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Theredweb:thestrugglebetweenRussia’sdigitaldictatorsandthenewonlinerevolutionaries/AndreiSoldatovandIrinaBorogan.

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Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.ISBN97811-61039157418(electronic)

1.Internet—Politicalaspects—Russia(Federation) 2.Informationsociety—Politicalaspects—Russia(Federation) 3.Internet—Accesscontrol—Russia(Federation) 4.Electronic

surveillance—Russia(Federation) 5.Freedomofinformation—Russia(Federation) 6.Russia(Federation)—Politicsandgovernment—1991–

I.Borogan,I.(Irina) II.Title.JN6695.A55A8592015303.48’330947—dc23

2015015850

FirstEdition

10987654321

“Informationwantstobefree.”

—FuturistStewartBrand

“Thisisnotaphoneconversation.”

—aRussianexpressionmeaningawishtodiscusssomethinginpersonbecause

somebodyelsemightbelistening

OChapter14.Moscow’sLongShadow

nNovember21, 2013,MustafaNayyem, a thirty-two-year-old liberaltelevision journalist, had been deeply disappointed by UkrainianpresidentViktorYanukovych’s decision to postpone the integration of

UkraineintotheEuropeanUnion.Yanukovychhesitatedtosignanagreementwiththe EU because of pressure fromVladimir Putin, who wanted to hold UkraineclosetoRussiaandopposedanypactwithEurope.

NayyempostedanangrymessageonFacebook.“Well,let’sgetserious,”hewrote. “Who today is ready to come toMaidan beforemidnight? ‘Likes’ don’tcount.Onlycommentsunderthispostwiththewords,‘Iamready.’Assoonaswegetmorethanathousand,wewillorganizeourselves.”

This Facebook post started the Ukrainian revolution. Thousands went toIndependenceSquare,popularlyknownasMaidan,andstayedthere.Inthemonthsthatfollowed,theMaidanwasturnedintoanimprovisedfortress,surroundedbybarricades,fires,andsmokingtiresandguardeddayandnightbyprotesters.TheprotesterswantedclosertieswithEurope—asentimentthatwassharedbypartofUkraine’s population, largely in thewestern portionof the country,whereas theeast felt aligned toRussia,not in the leastbecausemost spokeRussianas theirfirst language.The protests inKievwere a seminal crisis for Putin,who felt amovebyUkrainetowardEuropewouldbeintolerable—itwouldbringtheWesttoRussia’sborders.

OnNovember30theUkrainianriotpolice,theBerkut,launchedanoffensiveagainst the protesters on the Maidan, and dozens were severely beaten. Theprotesters were forcibly dispersed. Some of them took refuge in St.Michael’sCathedral,anelegantgold-domedmonasterynotfarfromthesquare.Thepolicethenbesiegedthemonastery.

SashaRomantsovaworkedatabankinKiev,butsheharboredthesoulofapopularorganizer.Attwenty-seven,shehadalreadysuccessfullycreatedalargestudent movement at her university and was deeply interested in events at the

Maidan.ShehadjoinedoneofthefirstmarchesinfavorofUkraine’sintegrationwithEurope.

Whentheprotestsweredispersedintothemonastery,Romantsovareceivedadesperate textmessage froma friendhiding inside,whosaid theBerkutwerebatteringdownthemonastery’sdoors.Romantsovawasfrightenedforherfriendandangryattheuseofforceagainsttheprotesters.ShecalledtheCenterofCivilLibertiesofKievandvolunteeredtodosomething—anything—tohelptodefendtheprotesters.Thecenter,basedinaresidentialapartmentinthecenterofKiev,wasatthatmomentthinkingthesamething;aworkshopwasunderwayonhumanrights.Theydecided to formavolunteerservice tohelp locate thedetainedandwounded from theBerkut crackdown and to open a telephone hotline to gatherinformationfromthoseintrouble.

Butoneofthemostimportantdecisionsmadethatdaywastoopenagroupon Facebook, called Euromaidan SOS, which immediately gathered over tenthousand followers.When Romantsova called the center to volunteer, she wastold,“Weopenedaphonehotline,andweneedavolunteertositherefrom4:00a.m.to8:00a.m.”Romantsovaenthusiasticallyaccepted.Shehadtobeatworkat9:00a.m.butwasmorethanwillingtoworkthehotlineforfourhoursfirst.Shestayed there formonthsduring theMaidanuprising, shuttlingbetween theofficeandthehospitalwherethewoundedweretreated.Whenafewradiostationsandamajor televisionchanneladvertised thephonenumbers for thehotline—actuallythree cell phones—the project expanded rapidly. It began with the intention oflocatingcasualties,butitsoonbecameaninformationservice,fieldingcallsfromall over the city. People called in to report eyewitness spottings of theBerkut,whichwere then posted on the Euromaidan SOS page, asking thosewho livednearbytoverifythemandreportback.1

To an extent this must have made Putin pale—the digital pathways wereenabling the protest against authority. The Euromaidan SOS experiment onFacebooktookadvantageofthehorizontalstructureofanetwork,allowingpeopletoshareinformationreadilyanddisseminatingitwhereitwasneededwithouttheneed for an established organization behind it. What happened in Kiev wasreminiscent of Relcom’s request in August 1991 for users to look out their

Y

windowsand reportback troopmovements,but this time itwasnote-mailsbutFacebookthatprovidedtheplatform.TheauthoritiesknewwheretheEuromaidanSOS was based, but the speed of the network took them by surprise. TheEuromaidan SOS group on Facebook thrived and grewwith the protests. SoonEuromaidan SOS had created comprehensive lists of the wounded or thosemissing or detained by the Berkut, and the lists were frequently checked andupdated.AlongwithRomantsova, 250 volunteersworked onEuromaidan SOS,searchingforthemissingandkeepingadirecttelephonelineopentotheMaidanprotest organizers on the square. Regular announcements were made bymegaphoneatthesquareregardingthosewhoweremissingordetained.

et therewasadarksidetothispoliticalconflict: thedigitalpathwaysthatenabled protest could also be used against the protesters. The night of

January21,2014,wasfrostyandonlyabout10degreesattheMaidan.Mostoftheprotestersweresleepingintents.Suddenly,all theircellphonesvibratedwithanewtextmessage.Thenumberwasdisguisedasaservicemessage,andit read,“Dearsubscriber,youareregisteredasaparticipantinamassdisturbance.”

Theidenticalmessagewenttousersofeachofthethreemobileoperatorsinthe city—Kyivstar, MTS, and Life. But it went only to people who were onIndependence Square. The phrasing of the message echoed language in a newUkrainelawthatmadeitillegaltotakepartinaprotestdeemedviolent.Thelawhadtakeneffectthatverymorning.

Thesenseofthemessagewasclear:theprotestershadbeenidentified.Thetextmessagewasameansofintimidation.

Romantsovaalsoreceivedthetext.Shewasn’ttakenabackbyit,butsheandtheprotesterssawitasanewtrickbytheauthoritiesagainsttheprotesters.ManyoftheMaidanprotestersquicklytookascreenshotofthemessageandposteditonline—thenetworkansweredback,defiantly.

In fact, the textsappeared tohave littleeffect.The textmessagesoutragedmanyUkrainiansandwerewidelyreported.2AllthreeUkrainianmobileoperators

immediatelydenied theyhadsent the textmessages.So thequestionemerged: Ifthemessagewasnotsentbythemobileoperators,howitwasdone?

Kyivstarsuggestedthatitwastheworkofa“pirate”cellphonetowersetupin the area. This could have referred to something called an IMSI-catcher, adevice that can emit a signal over an area of nearly four squaremiles, forcinghundreds of cell phones per minute to release their unique IMSI and IMEIidentificationcodes,whichcanthenbeusedtotrackaperson’smovementsinrealtime. Every phone has such identification codes, although most people are notawareofit.Thistechnologyalsocanbeusedtointercepttextmessagesandphonecallsbydupingcellphoneswithinrangeintooperatingwithafalsecellulartower.Atransceiveraroundthesizeofasuitcasecanbeplacedinavehicleoratanotherstaticlocationandthenoperatedremotelybysecurityagentswirelessly.

However,thetelephonecarrierscouldoffernoevidencethatapiratetowerwas used, but there is another possibility: SORM—the black boxes,which canmonitorbothInternetandcellularcommunications—couldidentify theprotestersandsendthemessage.IfsecurityserviceshadSORM,theycoulduseitasabackdoorintotheUkrainianmobilenetworks,givingthemtheabilitytocarryoutsuchanoperationwithoutbeingdetected.

Afascinatingcluethenemerged.AKievcitycourthadorderedKyivstartodisclosetothepolicewhichcellphonesintheirnetworkwereturnedonoutsidethe courthouse during a protest that occurred on January 10.3 Thewarrant,No.759,whichweobtained,was issuedbyaKievdistrict courton January13. Itsgoalwastoidentifypeopleintheparticularareaoftheprotest.Further,thepolicespecifically requested that a representative of Kyivstar be excluded from theproceedings to keep the operation secret. The judge agreed with the policerequest.

This warrant made clear that the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) andother law enforcement agencies had the capability to eavesdrop oncommunications networks without the telecom operator’s knowledge. Thus, thesecurityservicescouldhaveusedtheirsurveillancesystemsagainstprotesters.OnFebruary3thecommunicationsregulatoryagencyofUkrainereportedthatitcouldnot determinewho had sent the textmessages to protesters in January. Secrecy

A

prevailed.

fterMarch1,thedayRussiaannexedCrimea,manyWesternexpertstoldusatdifferentcybersecuritygatheringsthattheyexpectedamassivedenial-of-

service attack to be launched against Ukrainianwebsites. The fears were wellfounded: every Russian conflict with a neighboring country in the 2000s—includingGeorgiaandEstonia—hadbeenaccompaniedbysuchrelativelycrudeonslaughts against the countries’ online resources.4 For a while the Ukraineconflict developed along the same lines.OnMarch3 theUkrainian informationagencyUNIANreportedapowerfuldenial-of-serviceattack,causingtheagency’swebsitetobetemporarilytakenoffline.5TheInternetinfrastructureofthecountryseemedweak,almostbeggingcyberhackerstotrytheirhand.Ukrainiansclearlyunderstood this vulnerability.That samedayKonstantinKorsun, anSBUcyber-securityofficerin1996–2006andnowinthecybersecuritybusiness,workingasthe head of the NGO Ukrainian Information Security Group and supportingMaidan,appealedforhelp.“BecauseofthemilitaryinterventionofRussiaagainstUkraineIaskeverybodywhohasthetechnicalabilitytocountertheenemyintheinformationwar,tocontactmeandbepreparedforafight,”hewroteonLinkedIn.“Willtalktothesecurityforcestoworktogetheragainsttheexternalenemy.”

Almost immediatelyhereceivedareplyfromMaximLitvinov,headof thecyber crime department in the InteriorMinistry of Ukraine: “You can count onme.” Litvinov said he had analysts, a laboratory, and loyal personnel, and hedidn’twanttowaituntilthecountrywasalreadyunderattack.6

Butthelargeandmuch-fearedcyberattackonUkrainedidnotcomeasithadbeen anticipated; instead it came from another direction, a tidal wave ofpropaganda spread on social networks.7 The Kremlin launched a massivecampaign to infiltrate social networks—first of all,VKontakte—and exploit thedigital pathways for its own purposes. Russia possessed certain naturaladvantagesonthisinformationbattleground.First,bothRussiaandUkraineshareda common cultural and historical legacy in the Soviet Union, such as the

experience of World War II and the shared Russian language, used widely inUkraine.Second,theRussian-basedsocialnetworkVKontakteisthemostpopularsocial network in Ukraine, with more than 20 million users. Russian officialsknewhowtoframethemessagestheywantedtosendandhadallbuttakencontrolofVKontakte.They thendecided to take their information combat to the enemy,fighting on Twitter, YouTube, and anywhere the digital revolutionaries hadpreviouslyraisedavictoryflag.

FromtheKremlinanarmywasunleashed,afightingforcewhoseweaponswere words. Legions of trolls, people who disrupt online discussions bydeliberately posting inflammatory, extraneous, or off-topic messages, weredeployedtoprovokeandintimidatepeople.Thetrollsarenotusuallyvolunteersbutpaidpropagandists.Inthe2000stheywereusedinsideRussiaagainstliberaland independentmedia and bloggers. Now this army, hundreds of people, wasdirectedoutside.

The trollsoftenappear in the comments sectionof traditionalnewsmediaandsocialmedia.KatarinaAistova,aformerhotelreceptionist, thentwenty-oneyearsold,wasoneofthem.InApril2014shespottedsomethingnegativewrittenaboutPutinonWorldNetDaily.“YouareagainstPutin!”sheexclaimedinresponseto another user. “Do you actually know what he does for his country and forpeople?? The fact is that Obama is losing ground as a leader.” A lot of thecommentarywasmuchmorestrident.

TheGuardianwasamongthefirstintheWesternmediatofinditselfintheRussian trolls’ crosshairs.OnMay4 thenewspaper reported that aparticularlynasty strain emerged in the midst of the conflict in Ukraine, “which infestscomment threads on the Guardian and elsewhere, despite the best efforts ofmoderators.”Readersandreportersbecameconcernedthatthesecommentscamefrom “those paid to troll, and to denigrate in abusive terms anyone criticisingRussiaorPresidentVladimirPutin.”ThefirstcomplainttothemoderatorsoftheGuardian was reported on March 6, when a reader complained, “In the pastweeks[I]havebecomeincrediblyfrustratedanddisillusionedbyyourinabilitytoeffectivelypolicethewavesofNashibot trollswho’vebeenrelentlesslypostingpro-Putin propaganda in the comments on Ukraine v Russia coverage.” The

Guardian replied that therewasnoconclusiveevidenceaboutwhowasbehindthe trolling, although Guardian moderators, who deal with forty thousandcommentsaday,believedtherewasanorchestratedcampaign.8

In 2014French and then Italian journalists told the authors that theywereattackedbytrollswhentheypublishedcriticalstoriesonRussia.InbothcountriestheonslaughtswerecarriedoutinfluentandfaultlessFrenchandItalian,andthetrolls attacking the critical reporting from Russia were the same ones whoseparatelywereknowntowritexenophobicandanti-immigrantposts,whichledFrenchjournaliststosuspectthatthecommentscouldbecomingfromacommunityoffar-right-wingactivists.

InMay,IlyaKlishin,theeditoroftheTVDozhdwebsite,shedsomelightonthetrollsfocusedontheWesternmedia.OnMay21KlishinexposedinVedomostitheorganizationoftrollsthathadbeendirectedtotargettheAmericanaudience.9

Hereported that the teamservingunderVyacheslavVolodin, thedeputychiefofthepresidentialadministrationinMoscow,whohadreplacedSurkovatthepeakofthe2012protests,hadproposeda“systematicmanipulationofpublicopinionthroughsocialmedia.”

SourcesclosetothepresidentialadministrationtoldKlishinthatpreliminaryworkbeganinthefallof2013andthatVolodinpersonallyapprovedthestrategy.VolodinalsomovedKonstantinKostin—theKremlinofficialwhooncehadbeenontheotherendofaphoneline,pressuringtheYandexNewsteamtoshapetheirnews report to fit Kremlin wishes—into a key position at the Civil SocietyDevelopmentFoundation, apro-Kremlinorganization, althoughKostin remaineddirectlysubordinatetoVolodin.10Inthesummerof2013heannouncedthelaunchofanew,largesystemforsocialnetworkmonitoringcalled“Mediaimpuls.”

It was an ambitious attempt to monitor and manipulate social networks.Kostin boasted that they joined efforts with the Boston-based firm CrimsonHexagon, using a system designed to figure out consumer trends on socialnetworks. According to Kostin, Mediaimpuls could monitor LiveJournal andTwitter along with Russian social networks. But it was cursed with the sametrouble theRussian secret services hadbeen lamenting since2011: it couldnotdealwithFacebookbecauseFacebookdoesnotgiveupthedata.11

Inthefallof2013thenewspaperNovayaGazetaexposeda“farm”oftrollswritingawayinasuburbofSt.PetersburgknownasOlgino.Theretheemployeeswere paid over 25,000 rubles a month, then equivalent to about $900, to postcomments on blogs and news articles. The troll farm occupied two rooms in aposhhomewithlargeglasswalls.Accordingtothereport,employeesinoneroomwroteblogposts for social networks,while those in theother roomworkedoncomments. The troll farm had close ties with pro-Kremlin youth movements.Amongthoseworkingintheglass-walledhousewasKatarinaAistova,theyoungwomanmentionedabove.

AnonymousInternationalpublicizedtheinternalreportsofthisgroupinMay2014,withdocumentsconsistingofdozensofanalyticalbriefsdetailingthewaythe comments were dealt with on US media sites. There were alsorecommendations,suchasthisoneforthesitePolitico:“Inthefuture,thereshouldbemoreprovocativecommentstostartthediscussionwiththeaudience.”

The documents show that the masterminds of the troll movement werecuriousaboutlegitimateonlinemovements—thedocumentsincluded,forexample,a detailed analysis of Barack Obama support communities on Facebook andTwitter.Theywerealsoawareoftheperilsofbeingdeletedbymoderators;onebrief cautions about “Censorship on the American Internet.” But the mostinterestingdocumentwasone that allbut acknowledged thatusers in theUnitedStates could easily spot the troll campaigns supporting Russia, rendering thepostingsuseless. “In the studyofmajorUSmedia, somepro-Russiancommentswere seen. After a detailed study, it became clear that such comments areextremely negatively perceived by the audience. In addition, users suggest thatthesecommentswerewritteneitherforideologicalreasonsorwerepaid.”

Althoughthecampaignmaynothaveworkedwell in theUnitedStatesandBritain,Ukrainewas different. False reports from the east ofUkraine and fakephotographsofpurportedatrocitiesandvictimsfloodedVKontakteandFacebook.PhotographsofcasualtiesfromthewarinSyriaweredoctoredandpresentedascomingfromtheUkraineprovincesofLuhanskorDonetsk.Thetrollsclaimedtheviolence was caused by Ukrainian “fascists” and sometimes borrowed imagesfromwarmoviestomaketheirpoint.Therewasaheart-wrenchingphotographof

agrievingyounggirl,sittingbythebodyofadeadwomansprawledonthegroundand carrying the caption, “This is democracy, baby, Ukrainian army is killingDonbass people.” It went viral on social networks under the hashtag#SaveDonbassPeople. In fact,however, thephotowasborrowed froma famousRussian film,Brest Fortress, released in 2010, about the Nazi invasion of theSovietUnionin1941.

Although this and many other postings in the troll campaigns were filledwithdeceptions, theyalsostruckanerve,appealing to thehistoricalmemoryoftheSovietUnion—acountry that lostover30millionpeople inWorldWarII—and carrying a highly emotionalmessage to the Internet audience: fascistswerecoming again, this time with backing from the West, and there could be noquestionsasked,noplaceforskepticism,doubt,oroppositioninthisfighttothedeath.

By theendof2014 thearmyof trollsenjoyedamajorboost.The trollsatOlginolefttheglass-walledhouseandmovedtoafour-storybuildinginthesamesuburb of St. Petersburg in order to accommodate their growing numbers, now250people.12Theyworked in twelve-hourshiftsandwererequired topost135commentsaday.13New initiativeswere launched, suchasaquasi-newsagency,like ANNA News, which was registered in Abkhazia, a breakaway region ofGeorgia.TheagencysetupaccountsonaRussianreplicaofYouTube,knownasRutube;onYouTube itself; andonVKontakte, Facebook,Twitter,Google+, andOdnoklassniki.Theypostedvideosthatwerepresentedasnewsbutwerelargelypropagandistic, including videos celebrating fighting by separatists in Ukraine.Another faux news agency, Novorossia television, set up accounts in socialnetworks,postedvideosonadailybasis,andcollectedmoneyforseparatists.Thevideos were then picked up by conventional pro-Kremlin TV channels anddisseminated domestically and internationally. The efforts of these fake newsagencieswerecombinedwiththoseofdozensofonlinecommunitiespositionedasblogsofpatrioticcitizens.

Some of the individual trolls enjoyed large, committed audiences.One ofthem writes under the name LevMishkin, taking his name from a character inFyodorDostoyevsky’s famous novelThe Idiot. The character in the novel is a

O

symbolofRussianhumilityandkindness,butthetrollLevMishkinisdifferent.Nooneknowshistrueidentity,butheisveryactiveonlineasaRussianpropagandist.OnFacebookhelistsamonghisfriendssomeprominentpro-Kremlinspindoctorsand often mocks Ukraine’s political leaders. His message is bitterly anti-Americanandanti- Western,andhefrequentlypublishesdoctoredphotographstomake his point. As of this writing, he had almost five thousand followers onFacebookandovertwenty-sixhundredonTwitter,andmorethanamillionpeoplehave watched his videos on YouTube. For all his activity, however,Mishkin’sbiggestcoupappearedtobesomethingthatalmostescapednotice.

n February 4 the audio recording of an intercepted phone conversationbetweenVictoriaNuland,theUSassistantsecretaryofstateforEurope,and

GeoffreyPyatt, theUSambassador toUkraine,waspostedonYouTubeand thenextdayrepostedbyMishkin,openinganewfrontonthedigitalbattlefield.

The recordingwas explosive, a conversation between twoUS diplomats,discussinghowtoresolvetheongoingstandoffbetweentheUkrainiangovernmentand protesters. In the private conversation, recorded in January 2014, NulandcursedtheEuropeanUnion,expressingfrustrationattheEU’shandlingoftheKievcrisis.Accordingtooursources,PyattinKievusedanordinarycellphoneforthisconversation,notanencryptedone.Although therecordingwasembarrassing totheUnitedStates,asNulanddeclared“FucktheEU,”anotheraspectofitprovedincendiary. Nuland expressed a preference for who should enter the newUkrainian government—proof positive, in the Kremlin’s view, that the UnitedStateswascallingtheshotsinUkraine.Itisn’tknownpreciselywhoobtainedtheconversation,butitwassomeonewhowantedtoembarrasstheUnitedStatesandhadthemeanstointerceptandrecordatelephonecall.

TheaudiowasinitiallyuploadedontheYouTubechannel“RePost,”whichhad been mostly uploading anti-Maidan videos and smearing Ukrainianpoliticians. In some videos the voice of the cameraman is heard, he speaks inRussian and pretends to be a journalist, but he is very focused on documenting

protesters’ faces,weapons(self-madebatonsand the like),andactions.MostofthevideosgotonlyafewhundredviewsonYouTube.

Quite suddenly, on February 4, the channel’s moderators uploaded theconversation,alongwithanotherconversationbetweenEuropeanofficials.14Twodayspassed,andnoonenoticed.Finally,onFebruary6,ChristopherMiller,thentheeditorofEnglish- languageUkrainiandailyKyivPost,receivedane-mailwithalinktotheNulandvideo.Thepersonwhosentittohim,anacquaintanceinthesecurityservice,asked,“Didyouseethis?”

Miller was thrown at first. The video had been viewed only three timesbeforeMillerwatchedit,andhewonderedwhetheritwasauthentic.Butthemorehe listened to it, the more he came to realize it was genuine. He called theembassytogetacommentandaskedifitwasreal.Theyhadnoideawhathewastalkingaboutandwereshocked.15Milleratoncepublishedthestory,onFebruary6,quotingtheinterceptonthewebsiteoftheKyivPost.16

ButastrangethinghappenedonthewaytoapublicuproarovertheNulandcomments: Miller was not the only recipient. In fact, before he published hisarticle, the hot intercept had fallen into the hands of the mysterious troll LevMishkin,whoposteditonhisYouTubechanneladaybeforeMiller,onFebruary5.AndwhenMishkinuploadedit,thevideowentviral.

The story of the recording—a murky one of phone calls recorded andmysterious uploads—highlights a larger picture depicting the security services,bothinRussiaandUkraine,attemptingtoinfluencethepoliticalcourseofeventswithunderhandedmeans.TheeavesdroppingonNulandandPyattwasprobablymade possible by SORM technology in Ukraine identical to Russia’s. Therecordingwasthenpassedfromonehandtoanotheruntilitbecamepublic,intheprocess removing any fingerprints of who originallymade the interception andrecording.That’sthewaycombatintheshadowsofthedigitalworldisdone.

The call created a sensation, but theUkrainian security service, the SBU,denied any involvement. In twodays theSBUheld a press conference inKiev.When asked about theNuland recording,Maxim Lenko, a senior investigationsofficialintheSBU,whowaspresentattheconference,steppedforwardandsaid,“TheUkrainianSecurityServiceisnotconductinganyinvestigationintothematter

atthistime.”17

Thevideowas extensively used byRussian propaganda outlets to portrayMaidan as an American conspiracy. The circumstances of the intercept and itscircuitousroute to themediasuggest that itwas theSBU,not theRussiansecretservices,thatconductedtheinterception.Itisimpossibletoknowforsure,butwethink some SBU officers likely intercepted the Nuland call and then shoppedaround until they found a colleague or friend who would post it on YouTube.Whentheschemedidn’tigniteamediastorm,theykeptshoppingforanalternativeoutletandeventuallyfoundone.

Time and again intercepted conversations in Ukraine were used tocompromise political opponents, and surveillance on telecommunications wasused as a means of intimidation. This strategy provoked a great deal ofspeculation about conspiracies; for months a Ukrainian mobile operator wasaccused of sendingUkrainian citizens’ personal data to Russia andmaintainingtheirserversinMoscow.Noproofwaseverfound.

Thetruth,however,mightbemuchsimpler,tracingbacktoSORM,theblackboxes first deployed inRussia years earlier tomonitor telecommunications andInternettraffic.Ukraine’ssecurityservicespossesstheirownSORM;exceptforaperiod after the Orange Revolution in 2005–2010, they always kept close tieswiththeRussiansecurityservices.Thetwocountries’securityofficerscarriedoutjointoperationsandexchanged information, and that special relationshipended,ratherspectacularly,onlyinFebruaryof2014whentheSBUexposedthenamesofFSBgeneralswhowerepresentinKievonthedayYanukovychfledhiscapital.

Ukraine’s version of SORMwas evenmore intrusive thanRussia’s. “TheUkrainianSORMistougher—theyhavetherighttointerrupttheconversationandwehavenosuchpowers,”saidVictorShlyapobersky,achiefoftheSORM-testinglaboratory at the St. Petersburg branch of the Central Research Institute ofCommunications,oneof threemainRussianresearchcentersworkingonSORMdevelopment.TobestuckintheSovietlegacymeanstobedependentonRussiansupplies of surveillance. When Ukraine updated its national needs for SORMequipment in2010, theRussiancompany IskraUraltel, amanufacturerofSORMequipment, was happy to announce that it had successfully tested its SORM

devicesunderthenewrequirements,andithadbeenapprovedbytheSBU.18

AlthoughUkrainehewedtoRussia’seavesdroppingsystemwithequipmentsuppliedbyRussia, this does not necessarilymean thatRussian secret servicesconducted all sensitive interceptions, but this option cannot be ruled out.But itdoes suggest that the Ukrainian security services modeled their surveillancecapabilities after the most opaque and nontransparent example, with originstracingbacktotheKGB.

UkrainepossessednotonlythesameequipmentasRussiabutalsousedthesame terminology. In two decades of independence Ukraine didn’t modify thebasictermsusedtolabelitssurveillancedepartments.IntheSovietKGBtheunitin charge of surveillance was called the OTU (Operativno- TechnicheskoyeUpravlenie, or the Operative-Technical Department), and eavesdropping andsurveillanceoperationswere identified inofficialdocumentationasORM.ThatSoviet-style euphemism means Operativno- Rozisknie meropriatiya, orOperative-SearchMeasures.

In the 1990s the Russian FSB changed the name of the department to theUOTM (adding thewordMeasures to its title), but for yearsUkraine remainedattached to theSoviet acronymOTU.Now thisdepartment is called theDOTM(the Department of Operative-Technical Measures), echoing the Russianexperience.

In lateFebruary inKiev the chief ofDOTMwas fired alongwithMaximLenko,whohaddeniedSBU’sroleininterceptingtheUSdiplomats’conversationjust threeweeksbefore.19 InJuly thechiefofDOTMwaschangedagain.20 Thismusical chairsof theDOTM indicated that thenewUkrainianauthoritiesdidn’tacceptthattheSBUhadhadnothingtodowiththeeavesdropping.

ThesagaoftheNulandinterceptionandthelargerbattleforthedigitalspaceinUkrainealso reflects the reality throughout the formerSovietUnion.Someofthenations thatbecame independent in1991 simplypreserved themethods theyinherited from the old regime. “Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Uzbekistan,they all use a system that is much closer to SORM than to the European orAmerican systems,” Shlyapobersky told us. In our own investigationswe founddocuments confirming that Belarus, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and

I

KyrgyzstanallhavetheirnationalSORMsystems.AndinmostcasesthismeanstheirlegislationandequipmenthasalsobeencopiedandimportedfromRussia.21

nSeptember2014,sevenmonthsafterMaidan,Kievwasbacktonearnormal.Independence Square was cleared; there was no sign of the barricades or

burning tires thathadoncecloggedthestreets. Itwas timefor theparliamentaryelections, and Mustafa Nayyem, who had done so much to launch the Maidanmovement with his post on Facebook, was one of the candidates. Andrei haddifficultycatchingupwithhisbusyschedule, soNayyemsuggested theymeetatthecitycourt.

Nayyem had found out that a Ukrainian oligarch was trying to run forparliamentdespitethefacthehadspentmostofthe2000soutofthecountry,andthiswasagainstUkrainianlaw.SoMustafawenttothecourt,andonthedaywemet,thehearingswereunderway.

TheshabbySoviet-stylebuildingonMoskovskyaStreet,wherethecitycourtoccupiesafewfloors,posedastrikingcontrasttotheMoscowcitycourt,whichis all marble, statues, and expensive furniture. In a tiny room packed withjournalists,abald-headedMustafa,wearingallblack,withhistwolawyers,facedthreejudges.

Mustafa’slawyerwasinthemiddleofalongperoration,fullofdetails.Themainjudgeturnedleftandwhisperedsomethingtohiscolleague.

Mustafa’s lawyer exclaimed, “You should listen carefully to what I’msaying!”

“Well,theentirecountrylistenstoyounow,”thejudgesaidapologetically.Andheobviouslydidn’tmeanonly the lawyer.Thedigital revolutionaries

hadfoundtheirvoice.

AChapter15.InformationRunsFree

longwiththepressureonglobalplatformssuchasFacebook,Google+,andTwitter,theKremlinalsowantedtoratchetupthepressureontwovery popular Russian platforms—the social networkVKontakte, with

massiveusergroupsofthousandsofpeopleinvolvedinpoliticalevents,andthesearch engineYandex,which carried newsheadlines on its homepage that hadbecomeessentialdailyreadingformillionsofRussians.BothenjoyedwidespreadusebeyondRussia’sbordersintheformerSovietUnion.WhenRussianauthoritiesset out in 2014 towin the hearts andminds ofRussian-speaking populations athome and abroad and to persuade them to accept the Kremlin’s version of theconflictinUkraine,controllingthesetwohome-grownplatformsbecamecrucial.

TheyearbeganinconfusionforVKontakte.OnJanuary24PavelDurov,theprimary founder, sold 12 percent of the company—his share—to a friend, IvanTavrin, CEO ofMegaFon, one of the biggest telecommunications companies inRussia, and offered odd explanations for the sale in a post on his page onVKontakte, saying that “what you own, sooner or later, owns you.” Reclusive,Durov communicated almost entirely with the outside world by posting on hispage. In the same post, however, he stressed that he would remain CEO ofVKontakte.“It’smyresponsibilityto[take]careofandprotectthisnetwork,”hewrote.

VKontaktewasmodeled after Facebook, andDurov even chose the samefonts and colors, blue and white, for his network, but with a more primitivedesign.Thenetwork itself is a strangemixof contradictions: althoughauser isrequiredtoprovideagenuineidentitytoregisterwithVKontakte,thenetworkhasbeenfamousforyearsasasafehavenforpirates,andmanyuseditasasourceofwatchingmovies and listening tomusic for free.1 ItwasRussia’smost popularsocialnetworkin2012,earningover$15millioninnetprofitthatyear.

VKontakte was caught in the middle of a conflict over control of thecompanybetweentwoofitsbiggestshareholders,botholigarchs:IgorSechinand

AlisherUsmanov. Sechinwas a personal friend of Putin;Usmanovwas a pro-Kremlinoligarchwhohadgatheredavastmediaempireofformerlyliberalnewsoutlets—hestartedwithGazeta.ru,thenacquiredKommersant,andlaterturnedtotheInternet—andabsorbedLiveJournal.com,themostpopularbloggingplatform,aswellasMail.ru,themostpopulare-mailservice,andwasbelievedtowanttoacquiresomeofYandextoo.

Whencaught in thesqueezebetween the twooligarchs,Durovwasfeelingthe pressure personally. Some shareholders reportedly launched an internalinvestigationat thebehestofoneof theoligarchs intoDurov’sbusinessexpenseaccounts,forreasonsthatwereunclear.2Inspring2014thepressuretookitstollonDurov,whowasstillonly twenty-nineyearsold.Hismovesbecame frantic.OnMarch11heposted,“SevenReasonstoStayinRussia,” inwhichhewrote,“InrecentmonthsthetopicofemigrationfromRussiahasbecomefashionable.ButIgoagainst thetrend,andherearemysevenreasonstostayinthecountry.”Helistedlowtaxes,talentedpeople,beautifulgirls,andsoon.

OnApril1,outof theblue,DurovannouncedhewasresigningasCEOofVKontakte.Then,twodayslater,hedisavowedhisresignationstatement,andfourdaysafterthathepostedanewmessage,lamentingbitterlythesituationinsidethecompany. He said he had filed a lawsuit to try to get back on the board ofdirectors.

Whereas Durov’s previous posts had largely been about the company’sinternalownershipconflict, theposts thatheputuponApril16carriedamoreominous tone; theypotentiallyapplied toeverybodywhoused thenetwork.Thefirstwaspostedat9:36p.m.:

OnDecember13,2013,theFSBrequestedustohandoverthepersonaldataoforganizersofthe Euromaidan groups. Our response was and is a categorical “No.” Russian jurisdictioncannot includeourUkrainianusersofVKontakte.DeliveryofpersonaldataofUkrainians toRussian authorities would have been not only illegal, but a treason of all those millions ofUkrainianswho trust us. In the process, I sacrificed a lot. I soldmy share in the company.SinceDecember2013, I havehadnoproperty, but I have a clear conscience and ideals I’mreadytodefend.

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HethenpostedascanoftheFSBletter,exactlyinthesamemannerashehadinDecember2011,whenherefusedtocooperatewiththemabouttheprotestsinMoscow.

The second posting, two hours later, declared, “OnMarch 13, 2014, theProsecutor’s office requested me to close down the anticorruption group ofAlexeyNavalny.Ididn’tclosethisgroupinDecember2011,andcertainly,Ididnotcloseitnow.Inrecentweeks,Iwasunderpressurefromdifferentangles.Wemanagedtogainoveramonth,butit’stimetostate—neithermyself,normyteamare going to conduct political censorship. . . . Freedom of information is theinalienablerightofthepost-industrialsociety.”

OnApril21Durovwasfiredaschiefexecutive.Helearnedthenewsfromjournalists.He claimedhewas firedbecauseofhispublic refusal to cooperatewith theauthorities.ThenextdayTechCrunch, awebsite, askedDurov inane-mailabouthisfutureplans.“I’moutofRussiaandhavenoplanstogoback,”hewroteback.Durovleftthecountry.

WithDurov gone, the companywas firmly under the control of two loyaloligarchs; theKremlinhadmanaged to repeat the tactic ithadusedearlierwithtraditionalmedia,likeGusinsky’sMedia-Mostinthe2000s.Thistimeitwaseveneasier,astherewereneitherjournaliststodemandapersonalmeetingwithPutinnoruserswhomightcometodemonstrationsonMoscow’sstreets.AtthistimetheKremlinbelievedtheyfullycontrolledtheVKontaktecompanyanditsnetwork—they foresaw no surprises. What the Kremlin miscalculated was that a socialnetwork is different from either television or newspapers. Although journalistsgeneratethecontentintraditionalmediabyworkingintheeditorialoffice,users,oftenwidely dispersed, create the content on socialmedia, and they don’t carewhoownsthenetwork.

TheselegionsofdisperseduserswouldsoonproveVKontakte’sstrength.

nApril 24 Putin fired a shot that hadwide reverberations at the second-largest Internet company in Russia. He was in St. Petersburg at a media

forum organized by the All-Russia People’s Front, an ultrapatriotic, populistmovementPutinhadurgentlylaunchedin2011tocorralpoliticalsupportfromtheprovinces and other quarterswhen hisUnitedRussia Party, largelymade up ofbureaucrats,losttherespectofmanyvoters.ThenewPeople’sFront,consciouslyevokingsymbolsandnamesoftheSovietera,hadamodernpoliticalpurposeforPutin:tocountertheliberal- minded,Westernizedintelligentsiaofthebigcities.

Itwasastagedeventintheround,andinthemiddleofthediscussionapro-Kremlin blogger, Viktor Levanov, addressed Putin with an unusually longstatement about the Internet. Levanov first attacked theUnited States—“It is anopensecret that theUnitedStatescontrols theInternet”—thenwentafterGooglespecifically. “Whycan’t theybuild servershere?”he said, echoing theKremlinline.“IdonotwantmypersonaldataandinformationaboutpoliticiansthatrunmycountrytogototheUnitedStates.”

Putinweighedinandansweredashehadbefore,referringtoSnowdenandNSA,saying that theserversshouldbe relocated toRussia.ThenPutinassertedthat the Internet began “as a special CIA project. And this is the way it isdeveloping.”

Next Levanov did something unexpected. He asked a question about theRussian company Yandex, one of the most recognizable brands and popularwebsitesinthecountry.“ItisnotquiteclearwhatYandexis:ontheonehandweknowitasasearchengine;butontheotherhanditisakindofmedia,becauseallthetime,everydaythetopfivenewsitemsYandexcollectsfromothersourcesareviewedbymillionsofpeople.Meanwhile,Yandexdoesnothaveamedialicenseandcannotbeheldliableunder thelawasamediaoutletbecauseit isasearchengine.”3

Thiswasnotacasualallegation.ByraisingthequestionofwhetherYandexwas amedia organization, the bloggerwas aiming a knife at its heart. ForcingYandex to register asmediawouldmake thecompanysubject toRussianmedialegislationand libel law,underwhich, if themediagets twowarnings from thegovernment,itcouldbecloseddown.UntilthispointYandexhadoperatedoutsidethiscontrol.

Putin eagerly pursued the theme. He claimed that Yandex, when it was

formed,hadbeen“forced”toacceptAmericansandEuropeansinitscompany’smanagement.“And theyhad toagree to this,”hesaid.Healso lamented that thecompany was partially registered abroad. Then Putin bore down on the realculprithehadinmind:“AsIhavesaid,thiswasallcreatedbytheAmericansandtheywanttoretaintheirmonopoly.”4

Putin’s message was ominous, suggesting that one of the most successfulInternetcompaniesinRussiawasunderAmericancontrol,whichinturncontrolsthe Internet. Putin had already warned with great fervor in his Crimea speechabouttraitorsand“fifthcolumns,”andnowhiscommentsseemedtosuggesttherewassomethingwrongwithYandexhavingforeignersaround.

ThenextdayYandexNV, theDutch-registeredparentcompanyofRussia’ssearchgiant,fell16percentontheNASDAQ,andAmericaninvestorsrushedtoMoscowto talk toYandex’smanagement.5Yandex responded toPutinby sayingthatinternationalinvestors’participationwasnormalforatechstart-upandthat,as a public companywith a 70 percent free float, no single shareholder couldexertpressure.6YandexremindedPutinthatRussiawasoneofthefewcountrieswheredomesticInternetbrandswerestrongerthanglobalones.

InearlyMayaworriedYandexrecruitedtoitsboardGermanGref,CEOofthe huge state-owned Sberbank and who is thought to be personally close toPutin.7

ItsoonwasevidentthatPutinhadnotidlyraisedquestionsaboutYandex.InMay Andrei Lugovoi, the parliamentarian who authored legislation making itpossible to block Ej.ru, Grani.ru, Kasparov.ru, and Navalny’s blog in March,announced a new initiative to forceYandex to register as amedia company.8 Itwasanunmistakablethreat.

In a week the Russian Investigative Committee, an increasingly powerfullaw enforcement body, sent representatives to Yandex offices with a searchwarrant.9Thepretext for thewarrantwasacriminal investigationconductedbythecommitteeagainstAlexeyNavalny—thecommitteeallegedNavalnyhadstolenmoney he had gathered via the online service Yandex, money intended for hiscampaign forMoscowmayor theprevious autumn.But the raidwas a shockingdevelopment and went way beyond the reasons cited for the search warrant.

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Yandex was one of the most famous Russian companies and inspired pride inRussia. Its profitability came not from oil and gas, the traditional sources ofRussianwealth,butthroughbuildingabusinessbasedontechnology,andhere,inthisfield,RussianengineerssuccessfullycompetedwithAmericancompanies—YandexhadabiggershareoftheRussiansearchmarketthanGoogle.

Manypeople felt uneasy aboutPutin’s eagerness to target the pride of theRussiantechbusiness.Russianhigh-techcompaniesoftenhadforeignersontheirboards—itwasatickettoworldmarketsandforeigninvestments,andforyearsitsignaled success.Now theRussian president hadmade foreign boardmemberslooksuspicious,almostasiftheywereagentsofaforeignstate.

he campus of Kaspersky Lab headquarters in Moscow fills three modernsemitransparent buildings, surrounded by green lawns and the shimmering

surfaceofanearbyreservoir.Thetableausuggestsnothingmorethananambitionto be like Google or Apple—a big multinational, respected everywhere.KasperskyLabisoneofRussia’smostrecognizablebrands.OnthedayIrinawentthereinMay2014,childrenfrolickedonthegrassinfrontofthecompany’sgreenandredcorporatelogo.AndreyYarnikh,headofgovernmentrelations,saiditwasthedayemployeescouldbringchildrentotheoffice.

While Irina was walking around with Andrey Yarnikh, a big black SUVbraked suddenly behind them.Aman ofmedium height and grayingwavy hair,wearingabrightshirtandjeans,jumpedoutofthecarandapproachedus.ItwasEugeneKaspersky,founderandCEOofKasperskyLab.

“Hi,”hegreetedYarnikhandshookhishand.“HiGenya!”saidYarnikh.AndthenKasperskydisappearedevenfasterthan

heemerged.10

YarnikhexplainedthatKasperskydidn’tlikeformalityeitherinconversationor clothes, and in the early years of the company, when the laboratory was arelativelysmallentity,heusedtokissallfemaleemployeesandshakehandswitheverymanhemet.

But this placid surface concealed anxieties behind the glass walls of theheadquarters. Putin’s remarks about foreigners atYandexmade itsway throughKaspersky Lab like a bolt of lightning. Although based inMoscow, Kasperskyboasts that 400millionpeopleworldwide are protectedby its cyber-threat andantivirus products. At one point a foreign investment firm, General Atlantic,ownedpartofKasperskyLab.11AndinFebruary2014Kasperskyhadestablishedan international advisory board and recruited several Americans, includingHowardSchmidt,formercyberadvisertoPresidentsBushandObama.IfhavingAmericans involved in an Internet company was going to be a problem, thenKaspersky,likeYandex,wouldnotbeimmunetoscrutiny.

KasperskyLab has offices everywhere, fromAustralia toGermany, SouthAfricatotheUnitedStates.JustlikeYandex,KasperskyLabisregisteredabroad,intheUnitedKingdom.12AndjustasVolozhbuiltYandex,whenKasperskybuiltup his company, he didn’t exploit government connections and has not beenpromotedbythestate.

KasperskywasacomplexandsometimesobscurefigureintheworldoftheRussianInternet.Whenthefirstdigitalattacksweremadeonthemedia,helookedtheotherway.ButthenhecametotherescueofNovayaGazeta.AtothertimeshetookpositionsthatshowedsympathyfortheKremlinapproachtotheInternet.Forexample, in February 2011 Kaspersky Lab joined the Safe Internet League, anOrthodox-dominatedNGOthatpromotes Internetcensorshipunder thepretextofprotectingchildrenfromharmfulcontent.13TheLeagueadvancedweird ideasofcreating“whitelists”ofsitesapprovedinadvancebythem,andcyberdruzhinas(from the Russian word that means the feudal prince’s armed guardsmen)patrolling the Internet.14 The League has been working closely withRoskomnadzor.15

On the day Irina visited, people at Kaspersky were debating AnatolyKarachinsky’s decision tomovehis software company,Luxoft, out ofRussia. Itprompted a natural question about whether any large international companiescouldstay.Irina’ssourcesinthecompanysaidthatmanypeopleatKasperskyLabregardedPutin’swordsabouttheInternetandCIA—andtheoffensiveonYandex—asahiddenthreat.Theywonderedwhattodo.

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nthecenterofMoscowamodernofficebuildingwaserectedin2007atatimeofmassiverenovationaroundthecity.Thebuilding,whichhousesSilver-City,

abusinesscenter,hasallthehallmarksofthatperiod:allglassandconcrete,withugly rectangular forms thatharkback to the1970s,defined inoutlandishorangestripes.Itwasat thisbuildingonJune10,2014,thatPutinwastomeetwiththeleadersoftheRussianInternetforthefirsttimeinfifteenyears;thelastandonlypreviousmeetingwasinDecember1999.

Back then people spoke openly in front of Putin and were not afraid tooppose what they saw as the government’s power-grab to control the Internet.They did not fear Putin in those days, and by the end of themeeting Putin hadsupportedthosewhoobjectedtothegovernmentintrusion.AtthattimetheInternetwas new, and sowas the hodge-podge of entrepreneurswhometwithPutin.AdecadeandahalflatertheRussianInternethadgrownintoa$143billionannualbusiness, employing over 1.3 million professionals, generating 8.5 percent ofRussia’sgrossdomesticproductandaccountingfor2.5percentofallitstrade.16

InthosesameyearsPutin’sgovernmenthadimposedsurveillanceontheInternet—theSORMblackboxesand,ultimately,filteringandcensorship.

The security at themeetingwas strict, and journalistswere admitted onlywithspecial identitycards issued just for thisevent.BeforePutinarrived, therewasa sessionabout the futureof the Internet. Itwasmore likeawake.Noonejumped fromachair and shoutedabout the lackof Internet freedom. In fact, thesubject of state control over the Internet was never mentioned; rather, it wasevidentthatPutin,notyetintheroom,heldtheupperhand.Thisrealityweighedheavilyonthosewhowerepresent,includingVolozh,thefounderofYandex,whohadalsobeenpresentfifteenyearsearlierandwalkedoutofthatmeetingwiththepencil. At this very moment Volozh was feeling the Kremlin pressure on thebusinesshehadbuilt,andeverybodyknewit.

Theycouldseeapowerfulreminderinthechairmarked“VKontakte.”Inthechair was not Durov, the founder; instead, there was Boris Dobrodeyev, thendeputy chief executive of VKontakte, whose presence underscored the growing

clout of the Kremlin. Dobrodeyev is a scion of the post-Soviet mediaestablishment; his father,Oleg, is head of the television colossus known as theAll-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company.17 WhenDobrodeyevsat in thechair, itwasasignthatotherchairscouldalsosuffer thesamefate—thefounderscouldbereplaced.ThebloggerLeviev,whohadinventedAlexey Navalny’sbigredbutton,waspresentatthemeetingbecausehiscompanywas broadcasting it. When he saw how Durov’s chair had been filled, heimmediately thought of the peril that faced Volozh and Yandex. “Yandex’sbusiness,allits‘circulatorysystem,’isinRussia:datacenters,offices,thestaff.Yes, thereareofficesabroad,but it isadrop in thesea, insignificant. IfVolozhwastosaysomethingwrong—itwillbeveryeasytotakehisbusinessaway,”hetolduslater.

Putinwaslate,asusual,andwhenhedidarrive,hedidn’timmediatelyentertheconferenceroom;rather,hewasshownasmallexhibitionofInternetstart-upsin the hall. He was escorted by Kirill Varlamov, who had grown up inEkaterinburg,graduatedfromthelocaltechnicaluniversity,andjoinedUralmash,themammothmetallurgicalfactory,asanengineer.Intheearly2000shefoundedasmallsoftwarecompanyandsoonmovedtoMoscow.In2011hecaughttheeyeofsomepeopleatoneofPutin’spetprojects, theAgencyofStrategicInitiatives.ItwaslaunchedwhenPutinwasprimeministerandwasdesignedtobeahigh-techincubator, just like amuch-publicized effort byMedvedev known as Skolkovo.Varlamov joined the agency, and it proved to be a wise decision; he wasintroducedtoPutin.Inthesameyear,whenPutinformedtheAll-RussiaPeople’sFront,Varlamovjoined.HewasincludedonalistofnearlyfivehundredpeoplewhowereprominentPutinpoliticalsupporters,mostofthemcelebrities;hewasthe only one with an Internet background. After Putin was elected president,Varlamovwasmade theheadof a state-fundedventure capital fund, givinghimpower over the budget available to Internet start-ups. By then Medvedev’sSkolkovowas in clear decline.Varlamovmaintained a key position at theAll-RussiaPeople’sFront.

Russiahadproducedanentiregenerationofbrightentrepreneursinthefirstyearsof thedigital revolution,butPutinwasnot interested in them.Hewanted,

mostofall, someone loyal.Varlamov’sappearanceat theJunemeetingsignaledthat Putin had triumphed.Varlamov’s fund had even organized themeeting, andwhen Putin appeared, Varlamov sat on his right—there was no doubt thatVarlamovwasthestaroftheshow.Volozh,whowasagenuineInternetlegendinRussia, looked uneasy. Hewas exceedingly cautious and repeated his line thatthere are very few countries in the world where the local Internet companiesdominate, and these companies becameprominent not becauseof protectionbutbecausetheywereleftalone.

Thesolequestionaboutrepressivemeasureson theInternetwasraisedbyDmitry Grishin of Mail.ru, Russia’s leading e-mail service. An engineer bytraining, Grishin, thirty-five years old, was nervous as he looked at Putin. Hebeganbysaying thatmostRussiansoftwareadvanceshadhappenedbecause thestatelefttheinventorsalone.“Andwehavethismentality,”hesaid.“Wehavethismentality that we count on ourselves.” He added that any contacts with theauthoritiescan’tleadtogoodthings,and“inprinciple,ifyoucanhide,itisbettertohide.”

Putinsternlyinterruptedhim.“It’swrong,”hesaid,shakinghishead.“Firstofall,youcan’thidefromus.”TheremarksaideverythingaboutthestateoftheInternetinRussia:ithadgrownimmensely,hadenabledappealsforfreedom,andyettherewasnoplacetohide.

Grishin reddenedand saidexcitedly, “Weoftenhear that all Internetusersarefromanotherplanet.Butwedoloveourcountry;wewanttohelptomakeitcomfortable to liveandwork in.Andweunderstand that the Internethasgrownanditisnowanintegralpartofthesociety.Therefore,inprinciple,weunderstandthat the regulation, it’snecessary.Andoften the ideas in the regulation, theyareverycorrect.But,unfortunately,sometimesithappensthatrealization,ingeneral,isfrightening.Anditwouldbegreattodevelopsomesortofprocessthatallowsusnotonlytolistenbutalsotobelistenedto.Itwouldbevery,veryimportant!”18

Itwasapoliteappealbut,initstimidity,reflectedtherealityofPutinandtheInternet. The entrepreneurs and businessmen were not challenging the Kremlin;there were no new proposals that day, no confrontations. And some of thosepresentwereworried that a discussionmight have been started about a project

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called Cheburashka, to create a purely domestic Internet—inaccessible fromabroad—named after a popular children’s cartoon character. The project wassuggestedbyaRussiansenatorinApril,but,thankfully,itdidnotcomeup.

The real beneficiary on June 10 was Putin’s political machine, the All-RussiaPeople’sFront,andKirillVarlamov.ThegenuineInternetmarket leaderswereinvitednottotalktoPutinbuttolendlegitimacytoagovernment-fundedpetproject.Andtheydid.

lthoughYandexhadonce resistedpressure from theKremlin,now it gavesomeground.OnSeptember12,2014,Yandexannouncedthatthecompany

agreedtoformallyregisterthreeofitsonlineservices—Yandex’scloudservice,itssocialnetworkMoiKrug,anditsmailsystem.TheywereputonaspeciallistofRoskomnadzorconsistingofonlineservices required tokeepusers’metadataforsixmonthsandtoprovideremoteaccesstothisdatafortheRussiansecurityservices.Mail.ru andVKontaktewere also included on the list.19 The scope ofSORMhadjustexpanded.

YandexalsoattemptedtotreadcarefullyintheminefieldoftheUkrainewar.InMarch the service startedofferingdifferentmapsofUkraine forRussian andUkrainian users. The Russians would see a map showing Crimea as part ofRussia,whileauserinUkrainewouldseethepeninsulaasstillpartofUkraine.Yandexexplained itbysayingCrimeawouldbeshownaccordingto theofficialpositionofthecountryinwhichthemapwasviewed.20

heKremlinpressuretocontroltheInternetwasnotalwaysvisible.Itdidnotalwaysappearinblack-and-whitethreats.Sometimesthebattlewaswaged

in themists.Thosewhobelieved inkeeping the Internetoutof thehandsof thestate tried to survive anyway they could.AndreiKolesnikov learned the gamefirsthand,andhewasaverygoodplayer.CEOofanNGOthathadbeensetupin

2001 to oversee Internet domainnames,Koles nikovhas a longhistorywith theRussian Internet; in1992hewasoneof eightpeoplewho signed theagreementthat established the domain .ru. He was present at the meeting with Putin inDecember1999,andhealsoattendedthemeetingwithPutininJune2014,thoughthistimehewasnotinvitedtojointhepanel.

Kolesnikov was the first Russian expert who joined ICANN’s governingbodies, andhewas acutely awareof theKremlin’s ideas about the Internet andwhattheKremlinthoughtofNGOsasawhole.Toavoidinterference,hedevoteda lot of time to attending public meetings on Internet security and offeredrepeatedlytobeatechnicalexperttopeoplewhowereinchargeofsettingpolicyontheInternet.Hispositionwasfragile.WhenAndreivisitedhiminSeptember2014,Kolesnikovarguedwithgreatfervorthatrepressivelawswere,infact, in“aparallelreality,”andtheyhadnoimpactontheInternetatall.Afterhalfanhourofwrangling, he insisted thatwhat the authorities had done to the Internetwasentirelyimmaterial:“Look,diditaffectyourmorningcoffee?”21

Butthenextmorningbroughtdisturbingnews.ThebusinessdailyVedomostiexposedaKremlinplantogathertheRussianSecurityCouncil,theadvisorygroupto the president on security, in three days to discuss the option of shutting thecountryofffromtheglobalInternetincaseofanemergency.

The centralized structure of theRussian Internet has led the authorities tobelievethatit isentirelypossibleandthattheinternationaltrafficcanbecutoffeither by the operators that control cross-border fiber-optic cables or at theInternetexchangepoints,wheretheinternationaltrafficjoinsthenationalInternet.

Even two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russiantelecommunications remain largely centralized. Russia is connected with theoutsideworldby fiber-optic cables,mostof them laidby fiveRussiannationaloperators, with the state- controlled Rostelecom enjoying the largest Internetbackbonenetworkinthecountry.RussiahasonlyadozenInternetexchangepoints(comparedwithmore than eighty in theUnitedStates).22And nearly half of theRussianInternettrafficpassesthroughoneofthem,MSK-IX.TheMSK-IXitselfisbasedonthepremisesofthephonestationM9,whichisownedbyRostelecom.

ThegeographyofRussiadoesn’thelp.Althoughmostoftheworld’sInternet

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trafficispassedviaunderwatercables,RussiaconnectswiththeWestthroughtheterrestrialcross-borderfiber- opticcableslaidfromMoscowtoSt.PetersburgtoHelsinki andStockholm, andonly recently didRostelecom lay cables in a newdirection, fromMoscow to Frankfurt,Germany. In the east there are also somelines toChina, Japan,and Iran,butoverall theconnections to theoutsideworldaresparse.

Althoughitdidn’tgetasmuchattention,theSecurityCouncilalsowantedtotalk about a second option—to hand over the powers of administering RussiandomainsfromKolesnikov’scentertothegovernment.Ifapproved,itwouldmeanthatallRussiandomainswereunderdirectgovernmentcontrol—or,rather,directcontrolofmostwebsitesinthecountry.

This time the initiativewasnotapproved,but themessagewasstrongandclear.

n 2014 Putin had one big secret hewanted to keep:Russian troopswere inUkraine.TheRussiansecurityserviceshunteddownpeoplearoundthecountry

who tried to expose Putin’s secret, relying on the same technology the secretpolicehadusedalmostseventyyearsearlier.

OnApril17,2014,SvetlanaDavydovaheardsomethingonthestreetinthecity ofVyazma, about 150mileswest ofMoscow, and grabbed her phone. Shewasamotherofsixchildrenandpregnantwiththeseventh.Sheknewthatoutsidethesmall towntheRussianmilitaryintelligenceservicehadabase,andshehadjustoverheardtalkatabusstopthatsmallgroupsofofficerswerebeingsenttoMoscowandthenUkraine.

At that moment Russia was backing an undeclared war by Ukrainianseparatists.Davydovahadnoaccesstosecretinformationaboutthemilitaryunit;she simply overheardwhat peoplewere saying on their cell phones at the busstop.ShewasveryinterestedineventsinUkraineandpersonallyopposedtotheRussian military presence there. She told her husband, Anatoly, what she hadheard—andwhatitmightmean.Thenshewrotedownwhatsheknew.

Thatday,around2:00p.m.,shecalledahotlinetotheembassyofUkraineinMoscowonhercellphone.She told theembassyshehad informationabout thedeployment of Russian military intelligence officers to Ukraine, and not muchmore.Nineminutes later the first secretary of the embassy called her back andasked her to provide details.Davydova relayed all she knew—just rumors shehadheardonthestreet.

Davydovadidn’tknow it,but theFSBwasmonitoring thehotline,and theRussiansecurityservicerecordedDavydova’svoiceon the line to theembassy.The FSB immediately went to work to identify who she was. They had nodifficulty—Davydova’sphonenumberwaseasilytraced.

Thennothinghappenedforawhile.Davydovawasnotquestionedaboutthecall.ThewarinUkrainegrewmoreintense.

SixmonthslaterDavydovahadgivenbirthtoababygirl.Intwomonths,onJanuary 21, 2015, there was a knock at the door of her apartment, and whenAnatolyopenedit,agroupofspecialoperationssoldiersdressed inblackburstin.ThegroupwasledbyatopofficialoftheFSBsentfromMoscow.Davydovawasdetained, takenaway,and theofficers searchedher small apartment, takinghercomputer,notebooks,andothermaterialsasthefamilylookedon.DavydovawasbroughtdirectlytoMoscow’sLefortovoprison,themainprisontheFSBusedfor high-profile investigations and detentions. Davydova was frightened—andworried, not least of all about the two-month-old baby shehadbeen torn awayfrom.

Sixdayslatershewaschargedwithtreason,whichcancarryasentenceoftwelve to twenty years in prison. Shewas told that her call to the embassy ofUkraine had been intercepted. She was given a state-appointed lawyer whoadvised her to plead guilty. Overwroughtwith emotion and scared, at first shecomplied.

For the FSB it was not enough to have just a guilty plea, however; theyneeded to prove she hadmade the call. For this the security service needed asample of her voice to compare with the recording of the call. But Davydovarefusedtogivethevoicesample.

Atthispoint,inearly2015,hercasegainedwidespreadattentioninRussia,

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andhumanrightsactivistsvisitedherinLefortovo,acommonpractice.Whentheycametotheprisontoseeher,theFSBillicitlymadeavideo,withouttellingherortheactivists.ThentheFSBreachedbacktotechnologythathadbeencreatedandperfected since 1949 in the work at Marfino and Kuchino. From this videorecordingtheycomparedhervoiceontheinterceptedphonecall.23

Davydovawasnotaspy—shewasahousewife.Butshewascaughtup insomething larger—the secret services were repeating practices of wiretappingandexaminingvoices,allinanefforttokeepthelidonaclosedsociety,tolockup information, even if itwas just a rumor ahousewifehadoverheard at abusstop.

Aftertwoweeksinprisonandapublicoutcry,Davydovawasreleased,andthechargeswerelaterdropped.

nthesummerof2014RussianandUkrainianjournalistsstartedtofinddozensofprofilesofRussiansoldiersonVKontakte—andmanywhohadbeenposted

toUkrainehadaddedtotheirpagesphotographsfromtheirposting.TheRussianmilitarycommanderswerenotawarethesoldierswerepostingboastfulcommentsandphotographs,identifyingtheirunitsandtheirgeographicpositions.

ThepicturesandcommentsrevealedaliethatPutinhadbeenspoutingaboutthe war. Journalists in Russia’s northwestern city Pskov, bordering Latvia andEstonia,foundonline,onVKontakte,profilesofsoldiersfromaparatrooperbaseintheregion.Thesoldiers,whohadvisitedtheirpagesforthelasttimeonAugust15–16,postedphotographsfromUkraine.

Then the soldiers disappeared. There were awful rumors that dozens ofPskov’s paratroopers had been killed in an ambush in Ukraine. On August 22journalistsfoundanewpostontheVKontaktepageofoneofthesoldiers,LeonidKichatkin:

“Lifehasstopped!!”Then,abitlater:“Dearfriends!!!!!!!!!!Leonidwaskilled[. . .]funeral[’]s

Mondayat10aminVibutah.Whowantstosaygoodbyetohim,pleasecomeover.

Myphonenumber8953254066.Awife[,]Oksana[.]”Soonthepostreportingthetragedywasremovedandreplacedbyacheerful

post depicting a family celebration.When journalists called thenumber, amalevoiceonthephoneansweredthathewasLeonid,aliveandwell.

Butjournalistsattendedthefuneralsandfoundthetwonewgraves,andoneofthembearstheinscription:“LeonidKichatkin,30.09.1984–19.08.2014.”

WhentwoTVDozhdjournalistsandaNovayaGazetareporterwenttothePskovcemetery, theywereattackedbyunknownmen inbalaclavas, anda localparliamentarydeputywasbeatenupbecausehehadexposed thepostings in thelocal newspaper. But it didn’t prevent other leaks about Russian soldiers inUkraine,andVKontakte turnedout tobe indispensable—for thesoldierspostingand for all the others who would be reading. The soldiers chose VKontaktebecause itwaseasy touseandwas there, alwaysonline.OnJuly23aRussiansoldier conscript from Samara in southern Russia posted photographs of hisartillery pieces onVKontakte, with thewords, “All night wewere shooting atUkraine.”Itwentviral.

TheRussianseizureofCrimeainearly2014wascarriedoutbloodlesslybyunmarkedsoldiers.Itwasrelativelycleanandswiftandheraldedasanewkindofwarfare.ButthetwogravesinPskovshatteredthisimageofabloodlessnewkindofwarfare.TherealitythatsoldierswerebeingkilledonthebattlefieldinUkraineexposed the cover-up and deception about Russia’s role in the violence in theDonbass. The losses, inevitable lies, and cover-ups didn’t work in large partbecauseRussian soldiers aswell as their relatives and friends kept posting onVKontakte.

After all theKremlin efforts to control information, the information aboutUkraine freed itself. The primary source of sensitive data on the violence inUkrainewas not journalists, nongovernmental organizations, opposition leaders,activists,or evenbloggers; itwas soldiers. Inexperienced youngmen,who hadbeen schooled by state-sponsored television propaganda,were electrified by itandwenttowar,boastingoftheirexploits.

Thenetworkenabledtheinformationtomovefreely,unhindered,tomillions.