattributed affect. It is concluded that the coherence-induced fluency by itself is not consciously experienced and not used in the coherence intuitions, but the fluency-triggered affective consequences.

T3-5The feeling of warmth scale, post-decision wagering and confidence ratings as a measures of knowledge access in artificial grammar learning task


Wierzchon M., Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland

The aim of the presentation is to compare the access consciousness measures applied in implicit learning studies. Most of the researchers have agreed that the accuracy of the indirect tests performance reflect in fact both conscious and unconscious influences of memory. To assess the ability of conscious access to the information stored in the memory multiple methods were proposed, such as confidance ratings (Dienes & Perner, 2002) or more recently post-decision wagering (Persaud, McLeod & Conwey, 2007). In the presentatation the results of those two methods will be compared with the feeling of warmth scale data (Metcalfe, 1986). It was assumed that feeling of warmth, as a more sensitive measure, would be correlated with the classification accuracy to more extend than other scales. To address the problem, two experiments using artificial grammar learning paradigm were conducted. In the classification phase of the first experiment, the declarative ratings of confidence and feeling of warmth were collected. The second study compare the results of those two methods with the post-decision wagering data.The results indicate the classification above the chance level in all experimental groups. The higher classification accuracy was related with the higher feeling of warmth declared by the participants in both experiments. The results of confidace ratings were inconclusive whereas the results of the post-decision wagering were not related to the classification performance.The results of the studies seem to confirm that warmth scale is more sensitive measure of knowledge access. The scale is also more understandable for participants. Finally the results showed significant difference between the post-wagering scale and other two scales results suggesting, that each measure could reflect other aspect of access consciousness.

T3-6Conflict adaptation effects in implicit sequence learningJimenez L., Department of Psychology, Campus Sur, Universidad de Santiago, Santiago de Compostela, Spain

We seem to solve conflictive situations much better right after having solved a previous one than after dealing with a situation not needing control. The nature of the mechanism responsible for these conflict adaptation effects is a current hot topic of debate. According to the conflict monitoring model, these effects depend on the adjustment of control triggered by the detection of conflict on the preceding situation. But, what does “detection” mean in these conflict monitoring models?In the present study I will present results showing that these conflict monitoring processes can operate implicitly in an implicit learning procedure, thus modulating the expression of tendencies of which participants are not aware. Previous results have shown that participants instructed to look for sequences in a serial reaction-time task develop overt expectancies which lead them to stop using their knowledge over a conflict block in which most of the trials are not structured according to the trained sequence. In contrast, incidental learners keep applying their knowledge in these conditions, responding to the few trials which are still generated according to the sequence. It appears as if these incidental learners are insensitive to the conflict generated by non-sequential trials, or fail to develop an overt expectancy out of these conflict trials.Reanalyses of these data, together with a new experiment with a probabilistic sequence learning procedure, showed that conflict adaptation effects can indeed be produced in implicit sequence learning even in the absence of an overt expectancy, thus leading to a dynamic adaptation to conflict in which the impact of conflict trials


depends on their relative likelihood. These results are discussed in the context of conflict monitoring of implicit cognition.

WG3 (Paradigms)

POSTERS

P3-1The cerebellar electrocortical activity in wakefulnessJ. Podgorac, Lj. Martac, G. Grbic, M. Culic, G. Kekovic, S. Sekulic* Institute for Biological Research “Sinisa Stankovic”, University of Belgrade, Belgrade*Medical Faculty, University of Novi Sad, Novi Sad, Serbia

If we consider consciousness as a biological phenomenon like any other, we may investigate it neurobiologically; that means that consciousness is caused by neurobiological processes and is realized in brain structures. The cerebellum is regarded as a structure that can help not only motor but also nonmotor brain regions to do their work effectively. Our particular interest is focused on cerebellar role in consciousness. As a first experimental step, we started to investigate the spontaneous electrical activity of cerebellar cortex in wakefulness of unrestrained rats. We noticed that relative power spectra of paravermal cerebellar electrocortical activity in the alpha range (5-8 Hz) was dominant while the rats were awake but quite, while during the exploratory movements in the cage, the dominance of alpha (8-12 Hz) and increase in beta (15-32 Hz) range appeared. Spectral characteristics of cerebellar activity in awake rat differed greatly from those in an anesthetized rat where delta range (1-4 Hz) greatly dominated. The experiments in a near future would be performed on the animal model of depression where cerebellar and cerebral activity would be recorded in sleep-wakefulness cycle by telemetric system and analyzed by nonlinear methods.

P3-2Unconscious rule applicationFilip Van Opstal, Wim Gevers, Magda Osman, Tom VergutsGhent University, Belgium

Traditionally, it is thought that unconscious cognitive processing is restricted to highly automatic knowledge, or at most to knowledge that is strongly prepared by conscious processes (Dehaene et al., 1998, Dijksterhuis et al., 2008). Here, we test this idea. In four experiments, we consistently show that an abstract rule (indicating whether two stimuli are same or different) can be unconsciously applied to items that are outside the current task set (e.g., number processing when the task is to compare color patches). This suggests that unconscious processing may be more powerful than previously assumed.

P3-3Contingent negative variation – an electrophysiological parameter of learning in subjects with high anxiety Sanja Mancevska, Liljana Bozinovska, Adrijan Bozinovski1


Department of Physiology, Medical Faculty, University "Ss.Cyril and Methodius", Skopje, 1 American College, Skopje, Republic of Macedonia

A forewarned reaction time task (S1-S2-MR paradigm) is often used in event-related potential (ERP) studies of attention. This paradigm is known to elicit the contingent negative variation (CNV), a slow negative biopotential shift that is recorded from the scalp, with highest amplitude on vertex (Cz electrode site), in the period between two contingent stimuli, as a result of a conditioning process. Originally Gray Walter in 1964 called it an "expectancy wave". Later on CNV was closely related to processes of attention and anticipation including preparation for (motor) performance. Latest studies are focused on CNV generators. The aim was to investigate the dynamics of the contingent negative variation in 15 subjects with high anxiety (Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale -TMAS score = 33,9± 6,7) and in 18 subjects with low anxiety (TMAS score = 7,5 ± 2,9), both aged 19 to 22 years. An electrophysiological method -electroexpectogram (EXG) paradigm was used. Electroexpectogram (EXG) paradigm is a modified and an expanded CNV paradigm employing a biofeedback design. The dynamics of expectancy and attention represented by CNV amplitude is observed during 100 subsequent trials. The subject is placed in a "game with the paradigm", based on a biofeedback. The appearance of "go" (S2 signal present, MR towards S2 requested in the paradigm - trials of acquisition of the conditioned answer) and "no-go" condition (S2 signal absent, no MR response requested - trials of the extinction of the conditioned answer) exclusively depend on the amplitude of the late component of the CNV potential recorded from vertex (Cz). It is the leading parameter of the design with a threshold value. During the EXG paradigm, an oscillatory curve, containing the values of the maximal CNV amplitude within each trial, can be recorded. We call it electroexpectogram (EXG curve). It shows the oscillatory dynamics of the value of the recorded CNV potential around the threshold line. The threshold value of the CNV amplitude for this study was - 5V. Maximal amplitude of the late contingent negative variation was -9,9 ± 4,2 V in subjects with high anxiety, and –11,4 ± 3,5 V in subjects with low anxiety (p= 0.28). Mean values of the CNV amplitude during the whole test were -5,7 ± 3,7 V in subjects with high anxiety and -5,9 ± 3,8V in subjects with low anxiety (p= 0,288). Minimal reaction time towards S2 tone was 187,3± 24,1 ms in high anxiety group and 170 ± 31,4 ms in subjects with low anxiety (p=0,068). Mean reaction times were 326,2± 182,6 ms in subjects with high anxiety and 276,5 ± 152,1 ms in subjects with low anxiety (p<0,0005). The number of the oscillatory EXG cycles was 3,72,1 in high anxiety group, and 3,51,4 in low anxiety group (p>0,05).

P3-4What the recovery of structure-from-motion can tell about the adaptive brain: cue combination and sensory conflictNadeja Bocheva, Institute of Neurobiology, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia, Bulgaria

The present study demonstrates the possibility to infer information about the perceptual interferences in visual perception by using psychophysical methods. The recovery of structure from motion is studied under different experimental conditions that require either the integration of the information provided by a variety of visual cues like texture or shading with the information provided by the motion and/or the resolution of a


sensory conflict between the cues. The results show that even when the motion provides veridical information about the object shape and its movement, the visual system relies mostly on the information that could be extracted from a single frame. The data also suggest that human performance deviates from the predictions based on certain constraints used in computational studies like rigidity. The implications of the results for understanding the normal processing of the human brain, representation of the sensory information and for its adaptive behavior will be discussed. The possible relation of the observed performance to the evolutionary development of the visual system in order to efficiently code the information significant for the survival will also be considered with regard to awareness and planning of actions.


WG4 (Implications)

ORAL PRESENTATIONS

WG4 (Implications)

POSTERS

P4-1Dissociating Neural Correlates of Detection and Evaluation of Social Gaze. A. Georgescua, B. Kuzmanovica, , S. Eickhoffb,c, N. J. Shahb,d, G. Bentee, G. R. Finkb,d,f, K.Vogeleya,d

aDepartment of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, University Hospital ColognebInstitute of Neurosciences and Biophysics — Medicine (INB3), Research Center JuelichcDepartment of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, University Hospital AachendBrain Imaging Center West, Research Center JuelicheDepartment of Psychology, University of ColognefDepartment of Neurology, University Hospital Cologne

The interpretation of interpersonal gaze behavior requires the use of complex cognitive processes and guides social interactions. Among a variety of different gaze characteristics, gaze direction and gaze duration modulate crucially the meaning of the ?social gaze?. Nevertheless, prior neuroimaging studies disregarded the relevance of gaze duration by focusing on gaze direction only. The present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study focused on the differentiation of these two gaze parameters. Therefore direct gaze displayed by virtual characters was, firstly, contrasted with averted gaze and, secondly, systematically varied with respect to gaze duration (i.e., 1, 2.5 or 4 seconds). Consistent with prior findings, behavioral data showed that likeability was higher for direct than for averted gaze and increased linearly with increasing direct gaze duration. On the neural level, distinct brain regions were associated with the processing of gaze direction and gaze duration: (i) the comparison between direct and averted gaze revealed activations in bilateral occipito-temporal regions including the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), (ii) whereas increasing direct gaze duration evoked differential neural responses in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) including orbitofrontal and paracingulate regions. The results suggest two complementary cognitive processes related to different gaze parameters. On the one hand, the recruitment of multimodal sensory regions in the pSTS indicates detection of gaze direction via complex visual analysis. On the other hand, the involvement of the MPFC associated with outcome monitoring and mentalizing indicates higher-order social cognitive processes related to evaluation of the ongoing communicational input conveyed by direct gaze duration.

P4-2Vegetative and the minimally conscious state: Ethical considerations


Athena Demertzi, Marie-Aurélie Bruno, Audrey Vanhaudenhuyse, Caroline Schnakers, Didier Ledoux, Jan Bernheim, and Steven Laureys

Cyclotron Research Centre, University of Liège, BELGIUM

Introduction: Patients in vegetative state (VS) show relatively preserved arousal levels without manifesting signs of awareness. Minimally conscious state (MCS) patients are aroused and show inconsistent but reproducible signs of awareness. Medical guidelines have considered treatment withdrawal (artificial nutrition and hydration) in permanent VS ethically justified. The fact that almost half of chronic MSC patients are misdiagnosed as permanent VS (Andrews, Murphy, Munday, & Littlewood, 1996), raises the important ethical issue how MSC patients are to be considered, particularly when end-of-life decisions need to be taken. Methods: A questionnaire about end-of-life issues in chronic VS or MCS (i.e. more than one year) was presented to people at meetings about disorders of consciousness in Belgium and other countries. Results: The sample included 801 respondents (Mage= 40 yrs, range= 16-85, 42% women, 53% Belgians) and was analyzed based on their professional background: health-care workers (n= 601, 75%) and other professionals (n=200, 25%). Among health-care workers, 49% (n=390) found treatment withdrawal in chronic VS acceptable and 18% disagreed (n=114). Fifteen percent of other professionals (n=119) agreed with treatment withdrawal, and 9% disagreed (n=74) (9 % no responses). The two groups differed significantly [x2(2, 801)= 19.5, p< .01]. When the respondents imagined themselves in chronic VS, 71% would not wish to be kept alive, whereas 26% would wish maintenance of treatment (2% no responses). Among health-care workers, 21% (n=167) treatment withdrawal in chronic MCS acceptable, and 46% disagreed (n=366). Eight percent of other professionals agreed with treatment withdrawal (n=62), and 17% disagreed (n=133) (8 % no responses). The two groups differed significantly [x2(2, 801)= 14.1, p< .01]. When the respondents imagined themselves in chronic MCS, 58% would not wish to be kept alive and 40% would wish maintenance of treatment (2% no responses). Conclusions: The majority of health-care workers find treatment withdrawal in VS acceptable. However, their opinions differ significantly from laypersons. Although the majority of health-care staff disagrees with treatment withdrawal in chronic MCS, a small percent still finds it ethically justified.

cost b10: brain damage and repair · web viewthe present work investigates which of these...

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