IBP VS. ZAMORA, 338 SCRA 81INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner, vs.HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES,respondents.

Facts: At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullity on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the Marines) to join the Philippine National Police (the "PNP") in visibility patrols around the metropolis. Formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 1 (the "LOI") which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. 2 Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila through a sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members include those that are well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP/Military personnel.

Issue:1. Whether the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement is in derogation of Article 2, Section 3 of the Constitution;2. Whether the deployment constitutes incursion in a civilian function of law enforcement;3. Whether the deployment creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the military to perform civilian functions of the government4. Whether the deployment gives more power to the military than what it should be under the Constitution.

The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing; (2) Whether or not the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review, and, (3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.

Held:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Ratio:The question of deployment of the Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny since the same involves a political question; that the organization and conduct of police visibility patrols, which feature the team-up of one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does not violate the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.

In view of standingApart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case.

National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols.Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are ''political questions." The reason is that political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.

In view of abuse of discretionThe President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.

President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically, the power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Calling the armed forces is not proper for judicial scrutiny since it involves a political question and the resolution of factual issues which are beyond the review powers of this Court.

By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom.

In view of burden of proof on factual basisIt is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military.

The present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are deployed, the military will gain ascendancy, and thus place in peril our cherished liberties. Indeed, whether it is the calling out of the armed forces alone in order to suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion or also the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the proclamation of martial law (in case of invasion or rebellion), the exercise of the President's powers as commander-in-chief, requires proof not mere assertion. 4 As has been pointed out, "Standing is not 'an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable' . . . but requires . . . a factual showing of perceptible harm."

Because of the absence of such record evidence, we are left to guess or even speculate on these questions. Thus, at one point, the majority opinion says that what is involved here is not even the calling out of the armed forces but only the use of marines for law enforcement. We need to have evidence on these questions because, under the Constitution, the President's power to call out the armed forces in order to suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion is subject to the limitation that the exercise of this power is required in the interest of public safety.

Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers.

In view of the Courts concurrenceWe do not doubt the veracity of the President's assessment of the situation, especially in the light of present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and other public places. These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI 2000. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. 38 It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines.

Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting the patrols. As such, there can be no "insidious incursion" of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.

Political questions are defined as "those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government." 2 They have two aspects: (1) those matters that are to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity and (2) matters which have been specifically delegated to some other department or particular office of the government, with discretionary power to act. 3 The exercise of the discretionary power of the legislative or executive branch of government was often the area where the Court had to wrestle with the political question doctrine.

FACTS: Following an alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, Pres. Estrada ordered the deployment of the Phil. Marines to join in visibility patrols around the metropolis. The Pres. invoked his Comm.-in-Chief powers under Sec 18, Art VII of the Constitution. The IBP seeks to nullify the order on constitutional grounds.

ISSUE: Does it have standing?

HELD: Locus standi has been defined as personal & substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as result of the challenged act. In this case, IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the constitution. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law & nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothed it w/ standing. That is too general, an interests that is shared by other groups & the whole citizenry. IBPs fundamental purpose that is to elevate the standards of the law profession & improve the administration of justice, cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines.

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVESG.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.,petitioner,NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS,petitioner-in-intervention,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,petitioner-in-intervention, vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA,respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

FACTS:On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.ISSUES:1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.HELD:1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in this case was the constitutionality of the subsequentfilingof a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives is constitutional, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question h; as resulted in a political crisis.

HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representativesare unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

REASONING:In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicialbranches ofgovernment by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine ofchecks and balanceswhich has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of thesethree branchesmust be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of governmentactbeyond the powers assigned to it bythe Constitution.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinarymeaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House,the meaning ofSection 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.

The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turnjusticiable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government.- See more at: http://studentsofsocrates.blogspot.com/2010/05/francisco-vs-house-of-representeatives.html#sthash.m8asoVnU.dpuf

KILOSBAYANvs.MANUEL L. MORATO

G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAADA, REP. JOKER P. ARROYO,petitioners,vs.MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,respondents.Ponente: MENDOZAFACTS:[T]his suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in the first case [decision in G.R. No. 113375 (Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)) invalidating the Contract of Lease between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC)]. Petitionersmaintain (1) that the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges of a joint venture which were found in the Contract of Lease nullified in the prior case; (2) that the ELA did not have to be submitted to a public bidding because it fell within the exception provided in E.O. No. 301, 1 (e); (3) that the power to determine whether the ELA is advantageous to the government is vested in the Board of Directors of the PCSO; (4) that for lack of funds the PCSO cannot purchase its own on-line lottery equipment and has had to enter into a lease contract; (5) that what petitioners are actually seeking in this suit is to further their moral crusade and political agenda, using the Court as their forum.ISSUE:Whether or not the ELA between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. is invalid.HELD:NO. Petition for prohibition, review and/or injunction was dismissed. Pertinent to the issue, the SC held:

x x x

(3) that the ELA is valid as a lease contract under the Civil Code and is not contrary to the charter of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office;

(4) that under 1(A) of its charter (R.A. 1169), the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office has authority to enter into a contract for the holding of an on-line lottery, whether alone or in association, collaboration or joint venture with another party, so long as it itselfholds or conducts such lottery; and

(5) That the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) in question did not have to be submitted to public bidding as a condition for its validity.RATIO:E.O. No. 301, 1 applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment. It does not refer to contracts of lease of equipment like the ELA. The provisions on lease are found in 6 and 7 but they refer to the lease of privately-owned buildings or spaces for government use or of government-owned buildings or spaces for private use, and these provisions do not require public bidding.It is thus difficult to see how E.O. No. 301 can be applied to the ELA when the only feature of the ELA that may be thought of as close to a contract of purchase and sale is the option to buy given to the PCSO. An option to buy is not of course a contract of purchase and sale.

Indeed the question is not whether compared with the former joint venture agreement the present lease contract is [more] advantageous to the government. The question is whether under the circumstances, the ELA is the most advantageous contract that could be obtained compared with similar lease agreements which the PCSO could have made with other parties. Petitioners have not shown that more favorable terms could have been obtained by the PCSO or that at any rate the ELA, which the PCSO concluded with the PGMC, is disadvantageous to the government.SEPARATE OPINIONS:PADILLA,concurringI join the majority in voting for the dismissal of the petition in this case.

As to whether or not the ELA is grossly disadvantageous to the government, it should be stressed that the matter involves, basically, a policy determination by the executive branch which this Court should not ordinarily reverse or substitute with its own judgment, in keeping with the time honored doctrine of separation of powers.

VITUG,concurringI most humbly reiterate the separate opinion I have made inKilosbayan, Inc., et al., vs. Teofisto Guingona, Sr., etc., et al. (G.R. No. 113375, promulgated on 05 May 1994).

Back to the core of the petition, however, the matter of the legal standing of petitioners in their suit assailing the subject-contract appears to me, both under substantive law and the rules of procedure, to still be an insuperable issue. I have gone over carefully the pleadings submitted in G.R. No. 118910, and I regret my inability to see anything new that can convince me to depart from the view I have expressed on it in G.R. No. 113375.

FELICIANO,dissentingWith very great respect, it is submitted that the above conclusion has been merely assumed rather than demonstrated and that what is in fact before this Court does not adequately support such conclusion.

REGALADO,dissentingI am constrained to respectfully dissent from the majority opinion premised on the constitutional and procedural doctrines posed and interpreted in tandem therein. I also regret that I have to impose on the majority with thisvirtual turno en contrawhen I could have indicated my disaccord by just joining Mr. Justice Davide in his commendably objective presentation of the minority position. I feel, however, that certain views that have been advanced require a rejoinder lest they lapse into the realm of unanimous precedents.

DAVIDE,dissentingI register a dissenting vote.

I am disturbed by the sudden reversal of our rulings inKilosbayan,Inc., et al. vs. Guingona, et al.(hereinafter referred to as thefirst lottocase) regarding the application or interpretation of the exception clause in paragraph B, Section 1 of the Charter of the PCSO (R.A.. No. 1169), as amended by B.P. Blg. 442, and on the issue oflocus standiof the petitioners to question the contract of lease involving the on-line lottery system entered into between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC). Such reversal upsets the salutary doctrines of the law of the case,res judicata, andstare decisis. It puts to jeopardy the faith and confidence of the people, specially the lawyers and litigants, in the certainty and stability of the pronouncements of this Court. It opens the floodgates to endless litigations for re-examination of such pronouncements and weakens this Courts judicial and moral authority to demand from lower courts obedience thereto and to impose sanctions for their opposite conduct.FACTS:In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket orat leastP35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contractISSUES:Whether or not the petitioners have standing?

HELD:NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.

SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC

270 SCRA 106FACTS:

On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others:

1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and

2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.

ISSUE:

WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by peoples initiative.

WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and if so WON the Act as worded adequately covers such initiative.

WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative?

WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in the draft petition would constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the constitution.

WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.

WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.HELD:

NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.

While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to forthwith dismiss the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent.

WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.

Lambino Vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 174153

Oct.252006Facts:Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

Issue:Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Groups petition.

Held:According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.

Facts1. On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups1and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2and Section 73of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").

2. The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelveper centum(12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least threeper centum(3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

3. The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)5and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions."6These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:

DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?

4. On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.

Issue1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling inSantiagodeclaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition.Decision1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People. Since the full text proposal was not presented to the people during the signing of the petition.2.A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary. The present initiative must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives3.For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commission on Elections.

TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-34150, October 16 1971, 41 SCRA 702FACTS:

The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congressapprovedin its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for thepurposeof calling a convention toproposeamendments to the Constitution. Afterelectionof delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. In the morning of September 28, 1970, the ConventionapprovedOrganicResolution No. 1 which is entitled as, "A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THECONSTITUTIONSO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18." On September 30, 1971, the COMELEC "resolved" to follow the mandate of the Convention, that it will hold the said plebiscite together with the senatorialelectionson November 8, 1971 .Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed apetitionfor prohibition, its main thrust being thatOrganicResolution No. 1 and the necessary implementing resolutions subsequentlyapprovedhave no force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the senatorialelections, on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by theConstitution, power lodged exclusively in Congress as a legislative body and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under Article XV Section 1 of the 1935Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all other amendments to be drafted and proposed by theConstitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not theOrganicResolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention violative to theConstitution.

HELD:

NO. All the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of a Constitutional amendment may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal ofthe natureof the amendment per se but as well as its relation to the other parts of theConstitutionwith which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the present context, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits, if not thousands, ofproposalsto amend the existingConstitution, to present to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement.

GONZALES VS. COMELEC [21 SCRA

774; G.R. No. L-28196; 9 Nov 1967] GONZALES VS. COMELEC [21 SCRA 774; G.R. No. L-28196; 9 Nov 1967]Facts:The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction.

The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions:

1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1,- proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1) member;

2. R. B. H. No. 2, -calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and

3. R. B. H. No. 3, -proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.

Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.

Issue:Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the Constitution.

Held:In as much as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. It may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer. And the reasons are obvious:

(1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and

(2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid, insofar as the public is concerned.

"The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof."

Article XV of the Constitution provides:

. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.

From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.

SANIDAD VS. COMELEC

73 SCRA 333PABLITO V. SANIDAD - petitioner; newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras

COMELEC - respondent; through its Solicitor- General

Type of petition filed: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

ISSUE:Whether Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is constitutional or not.

FACTS:

COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 was promulgated due to the enacted RA No. 6766 (An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region) last October 23, 1989, which paved for a call of a plebescite fo its ratification (original schedule was reset from December 27, 1989 to January 30, 1990.

Allegations of Sanidad:

1.Unconsitutional as it it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press

2.Constitutes a prior restraint on his constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press bause of its penal provsions in case of violation

Responses of COMELEC

-Not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press but only a valid implementation of the power of the Comelec to supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of RA 6646

-Does Not absolutely bar petitioner from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the Organic Act. He may still express his views or campaign for or against the act through the Comelec space and airtime (magazine/periodical in the province)

HELD:

Petiton is GRANTED- Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional . TRO made permanent due to the follwing reasons:1. It has no statutory basis2. Form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason3. affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. FACTS:

On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its whereas clauses that the peoples continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.

On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it.ISSUE:Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.HELD:The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .. The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.

This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time.ANTONIO M. SERRANO VS. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. AND MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC.GR No. 167614 March 24, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation leave per month.

On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000 upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer. Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998, serving only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.

Serrano filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73 (based on the computation of $2590/month from June 1998 to February 199, $413.90 for March 1998, and $1640 for March 1999) as well as moral and exemplary damages.

The LA declared the petitioners dismissal illegal and awarded him US$8,770, representing his salaray for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment, plus $45 for salary differential and for attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount; however, no compensation for damages as prayed was awarded.

On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision and awarded Serrano $4669.50, representing three (3) months salary at $1400/month, plus 445 salary differential and 10% for attorneys fees. This decision was based on the provision of RA 8042, which was made into law on July 15, 1995.

Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042, which reads:

Sec. 10. Money Claims. x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

The NLRC denied the Motion; hence, Serrano filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause. The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate, but skirted the constitutional issue raised by herein petitioner Serrano.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment of contracts;

2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.

HELD:

On the first issue.

The answer is in the negative. Petitioners claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive is not tenable.

Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides: No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a prospective operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected; however, as to laws already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof. Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in application to laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.

As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the execution of the employment contract between petitioner and respondents in 1998. Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject clause, impaired the employment contract of the parties. Rather, when the parties executed their 1998 employment contract, they were deemed to have incorporated into it all the provisions of R.A. No. 8042.

But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed. Police power legislations adopted by the State to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people are generally applicable not only to future contracts but even to those already in existence, for all private contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public welfare.

On the second issue.

The answer is in the affirmative.

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.

Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.

Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of classification into its legislation; however, to be valid, the classification must comply with these requirements: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all members of the class.

There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest; b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show that the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest; and c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.

Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:

First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more;

Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and

Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment;

In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment contract have since been differently treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment.

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.

There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the Constitution, the Court now subjects the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and determines whether it serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive means.

What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the public interest in safeguarding health or maintaining medical standards, or in maintaining access to information on matters of public concern.

In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling state interest that the subject clause may possibly serve.

In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence of a compelling state interest that would justify the perpetuation of the discrimination against OFWs under the subject clause.

Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is to protect the employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, such callous and cavalier rationale will have to be rejected. There can never be a justification for any form of government action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the favored sector is composed of private businesses such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution commands. The idea that private business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest is odious.

Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary liability of placement agencies vis-a-vis their foreign principals, there are mechanisms already in place that can be employed to achieve that purpose without infringing on the constitutional rights of OFWs.

The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-Based Overseas Workers, dated February 4, 2002, imposes administrative disciplinary measures on erring foreign employers who default on their contractual obligations to migrant workers and/or their Philippine agents. These disciplinary measures range from temporary disqualification to preventive suspension. The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers, dated May 23, 2003, contains similar administrative disciplinary measures against erring foreign employers.

Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less restrictive means of aiding local placement agencies in enforcing the solidary liability of their foreign principals.

Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.

The subject clause or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

UMALI VS. GUINGONA [305 SCRA 533; G.R. No. 131124; 21 Mar 1999]Facts:

Osmundo Umali the petitioner was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue by Pres Fidel V. Ramos. He assigned him in Manila, November 29, 1993 to March 15, 1994 and Makati, March 16, 1994 to August 4, 1994. On August 1, 1994, President Ramos received a confidentialmemorandumagainst the petitioner for alleged violations of internal revenue laws, rules and regulations during his incumbency as Regional Director, more particularly the following malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance. upon receipt of the said confidentialmemorandum, former President authorized the issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension of the petitioner and immediately referredthe Complaintagainst the latter to thePresidentialCommission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation. Petitioner was duly informed of the charges against him. And was directed him to send in his answer, copies of his Statement of Assets, and Liabilities for the past three years (3), and PersonalData Sheet. Initial hearing was set on August 25, 1994, at 2:00 p.m., at the PCAGC Office. On August 23, the petitioner filed his required answer. After evaluating the evidence on record, the PCAGC issued its Resolution of September 23, 1994, finding a prima facie evidence to support six (6) of the twelve (12) charges against petitioner. On October 6, 1994, acting upon the recommendation of the PCAGC, then President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing petitioner from the service, with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not AO No. 152 violated petitioner's Right to Security of Tenure.

(2) Whether or Not Petitioner was denied due process of law

(3) Whether or Not the PCAGC is a validly Constituted government agency and whether the petitioner can raise the issue of constitutionality belatedly in its motion for reconsideration of thetrial courtsdecision.

(4) Whether or Not the ombudsman's resolution dismissing the charges against the petitioner is still basis for the petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in AO No. 152

Held:Petitioner maintains that as a career executive service officer, he can only be removed for cause and under the Administrative Code of 1987, 6 loss of confidence is not one of the legal causes or grounds for removal. Consequently, his dismissal from office on the ground of loss confidence violated his right to security of tenure, petitioner theorized. After a careful study, we are of the irresistible conclusion that the Court of Appeals ruled correctly on the first three Issue. To be sure, petitioner was not denied the right to due process before the PCAGC. Records show that the petitioner filed his answer and other pleadings with respect to his alleged violation of internal revenuelaws and regulations, and he attended the hearings before the investigatory body. It is thus decisively clear that his protestation of non-observance of due process is devoid of any factual or legal basis. Neither can it be said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts as his security of tenure. According to petitioner, as a Regional Director of Bureau of Internal Revenue, he is CESO eligible entitled to security of tenure. However, petitioner's claim of CESOeligibilityis anemic of evidentiary support. It was incumbent upon him to prove that he is a CESO eligible but unfortunately, he failed to adduce sufficient evidence on the matter. His failure to do so is fatal. As regards the issue of constitutionality of the PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his motion for reconsideration before the RegionalTrial Courtof Makati. It was certainly too late to raise for the firsttime at such late stage of the proceedings. As to last issue, It is worthy to note that in the case under consideration, the administrative action against the petitioner was taken prior to the institution of the criminal case. The charges included in Administrative Order No. 152 were based on the results of investigation conducted by the PCAGC and not on the criminal chargesbefore the Ombudsman. In sum, the petition is dismissable on the ground that the Issue posited by the petitioner do not constitute a valid legal basis for overturning the finding and conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals. However, taking into account the antecedent facts and circumstances aforementioned, the Court, inthe exerciseof its equity powers, has decided to considerthe dismissalof the charges against petitioner before the Ombudsman, the succinct and unmistakable manifestation by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue that his office is no longer interested in pursuing the case, and the position taken by the Solicitor General, that there is no more basis for Administrative Order No. 152, as effective and substantive supervening events that cannot be overlooked.

GONZALES VS. NARVASA

337 SCRA 733

Gonzales v NarvasaG.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000Facts:OnDecember9,1999,apetitionforprohibitionandmandamuswasfiledassailingtheconstitutionalityofthecreationofthePreparatoryCommissiononConstitutionalReform(PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.In his capacity as citizen and as taxpayer, he seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit frompassing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers andassistants.PetitioneralsopraysthattheExecutiveSecretarybecompelledthroughamandamus tofurnish the petitioner withinformation requesting thenames of executive officialsholding multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments and a list of the recipientsof luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacaang.Issue:Whether or not petitioner possesses the requisites of filing a suit as a citizen and as taxpayer.

Ratio Decidendi:The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have standing to bring suit as citizen. Petitioner didnot in fact show what particularized interest they have to bring the suit. As civic leaders, they stillfall short of the requirements to maintain action. Their interest in assailing the EO does notpresent to be of a direct and personal character. Furthermore, they do not sustain or are inimmediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement.Astaxpayers,petitionerscannotattacktheEO.ThereisnoappropriationgrantedfromCongress but only an authorization by the president. There being exercise by Congress of itstaxing and spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to question the PCCRs creation. Thepetitioner has failed to show that he is a real party in interest.With regards to thepetitioners request ofdisclosure to public information, the Court upheld thatcitizens may invoke before the courts the right to information. When a mandamus proceedinginvolves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by themere fact that the petitioner is a citizen.TheSupreme Courtdismissedthe petitionwiththeexceptionthatrespondentExecutiveSecretary is ordered to furnish petitioner with the information requesteFACTS:

Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, filed apetitionfor prohibition andmandamusfiled on December 9, 1999, assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of thepositionsofpresidentialconsultants, advisers andassistants. The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue ofExecutive OrderNo. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same. Petitionerdisputesthe constitutionality of the PCCR based on the grounds that it is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the constitutionality ofExecutive OrderNo. 43

HELD:

The Court dismissed thepetition. Acitizenacquiresstanding only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatenedinjuryas a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; theinjuryis fairly traceable to the challenged action; and theinjuryis likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personalinjuryattributable to the creation of the PCCR.If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any injury in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the legislatures powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR.Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even anyindirect,injury.Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to anypenaltiesor burdens as a result of the PCCRs activities.Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish hislocus standiso as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.

Furthermore, ataxpayeris deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or theConstitution. It is readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is appropriated for its operationalexpensesto be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President.Being that case, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a representation.

Malaluan vs. COMELEC 254 SCRA 39

G.R. # 120193

FACTS:Petitioner Malaluan and Private Respondent Evangelista were both Mayoralty candidates.Private Respondent was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor against the Petitioner.Petitioner filed an election protest with the RTC contesting 64 out of the total 181 precincts of the said Municipality.The trial court declared Petitioner as the duly elected Municipal Mayor.The Private Respondent appealed the Trial Courts decision to the COMELEC, which declared Private Respondent to be the duly elected Municipal Mayor.The COMELEC found Petitioner liable for attorneys fee, actual expenses for Xerox copies, and unearned salary and other emoluments, en masse denominated as actual damages.Petitioner naturally contests that propriety and legality of this award upon private respondent on the ground that said damages have not been alleged and proved during trial.COMELEC on the other hand, concluded in justifying that Private Respondent be awarded actual damages, and hold that since Petitioner was adjudged the winner in the elections only by the Trial Court, the Petitioner is deemed to have occupied the position in an illegal manner as a Usurper.ISSUE:W/N Petitioner acted as a Usurper?HELD:We hold that petitioner was not a usurper because, while a usurper is one who undertakes to act officially without any color of right, the petitioner exercised the duties of an elective office under color of election thereto. It matters not that it was the trial court and not the COMELEC that declared petitioner as the winner, because both, at different stages of the electoral process, have the power to so proclaim winners in electoral contests.We deem petitioner, therefore, to be ade factoofficer who, in good faith, has had possession of the office and had discharged the duties pertaining thereto and is thus legally entitled to the emoluments of the office.

Alunan vs MirasolGR No. 108399 July 31, 1997Facts:

LGC of 1991 provided foran SK in every barangay to be composed ofa chairman, 7members, a secretary and a treasurer, and provided that thefirst SK elections wereto be held 30days after the next local elections. The Local Government Code wasenacted January 1, 1992.

The first elections underthe code were held May of 1992. August 1992, COMELECprovided guidelines for the holding of the general elections for the SK onSept. 30,1992, which also placed the SK elections under the direct control and supervision ofDILG, with the technical assistance of COMELEC. After postponements, theywereheld December 4, 1992.

Registration in6 districts ofManila was conducted. 152,363 people aged 15-21registered, 15,749 of them filing certificated ofcandidacy. The City Council passedthe necessary appropriations for theelections.

September 18, 1992 The DILG, through Alunan, issued aletter-resolutionexempting Manila from holding SK elections because theelections previously held onMay 26, 1990 were to beconsidered the first SK elections under the new LGC. DILGacted on aletter by Santiago, acting President of theKB (Kabataang Barangay) CityFederation of Manila and a member of the City Council ofManila, which stated thatelections for the Kabataang Barangay were held onMay 26, 1990.In this resolution,DILG stated that the LGC intended toexempt those barangay chapters whichconducted their KB elections from January 1, 1998 to January 1, 1992from theforthcoming SK elections. The terms of those elected would be extended to coincidewith the terms of those elected in theSK elections

Private respondents, claiming torepresent 24,000members of the Katipunan ngKabataan, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, arguing thatthe DILG hadnopower to amend the resolutions of the COMELEC calling for general elections for SKs,and that DILG denied them equal protection of laws.

RTC issued an injunction and ordered petitioners to desist from implementing theorder of theDILG Secretary, and ordered them toperform the specified pre-electionactivities in order to implement thegeneral elections. The case was reraffled to adifferent branch of the same court, and the new judge heldthat DILG had no powerto exempt Manila fromholding SK elections, because that power rests solely inCOMELEC, and that COMELEC already determined that Manila has not previously heldelections for KB by calling for a general election, and that the exemption of Manilaviolated the equal protection clause because ofthe 5,000 barangays that previouslyheld elections, only in Manila, 897barangay, were there noelections.Issue:Whether COMELEC can validly vest the DILGwith the power ofdirect control and supervisionover the SKelections with the technical assistance of COMELECWhether DILG can exempt an LGU from holding SK electionsHeld:

Despite the holding of SK elections in 1996, thecase is not moot; it iscapable ofrepetition, yet evading review.

DILG had the authority to determine whether Manila would be required to hold SKelections.

o

COMELEC vesting DILG with such powersis not unconstitutional. Election forSK officers are not subject to thesupervision of COMELEC in the same waythat contests involving elections of SK officials do not fall within thejurisdiction ofCOMELEC.