conversion and consciousness in plotinus, 'enneads' 5, 1 [10], 7

Conversion and Consciousness in Plotinus, 'Enneads' 5, 1 [10], 7Author(s): Frederic M. SchroederSource: Hermes, 114. Bd., H. 2 (2nd Qtr., 1986), pp. 186-195Published by: Franz Steiner VerlagStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4476494 .Accessed: 07/03/2014 16:48

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CONVERSION AND CONSCIOUSNESS IN PLOTINUS, tENNEADS' 5, 1 [10], 7

In a larger study of consciousness in Plotinus', I am seeking to demon- strate how knowledge presupposes not only knowing subject and object of knowledge, but a transcendent ground of both in the One, the highest hypostasis of his metaphysical system. In the course of pursuing this study, I realized that before my work could proceed further, I must devote a prefatory paper to the solution of a notorious crux, Enn. 5, 1 [10], 7, 11 - 13. This text contains a term which is crucial to my argument, ouvaiao4hot4. The sentence in question contains its own difficulties. The entire chapter, moreover, in which this text occurs, offers many further cruces. The solution of the crux in lines 11 to 13 depends, to a large extent, on the construction of the chapter as a whole.

The cruces in 5, 1 [10], 7 have been the subject of astonishingly abundant commentary. They have received a truly magisterial treatment by J. IGAL2. Recently there has appeared a detailed and highly competent commentary on Enn. 5, 1 [101 by M. ATKINSON3. ATKINSON acknowledges his debt to IGAL, although he differs from him on some points. He also offers an almost com- plete bibliography and documents the course of this elaborate discussion4. In the interests of economy this paper shall not provide a historia quaestionis and bibliography, but will address itself principally to points of difference with IGAL and ATKINSON.

In the previous chapter, 5, 1 [10], 6, Plotinus treats of the procession of voiv; from the One. In the present chapter, 5, 1 [10], 7, he discusses the return of vo63 to the One that it might receive its full formation. The first sentence states that voi3; as product or offspring5 of the One resembles and is an image

i Xuvouoict, ouvaiohqjoSt and o6vecat: Presence and Dependence in the Plotinian Philosophy of Consciousness, still in progress and funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. I wish here to thank SSHRCC for their generous support of my research in Freiburg-im-Breisgau in 1982 and also to express warm gratitude to Professor W. BEIERWALTES for his hospitality and advice during my sojourn.

2 La Genesis de la Inteligencia en un pasaje de las Eneadas de Plotino (V. 1.7.4-35), Emerita 39, 1971, 129 - 157.

3 Plotinus: Ennead V. 1. On the Three Principal Hypostases, A Commentary with Translation, Oxford, 1983.

4 ATKINSON does not include M. I. CANTA CRUZ, Sobre la generaci6n de la inteligencia en las Eneadas de Plotino, Helmantica 30, 1979, 287-315, especially 312-313, who subscribes to the position of HADOT on the relevant cruces. Also not included is BLUMENTHAL'S review of O'DALY'S monograph: See notes 10 and 11 below.

s Line 3. HENRY and SCHWYZER: ysv6Oisvov; all other editors: yEwpvv6bpvov. ATKINSON, note 4 above, 155 - 156 prefers yevvcbgevov on the grounds that yevvav is used six times at the end of the previous chapter.


Conversion and Consciousness in Plotinus, 'Enneads' 5, 1 [10], 7 187

of the One. IGAL argues correctly6 that the binary series LXX& - i in the following two sentences represents dialogue, the first element indicating an objection, the second a reply. The interlocutor dismisses the language of resemblance to pose a difficult question7: >>But the One is not intellect. How on earth, then, does it produce Intellect?<

ATKINSON is correct in his view8 that the attempt is to answer the question of how, as the One is not voi;, it can produce voi;. He takes issue with HADOT9 who thinks the request is merely for an elaboration of the language of imitation which would of itself answer the question. ATKINSON'S argument is also put forth by O'DALY10 to whom BLUMENTHAL replies": >)His argument hardly requires the strange assertion that in the question ,ctiC o6v voiv ycvv4; it is vo6v that is in the emphatic position and that the point of the question is therefore how the One produces Nous

188 FREDERIC M. SCHROEDER

This reasoning is followed with the words (lines 6 - 7): To' yap xcatact - 06vov dkXo ij alraqat; i] vov;. With one exception, all authorities construe dkko as accusative. That which grasps or comprehends something else is either sensation or intellect. HARDER is alone in referring To - xaTaXagki- vov to the One and in construing dXXo as a nominative. He translates: >>Denn das, was dies Auffassen tatigt, ist etwas anderes als Wahrnehmung oder Geist 13

Conversion and Consciousness in Plotinus, 'Enneads' 5, 1 [101, 7 189

Both IGAL 17 and ATKINSON 18 take the referent of the To0To to be the centre of the geometrical circle of the analogy. These words belong to an objector to Plotinus' argument from geometrical analogy. The circle is divisible and the centre is not. The argument would then run on: How can the One (corresponding to the centre of the analogy) as indivisible, produce voui; (answering to the circle) which is divisible? IGAL and ATKINSON are correct in their determination of the general sense of the analogy. For it to be expressed, however, it is not necessary that the referent of tOiTo be the One. The series line (sensation), circle (vo6;), centre (the One) has already been elliptically introduced by the preceding aEoSr4olv ypagi1v xai T& d6Xa. IGAL demonstrates 19 the series intended through comparison with 6, 9 [9], 8 which is chronologically immediately prior to 5, 1 [10], 7. The corresponding indivisibility of the centre may already be implied from the divisibility of the circle. The passage is in any case highly elliptical. The context, how can the One, which is not voUi;, produce voi;, already suggests this train of thought.

I suggest that the proper referent of T0oiTo is, not the centre of the circle (corresponding by analogy to the One), but rather the inchoate voi3;. In lines 6 - 7, if my interpretation is correct, we are told that the inchoate voi34 is other than sensation or intellect. Here, to the objection that voi); is divisible (and hence could not be generated by the One which is indivisible), it is answered that the inchoate voi34 is not such, i. e. it is neither a circle nor is it divisible. Circularity, divisibility and intellection are produced when it has looked to the One, i. e. when two stages of the series of the geometrical analogy, viz. centre and circle, are established. At this point, however, it is no longer the inchoate voO;, but voib; fully formed.

It might be objected to this thesis that divisibility, in the sense of the potency of being divided, belongs to the inchoate vou0. To this it may be replied that Plotinus is describing in spatio-temporal language entities to which that language is not wholly adequate20. He is separating in time and space what is only intellectually separable. The inchoate voi; is a phase or aspect of vovg, not an historical epoch in its evolution. Qua this potential phase of vows it is in itself neither divisible nor divided.

Support for the above interpretation of 5, 1 [101, 7, 6- 9 may be found in 6, 7 [381, 16, 10- 16:

Now when it [sc. vobi was looking (t.6pa) toward the Good, was it thinking (tVO6c) that One as many, dividing (pcpiIcv) it unto itself, because it could not think it altogether as an entirety? But it was not yet as voD; (oftw voi6,) that it was looking upon that [sc. the

17 Note 2 above, 142- 143. 18 Note 3 above, 163. 19 Note 2 above, 129 -142. 20 For this principle see 3.5 f50]. 9.24 - 29.



One], but it was looking without thought. Then it must be said that it was not yet seeing (Ubpa), but it was living toward it [sc. the One) and depended from it and was turned toward it.

Significantly, in 6, 7 [38], 16, as in 5, 1 [101, 7, both vision, intellection and division are denied to the inchoate voic,. In the chronologically later 6, 7 [38], 16, Plotinus is hesitant to employ even the conative imperfect &b'pa to describe the awareness of the inchoate vo3; .

Next Plotinus describes the vision which voi3q has of the One (lines 10- 11): 'Civ o6V toTt 6&vagtq, raiTa diio Pj; 8uv6jeo)w otov oxtlo4&7 Iv vo6ioat xac'opdi i otx' dv Aiv vofi;. >>The act of thought separates off, as it were, from the potentiality the items of this potentiality and sees them (otherwise it would not have become intellect)21

Conversion and Consciousness in Plotinus, 'Enneads' 5, 1 110i, 7 191

The conversion of lines 5-6 is advanced as evidence, one way or the other, for the subject of EXet. We have already adopted the view that the conversion in lines 5 - 6 is not of the One toward itself, but of voi3; toward the One. If this is the case, then it is unlikely that, in the passage presently under discussion, we are meant to understand the One's consciousness of itself. Rather we should think that Plotinus is speaking here of awareness of the One on the part of vof3;.

If the One is the subject of ft%e, then there is an abrupt change of subject from the previous sentence. What is more, the force of btsi is retrospective. The creation of voi; has just been described in terms of its self-constitution. We are now to discover more about this self-constitution of voibg. It would be most odd, if in this context the One were suddenly advanced as a reason for the genesis of voof.

The use of ij8i applies nicely to the inchoate vof3;. Advocates of the One as subject of IXet may emphasize the use of the qualifying olov before ouvaiohiotv. The One may not have consciousness in the ordinary sense because the word carries duality. Yet olov is appropriate for the awareness of the inchoate voO; which has not advanced to the full degree of consciousness.

HENRY argues m that in line lI the subject of 9Xst must be voi5; because, even if we grant that the One may have a consciousness of itself, it cannot have a consciousness of its &Uvagl;, which is related to externs. Indeed it is true that the One, from its creative power (86vait;) produces all things27. It is not, however, necessary to conclude that the 8i5vagiu of the One is to be understood only in its relation to externs. Plotinus distinguishes generally between the act which is of the essence of each thing and the act which proceeds from it. There is the act of heat which is in fire and identical with it and the act of heat which proceeds from it and warms other things. Thus the One contains its own act and a second act, which is vo134, proceeds from the One. The One need not address itself to any extern to produce voo;. While the One abides in its own act, vo6q, as second act, proceeds from the One (5, 4 [7], 2, 26 -39).

RUTTEN observes28 that for Aristotle the mover need not itself be moved by the same movement which it communicates to that which is moved. Nevertheless the distinction between the second act in that which is moved and as act of the mover is only notional29. Plotinus, argues RUTTEN, agrees that the mover need not itself be moved by the act which it communicates to the

26 Discussion of H.-R. SCHWYZER, 'Bewul3t' und 'UnbewuJ3t' bei Plotin, Les Sources de Plotin, Entretiens Hardt 5, Vandoeuvres and Geneva 1957, 387.

27 5, 3 1491, 15, 32-35; 3, 8 [30], 10, 1; 5, 1 [10], 7, 9. 28 C. RUTTN, La doctrine des deux actes dans la philosophie de Plotin, Revue Philosophique

146, 1956, 100- 106. 29 Aristotle, De Anima 426 A 5 - 6; Physics III 3; VIII 5.



moved, but differs from Aristotle in stipulating that the distinction between the second act in that which is moved and as act of the mover is real. Thus the primary act of the mover has no relation ad externa (cf. 5, 4 [71, 2, 28 - 30 and 6, 7 [38], 40, 5-24).

Plotinus speaks similarly of the production of vot; as act from the &6vagit; of the One (5, 3 [49], 15, 32-33). It is obvious that the terms 86vagt4 (conceived as creative power)30 and Evtpyma as primary act which is of the One (as distinguished from secondary act which is from the One, i. e. vo13q) are interchangeable31. Thus, if the primary act of the One is not addressed ad externa, neither is its 81vait;.

Clearly, however, HENRY is correct in insisting that the consciousness here must be of the One considered in terms of its effects. This is guaranteed by the epexegetic clause oTt t6vaTal cUooiav (line 13). Now the One might have a consciousness of its 86vagi; as the equivalent of its primary act, but hardly of this in terms of its effect. Nov5 may have a consciousness of the 86vajgi of the One as primary act which has no necessary relation to externs. Plotinus speaks of a phase of vov5q, in identity with the One, which transcends the complex of Form-Thoughts, a sort of ambassador of the One in the structure of voOq 32. The epexegetic o'Tr 86vaTat ovotiav (line 13), however, excludes the possibility that this is the kind of consciousness of the One which is involved here. Nov5 comes into being while the One remains what it is (5, 2 [11], 1, 17 - 18). The doctrine of the double act allows the One to preserve its integrity and transcendence in the production of vov5q. In saying that vofOq has a otov GuvatioGioiv Tc, 8UVdPtco it is meant that it is aware of the primary act of the One which is creative power. Yet this consciousness is not the unalloyed awareness of the transcendent phase of voib. It is rather an awareness on the part of the inchoate vof3q of that primary act or creative power of the One that it is the source of von; as secondary act proceeding from the One.

IGAL argues33 that the &6vaRgi of line 12 belongs, not to the One, but to the inchoate vov3. This is to say that the inchoate vof; has a quasi-awareness of its own power to produce essence. This construction involves an abrupt change of referent for the word &vvagtq. It occurs shortly above, both in lines 9 and 10, where it refers, not to voi3, but to the One. Further, the referent is

30 For the notion of &3vagtq in the Stoa and Plotinus see W. THEILER, Plotin zwischen Platon und Stoa, Les Sources de Plotin, Entretiens Hardt 5, Vandoeuvres and Geneva, 1957, 66, 72ff. and my Representation and Reflection in Plotinus, Dionysius 4, 1980, 43-49.

31 My Representation and Reflection, note 30 above, 46-47. 32 5, 3 [491, 14, 14- 15: voi5S xctaap6q; 6 Mvbov vo5q; 6, 9 [91, 3, 27: t-oO )you 6 RpCorov. On

this aspect of voO4 see J. TROUILLARD, L'impeccabilite de 1'esprit selon Plotin, Revue de l'Histoire des Religions 143, 1953, 19- 29; J. M. RIST, Mysticism and Transcendence in later Neoplatonism, Hermes 92, 1964, 213 -225.

33 Note 2 above, 152 -153.


Conversion and Consciousness in Plotinus, 'Enneads' 5, 1 [101, 7 193

again the One in the next sentence, in the words nap' ?xcivou 6v6fut. Let us avoid this difficulty by supposing that &vapt; in line 12 refers to the primary power of the One. Let us also suppose that the subject of Exel is the inchoate voi3;. Let us further suppose that the subject of &tvatat is the power which belongs to the One. We might provide the following interpretation: ))Nof); has a kind of awareness [sc. of the power of the One] that it [i. e. the power which resides in the One] can produce essence.< The inchoate voi3 has this awareness in that condition of quasi-separation from the power of the One (oiov o-Xtotvit) which is impossible to the One itself. Whatever consciousness the One may have of itself and its power, it cannot be conscious of the extrinsic effect of the power, i. e. that it can produce essence. This is possible only to vo134. It is precisely in the quasi-awareness of this possibility latent in the power of the One that there lies the potentiality that voi); may produce essence. When voi; is fully aware of the One's power that it can produce essence, that very awareness constitutes voi;. Noi3; is the self- constituting awareness of the power of the One that it may produce essence.

A parallel confirms the view that the referent of 66vapt; in 'rij 8uvadpcs( ott 6uVLatTat ovoiav in 5, 1 (10], 7, 12- 13 is the One. In 5, 3 [49], 7, 1 - 4, the fully formed voib; (not the inchoate voi3; as here) is said to know itself in the knowledge of the One. In this act it will know (lines 3 - 4) >>what it has from that [sc. the One] (0octa EXt nap' tx&iivou) and what it [sc. the One] has given and what that [sc. the One] can produce (xavi a &Uvatac txIvo4)

194 FREDERIC M. SCHROEDER: Conversion and Consciousness in Plotinus

also differs in the location of the 66vactq in line 12 in the One, rather than in vov3. Philologically the interpretation is close to that of IGAL. It exhibits, however, some more profound philosophical differences. IGAL argues correctly that the awareness described as oiov ouva;ioahliv belongs to the inchoate vov;. While the ftvatA; or power resides in the One while it is the object of the quasi-awareness of the inchoate vot;, it is appropriated by vofi; as voi5; realizes the ability of that power to produce essence, i. e. voti itself as the power of the One.

This construction has the advantage of greater continuity. There is no need to suppose an abrupt change of referent for the word S&vvaqi;. Where IGAL states simply that vows receives power from the One by which it may define itself, the present interpretation shows how this is done. It has also the advantage of economy. There is no ellipse between the declaration of the power of the One and its appropriation by vovi, because while that power remains what it is in the One's own nature, what is new is the kind of awareness, the consciousness of the possibility which that power contains, which is unique to vob; and which is constitutive of vofvq. This interpretation further allows a just balance between the autonomy of vof; (IGAL'S central concern) and the sovereignty of the One. The One is sovereign in the sense that it (1) by being what it is produces von;; (2) by retaining its power allows to voi;q the capacity for that consciousness by which it produces itself. Noi3 is autonomous in that the consciousness which it has of the One's power is self- constituting within the framework of its continuity with its source in the One. To IGAL's question, whether aXt~ogtlvT is middle or passive, Plotinus might well answer: )>Yes!((

Thus the xaii in xai 6pict,E (line 13) may (pace ATKINSON) be construed with the instances of xaii in xavi I6)vvUTCi ntap' 'Exivou) xai sXctoihrat si; ouoiciv nap' txsivou (lines 15 - 16). The self-constitution expressed by 8t' aiiov opitCi (line 13) is not at all at variance with the reliance on the One expressed by nap' txcivoO (line 16). ATKINSON takes36 the notion that this strengthening and perfecting (pfi)vvUTact xtX., lines 15- 17) described in the sentence which begins at line 13 are a further completion of vot); which follows upon its self-constitution, but does not explain how we are to understand this. He refers to 5, 1 [10], 5, 17-18: 4op(porat 8t 6XdXov g?v tp6iov 1Icpa TOi) tvO6, dXXov Tp6itov nap' a'itob. Plotinus here, however, goes on to compare this shaping by the One in terms of o6y; advancing to Opciotq which is reflected in chapter 7. If our interpretation of that language there is correct, then the shaping of vo6; by the One is accomplished by the One acting simply as power which contains the possibility

36 Note 3 above, 170- 171.


KEVIN CORRIGAN: Plotinus, 'Enneads' 5, 4 [71, 2 and Related Passages 195

of creating essence to be realized by voi5; in its self-constituting act of vision. This is to say that the action of the One (which consists simply in its being what it is) is prior to the self-constitution of voib;.

Kingston (Canada) FREDERIC M. SCHROEDER

PLOTINUS, 'ENNEADS' 5, 4 [7], 2 AND RELATED PASSAGES A New Interpretation of the Status of the Intelligible Object

It is generally accepted that in an early treatise, 5, 4, [7], 2, contrary to Plotinus' normal thinking, the One is regarded as an intelligible object (voIJtOv)'. The One, in its perfect immobility (reminiscent of the Numenian first vo06q)2 has >>a sort of conperception of itself< and of its entire content, and even possesses )>a thinking different from that of vof)

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