THE COLLEGE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

Student Name: Commander Wayne Davey, United States of America South and Central Asia Program Class of 2015 Thesis Title: Sub-regional Organizations: Next Drivers of a Security Regime in the

Middle East?

Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Master of Arts in Strategic Security Studies

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE

INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE

VIEWS OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD

INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

ABSTRACT

In a world of complex interdependence, wicked problems, and seemingly

insurmountable challenges, the United States can no longer go it alone, nor can it

completely disengage from the Middle East. Although a region-wide security regime is

unlikely in the near future, sub-regional organizations have shown promise in addressing

some regional security issues in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Sub-regional

organizations can be agents of action, bridging the gap between regional actors and

regional organizations, and merging legitimacy of action with the legality of the United

Nations Security Council. The regional actions of the United States, as an external

hegemon, have directly contributed to the underdevelopment of regional institutions and

mechanisms, resulting in an incapacity to address regional security problems. As part of

its emerging strategy in the Middle East, the United States must exercise smart leadership

in it application of smart power to facilitate and support: capacity-building efforts of sub-

regional organizations and institutions; partnerships between global hegemonic orders

and regional hegemonic orders; and advancement of the Middle East Peace Process.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................................... i

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 1

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................................ 6

CHAPTER 3: REASONS FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION ................................................. 14

CHAPTER 4: BARRIERS TO REGIONAL COOPERATION ................................................... 22

CHAPTER 5: REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST................................ 29

CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE AND UNITED STATES POLICY ...................................................................... 41

BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................... 46

GLOSSARY ................................................................................................................................. 55

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Leadership is influence. That’s it. Nothing more; nothing less.

‒ John C. Maxwell

Definition of the Problem

“Leading from behind” is the unfortunate description of the regional strategy of

the United States in the Middle East. Borrowed from a series of quotes in the 1994

autobiography of Nelson Mandela, New Yorker journalist Ryan Lizza put the phrase into

foreign policy discussion in early 2011 (Lizza 2011b). Although it is an awful foreign

policy slogan, some argue the approach has merit (Gelb 2013). Others argue that the

approach causes instability in the region and puts the security interests of the U.S. at risk

(Krauthammer 2011; Cook 2015, 1; Dueck 2015, 7). Dr. Barry Posen, author and

professor of political science at MIT, argues that the U.S. has pursued a grand strategy of

“Liberal Hegemony” over the past two decades, but needs to pursue a new grand strategy

of “Restraint” (Posen 2014, xi). How will the United States, under its new and evolving

regional strategy in the Middle East, address peace and security challenges? Because of

the seemingly insurmountable barriers to implement a region-wide security regime and

the advantages of operating at the sub-regional level, the key to peace and security is a

regional approach driven by sub-regional organizations and sub-regional orders. Under

its emerging engagement policy in the Middle East, the United States should focus more

on sub-regional organizations, by facilitating capacity-building efforts of sub-regional

organizations and institutions, partnerships between global hegemonic orders and

regional hegemonic orders, and advancement of the Middle East Peace Process.

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In the Middle East, a complex storm of wicked problems is forming at an

accelerated pace, bringing together a convergence of old, new, and emerging threats. Past

and future problems are seemingly being pulled into the vortex of current problems and

overwhelming state and regional systems. Problems emanating from the Middle East are

rapidly spilling into nearby regions: failing states cannot provide basic services to their

inhabitants; ISIS is holding land in two countries, directly operating in seven other

countries, and has affiliates operating in four more countries (Gambhir 2015); refugee

populations are crossing into Europe and other regions not seen since World War II;

human suffering is expanding; rapidly decreasing oil revenues are destroying economic

systems; and a new nuclear and conventional arms race is emerging. A new wave of

popular uprisings is on the cusp of explosion in countries and territories such as Egypt,

Jordan, Iran, Turkey, Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, and Greece. Regional states, non-state

actors, extra-regional states, and multinational organizations will be forced to better

address security issues by changing the model of international cooperation.

Since the phenomenon of the Arab Spring began in December 2010, regional and

sub-regional organizations in the Middle East have undertaken activities which show

promise for a future of increased regional cooperation to solve present and emerging

problems. As the predominant external hegemon, the United States, disengages from the

region and state and non-state actors rush in to take advantage of ungoverned and

alternatively governed spaces, an opportunity has emerged for sub-regional organizations

to become central and take the next steps toward regional peace and security. The

international community, the United Nations, and regional institutions must support the

action of sub-regional organizations and cooperative efforts which contribute to the

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development of sub-regional institution-building that enables regional governance and

regional peace and security. Sub-regional solutions for regional problems should be the

new focus for conflict management in the Middle East.

Among scholars, practitioners, and policy officials, there is a growing discussion

on the importance of regions and regionalism in international politics (Lake and Morgan

1997, 5; Buzan and Wæver 2003, 10; Harders and Legrenzi 2008, 1; Legrenzi 2011,

149). After the Cold War, regional organizations have become more relevant and more

instrumental in affecting peace and security (Aris and Wenger 2014, 1). Intervening

actors and organizations which lack ties to states and regions in which they operate are

viewed as outsiders and lack legitimacy, even though they may have the ability and

resources to assist nation-states solve problems. Regional organizations, and in particular

regional security organizations, have been successful in Europe, the Americas, and

Africa. Leading scholars have identified South Asia, East Asia, and the Middle East as

the regions having the lowest levels of institutionalization and regional integration in the

world (Beck 2015, 191; Fawcett 2013c, 368; Wallensteen 2015, 18). Furthermore, “the

Middle East is one of the least regionally integrated and most under-institutionalized

world areas” (Beck 2015, 191). David Lake and Patrick Morgan, in their groundbreaking

book advocating a regional lens for scholarly analysis and international diplomacy,

declared “the world has now changed. The regional level stands more clearly on its own

as the locus of conflict and cooperation for states and as the level of analysis for scholars

seeking to explore contemporary security affairs (Lake and Morgan 1997, 6). Despite the

calls for a new focus on regions and sub-regions to solve security issues, “there is little

talk of Middle Eastern solutions to Middle Eastern problems” (Fawcett 2015b, 146).

4

Regions, Regionalization, and Regionalism

The Middle East is one of the most socially interconnected, interdependent and

complex regions. Yet, it is described as a “region without regionalism” (Aarts 1999, 911).

Just what is a region? What is regionalization? And, what is regionalism? Like many

terms, a region is a contested concept. Traditionally, a region is a spatial term grouping

“territorial units in geographical proximity, constituting a spatially bound and contiguous

area” (Börzel et al. 2012, 3). In thought and in practice, a region can be defined by other

characteristics than adjoining territorial space which go beyond spatial bounds: political,

economic, religious, socio-cultural, or qawm. Some dimensions may be more prominent

and important than others. Regardless of the individual qualities of a region, it must

exhibit a certain level of interdependence (Nye 1968, vii). A region can be inside,

outside, or crossing nation-state boundaries. It may be defined differently by different

peoples, or it may not exist at all, especially if the concept is not institutionalized within a

particular social consciousness. Thus, regions are thought of as being socially constructed

conceptions of community and society, and are contested concepts.

According to Pinar Bilgin, the “Middle East” is a geopolitical-spatial term used

by external actors to describe a part of the world with certain security and concerns and

interests (Bilgin 2005, 12). Today, it most commonly refers to all Arab states, plus

Turkey, Israel, and Iran (Monier 2014, 423), which this paper recognizes for simplicity of

analysis. Some argue narrowing the term to exclude the Arab states west of Egypt, using

the terms Middle East and North Africa (MENA) or Greater Middle East. Others argue

the inclusion of the Muslim republics of Central Asia. Although this definition is

problematic, the Middle East region has several common characteristics which can

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describe overlapping sub-regions. Politically, it has high levels of authoritarianism and

low levels of democratization; economically, it is dominated by rentier economies and

low economic liberalization; culturally, it is predominantly Arab and Islamic. These sub-

regions do not imply cohesion or uniform behavior (Fawcett 2013a, 4).

Regionalization “refers broadly to processes (as opposed to a deliberate policy)

encompassing an increase in regionally-based interaction and activity” (Fawcett 2013b,

191). It describes the degree of interconnectivity between elements, such as objects,

systems, businesses, people and societies. Regionalization is akin to globalization with a

regional scope. These processes include economic, societal, and security activities and

interactions involving flows of objects, people, ideas, information, data, etc. crossing

state, national, and societal boundaries and connecting regions.

Regionalism (as opposed to regionalization), according to one of the foremost

scholars on the topic, Dr. Louise Fawcett, professor of international relations at St.

Catherine’s College (Oxford, UK), is a “policy-driven process in which states (and other

actors) pursue common goals and policies in any given region” (Fawcett 2013b 191). It is

viewed as a “state-led project based on intergovernmental negotiations and treaties”

(Goltermann et al. 2012, 4). At the most basic end of the spectrum, it is the promotion of

an awareness of a regional society; at the most developed end, it is manifested as a formal

institution or organization. Regionalism is institutionalized regionalization with

cooperative responses in which individual elements work together to avoid the minimalist

effects of the prisoner’s dilemma and to maximize collective benefits. Although

traditional thought has framed the concept around states, non-state actors operating

within a state or between states have roles within regionalism (Fawcett 2013b, 191).

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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

Concepts for a Middle East Regional Security Structure

Based on the successes of regional peace and security institutions in Europe, Asia,

and Africa, and the inability of the international community at large and individual states

to address domestic and regional security threats, regional organizations and regional

security arrangements are more commonly being viewed as the key to stability in the

Middle East. In a review of the scholarly literature with regions as the level of analysis, a

number of regional approaches to security have been proposed characterized by the level

of governance at which peace and security measures are implemented, or stated another

way, the level of governance at which action occurs. These approaches are based on the

history of the region and the possibility for future success. The four most common

regional security mechanisms or regimes are: institutionalized regional cooperation,

institutionalized sub-regional cooperation, ad-hoc and informal cooperation, and a

hegemon or hegemonic order which implements the security order. Derivations of these

four basic regimes exist, including approaches with varying degrees of scope and

importance of the issues to be solved.

Regional Organizations Implement the Security Order

One concept of a regional security order in the Middle East is one that is driven at

the regional level by a regional organization and its supporting institutions (Dakhlallah

2012, 393; Dessouki 2015, 101). This institutional approach, shared and promoted by the

United Nations, makes regional organizations and regional cooperation forums the

drivers of peace and security. By connecting the international legality established by the

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UN to the regional legitimacy of regional organizations, regional organizations have the

potential to mobilize regional action to address peace and security problems (United

Nations 2015).

The League of Arab States (LAS), with 22 members, has been the recognized

regional unifier of the Middle East and North Africa, but has defined the region based on

an Arab identity, excluding the powerful non-Arab states of Israel, Iran, and Turkey, and

other trans-regional actors. Other important regional organizations and cooperation

agreements which have members in the Middle East include the Organization of Islamic

Cooperation (OIC), the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) and the sub-regional

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In discourses of a region-wide approach to security,

scholars are in agreement that the status quo will not work for the future, and a region-

wide organization such as the LAS would have to evolve to be more effective. Although

the LAS was known for much talk and not much action prior to 2011, the response of the

LAS to the Arab Spring shows some promise for expanded action in the future.

For the regional system to be effective, the LAS would have to make significant

reforms, such as re-defining common threats that go beyond the traditional barriers to

Arab solidarity, allowing for a greater role of inter-regional organizations within the

LAS, developing institutions and sub-regional organizations within the LAS, and

permitting small blocs of Arab states to organize and suppress internal domestic revolts

that threaten to spill over into adjoining states (Dessouki 2015, 101). Additional reforms

include the creation of an Arab Peace and Security Council modeled after the United

Nations Security Council, and allowing a small group of strong Arab states to lead

multilateral security intervention efforts across the region (Dakhlallah 2012, 412). Even

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more comprehensive reforms have been suggested, including a departure from an Arab

identity to a more inclusive and multinational identity that includes non-Arab states, and

the transition to a regional union, with economic and military cooperation modeled after

the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

(OSCE) (Dessouki 2015, 102-103).

Sub-regional Organizations Implement the Regional Security Order

According to Egyptian diplomats and authors Nabil Fahmy and Karim Haggag,

“the history of the Middle East shows that successful conflict management and resolution

processes are not dependent on region-wide frameworks” (Fahmy and Haggag 2014, 57).

Because region-wide approaches to security in the Middle East have been plagued by

collective inaction, sub-regional organizations and sub-regional cooperation have

recently received major attention because of the ability to actually get things done (Aarts

1999, 921; Harders and Legrenzi 2008, 3; Legrenzi 2011, 150; Brock 2012, 2). The Gulf

Cooperation Council (GCC) is the best example of a formal, multifunctional sub-regional

organization in the Middle East, although other sub-regional arrangements exist, such as

the trade-focused Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Agadir Agreement, and the trans-

regional Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) (Ehteshami 2011, 175-179).

Because of the inability to create a region-wide security order, some scholars

suggest that a regional security order in the Middle East could be built around the sub-

regional level of cooperation. One model of future cooperation is based on the GCC,

which is built on a pragmatic approach to legitimacy instead of the pan-Arab consensus

which restricts a larger regional organization (Harders and Legrenzi 2008, 3). More

informal types of sub-regional cooperation, such as a union of states or an agreement

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among state leaders, could be a sub-regional mechanism for action. Outside of a regional

security focus, “new economic cooperation efforts like the Agadir Agreement indicate

that sub-regional economic cooperation of smaller groups might be the future model of

Arab regional cooperation” (Harders and Legrenzi 2008, 5). Over time, a regional

economic cooperation model could be expanded to include conflict resolution and peace

and security elements.

Going one step further in a sub-regional cooperative model, some scholars argue

that the key to success of a sub-regional order is dependent on a regional hegemon

(Kamrava 2012, 103; Beck 2015, 193). In the case of the Gulf region, Saudi Arabia has

acted as the regional hegemon within the GCC and the LAS, working with other regional

organizations and other regional and global actors. In response to the Arab Spring

uprisings, Saudi Arabia acted within the GCC to implement security measures, led the

GCC within the greater LAS to legitimize GCC actions, and enabled the LAS to legalize

actions within the United Nations. The weight of Saudi Arabia allowed the GCC to

intervene in the Bahraini uprising, to manage the uprisings in Yemen, and launch an

initiative to expand membership to Jordan and Morocco (Beck 2015, 200). The GCC has

signaled for a number of years its desire to include Jordan and Morocco. Two scenarios

could evolve from a GCC expansion: a stronger GCC which could supplant the LAS

(Kamrava 2012, 100), or the beginnings of a second sub-regional organization outside the

Gulf region which would be highly aligned with the GCC (Beck 2015, 200). These

activities show that the combination of a regional hegemon within a sub-regional

organization can produce notable peace and security outcomes in the Middle East.

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Ad-Hoc Regional Cooperation Implements the Security Order

Based on a very long history and the realistic expectations for cooperation in the

future, a popular idea for a regional security mechanism in the Middle East is one that is

informal, ad-hoc, and flexible (Kodmani 2011, 223; Jones 2011, 19; Müller 2014, 464) .

In his analysis of the regional security space surrounding Afghanistan, Stephen Aris

concludes that a comprehensive regional framework is not feasible, and “cooperation will

instead continue to function most vibrantly within more informal and ad hoc smaller

coalitions and fora” (Aris 2013, 209). Ad-hoc cooperation, compared to a regional or sub-

regional institutional approach, offers advantages such as simplicity, speed of response,

and tailored approaches towards specific security tasks (Müller 2014, 464). Another

advantage of an informal approach to security is that it serves as a present baseline to

address current security issues, which can incrementally evolve into a more structured

security regime.

Accepting the present ad-hoc nature of the security structure, the significant

impediments to multilateral cooperation, and the low expectations for future change,

several ad-hoc security models exist, which could advance the security regime toward a

more cooperative mechanism. The first model is to further develop cooperative

frameworks across the wider region based on economic collaboration with less

controversial interstate trade, transportation, common markets, and energy exchanges

(Aris 2013, 209). Examples include expanding the non-contiguous Agadir Agreement

(Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia), or forming counterbalancing micro-regional free

trade agreements between the trio of Egypt, Israel, and Jordan, and the trio of Morocco,

Algeria, and Tunisia (Gylfason, Martínez-Zarzoso, and Wijkman 2015, 261). The second

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model is to emphasize Track II efforts with informal political arrangements and create

specific sub-regional or micro-regional institutions on an as needed basis. One example

would be the creation of a modest regional security center to service select security

coordination efforts between a block of states (Jones 2011, 19). The third model is to

involve an extra-region state, group of states, or hegemonic order to partner with a

regional ad-hoc coalition. One example is the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP),

which is a current partnership between the EU and states in the Southern and Eastern

Mediterranean to promote economic growth, political reform, and conflict resolution

(Gylfason, Martínez-Zarzoso, and Wijkman 2015, 247).

Regional or Extra-Regional Hegemonic Order Implements the Security Order

In the absence of regional collective action, a hegemonic order such as the Middle

East Quartet—the UN, U.S., EU, and Russia—could be the driver for collective action in

the Middle East. Currently, the Quartet functions as a contact group operating in an

informal diplomatic manner to facilitate coordination and mediation of certain regional

issues (Müller 2015, 464). Another idea is for a regional hegemonic order of regional

powers to lead regional cooperation, such as Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

Because regional cooperation is unlikely without extra-regional support, a likely

partnership would be one with the United States, the EU, or another rising world power.

A more comprehensive partnership could combine key regional actors with key global

actors, such as the 4-element bloc of the EU, U.S., Russia and China, the Quartet, the

Quartet plus China, or the P5+1 members of the U.S., UK, France, China, Russia plus

Germany (Harrison 2015, 16). Building on the recent diplomatic success of the P5+1

countries and the UN in negotiating a nuclear agreement with Iran, and the rising

12

instability in the Middle East, the United Nations, since July 2015, has pushed for

advancing the Middle East Peace Process by the Middle East Quartet in combination with

the Arab Peace Initiative (United Nations 2015).

Closing the Gap: U.S. Policy and Regional Organizations in the Middle East

In the most recent National Security Strategy, there is an emphasis on the

leadership of the United States in the world to address security challenges. The mandate

is to lead with purpose, with strength, by example, with capable partners, with all

instruments of national power, and with a long-term perspective (The White House 2015,

2-5). The stated ways to increase cooperation with international institutions, including

regional organizations, are to share burdens and uphold international norms (The White

House 2015, 3). For conflict prevention within and among states, the United States is to

“continue to bolster the capacity of the U.N. and regional organizations to help resolve

disputes, build resilience to crisis and shocks, strengthen governance, end extreme

poverty, and increase prosperity” (The White House 2015, 11). In a review of the

literature regarding the activities of the United States toward increasing the capacity of

regional organizations in the Middle East, there appears to be a large say-do gap. Even

though there is a strategy which clearly involves institution-building of regional

organizations, especially to resolve conflict, the United States clearly engages almost

exclusively in bilateral and multilateral methods on a state-to-state level, with minimal

involvement of regional organizations.

The policies and actions of the United States toward regional organizations have

been sorely lacking for nearly half of a century. Referring to the Johnson

Administration’s “ad-hoc” and “neglecting” approach to regional organizations in the

13

1960s, “a number of critics…have echoed a more consistent policy of support for

autonomous regional organizations without direct United States membership as a means

to a structure of world order” (Nye 1969, 723). With the exception of NATO, the African

Union (AU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the

Organization of American States (OAS), and the League of Arab States (LAS), “little

attention is placed in Washington on the myriad of regional bodies that exist” (Kingah

2012, 5). Along with lackluster policies and activities between the United States and

regional organizations in the Middle East, there is a lack of literature to advocate for

increased engagement and capacity-building efforts which would improve the efforts of

regional organizations to address regional security problems and resolve conflicts. This

paper will attempt to close that literature gap.

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CHAPTER 3 REASONS FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION

Overview of Middle East Insecurity

The sources of insecurity in the Middle East have been traditionally identified using

the main schools of theoretical thought—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—with

the emerging perspective of regionalism, providing constructive additions to

understanding the complex nature of the region, and contributing factors to domestic,

regional, and global insecurity. Using regions as the level of analysis, vice global or

national levels, different analytical perspectives are brought together to explain the

complex insecurity of the region. The broad and lasting issues that affect peace and

security in the Middle East region all contribute to the reasons for cooperation and non-

cooperation. These issues are well-known and define the region: the Arab-Israeli conflict;

the Shiite-Sunni divide; Saudi Arabia and Iran contesting to be the voice of Islam; and

the large disparities among groups of people regarding power, influence, human capital,

and resources.

Conflict and cooperation are shaped by the historical and overarching forces of

conflict within the Middle East. These forces include: the Westphalian borders drawn

from the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 which are at odds with how the regional nations

view their own community and are the cause of border clashes; regional fragmentation of

weak states, artificial states, and non-state groups which are incongruent with the supra-

state identities of Arabism and Islam, causing state legitimacy deficits; the

marginalization of minority groups, namely the Palestinians and Kurds who struggle for

recognition and statehood; and the hyper-sensitivity of states, such as Israel and Iraq, to

15

maintain their own security by launching several wars with their neighbors. Outside

intervention by extra-regional powers and hegemons have substantially compounded the

sources of instability, caused further divisions between regional states, eroded state

sovereignty, and hindered regional cooperation. Outside hegemons, therefore, have

further caused the instability in the region that they tried to reduce in the first place by

accelerating the security dilemma (Hinnebusch 2014, 122-123).

The United Nations and Regional Organizations

During formation of the United Nations in 1945, the founders clearly had a concept

for the relationship between the UN and regional arrangements and an expectation of the

role of regional organizations towards peace and security. In fact, the League of Arab

States (LAS) was founded six months prior to the UN, and in light of the potential for a

regional organization contributing to peace in the Middle East, Article VIII of the UN

charter was established to recognize the connection between the United Nations Security

Council (UNSC) and regional arrangements and agencies, and the contributions of

regional organizations towards international peace and security. The charter explicitly

designated the UNSC with the responsibility of international peace and security, giving it

power to authorize and enforce regional actions contributing to peace and security.

Recognizing its own limits and the advantages of regional bodies, the UN had a concept

that “regional agencies” would be central to implementing peace and security measures

within the borders of established states, between states, and among regions.

In 2006, the United Nations recognized the increasing need for regional

organizations and issued a report from the Secretary-General that described the

framework of a regional-global security partnership concept based on the legality of the

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United Nations and the legitimacy of regional organizations, which could contribute to

international peace and security (Söderbaum and Tavares 2011, 6). Although the UN did

not specifically define a regional or sub-regional organizations, it did declare that

“regions” were difficult to describe and had many different characteristics. The report

made clear that sub-regional organizations were an extension of regional organizations

under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In addition, the report defined seven functions of

regional and sub-regional organizations which could contribute to international peace and

security: conflict prevention; peacemaking; peacekeeping; peacebuilding; disarmament

and non-proliferation; protection of civilians; and natural disaster relief. The updated

2006 concept of regional arrangements with the UN was based on a resolution issued in

2005 which placed importance on regional and sub-regional organizations that could

enter into standby arrangements with the UN and be rapidly deployable for specific UN-

mandated missions, including counter-terrorism, countering the illicit trade of small arms

and light weapons, and assisting in capacity-building efforts (United Nations 2006, 1-14).

The relationship between the UN and regional institutions is important because it creates

the legality-legitimacy nexus. The UN and UNSC, when authorizing intervention in a

region or within a state’s borders, bring international legality for action. Regional and

sub-regional institutions and orders bring regional and local legitimacy for action.

Reasons for Regional Cooperation and Regional Organizations

Nation-states cooperate within bilateral, multilateral, and international institutional

mechanisms, such as informal agreements, coalitions, formal alliances, and treaties with

neighboring and distant states, regional organizations, and international organizations for

many reasons. With respect to regional cooperation, and more broadly international

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relations, there is no one theory adequate to understand, analyze, and explain why states

and other important actors cooperate. There are many reasons for regional cooperation.

Some reasons are broad, while other reasons are very specific. Some reasons are

characterized as being more important, while other reasons are viewed as less important.

Regionalism and Realism: Power, Peace, and Security

Generally-speaking from a realist perspective, states conduct activities in their

own self-interest to maximize their power and security. They cooperate to enhance their

strength, influence, and relative position vis-à-vis other states and actors. Strong states,

including hegemons, integrate into regional institutions and systems to project their

power and influence (Fawcett 2015b, 133), while weaker states integrate to maximize

their collective strengths and to balance an opposing power. On the domestic or sub-

national level, regimes and groups seek to balance an opposing power or threat,

originating both from inside and outside its borders. On the regional level, regimes and

transnational groups seek to balance an opposing power or threat, both from inside and

outside the region. States enter into regional cooperation to reduce instability at the

domestic, regional, and international levels. Because regional organizations exist at the

crossroads of the domestic and international realms, they are regarded as the gateway to

address insecurity and resolve conflict (Fawcett 2013b, 186-187).

Crossing the political and economic stratifications of regional cooperation,

collective defense and collective security are primary reasons for states to enter into

regional arrangements. In collective defense, states have a common perception of a

threat, and cooperate to prepare for, and respond to, a threat emanating from an outside

state or group of states. Such an action is permitted under provisions of the United

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Nations Charter, but must be approved by the United Nations Security Council.

Collective security is a much broader concept, and is undefined by the UN. It refers to

“collective action in response to a collectively identified threat” (Orakhelashvili 2011, 4),

from both external states and internal member-states. Collective security involves formal

arrangements between states, usually via treaties, which are binding and delineate certain

rights and responsibilities of the signatories. Collective defense and collective security

arrangements are similar, involving “long-term relationships among the members, formal

decision-making structures, and an expectation that action under the arrangement could

be activated by a variety of threats” (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2014, 4).

Another reason for regional cooperation is collective conflict management

(CCM), which is different from, but related to, collective defense and collective security.

It involves four main elements: ending or reducing violent conflict; mediating or assisting

in a negotiation process; helping to resolve social, economic, or political issues resulting

from the conflict; and providing monitoring services, guarantees, or other measures to

sustain a long-term peace settlement (Croker, Hamson, and Aall 2014, 4). Examples of

CCM include intervening in a state-on-state war, a civil war within the borders of a state,

cross-border insurgencies, and border disputes. The UN often refers to peacekeeping,

conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding as elements of

conflict management. This regional cooperative action is recognized by the UN under

Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter as a just cause for a regional organization or a

regional actor to intervene to resolve disputes affecting international peace and security.

Regional organizations are becoming more involved in CCM because of an increase in

the cases of regional conflict, a declining interest by the world’s great powers to

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intervene, and the limitations of an overstretched and under-resourced UN (Croker,

Hamson, and Aall 2014, 4). The UN and regional actors need regional organizations.

Regionalism: Political and Economic

The factors which drive regionalism, and hence the formation and transformation

of regional organizations, can be characterized as falling into two main groupings:

political factors and economic factors (Karns and Mingst 2010, 148; Kirchner and

Dominguez 2014, 170; Fawcett 2015a, 44). Political factors driving regionalism, and the

actions of regional organizations, include power dynamics, identity and ideology, internal

and external threats, domestic politics, and leadership (Karns and Mingst 2010, 148-150).

Power dynamics are at play when hegemonic or rising regional or global powers attempt

to influence regional orders and create a perceived imbalance. The rise of Egypt and

Israel in the Middle East has been contested many times, both by regional powers and

external powers. External hegemons, namely the United States, have also been resisted.

Today, as the United States withdraws from the region, a rising Iran, Russia, and China

are being resisted in the Middle East, not only by states, but by non-state actors as well.

The power vacuum left by the withdrawal of external powers and the weakening of

regional states, has allowed ISIS to establish space to operate.

Identity and shared perceptions of what defines a region, and a common ideology,

contribute to regional cooperation and the formation of a regional organization. The

League of Arab States was formed around the Arab linguistic-cultural identity; the

Organization of Islamic Cooperation is formed around the Islamic religious-cultural

identity; NATO and the EU are based on a liberal and democratic ideology; the

Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the African Union (AU) formed based on non-

20

interference and anti-colonialism. Shared threats are powerful drivers of organizations.

NATO formed to halt Soviet aggression and the expansion of communism; the GCC

formed because of the external threats of Iran and Iraq, and the internal threats of

domestic economic crisis.

Similar domestic politics, in the form of regime types and economic governance,

make agreements among members of a regional organization easier to attain. All

members of the EU are democracies and all members of the GCC are authoritarian,

making cooperation easier. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),

especially since the 1990s, has had difficulty in reaching agreements because of the wide

variation of political systems between its members. Leadership, in the form of aggressive

leaders and regional powers, provides the impetus to form collective policies and

collective actions. The United States has consistently exercised leadership in NATO and

Organization of American States (OAS), while Japan and Australia have led efforts in the

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

Economic factors at the local/domestic, regional, and global levels drive

cooperation between states, regionalism, and the activities of regional organizations. A

regional marketplace connects the global market to domestic markets, as well as adjacent

regional markets. The economic health of a nation-state, especially a small and relatively

weak state, depends on the regional economy. Larger, more developed states depend on

both regional and global markets for their economic health. Economic cooperation allows

consumers and producers to benefit from economies of scale, reduced transaction costs

and trade barriers, and more efficient movement of goods and labor. The cooperative

economy attracts foreign direct investment and allows a state to have more economic

21

power within international markets and more political power within international

institutions (Börzel 2012, 258). Economic cooperation facilitates movement of people

and goods across state borders, the development of regional infrastructure, and

connections to the global marketplace. Some regional organizations, such as the EU,

Mecrosur in South America, and members of the North American Free Trade Agreement

(NAFTA), prefer a “closed regionalism” which grants trade advantages to its members.

Other states and regional organizations, especially in Asia, practice an “open

regionalism” to take advantage of the benefits with trading partners which are not part of

their region (Karns and Mingst 2010, 151-152).

The Balance Sheet: Primary Reasons for Regional Organizations in the Middle East

Nowhere in the world is the security dilemma amongst a state of anarchy more

pronounced than the Middle East. Although the constructivist concept of cooperation

leading to a higher level of security is understood at the local level, the realist concept of

a fight for power prevails at the regional and international level. From a review of the

scholarly literature, the three main reasons in rank order for regional cooperation and

regional organizations emerge in the Middle East: first, protecting a state’s regime from

internal threats; second, protecting a state’s regime from external threats; and third,

maintaining a state’s perceived borders. These reasons for regional cooperation in the

Middle East are hyper-inflated compared to other regions of the world. The focus of

security is on the regime and ruling elites, which comes at the expense of the well-being

of the general population. The domestic security dilemma and the regional security

dilemma combine to create large disparities in power, resources, and the public goods

resulting in a political security mechanism in which nobody wins.

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CHAPTER 4 BARRIERS TO REGIONAL COOPERATION

The Security Dilemma, Self-determination, and Non-intervention

Barriers to international cooperation have distinct regional flavors, while at the

same time, are affected by global, transnational, and domestic causal factors. In a very

broad sense, the main challenges to the formation, existence, and effectiveness of

regional organizations in addressing security threats in every region of the world are the

principles of self-determination and non-intervention established by the Westphalian state

system, which cause a reluctance of member states to cooperate and cross boundaries

both in a physical and functional sense. These international normative principles,

combined with the minimalist outcome of the combined security and prisoner’s

dilemmas, cause collective action problems and diminish the ability for regional

organizations to collectively and effectively deal with security threats. Regional

organizations which have a declared emphasis on security and collective defense, are

impeded by the barriers to regional cooperation, and tend to issue declarations that are

out of balance with the actions taken to support collective security (Kirchner and

Dominguez 2014, 175-176). The disparity between the overuse of rhetoric by regional

organizations and member states, and the under-delivery of public goods, is often called

the “say-do gap.” The disconnect between what is said and what is delivered causes trust

and legitimacy problems between governing regimes and the governed populations, as

well as between states. In the Middle East, the “say-do gap” looms large.

The principles of self-determination and non-intervention as barriers to regional

cooperation are especially pronounced in the Middle East, with its lengthy historical

23

legacy of maintaining the status quo in the interest of stability in three areas: regime

survival, territorial integrity, and national sovereignty (Snetkov and Aris 2013, 10).

However, in recent times, states have permitted exceptions to the principle of non-

interference and have allowed outside intervention. From a collective action perspective,

member states of regional organizations have established just cause to intervene inside

the boundaries of another state, under the auspices of the responsibility to protect (R2P)

within the UN system (Paris 2014, 569), and the newly-developed concept of the

responsibility while protecting (RwP) introduced by Brazil in 2011 (Powers 2015, 5).

Barriers to regional cooperation can be understood from different perspectives,

considering different referent objects (state, region, non-state actors). From a realism-

realist perspective framed on the self-interested desire for power and the distrust of other

actors, the role of regional organizations is greatly hindered by power plays and

competition between existing and rising regional hegemons, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran

and Egypt; between global hegemons, such as the United States, Russia, and China, for

regional penetration; and between regional hegemons and global penetrators which all

aspire to be major players in the region. Furthermore, the persistence of identity markers,

such as Islam, religious sects, the concept of pan-Arabism or “Arabness,” or other ethno-

linguistic identifiers serve to preserve social cohesion at the expense of improving

security and reducing common threats (Aris and Wenger 2014, 249).

Hegemons, Identity, and Threat Perceptions

Across the scholarly literature, the most identified barriers to regional cooperation in

the Middle East are competition between hegemonic states, overlapping and contested

socio-cultural identities, and differing threat perceptions. One of the most identified

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barriers to regional cooperation, and reasons for instability in the Middle East, is the

influence of a hegemon in the region, and the counter-response by regional actors to

diminish the influence of the hegemon (Hinnebusch 2003, 239; Harders and Legrenzi

2008, 1; Snetkov and Aris 2013, 271; Fawcett 2013b, 200; Aris and Wenger 2014, 249).

After the Cold War, the Middle East was deeply penetrated by external powers, mainly

via two wars in Iraq and the War on Terror. Unable to compete with overwhelming hard

power, many states chose to bandwagon with the U.S. hegemon, using soft power

approaches to provide some counterbalance. This era of instability shows that an external

hegemon with an overbalance of hard power is disruptive to regional security and inhibits

the development of regional security institutions (Hinnebusch 2013, 87).

A hegemon can come from two separate regions. A hegemon from inside the

region, such as Egypt, Iraq, or Iran, exerts influence, is opposed by other regional powers,

and is forced back into a quasi-hegemonic or middle-power role. A hegemon from

outside the region, such as the U.S. or a Western-aligned security order, further

intensifies the regional power-balancing effects. The hegemonic influence from outside

the region is more disruptive than an internal hegemon, as some regional powers will

align with the external hegemon, in order to maintain state-regime integrity, border

controls, and prestige vis-à-vis other regional states and their regimes. When more than

one external hegemon enters the region, regimes will either align with one particular

external power, or will hedge their bets by aligning with both in some fashion that

maximizes regime integrity. Many states in the region, as a matter of foreign policy, will

leverage interdependence with more than one external power. For example, wealthy

states in the Gulf region will purchase military equipment and training from a number of

25

states across the globe who act as peer competitors, thereby ensuring the survival of the

regime and the well-being of its political and economic system.

The Middle East has been characterized by many scholars as a “uniquely

penetrated region” (Hinnebusch 2013, 78), partly because of the failure of regional rival

powers to achieve any lasting hegemony, the actions of regional powers to prevent the

rise of any single regional power, and the ability of regional powers to entice external

powers into the region as an allied force. External hegemons, assisted by other extra-

regional powers, have penetrated into the region for a number of reasons, including

preventing the rise of regional hegemons, securing control over energy resources, and

conducting a war on terrorism (Hinnebusch 2013, 78). The effect of the external

hegemon in the region over time has been to prohibit the development of regional

institutions and regional cooperation in the Middle East, causing the very instability in

the long-term that the hegemon was actually trying to limit in the short-term.

Transnational and trans-regional identities which shape political, societal, and

individual contexts also create barriers to regional cooperation. Often referred to as

“social consciousness” (Monier 2014, 430), a region goes beyond the spatial concept and

into other regional identifiers such as language, culture, religion, ethnicity, and socio-

economic groupings. Terms such as the Middle East, the West, Arab, and Islamic are

highly contested, have many segmented divisions, are overlapping, and are often

opposing. Some states compete regarding their rights to be the voice of a group of people,

such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, which compete to be the voice of Islam. These groupings

also have the power to exclude other groups of people. Turkey, Iran, and Israel are not

considered Arab, yet they are important powers in the Middle East region. Sunni and Shia

26

sects compete for legitimacy and to define what it means to be Islamic. All these

intertwined, complementing, and opposing regional groupings face different threats, and

they have different priorities regarding those threats.

A regional consciousness shapes identification of threats, enemies, and allies.

Stated another way, who you think you are defines who you think your friends and

enemies are, and what your threats are. In a circular fashion, the regional consciousness

shapes the regional order, and the regional order continuously attempts to shape the

regional consciousness. Without one dominating regional consciousness, many regional

orders create a fragmented social structure and state system, which then become barriers

to regional cooperation. Even when trying to solve major international problems, there is

disagreement on defining the threat and hence, developing solutions that lead to an

improved security order. The security dilemma further spirals out of control.

The third major barrier to regional cooperation in the Middle East is differing

threat perceptions, which are deeply rooted in the history of conflict. Across the region,

there is a lack of agreement on the major threats to security and how those threats are

prioritized, all leading to collective inaction and exacerbation of the security dilemma

(Hinnebusch 2014, 122-124; Kodmani 2011, 228). On the domestic level, state regimes

perceive security threats from within their own borders and citizenry as the primary threat

to regime existence. Citizens of a state may view the primary threat to its people to be the

regime itself (i.e. Syria) or other sub-national or trans-national groups, resulting in

regional and domestic sectarian conflict or an inability of a state to provide basic

governance and provision of collective goods, such as food, water, electricity, rule of law,

and employment. To counter this threat, regimes rely heavily on domestic intelligence

27

services and military actions to protect the ruling regime, creating a securitized approach

to internal security. Thus, there is disagreement between the government of a state and

the citizens of the state on the threats to security within the state’s borders, which has

been called the “state-society gap” (Kodmani 2011, 223).

State regimes perceive transnational and cross-border subversion from regional

rivals—state and non-state actors—as the secondary threat to regime existence. To

counter such threats, regimes will obtain protection from one or more external powers

from outside the region, bandwagon with one or more regional power, or balance against

the threat itself, usually through subversion tactics and non-military counter-methods.

Regional consciousness, or how individual people and groups of people view their

identity, comes into play when attempting collective action and identifying threats.

Nothing embodies the character of the Middle East region and the barriers to

regional cooperation more than the Arab-Israeli conflict. Born from the Balfour

Declaration and the mandate for Palestine in 1917, through the declaration of Israel as a

state in 1948 and the wars of conflict, to the current regional and global complexities of

insecurity today, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict displays how the aforementioned main

barriers to regional cooperation in the Middle East come together and play out. Although

intense Israeli-Arab fault lines exist, the most prominent fault lines are within Arab-Arab

alignments. Since the 1950s, Arab states have chosen alignment and non-alignment

strategies in the combined context of the Arab-Palestinian divide and the influence of

extra-regional and hegemonic actors. (Smith 2013, 246). Of the three prominent

organizations in the Middle East—OIC, LAS, and GCC—all have strong mandates

supporting a Palestinian state and resolution of the Middle East Peace Process. The result

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has been major friction between Arab powers, and Arab powers and the United States,

creating Arab distrust towards the West (Mousavian and Saberi 2015) and inhibiting

institutional development of regional cooperation against common threats.

Because of repeated failures by international efforts to obtain significant progress

toward an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement and the acknowledgement of the

importance of a region-led solution to the conflict, the king of Saudi Arabia put forward

the Arab Peace Initiative (API) in 2002 at the annual summit of the League of Arab

States (LAS), calling for a two-state solution and Arab normalization with Israel. It has

broad support in the Arab world and received renewed attention as recent as July, 2015 in

a revitalized UN-led peace initiative (United Nations 2015). The API is significant,

because is the first time Arab states have publically endorsed a mechanism which could

lead to recognition of the state of Israel. Although the API is viewed by Israel as an

ambiguous all-or-nothing proposal which Israel has countered with its own Israeli Peace

Initiative in 2011, it is viewed as the only regionally legitimate foundation in the Middle

East Peace Process (Baskin and Siniora 2015, 153-157).

The three main regions to regional cooperation—hegemons, identity, and threat

perceptions—all come together within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to this day.

Although some scholars and policy officials identify the Israeli-Palestinian issue as being

the main barrier to regional cooperation, many others identify it as a result of other

barriers to cooperation. Regardless, the issue reigns supreme. Thus, many experts argue

that regional security in the Middle East cannot progress without seriously addressing the

enduring Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet, the United States is not listening and Middle East

insecurity continues (Fahmy and Haggag 2015, 66).

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CHAPTER 5 REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Regional organizations in the Middle East have been very slow to form and

evolve and are only marginally effective in addressing conflict and other regional

problems. There are only three prominent regional institutions representing the Middle

East, each having a peace and security mandate: the trans-regional Organization of

Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the regional League of Arab States (LAS), and the sub-

regional Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). However, only the LAS and GCC have had

an effect on peace and security matters. Although only slightly effective prior to the Arab

Spring uprisings in 2010-2011, the LAS and GCC have had an “awakening” of their own,

addressing some factors affecting peace and security inside the borders of their members,

and to a lesser extent, outside their borders (Beck 2015, 190; Beck 2014, 1).

League of Arab States

The League of Arab States, often called the Arab League, was founded in 1945,

six months before the formation of the United Nations, by seven states: Saudi Arabia,

Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Yemen. It is headquartered in Cairo, Egypt and

is the second oldest regional organization in the world, behind the Organization of

American States (OAS). Today, it has 22 members stretching from the Arabian Peninsula

to North Africa, including Somalia in East Africa and Comoros, an island just north of

Madagascar. Palestine is a member, and is recognized by the LAS as a state. Syria, is a

member, but in a suspended status. The LAS promotes general interests among its

members regarding the economy, finance, culture, social welfare, and health. It has a

strong non-interference policy regarding the sovereignty of member states, and peace and

30

security matters are addressed only in a general sense. As such, the LAS is ineffectual in

direct actions to regional security. However, it is influential as a voice of the majority of

Arab states, especially in its relationship with the 57 members of the Organization of

Islamic Conference (OIC) and within the United Nations. The LAS has had observer

status in the United Nations since 1950 (Masters and Sergie 2014, 1-2).

Table 1: League of Arab States Membership

Founding Members (7) Current Membership (22) Observer States (4) Egypt Egypt Qatar (GCC) Eritrea

Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia (GCC) Palestine Brazil Iraq Iraq Mauritania Venezuela

Lebanon Lebanon Morocco India Transjordan Jordan Algeria

Yemen Yemen Tunisia Syria Syria (suspended) Libya

Bahrain (GCC) Sudan Kuwait (GCC) Djibouti UAE (GCC) Somalia Oman (GCC) Comoros

Source: (Love 2013, 1348, 1359; Masters and Sergie 2014, 1)

Figure 1: Map of the League of Arab States (BBC 2015).

31

The LAS has played a role in a number of defining issues which have helped

solidify Pan-Arab nationalism but have also hindered it from acting in a cohesive manner.

Arab unity took shape in the 19th century in opposition to Ottoman (Turkish) rule. During

World War I, Arabs united in opposition to Ottoman and British aggression, culminating

when the British betrayed an agreement to establish an independent Arab state, and

endorsed the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement, which divided the Arab region and set

boundaries contrary to Arab logic. Soon after the LAS was formed, Arabs further united

in opposition to the declared state of Israel in 1948, and simultaneously in support of an

established state of Palestine. To this day, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the greatest

defining issue of the region. The LAS initially rallied behind a rising Egypt and President

Nasser’s popular Pan-Arab movement in the 1950s and 1960s, but opposed Egypt when it

began peace negotiations with Israel in 1979. The civil war in Yemen from 1962-1970

put two of its founding members, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, on opposing sides in a proxy

war. The LAS tried to assert control over the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)

when it emerged and gained what was seen as too much power in the region. There was

considerable disunity within the LAS during the 1990-1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq

War (Masters and Sergie 2014, 2-3).

Gulf Cooperation Council

The GCC was founded in 1981, is headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and has

six member states (see Figure 2 and Table 1), all of which are members of the League of

Arab States. In contrast to the regional aspect of the Arab League, the GCC is a sub-

regional organization. It was originally formed as a security response to counter Shiite

Iran’s threats to Sunni Islam as Iran emerged from its Islamic revolution of 1979, as well

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as responding to the overall weakness of the League of Arab States. The Gulf States were

also alarmed by the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The GCC feared the

rise of a powerful Iraq, as displayed during Iraq’s involvement in the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran

war, and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

Figure 2: Gulf Cooperation Council Member States (Role of the GCC 2014)

Although the GCC charter states the basic objective of the GCC is “to effect

coordination, integration, and inter-connection between member states in all fields in

order to achieve unity between them” (GCC Charter 2015), the focus of the GCC is

clearly related to security, sovereignty of its borders, and regime stability of each

member. The GCC has not developed a formal collective security framework, which

gives the GCC flexibility responding to security concerns, with the restriction that

“substantive matters shall be carried out by unanimous vote” (GCC Charter 2015). For

GCC external actions, such as the response to the Arab Spring uprisings, unanimous

consent has been followed. Since the Arab Spring, three examples show a remarkable

33

shift in the GCC’s regional policies regarding Bahrain, Yemen, and possible GCC

expansion.

League of Arab States and Gulf Cooperation Council since the Arab Spring

Post Arab Spring: LAS Role in Tunisia and Egypt

Responding to the revolts in Tunisia in December 2010, Amr Moussa, secretary-

general of the LAS, acknowledged in January 2011 that the uprising was caused by poor

economic conditions in the greater Arab world, as a signal to encourage other Arab

leaders to respond to public outcries before such protests could arise in other Arab states.

At the same time, the LAS announced a $2 billion program to assist Arab economies in

relieving the unrest caused by economic pressures. The LAS refrained from declaring

support for the protesters to avoid inciting further violence in Tunisia. One week later, the

uprisings in Egypt began, and the LAS took a similar passive role but expanded its

rhetoric in another signal to Arab leaders to take action. After President Hosni Mubarak

of Egypt re-shuffled his cabinet, Secretary-General Moussa stated that a deeper change

was needed in Egypt and in other countries across the region. As Tunisia, and to a greater

extent Egypt, retaliated with brute force against protesters, the LAS was split on the

degree of brutality being used by individual regimes, and issued very cautious, but

critical statements against regime actions. Regarding Tunisia and Egypt, the LAS took

the role of regional facilitator and maintained its policy of non-interference, even though

the United Nations pushed the League to take a more active role (Schulz 2015, 210).

Post Arab Spring: LAS Role in Libya

After the uprisings in Libya and the extreme brutality used against protesters, the

LAS suspended Libya’s membership in February 2011, and acted within the UN as the

34

“Arab voice” to convince the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to vote in favor

of a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) mandate of action towards Libya, which led to

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 and the strong support of the LAS for

establishing a no-fly zone. This was notable because it was the first time that the LAS

intervened because of the internal affairs of a member state, going against its non-

interference policy. Even though the LAS endorsed R2P for the initial intervention in

Libya, it later opposed expanded NATO action in Libya, reasoning that the R2P mandate

went well beyond action to protect civilians when NATO took action to cause regime

change, protect oil reserves, conduct counter-terrorism, and limit weapons proliferation

(Eriksson 2015, 223-225).

Post Arab Spring: LAS Role in Syria

In the wake of the Libyan uprisings, the LAS became very active in Syria. The

newly elected secretary-general of the LAS, Nabil El-Araby, in August 2011, voiced

concern over the public uprising in Syria and the extreme brutality of the Syrian military

forces against its citizens. The LAS and GCC worked together to pressure Syrian

President Assad to accept a political solution and institute political reforms. The LAS

brought the Syrian peace plan to the UNSC, but it was rejected by the vetoes of Russia

and China in October 2011, February 2012, and July 2012. The LAS, along with the

GCC, continued to work with the Syrian regime, getting it to agree to a temporary cease

fire in November 2011 and a roadmap to reform. During intense UN peace negotiations

with Syria from December 2011 until January 2012, the LAS took the lead in the peace

talks and sent observers to Syria to report on the implementation of a “protocol”

arrangement (Schulz 2015, 212-213). The observer mission was suspended in late

35

January 2012 because of escalating violence and direct threats to the observer group

(Samir and Soloman 2012).

During the peace negotiations, the League continued its show of strength. It

suspended the membership of Syria in November 2011 and transferred the seat to the

Syrian opposition. The League also imposed economic sanctions on Syria. Because of

Assad’s resistance to reform and the UN’s inability to agree on a peace plan for Syria, the

situation continued to deteriorate, as Russia and Iran supplied the Syrian regime with

military hardware, while Saudi Arabia and other GCC states supported the Syrian

opposition. The proxy war in Syria has split the LAS. Within the LAS, support of the

Assad regime is led by Algeria, Iraq, and Lebanon; and support of the Syrian opposition

is led by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States (Schulz 2015, 212-213).

Post Arab Spring: GCC Role in Bahrain

In response to the popular uprisings in Bahrain, February 14-19, 2011, which

called for a transition to a constitutional monarchy and created opposition forces, the

GCC took two very unusual and forceful steps against what they perceived as threats to

their sovereignty and unity. First, it displayed an aggressive use of its public rhetoric to

condemn Iran, which supported domestic opposition groups and Hezbollah within

Bahrain. Second, in response to a failed action by Bahraini security forces to quell an

uprising in Manama on March 13, the GCC sent 1,000 Saudi troops of the joint Peninsula

Shield Force from Saudi Arabia to Bahrain to support the ruling al-Khalifa family. This

force augmented 500 police officers from UAE and a small number of security forces

from Qatar (Pinto 2014, 168).

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Post Arab Spring: GCC Role in Yemen

The uprisings in Yemen beginning in January 2011 and the escalation of force by

Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) quickly triggered the possibility of a full-

scale civil war and threatened to spread instability to other Gulf countries. By November

2011, Saudi Arabia led GCC efforts and forcefully brokered a deal with the Yemeni

government, which was approved by the LAS. The deal led to the uncontested

resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, along with his guaranteed immunity. The

ensuing stability in Yemen allowed Saudi Arabia to get on firmer footing after being

jolted by the string of 2010-2011 Arab uprisings, until the conflict escalated again in

Yemen in late March 2015 (Beck 2015, 201). Saudi Arabia then led a ten-coalition

response called Operation Determination Storm with nine Arab Nations and the United

States beginning on March 26 that consisted primarily of airstrikes against Shia rebels

known as Houthis and their allies. On April 21, operations shifted to Operation Restore

Hope, with the goals of facilitating a political solution, protecting civilians, enabling

humanitarian assistance and international cooperation, and conducting anti-terrorism

operations (SUSRIS 2015).

Post Arab Spring: Possible Expansion of GCC Membership

As early as 2000, the idea of extending GCC membership beyond the six member

states to Jordan and Morocco first developed. The idea gained traction again in May 2011

and in April 2014 (Beck 2015, 201). Collaboration between the Gulf States and the two

monarchies of Jordan and Morocco have increased since 2011, and the increased public

debate on the possible expansion shows the GCC wants to become a more influential sub-

regional force in the Middle East.

37

Compared to the conditions which led to GCC creation in 1981, there are four

striking similarities affecting current considerations for GCC expansion (Al Tamamy

2015). First, the decline of Egypt has removed its current and potential contributions to

regional stability. Second, Iran’s renewed involvement in the region and expansionist

actions threaten the Gulf States and their Sunni allies, with the added concern of Iran

being much closer to being a nuclear power and the ensuing regional nuclear arms race.

Third, outside of diplomatic efforts, the League of Arab States has been ineffective in

direct contribution to regional security. Fourth, regional confidence in the ability of the

United States to contribute to regional stability is on the decline after the Iraq and

Afghanistan disengagement, as it was after the Vietnam disengagement.

With the increasing hegemonic influence of Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent

Qatar, the GCC is better-positioned to be the premier regional organization in the Middle

East. The GCC’s present focus is to quell domestic uprisings within the borders of its

members and adjacent countries and to counter increasing Iranian and Russian activities

in the region. Although the membership of the GCC has not formally expanded beyond

its original six members, Yemen and Iraq have a quasi-observer status and benefit from

inclusion in committees associated with culture, health, and sports.

Other Regional Organizations and Regional Cooperation Agreements

In addition to the League of Arab States and the Gulf Cooperation Council, there

are other regional organizations and regional cooperative arrangements in the Middle

East. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is a transregional organization,

formed in 1972, second in size only to the United Nations, representing 57 members,

including all 22 LAS members, promoting Islamic solidarity and social, cultural,

38

scientific, economic, and political cooperation (Lansford 2015, 1742). Although the

organization has international peace and security as part of its mandate, the OIC acts

more as an Islamic caucus within and among other international and regional bodies

using its summits to issue supporting or opposing declarations of international and

regional issues. Recent declarations have supported eliminating weapons of mass

destruction, Iran-IAEA nuclear negotiations, establishing a no-fly zone in Libya, and

resolution of the civil war in Syria, while condemning acts of terrorism and the ISIS

attacks in Syria and Iraq. The OIC has consistently supported the recognition of Palestine

and an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and in 2014 it established a ministerial

contact group to mobilize OIC assistance and support to the Palestinians in efforts to

negotiate a peace settlement (Lansford 2015, 1742-1744).

There are two noteworthy transregional organizations in the Middle East. The

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the largest regional

security organization in the world, having 57 members from Europe, Central Asia and

North America. Turkey is the only member in the Middle East (OSCE 2015a). Of the

eleven partners for cooperation recognized by the OSCE, three are from the Middle

East—Egypt, Israel, and Jordan—and three are from the Southern Mediterranean—

Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia (OSCE 2015b). The twelve-member Organization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has six members that are in the Middle East—

Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait—and two members that are in North

Africa—Libya and Algeria (OPEC 2015).

Regional trade agreements and regional economic cooperation forums exist in the

Middle East. Unfortunately, they have been ineffective in producing any notable

39

economic and trade advantages and have not contributed to significant institution-

building. The five-member Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) of Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria,

Libya, and Mauritania formed in 1989, and the four-member Agadir Agreement between

Morocco, Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia formed in 2004 were established to facilitate

economic integration and decrease trade barriers, but despite repeated conferences and

rhetoric, they have shown meager results (Abdmoulah 2011, 39).

Figure 3: Regional Trade Agreements in MENA (Arab-EU Business Facilitation Network 2015, 22). Note: Modified by author; Syria is suspended from the LAS and OIC

The larger Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement (PAFTA), sometimes referred to as

the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), is an 18-member economic bloc. When

created in 1997, the goal was to phase in tariff reductions by 2005 and compete with

other regional economic orders. Today, only partial implementation has been realized,

40

with no noticeable increase in trade benefits. Reasons for failure of a free trade area

include high transportation costs, violent conflicts, inefficient and corrupt public

economic sectors, and external trade agreements with economic powers such as the U.S.

and the EU (Youngs 2012, 26-27).

Within its bilateral European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and multilateral Union

for the Mediterranean (UfM), the EU works with is Mediterranean neighbors to promote

economic integration and democratic reform, including financial support and increased

access to EU markets. These neighbors include Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Palestine,

Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, and Turkey (European Union 2015a; European Union 2015b).

Although still in early development, these relationships offer a method to foster increased

institution-building in the region towards improving prosperity, security, and stability.

41

CHAPTER 6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL SECURITY

STRUCTURE AND UNITED STATES POLICY

Some regions of the world have been more successful attaining and maintaining

stability than other regions. However, the mere presence of established regional

organizations does not always result in a stable region. Europe has a strong regional

institutional system and a high level of stability. Africa has well-developed regional

institutions but suffers from a high level of instability. The Middle East has a weak

regional institutional system and a high level of instability. Clearly, there is no one-size-

fits-all approach to a regional institutional system that can deliver peace and security to a

particular region; security regimes must be tailored to each region and sub-region.

The future of peace and security in the Middle East depends on sub-regional

organizations and sub-regional cooperation. An effective region-wide security

mechanism is not in place, and a regional, comprehensive security regime is a bridge too

far. Sub-regional orders are where international action really takes place to address

regional security problems, such as resolving conflict, delivering humanitarian assistance,

and preventing human rights violations. Sub-regional orders, whether formal, informal, or

ad-hoc, can bring together the legality for action of the United Nations and the legitimacy

for action of region-wide authoritative structures. They can also facilitate action and

intervention by states and non-state actors and overcome collective action problems.

Although sub-regional organizations and sub-regional cooperation are

underdeveloped in the Middle East, sub-regional approaches to security problems have

shown some promise since the Arab Spring. Actions by the GCC, when combined with

diplomacy by the LAS, have been somewhat effective. Regional economic cooperation

42

also shows some promise. Sub-regional cooperation mechanisms and cooperative forums,

where the primary drivers to cooperation exist, should be the focus of diplomatic and

capacity-building efforts to further develop sub-regional security institutions in the

Middle East. As part of the next iteration towards peace and security in the Middle East,

regional and international states and actors should incorporate three basic lines of effort

towards development of a regional security regime: increase the capability and capacity

of sub-regional organizations and agreements; partner external hegemonic orders with

regional hegemonic orders; and move aggressively to solve the Middle East Peace

Process regarding the Palestinian-Israeli dispute.

Develop More Robust Sub-regional Organizations and Institutions

At the core of a regional security regime is the engine for action: sub-regional

organizations. Individual states and actors do not have the capacity to resolve regional

conflict, and a region-wide approach suffers from cooperative inaction. Although

individual states and regional organizations are important, sub-regional orders and

institutions will have the most impact on regional peace and security. A number of steps

should be taken at the sub-regional level.

First, the GCC should be immediately expanded to include Jordan and Morocco.

Although the GCC will unlikely give full membership to additional states, the first

iteration would be to formalize an institutional partnership between the GCC and Jordan

and Morocco since they would be the easiest fit with the Gulf monarchies. The second

iteration would be to formalize institutional partnerships with Egypt, Lebanon, and

Turkey. The third iteration could include Israel. At some point, the GCC would have

options to further develop sub-regional organizations such as extending full membership

43

beyond the current six GCC members or spinning off a second sub-regional organization,

such as Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, and Israel to make it easier to solve sub-

regional and micro-regional problems. In this case, the GCC could act as a sponsor.

Second, existing regional economic agreements should become further

institutionalized, adding peace and security interests to their current mandates. For

example, the four-member Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) could become an economic and

security agreement, and additional members could be added such as Mauritania and

Algeria to cover the North Africa region. Libya, with its current instability, would be

difficult to add as a full member unless global powers such as the U.S. and EU get

involved with facilitation efforts. Another example would be to form a sub-regional

organization with the six southern Mediterranean members of the OSCE—Algeria,

Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. Overlap of members within multiple sub-

regional organizations should not be avoided because of the unique nature of the region

and the advantages of interdependence. In this case, the OSCE and EU could act as

sponsors, incorporating EU efforts into its existing European Neighborhood Policy.

External Hegemonic Orders Must Partner with a Regional Hegemonic Orders

A regional hegemonic order, instead of a single hegemonic power, could provide

the impetus for regional action. When partnered with an external hegemonic order, the

combination could be a very powerful driver for action. History shows that the Middle

East will not accept a sole hegemon, whether from inside or outside the region. Thus, a

hybrid approach is necessary. An example of a regional hegemonic order could be the

four states of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and Israel working together. An example of

an external order with regional ties could either be the existing Quartet of the UN, U.S.,

44

EU, and Russia or a derivation of the P5+1 states which negotiated the Iran nuclear

deal—U.S., UK, France, China, Russia, and Germany. The external hegemonic order

would support the regional hegemonic body and let it lead the Middle East security order.

The challenge to this security regime would be to identify common threats. The

threat of ISIS could be used as the primary unifying threat to the region. After all, ISIS

poses direct threats to individual regime stability. The side-effects of the conflict in Iraq

and Syria could be handled first, such as refugee flows, humanitarian interventions,

establishing safe havens, and the responsibility to protect (R2P). Directly addressing the

threat of ISIS would need to immediately follow, and the U.S.-led global coalition to

counter ISIS could be transferred to the partnered hegemonic order. This may seem a tall

order, and it is, but getting two hegemonic orders together to solve regional problems

would be a big step in the right direction. Diplomatic efforts of world powers, especially

the EU, U.S., and Russia would be critical.

Move the Middle East Peace Process Forward: Solve the Israeli-Palestinian Problem

Because the Arab-Israeli conflict is the greatest barrier to regional cooperation,

the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) needs to be aggressively pursued. Resolution of

this issue can no longer be put off, even with the more immediate threat posed by ISIS

and other regional security threats. The United Nations has renewed efforts in mid-2015

toward resolution, and a global hegemonic order, such as the Quartet or P5+1, must come

together to solve this enduring problem. An aggressive approach to resolving the Israeli-

Palestinian dispute must be a shared process between external and regional hegemonic

orders and regional organizations. Without a solution that targets the enduring Israeli-

Palestinian conflict, regional security in the Middle East will not improve.

45

U.S. Policy Recommendations

As the United States disengages from the region and attempts to focus more on

the Asia-Pacific region, a storm of complex instability is quickly forming at an

accelerated pace which could overwhelm existing regional states. Major regional threats

are synchronizing: ISIS expansion; civil wars in Syria, Iraq and Yemen; massive refugee

flows into Europe; a rising Russia; an invigorated Iran; and an escalating conventional

and nuclear arms race. The region is on the verge of a third Palestinian intifada and a

second Arab Spring.

The United States must rebalance its approach to the Middle East by emphasizing

international relations and capacity building efforts at the sub-regional level for long-term

benefits. First, the United States must be a regional partner instead of a regional leader.

Recalibrating its smart power approach must include being part of an external multi-polar

hegemonic order which engages with an internal regional multi-polar hegemonic order.

Second, the United should act as lead facilitator by putting together a small international

contact team and aggressively pushing the Middle East Peace Process forward. Third, the

United States must take action to increase the capacity of sub-regional institutions and

arrangements in the Middle East by facilitating bilateral, multilateral, and international

institutional mechanisms. Fourth, and most importantly, the United States must re-define

its core interests in the region based on security pragmatism, so that its strategy can be

recalibrated to better apply smart power by using smart leadership.

46

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GLOSSARY

AMU…………………………………………………………………Arab Maghreb Union

APEC………………………………………………....Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

API………………………………………………………………..….Arab Peace Initiative

AQAP………………………………………………….Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula

ASEAN…………………………………..……….Association of Southeast Asian Nations

AU…………………………………………………………………………...African Union

CCM……………………………………………………..Collective Conflict Management

DAESH (DA’ISH, داش or DAASH)..a17Tl-dowla al-islaameeya fee-il-i’raaq wa-ash-shaam'

ECO……………………………………………….....Economic Cooperation Organization

ENP……………………………………………….………European Neighborhood Policy

EU………………………………………………………………….……..European Union

GAFTA……………………………………………………..Greater Arab Free Trade Area

GCC…………………………..…………………………………Gulf Cooperation Council

IAEA………………………………………………...International Atomic Energy Agency

ISIL………………………………………………..….Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant

ISIS……...........................................................................Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

LAS…………………………………………………………....……League of Arab States

MENA………………………………………………………Middle East and North Africa

MEPP…………………………………………………..………Middle East Peace Process

NAFTA………………………………….………..North American Free Trade Agreement

NATO…………………………………………………North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OAS……………………………………………..……….Organization of American States

56

OAU………………………………………………..………Organization of African Unity

OIC…………………………………….................….Organization of Islamic Cooperation

OPEC………………………...………Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

OSCE……………………………....Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PAFTA…………………………………………..………Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement

PLO…………………………………………..………Palestinian Liberation Organization

RO………………………………………………………………..…Regional Organization

RSO…………………………………………….…………Regional Security Organization

RwP…………………………………………………...…..Responsibility while Protecting

R2P……………………………………………………………….Responsibility to Protect

UAE…………………………………………………………..……..United Arab Emirates

UfM…………………………………………………………..Union for the Mediterranean

UN…………………………………………………………………….……United Nations

UNSC…………………………………………….………United Nations Security Council