Conventional Prompt Global StrikeSilver Bullet or Shot in the Dark?

Steve Fetter, University of MarylandPrinceton University, 12 Nov 2008

CINCSTRATCOM

Prompt Global Strike

2002 Nuclear Posture Review“This report establishes a New Triad,composed of…offensive strike systems (bothnuclear and non-nuclear)…to reduce ourdependence on nuclear weapons andimprove our ability to deter attack in the faceof proliferating WMD capabilities.Non-nuclear strike capabilities may beparticularly useful to limit collateral damageand conflict escalation…Accurate and timelytargeting information can increase thepossibilities for non-nuclear strike capabilitiesto substitute for nuclear weapons.”

Space Command Master PlanOctober 2003

“A prompt global strike capability…will providewarfighting commanders the ability torapidly…neutralize targets in hours/minutes,even when US and allied forces have a limitedforward presence.Prompt global strike…can transform thewarfighter’s role in the future. Most notably, anon-nuclear strike capability, possibly in the formof a…ballistic missile or air launch system couldprovide the President and the Secretary ofDefense with a range of options.”

USAF Transformation Flight PlanNovember 2003

“A prompt, global attack capability…would likelybe used against extremely high value targetssuch as hardened command and controlfacilities, terrorists, air defense systems, ballisticmissile launchers, and CBRNE production,storage, and delivery. This capability would be akey enabler of the global response mission ofholding terrorist-related targets at riskeverywhere. It would also allow the US to projectpower almost immediately in areas with noforward-deployed forces or easy access.”

Prompt Global Strike Concepts• Near term

– Kinetic-energy warheads delivered by ICBM, SLBM,on fixed targets identified with existing intelligenceassets (COMINT, IMINT, HUMINT)

• Long term– Armed UAV delivered by ballistic missile or

hypersonic cruise missile (mobile targets)• Longer term

– Space-based radar– Directed energy weapons or KE warheads delivered

by orbital vehicle

2006 Quadrennial Defense Review• “The Department will develop a wider range of conven-

tional options…It will convert a small number of TridentSLBMs for use in conventional prompt global strike.”• 2 missiles on each of 12 SSBNs, armed with 4 KEP

warheads in Mk-4 RB with attached backpack withflap and GPS terminal guidance

• IOC within two years for $500 million• 20-year lifecycle cost: $1 billion

• “Prompt and high-volume global strike to deteraggression or coercion, and if deterrence fails, to providea broader range of conventional response to thePresident.”

Conventional Trident Modification (CTM)

GPS

VLF Comms

Above GroundAirfields/Facilities

Port

RV Release(Exoatmospheric)

Shore VLF

CAM

D5 CTM

FY07-08 Appropriations• FY07 request: $127M for Conventional Trident

Modification (CTM) program to demonstrate feasibility– Congress rejected request primarily because of

“nuclear ambiguity” concerns; requested NAS study• FY07 appropriation: $20M for “items which are common

to all global strike alternatives until the completion of thestudy and a determination has been made on the bestcourse of action.”

• FY08 appropriation: No funding for testing, fabrication ordeployment of CTM; $100M in the RDT&E Defense-Wide appropriation for development of promising CPGStechnologies.

NAS study

“analyze the mission requirement and, whereappropriate, consider and recommendalternatives that meet the prompt global strikemission in the near term (1-2 years), the mid-term (3-5 years), and the long term. Thestudy should include analyses of the military,political and international issues associatedwith each alternative. The study shouldconsider technology options for achievingdesired objectives as well as mitigating policyconcerns.”

Committee MembershipAl Carnesale, Chair, UCLAPaul Bracken, Yale UniversityPaul Davis, RANDSteve Fetter, University of MarylandJohn Foster, former DDRE, director LLNLEugene Fox, USA (Ret.), former deputy director SDIOAlec Gallimore, University of MichiganRichard Garwin, IBM, JASONSEugene Habiger, USAF (Ret.), former CINCSTRATDavid Kalbaugh, former assistant director APLDavid Montague, former president MSD, Lockheed-MartinRobert Oakley, former ambassador to PakistanWilliam Smith, USN (Ret.), former deputy CNOWalter Slocombe, former U/S for Policy, DoDJohn Stenbit, former CIO, DoDDavid Van Wie, director, Precision Engagement Center APLRobert Wertheim, USN (Ret.), former director, Strategic SystemsEllen Williams, University of Maryland, JASONS

Key Questions• Does the U.S. need CPGS capabilities?• What are the alternative CPGS systems and

how effective do they appear to be?• What would be the implications of

alternative CPGS systems for doctrine,decision-making, and operations?

• What ambiguity concerns arise from CPGS,and how might they be mitigated?

• What arms control and political/internationalissues arise with CPGS systems, and howmight they be resolved?

Do We Need CGPS?Possible missions:• Gathering of terrorist or rogue leaders

• 1998 strikes against al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan• 2003 attack on Dora Farms complex in Iraq

• Transshipment of WMD• Brown/Schlesinger scenario: stolen nuclear weapons

observed being loaded onto vehicles• Preemption of imminent attack

• Ballistic missile observed being readied for launch• Other strategic attacks?

Shouldn’t the President have a conventional option?Any past case in which PGS would have made a difference?

Finding 1

• There exist credible scenarios in whichCPGS would provide meaningful politicaland military advantages.

• In some scenarios, CPGS would eliminatethe dilemma of choosing to respond withnuclear use, or not responding at all.

Alternatives to CTMSea-based• CTM with modified RV for vertical attack• CTM-2: 2-stage Trident with single large penetrator• Submarine-Launched Ground-Strike Missile (SLGSM):

2-stage missile in SSGNs (2-3 per launch tube)Land-based• Conventional Minuteman (abandoned)• Conventional Strike Missile (CSM) with boost-glide

reentry vehicleAir-/sea-based• Hypersonic cruise missile

CPGS Alternatives Examined

Alternatives Originsa

Launch

Vehicles

Range (Payload

Dependent) b

Munitions

Payload

Capacity c

Earliest

IOC d

20-Yr Cost

(relative to

CTM) e

Existing systems USA, USAF,

USMC, USN

Cruise missiles,

tactical aircraft

and heavy

bombers

1,500- >6,000

nmi

1,000-2,000

lb

Available

now

NA

CTM USN

(sea -based)

Trident : D5 (3 -

Stage)

>4,000 nmi >1,000 lb 2011 1

CTM-2 Committee

(sea -based)

Trident : 2-

Stage

>4,000 nmi f 2,000 lb f 2013 3

SLGSM USN

(sea -based)

2 Stage Rocket

Booster

3,000 nmi 2,000 lb 2014-

2015

5-10

Boost-glide Missile

(CSM -1)

Committee/ USAF

(land-based)

Minotaur III >6,000 nmi 2,000 lb 2016-2020

10-20

Boost-glide

Missile

(CSM -2)

Committee/

USAF

(land-based)

Minotaur III >6,000 nmi (plus

additional glide

range vs. CSM -1)

2,000 lb 2018-

2024

10-25

Hypersonic

cruise missiles

USN ( sea-

based) or

USAF ( land-

based or

B-52)

Single -stage

rocket booster

2,000-3,000 nmi 1,000-2,000

lb

2020 -

2024

10-20

Finding 2

• CTM has majors advantages overalternative CPGS systems in schedule,cost, and technical risk.

• CTM is the only CPGS system that could beavailable in the near-term.

• CTM would be effective only against softtargets, but CTM-2 could be effectiveagainst hard targets.

Political and Strategic Issues• Command and control

– Presidential authorization should be required• Inappropriate or mistaken use

– unique capability requires rapid decisions– CPGS makes it too easy to start a war?

• Accidental nuclear use• Impact on nuclear forces and deterrence

– SSBN vulnerability?– distraction from “doomsay” mission?– raising the nuclear threshold?

Political and Strategic Issues• Ambiguity: mistaking CTM for nuclear attack

– Not a unique problem for CTM; cannot be solved byavoiding use of legacy nuclear systems.

– Only Russia could detect CTM launch• Russia might not detect launch• If Russia detects launch, it would easily determine

that Russia was not target• If Russia mistakenly believed it was target, Russia

would not retaliate to launch of 2-4 missiles• The US could notify Russia in advance of launch• Garwin’s LoJack for CTM

Political and Strategic Issues• Overflight, debris, collateral damage

– no new issues compared to existing systems• Access to/need for forwared bases

– limited CTM system would have no impact• Proliferation

– would CTM de-stigmatize ballistic missiles?• Arms control

– INF: prohibits all ground-based ballistic/cruise missiles– START: counts all launchers; test site restrictions– Moscow Treaty: no effect– Will CGPS be an issue in a new agreement?

Strategic Considerations

• Significant fraction of Russian nuclear forces (silo-based ICBMs, mobile ICBMs in shelters, SSBNs inport, bombers) potentially vulnerable to CPGS– Even if initially deployment small, could be rapidly

expanded using existing launchers• Advanced systems under development could be

capable of finding and destroying mobile ICBMs• How will Russia (and China) respond?

– More emphasis on SSBNs?– Retaliation in response to conventional attack?– Hardening/close-in defenses?

Recommendations• Near term (1-2 years)

• Test CTM to determine effectiveness.• Improve targeting, planning, and decision making; develop

policies and doctrines to support CPGS• Conduct R&D on alternatives

• Medium term (3-5 years)• If CTM is effective, proceed with full-scale production and

deployment.• Work with allies, Russia, and others to mitigate policy and

international concerns associated with CPGS capability.

• Long term• Conduct RDT&E for most promising CPGS options to

improve weapon effectiveness (maneuverability, accuracy,range and lethality).

• Continue work to mitigate policy and international issuesassociated with CPGS as they might arise.

Questions?