constructivisms from a genetic point

8/12/2019 Constructivisms From a Genetic Point

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R E G U L A R A R T I C L E

Constructivisms from a Genetic Point of View:

A Critical Classification of Current Tendencies

Jos Carlos Snchez &Jos Carlos Loredo

Published online: 24 March 2009# Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2009

Abstract In this paper, we propose a critical classification of contemporary

constructivist orientations. Our fundamental theoretical reference is the notion of

genesis, understood as the construction of reality in a way that is neither relativist

nor positivist-realist. We identify a nucleus of classic, genetic constructivism that

revolves around the ideas of Baldwin, Piaget and Vygotsky and discuss two

tendencies that distort the spirit of that nucleus: objectivism and subjectivism.

Objectivism rules out the psychological, constructive activity of the subject,

subordinating (or just reducing) it to objective structures either from nature (likegenetic endowment or neural functioning), or from culture (like language or social

practices). Subjectivism completely detaches the objectivity of knowledge from its

construction on the part of the subject, reducing it to the mere product of individual

interest, view, or irrationality. Thus, subjectivism is the non-constructive way to

conceive the subject. Then, we attempt to show the dialectics that exists between

these two tendencies and the scope of our criteria by analysing a representative (non

exhaustive) group of authors who are defined as constructivists or who bring

important elements to the debate about constructivism.

Keywords Constructivism . Co-constructivism . Constructionism . Objectivism .

Subjectivism . Genetic Psychology

Introduction

The term constructivism and other related terms or expressions are used

abundantly in psychology and close disciplines. Nevertheless, the term hardly has

Integr Psych Behav (2009) 43:332349

DOI 10.1007/s12124-009-9091-1

J. C. Snchez (*)

Facultad de Psicologa, Universidad de Oviedo, Plaza Feijoo s/n, Oviedo, Asturias 33003, Spain


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any power to unify this group of theoretical concepts. It has served to categorize the

ideas of authors as disparate as Bourdieu, Brouwer, Foerster, Glasersfeld, Gergen,

Kelly, Latour, Lorenzen, Maturana, Pask, Piaget, Shotter, Vygotsky, and Watzlawick...

It is clear that the concept of construction can be understood in many and diverse

forms.Amongst authors such as Chiari and Nuzzo (Chiari and Nuzzo1996), Le Moigne

(Le Moigne1995) and Mascolo and Pollack (Mascolo and Pollack1997) there have

been several useful attempts to organize the panorama of constructivist tendencies.

Keeping these works in mind we would like to adopt a wider point of view that

analyzes the huge variety of constructivist viewpoints by paying attention not only to

their empirical psychology, so to say, but also to how they understand the process of

the construction of knowledge itself and the relation between knowledge and reality.

Also, we have tried to cover as many theoretical tendencies as possible in order to

enrich the panorama of contemporary constructivist viewpoints. The price to bepayed we must acknowledge is to be neither completely exhaustive nor

completely respectful to every aspect of each authors ideas. The risk is worth only

if the resulting global view can enrich the understanding of that author in some

respect.

Thus our classification (Table1) does not intend to be a mere listing of the ideas

of various authors. Furthermore, we do not find it possible to propose a neutral

classification that does not contain some theoretical compromise. In this sense, we

would like to establish a critical perspective, based on some central ideas of classical

constructivism, which clarifies, we think, the cluttered panorama of contemporaryconstructivist viewpoints. In order to do this, we will take as our reference the

historical tradition that comes from Kant, Darwin, Wundt and Helmholtz and goes

through to current work done by authors such as Glasersfeld, Valsiner or Deacon,

passing through Baldwin, Piaget and Vygotsky (centre column of the table). We will,

however, argue that even within this core of constructivism there are ideas that are

not completely congruent with each other, as well as having a tendency to drift

toward two extremes which we believe causes them to loose the specificity that

constructivism has as a powerful and original theoretical perspective. We have called

these two extremes, or opposite trends, subjectivism and objectivism. Some authors

who are normally considered to be constructivists have been included in one or the

other of these extremes. We have also considered some authors that do not define

themselves as constructivist but we feel are relevant in order to enrich the meaning

of constructivism (for example Edelman or Deacon).

The table presents a map of the most representative options. It should not be

taken we insist as an exhaustive list nor have all the details from the

mentioned authors been analyzed. We have chosen those authors and ideas that we

consider to be the most significant and our commentary does not imply that we do

not value the rest of their contributions. In addition, the placement of a specific

author in the table can be questioned, as it is our judgement about that perspective.

Nevertheless, this judgement forms a part of the general argument that underlies

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Occasionally, certain ideas from the same author may belong to one of the extremes

of the table while others may belong to the opposite. In fact, some names could appear

in more than one place in the table. This is the case for Berger and Luckmann, who

subsume psychological activities under objective social structures (right column of

Table1) but fall back on the pragmatism of consensus as the basis of knowledge (left

column). In order to reflect these kinds of situations, we have indicated the theoretical

aspects of the authors that could just as easily fit into the other column with italics.

The Objectivism-Subjectivism Dialectics and the Genetic Core

of Constructivism

Subjectivism assumes a negative conception of psychology in that no form of

objectivity can be founded on the activity of the subject given that the nature of that

action is understood as either not epistemologically reliable or irrational, driven by

desire, interest or passion. This tradition goes back to Plato and his idea of an

irrational soul that acts as an obstacle to true knowledge, which can only be reached

through the rational soul (Plato 1977, 2002). Of course, Platos main interest is to

Table 1 Contemporary constructivist tendencies

Subjectivisms

Psychological activity produces reality but isconceptualized in a subjective, non genetic way

Realm of ConstructivismPsychological activity is understood in terms of genesis

Knowledge and truth are constructed contextually

Characteristic tensionSubjectivism --------------------------------------------------------------------- Objectivism

Objectivisms

Psychological activity is explained by objective entities suchas genes, the brain, culture, language and systems, etc.

Kenneth Gergen, JonathanPotterReality is constructed by discourse based on the

consensus of individual and group interestsExplicit relativism. Irrational psychology(based on

desire or interest)

Edinburghs School (Barnes, Bloor)Scientific products are the result of negotiations and

consensus. Irrational psychology (based on interests)

Humberto MaturanaHumans (observers) and animals (autopoietic

machines) interpret or define their relation to the world

Heinz Von FoersterThe observer defines their own individual-mental reality,

Although there is a supposed inaccessible noumenicreality

Paul WatzlawickThe pragmatics of communication and language define

reality

BaldwinGenetic psychobiology and organic selection

Dialectic psychosocial construction of self

PiagetGenetic psychology and theory of the phenocopy

Construction of the subject-object duality

VygotskySociohistorical context of construction emphasized

Human simbolic activity emphasized.

Ernst Von GlasersfeldTruth as an adaptive utilityKnowledge = viable models

Barbara RogoffDevelopment as enculturation

Plurality of cultures

James WertschDevelopment by way of sociocultural interaction

And emphasis on mediation

Jaan ValsinerIntegration of Piaget-Vygotsky. The active caracter of imitation

Robert WozniakIntegration of Piaget-Vygotsky-Gibson.

Social construction of knowledge does not impederealism whose substrate resides in perception.

Erlangen School(Lorenzen)The method of the construction of reality is operational, not formal

The search for a universal objective language

Terrence DeaconC o-evolution of mind-language and

construction reciprocates both. Organic selection

Gerald EdelmanNeural Darwinism vs. nativism and modularityOrganization of the brain by means of activity

Gerhard RothThe brain (initial reality) constructs our phenomenological

reality

Francisco VarelaExplicitly criticizes subjective constructionism and solipsism

Subject and object are coordinated from the beginning. Truthis based on utility

Theory of Complex Systems

Baltes et al.; Oyama, Quartz & Sejnowski:the multilevel interaction of systems generates brain

development and psychological activity

Berger & LuckmannReality as a social construction

Subjects are like marionettes to socio-cultural contextPragmatic sense of construction

Bruno LatourRejection of the subject/object distinction

Objects have their own agencyMultilevel interaction between humans and non-humansPragmatic idea of construction

Theoretical components that could just as easily be placed in the opposite column (Subjectivism vs.

Objectivism) are italicised.

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Many centuries later, the subjective idealism of Hume (2007) and Berkeley

(1982) ended up taking this lack of trust in epistemological competence to the

extreme of solipsism: an absolutely individual mind that can not be sure of anything

apart from itself. This kind of mental individualism constituted a new refinement in

the history of subjectivism, now carried out by Hume without the help of a platonicrational soul. Nevertheless, the platonic irrational soul has not disappeared. A

conception of human nature as mainly selfish and hedonistic has been very common

to the present. It can be found from the philosophy of the Enlightenment period

(homo homini lupus) to Freuds psychology.

Classical constructivist psychology, as presented in Baldwins work, specifically

develops a notion of subject in clear opposition to an individualistic and hedonistic

concept of the mind and also to the bias of thinking that our most basic nature is

irrational. The key to constructivist psychology is the idea of development

understood as a genesis. This genesis is not, however, a creation out of nothing. Itmeans the creation of something new by way of a synthetic transformation of

something that previously existed. It has a logic that Baldwin begins to describe by

way of different circular reactions within the new developmental or genetic

psychology. What the subject does produce by way of previous socialization and

adult innovations is epistemologically relevant. For subjectivism there is no

genesis in this sense. What is produced, in that case, is an individual interiorisation, a

biased interpretation of the world.

Objectivism attempts to reduce psychological phenomenon to some type of

objective reality, be it genes, the brain, the environment, culture, language, etc.These types of objective structures are not thought of as essential products of the

activity of the subject. On the contrary, it is activity, in all cases, that is defined in

accordance with these structures. Objectivist perspectives also ignore the existence

of genesis: objective reality produces subjective reality, but not the opposite. The

objective exits before the subjective. Physicalism and reductionism (materialism in

general) tend to express themselves in an objectivist way when they refer to the

subject. Objectivism, however, is not the same as materialism. Social sciences and

philosophies of history have often tried to extend their categories to explain or

reduce human behaviour in an objective way (structural, ecological, historical,

socioeconomic, semiotic, political).

Historically there has been a very concrete point where objectivism meets

psychology: when positivism needs to define facts through sensorial experience,

as was the case in Ernst Machs work. However, behind objectivism as well, there is

often a negative conception of psychology that impedes the recognition of the

capacity to construct truths or objective structures that are present in the activity of

the subject. If the subject is defined through interest, irrationality or desire, it is

difficult to imagine that their actions could give rise to any objectivity. The

difference between the objectivist and subjectivist perspectives stems from the fact

that the subjective tends to result in relativist or nihilistic positions while the

objective always maintains a realist perspective although not necessarily

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it is not a product of the activity of the subjects but rather it comes before it and

explains it. Objective structures are what produce the organization of the world, in

which subjects will have to comply or, at best, reflect or represent .

In clear opposition to both objectivism and subjectivism, the intention of classical

constructivism has always been to understand that what is real is a construction, butthat the construction is not subjective in the subjectivism sense. The activity of the

subjects generates structures that acquire a certain objective autonomy (as realities or

truths), although they cannot be taken as the ultimate reference to explain subjects

activity, given that they themselves have been constructed. We could call it

subjectual activity to distinguish it from subjective activity in the subjectivist

sense already pointed out. The relation between the subjects activity and the

corresponding objective structures is therefore strictly dialectic: the subject does not

act in a vacuum without objective realities but neither do objective realities exist

prior to any construction, nor do they maintain themselves as if they were entities.Constructivism came about historically as an attempt to give sense to a theory of

the construction of knowledge that, situating the locus of activity in the empirical

subject (organic, social and historic), was able to develop a positive (subjectual, not

subjective) conception of psychology. It attempts to understand psychological

activity, not as an obstacle in reaching objectivity but rather the complete opposite:

as the only way to construct it. Kant can be thus considered the starting point for

constructivism. He stated that reason has insight only into that which it produces

after a plan of its own (Kant 1970: 20). However, he conceived the subject as a

transcendental

constructor, rather than considering it part of nature (perhapsbecause he viewed physical nature as an absolute deterministic machine, in a

objectivist sense). The transcendental subject started to become a naturalsubject in

the 19th century by way of at least two paths. On one side, through the development

of darwinian evolutionism and comparative psychology, which placed intelligence

inside organic nature (animal intelligence) and conferred to it a decisive role in the

processes of adaptation. On the other side, through sensory physiology and the new

experimental psychology, which studied, in a human subject made of flesh and blood

(and culture), the synthetic or genetic activity characteristic of Kants transcendental

subject, which Wundt also called apperception (Fernndez 2005; Snchez et al.1995).

Baldwin is the first author who tries to formulate a complete genetic psychology

that is not reduced to the psychology of infant development and does not try to

distance itself from the problem of the relation between ontogeny, phylogeny and

sociogenesis (see Cairns 1992; Richards 1987; Wozniak 1998, 2001). In his view,

the subject is ontologically formed from a set of general conditions for action, which

are now part of the philogenetic inheritance that was constructed, at some moment in

the history of the evolution of the species, as morphologic stabilizations of adaptive

activities in a way consistent with the theory of organic selection (Snchez and

Loredo2007). In addition, the upbringing of the subject is psycho-social, given that

the self is constituted from interaction with others. The subject is not originally

individual: the self and the alterare born together.

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theory of development that understands imitation to be an activity of reconstruction,

not of mere copying (Baldwin 1899, 1906), and 3) it coordinates ontogeny and

phylogeny by way of a theory organic selection that impedes any objectivism

be it biological determinism or genetic reductionism (Baldwin 1917). Perharps the

most radical baldwinian statement is that of considering reality as a wholeconstruction. This statement gets past Kants noumenon, because for Baldwin there

is no reality that is not constructed:

It is evident that each objective meaning found to be, for the process that gets

it, in its own sense real, is ipse facto real in that sense and for that mode . A

being having perceptual consciousness only, would have its perceptual real

world. [...] Now to try to go back of these deliverances of experience, and to

ask what is really real ontologically real, or real in itself is simply to

attemp again to do what each of these modes has already once attempted:

to construe all experience in one mode of the real. The ontologically, or

really real is simply that which satisfies interest in the impersonal and

detached the logical or theoretical interest (Baldwin1911: 55).

The perspectives of Piaget and Vygotsky contain components that perhaps get

further away from the constructivism Baldwin outlines. Although it is not pertinent

to go into further detail now, we refer to aspects such as latent Lamarckism in

Piagetstheory of the phenocopy, the inclination of Piaget to formally define the final

stages of development, the tendency for Vygotsky to assume the existence of a split

between animal

or lower

behaviour, and the culturally mediated behaviour, orthe excessive weight that the Vygotskyan perspective puts on a Marxist socio-

historic objectivism. But, altogether, we believe that the works of these authors

constitute an essential step forward in the constructivism outlined by Baldwin at the

end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. The best theories of

constructivism are those that attempt to simultaneously carry on a psychobiological

and sociogeneticaly founded explanation not only of the genesis of subjectual activity

but also the genesis of objectivity. The constitution of the subject takes place by way of

organic (non spiritual) and social (non individual) functions. The progressive

individualization is precisely what makes it part of provisionally necessary realities

(we could call them objectualityto distiguish from the objectivity in the objectivist

sense we have seen before) and of a group of common values and aspirations which

are susceptible to becoming universal (to gaining validity).

The Realm of Constructivisms and some Attractions

As can be seen in Table 1 we distinguish three main theoretical areas to align

different authors or schools to the three main trends we have already presented:

objectivism, subjectivism and constructivism. Of course, drawing lines on a paper is

much easier than unravelling conceptual networks. Our table could be seen as a

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have a group of contemporary authors that can be considered as belonging to the realm

of constructivism but who are also attracted to one side or the other (subjectivism

and objectivism) to some extent. We even have authors who seem to want to cross the

lines. Finally we have authors we consider mainly representatives of the ideas of

subjectivism or objectivism and threfore we depict them into these areas, in spite of thefact that some of them are known as constructionistsorradical constructivists.

As we have said in the introduction, we will provide a selection of representative

authors and we will characterize them in a few words. Let us face the risk and let us

test if the clasiffication helps us to understand the complex network of attractive

powers that defines the variety of constructivisms.

Lets begin withErnst von Glasersfeld. This author knows the ideas of Baldwin,

uses the genetic epistemology of Piaget and underlines the need for a socio-genetic

point of view with respect to the formation of the self in the interaction with others.

His constructivist viewpoint is considered radical because it assumes that allknowledge is an active construction and constitutes an adaptive function for the

human being considered as an empirical and organic subject (Glasersfeld 1985,

1994,2000). Nevertheless, we think that Glaserfelds approach too easily renounces

the foundation of a genetic conception of truth or objectivity and tends toward

subjectivism when knowledge is defined in terms of mere models that are viable,

contextual and useful in the world of experience (Glasersfeld 1994: 2627). The

rejection of realism seems to be equivalent to the rejection of (or a prevention

against) any alternative notion of reality and truth.

As agents (authors) of our own experiential reality we attribute continuity toourselves as its constructors. We cannot do otherwise, because the world we

come to know is based on the creation of regularities which we are able to

impose on the flux of experience. [...] However, from my constructivist

perspective, it is this very agent who constructs the notions of space and time,

and I am therefore reluctant to refer to the agents continuity as existence.

The words to be and to exist are far too firmly linked to the philosophers

traditional ontology in which they are intended to describe a world thatis and

exists in itself. The continuity I have in mind, in contrast, is a phenomeno-

logical construct of the experience and, as such, warrants no conclusions aboutan ontological reality (Glasersfeld2000: 56).

An example of the tendency of constructivism to slip towards objectivist positions

can be seen in work by Barbara Rogoff (Rogoff1991), which is formulated from

other assumptions closer to the vygotskyan tradition. This author emphasizes

participation in intersubjective cultural practices as a key for development but her

description of the processes of participation tends to forget the fact that interaction

between subjects is based on a genetic logic, that is to say, on reconstructive processes of

shared objectuality on the part of the subjects. Therefore, the danger of loosing sight of

the psychogenetic explanation and substituting it for an unspecified, almost phenom-

enological explanation of interaction arises. Additionally, any possible criteria of truth

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participation is required, anyway. There is a slight tendency to a sociocultural

explanation of action (a slight attraction towards social objectivism).

Among neovygotskyan constructivism there are other authors who also

emphasize the role interaction plays between subjects and insist on the fact that it

takes place in a specific sociocultural context. Perhaps to avoid the risks that wehave attributed to the perspective of Rogoff the use of generic or too descriptive

analysis of the interactions, authors such as James V. Wertsch or Jaan Valsiner try

to draw attention to the more concrete processes of mediation by which the subject is

formed. In any case, Wertschs position (Wertsch 1991) seems smoothly shifted

toward the objectivist extreme in that it owes much to the semiotics of Bahktin, and

so understands mediation the intervention of cultural structures at the heart of

psychogenesisin fundamentally symbolic terms. For him, the development of the

subject should be studied from semiotic cues. Given that the semiotics of Bahktin

defines semiotic processes as essentially collective processes, the identification of agenetic logic that would enable the formation of a subject does not constitute a

theoretical necessity any longer. Perhaps we could say that Wertchss position shows

a slight sign of the tendency towards a concept that is widespread in linguistic

objectivism (that language builds our minds).

The sociocultural approach of Jaan Valsiner(Valsiner1994; Valsiner and Van der

Veer2000; Valsiner and Rosa2007) gets away from this semiotic derivative and tries

to integrate the traditions of Baldwin and Piaget, on one hand, and Vygotsky and

Soviet psychology, on the other. This author explicitly vindicates Baldwins work

and defends a co-constructivist point of view. For him, this is not a new label, butrather a return to the classic authors in order to develop a dialectic perspective

regarding the relation between the individual subject and the sociocultural context.

Although Valsiner tends to define construction in semiotic terms, he also defends the

complimentary nature of the piagetian and vygotskyan traditions and criticizes those

points of view that exclude them. His work distances itself from other perspectives

that assume that theinternalization of cultural structures on the part of the subject is

passive or that the objectivity of cultural tools such as language, institutions or the

different symbolic systems, which form the subjects social environment, are

sufficient to explain the ontogenetic development of the subject. Furthermore, it is

necessary to identify the psychogenetic processes that are needed for internalization

to take place. The subject also needs to reconstruct the cultural guidelines of its

environment. Valsiner claims that the neovygoskians who understand internalization

as a passive process betray Vygotsky, who underlined the active character of co-

construction. Imitation is active. Semiotic mediation allows the world to acquire

meaning, but, because of it, the subject re-elaborates social experience in novel

ways. Considering our criteria, Valsiners position is a good example of a well

balanced contemporary constructivism. The advantage of such a position is not to

be classicalbut to be capable of including a wide range of current contributions in a

consistent theoretical network, including those contributions belonging to the

authors attracted to some degree by objectivist or subjectivist poles. In this sense



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vindicated the work of Baldwin (Wozniak1998). He also assumes genetic logic and

compliments it with a social and intersubjective characterization of development.

However, he introduces a third element, which we think distorts the constructivist

sense of his proposal and brings him closer to objectivist positions. We are referring

to the ecological theories of perception by James J. Gibson. For Wozniak, the way toavoid the limit of subjective relativism is to identify some dimension of development

that does not depend on the process of construction and therefore guarantees an

objective starting point, even though, from a determined level, the development is

understood as a dialectic and progressive construction of the subject and object in a

social context. This basic level, which comes before construction, is defined as the

balance between the affordances of the environment and the attunement of the

organism (Wozniak1992,1993). Moreover, this balance seems to be understood by

Wozniak as an encounter between the innate physical structure of the organism and

the basic objective structure of reality, both being immediately previous to theprocess of construction:

Energy arriving at perceptual systems is rich in higher order invariant

structure bearing a regular relation to properties of the environment. Invariant

structure has the potential to inform experience, to give it a particular pattern of

changing organization over time. Yet, from a constructivist perspective,

information is not by itself a sufficient condition for experience.

Experience not only has form, it has meaning. The construction of experience

requires the detection and attribution of meaning to information from theenvironment (Wozniak1993: 7879).

Wozniaks position could be considered as an smart example of the very

widespread approaches that could be called limited constructivism: construction is

effective only from certain level onwards (usually some kind of lower and mechanical

processes, or some evolutionary stage). Now constructivism prefers to rest on a realist

(objectivist) background or basis. This is really an old and radical problem.

The School of Erlangen and the so-called constructive philosophy (Lorenzen

1982, 1987; see also Butts and Brown 1989) also seem to look for an objective

anchor for construction, although in this case the authors appeal to languageunderstood as a universal structure. In fact, the members of the school come from the

fields of logic, and mathematics and not from the psychological or biological

disciplines. Despite this, they criticize the formalism of logical positivism and

propose a non formal operationalism that considers that the most relevant elements

in the analysis of knowledge are the operations that produce it. Human action is

therefore fundamental for knowledge. Only the concrete procedures, by which this

action is able to become objective, reveal the process of the construction of

knowledge (Lorenzen1982,1987). Furthermore, in this way, it is possible to reach a

general definition of human rationality (not only scientific rationality) and auniversal and practical implementation of this rationality in an ethical way. In the

i t d ti t th E li h t l ti f hi i th ti l b k P l L

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maintained: the primacy of practical (i.e., ethicopolitical) reason over

theoretical (i.e., technical) reason, justified by a demonstration that our

theories in logic, mathematics, and physics are instruments made by us for our

technical purposes. [...]

In contrast to analytic philosophy, in constructive philosophy our talking about

what we are doing (about aour praxis) is nottaken as something given that has

to be analyzed but as something to be constructed by us. The construction has

to be done methodically, that is, step by step, without gaps and without circles.

Methodical language construction starting from pretheoretic praxis and leading

to theories supporting praxis [...]. After the pragmatic turn we know that we

have to look for a pretheoretical praxis before any methodical language

construction can begin. The praxis for which supporting political theories have

to be constructed is the praxis of lawmaking, that is, the verbal praxis ofarguing about legal norms. [...]

The moral principle of Kant is is reconstructed for the lawmaker as the

principle of rational argumentation, that is, argumentation that uses only

impersonal, transsubjective arguments (Lorenzen1987: ixx).

In our opinion, what is missing from the School of Erlangen is a conceptuali-

zation of psychological function that allows the embodiment of this abstract

rationality that seems to be defined exclusively as thought, in accordance with

logical or mathematical operations. This abstract thought should be contextualized inthe functional architecture of the subject organic, natural, and rationality should

be linked to the sociocultural context in which the subject develops.

Terrence Deacon and Gerald M. Edelman also share a tendency to gravitate

towards objectivism. Their work does not come from the field of psychology, but

rather biology and neuroscience. Nevertheless, it can enrich constructivism. Deacon

adopts a bio-semiotic point of view and brilliantly uses a version of Baldwins

organic selection to acknowledge the reciprocal constitution of the brain and

language throughout human development (Deacon 1997). In contrast with innatist

and mechanistic approaches that treat language (or any other function) as a mere

product of previous brain structures or computational modules, Deacon points out

that during evolution linguistic activity itself was a new source of selective pressure

that contributed to the modern morphological configuration of the human brain.

What Deacon does not do, however, is generalize this principle to all non

linguistichuman and animal activity as would be suggested by Baldwin. He does

not appeal to genetic psychology to describe the activity of the subjects. Instead he

uses a semiotic approach. Perhaps the problem with semiotics, from a genetic-

constructivist point of view, is that semiotic realities need to be genetically

explained, not the reverse, because simbolic and linguistic functions are derived or

developed evolutionary and ontogenetically from simpler organic functions.

Taking semiotic relations as primary realities is a kind of realism, a linguistic



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in terms of a dialectic between biological maturation and experience. His neural

Darwinism a neurological analogue to natural selectiondescribes a process of

formation of neural networks that are functionally specialized in accordance with the

simultaneous process of learning by trial and error. This could be interpreted from

the perspective of genetic logic: the stabilization of the neural connections ismediated by the activity of the subject (Snchez1998). Nonetheless, Deacon does not

use genetic psychology. Instead, he tends to emphasize biochemical explanations, in

a way that is very common nowadays (neurochemical objectivism).

The Objectivist Perspectives

Gerhard Roth is also situated in the realm of neuroscience and shows a clear

interest in constructivism. He affirms that what we call reality is a construction of thebrain. This construction is, however, only a hypothesis of objective reality (Roth

2004). For him there is no way to confirm the existence of the external world.

Roths proposal is we thinka very good example of the high tensionbetween

subjectivism and objectivism that characterizes neurological constructivist perspec-

tives when genetic psychology, or at least a functional conception of the brain, like

Eldermans, is not taken into account. On one hand we are told that the only

objectivity possible is objectivity created by each particular brain but this seems to

trap us in a subjective solipsism. On the other hand, we are implicitly told that the

only objective reality is the brain. The brain is therefore considered a fundamentaland unquestionable reality that subordinates all posterior construction of knowledge

(see also Roth and Wullimann 2001).

Francisco J. Varela, who insists that subject and object are inherently

interdependent, has offered an astute criticism of the subjective solipsism of some

so-called constructivisms (Von Foerster for example). From his perspective, it is not

possible for the subject to reduce the object. Varela uses phenomenology to buttress

his perspective, but also adds the idea of an intersubjective self which seems to be

inspired by Buddhist philosophy (Varela 2004). For him the fact that knowledge is

an organic construction does not mean that some reference to objective or external

reality is lost forever and that we have to settle for hypothetical models whose

veracity is always put into doubt. In this sense, Varela, in our judgement, is much

closer to an ideal (and classic) constructivism than many constructivists. However,

we do not think that phenomenology is an effective substitution for genetic logic

because the presence of the object, which phenomenology takes as its starting

point, is exactly what needs to be explained in psychogenetic terms. Thus, Varelas

rejection of subjectivism leads him not to a constructivist view but to a very

particular (mystic?) kind of realist affirmation of objectivity.

The next objectivist perspectives which we would like to discuss are related to

Complex Systems Theory. This theory is usually presented as an alternative to

reductionism, given that it postulates an interaction, on many levels, between diverse



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interaction between the organism and the environment which are understood as

independent entities. In her view the most important thing is interaction and only

from it can the components of the organism and the environment arise. They are

emergent properties of a developmental process:

When the focus is on development, most of the moves I try to head off

involve agency from the inside-out, for this is where one most often

encounters the notion of internally driven, goal-directed forces, tipically

thought of as emanating from the DNA. When we turn to evolution, we find

the opposite: the constructor is the environment, or natural selection, or

even mother nature. Although it may seem unnecessary [...] to say there is no

constructor, then, it is not the practice ofpersonification that I am contesting,

but rather the notion ofform-giverseparate and independent from that which is

formed. Because DSA [Developmental Systems Approach] does not make the

usual move of casting development and evolution as contrasting sorts of

processes, one controlled from the inside (programmed, perhaps) and the

other from the outside (contingent, historical), the sense of construction is

similar for both: the appearance over time of an interactive product, in this

sense emergentrather than prefigured or predefined(Oyama2005: 273274).

Perspectives like this pose a serious criticism against both innatist and

environmentalist reductionism. Nevertheless, we believe that it substitutes the

specificity of the relation between subject and object (which implies purpose,

memory, meaning, experience, etc.) for a nonspecified multilevel interaction that, inthe end, seems to refer to an objective reality with a physicalist character, defined as

a group of physical systems and subsystems mutually affecting one another. The

absence of a genetic logic destroys any possibility of understanding the construction

of knowledge as a product of a dialectic relation between subject and object which

cannot be reduced to the type of relations that are given by the physical world. It is

not by chance that other ideas based on a systemic point of view, such as neural

constructivism (Quartz and Sejnowski1997) orbiocultural co-constructivism(Baltes

et al.2006), reproduce the same problem. Although these authors, just as Deacon or

Edelman, try to suggest a way for learning processes and cultural influence to

ontogenetically configure the brain, they do it without incorporating a psychogenetic

perspective and end up translating psychological functions to neural connections, in

line with connectionist models or mechanistic interpretations of learning. In this way

psychology loses its own ontological identity and gets trapped between two

objective realities: the physical and the cultural.

Far removed from this type of physicalist constructivism, we can find the social

constructivism of Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann who emphasize the

individual and contextual nature of knowledge in each human society (Berger and

Luckmann1966). This perspective reduces all knowledge to ideology, to a product

of social interests and forces. Therefore, everything that human beings believe about

reality is a social construction. Psychological activity exists for Berger and



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socialization in the individual. Because of this, we have placed these authors in the

column of Table 1 that corresponds to objectivist orientations: for these authors,

social objectivity is fundamental and explains all psychological processes. This is

an example of social objectivism.

Bruno Latour, the last author we have placed in the right column of the table,has probably been the most astute in pointing out that a rejection of objectivity,

understood as something apart from the activity of the subject (objectivity in a

realistic sense), does not mean an open defence of relativism. In his criticism of the

Edinburgh school and social constructivism (Latour1987), he points out that, even

from a pragmatic point of view, the fact is that objective structures do exist and

therefore we are forced to explain how they have been constructed, because we form

a part of them. Nonetheless Latour defends the idea that constructivist principles are

not only situated in the subject but also in objects (Latour 2002, 2004). In fact, he

explicitly rejects the genetic psychology of Piaget, arguing that the structures ofknowledge cannot be translated into psychological terms because this would

hypostasize them (Latour 1986, 1996). According to Latour, activity is distributed

in a network of interactions between humans and non-humans this is the way

he redefines subjects and objectsin such a way that the network itself appears to

be an objective structure from which everything arises. Thus the so called Actor-

Network Theory (Latour, 2005) ends up looking like a description of an external

reality which is the network of humans and non-humans interacting. This is a

particular and fuzzy sort of objectivism: the network is the whole thing, the objective

reality. There is also a (postulated) constructive process whithout a constructivegenetic logic (for a criticism see Loredo 2009).

The Subjectivist Perspectives

The constructionist theories ofJonathan Potter(Potter1996; Potter et al.1984) and

Kenneth J. Gergen (Gergen 1991, 1994, 2001) defend a point of view that is

related to that of Latour, in that they place the construction of knowledge in the play

between shared social meanings. We have placed these authors in the column that

corresponds to the subjectivists because they assume a negative conception of

psychology that goes hand in hand with their explicit defence of relativism. For them

there is no other reality than that which is dictated by consensus, and consensus

depends on individual and collective interests (Gergen 1991, chap. 4; Potter 1996,

chap. 4). In the end, discourse is not even a structure that could be considered as an

objective reference for action, but rather it is seen itself as a way of action, however

irrational or pragmatic (Potter 1996, chap. 8). Gergen even defends the idea that it

makes no sense to search for a theory of the subject: the only thing that makes sense

is to develop a plurality of discourses and practices related to the subject. He seems

to consider that the only alternative is to practice a scrupulous respect for any

possible way of understanding psychology (Gergen1994, chap. 1). This is in favour

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14/19

these novelties because for him to search for them is the same as imposing a filter on

the proliferation of the plurality of practice and discussion. In the abstractof an article

dedicated to responding to various commentaries on his work, Gergen condenses his

posture in the following way, which suggests that whoever does not accept his

relativism can only be a traditional realist with a nostalgia for pure rationality:

The present critiques are framed within a tradition that views argumentation

as a pathway to truth, objectivity and purity of reason. The constructionist

dialogues substantially refigure these criterial concepts, conceptualizing them

as artefacts of historically and culturally situated communities. Troubles begin

when any particular community begins to declare alterior realities null and

void. The constructionist dialogues invite us to replace questions of truth in all

worlds with communal deliberation on the future outcomes both for

psychology and global cultures of varying forms of intelligibility. In this

respect, constructionist discourse harbours the potential for enormous gains in

creative collaboration, a condition I find far more promising that the bounded

worlds of realism and rationalism favoured by these critiques. A liberal

constructionism would not abandon the traditions from which these critiques

emerge, while the unbridled expansion of any of these traditions would

eliminate all save its own (Gergen2001: 419).

The Edinburgh Schoolis another source of relativistic positions. For its members

(Barnes 1987; Bloor 1991; Barnes and Bloor 1982) scientific results are not quite

objective structures that constrain the behaviour of the subjects but rather theproducts of negotiation, the play between the interests of different guilds, social

demands and technology. Although these authors do not share the emphasis on language

(understood as discourse) with other constructionists, they do share the subjectivist

conception of psychology, which is now focused on the concept ofinterest.

In the ideas ofHumberto Maturanawe can find another type of subjectivism. It

would also be entirely possible to place his work next to the objectivist orientations

because of his use of systemic and cybernetic concepts, but instead, we would rather

focus on the fact that he emphasizes the idea of a human observerwithout offering a

clear criteria for objectivity, limiting himself to suppose that the observer merely

interprets that which he observes. Maturana also accepts the dualism between

animals and humans. Animals are auto-regulated machines, self organizing systems

(this is the objectivist side). Humans, thanks to language, are capable of observing

the reality of self organizing systems and non self organizing systems and

interpreting them, thus producing knowledge. However, there is no objective

criterion for this knowledge (this is the subjectivist side). Only language can

determine the meaning. Unfortunately, it does not seem that Maturana considers

appealing to psychology in order to understand the constitution of the human subject

or the origin of language (Maturana1988,2004).

Paul Watzlawick can be said to move in the arena of systemic orientations,

mostly applied to psychotherapy. Watzlawick defends a conception of reality as a

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15/19

restricted) on communication. There is no objectivity except that of the practical

processes of communication between subjects and the individual elaboration of vital

meaning. Suffering the fact that people suffer from psychologicalproblemsis

perhaps the only residue, like a noumenal reality, that opposes the liberty and the

desires and interests of the subject.The last author we would like to mention here is Heinz von Foerster. His

radical constructivism(Foerster1982,1984) is also linked to Systems Theory and

cybernetics. Although his point of view is similar to that of Maturana, he defends an

explicit relativism that is based on the idea that the world and truth are created by

each individual subject. Foerster therefore seems to accept solipsism. For him, there

is no alternative to the conception of knowledge as a representation of an external

reality. Given that this external reality is impossible to verify, everything has to be in

the subjects mind. If there is something real out there we can only make individual

interpretations. Objectivity is not constructed: as in the case of Maturana, the subjectis limited to being anobserverthat registers or describes things that do not represent

anything but themselves. In our view, Von Foersters view is a paradigmatic case of

subjectivism.

Conclusion

The field of tensions we have presented through our classification and our authors

examples can clarify to some extent the almost chaotic field of current constructivisms.Ours is a critical classification aimed at contrasting different constructivist paths and

assessing their consistency. Consistency is a key word, an index of truth in a

constructivist sense neither representation nor pure relativism. As we have argued,

a more consistent constructivism can be advanced by extending the classic

evolutionary-genetic-sociohistorical constructivism, that links elements from Kant,

Wundt, Baldwin, Piaget and Vygotsky, at the very least. This hiper-complex theory

permits us to critically integrate findings and ideas from a variety of fields (evolutionary

theory, brain development, experimental and developmental psychology, human

evolution, human history, social practices, and classic philosophical problems

concerning ontology and epistemology) in such a way others cannot.

There is a two-face structural problem that undermines the consistency of

constructivism, attracting it either to realism (the objectivists temptations that

blur the meaning of the astonishing discovering that reality is objectual,

constructed not objective, and that at the same time is being constructed) or

to subjectivism (that blurs the specific meaning of subjectual not subjective

genesis). Both atracting poles are classical, strong and widespread. They have their

own consistency in some particular ways. We think their consistency also depends

on our own constructivist weakness as expressed, for instance, by the subjectivist

distortion currently made by radical constructivisms or by the difficulties of

integrating the most important aspects of Piaget and Vygotsky. It is a dialectical



16/19

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Jos Carlos Snchez (Ph.D., Psychology, University of Oviedo, 1994) is Professor of the Department of

Psychology at Oviedo University (Spain). He has published in the areas of history of psychology andtheory of psychology. He currently teaches history and theory of psychology, and basic psychological

processes. His areas of interest are history of psychology, comparative psychology, evolution and organic

selection theory, constructivist traditions and conceptions of function in the behavioral sciences, and

aesthetics in psychology.

Jos Carlos Lorendo (Ph.D., Psychology, Universidad Nacional de Educacin a Distancia, 1999) is

Assistant Professor of the Department of Psicologa Bsica I at the Universidad Nacional de Educacin a

Distancia (National University for Open Education) in Madrid, Spain. He currently teaches history of

psychology, history of psychology in Spain, and epistemology. His areas of interest are history of

psychology, constructivist traditions in the behavioral sciences, and technologies of subjectivity.



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constructivisms from a genetic point

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