Justiceincontext:assessingcontextualismasanapproachtojusticeMichael Buckley*PhilosophyDepartment,LehmanCollege,CityUniversityofNewYork,NewYork,NY,USAAbstractMoral andpolitical philosophersareincreasinglyusingempirical datatoinformtheirnormativetheories. Thishassparkedrenewedinterest intoquestionsconcerningtherelationshipbetweenfacts andprinciples. Arecent attempt toframe these questions withinabroader approachtonormative theory comes from David Miller, who has on several occasions defended contextualismasthebestapproachtojustice. Millerarguesthatthecontextofdistributionitselfbringsoneoranotherpoliticalprincipleintoplay.Thispaperexaminesthisclaim.Itconsidersseveralplausiblestrategies for carrying out Millers general project and argues that each strategy fails. Nevertheless,theauthormaintainsthataninvestigationintowhytheyfail pavesthewayforaphilosophicallyplausibleaccountoftherelationshipbetweenfactsandprinciples.Keywords: justice; contextualism; global distributive justice; justication; JohnRawls;DavidMillerAnenduringprobleminmoral andpolitical philosophyconcerns therelationshipbetween facts and principles. Every normative theory must, either implicitly orexplicitly, address this relationship, because each theorys conception of justification,attribution, andobjectivityhinges onaninterpretationof it. Assuming, as manypolitical philosophersdo,thatprinciplesmustbejustifiedbytheconditionsoflifeas weknowit or not at all,1thenthegrowingbodyof empirical datacollectedfromthesocial andbiological sciences might safelybethought tobear ontheseinterpretations.2However, determining exactly how empirical data figures into themremainsaphilosophical, rather thananempirical, undertaking, forempirical datacanonlyhelpinform,butneverresolve,thisenduringproblem.Arecent attempt toframetheseissueswithinabroaderapproachtonormativetheory comes fromDavidMiller, who has onseveral occasions defendedcon-textualism as the best waytoapproachjustice.3Contextualismholds that it isthe context of distributionitself that brings one or other principles into play.4*Correspondenceto: Michael Buckley, Philosophy Department, Lehman College,City UniversityofNewYork,NewYork,NY,USA.Email:michael.buckley@lehman.cuny.eduEthics&Global PoliticsVol.5,No.2,2012,pp.7194#2012 M. Buckley. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 Unported License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/), permitting all non-commercial use,distribution,andreproductioninanymedium,providedtheoriginalworkisproperlycited.Citation:Ethics&Global Politics,Vol.5,No.2,2012,pp.7194.http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/egp.v5i2.897071Incontrast touniversalist approaches tojustice, whichviewprinciples as bothjustifiedindependentlyof theircontextof applicationanduniversallyapplicabletoall contexts, contextualismtreats diversepolitical issues interms of their uniquecontextual features rather thansystematicallyas part of*andansweredintermsof*an overarching theory of justice.5It does this by tracing systematic linksbetweenprinciples of justice andtheir contexts of application, andbyexposinganunderlying logic that we canbothgraspanduse as a critical tool toassessprevailingconceptionsofjusticeatanyparticularmoment.6Asaresult, contextu-alisminterpretstherelationshipbetweenfactsandprinciplesasinterdependent ormutuallysupportive.Miller thinks that contextualismis intuitivelyappealinginsofar as people tendtothinka just or unjust actiondepends onthe circumstances of the situation.7Inaddition, it accommodates apluralityof principles, whichheagainbelieves isappealinginsofar as it explains thepersistenceof diversemoral judgments acrossvariouspolitical issues. Andfinally, contextualismsupportstheideathat differentprinciples of justice are rationally justifiedinvirtue of their being tethered, butnotreduced, tofacts. Consequently, contextualismcomprisesanumberof relatedpositions that bear ontherelationshipbetweenfactsandprinciples: it isapiece-meal,pluralisticapproachthatavoidsintuitionism,relativism,andreductionismbydefendingnormativejudgments interms of alinkbetweenprinciples andfactualcircumstances.Miller frames his defense of contextualismin general terms, prompting theneed for further evaluative scrutiny, which he invites. This paper takes up hisinvitation. FollowingThomasPogge,itbeginsbydefendingtheclaimthatMillersgeneral viewis best labeled critical contextualism.8Critical contextualismtracessystematiclinksbetweenprinciplesof justiceandtheir contextsof application, asnotedearlier, but makes clear what seems implicit inMillers position, namely,that thedelineationof contexts must alsobejustified. Intheabsenceof furtherjustification, moral disputes over principles slip too easily into disputes overcompetingcontextual descriptions. If onepersondefendsaparticular responsetoglobal povertybyreferencetocontextA, andanotherdefendsadifferentresponseby reference tocontext B, thenit is difficult tosee howreferences tocontextsare anything but normative disputes themselves. Ideally, critical contextualismcanresolve the normative dispute by encompassing a non-normative defense ofthecontext. AsMillerputsit, clashesofprinciplewill not, ingeneral occur, oncethe context in which the distributive decision in question is being made isproperly specified.9I develop thisthought in CONTEXTUALISM AS CRITICALCONTEXTUALISM section, whereI arguethat Millers contextualismmust beinterpretedascritical contextualismif it istoavoid, asMiller putsit, sellingthepass toskepticism, relativism, conventionalismor any other viewthat discreditsjusticeasaworkableideaforsocialcriticismandsocialreform.10Assumingcritical contextualismisanaccurateinterpretationof Millersgeneralposition, it remains unclear howone might realize its several positions withinasingle approach, or whether such a realization is even possible. For example, can theM.Buckley72delineationof acontext admit of aclear anduncontroversial description? Is theaccount of pluralismsufficiently critical to avoidskepticism, relativism, or con-ventionalism?Doprinciplesappropriatetoonecontext everconflict withanother,and,ifso,isthereacontextualsolutiontotheconflict?Miller responds to these questions by drawing heavily onempirical research.I argue in DELIMITINGTHE CONTEXT: MILLERS STRATEGYANDITSPROBLEMSsectionthat thisstrategyisinsufficientlycritical, sinceit istooaccommodatingof thestatusquoandthusincapableof providingaworkableideaforsocial criticism. IdevelopanalternativestrategyinTHREEDISTRIBUTIVECONTEXTS section, where systematic links between principles and contextsarepresentedinterms of amirroringrelationshipbetweenaprinciples directiveandthecontextual factsthat generateclaimstoresources. Theideaisthat if oneabstractsfromdistributivecontextsfamiliartothephilosophicalliteratureonglobaljustice, one can expose the formal structure underlying a persons claim to resources.Assuming these formal structures capture legitimate claims, plausible principlesofjusticemustsharethesameformalstructureinordertoanswertheclaim.InJUSTIFICATIONINCONTEXTsection, Iarguethatthisformal strategyrealizes many of the key features of critical contextualism. However, the strategy offersno contextual way of balancing conflicts between distributive contexts. Specifically, itcannot adjudicate situations where the defense of a principle inone context isconceptually linked to the defense of a principle in another context. Having failed todevelopacontextualanswertowhatIframeasapriorityproblem,Iarguethattheseveralplausiblestrategiesforexplaininghowcontextualismmighttracesystematiclinksbetweenprinciplesandfactualcontextsfail torealizethedistinctivefeaturesofcontextualism.Thesefindings raisedoubtsabout whether critical contextualismcanrealizeitsseveral positions within a distinct approach. However, I do not further conclude fromthese doubts that contextualism is without insight. Indeed, an investigation into whythe several strategies fail paves the way for outlining a distinct, philosophicallyplausible account of the relationship between facts and principles in normativetheory,whichIidentifyintheconclusion.Asaresult,onemightviewthispaperasworking within the spirit of Millers invitation to scrutinize, examine and develop thecontextualdimensionsofnormativepoliticaltheory.CONTEXTUALISMASCRITICALCONTEXTUALISMA contextual approach to justice reflects a number of related positions. It is pluralisticinsofarasdifferentcontextsofdistributionsupporttheappropriatenessofdifferentprinciples; it is objective insofar as judgments based on principles find rationalgroundsofjustificationinalinkwithfactualcircumstances;anditiscritical insofaras justifiedprinciples serveas independent criteriaagainst whichsocial practicesandinstitutions are judgedandfoundwanting. To illustrate the key idea, takethefactual circumstancessurroundingorgantransplants. ThesecircumstancesareJusticeincontext73usuallysufficientlyrobust toat least ruleout asinappropriatecertaindistributiveprinciples. For example, the principle first-come-first-served makes little sense ifthebiological matchbetweenakidneyandarecipientiscrucial totheoperationslong-term success. In this and other cases, the relevant distribution principle dependson facts about what is being distributed and to whomit is being distributed.Referencestothesefactsjustifytheprinciple.Miller is not alone in thinking the context important to the justification ofprinciples. Rawlsexpressesasimilaridea. Henotes, it isthedistinct structureofthesocial framework, andthepurposeandroleof itsvariouspartsandhowtheyfit together, that explainwhythere are different principles for different kinds ofsubjects.11On this view, the distributive context plays a distinct justificatoryrole. Different principlesarejustifiedinvirtueof their appropriatefit todifferentsubjects or contextual circumstances. Miller describesthe fit as follows: in contextCitisalwaysrighttodistributetherelevantgoodsandbadsaccordingtoprincipleP.12Provided we can identify the unique features of context C, we can thenrationallyexplainanddefendtheappropriatenessof principlePwithout referenceto a more fundamental or transcendental principle. Given a variety of distinctcontextual situations, it further follows that there is a plurality of equallyfundamental principlesthatisneitherderivedfrom, norrepresentsthesubstantiveapplicationsof,anoverarchingprincipleofjustice.13Onemight reasonablyresist theclaimthat contextualismisrationallygroundedandthussufficientlycritical bycitingtheworkofMichaelWalzer.Walzersmannerof identifying distributive spheres, or contexts, captures a factual component(the factual social meaning of a particular good) and matches these factualelements to normative directives (the principles that inform the goods distribution).OnWalzers view, thecrucial mediumof social relations is asharedconceptionof what thegoods areandwhat theyarefor.14It is this sharedsocial meaningthatdeterminesthedistributionofaparticulargood.Moreover,[m]enandwomentakeonconcreteidentitiesbecauseof thewaytheyconceiveandcreate, andthenpossess andemploy social goods.15As a result, bothdistributive principles andjudgmentsabout themarebasedonpeoplesdeepest senseof howtheyought tolive,orhowwemeantoliveanddontyetlive.16Sincethesemeaningsarerootedinculture, distributiveprinciples*alongwiththeoperativeconceptions of moralpersons*areculturallyrelative.WhileWalzerslineof reasoningcouldgenerateagreement onthefacts (inananthropological sort of way), hiscontextualismfailstobecritical inthefollowingsense: principlesfail toserveasindependentcriteriaagainstwhichsocial practicescanbe assessedandfoundwanting. This is because the defense of principles isbasedontheverysocial values(andpractices)theprinciplesaremeant toassess.Walzer readilyconcedes thepoint. Heviews thesocial criticas aninterpreter ofa societys history and culture*one who assesses the fit between a societysinstitutions and ideals. Those best positioned to interpret this fit are those raised inthe society.17Outside criticism is generally illegitimate, because knowledge about theM.Buckley74social fabricof society*essential totheinterpretation*isgenerallyunavailabletoforeigners.18Walzers contextualism illustrates the following point. To avoidrelativismorconventionalism, principles must be sufficiently independent of cultural bias so as toserveasindependent criteriaagainst whichprevailingnormsandthepoliciestheysupport can be assessed. It is not enough to trace systematic links between principlesof justice andtheir contexts of application. Acritical contextualismmust tracesystematiclinksbetweenprinciplesandcontextsthatarethemselvesjustified.It is not always clear whether Miller views his conceptionof social criticismasbeingsignificantlydifferent fromWalzers, becausehesometimescitesWalzersviewasanillustrationofcontextualism.19However,ifcontextualismistoavoid,asMiller puts it, sellingthe pass toskepticism, relativism, conventionalismor anyother viewthat discreditsjusticeasaworkableideafor social criticismandsocialreform,thenWalzerservesasapoormodel.20WemustinsteadfollowPogge,whosuggests anchoringthedelimitationof thecontext inamoreobjectivedefense.21Supposingwecanobjectivleydefendthedelimitation, thentheprinciples appro-priate to the context are likewise firmly anchored, and thus able to serve asindependentmetricsofassessment.Tracing systematic links between principles and contexts that are themselvesjustifiedsuggeststhefollowing. Inadditiontojustifyingaprincipleasappropriatetosomecontext,thedelineationofthecontextrequiresaself-standingjustification.Intheabsenceofaself-standingjustification,moraldebatesoverprinciplessliptooeasilyintodebatesovercompetingcontexts.Howmight thecontext bejustified? As I havejust describedit, contextualismseems toimplyadivisionof labor betweenthejustificationof acontext andthejustification of a normative principle appropriate to the context. This suggestsachievingtheformerdefensepriortothelatter, whichinturnsuggeststhearrowsofjustificationpointinonedirection, fromthefactscomprisingthecontexttotheprincipleofdistribution.Insomecases,thecontextual factsmightimplyaimsthatinturnmovejustificationsmoothlyfromfactstoprinciples, asperhapsinthecaseof organtransplants. However, therearetwoproblems withthis approach. First,the arrangement of facts comprising a context might be complex and open tocompeting interpretations.22Consider the question: why have some societies becomerich while others have remained poor? Historical studies and development economicsoffer competing answers.23For example, while there are goodreasons to thinkdomestic institutions*such as dependable property rights, law, bureaucraticcapacity, andindependentcourts*arecausallyefficaciousforeconomicgrowth, itisunclearwhetherthesefactorsaresufficientlyinsulatedfromglobal structurestobe independently efficacious.In theabsence ofa resolution amongrival explanatorytheories,thecontextcannotbedescribedclearlyanduncontroversially.Onemight object tothis bynotingthat whilenodominant explanatorymodelcurrently exists, further empirical work couldyieldone. As withother areas ofempirical investigation, thesupportingdatacanmountinfavorofonetheoryoveranother, at whichpoint thecontext of distributionwouldbejustifiedonfamiliarJusticeincontext75empirical grounds. But this leads to a second, more troubling philosophicaldifficulty; namely, that theverypurposeof identifyingcertainfacts insupport ofanormativeprinciple is alreadyguidedbyapractical enterpriseinfluencedbyavariety of social factors. Here the problemis not that of reconciling competingempirical accounts through further empirical research. Rather, the problemisestablishingaclear anduncontroversial descriptionof thecontext. This problemmight result becausepeopleassigndifferent weightstothefactsagreedon. Sincethe assignment of weights is not itself determined by the facts (for if it were,then those further facts would be subject to competing assignments as well,suggestinganinfinite regress), the different descriptions are incommensurable.24Ortheproblemmightresultfromavarietyofmorecomplicatedreasonsadvancedbyphilosophers as diverseas Nietzsche, Gadamer, Quine, Davidson, andRorty.Thesephilosophers haveproblematizedtheconceptions of rationalityandrealityon which clear and uncontroversial descriptions of facts are normally based.In the process, they challenge the very possibility of developing a self-standingjustificationof aparticular context basedonempirical data. Intheabsenceof anuncontroversial description, little justificatory force is gained by referencing contexts,becausedisputesoverprinciplessimplysliptodisputesovercontextual interpreta-tions. ThisunderminesMillersclaimthatclashesof principlewill not, ingeneraloccur, once the context in which the distributive decision in question is being made isproperlyspecified.25Howmightonerespondtothesenotableandtroublingphilosophicalchallenges?There are at least three possibilities. First, one might concede their points bycouching interpretations of contexts in terms of reflective equilibrium.26Second, onemight concede their points by specifying interpretations of contexts interms ofpoliticalproblemsinneedofrectification.27Third,onemightjettisontheideaofaself-standing justification by construing the relationship between principles andcontext as mutually supportive. Miller opts for the third strategy, which is sometimesspecifiedasamodifiedversionof thefirst.28Heclaimsthatdistributiveprinciplesbothreflect andhelpconstitute contextual circumstances.29Inthe next section,IexplorethisideaandarguethatMillersexecutionofitisinsufficientlycritical.DELIMITINGTHECONTEXT:MILLERSSTRATEGY ANDITSPROBLEMSIdentifyinganinterdependent relationshipbetweenprinciples andcontextsisanexercise injustification*we are looking for principles appropriate to a context.Millerconceivespolitical justificationintermsof alinkbetweentheepistemicandpractical dimensions of political philosophy. Acondition for a theorys beingvalid, Miller writes, isthat it shouldbepossiblefor peopletocometoaccept itandliveaccordingtoitsprinciples.30Principlescannotmakeimpossibledemandsonus andstill bepubliclyjustifiable; nor cantheydemandasocial order toofarfromourinstitutional capacitiestobepracticablyfeasible.31PublicjustificationandM.Buckley76practical feasibilityplacelimitsontheappropriatenessofprinciples, andthesetwolimitspredominatelycharacterizeMillersapproachtojustification.Whenfixingontheselimits,Millerisacutelyawareofthephilosophicalproblemsthey create. For example, when identifying co-citizenship as a factual limit onthe feasibility of global justice, Miller notes that this seems totake for grantedaninstitutional arrangement that might itself beregardedasunjust: theexistenceof separate states eachdeliveringaseparate bundle of rights, opportunities, andresourcestoitsownmembers, but not tooutsiders.32Miller seemstoimagineahypothetical critic arguing that co-citizenship, while indeed a fact, represents ahistorically contingent fact in need of justification, and it is a mistake to treatthiscontingent fact asalimitingconditiononaprinciplesjustification. Todoso,the critic might continue, is to turnthe critical relationship betweenprinciplesandinstitutionsonitshead. Ratherthanprinciplesservingasindependentcriteriaagainst whichinstitutions are assessedandfoundwanting, the institutions serveasfixedpointsagainstwhichprinciplesarejudgedfeasible. Thisunderminestheircriticalfunctionbyprivilegingthestatusquoandplacingitbeyondreproach.Miller recognizes theproblem, but rather thanabandonreference tofacts, herecasts the challenge as one about determining whichfacts count as contextuallimits our theorymust recognizeas fixed, andwhichcount as contingencies ourtheorysprinciplesmightalter.33Assuming,asmanypolitical philosophersdo,thatprinciplesmust bejustifiedbytheconditionsof lifeasweknowit or not at all,thechallengemight beframedas follows.34Whendefendingaset of principles,one must avoid confusing cultural or historical contingencies with fixed limits, or elseone unwittingly affirms the status quo. But one must also avoid confusing thefixedlimitswithcontingentfacts,orelseoneunwittinglycreatesauseless,utopiantheory. Rawls identifies thesameproblem. For Rawls, thereis aquestionabouthowthelimits of thepracticablypossiblearediscernedandwhat theconditionsof our social worldinfact are.35Theproblemis that thelimits of thepossiblearenotgivenbytheactual,forwecantoagreaterorlesserextentchangepoliticalandsocialinstitutionsandmuchelse.36Like Miller, Rawls relates this problem to the practical roles of political philosophy.Onesuch role isto orientate the publictowarda possible way of viewingits politicalandsocial relations; theother is toreconcilethepublicwithcertainfacts abouthuman relations discovered overtime.37Pursuing these aims simultaneously impliesconstructingthemost just theorypossible. Whilefeasibilityplacesaconstraint onjustification, practical expedience must not be purchasedat the price of leavinga more just, albeit less expedient, alternative on the table.38As Rawls puts it,normativetheoryshouldidentifyarealisticutopia.ThequestioniswhetherMillersufficientlymeetsthischallenge.Ascharacterizedearlier,thelimitsofthepracticablypossibleimplyatheorycanerreitherby failingtoreachtheouteredgeof thelimit or bytransgressingit. Thesetwopossibilitiesobtainbecause(1)factsserveasaceilingbeyondwhichour moral idealsbecomesheer fancy and (2) principles serve as a floor below which our practical observationsexpose mere expedience. The relationship between facts and principles portrayed byJusticeincontext77this challenge canbe characterizedas mutually supportive; facts andprinciplescheckeachother. Thechallengeis toexplainthis relationshipinamanner thatpreserves boththe critical functionof principles andthe feasibility constraint offacts. Miller, Iargue, employsastrategythat failstopreservethecritical functionofprinciples.Toseethis, consider Millerspublicjustifiabilityconstraint. Apubliclyjustifiedtheoryof justiceisonethatappearsnolongerasanexternal impositionconjuredup by the philosopher, but as a clearer and more systematic statement of theprinciplesthat peoplealreadyhold.39Inotherwords, atheorysprinciplesshouldnot transgress the factual limits of the practicably possible. This is importantbecausepolitical philosophy, asabranchof practical reasons, aimstoinformandgovernthejudgmentsof citizensintheir support anddeliberationof institutionalstructuresandsocialpractices.40Asetofpoliticalprinciplescannoteffectivelyservethisaimif itplacesforeignoridealisticobligationsonthoseitismeanttogovern.Miller, inanefforttoguardagainstthiserror, looksempiricallyatthejudgmentsandbehaviorofpeoplewhentheyallocateresourcesindifferentcontexts.41Intheabsence of empirical testing, Miller worries that themoral ideals embodiedinapolitical theory risk becoming utopian in the pejorative sense of the word. A utopiantheoryisaninvalidtheory,since,asalreadynoted,aconditionforatheorysbeingvalidisthatitshouldbepossibleforpeopletoacceptit.However, whyshouldwesuppose, asMillersargumentwouldhaveussuppose,that theempirical datareliedon, whichdescribes actual beliefs, set thelimit forwhat people might possibly accept? Obviously, the beliefs and behaviors ofSouthern Americans prior to 1865 set public justifiability constraints on the abolitionof slavery. It certainly was impossible for themtowillingly accept emancipation.But toinfer fromthistheinvalidityof aslave-freesociety, andtofurther suggestthe impossibility of accepting such a society at some point inthe future, is toconfuse historically contingent facts with contextual limits our theory must recognizeasfixed.Empirical data concerning actual beliefs cannot informus as tothe status ofthose beliefs. HereRawls is instructive. For Rawls, correct normativejudgmentsand the facts to which they refer depend on our having first taken up somenormativestandpoint.42Toillustratethis,Rawlsnotesthatslaveryisunjustbecauseit allowssometoownothers. It isthisfact andnot thefact that slaveryoccurredinsomeplacesoratcertaintimesthatmakesslaverywrong. Thefirstfactreflectsthe so-called right-and-wrong-making characteristics, which we can identifybecause a constructivist procedure is framedtoyieldthe principles andcriteriathat specifywhichfacts about actions, institutions, persons, andthesocial worldgenerally,arerelevantinpoliticaldeliberation.43Intheabsenceofawayofdiscer-ningcontingentfromnon-contingentfacts,atheoryrisksprivilegingthestatusquoatthepriceofamorejustalternative.Apolitical theorydevelopinganinterdependent relationshipbetweenprinciplesandfacts must balance empirical data witha methodfor morally assessing thedatas relevance. To some extent, Millers reliance on a second type of factualM.Buckley78consideration,presuppositional evidence,is meant to achieve thisbalance, becauseit aimstodrawanalytical distinctionsbetweensocial valuesthatcanthenbeusedto interpret empirical findings. The general idea is that unless certainfacts arepresupposedtoholdtrueforcertainkindsof associations, thenormativeconceptsordinarily used to assess those associations become irrelevant or unfeasible.44For example, it is sometimes arguedthat our ordinary concept of social justicerequires, asapresuppositional condition, somethinglikeHumescircumstancesofjustice.45Likewise, Miller develops several modes of association that explain certaindistributive concepts commonly applied in contemporary liberal society. Theseincludesolidaristicassociationssuchasthefamily, instrumental associations suchas the corporation, andpolitical associations suchas the state. Eachassociationhas acorrespondingdistributionprinciplethat not onlyreflects thecharacter ofgrouprelations but alsohelps toconstitutethose relations for the future.46Forexample, need identifiestheproperprincipleforsolidaristicassociations, desertcaptures theappropriateprinciplefor instrumental relations, and, withinpoliticalassociations, equalitydeterminesjust distributions. Intheabsenceof presupposi-tionalconditions,suchascommonidentitywithinsolidaristicassociations,certaindistributiveprinciplessuchasneedcannot hold.Asaresult,presuppositionalfactsplacefeasibilityconstraintsonappropriateprinciples,butthoseprinciplesalsohelpisolatedcertainfactsasrelevanttonormativeassessment.Thus,thereisamutuallysupportiverelationshipbetweenthemoralconceptandafact.While this approachrisks reintroducingthe sort of conventionalismassociatedwithWalzer,47I thinkanalternativewayof carryingit out provides apromisingstrategy for establishing an interdependent relationship between principles andcontexts, and I suggest such an alternative in the next section. Presenting a plausibleversion, however, facessignificantchallengesnotonlyillustratedbytheaforemen-tionedriskof conventionalismbut alsobyMillers characterizationof theglobaljustice mode of association. He describes this relation as one among nationsformingindependentpoliticalcommunitieswithinterestsindeterminingthefutureof theirowncommunity, rather thanamongpeoplewhoarecitizensof thesamepolitical community.48The presuppositional fact implicit inthis mode, namely,the relations among self-determining political units, places a feasibility constraint onappropriateprinciplesof global justice. But fromwheredoesthisconstraint arise?Miller again relies on empirical research, noting that philosophers working onglobal justice can elaborate principles that are consistent with what can be regardedas commonground amongsocial scientistsworkinginthearea.49Thecommonground includestheobservationthatdomesticfactors . . .playatleastasignifi-cant part inexplainingtherelativewealthandpovertyof nations, andthat thisisenough to ground an investigation of national responsibility.50Apparently, thequestionis not what institutions weought tohave, but what theinstitutions wecurrentlyhavewouldhavetodotobejustified.51Thisisaperfectlylegitimatequestion, but evenaplausibleresponsetoit doesnot answer the challenge Miller sets himself. Recall, the challenge is todiscernwhich facts count as contextual limits our theory must recognize as fixed andJusticeincontext79whichcount as contingencies our theorys principles might alter.52Social scienceconcerningexistingassociationscannotanswerthisquestion,sinceexistingassocia-tion do not exhaust the set of feasible associations. In order to know whether a theoryhasreachedthefeasiblelimits,wemustdistinguishbetweenhistoricallycontingentinstitutionsour theorysprinciplesmightalterandnon-contingent institutionsourtheory must recognize as fixed. In the absence of this distinction, we risk purchasingafeasibletheoryatthepriceofamorejust,albeitlessexpedient,alternative.Millersrelianceonempirical datahasbeencriticizedforavarietyof reasonsinother places.53I have focused my argument around Millers own standard ofcriticism, arguing that Millers reliance on empirical data does not avoid, as heputsit,sellingthepasstoskepticism,relativism,conventionalismorany otherviewthat discredits justiceas aworkableideafor social criticismandsocial reform.54Itdoesnotprovideaworkableideaofsocialcriticismbecauseitsmanneroftestingnormativeprinciplesisnot balancedagainst amechanismfor testingthestatusoffacts. Expressed in terms of the limits of the practicably possible, it does not identifyboththe facts serving as a ceiling beyondwhichour moral ideals become sheerfancyandtheprinciplesservingasthefloorbelowwhichourpracticalobservationsexpose mere expedience. Rather, it risks purchasing feasibility and public acceptanceatthepriceofexpedience.The analysis of Millers strategy, however, exposes contextualismto a moregeneral difficulty, for if the identification of non-contingent factual limits firstrequires normativeprinciples, thenit cannot alsobetruethat thejustificationofnormative principles first requires the identification of non-contingent factuallimits. Nor canone beginwith a normative standpoint in order to informtheselection of contextual facts, because one would then require a non-normativejustificationof this standpoint.55If eachrouteassumes havingfirst traversedtheother, then how can a critical contextualism realize the otherwise appealing idea thatprinciples are justified by virtue of a mutually supportive fit within different contexts?I noted previously that Millers modes of association suggest a promisingapproach. Rather thanprovideaself-standingjustificationof contexts, or defendtheconnectionbetweenprinciplesandmodesofassociationonempirical grounds,or beginwithmoral concepts inorder toisolaterelevant facts, wemight insteadabstractfrommodesofdistributionwidelyidentifiedinthephilosophical literaturein order to analyze their formal structures. If the formal structures expose themannerinwhichcertainclaimstoresourcesoriginate,thenthosestructuresincludewithin themsome minimal normative content*a persons claimto resources.Principlesansweringtheseclaimscanbesaidtofit themodeof associationanddetermine howresources shouldbe distributed. This formal approachcanthenexplainthefitintermsofanunderlyinglogical relationshipbetweenaprinciplesdirectiveandtheoriginsofaclaim.Itisthisunderlyinglogicratherthanthemoralconceptsorempirical datathatgeneratesthecritical leverageforassessingexistinginstitutions and practices. I now turn to this alternative strategy to see whether it canrealizethe severalpositions associatedwith a criticalcontextualism.M.Buckley80THREEDISTRIBUTIVECONTEXTSIn this section I examine the formal structures of three distributive contexts commontothe global justice literature. The aimis toexplainthe idea of anunderlyinglogic[betweenprinciplesandcontexts]thatwecanbothgraspanduseasacriticaltool when assessing the prevailing conceptions of justice.56The three contextsarenot meant tobeexhaustive. Rather, theyaremeant toillustrateanalternativewayofexplainingtheinterdependentrelationshipbetweenprinciplesandcontexts.To avoidconfusion, I note at the outset that I amnot trying to defend thesethreecontexts. Rather, Iassumetheminordertobetterexplainwhatismeantbythefit betweenprinciples andcontexts, andhowanunderlyinglogic might beused to generate the critical leverage expected of principles. This assumption shouldwork in favor of critical contextualism. However, as I explain in the next section, thisstrategyalsofailstorealizeallthedistinctelementsofcriticalcontextualism.Twoofthethreecontextsareprevalentinthephilosophical literature, includingthe global justice literature. Following Rawls, I will refer toone as anallocativeassociationandthe other as a pure procedural association.57Allocative andpureprocedural associationscapturedistinct relationsbetweenthegoodsdelivered, theparties receiving or providing goods, andthe manner inwhichclaims togoodsoriginate. I will argue that these contexts informthe structure of the normativedirectivesmeanttogoverntheassociations, becauseprinciplesrespondingtothesedistinct relations must be structured in particular ways if they are to properlyrespond,orreflect,thecircumstancestheyaremeanttogovern.Consider an allocative association, which involves the allocation of existinggoodsamongnon-cooperativeagents,oragentshavingnothingtodowithcreatingthe goods distributed. The discernable features of anallocative context include:(1)theagents[states,individuals]whoseneeds,desires,capacities,andpreferencesareknown, andbetweenwhomallotmentsof bundlesof goodstakeplace, (2)thefact that those receivingallotments have not producedthe goods delivered, and(3) the absence of a shared institutional arrangement between donors and recipients.As aresult, therecipients claims arenot basedontheir productiveefforts or onreasons citingsharedinstitutional arrangements. Instead, claimsarebasedontherecipients particular characteristics, such as their need for certain resources.Similarly, donors areidentifiedbysomecharacteristic, suchas capacity, invirtueofwhichtransfersmightbedeemedmorallyobligatory.Giventhediscernablefeaturesof anallocativeassociation, normativedirectivesgoverning it must identify both the characteristics of recipients by which entitlementsaredeterminedandthecharacteristicsofdonorpartiesbywhichremedialresponsi-bilitiesareassigned.58Forexample,theprincipletoeachaccordingtoneed,fromeachaccordingtoabilityreflectsanallocativecontext insofarasit directsthetransferofsome already made good from one group to another based on specific characteristicsof eachgroup. Rawlss dutyof assistance provides another example. For Rawls,thedutytoassistobligateswell-orderedsocietiestoassistthosestatesthatcouldbewell-ordered savefortheirwantofhuman,material,technological,orinstitutionalJusticeincontext81capital.59The underlying logical structure of an allocative principle is captured by thefollowing decision-makingrules:ResourceEntitlementRule(RER). Allocateresourcemtoagentawheneverameetscriterionx.RemedialTransferRule(RTR). Ifagentbmeetscriterion y,allocateresourcemfrombtoa whenever ameetsthepreviousRERcondition.Herexandyrepresent substantivecriteriabywhichallocations aredeemedjust.UsingRawlssdutyof assistanceasanexampleof asubstantiveprinciple, wecanfillinthevariablesasfollows:Ifsocietybiswell-ordered(y),thenallocateresourcemtosocietyaif societyas needs results onlyfromawant of human, material,technological,orinstitutionalcapital(x).Rawlss dutyof assistance has beencriticizedfor failingtoaddress the effectsof an increasingly complex global marketplace.60According to this criticism, arelevantcontextual featureof global distributivejusticeisaglobal economicordercomparableinextentandindistributional effectstothedomesticeconomicorder.Assuch, themoral dimensionsofglobal povertymustbeanalyzedunderthelightofaglobaleconomicbasicstructure.Thosetakingthisperspectiveframeglobal distributivejusticeintermsof apureprocedural context. Apure procedural context involves the distributionof goodscreatedbyanddistributedamongcooperativeagents.Itssalientfeaturesincludeaninstitutional order within which production and subsequent distribution takesplace. Theprinciples appropriatetothis context set backgroundeconomicrules,and are thus prior to both production and distribution and therefore involveneithertheideaofanalreadyexistingpool ofstufftobedoledoutnortheideaofalreadyownedresourcestoberedistributed.61Within a pure procedural association, a persons claimto a resource derivesfrom ones having played by the rules governing the institutional order. Distributionsare determined not by an allocative principle redistributing already producedgoodsfromonepartytoanotheronthebasisof their specificcharacteristics, butrather by a pure procedural principle governing the background economic structure.Asinthecaseofalottery,wherebyeachpersonisgivenanequalchancetoreceivea good, the outcome*whatever it might be*is appropriate inlight of the rulesandpurposesofthedistributiveprocess.In a pure procedural association, claims to resources originate with onescooperativeeffortincreatingthegoodsunderasharedsetofinstitutional arrange-ments. Akey function of a pure procedural principle is to define appropriatedistributions in terms of legitimate expectations. Capitalistic economies governed byprivatepropertyrulesillustratethepoint:distributionsresultfromvariousdecisionsmade within a marketplace and no attempt is made to redistribute already producedM.Buckley82resourcesonthebasisofspecificcharacteristicsofparticularindividuals.62Instead,supply anddemanddetermines distributions throughaprice-coordinatedsystemofexchangeaffectedbytheinnumerabledecisionsofconsumersandproducers.Wecanexpresstheunderlyinglogicofpureprocedural principlesmoreformallybynotingthefollowingdecision-makingrules:PublicStructureRule(PSR). If structure z is a unified structure of cooperation, then z is to be ordered by a set ofpublic rules against which claims to resources can be made and judged legitimate.LegitimateExpectationsRule(LER). IfaactsinaccordancewiththepublicrulesidentifiedbyPSR,thenaisentitledtowhateverdistributionfollowsfromactinginaccordancewiththoserules.Noticethat apureproceduralassociationislogicallydistinctfromanallocativeone.Whereasthelatteridentifiesappropriateholdingsonthebasisofcertaincharacter-istics of particular individuals, the former identifies anappropriate set of publicrulesagainst whichlegitimateexpectationsareformedandholdingsdeemedjust.Alogically sound defense of a distributive principle depends on its fit with adistributive association. For those citing domestic factors as the cause of globalpoverty, theproblemofglobal distributivejustice(ifthereissuchaproblem)istoidentify the relevant characteristics by which recipients are entitled and donorsobligated to transfer existing goods. Pure procedural principles of distributive justice,suchasRawlssdifferenceprinciple,areconceptuallyinappropriatetothiscontext,sincethemannerinwhichtheyadjudicateconflictingclaimsdependsonaunifiedstructureofcooperationwithinwhichproductionandsubsequentdistributiontakesplace. In the absence of a unified structure of cooperation, pure procedural principlescannot performtheir key function, namely, to order the public rules governingunifiedschemesanddeterminingthelegitimacyofclaims.Conversely, thosecitingglobal economicinstitutionsasthecauseofpovertymustfindallocativeprincipleslogically inappropriate, because they merely redirect the holdings of preexistinggoods. However, the problemdoes not rest onthe redistributionof preexistinggoods*the problem rests on the inappropriate rules governing the global institutionswithinwhichproductiontakesplace.Whileallocative andpureprocedural contexts framemanyphilosophical argu-ments on global distributive justice, a third context is appropriate in some cases. I callthis third context a transitive context, since it reflects claims arising from externalizedburdens, that is, harms createdbyonegroupbut experiencedbyanother grouphavingnothingtodowithcreatingtheharms. Thequestionof atransitivecontextisthis: towhat extent must someindividualsor stateshonor theclaimsof otherswithwhomtheyshareacommonstructurebutnocooperativerelation?Atransitiverelation is distinct froma pure procedural one, since the latter focuses on thecooperativeeffortswithinaunifiedstructureofinstitutionsandidentifieslegitimateJusticeincontext83expectations in light of public rules. However, those rules say nothing aboutthe effects of cooperative decisions onother parties througha sharedbut non-cooperativestructure,suchasasharedecosystem.Thesesharedstructuresprovideconduits throughwhichbenefits createdbyone grouppass over andtake effectasburdensforanothergrouphavingnothingtodowithcreatingthoseburdens.63As a decision made within a cooperative association might create a costly andcoerciveimpositiononanother non-cooperatingparty, thelatter partymayhavelegitimateclaimsagainstthefirst.Akeyfunctionof transitiveprinciplesistoidentifytheparticularcharacteristicsbywhichtransferredburdensareassessed. Anotherkeyfunctionistoidentifythelinks throughwhichremedial responsibilities areassigned. Giventhesefunctions,the normative directive must specify a point at whichanexternalizedburdenisdeemed illegitimate. We can express its logical structure with the following decision-makingrules:TheExternalityRule(ER). Ifnon-cooperativestructurezcanfacilitatetheexternalizationofburdenxfroma to b, then z must be constrained by criterion y, which identifies a pointbelowwhichtheexternalityisillegitimate.RemedialTransitiveRule(RTR). Ifburdenxiscreatedbyaandrealizedinbthrough(ER)suchthattheburdencausesbtofallbelowy,thenbisentitledtoresourcesreestablishinglevely.Whileatransitivecontexthasauniquestructure, itsharesfeatureswithbothpureprocedural andallocativecontexts. Likepureprocedural contexts, it tiesresourceclaims to shared structures that help determine and shape distributions. Likeallocative contexts, it identifies a criterion for assessing resource holdings on the basisof specific information about particular agents. The similarities can sometimesleadtoconfusionoverwhetheradistributiveprinciplefitsoneoranothercontext,but one way to contrast the three distributive contexts is to ask the following.(1) Arethedistributedresources createdthroughthecooperativeefforts of thosereceivingthedistribution?(2)Dopartiesshareastructurethathelpsdeterminethedistributions?(3)Issomeevaluativecriterionrequiredtoassesspeoplesindividualresourceholdings? Allocativecontexts answer no tothefirst twoquestions andyes tothelast. Pureprocedural contexts answer yes tothefirst twoquestionsandnotothelast,andtransitivecontextsanswernotothefirstandyestothelasttwoquestions.JUSTIFICATIONINCONTEXTThedistributivecontextsidentifiedpreviouslyareformal inthattheyidentifyhowthestructureofanassociationdeterminesthemannerinwhichclaimstoresourcesM.Buckley84originate.Thestructureinturninformsthekeyfunctionsofaprinciplerespondingtothese claims. Inorder for the principle toanswer aclaim, its structure mustreflect theformof associationwithinwhichtheclaimoriginates. It isinvirtueofthisreflectionthatprinciplesaresaidtofittheircontextsof application, anditisintheanalysis of thecontext that this fit canbesaidtoexpress anunderlyinglogic*for once the associationis analyzedas anallocative, pure procedural, ortransitive association, thenthe normative theorist will knowinstantly what kindofformalprincipleisrequiredtoanswertheclaim.Moreover, theformal strategyinformstherelevanceof empirical data. That is,empiricaldataarerelevantwhenitfillsoutthedetailsoftheformalassociation.Weare to look for data determining which association is appropriate to the moralanalysis of political issues, suchas, poverty, publichealth, resourceconflict, andhumanmigration. Insome cases, the data might not sufficiently determine theappropriatenessofoneassociation.Inothercases,thedatamightmountinfavorofone association over another. Nevertheless, the formal strategy provides a perspectivefrom which to interpretand clarify the relevanceof empiricaldata to moral analysis.Togivetheseabstractconsiderationssomecontent,considertheeffectsofglobalwarmingontheHimalayanglaciersandTibetanplateau.Theseglaciersareamongthe worlds largest freshwater catchments andthe source of freshwater for over1 billion people.64Stable glaciers act as seasonal watertowers, locking fresh water inthewinter andreleasingit graduallythroughout thewarmingmonths. Accordingto the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), changes in snowandglacier melt, aswell asrisingsnowlinesintheHimalayas, will affect seasonalvariationinrunoff, causingwatershortagesduringthedrysummermonths. One-quarterofChinaspopulationandhundredsofmillionsinIndiawillbeaffected.65Inorder tocorrect for the quickening pace of glacier melt andcompensate forincreasinglydrier summer months, China, India, andother countriesmust investinnewwater storage facilities now. Inthe absence of investment today, peoplewillsufferterriblytomorrow.How should the normative dimensions of this issue be framed, and what principleshould govern a response? If variations in the earths surface temperature arenaturallycaused, thenclaimstoresourcescannotoriginatefromeithercooperativeefforts or coercive impositions among groups. Supposing this is the case, thenquestions of justice cannot be framedinterms of pure procedural or transitivecontexts. They must instead be framed in terms of an allocative context (if they are tobeframedat all), sincethenormativeprincipleappropriatetothis analysis mustidentify: (1)theparticularcharacteristicsbywhichpeopleareentitledtoresourcesand (2) the particular characteristics by which donors are assigned remedialresponsibilities. If theprincipledoes not identifythesefeatures, it cannot answerthe claim in a manner fitting its origin. And if it cannot answer the claim in a mannerfitting its origin, the solution offered will appear inappropriate, arbitrary, andunjustified. Bycontrast, anappropriateprinciplemightdirectwealthycountriestoaidpoorercountriesfacingseriousfreshwatershortages, asRawlssdutyof assis-tancesuggests; orit mightdirecttodaysresidentsof theaffectedareastoallocateJusticeincontext85savings towardinvestments for the sake of tomorrows potentially water-starvedresidents. Ineachcase, existingresourcesareallocatedfromonegrouptoanotherbasedonspecificcharacteristicsofthegroups.Nowsuppose that global warming is anthropogenic, as the IPCCargues.66Claims to fresh waterresources will have originated from a shared structure throughwhichcoerciveimpositions arefacilitatedbetweengroups. Onemight arguethatbecausethecooperativeeffortsof one(orseveral)partyhavegeneratedpollutantspassingover andtakingeffect as burdens inanother partyhaving(at least untilrecently)nothing to do with creating the burden,the first party isobligated to offsettheburden.Inthiscase,theprinciplemustreflectatransitivecontext;itsdirectivemust identify(1)theappropriatecharacteristicsbywhichtransferredburdensaredeemed illegitimate and (2) a link through which remedial responsibilities areassigned. Appropriateholdingsmight beframedintermsof anadequatenetworkof water storagetowers, andremedial responsibilities might beassignedtothoseburning fossilfuels, perhapsthrough a globalcarbon tax on fossilfuel consumption.These two competinganalyses depend fortheirresolutionon empirical data. But,giventheformal strategy, wenowpossess aperspectiveshapingthefact patternsdrawn fromrawdata.Oncethedatamountsinfavorofonepattern,theassociationit favors will determine the formof the principle governing obligations andentitlements.Thisillustrateshowadistributiveprinciplesdirectivefits thecontextof application. It also illustrates howone might trace systematic links betweenprinciples of justiceandtheir contexts of application byexposinganunderlyinglogicthatwecanbothgraspanduseasacriticaltoolwhenassessingtheprevailingconceptions of justice.67The underlying logic is captured by the mirroringrelationshipbetweentheprinciplesdirectiveandthefactsfillingoutthestructureof the association. Inother words, once a context is analyzedas allocative, forexample, then its governing principle must*as a matter of logical structure*allocateexistinggoodsbetweenpartiesbasedonthecharacteristicsoftheparties.Expressedthe other way around, the rules reflected in allocative, pure procedural, and transitiveprinciplesrequirecertainthingstobetrueof theircontextsof applicationif eachistofunctionproperly.Inthecaseofallocativeprinciples,goodsmustalready exist,and donors and recipients must exhibit clear characteristics. By contrast, pureprocedural principles function in a context where what matters is neither theexistence of already producedgoods nor the specific characteristics of persons,but rather a unified scheme of cooperation within which production and subsequentdistributiontakes place. Andfinally, transitiveprinciples requirefor their properfunctioningacontextcharacterizedbyexternalizedharms. Intheabsenceof thesefactual features, adistributiveprinciplecannotfunctionproperly, itcannotanswerclaims people make. If it cannot function properly, it cannot be justified asappropriatetothecontext.The formal strategy alsoexplains Millers claimthat clashes of principle willnot, in general occur, once the context in which the distributive decision in questionis beingmadeis properlyspecified.68Oncetheanalysis of thecontext identifiesit tobeallocative, for example, thedistributiveprinciplemust takeanallocativeM.Buckley86form. It cannot taketheformof either apureprocedural or transitiveprinciple.As aresult, the formal strategyprovides the critical leverage expectedof criticalcontextualism, because the underlying logic exposedby the analysis determineswhich formal principle is appropriate. If one applies a pure procedural principle to anallocativecontext,thentheerrorcanbeexplainedandrationallycorrected.One notable drawback to this strategy is that it is unable to resolve clashes betweensubstantive principles sharing the same form. This is because the strategy onlyexposestheformalrelationshipbetweenprinciplesandcontexts.Itdoesnotfurtherdiscriminateamongsubstantiveprinciplesand, asaresult, producesaratherweakaccount of justification. Normativepolitical judgmentsarejustifiedwhentheyarebasedonprinciples whoseformfits thecontext of application. Theformcanbeexpressedby more thanone substantive principle. For example, the substantiveprinciples toeachaccordingtoneed, fromeachaccordingtoabilityandRawlss dutyof assistance are eachallocative. The formal strategy offers noway todeterminewhichofthecompetingprinciplesbetterservestheclaimsresultingfromallocativeassociations. As a result, it cannot determine which of the two is uniquelyappropriate to a context. In the absence of further determination, the formalstrategyscriticalleverageislimited.Whilethis is aserious shortcoming, I donot findit fatal. Onthecontrary, ithelps explaintheopentextureof moral debate, andprovides arationalefor whyrival substantive principles might gain wide consensus among opposing parties.Atthesametime, itsignificantlynarrowsthefieldofplausiblerivalsbyeliminatingasunfit thoseprinciplesfailingtoreflect themannerinwhichclaimstoresourcesoriginate. So while the formal strategy cannot reconcile competing substantiveprinciplessharingthesameform,itsinabilitytodosoactuallyexplainsapersistentfeatureofmoraldiscourse.Amuchmoreserious problemwiththis strategyis that it offers nocontextualwayof balancingconflicts betweendistributivecontexts. Specifically, it is unabletoresolvesituationswherethedefenseofaprincipleinonecontextisconceptuallylinked to the principle of another context. Such conflicts seemlikely to occurbetweenpureprocedural andtransitiveprinciples, becausethelegitimateexpecta-tions established by pure procedural principles depend in part on whether the unifiedstructure of cooperation they support create illegitimate externalities. Rawls providesaninstructive case whendiscussingthe relationbetweenthedifference principleand the just saving principle.69The difference principle is a pure proceduralprinciple. It governs legitimateexpectations byspecifyingthepublicrules againstwhich claims among cooperative members are made and judged legitimate. The justsavingsprincipleisatransitiveprinciple. It identifiesacriterionagainst whichthepresentgenerationcanassessitsrateofaccumulationsothatfuturegenerationsdonotfall belowajustlevel ofwealth. Thejustsavingsprincipleactsasaconstrainton the rate ofaccumulation; the difference principle arranges economic inequalitiessothat they are tothe greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent withthejust savings principle.70As aresult, thedefenseof thedifferenceprincipleisconceptuallylinkedtothejust savings principles. Future generations claimtoaJusticeincontext87minimumlevelofwealthtakespriorityoverthepresentgenerationsclaimtowealth(beyondthat minimum) resulting fromtheir cooperative efforts withina unifiedschemeofinstitutions.Rawlsscaseisaninstanceof apriorityproblem: howshouldcompetingclaimsandtheirrespectiveprinciplesbeprioritized?InA TheoryofJustice,Rawlsdiscussesthepriorityprobleminrelationtointuitionism,faultingtheintuitionistwithprovi-dingnosystematicassignment of weights for adjudicatingcompetingclaims andprinciples.71Instead, intuitionismreliesonintuitivetrade-offsbetweenconflictingclaims. Critical contextualismattempts toavoidintuitive trade-offs by rationallygrounding the justification of principles in distinct contexts of deployment. However,the formal strategyfails inthis regard, for thereare at least somecases whenacontextualistapproachwill failtoprovidesuchgrounds.Take,forexample, aglobalanalog to the relationshipbetweenthe difference principle andthe just savingsprinciple, namely, howthedistributiveclaimsamongco-nationalsarebalanced, orprioritized, against the claims of foreigners affected by the cooperative efforts amongco-nationals.Heretheconflictisbetweenapureproceduralandtransitivecontext.To avoid intuitionist trade-offs, critical contextualism must offer a reasoned responsetothis priority problem, and, todothat, it must resituate the conflict withinabroader context.But what might be that broader context? Further abstraction couldfail tocapturethemannerinwhichclaimstoresourcesoriginate, therebyseveringthelinkbetweennormativedirectivesandtheircontextsofapplication.So,whileamoreabstractcontext, suchasresourceallocation, includesbothpureproceduraland transitive contexts, it is too abstract to expose a systematic link betweenprinciples andcontexts, andthus tooabstract tosolvethepriorityprobleminamannerconsistentwithcriticalcontextualism.Whilemyinabilitytoprovideacontextual answerdoesnotentail theabsenceofany suchanswer, it seems almost certainthat at some point contextualismwillface a priority problemthat falls between contexts. Contexts are not alwaysautonomous. Theyareoftenconceptuallylinked. Yet if this is thecase, thentheformal strategy runs up against a limit, and, in order to circumvent the limit,contextualargumentsmustrelyonanotherapproach(intuitionism,constructivism,andutilitarianism)todeterminetheprioritybetweenconflictingprinciples.Interestingly, DavidMillers approachtothe priorityproblemincludes anon-contextual set of priority rules (he calls them sub-duties), which he derives from ourduty torespect humanrights. Miller identifies four priority rules whenconside-ringconflictsbetweenglobalanddomesticduties.72Thefirstrule*refrainingfrominfringing onbasic humanrights*entails that eachpersons basic humanrightsare tobe givenequal considerationirrespective of nationality. For example, thegovernment of a nation whose members are starving would not be justified inseizing resources fromanother nation if this meant that some of that nationsmembers would fall below the threshold for adequate nutrition.73Not unlike Rawls,Millerthinkscooperativeactivitiesamongonegroupareconstrainedbyacriterionidentifyingillegitimateexternalities. Inthiscase, thepriorityrulecoordinatespureproceduralandtransitivecontexts,givingprioritytothelatter.ThisisanintuitivelyM.Buckley88plausible answer, but it is not acontextual answer. Miller does not justifybasichumanrights by reference to aninterdependent relationship betweenfacts andprinciples.74Rather,headvancesahumanitarianstrategyalongthelinesofthefirststrategy considered and dismissed at the outset of this paper*the stand-alonejustification of context. He grounds basic human rights on facts about what humansneed.75Thiscreatesanumberof philosophical challenges, but it alsosuggestsadeparture fromcontextualisminat least this case. Interestingly, Miller does notclaimthat therearenocontext-independent principlesof justice . . . [and]it maybethat contextualismalonecanprovidenodecisiveargument for prioritizingonecontext and its associated principles.76But if this is so, where does it leavecontextualismand its unique perspective concerning the relation between factsand principles? Why not suppose, as some philosophers suggest, that context-independent principles are logically prior to, and ground the justification of, context-dependentprinciples?77CONCLUSIONSuchquestions takeus well beyondthescopeof this paper, whichalreadyraisestough questions for critical contextualism. Nevertheless, recalling a point madeearlier, I think critical contextualismoffers meaningful insights into normativepolitical theory. I will close this paper by briefly underscoring the insights that,Ithink,movenormativepoliticaltheoryinaproductivedirection.The first is that critical contextualism tries to identify a role for factualconsiderations in the defense of principles. It does this by taking a piecemealapproachtotheory, onethattreatsdiversepolitical issuesintermsoftheiruniquecontextual features rather thansystematicallyas part of*andansweredintermsof*anoverarchingtheoryof justice. Ithinkthispiecemeal approachtonormativetheory is promising because it is connected to a methodological approach thatcoversall normativeissues. Onthispoint, MilleragainconvergeswithRawls, whotookanincreasinglypiecemealapproachinhislaterwritings,noting:Eachtime[thesubjectchanges]theconstructivistprocedureismodifiedtofitthesubject inquestion. Induecourseall themainprinciplesareonhand, includingthose neededfor the various political duties andobligations of individuals andassociations. Thus, a constructivist liberal doctrine is universal in its reach once it isextendedtogiveprinciplesforallpoliticallyrelevantsubjects.78Critical contextualism, likeRawlsianconstructivism, ismethodologicallyuniversalinits reach. It specifies a systematic approachfor addressing diverse normativeissues. It does not identifyaset of universal principles interms of whichdiversesubjectscanbeassessed. Instead, eachsubjectistakenupseparatelyandassessedintermsofitscontextualfeatures.This methodological approachhelps explainthepersistenceof moral pluralismwithout invoking mysterious intuitions or surrendering to blindrelativism. Thisis the secondimportant feature of contextualism, namely, that the structure ofJusticeincontext89justificationexplains theexistenceof rival principles interms of ordinaryfactualcircumstances that canberationallyanalyzed. Different contextual circumstancesrequiredifferent principles of justice. Analyses of thecontext canhelpdeterminewhichprincipleisappropriatetowhichcontext. Inthecaseoftheformal strategy,although the analyses cannot resolve all conflicts*such as conflicts betweensubstantiveprinciples sharingthesameformor conflicts betweencontexts*theynevertheless might resolve many conflicts. Moreover, for those conflicts leftunresolved, theformal strategyat least providesareasonforwhycertaindisputescannotberesolvedtofewerthanseveralplausiblerivals.Invirtueofrationallyexplainingpluralism,contextualismprovidesanaccountofwhatacorrectnormativejudgmentlookslike.Correctnormativejudgmentsreflectarelational property, ratherthananon-natural orsupervenientproperty.79Thisisthe third important feature. With respect to the formal strategy, the relationalpropertyobtainsbetweenanormativedirectiveandthemannerinwhichclaimstoresources originate. The relation admits of an underlying logic whereby theappropriate principle is the one that answers the claim. Inorder toanswer theclaim, thestructureof theprinciplemust reflect thestructureof theassociationwithin which the claimto resources originates. When these structures match,normativejudgmentsbasedontheappropriationprinciplearecorrect; theyreflecttheright form.The logical relation between claims and principles has no practical import withouteithertheactual factsthatgiverisetoclaimsortheparticularprinciplesthathelpaddressthem. Thefourthandfinal importantfeatureof contextualismisthatrealworldfactshelpshapeandshiftourmoral horizon. FollowingRawls, Ireferredtothis as the limits of the practicably possible, and understood these limits as providingboth a ceiling beyond which ourmoral ideas represent sheer fancy and a floor belowwhichfactual considerations represent mere expedience. Some facts are morallyrelevant,andthechallengeistodiscernwhichfacts.Ithinkaplausibleresponsetothis challenge takes a piecemeal approachtonormativetheory, where issues areframedinterms of their (formal) contextual features. Thisreturns us tothefirstinsightnotedpreviously.Unfortunately,noneofthestrategiescanvassedinthispaperfullyrealizeallfourfeatures.Asaresult,theseinsightsseemtogounfulfilled.Inlightofthis,thosewhofindMillersgeneral viewof contextualismappealingmightdevelopitsfeaturesbycontextualizinganalreadyexistingapproachratherthanfurtherdevelopingcriticalcontextualism. In my view, the leading candidate is Rawlsian constructivism. I notedearlierinthispaper that, inresponsetoavarietyof reasonsfor thinkingobjectivecharacterizations of contexts impossible, one might specify interpretations ofcontexts interms of political problems inneedof rectification. Certainelementsof Rawlsian constructivismcan be developed along these lines.80As the othertwo strategies for addressing these arguments*reflected in Millers manner ofproceeding*seem to fail, a contextualized constructivism could very well be the beststrategyforrealizingthefour aforementionedinsights withinonedistincttheoreticalapproach.M.Buckley90NOTES1. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev.ed. (Cambridge:Harvard UniversityPress, 1999), 398.2. AnotableexceptionisG.A.Cohen, whoarguesthatfundamental principlesofjusticearefact-insensitive.G.A.Cohen,RescuingJusticeandEquality(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,2008).3. DavidMiller,TwoWaystoThinkAboutJustice.Politics,Philosophy&Economics1,no.5(2002): 528; DavidMiller, Principles of Social Justice (Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,1999), Chapter 2; DavidMiller, Political Philosophyfor Earthlings, inPolitical Theory:MethodsandApproaches, eds.DavidLeopoldandMarcStears(Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,2008).4. Miller,TwoWaystoThinkAboutJustice,10.5. ThecontextualismadvancedbyMillerandexaminedinthispaperisdifferentfromwhatgoesunder thenamemoral contextualism, whichreferstoasemanticthesisabouttruthvaluesofmoral attributionbeingrelativetothecontextoftheattributor. SeeJohnGreco,Whats Wrong withMoral Contextualism. Philosophical Quarterly 58, no. 232(2008):41636.BeritBrogaard,MoralContextualismandMoralRelativism.bothinPhilosophicalQuarterly58,no.232(2008):385409.6. Miller,TwoWaystoThinkAboutJustice,19,13.7. DavidMiller, National ResponsibilitiesandGlobal Justice(Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,2007),14.8. Pogge writes, Miller and I may converge then upon an intermediate view*criticalcontextualism*denedby the rejectionof monistic universalismonthe one handanddogmatic contextualismon the other. We both envision different fundamental moralprinciplesapplyingin differentcontexts,andwe both seekjusticationsforthedelimitationof contextsandtheformulationof fundamental principlesappropriatetothem. ThomasPogge,WorldPovertyandHumanRights,2nded.(Cambridge:Polity,2008),110.9. Miller,TwoWaystoThinkAboutJustice,20.10. Ibid.,25.11. JohnRawls, TheLawof Peoples, inCollectedPapers, ed. Samuel Freeman(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1999),533.12. Miller,TwoWaystoThinkAboutJustice,12.13. Ibid.,10.14. MichaelWalzer,SpheresofJustice(NewYork:BasicBooks,1983),67.15. Walzer,SpheresofJustice,8.16. Michael Walzer, The Companyof Critics: Social CriticismandPolitical Commitment intheTwentiethCentury(NewYork:BasicBooks,1988),232,230.17. BrianBarry, Social CriticismandPolitical Philosophy. PhilosophyandPublic Affairs 19,no.4(1990):36073.18. Walzer thinks outsiders can legitimately assess the t between a government and its people inat least some circumstances. Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States: A Response toFourCritics.PhilosophyandPublicAffairs9,no.3(1980):20929.19. Miller, TwoWaystoThinkAbout Justice, 1012. Miller, Principles of Social Justice, 25.Moreover, Walzer doesnot alwayst mydepiction. Elster notes, [a]t time, onegetstheimpression that he [Walzer] advocates a principle of goods-specicity according to which thenatureofthegoodrequiresacertainprinciplesofdistribution. . . Atothertimes,itismorenatural toreadhimasproposingaprincipleofcountry-specicity,accordingtowhichthejustallocationdependsonthemeaningofthegoodinthesocietyinquestion.JonElster,Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens (New York: RussellSageFoundation,1992).20. Miller,TwoWaystoThinkAboutJustice,25.21. Pogge,WorldPovertyandHumanRights,110.Justiceincontext9122. ThisrepresentstherstofRawlssburdensofjudgment. JohnRawls,Political Liberalism,2nded.(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress),556.23. Forsomeoftheliteraturerepresentingthesecompetinganswers,seeMathiasRisse,WhatWeOwetheGlobalPoor.JournalofEthics9(2005):81117;ThomasPogge,EradicatingSystemicPoverty: Brief for aGlobal Resources Dividend, andMoral UniversalismandGlobal Economic Justice, bothinWorld Poverty and Global Justice, 11821; 2057. Inaddition to the domestic and global institutional theses, there are geographic andenvironmentaltheses.Foranexampleofeach,seeJaredDiamond,Guns,GermsandSteel:TheFatesofHumanSocieties(NewYork:W.W.Norton&Co.,1999);andIanMorris,WhytheWestRules*ForNow(NewYork:Farrar,StrausandGiroux,2010).24. This represents thesecondof Rawlss burdens of judgment. Rawls, Political Liberalism,556.25. Miller,TwoWaystoThinkAboutJustice,20.26. Rawls, ATheory of Justice, 18; andNormanDaniels, Justice and Justication: ReectiveEquilibriuminTheoryandPractice(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996).27. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 3; Christine Korsgaard Realism and Constructivism inTwentieth-Century Moral Philosophy. Journal of Philosophical Research, APACentennialSupplement (2003), 99122; Michael Buckley, TheStructureof JusticationinPoliticalConstructivism. Metaphilosophy 41no. 5(2010): 66989; andSharonStreet, What isConstructivisminEthicsandMetaethics.PhilosophyCompass5,no.5(2010):36384.28. Miller, Principles of Social Justice, 5360; andMiller, TwoWaystoThinkAbout Justice,1718.29. Miller,PrinciplesofSocialJustice,35,43,65;Miller,TwoWaystoThinkAboutJustice,6;Daniel M. Weinstock,Miller on Distributive Justice, in Forms of Justice: Critical Perspectiveson David Millers Political Philosophy, eds. Daniel Bell and Avner de-Shalit (Oxford: RowmanandLittleeldPublishers,Inc.),272.30. David Miller, A Response, in Forms of Justice, eds. Daniel Bell and Avner de-Shalit (Oxford:RowmanandLittleeldPublishers,Inc.),352.Foralongertreatmentonthisquestion,seeMiller,PoliticalPhilosophyforEarthlings.31. Miller,PrinciplesofSocial Justice,3435.32. Miller,National Responsibilities,17.33. Miller,National Responsibilities,18;andMiller,PoliticalPhilosophyforEarthlings.34. Rawls,A TheoryofJustice,398.35. JohnRawls,TheLawofPeoples(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,2001),12.ThishasnotbeenawidelydiscussedissueinthesecondaryliteratureonRawls.Forsomeremarks,seeMiller, Political PhilosophyforEarthlings; andMarkJensen, Thelimitsof practicalpossibility.TheJournal ofPolitical Philosophy17,no.2(2009):16884.36. Rawls, TheLawof Peoples, 12; JohnRawls, Justiceas Fairness: ARestatement (Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,2001),45.37. Rawls,JusticeasFairness:ARestatement,25.38. Jensen,Thelimitsofpracticalpossibility,168184.39. Miller,PrinciplesofSocial Justice,51.40. Miller,PoliticalPhilosophyforEarthlings,44.41. Miller,PrinciplesofSocial Justice,25,34;andMiller,National Responsibilities,1416.42. Street,WhatisConstructivism,366.43. Rawls,Political Liberalism,12122.44. Miller,PoliticalPhilosophyforEarthlings,41.45. David Hume, ATreatise of Human Nature, 2nd ed., L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: TheClarendon Press, 1978), 484501; H.L.A Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: The ClarendonPress,1961),18995;andRawls,A TheoryofJustice,10912.46. Miller,PrinciplesofSocial Justice,65.M.Buckley9247. Alternatively, onemightassociatethisstrategywithwhatT.M. Scanloncallsthedescrip-tive interpretation of reectively equilibrium. T.M. Scanlon, Rawls on Justication,in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,2003),13957.48. Miller,National Responsibilities,15.49. Miller, AResponse. Critical Reviewof International andSocial andPolitical Philosophy11,no.4(2008):554.50. Ibid.,554.51. MichaelBlake,DistributiveJustice,StateCoercion,andAutonomy.PhilosophyandPublicAffairs30,no.3(2001):262.52. Miller,National Responsibilities,18,andPoliticalPhilosophyforEarthlings.53. SeeAdamSwift, Social Justice: WhyDoes it Matter What thePeopleThink, inFormsof Justice: Critical Perspectives onDavid Millers Political Philosophy, eds. Daniel Bell andAvner de-Shalit (Oxford: RowmanandLittleeldPublishers, Inc.), 1328; BrianBarry,StatismandNationalism: ACosmopolitanCritique, inGlobal Justice, eds. IanShapiroandLeaBrilmayer (NewYork: NYUPress, 1999), 1266; Daniel Weinstock, NationalPartiality: ConfrontingtheIntuitions. TheMonist 82(1999): 51642; VeitBader, GlobalJusticeinComplexMoral Worlds. Dilemmasof ContextualizedTheories, Critical ReviewofInternational Social andPolitical Philosophy11,no.4(2008):53952.54. Miller,TwoWaystoThinkAboutJustice,25.55. Acommoncriticismof Rawlss constructivismargues that the constructivist procedureembodies denseandrichlyarticulatedyet unjustiedmoral concepts, andthereforebegsimportant philosophical questions. Some examples include: Thomas Nagel, Rawls onJustice, in Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls ATheory of Justice, ed. Norman Daniels(Stanford: StanfordUniversityPress, 1975); Cohen, RescuingJustice andEquality; DavidO. Brink, RawlsianConstructivisminMoral Theory. CanadianJournal of Philosophy17(1987): 7190. Of course, Rawls relies onwide andgeneral reective equilibrium, butit is doubtful this reliance can avoid the very criticisms leveled against Millers contextualism.56. Miller,TwoWaystoThinkaboutJustice,13.57. Rawls,A TheoryofJustice,7677;andRawls,JusticeasFairness,50.58. DavidMillerhasdiscussedtheproblemofassigningremedialresponsibilitiesinDistribut-ingResponsibilities.Journal ofPolitical Philosophy9,no.4(2001):45371.59. Rawls,TheLawofPeoples,10520.60. AllenBuchanan,RawlssLawofPeoples:RulesforaVanishedWestphalianWorld.Ethics110, no. 4 (2000): 697721; and Thomas Pogge, An Egalitarian Law of Peoples. Philosophy&PublicAffairs23,no.3(1994):195224.61. Pogge,WorldPovertyandHumanRights,182.62. Althoughhe does not use the same terminology, it is clear that FriedrichvonHayeksargument against social justiceis basedonthemistakenideathat all principles of socialjusticeareallocativeprinciples,andthusunsuitableforapureproceduralassociationsuchasmarkets.FriedrichvonHayek,Law,LegislationandLiberty:TheMirageof Social Justice,vol.2(Chicago,IL:UniversityofChicagoPress,1978).63. The Trail Smelter Case is just one of many such cases. In this case, sulfur dioxide emissionsfrom a zinc and lead smelter in Trail, British Columbia, damaged a 30-mile stretch from theinternational boundarytoKettleFalls, Washington, affectinglogging, farming, andcattlegrazing industries crucial to the area. Legal arbitration resulted in Canada havingtopaytheUSfor damages. UnitedNations TreatyCollection, Report of InternationalAtribral Awards: Trail Smelter Case, 2006. http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_III/1905-1982.pdf(accessedDecember15,2011).64. Kevin Watkins, United Nations Development Program Human Development Report 2006: BeyondScarcity:Power,PovertyandtheGlobal WaterCrisis(NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2006):165.Justiceincontext9365. Bates, B.C., Z.W. Kundzewicz, S. Wu, and J.P. Palutikof, (eds). Climate Change and Water:Implications for PolicyandSustainableDevelopment, 129; Intergovernmental Panel onClimateChange. Technical Paper VI, 2008. http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/technical-papers/ccw/chapter7.pdf(accessedDecember15,2011).66. The IPCCnotes that [d]etectionandattributionstudies consistently ndevidence forananthropogenicsignalintheclimaterecordofthelast35to50years,andthatwarmingoverseveral decadeshasbeenlinkedtochangesinthelarge-scalehydrological cyclesuchas:increasingatmosphericwatervapourcontent;changingprecipitationpatterns,intensityandextremes; reducedsnowcover andwidespreadmeltingof ice. SummaryforPolicy-makersof theSynthesisReport of theIPCCFourthAssessment Report, chap. 2. http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_sry.pdf (accessed February 1, 2012) andClimateChangeandWater:ExecutiveSummary,3;Intergovernmental Panel onClimateChange, Climate Change Synthesis Report: Summary, 2007. http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/technical-papers/ccw/executive-summary.pdf(accessedDecember15,2011).67. Miller,TwoWaystoThinkAboutJustice,13,19.68. Ibid.,2069. Rawls,A TheoryofJustice,2635.70. Ibid.,263,266.71. Ibid.,3040.72. Miller,National Responsibilities,47.73. Ibid.,48.74. For acritical lookat Millers account of humanrights, seeLeif Werner, HumanRightsandEqualityintheWorkof DavidMiller. Critical Reviewof International andSocial andPolitical Philosophy11,no.4(2008):40111.75. Miller,National Responsibilities,178200.76. Miller,TwoWaysofThinkingaboutJustice,245,21.77. Cohen,RescuingJusticeandEquality.78. Rawls,TheLawofPeoples,532.79. For arelational account of moral objectivity, see Nicholas Rescher, Moral Objectivity.Social PhilosophyandPolicy25,no.1(2008):393409.80. Buckley,TheStructureofJustication;andStreet,WhatisConstructivism.M.Buckley94