constitutional law ii (bill3) benita
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Presley v. Bel-Air Village Association201 SCRA 13
FACTS:Plaintiff- appellee, Bel- Air Village Association Inc.
(BAVA) filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages with preliminary injunction against defendant-
appellant for violation of the Deed Restrictions of Bel- Air
Subdivision, which provides among others that the house and
lot shall be used only for residential and not for commercial
purposes. Plaintiff- appelle was alleged to have violated the
Deed after the latter operated a hot Pan de Sal store in the
house and lot located in the said Subdivision.
The trial court rendered a decision in favour of BAVA which
was affirmed by the respondent CA. Thus, appellant filed an
instant petition before the SC.
ISSUE:W/N the defendant- appellant violated the Deed of
Restrictions of Bel- Air Subdivision.
HELD:No. The SC ruled that the street (Jupiter) where the
house and lot is located is not covered by the restrictive
easements based on the 'deed restrictions' but chiefly
because the National Government itself, through Ordinance
No. 81-01 of the Metro Manila Commission (MMC), had
reclassified it into a 'high density commercial (C-3) zone.
Hence, the petitioners have no cause of action on the
strength alone of the said deed restrictions.
As far as the Bel-Air subdivision itself is concerned, certainly,
the restrictive easements are valid and enforceable. But they
are, like all contracts, subject to the overriding demands,
needs, and interests of the greater number as the State may
determine in the legitimate exercise of police power. Our
jurisdiction guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be
the 'law between the contracting parties, but while it is so, it
cannot contravene 'law, morals, good customs, public order,
or public policy.' Above all, it cannot be raised as a deterrent
to police power, designed precisely to promote health, safety,
peace, and enhance the common good, at the expense of
contractual rights, whenever necessary. Decision of the
respondent court is reversed.
Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance
235 SCRA 630
FACTS:These are motions seeking reconsideration of a
decision dismissing the petitions filed in these cases for the
declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise
known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. CREBA asserts
that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2)
classifies transactions as covered or exempt without
reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes should be
uniform and equitable and that Congress shall "evolve a
progressive system of taxation."
It is claimed that the application of the tax to existing
contracts of the sale of real property by installment or on
deferred payment basis would result in substantial increases
in the monthly amortizations to be paid because of the 10%
VAT. The additional amount, it is pointed out, is something
that the buyer did not anticipate at the time he entered into
the contract.
ISSUE:Whether RA 7716 impairs obligations of contracts and
is therefore unconstitutional.
HELD:No. Not only are existing laws read into contracts in
order to fix obligations as between parties, but the
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also
read onto contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order
Only slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical is the
contention of CREBA that the imposition of the VAT on the
sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered
into prior to the effecting of the law would violate the
constitutional provision that No law impairing the obligationof contracts shall be passed. It is enough to say that the
parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of
prophetic discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing
power of the state. For not only are existing laws read into
contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but
the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is
also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the lega
order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment
presupposes the maintenance of a government which retains
adequate authority to secure peace and good order of
society.
Siska Development v. Office of the President 231 SCRA
674 FACTS:Petitioner, a subdivision owner-developer
entered into a Contract to Sell with Guadalupe Sering,
involving a lot situated at the Mira-Nila Subdivision in Quezon
City. With the consent of the petitioner, Guadalupe
transferred all her rights and interests over the aforesaid lot
in favor of respondent Socorro Sering. Thereafter, private
respondents assumed the transferors obligation by paying
the monthly amortizations for the lot. Private respondents
defaulted in the payment of their monthly amortizations, butpetitioner still accepted the late payments. Petitioner sen
private respondents a notice of rescission of the Contract to
Sell for failure to pay the monthly amortizations on time but
it was cancelled after private respondents updated thei
payments, and imposed the condition that should it be
necessary to rescind the contract for a second time, the
second rescission would be final. Private respondents again
defaulted in paying their monthly amortizations .When
private respondent offered to pay the remaining balance of
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the purchase price, a representative of petitioner refused to
accept the payment, alleging that the contract had already
been cancelled. However, said respondent protested that he
had not received any notice of rescission from petitioner. To
compel the execution by petitioner of the final deed of sale,
private respondents filed an action for specific performance
in the CFI but it was dismissed. When the case was elevated
to the Office of the President, the latter ruled in favor of
private respondents, directing petitioner to execute a final
deed of sale on the lot covered by the Contract to Sell in favor
of private respondents upon payment of the unpaid balance
of P9, 341.24.
Petitioner argues that the relationship between the parties is
governed solely by the Contract to sell because said contract
was entered into long before the passage of the Maceda Law.
Without expressly stating so, petitioners line of argument
invokes the non-impairment clause of the Constitution (Art.
III, Sec. 10).
ISSUE: WON there was a violation of non-impairment
clause of the constitution.
HELD: None. The purpose of said clause is to safeguard the
integrity of contracts against unwarranted interference by
the State. As a rule, contract should not be tampered with by
subsequent laws that would change or modify the rights and
obligations of the parties. As noted by Justice Isagani A. Cruz
The will of the obligor and obligee must be observed; the
obligation of their contract must not be impaired.
Impairment is anything that diminishes the efficacy of thecontract. There is impairment if a subsequent law changes
the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new
conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws
remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties.
Miners Association v. Factoran 240 SCRA 100
FACTS: Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive
Order Nos. 211 and 279 in the exercise of her legislative
powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the
processing and approval of applications for the exploration,
development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes
the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-venture,
co-production, or production- sharing agreements for the
exploration, development, and utilization of mineral
resources.
The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR
of Administrative Order Nos. 57 which declares that all
existing mining leases or agreements which were granted
after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, shall be
converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1)
year from the effectivity of these guidelines. and
Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to
submit Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing
Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the
Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the
abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand and gravel
claims, after their respective effectivity dates compelled the
Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., an organization
composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim
holders, to file the instant petition assailing their validity and
constitutionality before this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the two Department Administrative
Orders valid.
HELD: Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the governing
law on the acceptance and approval of declarations oflocation and all other kinds of applications for the
exploration, development, and utilization of mineral
resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous.
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old
system of exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources through "license, concession or lease" which,
however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution.
By virtue of the said constitutional mandate and its
implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 whichsuperseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing
on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing
mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to
operate as the governing law. In other words, in all other
areas of administration and management of mineral lands,
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended,
and other existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of
Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus:
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, asamended, other existing mining laws, and their implementing
rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall
continue in force and effect.
Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the
reservation clause, mining leases or agreements granted by
the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order
No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations
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through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the
State.
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in
this regard, may not be precluded by the constitutional
restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering,
modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements
granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended,
pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-
extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of
public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The
passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded
Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR
Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
Juarez v. CA214 SCRA 475
FACTS: The subject of this controversy is a lot located at 502
Quezon Boulevard, Manila. It was leased in the early 1900sto Servillano Ocampo, who built a house thereon where he
lived with his parents and his sister Angela. The lease was
taken over by Angela Ocampo, who continued to stay in the
house together with her children, including herein petitioner
Virginia Ocampo Juarez. In 1976, Angela moved to her
daughter Virginias house in Pasay City. The house on Quezon
Boulevard she leased to Roberto Capuchino, reserving only
one room for her personal belongings. Meantime, the lot had
been sold by the Aranetas to Susanna Realty, Inc., which in
turn sold it in 1985 to Cetus Development Corporation, the
herein private respondent.
Immediately after acquiring the lot, Cetus filed a complaint
for ejectment against the petitioner with the Municipal Court
of Manila on the ground that the lessee had subleased the
property without its consent in violation of BP 877. The case
was dismissed. The court held that the statute was
inapplicable because the sublease was made prior to its
effectivity.
The Court of Appeals reversed. It ruled that BP 877 was
applicable because the original contract of lease did not
specify a fixed term and payment of the rental was made on a
monthly basis. The contract was deemed terminated from
month to month. Hence, when it was renewed in July 1985, it
became subject to BP 877, which had come into effect on
June 12, 1985.
ISSUE: Whether or not BP 877 is violative of the Impairment
Clause.
HELD: No. The impairment clause is now no longer inviolate;
in fact, there are many who now believe it is an anachronism
in the present-day society. It was quite useful before in
protecting the integrity of private agreements from
government meddling, but that was when such agreements
did not affect the community in general. They were indeed
purely private agreements then. Any interference with them
at that time was really an unwarranted intrusion that could
be properly struck down.
But things are different now. More and more, the interests of
the public have become involved in what are supposed to be
still private agreements, which have as a result been removed
from the protection of the impairment clause. These
agreements have come within the embrace of the police
power, that obtrusive protector of the public interest. It is a
ubiquitous policeman indeed. As long as the contract affects
the public welfare one way or another so as to require the
interference of the State, then must the police power be
asserted, and prevail, over the impairment clause.
FPIB v. CA
252 SCRA 259
FACTS: Producers Bank (now called First Philippine
International Bank), which has been under conservatorship
since 1984, is the owner of 6 parcels of land. The Bank had an
agreement with Demetrio Demetria and Jose Janolo for the
two to purchase the parcels of land for a purchase price of
P5.5 million pesos. The said agreement was made by
Demetria and Janolo with the Banks manager, Mercurio
Rivera.
Later however, the Bank, through its conservator, Leonida
Encarnacion, sought the repudiation of the agreement as it
alleged that Rivera was not authorized to enter into such an
agreement; hence there was no valid contract of sale
Subsequently, Demetria and Janolo sued Producers Bank. The
regional trial court ruled in favor of Demetria et al. The Bank
filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, Henry Co, who holds 80% shares of stocks with
the said Bank, filed a motion for intervention with the tria
court. The trial court denied the motion since the trial has
been concluded already and the case is now pending appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a perfected contract of sale.
HELD: Yes. There is a perfected contract of sale because the
bank manager, Rivera, entered into the agreement with
apparent authority. This apparent authority has been duly
proved by the evidence presented which showed that in al
the dealings and transactions, Rivera participated actively
without the opposition of the conservator. In fact, in the
advertisements and announcements of the bank, Rivera was
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designated as the go-to guy in relation to the disposition of
the Banks assets.
CMMA v. POEA243 SCRA 666
FACTS: Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies,
Inc., an incorporated association of licensed Filipino manning
agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed manning agencies
which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of
their respective foreign ship-owner-principals, urge the Court
to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing
Board" of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) and POEA Memorandum Circular No.
05, series of 1994, on one of the grounds that the resolution
and the memorandum circular are unconstitutional because
they violate the equal protection and non-impairment of
obligation of contracts clauses of the Constitution. The said
resolution and memorandum resolved to amend and increasethe compensation and other benefits in cases of death,
disability, and loss or damage to a Filipino seaman working in
ocean-going vessels.
In their, comment the public respondents contend that the
petition is without merit and should be dismissed because
the issuance of the challenged resolution and memorandum
circular was a valid exercise of the POEA's rule-making
authority or power of subordinate legislation.
ISSUE: Whether or not POEA resolution and memorandum is
unconstitutional.
HELD: There is no merit to the claim that the assailed
resolution and memorandum circular violate the equal
protection and contract clauses of the Constitution nor is
there-merit in the claim that the resolution and
memorandum circular violate the contract clause of the Bill of
Rights.
The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual
obligations is not absolute and is not to be read with literal
exactness. It is restricted to contracts with respect toproperty or some object of value and which confer rights that
maybe asserted in a court of justice; it has no application to
statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of the
general legislative powers of the State and involving the
public rights and public welfare of the entire community
affected by it.
It does not prevent a proper exercise by the State of its police
power by enacting regulations reasonably necessary to
secure the health, safety, morals; comfort, or general welfare
of the community, even though contracts may thereby be
affected, for such matters cannot be placed by contract
beyond the power of the State to regulate and control them
19
Verily, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts
and all rights are subject to the police power of the State and
not only may regulations which affect them be established by
the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change
from time to time, as the general, well-being of the
community may require, or as the circumstances may change
or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. 20 And
under the Civil Code, contracts of labor are explicitly subject
to the police power of the State because they are not
ordinary contracts but are impresses with public interest.
The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being
valid implementations of E.O. No. 797, which was enacted
under the police power of the State, they cannot be struck
down on the ground that they violate the contract clause. Tohold otherwise is to alter long-established constitutiona
doctrine and to subordinate the police power to the contract
clause. The Court resolved to dismiss the instant petition for
lack of merit with costs against the petitioners.
PNB v. O.P.252 SCRA 5
FACTS: May a buyer of a property at a foreclosure sale
dispossess prior purchasers on installment of individual lots
therein, or compel them to pay again for the lots which they
previously bought from the defaulting mortgagor-subdivision
developer, on the theory that P.D. 957, The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers Protective Decree, is not applicable to
the mortgage contract in question, the same having been
executed prior to the enactment of P.D. 957? This is the
question confronting the Court in this Petition challenging the
Decision dated March 10, 1992 of the Office of the President
of the Philippines in O.P. Case No. 4249, signed by. the
Executive Secretary, Franklin M. Drilon, by authority of the
President.
Private respondents were buyers on installment o
subdivision lots from Marikina Village, Inc. Notwithstanding
the land purchase agreements it executed over said lots, the
subdivision developer mortgaged the lots in favor of the
petitioner, PNB. Unaware of this mortgage, private
respondents duly complied with their obligations as lot
buyers and constructed their houses on the lots in
question.Subsequently, the subdivision developer defaulted
and PNB foreclosed on the mortgage. As highest bidder at the
foreclosure sale, the bank became owner of the lots.
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Acting on suits brought by private respondents, the HLURB
Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) in a
decision rendered ruled that PNB -- without prejudice to
seeking relief against Marikina Village, -- Inc. may collect from
private respondents only the remaining amortizations, in
accordance with the land purchase agreements they had
previously entered into with Marikina Village, Inc., and
cannot compel private respondents to pay all over again for
the lots they had already bought from said subdivision
developer. The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
affirmed this decision. The Office of the President likewise
concurred with the HLURB. Hence, the present recourse to
this Court. The petitioner complains that the retroactive
application of the law would violate the impairment clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Bank is a privy to the
contracts between private respondents and mortgagor-
subdivision developer, hence, the Office of the President
erred in ordering petitioner Bank to accept private
respondents remaining amortizations and issue the
corresponding titles after payment thereof.
HELD: Despite the impairment clause, a contract valid at the
time of its execution may be legally modified or even
completely invalidated by a subsequent law. If the law is a
proper exercise of the police power, it will prevail over the
contract.
Into each contract are read the provisions of existing law and,
always, a reservation of the police power as long as the
agreement deals with a matter affecting the public welfare.Such a contract, it has been held, suffers a congenital
infirmity, and this is its susceptibility to change by the
legislature as a postulate of the legal order.Privity of
contracts as a defense does not apply in this case for the law
explicitly grants to the buyer the option to pay the
installment payment for his lot or unit directly to the
mortgagee (petitioner), which is required to apply such
payments to reduce the corresponding portion of the
mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit
being paid for.
Wherefore petitioner Bank was enjoin to focus not only on
the strictly legal issues involved in this case but also to take
another look at the larger issues including social justice and
the protection of human rights as enshrined in the
Constitution; firstly, because legal issues are raised and
decided not in a vacuum but within the context of existing
social, economic and political conditions, law being merely a
brick in the up-building of the social edifice; and secondly,
petitioner, being THE state bank, is for all intents and
purposes an instrument for the implementation of state
policies so cherished in our fundamental law.
Eugenio v. Drilon252 SCRA 106
FACTS: Private Respondent purchased on installment basis
from Petitioner, two lots. Private respondent suspended
payment of his amortizations because of non-development
on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to
spouses Relevo and the title was registered under their name
Respondent prayed for annulment of sale and conveyance of
the lot to him. Applying P.D. 957 The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers Protective Decree, the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to
complete the development, reinstate Private Respondents
purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him
of the payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold
to the spouses. Petitioner claims that the Exec. Sec. erred in
applying P.D. 957 saying it should have not been given
retroactive effect and that non-development does not justify
the non-payment of the amortizations.
ISSUE: W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse
of discretion when he decided P.D. 957 will be given
retroactive effect.
HELD: No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with
grave abuse of discretion and P.D. 957 is to give retroactiveeffect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to
its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for
retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred
from the unmistakable intent of the law. The intent of the
statute is the law.
Meralco v. Province of Laguna306 SCRA 750
FACTS: On various dates, certain municipalities of the
Province of Laguna, including, Bian, Sta. Rosa, San Pedro
Luisiana, Calauan and Cabuyao, by virtue of existing laws then
in effect, issued resolutions through their respective
municipal councils granting franchise in favor of petitioner
Manila Electric Company ("MERALCO") for the supply of
electric light, heat and power within their concerned areas
On 19 January 1983, MERALCO was likewise granted a
franchise by the National Electrification Administration to
operate an electric light and power service in the Municipality
of Calamba, Laguna.
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On 12 September 1991, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the "Local Government Code of 1991," was enacted
to take effect on 01 January 1992 enjoining local government
units to create their own sources of revenue and to levy
taxes, fees and charges, subject to the limitations expressed
therein, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.
Pursuant to the provisions of the Code, respondent province
enacted Laguna Provincial Ordinance No. 01-92, effective 01
January 1993, providing, in part, Sec. 2.09. Franchise Tax
which states there is hereby imposed a tax on businesses
enjoying a franchise, at a rate of fifty percent (50%) of one
percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts, which shall include
both cash sales and sales on account realized during the
preceding calendar year within this province, including the
territorial limits on any city located in the province.
Respondent Provincial Treasurer sent a demand letter to
MERALCO for the corresponding tax payment. Petitioner
MERALCO paid the tax, which then amounted to P19,
520.628.42, under protest. A formal claim for refund was
thereafter sent by MERALCO to the Provincial Treasurer of
Laguna claiming that the franchise tax it had paid and
continued to pay to the National Government pursuant to
P.D. 551 already included the franchise tax imposed by the
Provincial Tax Ordinance. MERALCO contended that the
imposition of a franchise tax under Section 2.09 of Laguna
Provincial Ordinance No. 01-92, insofar as it concerned
MERALCO, contravened the provisions of Section 1 of P.D.
551 on 28 August 1995, the claim for refund of petitioner was
denied.
On 14 February 1996, petitioner MERALCO filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, a complaint for
refund, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order, against the
Province of Laguna and also Benito R. Balazo in his capacity as
the Provincial Treasurer of Laguna. The trial court, in its
assailed decision of 30 September 1997, dismissed the
complaint
ISSUE: W/N the imposition of a franchise tax under Section
2.09 of Laguna Provincial Ordinance No. 01-92 is invalid.
HELD Prefatorily, it might be well to recall that local
governments do not have the inherent power to tax 4 except
to the extent that such power might be delegated to them
either by the basic law or by statute. Presently, under Article
X of the 1987 Constitution, a general delegation of that
power has been given in favor of local government units.
While the Court has, not too infrequently, referred to tax
exemptions contained in special franchises as being in the
nature of contracts and a part of the inducement for carrying
on the franchise, these exemptions, nevertheless, are far
from being strictly contractual in nature. Contractual tax
exemptions, in the real sense of the term and where the non
impairment clause of the Constitution can rightly be invoked
are those agreed to by the taxing authority in contracts, such
as those contained in government bonds or debentures
lawfully entered into by them under enabling laws in which
the government, acting in its private capacity, sheds its cloak
of authority and waives its governmental immunity. Truly, tax
exemptions of this kind may not be revoked without
impairing the obligations of contracts. These contractual tax
exemptions, however, are not to be confused with tax
exemptions granted under franchises. A franchise partakes
the nature of a grant which is beyond the purview of the non
impairment clause of the Constitution. Indeed, Article XII
Section 11, of the 1987 Constitution, like its precursor
provisions in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, is explicit
that no franchise for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except under the condition that such privilege shal
be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress as
and when the common good so requires.
XII. Section 12
1. Rights in Custodial InvestigationMiranda v. Arizona384 US 436
Gamboa v. Judge Cruz 162 SCRA 675
FACTS: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without awarrant. During a line-up of 5 detainees including petitioner
he was identified by a complainant to be a companion in a
robbery, thereafter he was charged. Petitioner filed a Motion
to Acquit on the ground that the conduct of the line-up
without notice and in the absence of his counsel violated his
constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. The court
denied said motion. Hearing was set, hence the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or Not petitioners right tocounsel and due
process violated.
HELD: No. The police line-up was not part of the custodia
inquest; hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage
to counsel. He had not been held yet to answer for a crimina
offense. The moment there is a move or even an urge of said
investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain
information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the
time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted
by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be
made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
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On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way,
deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he
was duly represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the
opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to
substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and
instead opted to file a Motion to acquit after the prosecution
had rested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute
lack of opportunity to be heard.
People v. Pinlac165 SCRA 675
FACTS: The accused was convicted for two separate criminal
cases for robbery and robbery with homicide. He assailed his
conviction on the contention that the court erred in admitting
his extrajudicial confession as evidence which was taken by
force, violence, torture, and intimidation without having
appraised of his constitutional rights and without the
assistance of counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was observed during thecustodial investigation of the accused.
HELD: The court find it meritorious to declare that the
constitutional rights of the accused was violated in the failure
of the authorities in making the accused understand the
nature of the charges against him without appraising him of
his constitutional right to have a counsel during custodial
investigation. Moreover the prosecution merely presented
the extrajudicial confession of the accused which is
inadmissible as evidence and the other evidences provided
therein are merely circumstantial and subject for rebuttal.
The court acquitted the accused.
People v. Loveria187 SCRA 47
FACTS: The accused-appellant David S. Loveria was charged
with the crime of Robbery with Homicide and Frustrated
Homicide. After being convicted by the RTC, accused-
appellant filed an appeal, assailing, among others, assails the
manner in which he was identified by one of the victims at
the headquarters of the 225th Philippine Constabulary (PC) in
Cogeo, Antipolo, Rizal, claiming violation of his constitutional
right to counsel.
Sec. 20, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution, which was in force at
the time the events under review occurred reads: Sec. 20.No
person shall be compelled to be witness against himself. Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will
shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in
violation of this section shall be inadmissible in the evidence.
ISSUE: W/N accused-appellants constitutional right to
counsel has been violated.
HELD: No, the Court ruled that Loverias constitutional right
to counsel was not violated when he was identified in a police
line-up by one of the victims and neither can he now invoked
that right because a case is already pending in court.
The Court emphasized that the so-called Miranda rightscontained in the above-quoted constitutional provisions may
be invoked by a person only while he is under custodial
investigation. Since the appellant was not being investigated
when Manzanero was in the process of identifying him, he
cannot claim that his right to counsel was violated because at
that stage, he was not entitled to the constitutional
guarantee invoked. Furthermore, since custodial
investigation is defined as the "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way", these constitutional rights may no longer beclaimed by a defendant in a criminal case already pending in
court.
People v. Alegria190 SCRA 122
FACTS: Antonio Corporal, a security guard with multiple stab
wounds was found dead in the premises of the Warebank
Phil., Inc., in Tondo, Manila, where he was working. Among
the four suspects, Trial proceeded only against Labuac and
Buenaflor, who were both eventually convicted and
sentenced to life imprisonment. The lower court found that
on the above-mentioned date, the four accused agreed to
enter the compound of Warebank to steal empty bottles
However, they were seen by Corporal, who was then on duty
After stabbing the guard, the men fled the scene.
These findings were based on the sworn statements taken
from Labuac, Buenaflor and Alegria (one of the four), and the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, principally Alex Sto
Domingo and Perla Balde, who both declared that they saw
Buenaflor carrying Corporal's shotgun. Police officer, who
took the sworn statement of Labuac, and Police officer
Josefino Rey, who took the sworn statements of Buenaflo
and Alegria, both swore that the affiants were informed of
their constitutional rights and freely confessed their
participation in the murder of the guard.
The suspects took the witness stand and denounced thei
supposed confessions as having been taken from them
through threats and violence, were made to sign paper o
which content they did not understand, were not informed of
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their constitutional rights nor were they represented and
assisted by counsel.
HELD: In the case at bar, Labuac was hardly literate, not even
having finished Grade 1, and, like Buenaflor and Alegria, was
not represented by counsel. While there was a lawyer who
was allegedly called to be present at their interrogation, he
did not actively assist and advise them, being there merely to
give a semblance of legality to the proceedings. There is
nothing in the record to show that the lawyer made a single
manifestation or representation on behalf of the person he
was supposed to protect against any possible abuse of the
investigators.
The lawyer who was supposed to have advised the suspects
were the same person who took their oaths and certified that
he was "satisfied" that the statements were freely and
knowingly given.
The lawyer was also a member of the police organizationinvestigating the suspects and, no less remarkably, were not
presented as witnesses to authenticate the confessions. The
police officer who took their confession had admitted to have
prepared in advance the suspects statement to be signed by
the latter.
The court then ruled in favor of the suspects as having found
their confessions inadmissible in evidence due to the evident
non-conformity with the constitutional right to a counsel to
prevent confessions given under coercion. In absence of any
other evidence due to the inadmissibility of the confession,
the charges against the suspects were dismissed. In the
absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt, it must be
presumed that they did not kill the guard.
People v. De Guzman194 SCRA 191
FACTS: De Guzman was arrested for allegedly selling
marijuana after a buy-bust operation conducted by the
NARCOM District Office in Malolos, Bulacan. The case for the
prosecution was based mainly on the testimony of Sgt. Ruben
S. Bazar who stated that the operation was done after
receiving a tip from a confidential informer that the accused
would be selling marijuana at Virgen de los Flores, Baliwag,
Bulacan from six in the evening until midnight. The only other
witness presented by the prosecution was Capt. Marlene
Salangad of the PC Crime Laboratory, who affirmed the
findings in the field test and declared verbally and in her
report that the contents of the plastic bag from De Guzman
were marijuana fruiting tops.
The defense of De Guzman was flat denial stating that the
NARCOM agents simply arrested him without cause and
without warrant and took him to NARCOM headquarters
where they manhandled him. His ring and P2,000 cash
belonging to his sister was confiscated by the agents and then
dumped him in a fishpond where he was left until the
following morning, when he signed the Receipt of Seized
Property because he was afraid of further punishment. Also
two other witnesses testified that in the evening of the arrest
of the accused, they saw three men pointing their guns at De
Guzman and twisted his arm and tied his hands with wire
before taking him away.
The RTC did not believe the testimony of the accused. He was
later convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan
sentencing him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20
000.00.The case was brought to the Supreme Court asking fo
a reversal of his conviction on the ground that the evidence
against him was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of theconstitutional rights of the accused facing custodia
investigation.
HELD: This Court is also not inclined to believe De Guzmans
testimony. It is not because it is incredible but because there
is no evidence to sustain it, especially that such evidence is
not easily come by, given the circumstances of the accused
who is an ordinary individual without convenient connection
with a lawyer or the wherewithal to retain one. Neither can it
be supposed that by himself alone, this chicharon vendor
would be aware of his rights under the Constitution and havethe boldness to assert them against the authorities holding
him captive.
The receipt was in reality an admission which the accused-
appellant was forced to make without the assistance of
counsel and without being first informed of the constitutiona
rights of a person facing custodial investigation. That
evidence was totally inadmissible under the Bill of Rights and
the consistent rulings of this Court since the case of People v.
Galit.
People v. Lim196 SCRA 809
FACTS: In the morning of Sunday, April 20, 1969, Santiago
Tumaliuan, a 37-yr old businessman, drove his jeep to
Tuguegarao. He was accompanied by his daughter Vilma
whom he dropped off at St Paul College, and Fausto Guiyab,
Juan Malillin and Patrolman Cesar Binag who was his escort in
civilian clothes. They first played mahjong at the house o
one Mallabo. Guiyab remained in the jeep to guard it. A
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noon, they proceeded to the cockpit. Guiyab again watched
the jeep.
At about 4PM, Santiago and Binag left the cockpit. On their
way out, they passed by Antonio Lim and his bodyguard near
the exit. Genaro and Alberto, Lims companions, were
standing at the gate talking to each other. Upon reaching the
jeep, Santiago took the drivers seat. Binag seated himself at
the passengers and Guiyab occupied the back seat. They
first went to the gas station to fill up.
Binag saw Genaro and Alberto on the street 10 meters away
to his right. Genaro shouted in Ibanag dialect translated,
Fire now. 3 successive gunshots were fired in a few
seconds. The 1st show killed Santiago hitting him in the head.
The 2nd shot was fired at Guiyab who also shot in the head,
killing him instantly. The 3rd shot hit Patrolman Binag in the
jaw. He fell on the cement pavement and lost consciousness.
But before that, he saw Lim firing the first 2 shots w/ his .38
caliber nickel-plated Smith & Wesson revolver. Being apatrolman himself and having served in the army, he was
familiar w/ firearms. Lim was then wearing a yellow polo-
jacket. Binag had known him for a long time since they both
came from San Pablo and used to drink liquor together.
Binag sustained a gunshot wound above the left jaw, near the
mouth, injuring his tongue. If not for blood transfusion, he
would have died. In the hospital, on the night following the
shooting, the chief of police interviewed him and asked him
who had fired at him and his companions. As Binag could not
talk, he wrote on a piece of paper the name of his assailant:Antonio Lim with his bodyguard.
Prior to the shooting, Santiagos brother, Vice-Mayor Carlos
Tumaliuan was charged w/ the murder of Antionio Lims
mother and sister. Moreover, in another case, the brothers
of Lim were charged w/ murder and Binag was a prosecution
witness there. Santiago was known to be financier of his
brother, the vice-mayor, while Guiyab was a buyer of tobacco
for Santiago and was responsible for obtaining bail bonds for
the vice-mayor.
ISSUE:
HELD: The guilt of Lim was proven beyond reasonable
doubt. The shooting was indubitably treacherous for Lim
employed a form of assault w/c directly and specially insured
its execution w/o risk to himself arising from the defense w/c
the victims might have made (Art 14 RPC). The surprise
assault precluded them from making any defense at all.
Premeditation was not proven. The prosecution failed to
establish (a) the time when Lim determined to commit the
crimes, (b) the act showing that he had clung to his
determination, and (c) a sufficient interval between the
determination and the execution that would have afforded
him full opportunity for meditation and reflection and
allowed his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will.
There being no generic circumstances, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each of the 2 murders was properly
imposed (Art 64 & 248 RPC). An indeterminate sentence of 6
yrs. of prision correctional, as minimum, to 12 yrs. & 1 day of
reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum, is imposed for
the frustrated murder. Judgment affirmed.
People v. Arceo202 SCRA 170
FACTS: Accused- appellants, Arceo and Zapanta were charged
and convicted for conspiring and confederating together, and
mutually aiding and abetting one another in the sale and or
deliver of dried marijuana fruit tops. Accused Arceo was
arrested in a buy bust operation conducted by a compositeteam of Filipino and American Drug Enforcement officers
Upon interrogation, he confessed without the assistance of
counsel that the marijuana leaves came from co- accused
Zapanta, his marijuana supplier who was thereafter arrested
in his apartment. The accused appellants were convicted by
the trial court.
ISSUE: W/N the unwritten confession made by accused
appellant Arceo against Zapanta without the assistance of
counsel valid.
HELD: No. The accused-appellant Zapanta's guilt was based
haphazardly on the strength of Librado's unwritten extra
judicial confession that he (Zapanta) was the supplier o
marijuana. Librado's confession was thus not only unfounded
but obtained in gross violation of his fundamental right to
counsel. He was never provided with a counsel at the
preliminary stage of the investigation in which incriminatory
questions were asked him. Hence, the confession is
inadmissible as evidence of Pancho's guilt, or for any purpose
The decision appealed from is MODIFIED, AFFIRMING Librado
Arceo's penalty of life imprisonment, and ACQUITTING the
other accused-appellant, Pancho A. Zapanta, whose
immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered.
rroyo v. CA203 SCRA 750
FACTS: Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery
before the Regional Trial Court of Benguet against his wife
Ruby Vera Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo committed on
November 2, 1982 in the City of Baguio. Both defendants
pleaded not guilty and after trial, the RTC convicted
petitioner and Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri of adultery.
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Petitioner Arroyo filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Court of Appeals' Decision. Petitioner Ruby Vera Neri also
moved for reconsideration or a new trial, contending that a
pardon had been extended by her husband, private complain
ant Dr. Jorge B. Neri, and that her husband had later con
traded marriage with another woman with whom he is
presently co-habiting. Both motions were denied by the Court
of Appeals.
Petitioners then filed their respective motions praying for the
dismissal or for the granting of new trial of the case claiming
as basis for their motions Dr. Neri's manifestation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of his
constitutional rights on custodial investigation.
HELD: The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an
investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask
questions to elicit information and/or confession or
admissions from respondent-accused. In the present case, Dr.Neri was not a peace officer or an investigating officer
conducting a custodial interrogation; hence petitioner cannot
now claim that Mrs. Neris admission should have been
rejected.In short, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did
not err in admitting Dr. Neri's testimony as he was a
competent witness. Neither was said testimony rendered
inadmissible by the constitutional provision on the right to
remain silent and the right to counsel of a "person under
investigation for the commission of an offense."
People v. Parojinog 203 SCRA 673
FACTS: On March 31, 1984, a group of police and PC soldiers
were ambushed by the members of the Communist Party of
the Philippines and the New People's Army. On August 1,
1987, appellant was investigated at the INP station in Ozamiz
City. During which investigation, he confessed that he
surrendered to Governor Fortunato Sagrado of Misamis
Occidental in connection with the ambush of a group of
police and PC soldiers.
Before the start of the investigation, Pcpl. Santos apprised
appellant of his constitutional rights to counsel of his own
choice and if he did not have one a certain Atty. Fernando
Fuentes III of the CLAO will be his lawyer who will help him.
He agreed to have Atty. Fuentes as his lawyer thereafter; he
was informed of his right to remain silent or not to answer
any questions if he did not like to answer or if he had nothing
to answer. Finally, he was warned that his statement may be
used as evidence against him before the court. Atty. Fuentes
III assisted appellant during the entire investigation which
lasted for about an hour. After the investigation, appellant
signed his extra-judicial investigation. Atty. Fuentes III also
signed the document. Thereafter, two policemen escorted
appellant to the Office of City Fiscal Luzminda Uy for him to
swear to his written confession. Before swearing in appellant,
Fiscal Uy verified whether the statements therein were
indeed his.
At the trial, the prosecution presented some witnesses.
Appellant imputes involuntariness to said confession because
he was allegedly denied his constitutional right to counsel
during his custodial investigation by the police. He claims that
the lawyer assigned to him did not actually attend the
investigation as the latter went out and that said lawyer was
not his choice and was only forced on him.
ISSUE: WON there was a denial of constitutional right to
counsel on the part of the appellant.
HELD: None. Section 12 (1) of Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides: Sec. 12 (l). Any person underinvestigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that a person
under investigation for the commission of an offense may
choose his own counsel but if he cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. While the initial
choice of the lawyer in the latter case is naturally lodged in
the police investigators, the accused really has the final
choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask
for another one. In the instant case, the records show that no
objection was voiced by the accused throughout the entire
proceedings of the investigation and afterwards when he
subscribed to its veracity before City Prosecutor Luzminda V.
Uy. Thus, he apparently acquiesced to the choice of the
investigators. He complained for the first time that Atty.
Fuentes was not his choice only during trial. Thus, it was too
late.
People v. Nicolas204 SCRA 191
FACTS: The accused-appellant, in two separate information,
was charged with the crimes of robbery with homicide and
arson allegedly committed with two other co-accuseds,
namely, Rodolfo Nicolas y. delos Reyes and Roque Dilao y.
Adayo.
At the arraignment, the accused-appellant and his co-accused
entered separate pleas of not guilty in both cases.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellants admissions
are not admissible in evidence.
HELD: No.The admissions made by the accused-appellant
during custodial investigation as reflected in his sworn
statement dated October 8, 1983 cannot be admissible in
evidence for his statement before Patrolman Bataller was
given in gross violation of his constitutional rights as
guaranteed under Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973
Constitution (now Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution).
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant gave an
uncounselled confession before the investigating officer who
simply asked as one of the preliminary questions before the
accused-appellant made his declarations relating to the
crime.
Inasmuch as the records are bereft of any proof that the
accused-appellant knowingly rejected having a lawyer assisthim during the taking of the extrajudicial confession in
question, our ruling in the case of People v. Jara, bears
reiteration. Thus;
Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived
by the person entitled to that protection the presumption is
always against the waiver. Consequently, the prosecution
must prove with strongly convincing evidence to the
satisfaction of this Court that indeed the accused willingly
and voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and
deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having
a lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession. That
proof is missing in this case.
The ban against uncounselled confessions is even more
pronounced under the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution.
Hence, after 1987 regardless of whether or not the
confession of the accused is true, as long as it was given
without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in
evidence although it was a product of the accuseds own free
will and volition in view of the current policy with respect to
extrajudicial confessions based on the Bill of Rights.
People v. Marra236 SCRA 565
FACTS: In information filed before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 43, Dagupan City, Samuel Marra y Zarate, John Doe,
Peter Doe, Paul Doe and Tom Doe were charged with the
crime of murder for the fatal shooting of one Nelson Tandoc
on March 7, 1992. On June 4, 1992, amended information
was filed wherein Allan Tan, alias "Allan Yao," was indicated
as an accused instead of John Doe. A warrant of arrest was
thereafter issued against Allan Tan but the same was
returned un served; hence trial proceeded with regard to
herein accused-appellant Samuel Marra alone.
Duly assisted by counsel, appellant pleaded not guilty upon
arraignment on May 15, 1992. After trial on the merits
judgment was rendered by the court below on October 8
1992 finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, attended by the aggravating circumstance of
nighttime, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. He was further ordered to pay the heirs
of Nelson Tandoc the sums of P50,000.00 as death indemnity
P50,000.00 as actual damages, P100,000.00 as mora
damages, and the costs.
After a careful scrutiny of the records and an objective
evaluation of the evidence, the Court is not disposed to
reverse the judgment of the lower court, the decision of the
latter being amply supported by the established facts and
fully sustained by the applicable law. Marra contended that
he was under custodial investigation when he admitted thekilling but invoked self-defense.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marra was under custodia
investigation when he admitted the killing but invoked self-
defense.
HELD: Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides that "(a)ny person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Custodia
investigation involves any questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on
a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and
the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends
itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins
to operate.
In the case at bar, appellant was not under custodia
investigation when he made the admission. There was no
coercion whatsoever to compel him to make such a
statement. Indeed, he could have refused to answe
questions from the very start when the policemen requested
that they all go to his residence. The police inquiry had not
yet reached a level wherein they considered him as a
particular suspect. They were just probing into a number of
possibilities, having been merely informed that the suspect
was wearing what could be a security guard's uniform. As we
held in People vs. Dy: 25 "What was told by the accused to
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Pat. Padilla was a spontaneous statement not elicited
through questioning, but given in an ordinary manner. No
written confession was sought to be presented in evidence as
a result of formal custodial investigation. The trial Court,
therefore, cannot be held to have erred in holding that
compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial
investigation is not applicable in the instant case.
In addition, the law provides that the declaration of an
accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of
any offense necessarily included therein may be given in
evidence against him and, in certain circumstances, this
admission may be considered as part of the res gestae.
The Court affirmed the judgment of the court a quo finding
accused-appellant Samuel Marra y Zarate guilty of the crime
of murder and imposing upon him the penalty and civil
liabilities therein stated.
Navallo v. Sandiganbayan
234 SCRA 175
FACTS: Petitioner is the collecting and disbursing officer of
Numancia National Vocational School found to have
misappropriated public funds for private benefit after a COA
audit. He failed to restitute the amount despite COA
demands. A warrant of arrest was issued but petitioner
pleaded not guilty and invokes his right to custodial
investigation since during the COA audit and actual cash
count he was made to sign the certification on the fund
shortage in the absence of a counsel. He further contends
that the shortage of funds was due to the assurance of
certain Macasemo to settle his unliquidated cash advance
and his failure to do so resulted to the fund shortage.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to counsel be invoked during
the COA audit.
HELD: No, the right to counsel could not be invoked during
the COA audit since the procedure is not within the ambit of
custodial investigation. A person may be subject to
malversation of funds even in the absence of direct proof of
misappropriation as long as there is evidence of fund
shortage which the petitioner failed to explain with
convincing justification.
People v. Frago232 SCRA 653
FACTS: Orlando Frago was charged with rape and attempted
rape docketed as criminal cases nos. 9144 and 9145
respectively. Frago was acquitted on criminal case no 9145
and conviction on criminal case no 9144 undergone review.
Frago stated on his appeal that he was not assisted by a
counsel on any part of proceedings to include during his
identification by the victim on a police lineup.
ISSUE: W/N respondent was denied with the right to counsel.
HELD: Right to counsel attaches upon the start of
investigation, any person under investigation must among
other things be assisted by a counsel however during police
lineup accused was not yet entitled to such stage, to counselsince he had not been held yet to answer for a criminal
offense because police lineup is not yet a part of custodial
inquest. There is nothing in the record which shows that in
the course of identification from police line up the police
investigator sought to extract admission or confession from
appellant.
People v. Ruelan231 SCRA 650
FACTS:
Fordito Ruelan is the store helper of Ricardo & Rosa Jardiel
He stayed in the Jardiels residence but he had sep arate
quarters for sleeping. One day, Ricardo awoke to Rosa leaving
his room. He saw Rosa meet with Ruelan at the gate of the
house as they were about to open the store. Rosa ordered
Ruelan to get an axe to be used in repairing some fixtures and
a sack. Then Rosas house dog got loose & went out towards
the street. Rosa scolded Ruelan while the latter pleaded that
she stops berating him. Rosa didnt heed to his request &
Ruelan got fed up & using his axe, he struck Rosa behind her
right ear causing her to fall face down. Then, appellant
dragged her to a grassy portion at the side of the street &
immediately left the place. Ruelan was thus charged by the
RTC of the crime of murder and imposing on him the penalty
of life imprisonment.
ISSUE:
WON he can be found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged based on the established facts, without the
alleged written extrajudicial confession
HELD:
Ruelan contends that his extrajudicial confession is
inadmissible as he was never apprised of his constitutiona
rights to remain silent, to counsel, & to be informed of such
rights. But a confession is presumed to be voluntary until the
contrary is proved & the burden of proof is upon the person
making the confession. In this case, the presumption hasnt
been overcome. Not only is the appellants confession replete
with details only he couldve supplied, but the circumstances
surrounding its execution belie his claim. By voluntarily
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executing his extrajudicial confession after having been
informed by Atty. Luz Cortez of his constitutional rights, and
in the presence of and with the assistance of said counsel,
appellant Ruelan effectively waived his right to remain silent.
People v. Barasina - 229 SCRA 450
FACTS: The accused was charged of robbery with homicide.
During investigation he was investigated and made anextrajudicial confession during the interrogation in the
absence of a counsel. It was 2 weeks later that he was
provided with one in the person of Atty. Zena, a municipality
attorney where he was made to sign a sworn statement
admitting the shooting of the victim.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was accorded with due
process of custodial investigation.
HELD: No, the right of the accused for due process was clearly
violated since the authorities failed to provide him counsel
during the interrogation and he was not informed of his right
to remain silent and right to a counsel. Furthermore, the
counsel to be provided to the accused should be one who is
impartial, independent and of his own choice. If the accused
cannot afford to have his own counsel then he will be
provided by the authorities with one. Providing the accused
with municipality attorney as counsel would be prejudicial
because of conflict of interest involved in the performance of
duty of said counsel. The court held the evidence
inadmissible to court for failure to meet the requisites of due
process for conducting custodial investigation.
People v. Barlis231 SCRA 426
FACTS: Eliza Merceada reported for work at the store of
Romeo Abad. On her way, near the bamboo gr(o)ve, she
heard two shouts. She saw the three suspects coming out of
the bamboo grove. When the suspects were caught, they
were brought to the station for questioning. Galvante, one of
the suspects, admitted his guilt without counsel. During the
trial of the case, the moved for the exclusion of accused
Ernesto Galvante from the information for murder so that he
could become a witness for the Government. The two
accused denied the charges by interposing an alibi but such
was dismissed by the court in favor of the first hand
testimony of the Galvante who has no motive to kill the
victim.
The contention of appellants is the alleged violation of the
Constitution, particularly Section 12 of Article III, when in
accordance with the present rule for the qualification of a
state witness,23 Galvante executed a sworn statement
wherein he categorically admitted his guilt but without the
assistance of a counsel. Appellants also claim that Galvante
made his sworn statement in the presence of Atty.
Alejandro, the counsel of the plaintiff (sic), Mr. Matic, the two
brothers of the deceased, the Mayor of Pandi and another
person whom he did not know. With this battery of persons
surrounding him, we could imagine the pressure exerted on
Galvante.
ISSUE: WON the admission of guilt made by Galvante without
counsel may be questioned by his co-accused
HELD: Section 12 and Section 17 of the same Article shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him, meaning the
confessant. Thus this objection can be raised only by the
confessant whose rights have been violated as such right is
personal in nature. Galvante repeated in court what he had
stated in his affidavit and, although he was likewise subjected
to a thorough cross-examination, he stood fast on his
confession and the revelations therein. Appellants
imputations of pressure and coercion are refuted thereby.Also, by repeating his confession in court, Galvante converted
it into a judicial confession which, having been allowed by the
trial court eliminated the need for assistance of counsel
which is required in extrajudicial confessions.
People v. Bandula232 SCRA 566
FACTS: On 5 May 1989, the trial court rendered judgment
finding accused Aurelio Bandula guilty of the crime of robbery
with homicide. However, his three (3) co-accused were
acquitted "for insufficiency of evidence." Among the evidence
admitted to the lower court were the alleged extrajudicial
confessions of accused Bandula and Teofio Dionanao.
According to the trial court, these extrajudicial confessions
which were executed during custodial investigation, "have all
the qualities and have complied with all the requirements of
an admissible confession, it appearing from the confession
itself that accused were informed of their rights under the
law regarding custodial investigation and were duly
represented by counsel (Atty. Ruben Zerna)."
Appellant Bandula argues that the extrajudicial confessions
he and accused Dionanao executed suffer from constitutional
infirmities, hence, inadmissible in evidence considering that
they were extracted under duress and intimidation, and were
merely countersigned later by the municipal attorney who, by
the nature of his position, was not entirely an independent
counsel nor counsel of their choice. Consequently, without
the extrajudicial confessions, the prosecution is left without
sufficient evidence to convict him of the crime charged.
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ISSUE: W/N the constitutional rights of the accused to
counsel was violated?
HELD: Yes, the Court ruled that the constitutional rights of
the accused was violated and acquitted him of the crime
charged.
From the records, it can be gleaned that when accused-
appellant Bandula and accused Dionanao were investigatedimmediately after their arrest, they had no counsel present. If
at all, counsel came in only a day after the custodial
investigation with respect to accused Dionanao, and two
weeks later with respect to appellant Bandula. And, counsel
who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Ruben
Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay.
People v. Balisteros237 SCRA 499
FACTS: Eliza Merceada reported for work at the store of
Romeo Abad. On her way, near the bamboo grove, she heard
two shouts. She saw the three suspects coming out of the
bamboo grove. When the suspects were caught, they were
brought to the station for questioning. Galvante, one of the
suspects, admitted his guilt without counsel. During the trial
of the case, the moved for the exclusion of accused Ernesto
Galvante from the information for murder so that he could
become a witness for the Government. The two accused
denied the charges by interposing an alibi but such was
dismissed by the court in favor of the first hand testimony of
the Galvante who has no motive to kill the victim.
The contention of appellants is the alleged violation of the
Constitution, particularly Section 12 of Article III, when in
accordance with the present rule for the qualification of a
state witness,23 Galvante executed a sworn statement
wherein he categorically admitted his guilt but without the
assistance of a counsel. Appellants also claim that Galvante
made his sworn statement in the presence of Atty.
Alejandro, the counsel of the plaintiff (sic), Mr. Matic, the two
brothers of the deceased, the Mayor of Pandi and another
person whom he did not know. With this battery of persons
surrounding him, we could imagine the pressure exerted on
Galvante.
ISSUE: WON the admission of guilt made by Galvante
without counsel may be questioned by his co-accused.
HELD: Section 12 and Section 17 of the same Article shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him, meaning the
confessant. Thus this objection can be raised only by the
confessant whose rights have been violated as such right is
personal in nature. Galvante repeated in court what he had
stated in his affidavit and, although he was likewise subjected
to a thorough cross-examination, he stood fast on his
confession and the revelations therein. Appellants
imputations of pressure and coercion are refuted thereby.
Also, by repeating his confession in court, Galvante converted
it into a judicial confession which, having been allowed by the
trial court eliminated the need for assistance of counsel
which is required in extrajudicial confessions.
People v. Maqueda
242 SCRA 565
FACTS: Horace William Barker, a British consultant of the
World Bank, was brutally slain while his wife Teresita
Mendoza was badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion
of a robbery in their country home at Tuba, Benguet.
Sufficient prima facie evidence pointed to Rene Salvamante,
the victims former houseboy, as one of the perpetrators of
the ghastly crime. One Richard Malig was arrested but was
later on released after his motion, to drop him from the case
as there was no sufficient evidence against him and that
Hector Maqueda (also known as Putol) is impleaded as co-accused in the said case, was granted by the court. The court
issued warrants for the arrest of Maqueda and Salvamante.
However, only Maqueda was arrested, leaving Salvamante at
large.
Maqueda had been taken to the headquarters of the 235th
PNP Mobile Force Company at Sta. Maria, Calauag, and
Quezon where SPO3 Molleno got Maquedas statement.
According to him, he informed the accused of his rights under
the Constitution. The accused thereafter signed a
Sinumpaang Salaysay (sworn statement) wherein he narratedhis participation in the crime at the Barker house. Shortly
after his arrest, Maqueda filed an application for bail stating
that he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the
said case since he is the least guilty among the accused. This
was opposed by the prosecutor after receiving an affirmative
answer from the accused to his question if he was in the
company of Salvamante in entering the house of the Barkers.
During his detention, the accused also narrated to Ray Dean
Salvosa, a civilian, that Salvamante brought him to Baguio
City in order to find a job as a peanut vendor; Salvamante
then brought him to the Barker house and it was only thenwhen they were at the vicinity thereof that Salvamante
revealed to him that his real purpose in going to Baguio City
was to rob the Barkers. The trial proceeded against him only,
after he entered a plea of not guilty and put up the defense
of denial and alibi.
The trial court found the accused Hector Maqueda guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with
homicide and serious physical injuries and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
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victim for damages. The trial court admitted the Sinumpaang
Salaysay of the accused although it was taken without the
assistance of counsel because it was of the opinion that since
an information had already been filed in court against him
and he was arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by
the court, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was not, therefore, taken
during custodial investigation. Maqueda seasonably appealed
to the Supreme Court his conviction, highlighting the lone
error of the trial court that he was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sinumpaang Salaysay of the
accused was admissible in court although it was taken
without the assistance of a counsel.
HELD: While we commend the efforts of the trial court to
distinguish between the rights of a person under Section
12(1), Article III of the Constitution and his rights after a
criminal complaint or information had been filed against him,
we cannot agree with its sweeping view that after such filingan accused no longer, *has+ the right to remain silent and to
counsel but he [has] the right to refuse to be a witness and
not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such
refusal. If this were so, then there would be a hiatus in the
criminal justice process where an accused is deprived of his
constitutional rights remain silent and to counsel and to be
informed of such rights. Such a view would not only give a
very restrictive application to Section 12(1); it would also
diminish the said accuseds rights under Section 14(2), Article
III of the Constitution. The exercise of the rights to remain
silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under
Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution are not confined
to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or
information but are available at the stage when a person is
under investigation for the commission of an offense.
The provision also has the following safeguards: (a) the
council must be competent and independent, preferably of
his own choice, (b) if the party cannot afford the services of
such counsel, he must be provided with one, and (c) the
rights therein cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.It was therefore, wrong for the trial courtto hold that Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution is
strictly limited to custodial investigation and that it does not
apply to a person against whom a criminal complaint or
information has already been filed because after its filing he
loses his right to remain silent and to counsel. If we follow the
theory of the trial court, then the police authorities and other
law enforcement agencies would have a heyday in extracting
confessions or admissions from accused persons after they
had been arrested but before they are arraigned because at
such stage the accused persons are supposedly not entitled
to the enjoyment of the rights to remain silent and to
counsel.
People v. Morico246 SCRA 214
FACTS: Appellant in this case was caught in a buy-bust
operation conducted by the Anti-Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) upon an information from their confidentialinformant that a certain "Sixto," a resident of Barangay
Sabutan, Silang, Cavite, was engaged in the sale of marijuana
leaves.
The three hand-rolled sticks of marijuana leaves confiscated
from appellant were found positive for marijuana by the
National Bureau of Investigation.
Appellant claimed that he was working as a mason at
Barangay Sabutan when he was arrested. When appellant
asked why he was arrested, he was told that he was peddling
marijuana. Appellant was then brought to the municipal
building in Silang, Cavite. From Silang, appellant was brought
to Imus. He related that he saw the sticks of marijuana
presented in evidence against him for the first time in Imus.
On the third day of his detention, he was manhandled and
ordered to sign the "Receipt of Seized property" without the
assistance of counsel. He was threatened with bodily harm if
he failed to sign the document.
Appellant also claimed that when he signed the Booking
Sheet and Arrest Report the same was never explained to himnor was he assisted by counsel.
On the fourth day of his detention, the policemen demanded
money from him for his release. He refused.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erroneously convicted
the appellant of an offense which is not charged in the
information
HELD: An accused cannot be convicted of an offense not
charged in the information. To do so would constitute a
violation of his constitutional rights to be informed of the
charges against him and his right to due process. The
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses refer to minor or trivial matters and incidents
which do not detract us from the fact that appellant was
caught in flagrante delicto as a result of the buy-bust
operation.
Moreover, as long as the testimonies of the witnesses
corroborate each other on material points, the minor
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inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility. Such
inconsistencies are but natural and even enhance their
truthfulness as they wipe out any suspicion of a counseled
testimony.
This Court has laid down the rule, in a long line of cases that
the matter of presentation of prosecution witnesses is not for
the appellant or for the trial court to decide as it is the
prerogative of the prosecutor. Apparently, the prosecution
deemed it unnecessary to present their informant poseur-
buyer as there was already sufficient evidence to pin down
appellant. Besides, if appellant believed that the testimony of
the poseur-buyer could have exculpated him, he could have
availed of the compulsory process to have the latter
produced as his witness.
People v. Cabintoy247 SCRA 442
FACTS: Herein accused-Appellants were charged with the
crime of robbery with homicide. In the course of the trial, thefacts revealed that the accused were not informed of their
rights while under custodial investigation and executed
waiver of the right to counsel and extrajudicial confessions
without the assistance of counsel. It was further revealed that
the waiver and extrajudicial confessions were signed by the
counsel the day after it was executed by the accused-
appellants.
The trial court finds the accused- appellants guilty.
ISSUE: W/N confessions executed by appellants during their
custodial investigation admissible.
HELD: No. From the foregoing, one is led to the inevitable
conclusion that at the time the questioned confessions were
executed, there were no prior valid waivers of their
constitutional rights by accused appellants. This defect alone
is sufficient to render the confessions inadmissible in
evidence against accused-appellants. Moreover, the
confessions do not indicate that both accused were
represented by counsel during the investigation. The settled
rule is that an uncounselled extrajudicial confession without a
valid waiver of the right to counsel in writing and in the
presence of counsel is inadmissible in evidence.
People v. Agustin240 SCRA 541
FACTS: Dr. Bayquen, together with his son, Anthony;
Anthony's girlfriend, Anna Theresa; his daughter, Dominic;
and Danny, a family friend, were on their way aboard their
Brasilia to the doctor's residence at Malvar Street, Baguio
City. While they were cruising along Malvar Street and
nearing the Baptist church, a man came out from the right
side of a car parked about two meters to the church. The man
approached the Brasilia, aimed his armalite rifle through its
window, and fired at the passengers. All those in the car were
hit and Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa died on the spot.
Accused Quiao, an alleged former military agent who had
been picked up by the police authorities, confessed during
the investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo
Balajadia in his office that he was the triggerman. He
implicated Abenoja, Jr., who engaged him to kill Dr. Bayquen
for a fee, Cartel, who provided the armalite, and a certain
"Jimmy." During the investigation, Wilfredo Quiao was
assisted by Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. Stenographic notes of
the proceedings during the investigation as transcribed with
the sworn statement of Quiao was signed, with the
assistance of Atty. Cajucom, and swore to before City Fiscal
Balajadia. The following day, Agustin was apprehended, and
was investigated and was afforded the privileges like that of
Quijano. Agustins defense interpose that he was forced to
admit involvement at gunpoint in the Kennon Road. He
further declared that although he was given a lawyer,
Cajucom (a law partner of the private prosecutor), he
nevertheless, asked for his uncle Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that
Atty. Cajucom interviewed him from only two minutes in
English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he
understands. The promise that he would be discharged as a
witness did not push through since Quijano escaped.
However the RTC convicted him, since conspiracy was
established.
ISSUE: Whether or Not accused-appellants extrajudicial
statements are admissible as evidence.
HELD: No. Extrajudicial statement is not extrajudicial
confession. In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of
guilt of the accused, while an admission is a statement direct
or implied of facts pertinent to the issue. The rule on
inadmissibility, however expressly includes admissions, not
just confessions.
The extrajudicial admission of the appellant, contained in
twenty-two pages appear to be signed by him and Atty.Cajucom but for reasons not explained in the records, the
transcript of the notes which consists of twelve pages was not
signed by the appellant. Since the court cannot even read or
decipher the stenographic notes it cannot be expected that
appellant, who is a farmer and who reached only the fourth
grade, to read or decipher its contents. The appellant
therefore was deprived of his rights under Section 12(1),
Article III of the Constitution. Firstly, he was not fully and
properly informed of his rights. The appellant was not
explicitly told of his right to have a competent and
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independent counsel of his choice, specifically asked if he had
in mind any such counsel and, if so, whether he could afford
to hire his services, and, if he could not, whether he would
agree to be assisted