constitutional

Constitutional Law I POLITICAL LAW

Saint Louis University | SCHOOL OFLAW

Bar Operations Committee 2013 1

Table of ContentsTHE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE: GOVERNMENT......................................................................................6

ROMUALDEZ-YAP v. CSC ...........................................................................................................................6

DOCTRINE OF PARENS PATRIAE..........................................................................................................6

GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MONTE DE PIEDAD BANK............................................................6

MELCHORA CABANAS v. FRANCISCO PILAPIL ...........................................................................................7

DE JURE versus DE FACTO GOVERNMENT ...........................................................................................7

ANASTACIO LAUREL v. ERIBERTO MISA .................................................................................................... 7

SOVEREIGNTY ....................................................................................................................................8

WIGBERTO TANADA v. EDGARDO ANGARA..............................................................................................8

EFFECTS OF CHANGE IN SOVEREIGNTY................................................................................................8

BERNARDITA MECARIOLA v. HON. ELIAS ASUNCION ...............................................................................8

EFFECTS OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION..............................................................................................9

WILLIAM F. PERALTA v. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS ................................................................................9

DOMINIUM versus IMPERIUM, REGALIAN DOCTRINE..........................................................................9

FELIPE SEVILLE v. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY ......................................................................... 9

THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY ................................................................................................10

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO ................................................................10

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION....................................10

VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS................................11

MARIANO E. GARCIA v. THE CHIEF OF STAFF..........................................................................................12

ERNESTO CALLADO v. INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (IRRI).............................................12

THE HOLY SEE v. HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO .......................................................................................12

GAUDENCIO RAYO v. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN ............................................................13

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. JAVIER PABALAN...................................................................................13

PALAFOX v. PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE..............................................................................................14

LAUDENCIO TORIO v. FONTANILLA.........................................................................................................14

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES .............................................................................15

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA........................................................15

OPOSA v. FACTORAN ..............................................................................................................................15

GERRY TOYOTO v. HON. FIDEL RAMOS...................................................................................................16




THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TRANQUILINO LAGMAN ................................................................16

KILOSBAYAN, INC v. MORATO.................................................................................................................17

PHILIP MORRIS v. CA ...............................................................................................................................17

LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN v. HON. ROMEO F. EDU.......................................................................................18

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. HON. RALPH LANTION...................................................................................18

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NORMA CUISON-MELGAR.................................................................19

PHILIPPINE TELEGRAGRAPH & TELEPHONE CO. v. NLRC ........................................................................20

MAXIMO CALALANG v. WILLIAMS ..........................................................................................................20

DIONISIO V. AUSTRIA v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION ..................................................21

FRANCISCO GUDANI v. GENEROSO S. SENGA.........................................................................................22

SEPARATION OF POWERS.................................................................................................................22

ELDEPIO LASCO v. UNITED NATIONS REVOLVING FUND FOR NATURAL RESOURCES EXPLORATION(UNRFNRE) ..............................................................................................................................................22

BENGZON ET AL., v. HON. FRANKLIN N. DRILON ....................................................................................23

PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED) v. ...................................................23

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ...............................................................................................................23

SAGUIGUIT VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES...........................................................................................24

CHECKS AND BALANCES ...................................................................................................................24

JAWORSKI VS PAGCOR............................................................................................................................24

PHILIPPINES JUDGES ASSOCIATION v. PRADO........................................................................................25

DELEGATION OF POWERS.................................................................................................................26

ABAKADA V. ERMITA...............................................................................................................................26

THE UNITED STATES v. ANG TANG HO....................................................................................................26

SANIDAD VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ...........................................................................................27

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION (PBA) V. COMELEC .................................................................................27

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, QUEZON VS. HON. ANTONIO V. MENDEZ, SR...................................28

ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC. v. CA...............................................................................................29

OSMENA v. ORBOS..................................................................................................................................29

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION V. ANGELES ......................................................30

LEO ECHEGARAY v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE............................................................................................30

CHAVEZ v. ROMULO................................................................................................................................31

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DACUYCUY ............................................................................................32




THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT........................................................................................................32

GONZALES v. COMELEC...........................................................................................................................32

JOSE MARI EULALIO C. LOZADA v. COMELEC..........................................................................................33

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JALOSJOS...............................................................................................34

NICANOR T. JIMENEZ v. BARTOLOME CABANGBANG ............................................................................34

TOLENTINO, et al. v. SECRETARY OF FINANCE ........................................................................................35

ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS ....................................................................................................................35

FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS et al. vs. THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (SET) ..........................................35

SIXTO BRILLANTES, et al. v. COMELEC ....................................................................................................36

COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS ...................................................................................................36

DAZA v. SINGSON....................................................................................................................................36

FRANKLIN DRILON v. JOSE DE VENECIA ..................................................................................................37

ARROYO v. DE VENECIA...........................................................................................................................38

PACETE v. SEC OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINMENTS ......................................................................38

RUFINO R. TAN, v. RAMON R. DEL ROSARIO, JR. ....................................................................................38

JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., et al. v. THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE .............................................39

FRANCISCO GUDANI v. GENEROSO S. SENGA.........................................................................................39

GONZALES v. NARVASA...........................................................................................................................40

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION v. ENRIQUEZ ........................................................................41

RUFINO R. TAN v. RAMON R. DEL ROSARIO, JR. .....................................................................................41

THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT ..........................................................................................................42

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO V. RAMOS ...........................................................................................................42

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON v. COMELEC ..............................................................................................43

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY..................................................................................43

CORPUZ v. COURT OF APPEALS...............................................................................................................44

LUEGO v. CSC ..........................................................................................................................................44

IN RE APPOINTMENT OF HON MATEO VALENZUELA .............................................................................45

VETERANS FEDERATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REYES ..........................................................................45

ARMITA RUFINO v. BALTAZAR N. ENDRIGA .........................................................................................46

FRANKLIN M. DRILON v. ALFREDO S. LIM ...............................................................................................47

EUGENE GONZALES v. NARCISO ABAYA..................................................................................................48

SANLAKAS v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ANGELO REYES.............................................................................49




DAVID, et al. v ARROYO, et al..................................................................................................................49

SALVACION A. MONSANTO vs. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., ..............................................................50

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANCISCO SALLE, JR. and RICKY MENGOTE ......................................51

VICENTE GARCIA v. THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN..................................................................................52

GONZALES v. NARVAZA...........................................................................................................................52

FERDINAND MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS....................................................................................................53

BENJAMIN U. BORJA v. COMELEC...........................................................................................................53

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT....................................................................................................................54

FRANCISCO S. TATAD v. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY................................................54

CESAR BENGZON v. FRANKLIN N. DRILON ..............................................................................................54

APEX MINING CO., INC v. SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP. ............................................54

FRANCISCO SERRANO DE AGBAYANI vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK ..................................................55

WILLIAM TAN, JOAQUIN TAN LEH and VICENTE TAN v. HERNANI T. BARRIOS ......................................56

TEODORO B. PANGILINAN vs. GUILLERMO T. MAGLAYA........................................................................56

SPOUSES CONSING v. COURT OF APPEALS .............................................................................................57

CITY GOVERNMENT OF TAGAYTAY v. GUERRERO ..................................................................................57

NITAFAN v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE ............................................................................58

BERNARDINO MARCELINO v. HON. FERNANDO CRUZ, JR. .....................................................................58

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS ..............................................................................................58

BRILLANTES v. YORAC .............................................................................................................................58

NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION v. JUCO.........................................................................................59

CADIENTE v. SANTOS ..............................................................................................................................59

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA) v. THE COURT OF APPEALS ..................60

FRANCISCO ABELLA JR v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ..........................................................................60

LUCITA Q. GARCES v. COURT OF APPEALS..............................................................................................60

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v COMELEC...........................................................................................61

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), v. COMELEC................................................................................................................................................................61

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INC. v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT ...........................................................................62

ANIANO A. ALBON v. BAYANI F. FERNANDO...........................................................................................63

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS .............................................................................................63

ROMEO ACOP v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN.....................................................................................63




GLORIA G. LASTIMOSA v. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO VASQUEZ..............................................................64

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY...........................................................................................64

MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FACTORAN.....................................................................64

UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN, INC v. COURT OF APPEALS ....................................................................65

ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY v. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG ...............................................................66

UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS v. COURT OF APPEALS ..............................................................................66

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS v. COURT OF APPEALS.....................................67

AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION..........................................................................67

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS......................................................................67

LAMBINO v. COMELEC ............................................................................................................................68




THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE:GOVERNMENT

ROMUALDEZ-YAP v. CSCGR. No. 104226. August 3, 1993

FACTS: Conchita Romualdez-Yap started workingwith the PNB as special assistant with the rank ofSecond Assistant Manager assigned to the officeof the PNB President. After several promotions,she was appointed as Senior VP assigned to theFund Transfer Department. She filed severalapplications for leave of absence due to medicalreasons which were duly approved. ExecutiveOrder no. 80, otherwise known as the RevisedCharter of the PNB, was approved while she wason leave. It authorized the restructure orreorganization and rehabilitation of PNB. Pursuantto the reorganization plan, the Fund TransferDepartment was abolished and its functionstransferred to the International Department.Consequently, Conchita was notified of herseparation from the service.

Yap’s appealed to the Civil ServiceCommission questioning her separation. CSCChairman Samilo Barlongay upheld the validity ofher separation from the service. Yap filed an MRbut was denied. It cited that Sec. 33 of E.O. 80 orthe Revised Charter of the PNB provides for theauthority of the bank to effect reorganization. Italso cited Dario vs. Mison wherein it held thatreorganizations are regarded as valid providedthey are pursued in good faith. As a general rule,reorganization is carried out in 'good faith' if it is forthe purpose of economy or to make bureaucracymore efficient. In that event, no dismissal orseparation actually occurs because the positionitself ceases to exist.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reorganization waseffected with bad faith and thus be consideredinvalid.

HELD: PNB’s reorganization was by virtue of avalid law, EO 80. At the time of reorganization, dueto the critical financial situation of the bank,departments, positions and functions wereabolished or merged. The abolition of the FundTransfer Department was deemed necessary. Thiswas a management prerogative exercisedpursuant to a business judgment.

A person claiming to be entitled to a publicoffice or position usurped or unlawfully held orexercised by another may bring an action for quo

warranto. The petitioner therein must show a clearlegal right to the office allegedly held unlawfully byanother. Such action should be brought within one(1) year after ouster from office, and failure toinstitute the same within the reglementary periodconstitutes more than a sufficient basis for itsdismissal since it is not proper that the title to apublic office be subjected to continued uncertainty.An exception to this prescriptive period lies only ifthe failure to file the action can be attributed to theacts of a responsible government officer and not ofthe dismissed employee.

DOCTRINE OF PARENS PATRIAE

GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MONTEDE PIEDAD BANK

GR. No. L-9959. December 13, 1916

FACTS: On June 3, 1863, a devastatingearthquake in the Philippines took place. TheSpanish dominions provided $400,000 aid asreceived by the National Treasury as relief of thevictims of the earthquake. The government usedthe money as such but $80,000 was left untouchedand was thus invested to Monte de Piedad bank,which was in turn invested as jewelries, equivalentto the same amount.

In June 1983, the Department of Financecalled upon the same bank to return the $80,000deposited from before. The Monte de Piedaddeclined to comply with this order on the groundthat the Governor-General of the Philippine Islandsand not the Department of Finance had the right toorder the reimbursement because the Philippinegovernment is not the affected party. On accountof various petitions of the persons, the PhilippineIslands brought a suit against Monte de Piedad fora recovery of the $80,000 together with interest, forthe benefit of those persons and their heirs.Respondent refuse to provide the money.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine governmentis authorized to file a reimbursement of the moneyof the people deposited in respondent bank.

HELD: The Philippine government is competent tofile a complaint/reimbursement against respondentbank in accordance to the Doctrine of ParensPatriae. The government is the sole protector ofthe rights of the people thus it holds an inherentsupreme power to enforce laws which promotepublic interest. The government has the right to"take back" the money intended for the




people. The government has the right to enforceall charities of public nature, by virtue of its generalsuperintending authority over the public interests,where no other person is entrusted with it. No otherparty has been entrusted with such right, hence as“parents” of the people, the government has theright to take back the money intended for thepeople.

MELCHORA CABANAS v. FRANCISCO PILAPIL

GR. No. L-25843. July 25, 1974

FACTS: Florentino Pilapil insured himself andindicated his child to be his sole beneficiary. Helikewise indicated that if he dies while the child isstill a minor, the proceeds shall be administered byhis brother Francisco. Florentino died when thechild was only ten years old hence, Francisco tookcharge of Florentino’s benefits for the child.Meanwhile, the mother of the childMelchora Cabañas filed a complaint seeking thedelivery of the sum of money in her favor and allowherself to be the child’s trustee. Francisco assertedthe terms of the insurance policy and contendedthat as a private contract its terms and obligationsmust be binding only to the parties andintended beneficiaries.ISSUE: Whether or not the mother should beentitled to act as a trustee of a minor beneficiary ofthe proceeds of an insurance policy from thedeceased.HELD: The Constitution provides for thestrengthening of the family as the basic social unit,and that whenever any member thereof such as inthe case at bar would be prejudiced and hisinterest be affected then the judiciary if a litigationhas been filed should resolve according to the bestinterest of that person.

The uncle here should not be the trustee, itshould be the mother as she was theimmediate relative of the minor child and it isassumed that the mother shows more caretowards the child than an uncle.

It is buttressed by its adherence to theconcept that the judiciary, as an agency of theState acting as parens patriae, is called uponwhenever a pending suit of litigation affects onewho is a minor to accord priority to his bestinterest. It may happen, family relations may presstheir respective claims. It would be more inconsonance not only with the natural order ofthings but the tradition of the country for a parentto be preferred. it could have been different if the

conflict were between father and mother. Such isnot the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority.Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of theState in its role of parens patriae, cannot remaininsensible to the validity of her plea.

DE JURE versus DE FACTOGOVERNMENT

ANASTACIO LAUREL v. ERIBERTO MISA

GR. No. L-200. March 28, 1946

FACTS: The accused, Anastacio Laurel, wascharged with treason. During the Japaneseoccupation, the accused adhered to the enemy bygiving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that hecannot be tried for treason since his allegiance tothe Philippines was suspended at that time. Also,he claims that he cannot be tried under a changeof sovereignty over the country since his acts wereagainst the Commonwealth which was replacedalready by the Republic.

Anastacio Laurel, a Filipino citizen, wasarrested in Camarines Sur in May 1945 by theUnited States Army, and was intended, under acommitment order “for his active collaboration withthe Japanese during the Japanese occupation”;but in September 1945, he was turned over to theCommonwealth Government, and since then hasbeen under the custody of the respondent Directorof Prisons.ISSUE: During the long period of Japaneseoccupation, all the political laws of thePhilippinesw e r e s u s p e n d e d . T h u s , t r e a s on u n d e r t h e R e v i s e d P e n a l C o d e c a n n ot b e p u n i s h a b l e where the laws of the landare momentarily halted. Regarding the change ofsovereignty, it is true that the Philippines wasn’tsovereign at the time of the Commonwealth since itwas under the United States. Hence, the acts oftreason done cannot carry over to the newRepublic where the Philippines is now indeedsovereign.

The accused was found guilty. A citizenowes absolute and permanent allegiance to hisgovernment or sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty wasmade; hence, it is presumed that the Philippinegovernment still had the power. Moreover,sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is eithersubsisting or eliminated and replaced. Sovereigntyper se wasn’t suspended; rather, it was theexercise of sovereignty that was suspended. Thus,




there is no suspended allegiance. Regarding thechange of government, there is no such changesince the sovereign, the Filipino people, is still thesame. What happened was a mere change of name ofgovernment, from Commonwealth to the Republic of thePhilippines.

SOVEREIGNTY

WIGBERTO TANADA v. EDGARDO ANGARA

GR. No. 118295. May 2, 1997

FACTS: April 15, 1994: Respondent RizalinoNavarro, then Sec. of the Department of Trade andIndustry, representing the Government of theRepublic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh,Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results ofthe Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations.

On December 14, 1994, the PhilippineSenate adopted Resolution No. 97 which“Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the Senateconcur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification bythe President of the Philippines, Fidel V. Ramos,of the Agreement Establishing the World TradeOrganization.”

The WTO Agreement ratified by thePresident of the Philippines is composed of theAgreement Proper and “the associated legalinstruments of that Agreement which are integralparts thereof.” The Final Act signed by SecretaryNavarro embodies not only the WTO but also (1)the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2)the Understanding on Commitments in FinancialServices.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of theAgreement Establishing the World TradeOrganization and the Agreements and AssociatedLegal directly contravene spirit and intent ofSection 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12,Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that theResolution no. 97 as not unconstitutional. Whilethe Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipinogoods, services, labor and enterprises, at the sametime, it recognizes the need for business exchangewith the rest of the world on the basis of equalityand reciprocity and limits protection of Filipinointerests only against foreign competition and tradepractices that are unfair. In other words, the

Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationistpolicy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a“self-reliant and independent national economy”does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreigninvestments, goods and services. It contemplatesneither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy inthe international community.”

The Senate, after deliberation and voting,voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent tothe WTO Agreement thereby making it “a part ofthe law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of itssovereign duty and power.

EFFECTS OF CHANGE IN SOVEREIGNTY

BERNARDITA MECARIOLA v. HON. ELIASASUNCION

A.M. No. 133-J. May 31, 1982

FACTS: On August 6, 1968 Macariola filed acomplaint against Judge Asuncion with “actsunbecoming a judge”. The judge apparently boughta property , formerly owned by Macariola, whichwas involved in a civil case decided by him; and onAugust 31, 1966, the Asuncion couples conveyedtheir share and interest in the said property to TheTraders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc.The act of Asuncion engaging in commerce is saidto be a violation of paragraphs 1 & 5, Article 14 ofthe Code of Commerce which prohibits judges inactive service, among others, to do so within thelimits of the place where they discharge theirduties.

ISSUE: Whether or not the actuation of JudgeAsuncion in purchasing a portion of the property ina Civil case previously handled by him is an actunbecoming of a judge.

HELD: The Court held that respondent JudgeAsuncion's acts did not constitute an "ActUnbecoming of a Judge" but he was reminded tobe more discreet in his private and businessactivities for next time.

Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Codeapplies only to the sale or assignment of theproperty which is the subject of litigation to thepersons disqualified therein. Respondent judgepurchased the said lot after the decision renderedwas already final because no party filed for anappeal within the reglementary period whichmakes the lot in question no longer the subject tolitigation. Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did not buy




the lot in question directly from plaintiffs, ratherfrom a Dr. Arcadio Galapon.

EFFECTS OF BELLIGERENTOCCUPATION

WILLIAM F. PERALTA v. THE DIRECTOR OFPRISONS

GR. No. L-49. November 12, 1945

FACTS: During the Japanese occupation of thePhilippines, Peralta, a local policeman, wasconvicted of the offense of robbing in violation of alaw enacted by the Japanese puppet government,and was sentenced to life imprisonment. This is ahabeas corpus action brought before the courts ofthe restored government of the Philippine Islandswhich was based on the ground that the Court’sexistence was void ab initio because it was createdas a political instrumentality under the command ofthe Japanese Imperial Army; that the provisions ofthe said ordinance violate his constitutional rights;that the penalties provided for are much moresevere than the Revised Penal Code. SolicitorGeneral is of the opinion that the petition should begranted because the ordinance is “tinged withpolitical complexion”; that the procedure does notafford a fair trial and violates constitutional right ofaccused person under a legitimate Constitution.ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment of anoccupation court in a criminal case cease to bevalid upon the return of the legitimate sovereign.

HELD: The so-called Republic of the Philippines,being a governmental instrumentality of thebelligerent occupant, had the power or wascompetent to create the Court of Special andExclusive Criminal Jurisdiction.

After first determining that the law of whichPeralta had been convicted of violating was ofapolitical complexion, in that it could be violatedonly by the persons charged or connected with thesupervision and control of the production,procurement and distribution of food and othernecessaries enacted to prevent such items fromreaching guerillas, the court held that under thedoctrine of postliminium, Peralta’s conviction mustbe considered as having ceased to be valid, ipsofacto, upon the liberation of the Philippines byGeneral McArthur.

It appears that it was within the power andcompetence of the belligerent occupant topromulgate, through the National Assembly of theso-called Republic of the Philippines, Act No. 65 ofthe said Assembly, which penalizes the crimes ofrobbery and other offenses by imprisonmentranging from the maximum period of theimprisonment prescribed by the laws andordnances promulgated by the President or deathas maximum. Although these crimes are defined inthe Revised Penal Code, they were altered andpenalized by said Act no. 65 with different andheavier penalties, as new crimes and offensesdemanded by military necessity, incident to a stateof war, and necessity for the control of the countryby the belligerent occupant, the protection andsafety of the army of occupation, its support andefficiency, and the success of its operations.

DOMINIUM versus IMPERIUM, REGALIANDOCTRINE

FELIPE SEVILLE v. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTCOMPANY

GR. No. 129401. February 2, 2001

FACTS: The LSBOA recovered a Letter ofInstruction no. 962 to authorize them to acquireprivately owned lands by way of negotiated saleswith the land owner. On June 1, 1982, LSBOA filedmiscellaneous sales application covering thesubject lot. Then, the lot was assigned to theNational Development Company with all its rights.On November 29, 1988, the estate of JoaquinOrtega represented by Judicial AdministrationFelipe Seville filed with the Regional Trial Court acomplaint for recovery of real property, rentals anddamages against the respondents. The RegionalTrial Court reversed the judgment against therespondents. However, the Court of Appealsreversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court

ISSUE: Whether or not Felipe Seville is the realowner of the subject lot.

HELD: The petitioner could not have becomeowner thereof through acquisitive prescription andpetitioners challenge to LSBOA’s title cannot beranted because it is based on wrong premises andamounts to collateral attacks which is not allowedby the state or by the law. Under the RegalianDoctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to beclearly within private ownership are preserved tobelong to the state. Whereby, the petition is deniedand assailed decision affirmed.




THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. HON.ELIODORO B. GUINTO

GR. No. 76607. February 26, 1990FACTS: The private respondents are suing severalofficers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base inconnection with the bidding conducted by them forcontracts for barber services in the said basewhich was won by a certain Dizon. Therespondents wanted to cancel the award to the bidwinner because they claimed that Dizon hadincluded in his bid an area not included in theinvitation to bid, and subsequently, to conduct arebidding.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants wereimmune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treatyfor acts done by them in the performance of theirofficial duties.

HELD: The rule that a State may not be suedwithout its consent is one of the generally acceptedprinciples of international law that were haveadopted as part of the law of our land. Evenwithout such affirmation, we would still be boundby the generally accepted principles ofinternational law under the doctrine ofincorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted bythe majority of the states, such principles aredeemed incorporated in the law of every civilizedstate as a condition and consequence of itsmembership in the society of nations. All states aresovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdictionover one another. While the doctrine appears toprohibit only suits against the state without itsconsent, it is also applicable to complaints filedagainst officials of the states for acts allegedlyperformed by them in the discharge of their duties.The rule is that if the judgment against suchofficials will require the state itself to perform anaffirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must beregarded as against the state although it has notbeen formally impleaded. When the governmententers into a contract, it is deemed to havedescended to the level of the other contractingparty and divested of its sovereign immunity fromsuit with its implied consent. In the case Of US, thecustomary law of international law on stateimmunity is expressed with more specificity in theRP-US Bases Treaty. There is no question that theUS, like any other state, will be deemed to haveimpliedly waived its non-suability if it has enteredinto a contract in its proprietory or private capacity.It is only when the contract involves its sovereign

or governmental capacity that no such waiver maybe implied.It is clear from a study of the records ofGR No. 80018 that the petitioners therein wereacting in the exercise of their official functionswhen they conducted the buy-bust operationsagainst the complainant and thereafter testifiedagainst him at his trial. It follows that fordischarging their duties as agents of the US, theycannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable totheir principal, which has not given its consent tobe sued.As for GR No. 80018, the record is toomeager to indicate what really happened. Theneeded inquiry first be made by the lower court soit may assess and resolve the conflicting claims ofthe parties on the basis of evidence that has yet tobe presented at the trial.

The court finds the barbershops subject tothe concessions granted by the US government tobe commercial enterprises operated by privatepersons. The petitioners cannot plead anyimmunity from the complaint, the contract inquestion being decidedly commercial. Thus, thepetition is DISMISSED and the lower court directedto proceed with the hearing and decision of thecase.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NATIONALLABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

GR. No. 120385. October 17, 1996

FACTS: Petitioners Masagana Concrete Productsand Kingstone Concrete Products are licensedbusiness establishments owned by petitionerAlfredo Chua. Sometime in May 1983, MasaganaConcrete Products hired private respondent RubenMarinas as truck helper at the compensation ofP107.00 a day. The name of the establishmentwas later changed to Kingstone ConcreteProducts. Private respondent worked continuouslyfor petitioners until November 30, 1990.

Chua accused Marinas of tampering a“vale sheet” and was ordered to leave the businesspremises. Marinas returned the next day but hewas not allowed to enter the premises. OnDecember 3, 1990, Marinas sent a letter to Chuarequesting that the petitioner be allowed to returnto work. This request was ignored by petitioners.Marinas discovered that he has been replaced bya certain “Anton” and that his time card was nolonger in the rack.

Marinas filed a complaint againstpetitioners for Unfair Labor Practice, IllegalDismissal, Overtime Pay, Legal Holiday Pay,




Premium Pay for Holiday and Rent Day ServiceIncentive Leave. On the hearing date, only therespondent with his counsel appeared. Thehearing was reset but no one appeared forpetitioners. The hearing was rescheduled againbut only Marinas appeared before the LaborArbiter, although petitioners were notified thereof.A Notice of Hearing was sent to Chua stating that“failure on your part to attend the scheduledhearing on the same be conducted ex-parte afterwhich the case submitted for resolution.”ISSUE: Whether or not National Labor RelationsCommission went beyond its jurisdiction.HELD: The Court found no basis from the recordsto hold that the NLRC went beyond its jurisdictionor grave abuse of discretion when it rejected theclaim of petitioners that they were never servedany copy of the notices or summons of thescheduled hearings before the Labor Arbiter andthat the persons who allegedly signed the registryreturn cards correspondingly attached thereto weretotal strangers to herein petitioners. Equally withoutmerit is herein petitioner’s contention that theywere not afforded due process of law when theLabor Arbiter rendered its decision based only onthe evidence adduced by private respondentRuben Marinas. The authority of the labor arbiter torender judgment based on the evidence adducedby complaint is explicitly sanctioned by the Section10 of the Rule VII of the Revised Rules ofProcedure of the NLRC.

VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVESERVICES, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari ofthe decision dated August 11, 1989. On May 12,1986, a Memorandum of Agreement was executedby PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed theminimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight(8) hours of service security per day. On June 29,1987, Odin Security Agency filed a complaint withPADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throatcompetition. PADPAO and PC-SUSIA foundVMPSI guilty and recommended its expulsion fromPADPAO and the cancellation of its license tooperate a security agency.

As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI whenit requested one. VMPSI filed Civil Case No. 88-471 against the PC-Chief and PC-SUSIA in theRTC-Makati Branch 135, on March 28, 1988. Onthe same date, the court issued a restraining order

enjoining the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA fromcommitting acts that would result in thecancellation or non-renewal of VMPSI’s license.The PC Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a Motion toDismiss, Opposition to the Issuance of Writ ofPreliminary Injunction, and Motion to Quash theTRO, on the grounds that the case is against theState which had not given consent thereto and thatVMPSI’s license already expired on March 31,1988, hence, the restraining order or preliminaryinjunction would not serve any purpose becausethere was no more license to be cancelled.Respondent VMPSI opposed the motion. On April18, 1988 the lower court denied VMPSI’sapplication for a writ of preliminary injunction forbeing premature but VMPSI reiterated itsapplication for the issuance of preliminaryinjunction because PC-SUSIA had rejectedpayment of the penalty for its failure to submit itsapplication for renewal of its license. On June 10,1988, the RTC-Makati issued a writ of preliminaryinjunction upon a bond of P100,000, restraining thedefendant from cancelling or denying renewal ofVMPSI’s license. The PC-Chief and PC-SUSIAfiled a Motion for Reconsideration of the aboveorder, but it was denied by the court. On November3, 1988, the PC-Chief and PC-SUSIA sought reliefby a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.On August 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals grantedthe petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not VMPSI’s complaint againstthe PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against theState without its consent.

HELD: The State may not be sued without itsconsent. Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA, being instrumentalities of the nationalgovernment exercising a primarily governmentalfunction of regulating the organization andoperation of private detective, watchmen, orsecurity guard agencies, said official and agencymay not be sued without the Government’sconsent, especially in this case because VMPSI’scomplaint seeks not only to compel the publicrespondents to act in a certain way, but worse,because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatorydamages in the sum P1,000,000.00 exemplarydamages in the same amount, and P200,000.00asattorney’s fees from said public respondents. Evenif its action prospers, the payment of its monetaryclaims may not been forced because the State didnot consent to appropriate the necessary funds forthat purpose.

A public official may sometimes be heldliable in his personal or private capacity if he acts




in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority orjurisdiction, however, since the acts for which thePC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called toaccount in this case, were performed as part oftheir official duties, without malice, grossnegligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be hadagainst them in their private capacities.Furthermore, the Supreme Court agrees with theCourt of Appeals that the Memorandum ofAgreement dated May 12, 1986 does notconstitute an implied consent by the State to besued. The consent of the State to be sued mustemanate from statutory authority, hence, alegislative act, not from a mere memorandum.Without such consent, the trial court did notacquired jurisdiction over the public respondents.

MARIANO E. GARCIA v. THE CHIEF OF STAFF

GR. No. L-20213. January 31, 1966

FACTS: While undergoing military training for aperiod of 10 months, plaintiff-appellant MarianoGarcia, alleged that he suffered injuries at CampFlorida Blanca, Pampanga. On April 1957,he fileda claim to the Adjustant General Officer to recovera sum of money.

A motion was filed by Philippine Veteran’sAdministration and the Chief of Staff of the ArmedForces assailing for the dismissal of the claim. Thecourt dismissed the complainant as the action hasprescribed.ISSUE: Whether or not the suit against the Chief ofStaff is a suit against the staff.HELD: The Court held that the Court of FirstInstance has no jurisdiction over the said matter,the action being the money claim against thegovernment. It should be filed before the AuditorGeneral and will decide within 60mdays, in linewith Commonwealth Act 327.

ERNESTO CALLADO v. INTERNATIONAL RICERESEARCH INSTITUTE (IRRI)GR. No. 106483. May 22, 1995

FACTS: Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employedas a driver at the IRRI from April 11, 1983 –December 4, 1990. One day while driving an IRRIvehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back tothe IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident.Petitioner was informed of the findings of apreliminary investigation conducted by the IRRI's

Human Resource Development DepartmentManager.

In 1990, the petitioner submitted hisanswer and defenses to the charges against him.After evaluating petitioner’s answer, explanationsand other evidences, the petitioner was issued anotice of termination on December 7, 1990.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IRRI waived itsimmunity from suit in this dispute which arose fromas employer-employee relationship.HELD: The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear andequivalent and an express waiver by its director-general is the only way by which it may relinquishor abandon this immunity. On the matter of waivingits immunity from suit, IRRI had, early on, made itsposition clear. The petitioners reliance on theMemorandum with “Guidelines on handling casesof dismissal of employees in relation to PD 1620dated July 26, 1993 is misplaced. The SupremeCourt agrees with private respondents IRRI, thatthis memorandum cannot, by any stretch ofimmigration, be considered the express waiver ofthe Director-General.

THE HOLY SEE v. HON. ERIBERTO U.ROSARIO

GR. No. 101949. December 1, 1994

FACTS: This petition arose from a controversyover a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 squaremeters located in the Municipality of Paranaque.Said lot was contiguous with two other lots. Saidlots was acquired as a donation not for commercialpurpose but for the use of the petitioner toconstruct the official place of residence of theDapal Menico. This right is recognized by the 1961Vienna Convention of Diplomatic relations.

The decision to transfer the property andthe subsequent disposal thereof was likewiseclothed with a governmental character.Subsequently, the lot was sold to Ramon Licup. Inview of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lotsold to private respondent, a dispute arose as towho of the parties has the responsibility of evictingand clearing the land of squatters. Complicatingthe petitions of the parties was the sale by thepetitioner of the lot to Tropicana Properties andDevelopment Corporation.

Manager Domingo Arilos, Jr. acting as theagent of the seller moved to dismiss the complaint




for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunityfrom suit. The trial court denied said petition afterfinding that petitioner “shed-off” its sovereigntyimmunity by entering into a contract specificallybusiness contract in question.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner waived itsimmunity from suit when it entered to the contractof sale of lots.

HELD: As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the1987 Constitution, we have adopted the generallyaccepted principles of International Law. Evenwithout this affirmation, such principles ofInternational Law are deemed incorporated as partof the law of the land as a condition andconsequence of our admission in the society ofnations. In the present case, if petitioner hasbought and sold lands in the ordinary course ofreal estate business, surely the said transactioncan be categorized as an act jure gestionis.However, petitioner has denied that the acquisitionand subsequent disposal of the lot were made forprofit but claimed that it acquired said property forthe site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature inthe Philippines.

The Holy See is immune from suit for theact of selling the lot of concern is non-proprietary innature. The lot was acquired by petitioner as adonation from the Archdiocese of Manila. Thedonation was made not for commercial purpose,but for the use of petitioner to construct thereonthe official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio.The decision to transfer the property and thesubsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothedwith a governmental character. Petitioner did notsell the lot for profit or gain. It merely wanted todispose of the same because the squatters livingthereon made it almost impossible for petitioner touse it for the purpose of the donation.

GAUDENCIO RAYO v. COURT OF FIRSTINSTANCE OF BULACAN

GR. No. L-55273-83. December 19, 1981

FACTS: On October 26, 1978, respondentcorporation through its plant superintendentBenjamin Chavez caused to be openedsimultaneously all the three floodgates of AngatDam. As a result, hundreds of residents on

Norzagaray died and million worth of propertieswere destroyed and washed away.

Petitioners filed 22 complaints fordamages against respondent corporation andBenjamin Chavez, as plant superintendent.Respondent corporation filed an answer invokingthat the operation of Angat Dam is purelygovernmental function, hence, it cannot be suedwithout the express consent of the state. Thecomplaint was dismissed as well as the motion forreconsideration and holding Benjamin Chavez asthe sole party defendant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the power of respondentNAPOCOR to sue and be sued under its organiccharacter invokes to be sued and for tort.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that thegovernment owned and controlled corporation,having a personality of its own, distinct andseparate from that of the Government has thepower to sue and be sued. It is sufficient to saythat the government has organized a privatecorporation, but many in it and has allowed it tosue and be sued in any court under its characterwhich includes a tort claim such as the oneinstituted by the petitioners. The petition wasgranted.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. JAVIERPABALAN

GR. No. L-33112. June 15, 1978

FACTS: Respondent Judge Javier Pabalan issueda writ of execution on December 17, 1910 followedthereafter by a notice of garnishment of the fundsof respondent Virginia Tobacco Administration.The said funds were deposited at the PNB,petitioner, which invoked the doctrine of non-suability, it being alleged that such funds arepublication character.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner PhilippineNational Bank can invoke the doctrine of non-suability.

HELD: In the case, the petitioner invoke suchdoctrine because funds of public corporation couldbe properly made official or object of a notice ofgarnishment. Government – owned and controlledcorporation have a personality of their own,




separate and distinct from the government, theirfunds are not exempt from garnishment.

PALAFOX v. PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTEGR. No L-10059. January 31, 1958

FACTS: Sabas Jorralba was employed as a driverof the Presidential Government of Ilocos Nortedetailed to the office of the distinct engineer.September 30, 1948, while driving his freight-truckin compliance with his duties, he ran over PrecentoPalafox, father of appellants, victim died.

Jorralba pleaded guilty and sentence toreckless imprudence resulting to homicide. Havingreserved their right, the heirs of Paladox file a civilaction against the District Engineer, the employerand Provincial Treasurer and Sabas Jorralba.Appellants invoked the doctrine of respondentsuperior concerning liability of municipalcorporations for negligent acts of their employees.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Province of IlocosNorte can be liable for the acts of its regularagents.

HELD: If, the construction or maintenance of roadsin which the truck and the driver worked at the timeof the accident are governmental activities. Hence,the death of Palafox imposed in the Province noduty to pay monetary compensation.

LAUDENCIO TORIO v. FONTANILLAGR. No. L-29993. October 23, 1978

FACTS: The Municipal Council of Malasiqui,Pangasinan, passed Resolution No. 159 “tomanage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiestacelebration…” The “1959 Malasiqui ‘Town FiestaExecutive Committee” was created, which, in turn,organized a sub-committee on entertainment andstage. A “zarzuela” troupe, of which VicenteFontanilla was a member, arrived for theirperformance on January 22. During the “zarzuela”,the stage collapsed and Fontanilla was pinnedunderneath. He was immediately hospitalized, butdied the following day.

Fontanilla’s heirs filed a complaint torecover damages against the Municipality ofMalasiqui, its Municipal Council and all theCouncil’s individual members.The municipality invoked inter alia the defense thatas a legally and duly organized public corporationit performs sovereign functions and the holding of

a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmentalfunctions from which no liability can arise toanswer for the negligence of any of its agents.

The councilors maintained that theymerely acted as the municipality’s agents incarrying out the municipal ordinance and as suchthey are likewise not liable for damages as theundertaking was not one for profit; furthermore,they had exercised due care and diligence inimplementing the municipal ordinance. After trial,the RTC dismisses the complaint, concluding thatthe Executive Committee had exercised duediligence and care in selecting a competent manfor the construction of the stage, and the collapsewas due to forces beyond the control of thecommittee. Consequently, the defendants were notliable for the death of Vicente Fontanilla. Uponappeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trialcourt’s decision and ordered all the defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally the heirs ofVicente Fontanilla the sums of P12,000.00 by wayof moral and actual damages:P1200.00 itsattorney’s fees; and the costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipality ofMalasiqui may be held liable.

HELD: Yes. Under Philippine laws, municipalitiesare political bodies endowed with the faculties ofmunicipal corporations to be exercised by andthrough their respective municipal governments inconformity with law, and in their proper corporatename, they may inter alia sue and be sued, andcontract and be contracted with. The powers of amunicipality are two-fold in character: public,governmental or political on the one hand; andcorporate, private, or proprietary on the other.Governmental powers are those exercised by thecorporation in administering the powers of the stateand promoting the public welfare. These includethe legislative, judicial public, and political.Municipal powers, on the other hand, are exercisedfor the special benefit and advantage of thecommunity. These include those which areministerial, private and corporate.

These distinctions of powers arenecessary in determining the liability of themunicipality for the acts of its agents which resultin injury to third persons. If the injury is caused inthe course of the performance of a governmentalfunction or duty, no recovery can be had from themunicipality unless there is an existing statute onthe matter, nor from its officers, so long as they




performed their duties honestly and in good faith orthat they did not act wantonly and maliciously. Withrespect to proprietary functions, the settled rule isthat a municipal corporation can be held liable tothird persons ex contract or ex delicto. They mayalso be subject to suit upon contracts and its tort.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATEPOLICIES

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUDGEAMANTE P. PURISIMA

GR. No. L-42050-66. November 20, 1978FACTS: These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Reviewfiled by the People of the Philippines representedinvolve one basic question of law. These Petitionsor appeals involve three Courts of First Instance,namely: the Court of First Instance of Manila,Branch VII, presided by Hon. Amante P. Purisima(17 Petitions), the Court of First Instance of Manila,Branch XVIII, presided by Hon. Maximo A.Maceren (8 Petitions) and, the Court of FirstInstance of Samar, with Hon. Wenceslao M. Polo,presiding, (1 Petition). Before those courts,Informations were filed charging the respectiveaccused with "illegal possession of deadlyweapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9or the law that punishes "illegal possession ofdeadly weapon". However, the judges quashed ordismissed the Informations, on a common ground,that the Information did not allege facts whichconstitute the offense penalized by PresidentialDecree No. 9 because it failed to state oneessential element of the crime. This essentialelement is that the carrying outside of theaccused's residence of a bladed, pointed or bluntweapon “must be connected with or related tosubversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organizedlawlessness or public disorder.”ISSUE: Did the respondents err in dismissing thedifferent information filed before them?HELD: No. First, it is a constitutional right of anyperson who stands charged in a criminalprosecution to be informed of the nature and causeof the accusation against him. In these cases, theinformation filed must be clear and correct becausethe designation of the offense by the statute wereincorrect. Example, the carrying of so-called"deadly weapons" is a subject of another penalstatute and a Manila city ordinance (Act No. 1780Section 26: It should be unlawful for any person tocarry concealed about his person any bowie knife,

dirk dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon) andanother is Ordinance No. 3820 of the City ofManila who punishes anyone who shall carryconcealed in his person in any manner that woulddisguise its deadly character any kind of firearm,bowie knife, or other deadly weapon ... in anypublic place. It was not shown that the above-mentioned statutes were repealed by P.D. 9 (3)because it does not contain any repealing clause.Second, a simple act of carrying any of theweapons described in the presidential decree isnot a criminal offense in itself. What makes the actcriminal or punishable under the decree is themotivation behind it. Example if the offender iscarrying a knife to use for a livelihood or justcooking, then he must be detained? Third, whenambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task toconstrue and interpret guided by the basic principlethat penal statutes are to be construed and appliedliberally in favor of the accused and strictly againstthe state. Thus the court, DENIED these 26Petitions for Review and AFFIRMED the Orders ofrespondent Judges dismissing or quashing theInformation concerned.

OPOSA v. FACTORANGR. No. 101083. July 30, 1993

FACTS: The principal petitioners are all minorsduly represented and joined by their respectiveparents and a case as being enjoined in thePhilippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), adomestic, non-stock and non-profit corporationorganized for the purpose of engaging in concertedaction geared for the protection of our environmentand natural resources. The defendant was theHonorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., thenSecretary of the Department of Environment andNatural Resources (DENR).

The government grants Timber LicenseAgreements (TLAs) allowing people to cut timberwithin a period of 25 years. Thus petitioners filedthe act to the court saying that it was an unabatedhemorrhage of the country's vital life supportsystems and continued rape of Mother Earth.However, the court said that the act of theconcerned department is a pure political questiongiving them no power to take jurisdiction as basedon the non-impairment clause. Moreover,obligation of contracts must be followed.

ISSUE: Would the claims of the petitioners be setaside?




HELD: No. Their petition is granted. Section 16,Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitlyprovides: Sec. 16. The State shall protect andadvance the right of the people to a balanced andhealthful ecology in accord with the rhythm andharmony of nature and Sec. 15. The State shallprotect and promote the right to health of thepeople and instill health consciousness amongthem. Moreover, a timber license is a license orprivilege, which can be “validly withdrawn”whenever dictated by public interest or publicwelfare as in this case. The freedom of contract,under our system of government, is not meant tobe absolute. The same is understood to be subjectto reasonable legislative regulation aimed at thepromotion of public health, moral, safety andwelfare. In other words, the constitutional guarantyof non-impairment of obligations of contract islimited by the exercise of the police power of theState, in the interest of public health, safety, moraland general welfare. In the case at bar, it is thestate’s purpose of advancing the right of thepeople to a balanced and healthful ecology,promoting their health and enhancing the generalwelfare. Thus, as emphasized, the petition isgranted.

GERRY TOYOTO v. HON. FIDEL RAMOSGR. No. L-69270. October 15, 1985

FACTS: Gerry Toyoto, Eddie Gonzales andDominador Gabiana belong to a group called the"Urban Poor" which conducted a marchdemonstration and rally along Northbay Boulevardin Navotas, Metro Manila, on October 23, 1983.Thus among others, they were accused of violatingPresidential Decree No. 1835 (Codifying theVarious Laws on Anti-Subversion and Increasingthe Penalties for Membership in SubversiveOrganizations). Because of insufficiency ofevidence, an order of dismissal was datedNovember 9, 1984, but on December 5, 1984,when the petition for habeas corpus was filed, therespondents had not been released. Theauthorities refused to release the petitioners on theground that a Preventive Detention Action hadbeen issued against them. It is to be noted that thepetitioners had been in detention for over one yearfor they were arrested on October 23, 1983 eventhough the case to them was already dismissed.

ISSUE: Does the state have the power to re-arrestthe petitioners even after they had been acquittedby a court of competent jurisdiction for the offensefor which they had been previously arrested?

HELD: No. The court held that such act of theauthorities is repugnant to the government of lawsand not of men principle. Under this principle themoment a person is acquitted on a criminal chargehe can no longer be detained or re-arrested for thesame offense. WHEREFORE, the petition isgranted; the release of the petitioners is herebydeclared to be permanent.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.TRANQUILINO LAGMAN

GR. No. L-45892. July 13, 1938

FACTS: In these two cases (G.R. Nos. L-45892and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino andPrimitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation ofsection 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known asthe National Defense Law. As Filipinos and havingreached the age of twenty years in 1936, theappellants refused to register in the military servicebetween the 1st and 7th of April of said year,notwithstanding the fact that they had beenrequired to do so. It was shown that the twoappellants were duly notified by the correspondingauthorities to appear before the Acceptance Boardin order to register for military service inaccordance with law, but in spite of these notices,they had not registered up to the date of the filingof the information. Primitivo de Sosa reasons thathe is fatherless and has a mother and a brothereight years old to support, and Tranquilino Lagmanalso has a father to support, has no militarylearnings, and does not wish to kill or be killed. Asa result, each of these appellants was sentencedby the Court of First Instance to one month andone day of imprisonment.

ISSUE: Could one be exempted of such MilitaryService?

HELD: No. According to Section 2, Article II of theConstitution of the Philippines provides as follows:The defense of the state is a prime duty ofgovernment, and in the fulfillment of this duty allcitizens may be required by law to render personalmilitary or civil service. The National Defense Law,in so far as it establishes compulsory militaryservice, does not go against this constitutionalprovision but is, on the contrary, in faithfulcompliance therewith. This military service is aconsequence of its duty to defend the State and isreciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty,and property of the citizen. Thus, the appealedjudgment rendered in these two cases is affirmed.




KILOSBAYAN, INC v. MORATOGR No. 118910. November 16, 1995

FACTS: The petitioner filed this petition seeking todeclare the ELA, in real sense a lease agreementbetween PCSO and PGMC, invalid on the groundthat it is the same with the case of nullification ofthe Contract of Lease in the case of Kilosbayan, etal v Guingona. Petitioners here in this case arguedthat the amended ELA is inconsistent with andviolative of PCSO’s charter and the decision of theSupreme Court of May 5, 1995, that it violate thelaws on public binding of contracts. In response,respondents questioned the petitioners’ standing tobring the suit.

ISSUE: Do petitioners possess the legal standingto file the instant petition?

HELD: The court held that the Kilosbayan do notpossess the legal standing to file the petition. Thepetition should not be brought by parties who havebeen personally injured by the operation of the lawbut by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters whoactually sue in the public interest. This means thatonly those who have interest can bring the sue andit is the duty of the state to respect and protecttheir legitimate and collective interest. In this case,petitioners had no substantial interest in theagreement being challenged.

PHILIP MORRIS v. CAGR No. 91332. July 16, 1993

FACTS: Philip Morris, Incorporated is acorporation organized under the laws of the Stateof Virginia, United States of America, and doesbusiness at 100 Park Avenue, New York, NewYork, United States of America. The two otherplaintiff foreign corporations, which are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Philip Morris, Inc., aresimilarly not doing business in the Philippines butare suing on an isolated transaction. As registeredowners of "MARK VII", "MARK TEN", and "LARK"per certificates of registration issued by thePhilippine Patent Office on April 26, 1973, May 28,1964, and March 25, 1964, plaintiffs-petitionersasserted that defendant Fortune TobaccoCorporation has no right to manufacture and sellcigarettes bearing the allegedly identical orconfusingly similar trademark "MARK" incontravention of Section 22 of the Trademark Law.

In response, Fortune Tobacco Corporationadmitted petitioners' certificates of registration with

the Philippine Patent Office subject to theaffirmative and special defense on misjoinder ofparty plaintiffs. Private respondent alleged,however, that it has been authorized by the Bureauof Internal Revenue to manufacture and sellcigarettes bearing the trademark "MARK", and that"MARK" is a common word which cannot beexclusively appropriated.

Petitioners filed a previous petition forcertiorari before the Court but the petition wasreferred to the Court of Appeals. The Court ofAppeals initially issued a resolution which set asidethe court of origin's order dated April 22, 1987, andgranted the issuance of a writ of preliminaryinjunction enjoining Fortune, its agents,employees, and representatives, frommanufacturing, selling, and advertising "MARK"cigarettes.

Respondents filed a motion to dissolve thedisputed writ of preliminary injunction with offer topost a counterbond was submitted which wasfavorably acted upon by the Court of Appeals,premised on the filing of a sufficient counterbond toanswer for whatever perjuicio petitioners maysuffer. Petitioners, in turn, filed their own motion forre-examination geared towards reimposition of thewrit of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioner can enjoy theprotection of the Incorporation Clause/International Law?

HELD: The court held that cannot invoke theprotection they enjoy under the Paris Conventionof 1965 to which the Philippines is a signatory. Ourmunicipal law on trademarks regarding therequirement of actual use in the Philippines mustsubordinate an international agreement inasmuchas the apparent clash is being decided by amunicipal tribunal. The fact that international lawhas been made part of the law of the land does notby any means imply the primacy of internationallaw over national law in the municipal sphere.Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied inmost countries, rules of international law are givena standing equal, not superior, to nationallegislative enactments.

Petitioners may have the capacity to suefor infringement irrespective of lack of businessactivity in the Philippines on account of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law but the question iswhether they have an exclusive right over theirsymbol as to justify issuance of the controversial




writ will depend on actual use of their trademarksin the Philippines in line with Sections 2 and 2-A ofthe same law. It is thus incongruous for petitionersto claim that when a foreign corporation notlicensed to do business in Philippines files acomplaint for infringement, the entity need not beactually using its trademark in commerce in thePhilippines. Such a foreign corporation may havethe personality to file a suit for infringement but itmay not necessarily be entitled to protection due toabsence of actual use of the emblem in the localmarket.

LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN v. HON. ROMEO F. EDUGR. No. L-49112. February 22, 1979

FACTS: Agustin, the petitioner, was an owner of aVolkswagen Beetle car, model 13035 who didn’texecute an early warning device. The petitionerviolated Letter of Instruction No. 229 of PresidentFerdinand Marcos. This letter of Instruction aimedto prevent road accidents and in the interest ofsafety on all streets, highways includingexpressways. This Letter of Instruction requires allvehicle owners, users or drivers to procure earlywarning devices to be installed a distance awayfrom such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. Allmotorist and motor vehicle owners shall have at alltimes one pair of early warning device. Edu,respondent and in his capacity as LandTransportation Commissioner, set forth theimplementing rules and regulations of the saidinstruction.

In the present case, the petitioner filed apetition questioning the validity of a Letter ofInstruction providing for an early warning devicemandatory for motor vehicles. This petition allegesthat such letter of instruction and subsequentadministrative order are unlawful andunconstitutional as it violates the provisions of dueprocess in as far as the rules and regulations for itsimplementation are concerned.

ISSUE Is the assailed Letter of Instruction unlawfuland violated constitutional guarantees of dueprocess?

HELD: The assailed Letter of Instruction is validand constitutional. The said Letter of Instructionwas a valid exercise of police power and there wasno unlawful delegation of legislative power on thepart of the respondent. Police power is a stateauthority to enact legislation that may interferepersonal liberty or property in order to promote the

general welfare. In this case, the particularexercise of police power was clearly intended topromote public safety.

The Philippines adopts the generallyaccepted principles of international law as part ofthe law of the nation. Thus, as impressed in the1968 Vienna Convention it is not for this country torepudiate a commitment to which it had pledged itsword. Our country’s word was resembled in ourown act of legislative ratification of the said Hagueand Vienna Conventions thru P.D. No. 207. Theconcept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the wayof such an attitude which is, moreover, at war withthe principle of international morality.

In Santiago v. Far Eatern BroadcastingCompany , it was held that the constitutionality ofthe law will not be considered unless the point isspecially pleaded, insisted upon and adequatelyargued. Equal protection is not a talismanicformula at the mere invocation of which a party to alawsuit can rightfully expect success will crown hisefforts. The law is anything but that.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. HON. RALPHLANTION

GR No 139465. January 18, 2000

FACTS: On January 13, 1977, PresidentFerdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential DecreeNo. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for theExtradition of Persons Who Have CommittedCrimes in a Foreign Country". On November 13,1994, Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon,representing the Government of the Republic ofthe Philippines, signed in Manila the "ExtraditionTreaty Between the Government of the Republic ofthe Philippines and the Government of the UnitedStates of America" (hereinafter referred to as theRP-US Extradition Treaty).

On June 18, 1999, the Department ofJustice received from the Department of ForeignAffairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing arequest for the extradition of private respondentMark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to theNote Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, thewarrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court,Southern District of Florida, and other supportingdocuments for said extradition. Based on thepapers submitted, private respondent appears tobe charged in the United States violating someprovisions of the United States Code (USC). Onthe same day, petitioner issued Department OrderNo. 249 designating and authorizing a panel of




attorneys to take charge of and to handle the casepursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No.1069.

Private respondent Mark Jimenez,through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999addressed to petitioner requesting copies of theofficial extradition request from the U.S.Government, as well as all documents and paperssubmitted therewith. In response to privaterespondent's July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in areply-letter dated July 13, 1999 (but received byprivate respondent only on August 4, 1999),denied the foregoing requests.

On August 6, 1999, private respondentfiled with the Regional Trial Court of the NationalCapital Judicial Region a petition against theSecretary of Justice, the Secretary of ForeignAffairs, and the Director of the National Bureau ofInvestigation, for mandamus (to compel hereinpetitioner to furnish private respondent theextradition documents, to give him accessthereto, and to afford him an opportunity tocomment on, or oppose, the extradition request,and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially,fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set asideherein petitioner's letter dated July 13, 1999); andprohibition (to restrain petitioner from consideringthe extradition request and from filing anextradition petition in court; and to enjoin theSecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director ofthe NBI from performing any act directed to theextradition of private respondent to the UnitedStates), with an application for the issuance of atemporary restraining order and a writ ofpreliminary injunction. The aforementionedpetition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684and thereafter raffled to Branch 25 of saidregional trial court stationed in Manila which ispresided over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion,respondent. Lantion rendered decision orderingthe Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of ForeignAffairs and the Director of the National Bureau ofInvestigation, their agents and/or representativesto maintain the status quo by refraining fromcommitting the acts complained of and fromconducting further proceedings in connection withthe request of the United States Government forthe extradition of the private petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent, MarkB. Jimenez, be granted access to the officialextradition request and documents with anopportunity to file a comment on or opposition?

HELD: The Supreme Court held that the privaterespondent be furnished a copy of the extraditionrequest and its supporting papers and to give hima reasonable period of time within which to file hiscomment with supporting evidence. In this case,there exists a clear conflict between the obligationof the Philippine Government to comply with theprovisions of the treaty and its equally significantrole of protection of its citizens of its right of dueprocess. The processes outlined in the treaty andin the presidential decree already pose animpending threat to a prospective extradite libertyas early as the evaluation stage. It is not animagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminentone.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NORMACUISON-MELGAR

GR. No. 139676. March 31, 2006

FACTS: On March 27, 1965, Norma and Eulogiowere married in Dagupan City. On August 19,1996, Norma filed for declaration of nullity of theirmarriage on the ground that Eulogio ispsychologically incapacitated to comply with itsessential marital obligations. The manifestations ofEulogio’s psychological incapacity are hisimmaturity, alcoholism, unbearable jealousy,maltreatment, laziness and abandonment of hisfamily since December 27, 1985.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged psychologicalincapacity of respondent is in the nature ofcontemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code.

HELD: The Court cannot presume psychologicaldetect from the mere fact of Eulogio’s immaturity,habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy and thelike. These circumstances, by themselves, cannotbe equated with psychological incapacity within thecontemplation of the Family Code. It was notshown that these acts are manifestation of adisordered personality which makes Eulogiocompletely unable to discharge the essentialobligations of the marital state.




PHILIPPINE TELEGRAGRAPH & TELEPHONECO. v. NLRC

GR. No. 118978. May 23, 1997

FACTS: PT&T initially hired Grace de Guzmanspecifically as “Supernumerary Project Worker”, fora fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went onmaternity leave. She was again invited foremployment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon whowent on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 toJuly 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.

On September 2, 1991, de Guzman wasagain asked to join PT&T as a probationaryemployee where probationary period will cover 150days. She indicated in the portion of the jobapplication form under civil status that she wassingle although she had contracted marriage a fewmonths earlier. When petitioner learned laterabout the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M.Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum requiringher to explain the discrepancy. Included in thememorandum, was a reminder about thecompany’s policy of not accepting married womenfor employment. She was dismissed from thecompany effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiterhanded down decision on November 23, 1993declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed DeGuzman, who had already gained the status of aregular employee. Furthermore, it was apparentthat she had been discriminated on account of herhaving contracted marriage in violation of companypolicies.

ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civilstatus can be grounds to terminate the services ofan employee.

HELD: Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of theprotective laws for women, explicitly prohibitsdiscrimination merely by reason of marriage of afemale employee. It is recognized that company isfree to regulate manpower and employment fromhiring to firing, according to their discretion andbest business judgment, except in those cases ofunlawful discrimination or those provided by law.

PT&T’s policy of not accepting ordisqualifying from work any woman worker whocontracts marriage is afoul of the right againstdiscrimination provided to all women workers byour labor laws and by our Constitution. The recorddiscloses clearly that de Guzman’s ties with PT&Twere dissolved principally because of thecompany’s policy that married women are not

qualified for employment in the company, and notmerely because of her supposed acts ofdishonesty.

The policy of PT&T is in derogation of theprovisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code onthe right of a woman to be free from any kind ofstipulation against marriage in connection with heremployment and it likewise is contrary to goodmorals and public policy, depriving a woman of herfreedom to choose her status, a privilege that isinherent in an individual as an intangible andinalienable right. The kind of policy followed byPT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals andpurpose of marriage as an inviolable socialinstitution and ultimately, family as the foundationof the nation. Such policy must be prohibited in allits indirect, disguised or dissembled forms asdiscriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws ofthe land not only for order but also imperativelyrequired.

MAXIMO CALALANG v. WILLIAMS

GR. No. 47800. December 2, 1940

FACTS: The National Traffic Commission, in itsresolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommendto the Director of Public Works and to theSecretary of Public Works and Communicationsthat animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited frompassing along Rosario Street extending from PlazaCalderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from therailroad crossing at Antipolo Street to EchagueStreet, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of oneyear from the date of the opening of the ColganteBridge to traffic. The Chairman of the NationalTraffic Commission, on 18 July 1940,recommended to the Director of Public Works theadoption of the measure proposed in theresolution, in pursuance of the provisions ofCommonwealth Act 548, which authorizes saidDirector of Public Works, with the approval of theSecretary of Public Works and Communications, topromulgate rules and regulations to regulate andcontrol the use of and traffic on national roads. On2 August 1940, the Director of Public Works, in hisfirst indorsement to the Secretary of Public Worksand Communications, recommended to the latterthe approval of the recommendation made by theChairman of the National Traffic Commission, withthe modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue totraffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the




portion thereof extending from the railroad crossingat Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street.

On 10 August 1940, the Secretary ofPublic Works and Communications, in his secondindorsement addressed to the Director of PublicWorks, approved the recommendation of the latterthat Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed totraffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the pointsand during the hours as indicated, for a period of 1year from the date of the opening of the ColganteBridge to traffic. The Mayor of Manila and theActing Chief of Police of Manila have enforced andcaused to be enforced the rules and regulationsthus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity asa private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila,brought before the Supreme court the petition for awrit of prohibition against A. D. Williams, asChairman of the National Traffic Commission;Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works;Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Worksand Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, asMayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez,as Acting Chief of Police of Manila

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an unduedelegation of legislative power.

HELD: There is no undue delegation of legislativepower. Commonwealth Act 548 does not conferlegislative powers to the Director of Public Works.The authority conferred upon them and underwhich they promulgated the rules and regulationsnow complained of is not to determine what publicpolicy demands but merely to carry out thelegislative policy laid down by the NationalAssembly in said Act, to wit, “to promote safetransit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads andstreets designated as national roads by acts of theNational Assembly or by executive orders of thePresident of the Philippines” and to close themtemporarily to any or all classes of traffic“whenever the condition of the road or the trafficmakes such action necessary or advisable in thepublic convenience and interest.”

The delegated power, if at all, therefore, isnot the determination of what the law shall be, butmerely the ascertainment of the facts andcircumstances upon which the application of saidlaw is to be predicated.

To promulgate rules and regulations on theuse of national roads and to determine when andhow long a national road should be closed totraffic, in view of the condition of the road or the

traffic thereon and the requirements of publicconvenience and interest, is an administrativefunction which cannot be directly discharged by theNational Assembly. It must depend on thediscretion of some other government official towhom is confided the duty of determining whetherthe proper occasion exists for executing the law.But it cannot be said that the exercise of suchdiscretion is the making of the law.

DIONISIO V. AUSTRIA v. NATIONAL LABORRELATIONS COMMISSION

GR. No. 124382. August 16, 1999

FACTS: At around 5 PM of December 2, 1984,petitioner converged at J.R. Lawee Street, Manilafor the ostensible purpose of having mass at theSt. Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacananggrounds located in the street. Wearing the familiaryellow t-shirts, they started to march down saidstreet with raised clenched fists and shouts of anti-governmental investives. However, they werebarred by respondent Mayor Isabello Larriosa,upon orders of his superior and co-respondentGeneral Santiago Barangan, from proceeding anyfurther and because of the alleged warning givenby Mayor Larriosa that any similar attempt bypetitioners to enter the church in the future worldlikewise be barred, thus, this recourse.

During the hearing, respondents assuredpetitioners and the court that they have neverrestricted and will never restrict any person orpersons from entering and worshipping of said.They maintain, however, that petitioner’s intentionwas not really to perform an act of religiousworship, but to conduct an anti-governmentaldemonstration at a place close to the residenceand offer of the President.ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can invoketheir constitutional freedom to religious worshipand locomotion.HELD: The foregoing cannot but cost seriousdoubts on the sincerity and good faith of petitionersin invoking the constitutional guarantee of freedomof religious worship and of locomotion. While it isbeyond that every citizen has the undeniable andinviolable right to religious freedom, the exercisethereof, must be done with good faith.

The restriction done by privaterespondents is intended to secure the severalexecutive officers within the Malacanang groundsfrom possible external attacks and disturbances. Itis necessary to maintain the smooth functioning of




the executive branch of the government, whichpetitioners mass action would certainly disruptpetitioners are not denied of their freedom of beliefor religion, but only in the manner by which theyhad attempted to translate the same into action.

FRANCISCO GUDANI v. GENEROSO S. SENGAGR. No. 170165. August. 15, 2006

FACTS: On Sept. 22, 2005, Sen. Biazon invitedseveral senior officers of the AFP, including Gen.Gudani, to appear at a public hearing before theSenate Committee on National Defenseand Security concerning the conduct of the 2004elections wherein allegations of massive cheatingand the “Hello Garci” tapes emerged. AFP Chief ofStaff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum,prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan andcompany from appearing before the SenateCommittee without Presidential approval.Nevertheless, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutantestified before said Committee, prompting Gen.Senga to order them subjected to General CourtMartial proceedings for willfully violating an order ofa superior officer. In the meantime, PresidentArroyo issued EO 464, which was subsequentlydeclared unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President canprevent military officers from testifying at alegislative inquiry.

HELD: We hold that the President hasconstitutional authority to do so, by virtue of herpower as commander-in-chief, and that as aconsequence a military officer who defies suchinjunction is liable under military justice. At thesame time, we also hold that any chamber ofCongress which seeks the appearance before it ofa military officer against the consent of thePresident has adequate remedies under law tocompel such attendance. Any military official whomCongress summons to testify before it may becompelled to do so by the President. If thePresident is not so inclined, the President may becommanded by judicial order to compel theattendance of the military officer. Final judicialorders have the force of the law of the land whichthe President has the duty to faithfully execute.

As earlier noted, it was ruled in Senate thatthe President may not issue a blanket requirementof prior consent on executive officials summonedby the legislature to attend a congressionalhearing. In doing so, the Court recognized theconsiderable limitations on executive privilege, and

affirmed that the privilege must be formally invokedon specified grounds. However, the ability of thePresident to prevent military officers from testifyingbefore Congress does not turn on executiveprivilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power ascommander-in-chief to control the actions andspeech of members of the armed forces. ThePresident’s prerogatives as commander-in-chiefare not hampered by the same limitations as inexecutive privilege.

The President could, as a general rule,require military officers to seek presidentialapproval before appearing before Congress isbased foremost on the notion that a contrary ruleunduly diminishes the prerogatives of the Presidentas commander-in-chief. Congress holds significantcontrol over the armed forces in matters such asbudget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that theConstitution vests the title as commander-in-chiefand all the prerogatives and functions appertainingto the position. Again, the exigencies of militarydiscipline and the chain of command mandate thatthe President’s ability to control the individualmembers of the armed forces be accorded theutmost respect. Where a military officer is tornbetween obeying the President and obeying theSenate, the Court will without hesitation affirm thatthe officer has to choose the President. After all,the Constitution prescribes that it is the President,and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chiefof the armed forces.

SEPARATION OF POWERS

ELDEPIO LASCO v. UNITED NATIONSREVOLVING FUND FOR NATURAL

RESOURCES EXPLORATION (UNRFNRE)GR. Nos. 109095-109107. February 23, 1995

FACTS: Petitioners filed a suit because they weredismissed from their employment with privaterespondent, the United Nations Revolving Fund forNatural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE) whichinvolved a joint project of the PhilippineGovernment and the United Nations for explorationwork in Dinagat Island.

Later, a letter from the Department ofForeign Affairs (DFA) dated August 26, 1991acknowledged UNRFNRE as immune from suit.The letter confirmed that private respondent wascovered by the 1946 Convention on the Privileges




and Immunities of the United Nations of which thePhilippine Government was an original signatory.

On November 25, 1991, respondent LaborArbiter issued an order dismissing the complaintson the ground that private respondent wasprotected by diplomatic immunity. The Petitioners'motion for reconsideration was denied. When anappeal was filed with the NLRC, it affirmed thedismissal of the complaints.ISSUE: Was the principle of separation of powersbetween the decision of the court and the letterfrom the DFA followed in this case?HELD: Yes. Diplomatic immunity is essentially apolitical question and it is the duty of the courts toaccept the claim of immunity as to not embarrassthe executive arm of the government (which is theDFA) in conducting foreign relations. It is generallyaccepted that in such cases, the judicialdepartment of the government follows the action ofthe political branch and will not embarrass thelatter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.Thus the petition was dismissed.

BENGZON ET AL., v. HON. FRANKLIN N.DRILON

GR. No. 103524. April 15, 1992

FACTS:

This is an instant petition for readjustment ofretired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court ofAppeals monthly pension. The petitioners areretired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court ofAppeals who are currently receiving monthlypensions under R.A. No. 910 as amended by R.A.No. 1797.

Section 3-A, which authorizes saidpensions, of R.A. No. 1797 was repealed byPresident Marcos. The legislature saw the need tore-enact said R.A.s to restore said retirementpensions and privilege. President Aquino,however, vetoed House Bill No. 16297 as well asportions of Section 1 and the entire Section 4 ofthe Special Provisions for the Supreme Court ofthe Philippines and the Lower Courts.ISSUE: Can the President veto certain provisionsof the General Appropriations Act?

HELD: No. The act of the Executive in vetoing theparticular provisions is an exercise of aconstitutionally vested power. But even as theConstitution grants the power, it also provideslimitations to its exercise. The Executive must vetoa bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she is,

therefore, compelled to approve into law the entirebill, including its undesirable parts. It is for thisreason that the Constitution has wisely providedthe “item veto power” to avoid inexpedient ridersfrom being attached to an indispensableappropriation or revenue measure.

PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERSFEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED) v.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESGR. Nos. 177857-58. September 17, 2009

FACTS: This is an Urgent Motion to Approve theConversion of the SMC Common Shares into SMCSeries 1 Preferred Shares. COCOFED seeks theCourt’s approval of the conversion of 753,848,312Class “A” and Class “B” common shares of SanMiguel Corporation (SMC) registered in the namesof Coconut Industry Investment Fund and the so-called “14 Holding Companies” (collectively knownas “CIIF companies”) into 753,848,312 SMC Series1 Preferred Shares (hereinafter, the Conversion).Respondent Republic filed its Commentquestioning COCOFED’s personality to seek theCourt’s approval of the desired conversion. Itpostulates that, owing to the sequestrated status ofthe said common shares, only PCGG has theauthority to approve the proposed conversion andseek the necessary Court approval. Afterconsiderations, the executive branch of thegovernment, proposed for the conversion of theCIIF SMC shares.

ISSUE: Can the Court question the reasonsbehind the decision of the executive branch to askfor the conversion of the common shares topreferred shares?

HELD: No, because in doing so the Court wouldbe trenching on the well-settled doctrine ofseparation of powers. The cardinal postulateexplains that the three branches must dischargetheir respective functions within the limits ofauthority conferred by the Constitution. Under theprinciple of separation of powers, neitherCongress, the President, nor the Judiciary mayencroach on fields allocated to the other branchesof government. The legislature is generally limitedto the enactment of laws, the executive to theenforcement of laws, and the judiciary to theirinterpretation and application to cases andcontroversies.




SAGUIGUIT VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESGR No. 144054. June 30, 2006

FACTS: In eight (8) separate informations filedwith the RTC of Angeles City, thereat docketed asCriminal Case Nos. 94-03-226 to 94-03-233,Nieves Saguiguit was charged with violations ofthe Bouncing Checks Law. All containing identicalallegations as to the elements of the offensecharged and differing only as regards therespective amounts and due dates of the checkinvolved in each case, the eight (8) informationsuniformly alleged:

"That on or about the 1st week of April,1991, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, andwithin the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, theabove-named accused, did then and there willfully,unlawfully and feloniously draw and issue to thecomplainant MR. ELMER EVANGELISTA aTraders Royal Bank Check No._______, in theamount of _______, dated ________, 1991, wellknowing and without informing the complainantthat she has no sufficient funds with the draweebank, which check when deposited for paymentwas dishonored for reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED"and demand notwithstanding for more than five (5)days from notice of dishonor, the accused failedand refused and still fails and refuses to redeemthe said check to the damage and prejudice of thecomplainant ELMER EVANGELISTA in the afore-mentioned amount of__________,Philippine Currency".

On March 16, 1998, the Regional TrialCourt rendered a decision that petitioner is guiltyas charged in each information.

Unable to accept the verdict of guilt,petitioner went on appeal to the CA. On June 28,2000, the appellate court affirmed the decision ofthe trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court can re-examineextant jurisprudence on the Bouncing Checks Law.

HELD: The court held that court cannot re-examine extant jurisprudence on the BouncingChecks Law. What the petitioner asks is for theCourt to delve into the policy behind or wisdom of astatute, i.e., B.P. Blg. 22, which, under the doctrineof separation of powers, it cannot do, matters oflegislative wisdom being within the domain ofCongress. The Court can only interpret and applythe law and cannot, despite doubts about itswisdom, amend or repeal it. Courts of justice haveno right to encroach on the prerogatives of

lawmakers, as long as it has not been shown thatthey have acted with grave abuse of discretion.

In the case, petitioner's last and onlyremaining remedy is to seek an amendment of thelaw in question, a matter which should beaddressed to Congress because the legislature isthe primary judge of the necessity, adequacy,wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of anylaw.

CHECKS AND BALANCES

JAWORSKI VS PAGCORGR No. 144463. January 14, 2004

FACTS: The instant petition for certiorari andprohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Courtseeks to nullify the “Grant of Authority andAgreement for the Operation of Sports Betting andInternet Gaming,” executed by respondentPhilippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation(hereinafter referred to as PAGCOR) in favor ofrespondent Sports and Games and EntertainmentCorporation (also referred to as SAGE).

PAGCOR is a government owned andcontrolled corporation existing under PresidentialDecree No. 1869 issued on July 11, 1983 by thenPresident Ferdinand Marcos.On March 31, 1998, PAGCOR’s board of directorsapproved an instrument denominated as “Grant ofAuthority and Agreement for the Operation ofSports Betting and Internet Gaming”, whichgranted SAGE the authority to operate andmaintain Sports Betting station in PAGCOR’scasino locations, and Internet Gaming facilities toservice local and international bettors, providedthat to the satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriatesafeguards and procedures are established toensure the integrity and fairness of the games.

Pursuant to the authority granted byPAGCOR, SAGE commenced its operations byconducting gambling on the Internet on a trial-runbasis, making pre-paid cards and redemption ofwinnings available at various Bingo Bonanzaoutlets.

Petitioner, in his capacity as member ofthe Senate and Chairman of the SenateCommittee on Games, Amusement and Sports,files the instant petition, praying that the grant ofauthority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE benullified. He maintains that PAGCOR committedgrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or




excess of jurisdiction when it authorized SAGE tooperate gambling on the internet. According topetitioner, internet gambling does not fall underany of the categories of the authorized gamblingactivities enumerated under Section 10 of P.D. No.1869 which grants PAGCOR the “right, privilegeand authority to operate and maintain gamblingcasinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusementplaces, sports gaming pools, within the territorialjurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines.” Hecontends that internet gambling could not havebeen included within the commonly accepteddefinition of “gambling casinos”, “clubs” or “otherrecreation or amusement places” as these termsrefer to a physical structure in real-space wherepeople who intend to bet or gamble go and playgames of chance authorized by law.

ISSUE: Whether or not PAGCOR’s legislativefranchise includes the right to vest another entity,SAGE in this case, with the authority to operateInternet gambling.

HELD: A legislative franchise is a special privilegegranted by the state to corporations. It is a privilegeof public concern which cannot be exercised at willand pleasure, but should be reserved for publiccontrol and administration, either by thegovernment directly, or by public agents, undersuch conditions and regulations as the governmentmay impose on them in the interest of the public. Itis Congress that prescribes the conditions onwhich the grant of the franchise may be made.

In the case, the court holds that PAGCORhas acted beyond the limits of its authority when itpassed on or shared its franchise to SAGE.PAGCOR executed an agreement with SAGEwhereby the former grants the latter the authorityto operate and maintain sports betting stations andInternet gaming operations. In essence, the grantof authority gives SAGE the privilege to activelyparticipate, partake and share PAGCOR’sfranchise to operate a gambling activity. The grantof franchise is a special privilege that constitutes aright and a duty to be performed by the grantee.The grantee must not perform its activitiesarbitrarily and whimsically but must abide by thelimits set by its franchise and strictly adhere to itsterms and conditionalities. A corporation as acreature of the State is presumed to exist for thecommon good. Hence, the special privileges andfranchises it receives are subject to the laws of theState and the limitations of its charter.

The court held that while PAGCOR isallowed under its charter to enter into operator’sand/or management contracts, it is not allowedunder the same charter to relinquish or share itsfranchise, much less grant a veritable franchise toanother entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR cannotdelegate its power in view of the legal principleof delegata potestas delegare non potest,inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to showthat it has been expressly authorized to do so.

PHILIPPINES JUDGES ASSOCIATION v.PRADO

GR. No. 105371. November 11, 1993

FACTS: The petitioners, who are members of thelower courts, are questioning the constitutionality ofR.A. No. 7354 (An Act Creating the PhilippinePostal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functionsand Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation ofthe Industry and for Other Purposes ConnectedTherewith) on the grounds that: (1) its titleembraces more than one subject and does notexpress its purposes; (2) it did not pass therequired readings in both Houses of Congress andprinted copies of the bill in its final form were notdistributed among the members before itspassage; and (3) it is discriminatory andencroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.ISSUE: Is R.A. No. 7354 constitutional?

HELD: Based on the decision, the title of R.A. No.7354 does not violate the constitution. The title ofthe bill is not required to be an index to the body ofthe act, or to be as comprehensive as to coverevery single detail of the measure. It has been heldthat if the title fairly indicates the general subject,and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act,and is not calculated to mislead the legislature orthe people, there is sufficient compliance with theconstitutional requirement. The withdrawal of thefranking privilege from some agencies is germaneto the accomplishment of the principal objective ofR.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a moreefficient and effective postal service system.

Also, while it is true that a conferencecommittee is the mechanism for compromisingdifferences between the Senate and the House, itis not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Aconference committee may, deal generally with thesubject matter or it may be limited to resolving theprecise differences between the two houses.Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court




may not inquire beyond the certification of theapproval of a bill from the presiding officers ofCongress. Both the enrolled bill and the legislativejournals certify that the measure was dulyenacted in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26 ofthe Constitution.

However, Section 35 of R. A. No. 7354was annulled since it was found to be violative ofArticle 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing thatno person shall "be deprived of the equalprotection of laws."

DELEGATION OF POWERS

ABAKADA V. ERMITAGR. No. 168056, G.R. No. 168207, GR. No.168461, GR. No. 168463, GR. No. 168730.

September 1, 2005

FACTS: RA 9337 is the VAT Reform Act enactedon May 24, 2005. Sec. 4 (sales of goods andproperties), Sec. 5 (importation of goods) and Sec.6 (services and lease of property) of RA 9337, incollective, granted the Secretary of Finance theauthority to ascertain: a.) Whether by 31 December2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of the2004 GDP exceeds 2.8%; or b.) The NationalGovernment deficit as a percentage of the 2004GDP exceeds 1.5%.

If either condition is met, the Secretary ofFinance must inform the President who, in turn,must impose the 12% VAT rate (from 10%)effective January 1, 2006. ABAKADA maintainedthat Congress abandoned its exclusive authority tofix taxes and that RA 9337 contained a uniformproviso authorizing the President uponrecommendation by the Department of Finance(DOF) Secretary to raise VAT to 12%.

Sen. Pimentel maintained that RA 9337constituted undue delegation of legislative powersand a violation of due process since the law wasambiguous and arbitrary. Same with Rep.Escudero. Pilipinas Shell dealers argued that theVAT reform was arbitrary, oppressive andconfiscatory. Respondents countered that the lawwas complete, that it left no discretion to thePresident, and that it merely charged the Presidentwith carrying out the rate increase once any of thetwo (2) conditions arise.

ISSUE: Is there an undue delegation of powers?

HELD: No. The Constitution allows as underexempted delegation the delegation of tariffs,customs duties, and other tolls, levies on goodsimported and exported. VAT is tax levied on salesof goods and services which could not fall underthis exemption. Hence, its delegation if unqualifiedis unconstitutional. The Legislative power has theauthority to make a complete law. Thus, to bevalid, a law must be complete in itself, setting forththerein the policy and it must fix a standard, limitsof which are sufficiently determinate anddeterminable.

No undue delegation when congressdescribes what job must be done who must do itand the scope of the authority given. Secretary ofFinance was merely tasked to ascertain theexistence of facts. All else was laid out. Mainlyministerial for the secretary to ascertain the factsand for the president to carry out theimplementation for the VAT. They were agents ofthe legislative department thus, their acts weremerely implementations of the law.

THE UNITED STATES v. ANG TANG HO

GR. No. 17122. February 27, 1922

FACTS: On 30July 1919, the Philippine Legislature(during special session) passed and approved ActNo. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopolyand Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The saidact under extraordinary circumstances authorizesthe Governor General (GG) to issue the necessaryRules and Regulations in regulating the distributionof such products.

Pursuant to this Act, On 01 August 1919,the GG issued Executive Order (EO) 53 which waspublished on 20 August 1919. The said EO fixedthe price at which rice should be sold. Ang TangHo, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegallysold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the priceof eighty centavos. The said amount was wayhigher than that prescribed by the EO. The salewas done on the 6th of August 1919. On 08August 1919, he was charged in violation of thesaid EO.

He was found guilty as charged and wassentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus aP500.00 fine. He appealed the sentencecountering that there is an undue delegation ofpower to the Governor General.




ISSUE: Is there an undue delegation of power tothe Governor General?

HELD: Yes, unconstitutional and void. Thelower court’s decision was reversed and thepetitioner was discharged. When it authorizes theGovernor-General to fix the price at whichrice should be sold, it can be gathered thatlegislative power to enact law, is lodged inthe Executive. Promulgation of temporary rulesand emergency measures was left to the discretionof the GG. Legislature did not specify ordefine what conditions the GG shall issue theproclamation. Thus, the act states that it can beissued “For any cause.” Legislature did not definewhat is an extraordinary rise in the price of rice.(which shall be what is prevented by suchlegislature). In the absence of the proclamation, itwas not a crime to sell rice at any price. If everthere is a crime, it is because the GG issued theproclamation. The power conferred upon thelegislature to make laws cannot be delegated tothe GG or anyone else. The legislative cannotdelegate the legislative power to enact any law. Itcan only pass a law that does nothing more than toauthorize the GG to make rules and regulations tocarry the law into effect.

SANIDAD VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

GR. No. L-44640, GR. No. L-44684, GR. No. L-44714. October 12, 1976

FACTS:On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a nationalreferendum on 16 October 1976 for the CitizensAssemblies ("barangays") to resolve the issues ofmartial law. On 22 September 1976, the Presidentissued another PD 1031, amending the previousPresidential Decree 991, by declaring theprovisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing forthe manner of voting and canvass of votes in"barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable tothe national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October1976.

The President also issued PD 1033,stating the questions to be submitted to the peoplein the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976.The Commission on Elections was vested with theexclusive supervision and control of the October1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite.Pablo and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced for Prohibition with PreliminaryInjunction seeking to enjoin the COMELECfrom holding and conducting the Referendum

Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without forceand effect PD 991, 1033 and 1031.

They contend that under the 1935 and1973 Constitutions there is no grant to theincumbent President to exercise the constituentpower to propose amendments to the newConstitution. Another action for Prohibition withPreliminary Injunction was instituted by Vicente M.Guzman, Raul M. Gonzales, hisson, and AlfredoSalapantan, to restrain the implementation ofPresidential Decrees.

ISSUE: May the President call upon a referendumfor the amendment of the Constitution?

HELD: Yes. The power to legislate isconstitutionally consigned to the interim NationalAssembly during the transition period. However,the initial convening of that Assembly is a matterfully addressed to the judgment of the incumbentPresident. And, in the exercise of that judgment,the President opted to defer convening of thatbody in utter recognition of the people'spreference. Likewise, in the period of transition, thepower to propose amendments to the Constitutionlies in the interim National Assembly upon specialcall by the President (See. 15 of the TransitoryProvisions). Again, harking to the dictates of thesovereign will, the President decided not to call theinterim National Assembly. Would it then be withinthe bounds of the Constitution and of law for thePresident to assume that constituent power of theinterim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of thatbody's legislative functions? The answer is yes. Ifthe President has been legitimately discharging thelegislative functions of the interim Assembly, thereis no reason why he cannot validly discharge thefunction of that Assembly to propose amendmentsto the Constitution, which is but adjunct, althoughpeculiar, to its gross legislative power.

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION (PBA) V.COMELEC

GR. No. L-72915. December 19, 1985

FACTS:The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883calling for a special (snap) election for Presidentand Vice President was assailed by PBA,et al. They contend that it is violative of theConstitution because the office is not vacant. Then




President Marcos, although tendereda letter of resignation, gave condition that hisresignation will be effective only when the electionis held and after the winner is proclaimed andqualified as President by taking his oath of officeten (10) days after his proclamation.

The plaintiff contends that vacancy mustbe real and in Esse not a parody or shadow of thereal thing. In the same way that death, disability, orremoval from office must be actual and permanentbefore the pertinent provisions of Section 9, Art. VIIof the 1973 Constitution may come into play, somust a resignation be real and irrevocablypermanent.

ISSUE: Is BP Blg. 883 unconstitutional and shouldthis Court therefore stop and prohibit the holdingof the election?

HELD: By a 7-to-5 vote the SC decided to uphold theconstitutionality of said law. There is no clear casehas been made of an absolute void of power andauthority that would warrant its nullification and thatprohibition is not a remedy for acts done that canno longer be undone.

It is a political question. An examination ofthe Constitution, particularly Art.VII, Section 9,does not yield the conclusion that BP Blg.883 isoffensive to its provisions. What is clear is that theConstitution does not prohibit the President fromtendering a resignation that is not immediatelyeffective. Indeed, there is no provision whatsoeverregarding such kind of resignation.4. Theenactment of BP 883 falls within the legislativeauthority of the Batasang Pambansa. The case isdismissed and the prayer forthe issuance of an injunctionrestraining respondents from holding the electionon February 7, 1986 is denied.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, QUEZONVS. HON. ANTONIO V. MENDEZ, SRGR. No. 103702, December 06, 1994

FACTS: On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P.Garcia, issued Executive Order No. 353 creatingthe municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, bysegregating from the municipality of San Narciso ofthe same province, the barrios of San Andres,Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Talaalong with their respective sitios, upon the request

of the municipal council of San Narciso, Quezon.By virtue of Executive Order No. 174, dated 05October 1965, issued by President DiosdadoMacapagal, the municipal district of San Andreswas later officially recognized to have gained thestatus of a fifth class municipality beginning 01 July1963;

On 05 June 1989, the Municipality of SanNarciso filed a petition for quo warranto. Thepetitioning municipality contended that ExecutiveOrder No. 353, a presidential act, was a clearusurpation of the inherent powers of the legislatureand in violation of the constitutional principle ofseparation of powers. In their answer, respondentsasked for the dismissal of the petition, averring, byway of affirmative and special defenses, that sinceit was at the instance of petitioner municipality thatthe Municipality of San Andres was given life withthe issuance of Executive Order No. 353.

ISSUE: Is Executive Order No. 353 constitutional?

HELD: Executive Order No. 353 creating themunicipal district of San Andres was issued on 20August 1959 but it wasonly after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finallydecided to challenge the legality of the executiveorder. In the meantime, the Municipal District, andlater the Municipality, of San Andres, began andcontinued to exercise the powers and authority of aduly created local government unit. In the samemanner that the failure of a public officer toquestion his ouster or the right of another to hold aposition within a one-year period can abrogate anaction belatedly filed, so also, if not indeed withgreatest imperativeness.

At the present time, all doubts onthe de jure standing of the municipality must bedispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15October 1986) apportioning the seats of the Houseof Representatives, appended to the 1987Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres hasbeen considered to be one of the twelve (12)municipalities composing the Third District of theprovince of Quezon. Equally significant is Section442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effectthat municipal districts “organized pursuant topresidential issuances or executive orders andwhich have their respective sets of electivemunicipal officials holding office at the time of theeffectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth beconsidered as regular municipalities.” No




pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section442(d) of the Local Government Code is proferred.It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made,would succeed. The power to create politicalsubdivisions is a function of the legislature.Congress did just that when it has incorporatedSection 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which inessence are retrospective, and aimed at giving“validity to acts done that would have been invalidunder existing laws, as if existing laws have beencomplied with,” are validly accepted in thisjurisdiction, subject to the usual qualificationagainst impairment of vested rights.

All considered, the de jure status of theMunicipality of San Andres in the province ofQuezon must now be conceded.

ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC. v. CAGR. No. 100152. March 31, 2000

FACTS: Acebedo Optical applied fora business permit to operate in Iligan City.After hearing the sides of local optometrists, MayorCabili of Iligan granted the permit but he attachedvarious special conditions which basically madeAcebedo’s dependent upon prescriptions to beissued by local optometrists. Acebedo is notallowed to practice optometry within the city.Acebedo however acquiesced to the saidconditions and operated under the permit;

Later, Acebedo was charged for violating thesaid conditions and was subsequently suspendedfrom operating within Iligan. Acebedo then assailedthe validity of the attached conditions. The localoptometrists argued that Acebedo is estopped inassailing the said conditions because it acquiescedto the same and that the imposition of the specialconditions is a valid exercise of police power; thatsuch conditions were entered upon by the city in itsproprietary function hence the permit is actually acontract.

ISSUE: Is the special conditions attached by themayor a valid exercise of police power?

HELD: No. Acebedo was applying for a businesspermit to operate its business and not to practiceoptometry (the latter being within the jurisdictionPRC Board of Optometry). The conditions attachedby the mayor is ultra vires hence cannot be givenany legal application therefore estoppel does notapply. It is neither a valid exercise of police power.Though the mayor can definitely impose conditionsin the granting of permits, he must base such

conditions on law or ordinances otherwise theconditions are ultra vires. Lastly, the granting of thelicense is not a contract, it is a special privilege –estoppels does not apply.

OSMENA v. ORBOSGR No. 99886. March 31, 1993

Facts: P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in theGeneral Fund, designated as the OilPriceStabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF wasdesigned to reimburse oil companies for costincreases in crude oil and imported petroleumproducts resulting from exchange rate adjustmentsand from increases in the world market prices ofcrude oil.

Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassifiedinto a "trust liability account," in virtue of E.O. 1024,7 and ordered released from the National Treasuryto the Ministry of Energy. The same ExecutiveOrder also authorized the investment of the fund ingovernment securities, with the earnings from suchplacements accruing to the fund.

President Corazon C. Aquino, amendedP.D. 1956. She promulgated Executive Order No.137 on February 27, 1987, expanding the groundsfor reimbursement to oil companies for possiblecost underrecovery incurred as a result of thereduction of domestic prices of petroleum products,the amount of the underrecovery being left fordetermination by the Ministry of Finance.

The petition further avers that the creationof the trust fund violates Section 29(3), Article VI ofthe Constitution. The petitioner argues that "themonies collected pursuant to . . P.D. 1956, asamended, must be treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,'not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "ifa special tax is collected for a specific purpose, therevenue generated therefrom shall 'be treated as aspecial fund' to be used only for the purposeindicated, and not channeled to anothergovernment objective."

Petitioner further points out that since "a'special fund' consists of monies collected throughthe taxing power of a State, such amounts belongto the State, although the use thereof is limited tothe special purpose/objective for which it wascreated."

ISSUE: Whether or not the "delegation oflegislative authority" to the Energy RegulatoryBoard valid.

HELD: For a valid delegation of power, it isessential that the law delegating the power mustbe (1) complete in itself, that is it must set forth the




policy to be executed by the delegate and (2) itmust fix a standard — limits of which aresufficiently determinate or determinable — to whichthe delegate must conform. The standard, as theCourt has already stated, may even be implied. Inthat light, there can be no ground upon which tosustain the petition, inasmuch as the challengedlaw sets forth a determinable standard whichguides the exercise of the power granted to theERB. By the same token, the proper exercise ofthe delegated power may be tested with ease. Itseems obvious that what the law intended was topermit the additional imposts for as long as thereexists a need to protect the general public and thepetroleum industry from the adverseconsequences of pump rate fluctuations. "Wherethe standards set up for the guidance of anadministrative officer and the action taken are infact recorded in the orders of such officer, so thatCongress, the courts and the public are assuredthat the orders in the judgment of such officerconform to the legislative standard, there is nofailure in the performance of the legislativefunctions."

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADINGCORPORATION V. ANGELES

GR No. 108461. October 21, 1996

FACTS: The controversy springs from theissuance by the PITC of Administrative Order No.SOCPEC 89-08-01,[1] under which, applications tothe PITC for importation from the People’sRepublic of China (PROC. for brevity) must beaccompanied by a viable and confirmed ExportProgram of Philippine Products to PROC carriedout by the importer himself or through a tie-up witha legitimate importer in an amount equivalent tothe value of the importation from PROC beingapplied for, or, simply, at one is to one ratio. Toensure that the export commitments of theIMPORTER are carried out in accordance withthese rules, all IMPORTERS concerned arerequired to submit an EXPORT PERFORMANCEGUARANTEE (the “Guarantee”) at the time of filingof the Import Application. The guarantee shall bemade in favor of PITC and will be automaticallyforfeited in favor of PITC, fully or partially, if therequired export program is not completed by theimporter within six (6) months from date ofapproval of the Import Application. Should theIMPORTER or any of his duly authorizedrepresentatives make any false statements orfraudulent misrepresentations in the Import/ExportApplication, or falsify, forge or simulate anydocument required under these rules and

regulations, PITC is authorized to reject all pendingand future import/export applications of saidIMPORTER and/or disqualify said IMPORTERand/or disqualify said IMPORTER from doing anybusiness with SOCPEC through PITC.”

Desiring to make importations from PROC,private respondents Remington and Firestone,both domestic corporations, organized and existingunder Philippines laws, individually applied forauthority to import from PROC with the petitioner.They were granted such authority after satisfyingthe requirements for importers, and after theyexecuted respective undertakings to balance theirimportations from PROC with corresponding exportof Philippine products to PROC.

Subsequently, for failing to comply withtheir undertakings to submit export creditsequivalent to the value of their importations, furtherimport applications were withheld by petitionerPITC from private respondents, such that the latterboth barred from importing goods from PROC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the PITC is empowered toissue the Administrative Order?

HELD: The PITC was legally empowered to issueAdministrative Orders, as a valid exercise of apower ancillary to legislation. This does not implyhowever, that the subject Administrative Order is avalid exercise of such quasi-legislative power. Theoriginal Administrative Order issued on August 30,1989, under which the respondents filed theirapplications for importations, was not published inthe Official Gazette or in a newspaper of generalcirculation. The questioned Administrative Order,legally, until it is published, is invalid within thecontext of Article 2 of Civil Code. TheAdministrative Order under consideration is one ofthose issuances which should be published for itseffectivity, since its purpose is to enforce andimplement an existing law pursuant to a validdelegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in relation to LOI 444and EO 133.

LEO ECHEGARAY v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICEGR. No. 132601. October 12, 1998

FACTS: On June 25, 1996, this Court affirmed theconviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo forthe crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of hiscommon-law spouse and the imposition upon himof the death penalty for the said crime.




Petitioner filed a Motion forReconsideration raising mainly factual issues, andon its heels, a Supplemental Motion forReconsideration raising for the first time the issueof the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659(thedeath penalty law) and the imposition of the deathpenalty for the crime of rape. On February 7, 1998,this Court denied petitioner's Motion forReconsideration and Supplemental Motion forReconsideration.

In the meantime, Congress had seen it fitto change the mode of execution of the deathpenalty from electrocution to lethal injection andpassed Republic Act No. 8177. Pursuant to theprovisions of said law, the Secretary of Justicepromulgated the Rules and Regulations toImplement Republic Act No. 8177and directed theDirector of the Bureau of Corrections to preparethe Lethal Injection Manual.

On March 2, 1998, petitioner filed aPetition for Prohibition, Injunction and/orTemporary Restraining Order to enjoinrespondents Secretary of Justice and Director ofthe Bureau of Prisons from carrying out theexecution by lethal injection of petitioner underR.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules as theseare unconstitutional and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Secretaryunlawfully delegated the legislative powersdelegated to him under Republic Act No. 8177 torespondent Director?

HELD: The court held that there is no unduedelegation of Legislative power in R.A. No. 8177 tothe Sec of Justice and the Director of Bureau ofCorrections, but section 19 of the Rules andRegulations to implement RA No. 8177 is invalid.Empowering the Secretary of Justice in conjunctionwith the Secretary of Health and the Director of theBureau of Corrections, to promulgate rules andregulations on the subject of lethal injection is aform of delegation of legislative authority toadministrative bodies. the Court finds that theexistence of an area for exercise of discretion bythe Secretary of Justice and the Director of theBureau of Corrections under delegated legislativepower is proper where standards are formulatedfor the guidance and the exercise of limiteddiscretion, which though general, are capable ofreasonable application.

The Courts finds in the first paragraph ofSection 19 of the implementing rules a veritable

vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has practicallyabdicated the power to promulgate the manual onthe execution procedure to the Director of theBureau of Corrections, by not providing for a modeof review and approval thereof. Being a mereconstituent unit of the Department of Justice, theBureau of Corrections could not promulgate amanual that would not bear the imprimatur of theadministrative superior, the Secretary of Justice asthe rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177.Such apparent abdication of departmentalresponsibility renders the said paragraph invalid.

CHAVEZ v. ROMULOGR No. 157036. June 9,2004

FACTS: In January 2003, President GloriaMacapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech before themembers of the PNP stressing the need for anationwide gun ban in all public places to avert therising crime incidents. She directed the then PNPChief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend theissuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside ofResidence (PTCFOR). Acting on PresidentArroyo’s directive, respondent Ebdane issued theassailed Guidelines.

Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensedgun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued,requested the Department of Interior and LocalGovernment (DILG) to reconsider theimplementation of the assailed Guidelines in theImplementation of the Ban on the Carrying ofFirearms Outside of Residence. However, hisrequest was denied. Thus, he filed the presentpetition impleading public respondents Ebdane, asChief of PNP; Alberto G. Romulo, as ExecutiveSecretary; and Gerry L. Barias, as Chief of thePNP-Firearms and Explosives Division.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Ebdane isauthorized to issue the assailed Guidelines.

HELD: By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975, thePhilippine National Police (PNP) absorbed thePhilippine Constabulary (PC). Consequently, thePNP Chief succeeded the Chief of theConstabulary and, therefore, assumed the latter’slicensing authority. Section 24 thereof specifies,as one of PNP’s powers, the issuance of licensesfor the possession of firearms and explosives inaccordance with law. This is in conjunction with thePNP Chief’s “power to issue detailed implementingpolicies and instructions” on such “matters as may




be necessary to effectively carry out the functions,powers and duties” of the PNP.

R.A. No. 8294 does not divest the Chief ofthe Constabulary (now the PNP Chief) of hisauthority to promulgate rules and regulations forthe effective implementation of P.D. No. 1866.For one, R.A. No. 8294 did not repeal entirely P.D.No. 1866. It merely provides for the reduction ofpenalties for illegal possession of firearms. Thus,the provision of P.D. No. 1866 granting to the Chiefof the Constabulary the authority to issue rules andregulations regarding firearms remains effective.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DACUYCUYGR. No. L-45127. May 5, 1989

FACTS: On April 4, 1975, herein privaterespondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A.Caval and Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school officialsof Leyte, were charged before the Municipal Courtof Hindang, Leyte in Criminal Case No. 555 thereoffor violation of Republic Act No. 4670. The casewas set for arraignment and trial on May 29, 1975.At the arraignment, the herein private respondents,as the accused therein, pleaded not guilty to thecharge. Immediately thereafter, they orally movedto quash the complaint for lack of jurisdiction overthe offense allegedly due to the correctional natureof the penalty of imprisonment prescribed for theoffense. The motion to quash was subsequentlyreduced to writing on June 13, 1975. On August21, 1975, the municipal court denied the motion toquash for lack of merit. On September 2, 1975,private respondents filed a motion for thereconsideration of the aforesaid denial order on thesame ground of lack of jurisdiction, but with thefurther allegation that the facts charged do notconstitute an offense considering that Section 32of Republic Act No. 4670 is null and void for beingunconstitutional. In an undated order received bythe counsel for private respondents on October 20,1975, the motion for reconsideration was denied.

On March 15, 1976, the petitioner hereinfiled an opposition to the admission of the saidamended petitions 9 but respondent judge deniedthe same in his resolution of April 20, 1976. OnAugust 2, 1976, herein petitioner filed asupplementary memorandum in answer to theamended petition. On September 8, 1976,respondent judge rendered the aforecitedchallenged decision holding in substance thatRepublic Act No. 4670 is valid and constitutionalbut cases for its violation fall outside of thejurisdiction of municipal and city courts, andremanding the case to the former Municipal Court

of Hindang, Leyte only for preliminary investigation.As earlier stated, on September 25, 1976,petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic Act No. 4670should be invalidated as an "undue delegation oflegislative power.

HELD: The respondent judge erroneouslyassumed that since the penalty of imprisonmenthas been provided for by the legislature, the courtis endowed with the discretion to ascertain theterm or period of imprisonment. We cannot agreewith this postulate. It is not for the courts to fix theterm of imprisonment where no points of referencehave been provided by the legislature. What validdelegation presupposes and sanctions is anexercise of discretion to fix the length of service ofa term of imprisonment which must beencompassed within specific or designated limitsprovided by law, the absence of which designatedlimits well constitute such exercise as an unduedelegation, if not-an outright intrusion into orassumption, of legislative power.

THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

GONZALES v. COMELEC

GR. No. L-28196. November 9, 1967

FACTS: On March 16, 1967, the Senate and theHouse of Representatives passed the1.) R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1,proposing that Section 5, Article VI, ofthe Constitution of the Philippines, be amended soas to increase the membership of the House ofRepresentatives from a maximum of 120, asprovided in the present Constitution, to a maximumof 180, to be apportioned among the severalprovinces as nearly as may be according to thenumber of their respective inhabitants, althougheach province shall have, at least, one member; 2.)R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to proposeamendments to said Constitution, the conventionto be composed of two elective delegates fromeach representative district, to be "elected in thegeneral elections to be held on the secondTuesday of November, 1971;" 3.) R. B. H. No. 3,proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the sameConstitution, be amended so as to authorizeSenators and members of the House ofRepresentatives to become delegates to the




aforementioned constitutional convention, withoutforfeiting their respective seats in the Congress.

Subsequently, Congress passed a bill,which, upon approval by the President, on June17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913,providing that the amendments to the Constitutionproposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, atthe general elections which shall be held onNovember 14, 1967.

ISSUE: Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress,acting as a constituent assembly, violates theConstitution.

HELD: Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8)votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 andR. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid,the petitions in these two cases must be, as theyare hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayedfor denied, without special pronouncement as tocosts. It is so ordered.

As a consequence, the title of a de factoofficer cannot be assailed collaterally. It may not becontested except directly, by quo warrantoproceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts bequestioned upon the ground that he is merely a defacto officer. And the reasons are obvious: (1) itwould be an indirect inquiry into the title to theoffice; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if withinthe competence of his office, are valid, insofar asthe public is concerned.

Article XV of the Constitution provides that“the Congress in joint sessionassembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all theMembers of the Senate and of the House ofRepresentatives voting separately, may proposeamendments to this Constitution or call acontention for that purpose. Such amendmentsshall be valid as part of this Constitution whenapproved by a majority of the votes cast at anelection at which the amendments are submitted tothe people for their ratification. From our viewpoint,the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution aresatisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. B.H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seatsas legislators, even if they should run for andassume the functions of delegates to theConvention.

JOSE MARI EULALIO C. LOZADA v. COMELEC

GR. No. L-59068. January 27, 1983

FACTS: Lozada together with Igot filed a petitionfor mandamus compelling the COMELEC to holdan election to fill the vacancies in the InterimBatasang Pambansa. They anchor their contentionon Section 5 (2), Article 8 of the 1973 Constitutionwhich provides that “in case a vacancy arises inthe Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or morebefore a regular election, the Commission onElection shall call a special election to be heldwithin sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs toelect the member to serve the unexpired term.”COMELEC opposes the petition alleging,substantially, that 1) petitioners lack of standing tofile the Instant petition alleging for they are not theproper parties to institute the action; 2) this Courthas no jurisdiction to entertain this petition; and 3)Section 5 (2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitutiondoes not apply to the Interim BatansangPambansa.ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court cancompel COMELEC to hold a special election to fillvacancies in the legislatures.HELD: The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over theCOMELEC is only to review by certiorari thelatter’s decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearlyprovided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the newConstitution which provides that “any decision,order or ruling of the Commission may be broughtto the Supreme Court on certiorari by theaggrieved party within thirty days from his receiptof a copy thereof.”

It is obvious that the holding of specialelections in several districts where vacancies exist,would entail huge expenditure of money. Only theBatasang Pambansa can make the necessaryappropriation for the purpose, and this power of BPmay neither be subject to mandamus by the courtsmuch less may COMELEC compel the BP toexercise its power of appropriation. The power ofappropriation is the only sole and exclusiveprerogative of the legislative body, the exdercise ofwhich may not be compelled througha petition formandamus. What is more, the provision of Section5 (2), Article VIII of the Constitution was intendedto apply to vacancies in the regular NationalAssembly, now BP, not to the IBP.




PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JALOSJOSGR. No. 132875-76. February 3, 2000

FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos,is a full-fledged member of Congress who isconfined at the national penitentiary while hisconviction for statutory rape and acts oflasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowedto fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,includingattendance at legislative sessions andcommittee meetings despite his having beenconvicted in the first instance of a non-bailableoffense on the basis of popular sovereignty andthe need for his constituents to be represented.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant shouldbe allowed to discharge mandate as memberof the House of Representatives.

HELLD: Election is the expression of the sovereignpower of the people. However, inspite of itsimportance, the privileges and rights arising fromhaving been elected may be enlarged or restrictedby law.

The immunity from arrest or detention ofSenators and members of the House ofRepresentatives arises from a provision of theConstitution. The privilege has always beengranted in a restrictive sense. The provisiongranting an exemption as a special privilegecannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaningof its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given anyreason why he should be exempted from theoperation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution.The members of Congress cannot compel absentmembers to attend sessions if the reason for theabsence is a legitimate one. The confinement of aCongressman charged with a crime punishable byimprisonment of more than six years is not merelyauthorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.To allow accused-appellant to attendcongressional sessions and committee meetingsfor 5 days or more in a week will virtually make hima free man with all the privileges appurtenant to hisposition. Such an aberrant situation not onlyelevates accused-appellant’s status to that of aspecial class, it also would be a mockery of thepurposes of the correction system.

NICANOR T. JIMENEZ v. BARTOLOMECABANGBANG

GR. No. L-15905. August 3, 1966

FACTS: Cabangbang was a member of the Houseof Representatives and Chairman of its Committeeon National Defense. On 14 Nov 1958,Cabangbang caused the publication of an openletter addressed to the Philippines. Said letteralleged that there have been allegedly threeoperational plans under serious study by someambitious AFP officers, with the aid of somecivilian political strategists. That such strategistshave had collusions with communists and that theSecretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planninga coup d’état to place him as the president. The“planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, amongothers, under their guise and that Jimenez et almay or may not be aware that they are being usedas a tool to meet such an end. The letter was saidto have been published in newspapers of generalcirculation. Jimenez then filed a case againstCabangbang to collect a sum of damages againstCabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’sstatement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned forthe case to be dismissed because he said that asa member of the HOR he is immune from suit andthat he is covered by the privileged communicationrule and that the said letter is not even libelous.

ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is coveredby privilege communication endowed to membersof Congress.

HELD: Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitutionprovides “The Senators and Members of theHouse of Representatives shall in all cases excepttreason, felony, and breach of the peace. Beprivileged from arrest during their attendance at thesessions of the Congress, and in going to andreturning from the same; and for any speech ordebate therein, they shall not be questioned in anyother place.” The publication of the said letter is notcovered by said expression which refers toutterances made by Congressmen in theperformance of their official functions, such asspeeches delivered, statements made, or votescast in the halls of Congress, while the same is insession as well as bills introduced in Congress,whether the same is in session or not, and otheracts performed by Congressmen, either inCongress or outside the premises housing itsoffices, in the official discharge of their duties asmembers of Congress and of CongressionalCommittees duly authorized to perform its




functions as such at the time of the performance ofthe acts in question. Congress was not in sessionwhen the letter was published and at the sametime he, himself, caused the publication of the saidletter. It is obvious that, in thus causing thecommunication to be so published, he was notperforming his official duty, either as a member ofCongress or as officer of any Committee thereof.Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lowercourt the said communication is not absolutelyprivileged.

The SC is satisfied that the letter inquestion is not sufficient to support Jimenez’ actionfor damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffsare under the control of the persons unnamedtherein alluded to as “planners”, and that, havingbeen handpicked by Vargas, it should be notedthat defendant, likewise, added that “it is of coursepossible” that plaintiffs “are unwitting tools of theplan of which they may have absolutely noknowledge”. In other words, the very documentupon which plaintiffs’ action is based explicitlyindicates that they might be absolutely unaware ofthe alleged operational plans, and that they maybe merely unwitting tools of the planners. The SCdoes not think that this statement is derogatory toJimenez to the point of entitling them to recoverdamages, considering that they are officers of ourArmed Forces, that as such they are by law, underthe control of the Secretary of National Defenseand the Chief of Staff, and that the letter inquestion seems to suggest that the group thereindescribed as “planners” include these two (2) highranking officers. Petition is dismissed.

TOLENTINO, et al. v. SECRETARY OF FINANCE

GR. No. 115455. October 30, 1995FACTS: These are motions seekingreconsideration of our decision dismissing thepetitions filed in these cases for the declaration ofunconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwiseknown as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law.

Petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc.,Philippine Airlines (PAL), Roco, and Chamber ofReal Estate and Builders Association (CREBA))reiterate previous claims made by them that R.A.No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in theHouse of Representatives as required by Art. VI,Sec. 24 of the Constitution. Although they admitthat H. No. 11197 was filed in the House ofRepresentatives where it passed three readingsand that afterward it was sent to the Senate whereafter first reading it was referred to the SenateWays and Means Committee, they complain that

the Senate did not pass it on second and thirdreadings. Instead what the Senate did was to passits own version (S. No. 1630) which it approved onMay 24, 1994. Petitioner Tolentino adds that whatthe Senate committee should have done was toamend H. No. 11197 by striking out the text of thebill and substituting it with the text of S. No. 1630.That way, it is said, "the bill remains a House billand the Senate version just becomes the text (onlythe text) of the House bill.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 7716 isunconstitutional.HELD: The court concluded that the law suffersfrom none of the infirmities attributed to it bypetitioners and that its enactment by the otherbranches of the government does not constitute agrave abuse of discretion. Any question as to itsnecessity, desirability or expediency must beaddressed to Congress as the body which iselectorally responsible, remembering that, asJustice Holmes has said, "legislators are theultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare ofthe people in quite as great a degree as are thecourts." It is not right, as petitioner in G.R. No.115543 does in arguing that we should enforce thepublic accountability of legislators, that those whotook part in passing the law in question by votingfor it in Congress should later thrust to the courtsthe burden of reviewing measures in the flush ofenactment. This Court does not sit as a thirdbranch of the legislature, much less exercise aveto power over legislation.WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration aredenied with finality and the temporary restrainingorder previously issued is hereby lifted.

ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS

FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS et al. vs. THESENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (SET)

GR. No. 83767. October 27, 1988

FACTS: On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filedbefore the respondent Tribunal an election contestdocketed as SET Case No. 002-87 against 22candidates of the LABAN coalition who wereproclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987congressional elections by the Commission onElections. The respondent Tribunal was at the timecomposed of three (3) Justices of the SupremeCourt and six (6) Senators, namely: SeniorAssociate Justice Pedro L. Yap (Chairman).




Associate Justices Andres R. Narvasa and HugoE. Gutierrez, Jr., and Senators Joseph E. Estrada,Neptali A. Gonzales, Teofisto T. Guingona, JoseLina, Jr., Mamintal A.J. Tamano and Victor S. Ziga.

On November 17, 1987, the petitioners,with the exception of Senator Estrada but includingSenator Juan Ponce Enrile (who had beendesignated Member of the Tribunal replacingSenator Estrada, the latter having affiliated with theLiberal Party and resigned as the Opposition'srepresentative in the Tribunal) filed with therespondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification orInhibition of the Senators-Members thereof fromthe hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them are interestedparties to said case, as respondents therein.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SET can functionwithout Senator Members.

HELD: The proposed amendment to theTribunal's Rules (Section 24)—requiring theconcurrence of five (5) members for the adoptionof resolutions of whatever nature is a proviso thatwhere more than four (4) members aredisqualified, the remaining members shallconstitute a quorum, if not less than three (3)including one (1) Justice, and may adoptresolutions by majority vote with no abstentions.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petitionfor certiorari for lack of merit and affirmed thedecision of the Tribunal to not let Senator-Members to inhibit or disqualify himself, rather, justlet them refrain from participating in the resolutionof a case where he sincerely feels that his personalinterests or biases would stand in the way of anobjective and impartial judgment.

SIXTO BRILLANTES, et al. v. COMELEC

GR. No. 163193. June 15, 2004

FACTS: On December 22, 1997, Congressenacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing theCOMELEC to use an automated election system(AES) for the process of voting, counting of votesand canvassing/consolidating the results of thenational and local elections. It also mandated theCOMELEC to acquire automated countingmachines (ACMs), computer equipment, devicesand materials; and to adopt new electoral formsand printing materials.

On October 29, 2002, the COMELECadopted, in its Resolution No. 02-0170, amodernization program for the 2004 electionsconsisting of three (3) phases, to wit: (1) PHASE I– Computerized system of registration and votersvalidation or the so-called "biometrics" system ofregistration; (2) PHASE II – Computerized votingand counting of votes; and (3) PHASE III –Electronic transmission of results.

COMELEC subsequently approvedResolution 6712 adopting the policy that theprecinct election results of each city andmunicipality shall be immediately transmittedelectronically in advance to the COMELEC inManila.Petitioners in this case questioned, among others,the Constitutionality of the quick count as beingpre-emptive of the authority vested in Congress tocanvass the votes for the President and Vice-President under Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987Constitution.

ISSUE: Can the COMELEC conduct “unofficial”tabulation of presidential election results based ona copy of the election returns?

HELD: No. The assailed resolution usurps, underthe guise of an "unofficial" tabulation of electionresults based on a copy of the election returns, thesole and exclusive authority of Congress tocanvass the votes for the election of President andVice-President as provided by Article VII, Section 4of the Constitution.

COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

DAZA v. SINGSONGR. No. 86344. December 21, 1989

FACTS: Raul A. Daza was removed as therepresentative of the Liberal Party in the House ofRepresentatives after the reorganization of theLaban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). Hetherefore challenged hid removal from theCommission of Appointments and the assumptionof his seat in the Commission of Appointments byLuis C. Singson.

According to Daza, he cannot be removedbecause his election is permanent and thatreorganization of the House representation in thesaid body is not based on a permanent politicalrealignment because LDP is not a registered




political party and has not yet attained politicalstability.

For his part, Singson argued that thequestion raised is political in nature and so,beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. He alsomaintains that he is improperly impleaded fort realparty is the House of Representatives and that apolitical party is not required to be registered to beentitled to proportional representation.

ISSUE: Is the question raised in this case politicalor justiciable?

HELD: The issue raised in this case is justiciablerather political, involving as it does the legality andnot the wisdom of the act complained of, or themanner of filling the Commission on Appointmentsas prescribed by the Constitution. Even if thequestion were political in nature, it would still comewithin the court’s powers of review under theexpanded jurisdiction conferred upon it by ArticleVIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includesthe authority to determine whether grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to excess or lack ofjurisdiction has been committed by any branch orinstrumentality of the government. The courtresolved that issue in favor of the authority of theHouse of Representatives to change itsrepresentation in the Commission on Appointmentsto reflect at any time the changes that maytranspire in the political alignments of itsmembership. It is understood that such changesmust be permanent and do not include thetemporary alliances or factional divisions notinvolving severance of political loyalties or formaldisaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiancefrom one political party to another. Wherefore, LuisSingson has been validly elected as a member ofthe Commission on Appointments.

GUEVARA v. INOCENTESGR. No. L – 25577. March 15, 1966

FACTS: Onofre P. Guevara’s ad interimappointment as Undersecretary of Labor wasdeclared to be invalid on the ground that suchappointment lapsed when the Congress adjournedits last special session called under ProclamationNo. 2 of President Marcos. With this, Guevara fileda petition for quo warranto seeking to be declaredthe person legally entitled to said office of theUndersecretary of Labor.

ISSUE: Is the ad interim appointment of Guevaravalid?

HELD: After due deliberation, the Court resolvedthat the ad interim appointment extended toGuevara on November 18, 1965 by the formerExecutive lapsed when the special session ofCongress adjourned sine die at about midnight ofJanuary 22, 1966, as embodied in the resolutiondated February 16, 1966. As expressly provided inArticle VII, Section 10 of the Constitution, “ThePresident shall have the power to makeappointments during the recess of the Congress,but such appointments shall be effective only untildisapproval by the Commission on Appointmentsor until the next adjournment of the Congress.”.This provision contemplates two modes oftermination of an ad interim appointment: onemade during the recess of Congress and the otherduring the special session called underProclamation No. 2. The second mode oftermination had its constitutional effect as whenCongress adjourned sine die at about midnight ofJanuary 22. 1966. Such adjournment, in legalcontemplation, had the effect of terminatingpetitioner's appointment thereby rendering it legallyineffective.

FRANKLIN DRILON v. JOSE DE VENECIAGR. No. 180055. January 31, 2009

FACTS: Tanada requested from the House ofRepresentatives leadership in one seat in the CAfor the Liberal Party. He also requested theSecretary General of the House of Representativesthe reconstruction of the House contingent in theCA to include one seat for the Liberal Party. Healso brought the matter to the attention of DeVenecia, reiterating the position that since therewere at least 20 members of the Liberal Party inthe 14th Congress, the party should be representedin the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the House ofRepresentatives respondents have committedgrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack ofjurisdiction in constituting the CA in contraventionof the required proportional constitution ofdepriving the liberal party of its constitutionalentitlement to one seat therein.

HELD: Furnishing a copy of petitioner’s letter tothe Senate President and to the Speaker of theHouse of Representatives does not constitute theprimary recourse required prior to the invocation ofthe jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. It is themembers who claim to have been deprived of a




seat in the Commission on Appointments that mustfirst show to the House that they possess therequired numerical strength to be entitled to seatsin the Commission on Appointments.

ARROYO v. DE VENECIAGR. No. 127255. August 14, 1997

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and/orprohibition challenging the validity of Republic ActNo. 8240, which amends certain provisions of theNational Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called “sin taxes” on the manufacture and sale ofbeer and cigarettes. The petitioners are membersof the House of Representatives. They brought thesuit against the respondents charging violation ofthe rules of the House which petitioners claim are“constitutionally mandated” so that their violation istantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Did Congress act with grave abuse ofdiscretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240?

HELD: After considering the arguments of theparties, the Court finds no ground for holding thatCongress committed a grave abuse of discretion inenacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is thereforedismissed. The matter complained of concerns amatter of internal rules of the procedure of theHouse rather than the constitutional requirementsfor the enactment of law. Further, in the absence ofanything to the contrary, the Court must assumethat Congress or any House thereof acted in thegood faith belief that its conduct was permitted byits rules, and deference rather than disrespect isdue the judgment of that body.

PACETE v. SEC OF THE COMMISSION ONAPPOINMENTS

GR. No. L – 25895. July 23, 1971

FACTS: On April 4, 1966, Felizardo S. Pacete fileda petition for mandamus alleging that he wasappointed as a Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan,Cotabato on August 31, 1964. He assumed officeon September 11, 1964 and discharged his dutiesas such. As his appointment was made during therecess of Congress, it was submitted to theCommission on Appointments at its next session in1965. On May 20 of that year, he was unanimouslyconfirmed. As a matter of fact, two days later, hewas sent a congratulatory telegram by the then

Senate President Ferdinand E. Marcos, who waslikewise the Chairman of the Commission onAppointments. More than nine months after suchconfirmation, the then Secretary of Justice, advisedpetitioner to vacate his position as municipal judge,the ground being that his appointment had notbeen duly confirmed. Pacete was informed that onMay 21, 1965, a day after his confirmation, one ofthe members of the Commission on Appointments,the then Senator Rodolfo Guanzon, wrote to itsChairman stating that he was filing a motion for thereconsideration of the confirmation of theappointment of petitioner as municipal judge ofPigcawayan, Cotabato, in view of derogatoryinformation which he had received.

ISSUE: Is the filing of the motion forreconsideration a bar to the confirmation of thepetitioner’s appointment as a Municipal Judge?

HELD: No. The mere filing of a motion forreconsideration did not have the effect of settingaside a confirmation. A confirmation duly made isnot nullified simply by a motion for reconsiderationbeing filed, without its being voted upon andapproved. The constitutional requirement is clear.There must either be a rejection by theCommission on Appointments or nonaction on itspart. No such thing happened in this case. Hence,the petitioner in this case must prevail.

RUFINO R. TAN, v. RAMON R. DEL ROSARIO,JR.

GR. No. 109289. October 3, 1994

FACTS: This special civil action for prohibitionchallenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No.7496, also commonly known as the Simplified NetIncome Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), amendingcertain provisions of the National Internal RevenueCode.

Petitioners asserted that the enactment ofRepublic Act No. 7496 violates the Article VI,Section 26(1) of the Constitution which states that“Every bill passed by the Congress shall embraceonly one subject which shall be expressed in thetitle thereof.”

The Solicitor General espouses theposition taken by public respondents.

ISSUE: Is RA 7496 constitutional?




HELD: Yes. Petitioner contends that the title ofHouse Bill No. 34314, progenitor of Republic ActNo. 7496, is a misnomer or, at least, deficient forbeing merely entitled, "Simplified Net IncomeTaxation Scheme for the Self-Employed andProfessionals Engaged in the Practice of theirProfession"

The full text of the title actually reads:An Act Adopting the Simplified Net IncomeTaxation Scheme For The Self-Employed andProfessionals Engaged In The Practice of TheirProfession, Amending Sections 21 and 29 of theNational Internal Revenue Code, as Amended.

Article VI, Section 26(1), of theConstitution has been envisioned so as (a) toprevent log-rolling legislation intended to unite themembers of the legislature who favor any one ofunrelated subjects in support of the whole act, (b)to avoid surprises or even fraud upon thelegislature, and (c) to fairly apprise the people,through such publications of its proceedings as areusually made, of the subjects of legislation. Theabove objectives of the fundamental law appear tous to have been sufficiently met. Anything elsewould be to require a virtual compendium of thelaw which could not have been the intendment ofthe constitutional mandate.

Having arrived at this conclusion, the pleaof petitioner to have the law declaredunconstitutional for being violative of due processmust perforce fail. The due process clause maycorrectly be invoked only when there is a clearcontravention of inherent or constitutionallimitations in the exercise of the tax power. Nosuch transgression is so evident to us.

JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., et al. v. THE SENATEBLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE

GR. No. 89914. November 20, 1991

FACTS: The complaint insofar as pertinent toherein petitioners, as defendants, alleges thatdefendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez andJuliette Gomez Romualdez, acting by themselvesand/or in unlawful concert with defendantsFerdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, andtaking undue advantage of their relationship,influence and connection with the latter Defendantspouses, engaged in devices, schemes andstratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at theexpense of Plaintiff and the Filipino people.

On 28 September 1988, petitioner (asdefendants) filed their respective answers. On 13September 1988, Sen. Juan Ponce Enriledelivered a speech before the Senate on thealleged take-over of SolOil Incorporated by RicardoLopa (who died during the pendency of this case)and called upon the senate to look into possibleviolation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Actor RA 3019. The Senate Committee onAccountability of Public Officers or Blue RibbonCommittee (SBRC) started its investigation througha hearing on 23 May 1989, but Lopa and Bengzondeclined to testify. The SBRC rejected petitionerBengzon’s plea and voted to pursue itsinvestigation. Petitioner claims that the SBRC, inrequiring their attendance and testimony, acted inexcess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose.Hence this petition.ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate Blue RibbonCommittee's inquiry has no valid legislativepurpose.HELD: The 1987 Constitution expresslyrecognizes the power of both houses of Congressto conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus,Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:

The Senate or the House ofRepresentatives or any of its respective committeemay conduct inquiries in aid of legislation inaccordance with its duly published rules ofprocedure. The rights of persons appearing in oraffected by such inquiries shall be respected.

Verily, the speech of Senator Enrilecontained no suggestion of contemplatedlegislation; he merely called upon the Senate tolook into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No.3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft andCorrupt Practices Act." In other words, the purposeof the inquiry to be conducted by respondent BlueRibbon Committee was to find out whether or notthe relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr.Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connectionwith the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporationsbelonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to theLopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, nointended legislation involved.

FRANCISCO GUDANI v. GENEROSO S. SENGAGR. No. 170165. August. 15, 2006

FACTS: On Sept. 22, 2005, Sen. Biazon invitedseveral senior officers of the AFP, including Gen.Gudani, to appear at a public hearing before theSenate Committee on National Defenseand Security concerning the conduct of the 2004




elections wherein allegations of massive cheatingand the “Hello Garci” tapes emerged. AFP Chief ofStaff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum,prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan andcompany from appearing before the SenateCommittee without Presidential approval.Nevertheless, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutantestified before said Committee, prompting Gen.Senga to order them subjected to General CourtMartial proceedings for willfully violating an order ofa superior officer. In the meantime, PresidentArroyo issued EO 464, which was subsequentlydeclared unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President canprevent military officers from testifying at alegislative inquiry.

HELD: We hold that the President hasconstitutional authority to do so, by virtue of herpower as commander-in-chief, and that as aconsequence a military officer who defies suchinjunction is liable under military justice. At thesame time, we also hold that any chamber ofCongress which seeks the appearance before it ofa military officer against the consent of thePresident has adequate remedies under law tocompel such attendance. Any military official whomCongress summons to testify before it may becompelled to do so by the President. If thePresident is not so inclined, the President may becommanded by judicial order to compel theattendance of the military officer. Final judicialorders have the force of the law of the land whichthe President has the duty to faithfully execute.

As earlier noted, it was ruled in Senate thatthe President may not issue a blanket requirementof prior consent on executive officials summonedby the legislature to attend a congressionalhearing. In doing so, the Court recognized theconsiderable limitations on executive privilege, andaffirmed that the privilege must be formally invokedon specified grounds. However, the ability of thePresident to prevent military officers from testifyingbefore Congress does not turn on executiveprivilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power ascommander-in-chief to control the actions andspeech of members of the armed forces. ThePresident’s prerogatives as commander-in-chiefare not hampered by the same limitations as inexecutive privilege.

The President could, as a general rule,require military officers to seek presidentialapproval before appearing before Congress is

based foremost on the notion that a contrary ruleunduly diminishes the prerogatives of the Presidentas commander-in-chief. Congress holds significantcontrol over the armed forces in matters such asbudget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that theConstitution vests the title as commander-in-chiefand all the prerogatives and functions appertainingto the position. Again, the exigencies of militarydiscipline and the chain of command mandate thatthe President’s ability to control the individualmembers of the armed forces be accorded theutmost respect. Where a military officer is tornbetween obeying the President and obeying theSenate, the Court will without hesitation affirm thatthe officer has to choose the President. After all,the Constitution prescribes that it is the President,and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chiefof the armed forces.

GONZALES v. NARVASAGR No. 140835. August 14, 2000

FACTS: The Preparatory Commission onConstitutional Reform (PCCR) was created byPresident Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtueof Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order“to study and recommend proposed amendmentsand/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and themanner of implementing the same.”

In this petition for prohibition andmandamus filed on December 9, 1999, petitionerRamon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizenand taxpayer, assails the constitutionality of thecreation of the Preparatory Commission onConstitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positionsof presidential consultants, advisers andassistants. Petitioner asks this Court to enjoin thePCCR and the presidential consultants, advisersand assistants from acting as such, and to enjoinExecutive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora fromenforcing their advice and recommendations. Inaddition, petitioner seeks to enjoin the Commissionon Audit from passing in audit expenditures for thePCCR and the presidential consultants, advisersand assistants. Finally, petitioner prays for an ordercompelling respondent Zamora to furnish petitionerwith information on certain matters.

On January 28, 2000, respondent Hon.Andres R. Narvasa, impleaded in his capacity asChairman of the PCCR, filed his Comment to thePetition. The rest of the respondents, who arebeing represented in this case by the SolicitorGeneral, filed their Comment with this Court on




March 7, 2000. Petitioner then filed aConsolidated Reply on April 24, 2000, whereuponthis case was considered submitted for decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriations for thePCCR is valid.

HELD: The appropriations for the PCCR wereauthorized by the President, not by Congress. Infact, there was no an appropriation at all. “In astrict sense, appropriation has been defined ‘asnothing more than the legislative authorizationprescribed by the Constitution that money may bepaid out of the Treasury’, while appropriation madeby law refers to ‘the act of the legislature settingapart or assigning to a particular use a certain sumto be used in the payment of debt or dues from theState to its creditors.’ “ The funds used for thePCCR were taken from funds intended for theOffice of the President, in the exercise of the ChiefExecutive’s power to transfer funds pursuant tosection 25 (5) of article VI of the Constitution.

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION v.ENRIQUEZ

GR. No. 113105. August 19, 1994

FACTS: House Bill No. 10900, the GeneralAppropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), waspassed and approved by both houses of Congresson December 17, 1993. It imposed conditions andlimitations on certain items of appropriations in theproposed budget previously submitted by thePresident. It also authorized members of Congressto propose and identify projects in the "porkbarrels" allotted to them and to realign theirrespective operating budgets.

On December 30, 1993, the Presidentsigned the bill into law, and declared the same tohave become Republic Act No. 7663, entitled "ANACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THEOPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THEPHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TODECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEENHUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOROTHER PURPOSES" (GAA of 1994). On the sameday, the President delivered his Presidential VetoMessage, specifying the provisions of the bill hevetoed and on which he imposed certainconditions.

The Philippine Constitution Association,Exequiel B. Garcia and Ramon A. Gonzales astaxpayers, prayed for a writ of prohibition todeclare as unconstitutional and void: (a) Article XLIon the Countrywide Development Fund, the special

provision in Article I entitled Realignment ofAllocation for Operational Expenses, and ArticleXLVIII on the Appropriation for Debt Service or theamount appropriated under said Article XLVIII inexcess of the P37.9 Billion allocated for theDepartment of Education, Culture and Sports; and(b) the veto of the President of the SpecialProvision of Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.

ISSUE: Whether or not the power given to themembers of Congress to propose and identify theprojects and activities to be funded by theCountrywide Development Fund is anencroachment by the legislature on executivepower.

HELD: Under the Constitution, the spending powercalled by James Madison as "the power of thepurse," belongs to Congress, subject only to theveto power of the President. The President maypropose the budget, but still the final say on thematter of appropriations is lodged in the Congress.

The power of appropriation carries with itthe power to specify the project or activity to befunded under the appropriation law. It can be asdetailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be.The Countrywide Development Fund is explicit thatit shall be used "for infrastructure, purchase ofambulances and computers and other priorityprojects and activities and credit facilities toqualified beneficiaries . . ." It was Congress itselfthat determined the purposes for the appropriation.Executive function under the CountrywideDevelopment Fund involves implementation of thepriority projects specified in the law.

RUFINO R. TAN v. RAMON R. DEL ROSARIO,JR.

GR. No. 109289. October 3, 1994

FACTS: This special civil action for prohibitionchallenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No.7496, also commonly known as the Simplified NetIncome Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), amendingcertain provisions of the National Internal RevenueCode.

Petitioners asserted that the enactment ofRepublic Act No. 7496 violates the Article VI,Section 26(1) of the Constitution which states that“Every bill passed by the Congress shall embraceonly one subject which shall be expressed in thetitle thereof.”




The Solicitor General espouses theposition taken by public respondents.

ISSUE: Is RA 7496 constitutional?HELD: Yes. Petitioner contends that the title ofHouse Bill No. 34314, progenitor of Republic ActNo. 7496, is a misnomer or, at least, deficient forbeing merely entitled, "Simplified Net IncomeTaxation Scheme for the Self-Employed andProfessionals Engaged in the Practice of theirProfession"

The full text of the title actually reads:An Act Adopting the Simplified Net IncomeTaxation Scheme For The Self-Employed andProfessionals Engaged In The Practice of TheirProfession, Amending Sections 21 and 29 of theNational Internal Revenue Code, as Amended.

Article VI, Section 26(1), of theConstitution has been envisioned so as (a) toprevent log-rolling legislation intended to unite themembers of the legislature who favor any one ofunrelated subjects in support of the whole act, (b)to avoid surprises or even fraud upon thelegislature, and (c) to fairly apprise the people,through such publications of its proceedings as areusually made, of the subjects of legislation. Theabove objectives of the fundamental law appear tous to have been sufficiently met. Anything elsewould be to require a virtual compendium of thelaw which could not have been the intendment ofthe constitutional mandate.

Having arrived at this conclusion, the pleaof petitioner to have the law declaredunconstitutional for being violative of due processmust perforce fail. The due process clause maycorrectly be invoked only when there is a clearcontravention of inherent or constitutionallimitations in the exercise of the tax power. Nosuch transgression is so evident to us.

THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO V. RAMOS253 SCRA 559

FACTS: The Supreme Court discussed thepurpose of an election protest. The purpose of anelection protest is to ascertain whether thecandidate proclaimed elected by the board

of canvassers is really the lawful choice ofthe electorate. What is sought in an electionprotest is the correction of the canvass of thevotes, which is the basis of the proclamation of thewinning candidate. An election contest involves apublic office in which the publichas an interest. Certainly, the act of a losingcandidate of recognizing the one who is proclaimed the winner should not bar the losingcandidatefrom questioning the validity of the election of thewinner in the manner provided by law. MiriamDefensor-Santiago ran for presidency in the 1992National Elections. She lost, but filed this protestagainst the winner, Pres. FV Ramos. Subsequentlyhowever, she ran for Senator in the 1995Senatorial elections. She won and assumed officeas Senator in 1995. Considering this factual milieu,the issues revolve on whether this presentelectoral protest would still be valid, even after theprotestant has already assumed office as Senator,noting that should she win this protest, her term aspresident would coincide with her term as senator,which she is now in. Now, in 1996, the SC as PETdecides the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the present electoralprotest would still be valid, even after theprotestant has already assumed office as Senator,noting that she win this protest, her term aspresident would coincide with her terms assenator, which she is now in.

HELD: Defensor-Santiago filed her certificate ofcandidacy to run for senator without qualification orreservation. In doing so, she entered into a politicalcontract with the electorate, that, if elected, shewould assume the office as senator. This is inaccord with the constitutional doctrine that a publicoffice is a public trust. In assuming the officeof Senator, she has effectively abandoned herdetermination to pursue thispresentprotest. Such abandonment operates to render this protest moot.

The Supreme Court cannot subscribe tothe view of the Protestee that by filing hercertificate of candidacy for Senator ProtestantSantiago ipso facto forfeited her claim to the officeof President pursuant to Section 67 of B.P. Blg.881. Plainly, the said section applies exclusively toan incumbent elective official who files a certificateof candidacy for any office" other than the one heis holding in a permanent capacity." Even moreplain is that the Protestant was not the incumbentPresident at the time she filed her certificate ofcandidacy for Senator nor at any time before that.Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the




protestant to inform the PET within 10days if afterthe completion of the revision of the ballots fromher pilot areas, she still wishes to presentevidence. Since DS has not informed the Tribunalof any such intention, such is a manifest indicationthat she no longer intends to do so.

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON v. COMELECG.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004

FACTS: Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated apetition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJand to deny due course or to cancel his certificateof candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made amaterial misrepresentation in his certificate ofcandidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipinocitizen when in truth, according to Fornier, hisparents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie KelleyPoe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe,was a Spanish national, being the son of LorenzoPou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitionerasseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipinocitizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipinocitizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimatechild of an alien mother. Petitioner based theallegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent ontwo assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted aprior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez beforehis marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even ifno such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe,married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth ofrespondent.

ISSUE: Whether or Not FPJ is a natural bornFilipino citizen.

HELD: It is necessary to take on the matter ofwhether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-borncitizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or notthe father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would havehimself been a Filipino citizen and, in theaffirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacyof respondent prevents him from taking after theFilipino citizenship of his putative father. Anyconclusion on the Filipino citizenship of LorenzoPou could only be drawn from the presumption thathaving died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo wouldhave been born sometime in the year 1870, whenthe Philippines was under Spanish rule, and thatSan Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residenceupon his death in 1954, in the absence of anyother evidence, could have well been his place ofresidence before death, such that Lorenzo Pouwould have benefited from the "en masseFilipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in

1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), ifacquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F.Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJhas seen first light, confers citizenship to allpersons whose fathers are Filipino citizensregardless of whether such children are legitimateor illegitimate.

But while the totality of the evidence maynot establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is anatural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidenceon hand still would preponderate in his favorenough to hold that he cannot be held guilty ofhaving made a material misrepresentation in hiscertificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, inrelation to Section 74, of the Omnibus ElectionCode.

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v. EXECUTIVESECRETARY

GR. No. 83896. February 22, 1991FACTS: The petitioner are assailing the ExecutiveOrder No. 284 issued by the Presidentallowing cabinet members, undersecretary or asst.secretaries and other appointive officials of theexecutive department to hold 2 positions in thegovernment and government corporations and toreceive additional compensation. They find itunconstitutional against the provision provided bySection 13, Article VII prohibiting thePresident, Cabinet members and their deputies tohold any other office or employment. Section 7,par. (2), Article IX-B further states that “Unlessotherwise allowed by law or by the primaryfunctions of his position, no appointive official shallhold any other office or employment in theGovernment or any subdivision, agency orinstrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or theirsubsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmedby the Solicitor General, the said Executive Orderis valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated “unless otherwise allowed by law” which isconstrued to be an exemption from that stipulatedon Article VII, section 13, such as in the case of theVice President who is constitutionally allowed tobecome a cabinet member and the Secretary ofJustice as ex-officio member of the Judicial andBar Council.

ISSUE: Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B providesan exemption to Article VII, section 13 of theconstitution.




HELD: The court held it is not an exemption sincethe legislative intent of both Constitutionalprovisions is to prevent government officials fromholding multiple positions in the government forself-enrichment which a betrayal of public trust.Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down thegeneral rule applicable to all elective andappointive public officials and employees, whileSection 13, Article VII is meant to be the exceptionapplicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputiesand assistants. Thus the phrase “unless otherwiseprovided by the Constitution” in Section 13, ArticleVII cannot be construed as a broad exception fromSection 7 of Article IX-B that is contrary to thelegislative intent of both constitutional provisions.Such phrase is only limited to and strictly appliesonly to particular instances of allowing the VP tobecome a cabinet member and the Secretary ofJustice as ex-officio member of the Judicial andBar Council. The court thereby declared E.O 284as null and void.

CORPUZ v. COURT OF APPEALSGR. No. 123989. January 26, 1998

Facts: On 18 July 1986, CORPUZ was appointedas the MTRCB’s legal Counsel -- Prosecutor andInvestigation Services (Supervising Legal StaffOfficer). The appointment was approved by Asst.Regional Director Benita Santos of the CSC-National Capital Region. As MTRCB LegalCounsel, CORPUZ’ duties included “attendance inBoard meetings” pursuant to then ChairmanMorato’s memorandum of 11 September 1987.

Sometime in August 1991, the MTRCBpassed MTRCB Resolution No. 8-1-91 entitled “AnAct To Declare The Appointments Of TheAdministrative And Subordinate Employees OfThis Board As Null And Void.” This undatedresolution noted that the past and presentChairmen of the MTRCB had failed to submit forapproval the appointments of administrative andsubordinate employees to the MTRCB beforeforwarding them to the CSC, in violation of Section5 of P.D. No. 876-A, and later, P.D. No. 1986.

CORPUZ was unaware of thepromulgation of Resolution No. 8-1-91 as he wasthen on leave. The Resolution was likewise keptsecret and it was only on 12 March 1993 that anannouncement of its contents was posted by an AdHoc Committee on the MTRCB bulletin board.

On 14 July 1992, Henrietta S. Mendez wasappointed MTRCB Chairman. Ad Hoc Committee

composed of MTRCB members was thenconstituted to look into the appointments extendedby former Chairman Morato, as well as thequalifications of the appointees. Thereafter, theCommittee resolved to recommend to the MTRCBthe approval of the appointments, except that ofCORPUZ and seven others.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erredin ruling that the appointment of Corpus did nothave the approval of MTCRB Board which if notcorrected, is tantamount to a violation of hisconstitutional rights to security of tenure.

HELD: It is thus clear that there are two stages inthe process of appointing MTRCB personnel, otherthan its Secretary, namely: (a) recommendation bythe Chairman which is accomplished by the signingof the appointment paper, which is among hispowers under Section 5(d) above; and (b) approvalor disapproval by the MTRCB of the appointment.As to the Secretary, it is the MTRCB itself that isempowered to appoint said official pursuant toSection 16. Hence, in the case of CORPUZ, sincethe last act required for the completion of hisappointment, viz., approval by the MTRCB itself,was not obtained, as a matter of fact, the MTRCBultimately disapproved it, his appointment ceasedto have effect, if at all, and his services wereproperly terminated.

LUEGO v. CSCGR. NO. L-69137. August 5, 1986

FACTS: The petitioner was appointedAdministrative Officer 11, Office of the City Mayor,Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on February18, 1983. The appointment was described aspermanent" but the Civil Service Commissionapproved it as "temporary," subject to the finalaction taken in the protest filed by the privaterespondent and another employee, and provided"there (was) no pending administrative caseagainst the appointee, no pending protest againstthe appointment nor any decision by competentauthority that will adversely affect the approval ofthe appointment." On March 22, 1984, afterprotracted hearings the legality of which does nothave to be decided here, the Civil ServiceCommission found the private respondent betterqualified than the petitioner for the contestedposition and, accordingly, directed "that FeliculaTuozo be appointed to the position ofAdministrative Officer 11 in the AdministrativeDivision, Cebu City, in place of Felimon Luego




whose appointment as Administrative Officer II ishereby revoked."

ISSUE: Is the Civil Service Commission authorizedto disapprove a permanent appointment on theground that another person is better qualified thanthe appointee and, on the basis of this finding,order his replacement by the latter?

HELD: The stamping of the words "APPROVED asTEMPORARY" did not change the character of theappointment, which was clearly described as"Permanent" in the space provided for in CivilService Form No. 33, dated February 18, 1983.What was temporary was the approval of theappointment, not the appointment it sell And whatmade the approval temporary was the fact that itwas made to depend on the condition specifiedtherein and on the verification of the qualificationsof the appointee to the position. The Civil ServiceCommission is not empowered to determine thekind or nature of the appointment extended by theappointing officer, its authority being limited toapproving or reviewing the appointment in the lightof the requirements of the Civil Service Law. TheCivil Service Commission is limited only to the non-discretionary authority of determining whether ornot the person appointed meets all the requiredconditions laid down by the law. Significantly, theCommission on Civil Service acknowledged thatboth the petitioner and the private respondent werequalified for the position in controversy. To be sure,it had no authority to revoke the said appointmentsimply because it believed that the privaterespondent was better qualified for that would haveconstituted an encroachment on the discretionvested solely in the city mayor.

IN RE APPOINTMENT OF HON MATEOVALENZUELA

A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC. November 9, 1998

FACTS: Referred to the Court En Banc by theChief Justice are the appointments signed by HisExcellency the President under the date of March30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon.Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional TrialCourt of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24,Cabanatuan City, respectively. The appointmentswere received at the Chief Justice's chambers onMay 12, 1998. The referral was made in view ofthe serious constitutional issue concerning saidappointments arising from the pertinentantecedents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment isconstitutional.

HELD: It is the Court that is empowered under theConstitution to make an authoritative interpretationof its (provisions) or of those of any other law. OnMay 12, 1998, the Chief Justice received fromMalacañang the appointments of two (2) Judges ofthe Regional Trial Court mentioned above. Thisplaces on the Chief Justice the obligation of actingthereon; i.e., transmitting the appointments to theappointees so that they might take their oaths andassume their duties of their office. The trouble isthat in doing so, the Chief Justice runs the risk ofacting in a manner inconsistent with theConstitution, for these appointments appear primafacie, at least, to be expressly prohibited bySection 15, Article VII of the charter. Thiscircumstance, and the referral of the constitutionalquestion to the Court in virtue of the Resolution ofMay 8, 1998, supra, operate to raise a justiciableissue before the Court, an issue of sufficientimportance to warrant consideration andadjudication on the merits.

VETERANS FEDERATION OF THE PHILIPPINESv. REYES

GR. No. 155027. February 28, 2006

FACTS: Petitioner VFP was created under Rep.Act No. 2640, a statute approved on 18 June 1960.On 15 April 2002, petitioner's incumbent presidentreceived a letter dated 13 April 2002. On 10 June2002, respondent DND Secretary issued theassailed DND Department Circular No. 04 entitled,"Further Implementing the Provisions of Sections1and 2 of Republic Act No. 2640.Thereafter,petitioner's President received a letter dated 23August 2002 from respondent Undersecretary,informing him that Department Order No. 129dated 23 August 2002 directed "the conduct of aManagement Audit of the Veterans Federation ofthe Philippines." The letter went on to state thatrespondent DND Secretary "believes that themandate given by said law can be meaningfullyexercised if this department can better appreciatethe functions, responsibilities and situation on theground and this can be done by undertaking athorough study of the organization.”

Subsequently, the Secretary General of theVFP sent an undated letter to respondent DNDSecretary, with notice to respondentUndersecretary for Civil Relations andAdministration, complaining about the alleged




broadness of the scope of the management auditand requesting the suspension thereof until suchtime that specific areas of the audit shall havebeen agreed upon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed DepartmentCircular No. 04 expanded the scope of "control andsupervision" beyond what has been laid down inRep. Act No. 2640.

HELD: This Court has defined the power of controlas "the power of an officer to alter or modify ornullify or set aside what a subordinate has done inthe performance of his duties and to substitute thejudgment of the former to that of the latter." Thepower of supervision, on the other hand, means"overseeing, or the power or authority of an officerto see that subordinate officers perform theirduties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, theformer may take such action or step as prescribedby law to make them perform their duties." Thesedefinitions are synonymous with the definitions inthe assailed Department Circular No. 04, while theother provisions of the assailed department circularare mere consequences of control and supervisionas defined.

Department Circular No. 04 is an internalregulation. They are meant to regulate a publiccorporation under the control of DND, and not thepublic in general.

As to petitioner's allegation that VFP wasintended as a self-governing autonomous bodywith a Supreme Council as governing authority, wefind that the provisions of Rep. Act No. 2640concerning the control and supervision of theSecretary of National Defense clearly withholdsfrom the VFP complete autonomy. To say,however, that such provisions render the VFPinutile is an exaggeration. An office is not renderedinutile by the fact that it is placed under the controlof a higher office. These subordinate offices, suchas the executive offices under the control of thePresident, exercise discretion at the first instance.While their acts can be altered or even set aside bythe superior, these acts are effective and aredeemed the acts of the superior until they aremodified. Surely, we cannot say that the offices ofall the Department Secretaries are worthlesspositions.

ARMITA RUFINO v. BALTAZAR N. ENDRIGAGR. No. 139554. July 21, 2006

FACTS: Petitioners Armita B. Rufino, Zenaida R.Tantoco, Lorenzo Calma, Rafael Simpao, Jr., andFreddie Garcia, represented by the SolicitorGeneral and collectively referred to as the Rufinogroup, seek to set aside the Decision dated 14May 1999 of the Court of Appeals as well as theResolution dated 3 August 1999 denying theirmotion for reconsideration.

It was on 25 June 1966 when the thenPresident Ferdinand E. Marcos issued ExecutiveOrder No. 30 creating the Cultural Center of thePhilippines as a trust governed by a Board ofTrustees of seven members to preserve andpromote Philippine culture. After the declaration ofMartial Law, President Marcos issued PD 15 whichconverted the CCP under EO 30 into a non-municipal public corporation free from the pressureor influence of politics. He also increased themembers of CCP's Board from seven to ninetrustees. Later, Executive Order No. 1058, issuedon 10 October 1985, increased further the trusteesto 11. Subsequently, Aquino asked for the courtesyresignations of the then incumbent CCP trusteesand appointed new trustees to the Board.

During the term of President Fidel V.Ramos, the CCP Board included Endriga,Lagdameo, Sison, Potenciano, Fernandez, LenoraA. Cabili, and Manuel T. Mañosa ("Mañosa"). Still,On 22 December 1998, then President Joseph E.Estrada appointed seven new trustees, the Rufinogroup, to the CCP Board for a term of four years toreplace the Endriga group. However on 6th January1999, the Endriga group filed a petition allegingthat under Section 6(b) of PD 15, vacancies in theCCP Board "shall be filled by election by a vote ofa majority of the trustees held at the next regularmeeting x x x." In case "only one trustee survive[s],the vacancies shall be filled by the survivingtrustee acting in consultation with the rankingofficers of the [CCP]." The Endriga group claimedthat it is only when the CCP Board is entirelyvacant may the President of the Philippines fillsuch vacancies. They also asserted that whenformer President Estrada appointed the Rufinogroup, only one seat was vacant due to theexpiration of Mañosa's term. The Court of appealsgranted the allegation of Endriga group thus thisappeal by the Rufino group.

ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals err in itsdecision?




HELD: Yes. Basically, Section 6(b) of PD 15violates two constitutional provisions. First isSection 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitutionwhich provides: “The President shall nominate and,with the consent of the Commission onAppointments, appoint the heads of the executivedepartments, ambassadors, other public ministersand consuls, or officers of the armed forces fromthe rank of colonel or naval captain, and otherofficers whose appointments are vested in him inthis Constitution. He shall also appoint all otherofficers of the Government whose appointmentsare not otherwise provided for by law, and thosewhom he may be authorized by law to appoint. TheCongress may, by law, vest the appointment ofother officers lower in rank in the President alone,in the courts, or in the heads of departments,agencies, commissions, or boards.” This says thatthe trustees fall under the last - third group ofofficers. While Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15empowers the remaining trustees of the CCPBoard to fill vacancies in the CCP Board, allowingthem to elect their fellow trustees. On the otherhand, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987Constitution allows heads of departments,agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint only"officers lower in rank" than such "heads ofdepartments, agencies, commissions, or boards."This excludes a situation where the appointingofficer appoints an officer equal in rank as him.Second, it also violated Section 17, Article VII ofthe 1987 Constitution provides: “The Presidentshall have control of all the executive departments,bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the lawsbe faithfully executed.” The presidential power ofcontrol over the Executive branch of governmentextends to all executive employees from theDepartment Secretary to the lowliest clerk thusshowing that CCP falls under the Executive branchto which the President necessarily exercisescontrol over it. Thereby, this petition was grantedand Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 was declaredUNCONSTITUTIONAL.

FRANKLIN M. DRILON v. ALFREDO S. LIMGR. No. 112497. August 4, 1994

FACTS: The Secretary of Justice declaredOrdinance No. 7794, otherwise known as theManila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in theenactment of tax ordinances as given in Section187 of the Local Government Code:

The procedure for approval oflocal tax ordinances and revenue

measures shall be in accordancewith the provisions of this Code:Provided, That public hearingsshall be conducted for the purposeprior to the enactment thereof;Provided, further, That anyquestion on the constitutionality orlegality of tax ordinances orrevenue measures may be raisedon appeal within thirty (30) daysfrom the effectivity thereof to theSecretary of Justice who shallrender a decision within sixty (60)days from the date of receipt of theappeal: Provided, however, Thatsuch appeal shall not have theeffect of suspending the effectivityof the ordinance and the accrualand payment of the tax, fee, orcharge levied therein: Provided,finally, That within thirty (30) daysafter receipt of the decision or thelapse of the sixty-day periodwithout the Secretary of Justiceacting upon the appeal, theaggrieved party may fileappropriate proceedings with acourt of competent jurisdiction.

Consequently, a petition filed by the City ofManila then the Regional Trial Court of Manilarevoked the Secretary's resolution and sustainedthe ordinance, holding that the proceduralrequirements had been observed. Further, theysaid that Section 187 of the Local GovernmentCode unconstitutional insofar as it empowered theSecretary of Justice to review tax ordinances and,inferentially, to annul them. This was based thatthe power of control is only as vested to thePresident of the Philippines. Thereby, Secretary ofJustice having the power of control over localgovernments is in violation of the policy of localautonomy mandated in the Constitution and of thespecific provision therein conferring on thePresident of the Philippines only the power ofsupervision over local governments.

ISSUE: Was the decision of the trial court correct?

HELD: Partly, first Section 187 of the LocalGovernment Code authorizes the Secretary ofJustice to review only the constitutionality orlegality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, torevoke it on either or both of these grounds. Whenhe alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance,he is not also permitted to substitute his own




judgment for the judgment of the local governmentthat enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did setaside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did notreplace it with his own version of what the Codeshould be. He did not pronounce the ordinanceunwise or unreasonable. What this presupposes isthat the act of Secretary Drilon is basically asupervision and not control. The supervisor orsuperintendent merely sees to it that the rules arefollowed, but he himself does not lay down suchrules, nor does he have the discretion to modify orreplace them. If the rules are not observed, he mayorder the work done or re-done but only to conformto the prescribed rules. Also, it was further statedthat all the procedural requirements had beenobserved in the enactment of the Manila RevenueCode and that the City of Manila even consisting of25 exhibits. Thereby, judgment is hereby renderedREVERSING the challenged decision of theRegional Trial Court insofar as it declared Section187 of the Local Government Codeunconstitutional but AFFIRMING its finding that theprocedural requirements in the enactment of theManila Revenue Code have been observed

EUGENE GONZALES v. NARCISO ABAYAGR. No. 164007. August 10, 2006

FACTS: On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m.,more than 300 heavily armed junior officers andenlisted men of the AFP, entered the premises ofthe Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on AyalaAvenue, Makati City. They disarmed the securityguards and planted explosive devices around thebuilding. Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV,the troops then, through broadcast media,announced their grievances against theadministration such as the graft and corruption inthe military, the illegal sale of arms andammunition to the “enemies” of the State, and thebombings in Davao City intended to acquire moremilitary assistance from the US government; thusdemanded that the then President Gloria resign asPresident of the Republic. About noontime of thesame day, President Arroyo issued ProclamationNo. 427 declaring a state of rebellion, followed byGeneral Order No. 4 directing the AFP and PNP totake all necessary measures to suppress therebellion then taking place in Makati City. Later, thegovernment sent negotiators whose aim was topersuade them to peacefully return to the fold ofthe law. After several hours of negotiation, thegovernment panel succeeded in convincing themto lay down their arms and defuse the explosivesplaced around the premises of the OakwoodApartments. Eventually, they returned to their

barracks. Subsequently, a total of 321 soldiers,including petitioners herein, surrendered to theauthorities.

Petitioners invoke Republic Act No. 7055which says that the members of the AFP and otherpersons subject to military law, who commit crimesor offenses penalized under the Revised PenalCode (like coup d’etat), other special penal laws, orlocal ordinances, shall be tried by the proper civilcourt. But, an exception to the general rule, i.e.,where the civil court, before arraignment, hasdetermined the offense to be service-connected,and then the offending soldier shall be tried by acourt martial. Thus they further say that therespondent’s allegation of them violating Article 96(conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman)of the Articles of War is not service-connected, butis absorbed in the crime of coup d’etat, the militarytribunal cannot compel them to submit to itsjurisdiction.

ISSUE: Should the contention of the petitioners begranted that their case be tried in a civil court andnot to the military tribunal?

HELD: No. Basically, the trial court’s order thatwhat the petitioners did was not service-connected,but is rather absorbed and in the crime of coupd’etat, fails because it practically amended the law.Fundamentally, the law expressly vests that thecourt martial has the jurisdiction over “service-connected crimes or offenses.” The act of thepetitioners are fundamentally service-orientedbecause: First, the doctrine of ‘absorption ofcrimes’ is peculiar to criminal law and generallyapplies to crimes only punished by the samestatute. Second, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprivescivil courts of jurisdiction over service-connectedoffenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War.

Still the focus is that the Supreme Courthas recognized that courts-martial areinstrumentalities of the Executive to enable thePresident, as Commander-in-Chief, to effectivelycommand, control, and discipline the armed forces.In short, courts-martial form part of the disciplinarysystem that ensures the President’s control, andthus civilian supremacy, over the military. At theapex of this disciplinary system is the Presidentwho exercises review powers over decisions ofcourts-martial. Thereby, this petition for prohibitionis DISMISSED.




SANLAKAS v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARYANGELO REYES

GR. No. 159085. February 3, 2004

FACTS: Armed with high-powered ammunitionsand explosives, some three hundred junior officersand enlisted men of the Armed Forces of thePhilippines (AFP) stormed into the OakwoodPremiere apartments in Makati City in the weehours of July 27, 2003. The soldiers demandedthe resignation of the President, the Secretary ofDefense and the Chief of the Philippine NationalPolice (PNP). President issued later in the dayProclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4,both declaring “a state of rebellion” and calling outthe Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. By theevening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood occupationhad ended. After hours-long negotiations, thesoldiers agreed to return to barracks. ThePresident, however, did not immediately lift thedeclaration of a state of rebellion and did so onlyon August 1, 2003, through Proclamation No. 435.

The petitioners now contend that Section18, Article VII of the Constitution does not requirethe declaration of a state of rebellion to call out thearmed forces. They further submit that, because ofthe cessation of the Oakwood occupation, thereexists no sufficient factual basis for theproclamation by the President of a state ofrebellion for an indefinite period.

ISSUE: Was the contention of the petitionerscorrect?

HELD: No. Although, it is true that for the purposeof exercising the calling out power, the Constitutiondoes not require the President to make adeclaration of a state of rebellion, still Section 18,Article VII provides: “The President shall be theCommander-in-Chief of all armed forces of thePhilippines and whenever it becomes necessary,he may call out such armed forces to prevent orsuppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion…”basically this provision grants the President, asCommander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of “graduatedpower.” From the most to the least benign, theseare: the calling out power, the power to suspendthe privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and thepower to declare martial law. In the exercise of thelatter two powers, the Constitution requires theconcurrence of two conditions, namely, an actualinvasion or rebellion, and that public safetyrequires the exercise of such power. Note that the

Constitution vests the President not only withCommander-in-Chief powers but, first andforemost, with Executive powers. Thus it could beseen that the President’s authority to declare astate of rebellion springs in the main from herpowers as chief executive and, at the same time,draws strength from her Commander-in-Chiefpowers. Thereby, the President has fulldiscretionary power to call out the armed forcesand to determine the necessity for the exercise ofsuch power. Furthermore, none of the petitionershere have, by way of proof, supported theirassertion that the President acted without factualbasis. Consequently, this petition wasDISMISSED.

DAVID, et al. v ARROYO, et al.

GR. No. 171396. May 3, 2006FACTS: On February 24, 2006, as the nationcelebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa PeoplePower I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017declaring a state of national emergencycommanding the Armed Forces of the Philippines“to maintain law and order throughout thePhilippines, prevent or suppress all forms oflawless violence as well as any act of insurrectionor rebellion and to enforce obedience to all thelaws and to all decrees, orders and regulations bythe President. On the same day, the Presidentissued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017. OnMarch 3, 2006, exactly one week after thedeclaration of a state of national emergency andafter all the petitions had been filed, the Presidentlifted PP 1017.

In their presentation of the factual bases ofPP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated thatthe proximate cause behind the executiveissuances was the conspiracy among somemilitary officers, leftist insurgents of the NewPeople’s Army (NPA), and some members of thepolitical opposition in a plot to unseat orassassinate President Arroyo. They consideredthe aim to oust or assassinate the President andtake-over the reigns of government as a clear andpresent danger. During the oral arguments held onMarch 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified thefacts leading to the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O.No. 5. Significantly, there was no refutation frompetitioners’ counsels.

The Solicitor General argued that theintent of the Constitution is to give full discretionarypowers to the President in determining thenecessity of calling out the armed forces. He




emphasized that none of the petitioners has shownthat PP 1017 was without factual bases. While heexplained that it is not respondents’ task to statethe facts behind the questioned Proclamation,however, they are presenting the same, narratedhereunder, for the elucidation of the issues.

ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5are unconstitutional.

HELD: The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call bythe President for the AFP to prevent or suppresslawless violence. The proclamation is sustained bySection 18, Article VII of the Constitution and therelevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. However,PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving thePresident express or implied power (1) to issuedecrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedienceto all laws even those not related to lawlessviolence as well as decrees promulgated by thePresident; and (3) to impose standards on mediaor any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultravires and unconstitutional. The Court also rulesthat under Section 17, Article XII of theConstitution, the President, in the absence of alegislation, cannot take over privately-owned publicutility and private business affected with publicinterest.

In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No.5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President –acting as Commander-in-Chief – addressed tosubalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions ofPP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a validstandard – that the military and the police shouldtake only the “necessary and appropriate actionsand measures to suppress and prevent acts oflawless violence.” But the words “acts ofterrorism” found in G.O. No. 5 have not beenlegally defined and made punishable by Congressand should thus be deemed deleted from the saidG.O. While “terrorism” has been denouncedgenerally in media, no law has been enacted toguide the military, and eventually the courts, todetermine the limits of the AFP’s authority incarrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5.

SALVACION A. MONSANTO vs. FULGENCIO S.FACTORAN, JR.,

GR. No. 78239. February 9, 1989FACTS: On March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayanconvicted Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistanttreasurer of Calbayog City) and three otheraccused, of the complex crime of estafa thru

falsification of public documents. Monsantoappealed her conviction to the Court whichsubsequently affirmed the same. She then filed amotion for reconsideration but while said motionwas pending, she was extended on December 17,1984 by then President Marcos absolute pardonwhich she accepted on December 21, 1984. Byreason of said pardon, Monsanto wrote theCalbayog City treasurer requesting that she berestored to her former post as assistant citytreasurer since the same was still vacant.Monsanto’s letter-request was referred to theMinistry of Finance for resolution in view of theprovision of the Local Government Codetransferring the power of appointment of treasurersfrom the city governments to the said Ministry. TheFinance Ministry ruled that petitioner may bereinstated to her position without the necessity of anew appointment not earlier than the date she wasextended the absolute pardon. It also directed thecity treasurer to see to it that the amount ofP4,892.50 which the Sandiganbayan had requiredto be indemnified in favor of the government aswell as the costs of the litigation, be satisfied.

Seeking reconsideration of the foregoingruling, Monsanto wrote the Ministry on April 17,1985 stressing that the full pardon bestowed onher has wiped out the crime which implies that herservice in the government has never beeninterrupted and therefore the date of herreinstatement should correspond to the date of herpreventive suspension which is August 1, 1982.On April 15, 1986, said Office, through DeputyExecutive Secretary Fulgenio S. Factoran, Jr. heldthat Salvacion A. Monsanto is not entitled to anautomatic reinstatement on the basis of theabsolute pardon granted her but must secure anappointment to her former position and that,notwithstanding said absolute pardon, she is liablefor the civil liability concomitant to her previousconviction.ISSUE: Whether or not a public officer, who hasbeen granted an absolute pardon by the ChiefExecutive, is entitled to reinstatement to her formerposition without need of a new appointment.HELD: For Monsanto, this is the bottom line: theabsolute disqualification or ineligibility from publicoffice forms part of the punishment prescribed bythe Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsificationof public documents. It is clear from the authoritiesreferred to that when her guilt and punishmentwere expunged by her pardon, this particulardisability was likewise removed. Henceforth,Monsanto may apply for reappointment to theoffice which was forfeited by reason of her




conviction. And in considering her qualificationsand suitability for the public post, the factsconstituting her offense must be and should beevaluated and taken into account to determineultimately whether she can once again beentrusted with public funds. Stated differently, thepardon granted to her has resulted in removing herdisqualification from holding public employment butit cannot go beyond that. To regain her former postas assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply andundergo the usual procedure required for a newappointment.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANCISCOSALLE, JR. and RICKY MENGOTE

GR. No. 103567. December 4, 1995FACTS: Francisco Salle Jr. and Ricky Mengotewere found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals of the compound crime of murder anddestructive arson. They filed their Notice of Appeal.On 24 March 1993, this Court accepted theappeal. On 6 January 1994, however, FranciscoSalle, Jr. filed an Urgent Motion to WithdrawAppeal. The Court then required his counsel, Atty.Ida May La'o of the Free Legal Assistance Group(FLAG) to verify the voluntariness of the aforesaidmotion.

In her Manifestation with Motion toWithdraw Appeal, Atty. La'o informed the Courtthat her verification disclosed that Salle signed themotion without the assistance of counsel on hismisimpression that the motion was merely abureaucratic requirement necessary for his earlyrelease from the New Bilibid Prison (NBP)following the grant of a conditional pardon by thePresident on 9 December 1993. He wasdischarged from the NBP on 28 December 1993.She further informed the Court that Ricky Mengotewas, on the same dates, granted a conditionalpardon and released from confinement, and thathe immediately left for his province withoutconsulting her. She then prays that the Court grantSalle's motion to withdraw his appeal and considerit withdrawn upon his acceptance of the conditionalpardon.

In the resolution of 23 March 1994, thisCourt granted Salle's motion to withdraw hisappeal and considered this case. In itsMemorandum filed for the Appellee on 15December 1994, the Office of the Solicitor Generalmaintains that the conditional pardon granted toappellant Mengote is unenforceable because thejudgment of conviction is not yet final in view of thependency in this Court of his appeal. On the other

hand, the FLAG, through Atty. La'o, submits thatthe conditional pardon extended to Mengote isvalid and enforceable. Citing Monsanto vs.Factoran, Jr., it argues that although Mengote didnot file a motion to withdraw the appeal, he wasdeemed to have abandoned the appeal by hisacceptance of the conditional pardon whichresulted in the finality of his conviction.ISSUE: Is the pardon granted to the accusedduring the pendency of his appeal from a judgmentof conviction by the trial court enforceable?HELD: Where the pardoning power is subject tothe limitation of conviction, it may be exercised atany time after conviction even if the judgment is onappeal. It is, of course, entirely different where therequirement is " final conviction, " as wasmandated in the original provision of Section 14,Article IX of the 1973 Constitution, or "convictionby final judgment," as presently prescribed inSection 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Insuch a case, no pardon may be extended before ajudgment of conviction becomes final.

A judgment of conviction becomes final (a)when no appeal is seasonably perfected, (b) whenthe accused commences to serve the sentence, (c)when the right to appeal is expressly waived inwriting, except where the death penalty wasimposed by the trial court, and (d) when theaccused applies for probation, thereby waiving hisright to appeal. Where the judgment of convictionis still pending appeal and has not yet thereforeattained finality, as in the instant case, executiveclemency may not yet be granted to the appellant.

The "conviction by final judgment" limitation underSection 19, Article VII of the present Constitutionprohibits the grant of pardon, whether full orconditional, to an accused during the pendency ofhis appeal from his conviction by the trial court.Any application, if one is made, should not beacted upon or the process toward its grant shouldnot be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn.Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities ofthe Government concerned must require prooffrom the accused that he has not appealed fromhis conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal.Such proof may be in the form of a certificationissued by the trial court or the appellate court, asthe case may be. The acceptance of the pardonshall not operate as an abandonment or waiver ofthe appeal, and the release of an accused byvirtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, orparole before the withdrawal of an appeal shallrender those responsible therefor administrativelyliable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused




must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis forthe release of the accused from confinement.Considering that appellant Ricky Mengote has notfiled a motion to withdraw his appeal up to thisdate the conditional pardon extended to himshould not have been enforced. Nonetheless,since he stands on the same footing as theaccused-appellants in the Hinlo case, he may befreed from the full force, impact, and effect of therule herein pronounced subject to the condition setforth below. This rule shall fully bind pardonsextended after 31 January 1995 during thependency of the grantee's appeal.

VICENTE GARCIA v. THE HONORABLECHAIRMAN

GR. No. 75025. September 14, 1993

FACTS: Petitioner Vicente Garcia was employedas a supervising lineman at the Bureau ofTelecommunications. He was accused of stealingsome materials in their company. Thus, publicrespondents filed a criminal case against him forqualified theft before a court and on the sameground respondents also filed an administrativecase in which petitioner was found guilty and waslater dismissed from the service. With respect tothe criminal offense, petitioner was acquitted bythe court due to insufficiency of evidence.Petitioner was then reinstated from his work and isnow claiming before the Commission on Audit(COA) for his back salaries from the time of hisdismissal up to present. But COA on the otherhand reluctantly denied his pleadings. Meanwhile,petitioner was extended an executive clemency(absolute pardon) by the President. Still,respondent COA strongly refused to give duecourse to petitioners claim.

ISSUE: Is respondent entitled to the payment ofback wages after having been reinstated pursuantto the grant of executive clemency?

HELD: The Court ruled initially by explaining themandate of Sec 19 Article VII of the Constitutionand further articulates that the bestowal ofexecutive clemency on petitioner in effectcompletely obliterated the adverse effects of theadministrative decision which found him guilty ofdishonesty and ordered his separation from theservice. This can be inferred from the executiveclemency itself exculpating petitioner from theadministrative charge and thereby directing his

reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by thegrant of the pardon. This signifies that petitionerneed no longer apply to be reinstated to his formeremployment; he is restored to his office ipso factoupon the issuance of the clemency.

GONZALES v. NARVAZAGR. No. 140835. August 14, 2000

FACTS: On December 9, 1999, Ramon A.Gonzales filed a petition for prohibition andmandamus assailing the constitutionality of thePreparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform(PCCR) on two grounds: first, it is a public officewhich only the legislature can create by way of alaw and second, the President is excluded by theConstitution in creating the said body. Gonzalesalso seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit frompassing in audit expenditures for the PCCR andthe presidential consultants, advisers andassistants.In response, the respondents alleged that withrespect to the PCCR, this case has become mootor academic, meaning it no longer presents ajusticiable controversy because the issues involvedhave become academic or dead. Moreover,Gonzales’ lack of standing constitutes anotherobstacle to the successful invocation of judicialpower insofar as the PCCR is concerned.

ISSUE: Is there an exercise of the taxing orspending power by the Congress?

HELD: There is no exercise by Congress of itstaxing or spending power. The PCCR was createdby the President and that the amount of Php 3million was appropriated for its operationalexpenses to be sourced from the funds of theOffice of the President. The appropriations for thePCCR were authorized by the President, not byCongress. In fact, there was no an appropriation atall. "In a strict sense, appropriation has beendefined ‘as nothing more than the legislativeauthorization prescribed by the Constitution thatmoney may be paid out of the Treasury’, whileappropriation made by law refers to ‘the act of thelegislature setting apart or assigning to a particularuse a certain sum to be used in the payment ofdebt or dues from the State to its creditors.’ " Thefunds used for the PCCR were taken from fundsintended for the Office of the President, in theexercise of the Chief Executive’s power to transfer




funds pursuant to Section 25 (5) of Article VI of theConstitution.

FERDINAND MARCOS v. MANGLAPUSGR. No. 88211. October 27, 1989

FACTS: On September 28, 1989, PresidentMarcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii. In a statement,President Corazon Aquino said that in the interestof the safety of those who will take the death of Mr.Marcos in widely and passionately conflictingways, and for the tranquility of the state and orderof society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos willnot be allowed to be brought to our country untilsuch time as the government, be it under thisadministration or the succeeding one, shallotherwise decide.

Because of such statement, the petitionersfiled a Motion for Reconsideration arguing thefollowing: that to bar former President Marcos andhis family from returning to the Philippines is todeny them not only the inherent right of citizens toreturn to their country of birth but also theprotection of the Constitution and all of the rightsguaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution; thePresident has no power to bar a Filipino from hisown country; if she has, she had exercised itarbitrarily; and there is no basis for barring thereturn of the family of former President Marcos.The petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration washowever denied for it has been considered asmoot and academic as to the deceased Mr.Marcos.

ISSUE: Does the President have unstated residualpowers other than those expressly stated in theConstitution?

HELD: Yes. The President has unstated residualpowers which are implied from the grant of theexecutive power and which are necessary for herto comply with her duties under the Constitution.The powers of the President are not limited to whatare expressly enumerated in the article on theExecutive Department and in scattered provisionsof the Constitution. Among the duties of thePresident under the Constitution, in compliancewith his or her oath of office, is to protect andpromote the interest and welfare of the people. Herdecision to bar the return of the Marcoses andsubsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at thepresent time and under present circumstances is incompliance with this bounden duty. In the absenceof a clear showing that she had acted with

arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion inarriving at this decision, the Court will not enjointhe implementation of this decision.

BENJAMIN U. BORJA v. COMELEC

GR. No. 133495. September 3, 1998

FACTS: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr.was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18,1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. OnSeptember 2, 1989, he became mayor, byoperation of law, upon the death of the incumbent,Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and waselected mayor for a term of three years whichended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he wasreelected mayor for another term of three yearsending June 30, 1998.On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capcofiled a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Paterosrelative to the May 11, 1998 elections. PetitionerBenjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidatefor mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on thetheory that the latter would have already served asmayor for three consecutive terms by June 30,1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve foranother term after that.

On April 30, 1998, the Second Division ofthe Commission on Elections ruled in favor ofpetitioner and declared private respondent Capcodisqualified from running for reelection as mayor ofPateros. However, on motion of privaterespondent, the COMELEC en banc, voting 5-2,reversed the decision and declared Capco eligibleto run for mayor in the May 11, 1998elections. Accordingly, private respondent wasvoted for in the elections. He received 16,558votes against petitioner’s 7,773 votes and wasproclaimed elected by the Municipal Board ofCanvassers.

ISSUE: Does a vice-mayor who succeeds to theoffice of mayor by operation of law and serves theremainder of the term be considered to haveserved a term in that office for the purpose of thethree-term limit?HELD: No. Under the local Government Code, heis the presiding officer of the Sanggunian and heappoints all officials and employees of such localassembly. He has distinct powers and functions,succession to mayorship in the event of vacancytherein being only one of them. It cannot be said ofhim, as much as of the Vice-President in the eventof a vacancy in the Presidency, that in running forvice-mayor, he also seeks the mayorship. His




assumption of the mayorship in the event ofvacancy is more a matter of chance than of design.Hence, his service in that office should not becounted in the application of any term limit.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

FRANCISCO S. TATAD v. SECRETARY OF THEDEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

GR. No. 124360. November 5, 1997

FACTS: The petitions at bar challenge theconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled"An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industryand For Other Purposes," and E.O. No. 392 whichprovides the declaration of the full deregulation ofthe downstream oil industry. Petitioners add thatthe imposition of different tariff rates on importedcrude oil and imported refined petroleum productsviolates the equal protection clause, and thatundue delegation of legislative power to thePresident and the Secretary of Energy because itdoes not provide a determinate or determinablestandard to guide the Executive Branch indetermining when to implement the fullderegulation of the downstream oil industry.

Respondents, on the other hand, ferventlydefend the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 andE.O. No. 392 and allege that the issues raised bythe petitions are not justiciable as they pertain tothe wisdom of the law.

ISSUE: Does the courts have jurisdiction in thiscase?

HELD: Yes. Judicial power includes not only theduty of the courts to settle actual controversiesinvolving rights which are legally demandable andenforceable, but also the duty to determinewhether or not there has been grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction on the part of any branch orinstrumentality of the government. The courts, asguardians of the Constitution, have the inherentauthority to determine whether a statute enactedby the legislature transcends the limit imposed bythe fundamental law. Where a statute violates theConstitution, it is not only the right but the duty ofthe judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutionaland void. Still, the principle of separation of powermandates that challenges on the constitutionalityof a law should be resolved in our courts of justicewhile doubts on the wisdom of a law should bedebated in the halls of Congress. Later, the court

decided that the petitions are granted. R.A. No.8180 is declared unconstitutional and E.O. No. 372void.

CESAR BENGZON v. FRANKLIN N. DRILONGR. No. 103524. April 15, 1992

FACTS: Certain provisions in the GeneralAppropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relatingto the payment of the adjusted pensions of retiredJustices of the Supreme Court and the Court ofAppeals were vetoed by the then President Aquinofor the reason that they would erode the veryfoundation of our collective effort to adherefaithfully to and enforce strictly the policy andstandardization of compensation. She reasons thatthe government should not permit the grant ofdistinct privileges to select group of officials whoseretirement pensions under existing laws alreadyenjoy preferential treatment over those of the vastmajority of our civil servants.

ISSUE: Was the veto of the Presidentconstitutional?

HELD: No. Sec. 3, Art. VIII mandates that: “TheJudiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.Appropriations for the Judiciary may not bereduced by the legislature below the amountappropriated for the previous year and, afterapproval, shall be automatically and regularlyreleased.” This presupposes the fact that Fiscalautonomy means freedom from outside control.Thus the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in thedisposition of the funds allocated to it in theappropriations law. The veto made by thepresident in the specific provisions in the GeneralAppropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to theJudiciary how its funds should be utilized, which isclearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy and it impairsthe power of the Chief Justice to augment otheritems in the Judiciary's appropriation, incontravention of the constitutional provision on"fiscal autonomy." This petition is thereby granted.

APEX MINING CO., INC v. SOUTHEASTMINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP.

GR. Nos. 152613 & 152628. November 20, 2009

FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration dated12 July 2006, filed by Southeast Mindanao GoldMining Corporation (SEM), of this Court’s Decisiondated 23 June 2006 (Assailed Decision). The courtdecided in its late decision that the assignment of




Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in favor of SEMviolated one of the conditions stipulated in thepermit, i.e., that the same shall be for the exclusiveuse and benefit of Marcopper Mining Corporation(MMC) or its duly authorized agents. Also, SEM didnot claim or submit evidence that it was adesignated agent of MMC, making the latter notconsidered as an agent of the former; that thetransfer of EP 133 violated Presidential Decree No.463, which requires that the assignment of amining right be made with the prior approval of theSecretary of the Department of Environment andNatural Resources (DENR); that EP 133 expiredby non-renewal since it was not renewed before orafter its expiration; and that Executive Departmentto undertake directly the mining operations of thedisputed area or to award the operations to privateentities including petitioners Apex and Balite,subject to applicable laws, rules and regulations,and provided that these private entities arequalified.

Now , SEM contends that Proclamation No.297, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyoand declaring the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area as amineral reservation, is invalid and unconstitutionalon the ground that it lacks the concurrence ofCongress as mandated by Section 4, Article XII ofthe Constitution; Section 1 of Republic Act No.3092; Section 14 of Executive Order No. 292,otherwise known as the Administrative Code of1987; Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 7586, andSection 4(a) of Republic Act No. 6657.

ISSUE: Would the contention of SEM be grantedor reconsidered?

HELD: No. It is well-settled that when questions ofconstitutionality are raised, the court can exerciseits power of judicial review only if the followingrequisites are present: (1) an actual andappropriate case exists; (2) there is a personal andsubstantial interest of the party raising theconstitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicialreview is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and(4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of thecase. In this case at bar, it is clear that the thirdrequisite is absent. It must be pointed out that itwas only after the assailed Decision waspromulgated -- i.e., in SEM’s Motion forReconsideration of the questioned Decision filedon 13 July 2006 and its Motion for Referral of theCase to the Court En Banc and for Oral Argumentsfiled on 22 August 2006 -- that it assailed thevalidity of said proclamation. Certainly, posing thequestion on the constitutionality of Proclamation

No. 297 for the first time in its Motion forReconsideration is, indeed, too late.

FRANCISCO SERRANO DE AGBAYANI vs.PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

GR. No. L-23127 April 29, 1971FACTS: Serrano de Agbayani obtained a loan inthe amount of P450.00 from defendant Bank datedJuly 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944, securedby real estate mortgage duly registered coveringproperty described in T.C.T. No. 11275 of theprovince of Pangasinan. As of November 27, 1959,the balance due on said loan was in the amount ofP1,294.00. As early as July 13 of the same year,defendant instituted extra-judicial foreclosureproceedings in the office of defendant ProvincialSheriff of Pangasinan for the recovery of thebalance of the loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiffcountered with his suit against both defendants onAugust 10, 1959, his main allegation being that themortgage sought to be foreclosed had longprescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from thedate of maturity, July 19, 1944. He sought and wasable to obtain a writ of preliminary injunctionagainst defendant Provincial Sheriff, which wasmade permanent in the decision now on appeal.Defendant Bank in its answer prayed for thedismissal of the suit as even on plaintiff's owntheory the defense of prescription would not beavailable if the period from March 10, 1945, whenExecutive Order No. 32 was issued, to July 26,1948, when the subsequent legislativeact extending the period of moratorium wasdeclared invalid, were to be deducted from thecomputation of the time during which the bank tookno legal steps for the recovery of the loan. Asnoted, the lower court did not find such contentionpersuasive and decided the suit in favor of plaintiff.ISSUE: Was the lower court correct in theirdecision?HELD: No. From July 19, 1944, when plaintiff’sloan matured, to July 13, 1959, when extra-judicialforeclosure proceedings were started by appellantBank, the time consumed is six days short offifteen years. The prescriptive period was tolledhowever, from March 10, 1945, the effectivity ofExecutive Order No. 32, to May 18, 1953, whenthe decision of Rutter v. Esteban was promulgated,covering eight years, two months and eight days.Obviously then, when resort was had extra-judicially to the foreclosure of the mortgageobligation, there was time to spare beforeprescription could be availed of as a defense.Wherefore, the decision of January 27, 1960 is




reversed and the suit of plaintiff filed August 10,1959 dismissed.

WILLIAM TAN, JOAQUIN TAN LEH andVICENTE TAN v. HERNANI T. BARRIOS

GR. No. 85481-82 October 18, 1990

FACTS: On April 17, 1975, the three petitioners,with twelve (12) others, were arrested and chargedbefore the Military Commission No. 1, for thecrimes of: (1) murder through the use of anunlicensed or illegally possessed firearm (2)unlawful possession, control, and custody of apistol.

On September 15, 1988, Secretary ofJustice Sedfrey Ordoñez issued Department OrderNo. 226 designating State Prosecutor HernaniBarrios "to collaborate with the City Fiscal ofCagayan de Oro City in theinvestigation/reinvestigation of Criminal Case No.MC-1-67 and, if the evidence warrants toprosecute the case in the court of competentjurisdiction.”

Without conducting aninvestigation/reinvestigation, Fiscal Barrios filed onDecember 9, 1988, in the Regional Trial Court ofCagayan de Oro City two (2) information for IllegalPossession of Firearm docketed as Crim. CaseNo. 88-824 and Murder docketed as Crim. CaseNo. 88-825 against all the 15 original defendants inCriminal Case No. MC-1-67 including those whoalready died.

On November 7, 1988, William Tan,Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan filed this petitionfor certiorari and prohibition praying that theinformation in Crim. Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88-825, and the order of respondent Judge datedOctober 26, 1988 be annulled, and that the publicrespondents or any other prosecution officer "bepermanently enjoined from indicting, prosecutingand trying them anew for the offenses chargedtherein because they had alreadyISSUE: Whether or not State Prosecutor Barriosexceeded his jurisdiction and gravely abused hisdiscretion in reprosecuting them.HELD: Yes. The public respondents gravelyabused their discretion and acted without or inexcess of their jurisdiction in misconstruing thethird paragraph of the dispositive portion of thisCourt's decision in Cruz vs. Enrile as their authorityto refiled in the civil court the criminal actionsagainst petitioners who had been tried and

acquitted by Military Commission No. 1 during theperiod of martial law. It is an unreasonableapplication of Cruz vs. Enrile, for the decisiontherein will be searched in vain for such authorityto reprosecute every civilian who had ever faced acourt martial, much less those who had beenacquitted by such bodies more than a decade agolike the petitioners Tan, et al. herein. The decisionin Cruz vs. Enrile would be an instrument ofoppression and injustice unless given a limitedapplication only to the parties/petitioners thereinwho sought the annulment of the court martialproceedings against themselves and prayed for aretrial in the civil courts of the criminal casesagainst them.

TEODORO B. PANGILINAN vs. GUILLERMO T.MAGLAYA

GR. Nos. 104216 August 20, 1993.FACTS: Teodoro B. Pangilinan was appointed asExecutive Director of the Land TransportationOffice on July 8, 1987. On September 27, 1991,the petitioner called a press conference exposewhat the media later described as "the licenseplate mess." He also announced his intention to filegraft charges with the Ombudsman against Prado,Sabalza and Undersecretary Jose Valdecañas,also of the DOTC. The following day, SecretaryPrado relieved Pangilinan as Executive Director ofthe LTO and replaced him with Guillermo Maglayaas officer-in-charge. In this petition, Pangilinanprays for reinstatement on the ground that nocharge has been filed or proved against him tojustify his removal.

Required to comment, the SolicitorGeneral argues that Pangilinan was validlyseparated because he was appointed to thedisputed position in an acting capacity only. Hedoes not possess the qualifications prescribed forthe office of Executive Director of the LTO, which isa career executive service position for which only acareer executive service official is eligible. Thepetitioner is not a career executive service official.Hence, he could not be, and was not extended apermanent appointment.ISSUE: Was Pangilinan’s removal from the officevalid?HELD: Yes. Pangilinan was only an actingappointee because he did not have the requisitequalifications; as such, he could not claim securityof tenure. The Court has repeatedly held that thisguaranty is available only to permanentappointees. The fact that Pangilinan was qualifiedfor his initial appointment as agent in the NBI does




not mean he was qualified for all other positions hemight later occupy in the civil service. The lawdoes not prescribe uniform qualifications for allpublic positions regardless of nature or degree.

Strictly speaking, the petitioner'stemporary appointment as Executive Director ofthe LTO should have ended twelve months afterhe assumed office, or on July 16, 1988. From thatdate, his appointment had ceased to be valid evenif a qualified replacement was not yet available andconsequently had to be discontinued pursuant tothe above-quoted provision. Indeed, even on theassumption that his appointment could be and hadbeen validly extended beyond the one-year limit,that extended term was nevertheless validlyterminated with the appointment of his qualifiedreplacement

SPOUSES CONSING v. COURT OF APPEALSGR No. 143584. March 10, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner-spouses Antonio and SoledadConsing (“Antonio and Soledad”) were sugar-farmlandowners. Antonio and Soledad mortgaged theirproperties to the Philippine National Bank (“PNB”)Victorias Branch. Private respondent SugarProducers’ Cooperative Marketing Association(“SPCMA”) is a cooperative engaged in assistingplanters-members procure fertilizer and other farmneeds. In 1975, Antonio and Soledad purchasedon credit various grades of fertilizer throughSPCMA on the strength of the documentspresented by Antonio and Soledad. Thedocuments consisted of a certification issued byPNB and a promissory note chargeable againstPNB. When SPCMA presented the promissorynote, PNB refused to honor the note as Antonioand Soledad no longer had a fertilizer line withPNB. On 8 November 1977, SPCMA filed acomplaint for collection of sum of money againstAntonio and Soledad with the Regional Trial Courtof Negros Occidental, Bacolod City. On 19 June1989, the trial court ruled in favor of SPCMA.Dissatisfied with the decision of the trial court,Antonio and Soledad appealed to the Court ofAppeals. On 29 November1999, the Court ofAppeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. On5 June 2000, the Court of Appeals denied Antonioand Soledad’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of theRegional Trial Court failed to State the Legal Basisof its Ruling.

HELD: Antonio and Soledad draw our attention tothe two-page decision of the trial court penned byJudge Cicero U. Querubin. While Judge Querubinmentioned his factual findings, the legal basis ofhis ruling is not set out in the decision.

Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitutiondeclares that: No decision shall be rendered byany court without expressing therein clearly anddistinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.The court must inform the parties to a case of thelegal basis for the court’s decision so that if a partyappeals, it can point out to the appellate court thepoints of law to which it disagrees. Every judgeshould know the constitutional mandate and therationale behind it. Judge Querubin should haveknown the exacting standard imposed on courts bySection 14, Article VIII of the Constitution andshould not have sacrificed the constitutionalstandard for brevity’s sake. The failure of the trialcourt decision to measure up to the standard setby the Constitution is too gross to ignore as it is instark contrast to the Court of Appeals’ decision.The Court of Appeals’ decision, while also brief,being only three pages long, laid down the factualand legal reasons why Antonio and Soledad arethe ones liable to SPCMA, and not PNB.

CITY GOVERNMENT OF TAGAYTAY v.GUERRERO

GR. Nos. 140743 & 140745. September 17, 2009

FACTS: Tagaytay-Taal Tourist DevelopmentCorporation (TTTDC) is the registered owner oftwo (2) parcels of land covered by TransferCertificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-98163 and T-98174 of the Registry of Deeds of Tagaytay City.TTTDC incurred real estate tax liabilities on thesaid properties for the tax years 1976 to 1983. OnNovember 28, 1983, for failure of TTTDC to settleits delinquent real estate tax obligations, the CityGovernment of Tagaytay (City of Tagaytay) offeredthe properties for sale at public auction. Being theonly bidder, a certificate of sale was executed infavor of the City of Tagaytay and wascorrespondingly inscribed on the titles of theproperties on November 20, 1984. On July 14,1989, the City of Tagaytay filed an unnumberedpetition for entry of new certificates of title in itsfavor before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofCavite, Branch XVIII, Tagaytay City.

On July 21, 1991, TTTDC filed a petitionfor nullification of the public auction involving thedisputed properties on the ground that the




properties were not within the jurisdiction of theCity of Tagaytay and, thus, beyond its taxingauthority. The City of Tagaytay averred that basedon its Charter, the subject properties were within itsterritorial jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court oftagaytay has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: There is no boundary dispute in the case atbar. The RTC did not amend the existing territoriallimits of the City of Tagaytay and the Province ofBatangas. The entire Barrio Birinayan wastransferred to the Municipality of Talisay, Provinceof Batangas, by virtue of R.A. No. 1418. Atpresent, Barrio Birinayan forms part of theMunicipality of Laurel, also in the Province ofBatangas, pursuant to R.A. No. 5689. The RTCacted well within its powers when it passedjudgment on the nullification of the auction sale ofthe contested properties, considering that the Cityof Tagaytay has no right to collect real estate taxeson properties that are not within its territorialjurisdiction.

NITAFAN v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNALREVENUE

GR L-78780. July 23, 1987

FACTS: Nitafan and some others seek to prohibitthe CIR from making any deduction of withholdingtaxes from their salaries or compensation for suchwould tantamount to a diminution of their salary,which is unconstitutional. On June 7 1987, theCourt en banc had reaffirmed the directive of theChief Justice.

ISSUE: Whether the members of the judiciary areexempt from the payment of income tax.

HELD: No. Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987Constitution provides that salaries of judges maynot be decreased during their continuance inoffice. They have a fix salary which may not besubject to the whims and caprices of congress. Butthe salaries of the judges shall be subject to thegeneral income tax as well as other members ofthe judiciary.

BERNARDINO MARCELINO v. HON.FERNANDO CRUZ, JR.

GR No. L-42428. March 18, 1983

FACTS: On 04 Aug 1975, Marcelinowas convicted for rape. On the same date, theattorneys of both parties in the criminal casemoved for time within which to submit theirrespective memoranda. On the date set forpromulgation of the decision in its finality,Marcelino’s counsel moved for postponement. Thecourt ignored his motion.

ISSUE: Did Judge Cruz resolve the case withinthe allotted period?

HELD: The date of promulgation of a decisioncould not serve as the reckoning date because thesame necessarily comes at a later date. Section 11(1), Art 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides that“upon the effectivity of this constitution, themaximum period within which case or matter shallbe decided or resolved from the date of itssubmission shall be; 18 months for the SupremeCourt, 12 months for the inferior courts and 3months for lower courts. In practice, the SupremeCourt is liberal when it comes to this provision. Ithad various stands depending upon properapplication and for valid or meritorious reasonswhich are provided for by judges of the lowercourts in which extension may be given to resolvesuch cases.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

BRILLANTES v. YORAC

GR. No. 93867. December 18, 1990

FACTS: The petitioner is challenging thedesignation by the President of the Philippines ofAssociate Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac asActing Chairman of the Commission on Elections,in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who hadbeen named chairman of the fact-findingcommission to investigate the December 1989coup d'etat attempt. The qualifications of therespondent are conceded by the petitioner and arenot in issue in this case. The petitioner contendsthat the choice of the Acting Chairman of theCommission on Elections is an internal matter that




should be resolved by the members themselvesand that the intrusion of the President of thePhilippines violates their independence.

ISSUE: Whether the appointment of Yorac asacting chairman of the COMELEC valid.

HELD: Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitutionexpressly describes all the ConstitutionalCommissions as "independent." Althoughessentially executive in nature, they are not underthe control of the President of the Philippines in thedischarge of their respective functions. Each ofthese Commissions conducts its own proceedingsunder the applicable laws and its own rules and inthe exercise of its own discretion. The choice of atemporary chairman in the absence of the regularchairman comes under that discretion. Thatdiscretion cannot be exercised for it, even with itsconsent, by the President of the Philippines.

The designation by the President of thePhilippines of respondent Haydee B. Yorac asActing Chairman of the Commissions on Electionsis declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and therespondent is hereby ordered to desist fromserving as such.

NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION v. JUCOGR. No. L-64313. January 17, 1985

FACTS: The records reveal that privaterespondent (Benjamin C. Juco) was a projectengineer of the National Housing Corporation(NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975.For having been implicated in a crime of theftand/or malversation of public funds involving 214pieces of scrap G.I. pipes owned by thecorporation which was allegedly committed onMarch 5, 1975. Juco’s services were terminated by(NHC) effective as of the close of working hours onMay 14, 1975. On March 25, 1977 he filed acomplaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner(NHC) with Regional Office No. 4, Department ofLabor. The said complaint was certified byRegional Branch No. IV of the NLRC. On July 28,1977, the NHC filed its position paper alleging thatthe Regional Office Branch IV, Manila, NLRC, iswithout authority to entertain the case for lack ofjurisdiction, considering that the NHC is agovernment owned and controlled corporation; thateven assuming that this case falls within thejurisdiction of this Office, respondent firm (nowpetitioner) maintains that respondent (Juco), now

private respondent, was separated from theservice for valid and justified reasons.

ISSUE: Are employees of the National HousingCorporation (NHC) covered by the Labor Code orby laws and regulations governing the civilservice?

HELD: The NHC is a one hundred percent (100%)government-owned corporation organized inaccordance with Executive Order No. 399, theUniform Charter of Government Corporations,dated January 5, 1951. Section 1, Article XII-B ofthe Constitution specifically provides:The CivilService embraces every branch, agency,subdivision, and instrumentality of theGovernment, including every government-ownedor controlled corporation. Applying the pertinentprovisions of the Constitution, the Labor Code asamended, and the Civil Service Decree asamended and the precedent in the Alliance ofGovernment Workers decision, it is clear that thepetitioner National Housing Corporation comesunder the jurisdiction of the Civil ServiceCommission, not the Ministry of Labor andEmployment.

CADIENTE v. SANTOSGR. No. L-35592. June 11, 1986

FACTS: On September 13, 1971, petitionerCadiente was appointed by then Mayor Elias B.Lopez as City Legal Officer of Davao City. Theappointment was duly attested to and/or approvedas "permanent" by the Civil Service Commissionunder Section 24(b) of R.A. 2260. On January 6,1972, the new City Mayor Luis T. Santos, hereinrespondent, sent a letter to the petitioner advisingthe latter that his services as City Legal Officer ofDavao City "are dispensed with effective uponreceipt of said letter" on the ground that theposition of City Legal Officer was primarilyconfidential in nature. Petitioner appealed to theCivil Service Commission on January 7, 1982,which rendered its decision in its lst Indorsementdated March 2, 1972, therein holding that thetermination, removal and/or dismissal of petitioneris "without cause and without due process" andthat the position of City Legal Officer "is notincluded among those positions enumerated inSec. 5 of R.A. 2260 as belonging to the non-competitive service." The public respondents inthis case who are the City Mayor, the CityTreasurer, and the City Auditor of Davao City, stilldeclined and refused to recognize petitioner as the




one entitled to the disputed position of City LegalOfficer of Davao City.

Meanwhile, in an Indorsement datedFebruary 8, 1972, the Civil Service Commissionreturned the appointment of respondent Clapanoto respondent City Mayor.

ISSUE: Whether the appointment of respondentClapano be declared illegal and invalid.

HELD: The Court found as an undeniable fact thatthe position of a City Legal Officer is one which is"primarily confidential". The termination of theirofficial relation can be justified on the ground ofloss of confidence because in that case theircessation from office involves no removal butmerely the expiration of the term of office-twodifferent causes for the termination of officialrelations recognized in the Law of Public Officers.In the case at bar, when the respondent City Mayorof Davao terminated the services of the petitioner,he was not removed or dismissed. There being noremoval or dismissal it could not, therefore, be saidthat there was a violation of the constitutionalprovision that "no officer or employee in the civilservice shall be suspended or dismissed except forcause as provided by law" (Article XII-B, Section1(3), 1973 Constitution).

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEESASSOCIATION (SSSEA) v. THE COURT OF

APPEALSGR. No. 85279 July 28, 1989

FACTS: The petitioners went on strike after theSSS failed to act upon the union’s demandsconcerning the implementation of their CBA. SSSfiled before the court action for damages withprayer for writ of preliminary injunction againstpetitioners for staging an illegal strike. The courtissued a temporary restraining. Petitionerscontend that the court made reversible error intaking cognizance on the subject matter since thejurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National LaborRelations Commission as the case involves a labordispute. The SSS contends on one hand that thepetitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws,rules and regulation thus have no right to strike.They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLEtherefore the court may enjoin the petitioners fromstriking.

ISSUE: Whether SSS employers have the right tostrike.

HELD: No. In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 theemployees in the civil service are denominated as“government employees” and that the SSS is onesuch government-controlled corporation with anoriginal charter, having been created under R.A.No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil serviceand are covered by the Civil Service Commission’smemorandum prohibiting strikes.

FRANCISCO ABELLA JR v. CIVIL SERVICECOMMISSION

G.R. No. 152574. November 17, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner Francisco A. Abella, Jr., havingcompleted the training program for ExecutiveLeadership and Management in 1982 under theCivil Service Academy, pursuant to CSCResolution No. 850 dated April 16, 1979, whichwas then the required eligibility for said position,was permanently appointed as DepartmentManager III of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority(SBMA) in 1999, however, the CSC rejected theappointment because he does not possess theCES eligibility pursuant to Memorandum CircularNo. 21, series of 1994 issued on May 1994.

ISSUE: Is the CSC correct in rejecting thepermanent appointment of the petitioner?

HELD: Yes. Since petitioner had no CES eligibility,the CSC correctly denied his permanentappointment. The appointee need not have beenpreviously heard, because the nature of the actiondid not involve the imposition of an administrativedisciplinary measure. The CSC, in approving ordisapproving an appointment, merely examines theconformity of the appointment with the law and theappointee’s possession of all the minimumqualifications and none of the disqualification.

While petitioner was able to demonstratehis standing to appeal the CSC Resolutions to thecourts, he failed to prove his eligibility to theposition he was appointed to.

LUCITA Q. GARCES v. COURT OF APPEALSGR. No. 114795. July 17, 1996

FACTS: Lucita Garces was appointed ElectionRegistrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte on July27, 1986. She was to replace respondent ElectionRegistrar Claudio Concepcion, who, in turn, wastransferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte.Concepcion, however, refused to transfer post ashe did not request for it. The COMELEC en




banc resolved to recognize respondentConcepcion as the Election Registrar ofGutalac and ordered that the appointments ofGarces be cancelled.

ISSUE: Is the COMELEC correct in retainingConception as the Election Registrar of Gutalac,Zamboanga del Norte?

HELD: Yes. A transfer requires a priorappointment. If the transfer was made without theconsent of the official concerned, it is tantamountto removal without valid cause contrary to thefundamental guarantee on non-removal except forcause. Concepcion’s transfer thus becomes legallyinfirm and without effect for he was not validlyterminated. His appointment to the Liloy post, infact, was incomplete because he did not acceptit. Acceptance, it must be emphasized, isindispensable to complete anappointment. Corollarily, Concepcion’s post inGutalac never became vacant. It is a basicprecept in the law of public officers that “noperson, no matter how qualified and eligible he isfor a certain position may be appointed to an officewhich is not vacant. There can be no appointmentto a non-vacant position. The incumbent must firstbe legally removed, or his appointment validlyterminated before one could be validly installed tosucceed him

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v COMELECGR. No. 119976. September 18, 1995

FACTS: On March 23, 1995, private respondentCirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representativeof the First District of Leyte and a candidate for thesame position of Representative of the First Districtof Leyte, filed a "Petition for Cancellation andDisqualification" with the Commission on Electionsalleging that petitioner did not meet theconstitutional requirement for residency. In hispetition, private respondent contended that Mrs.Marcos lacked the Constitution's one yearresidency requirement for candidates for theHouse of Representatives for she only wrote in herCertificate of Candidacy that her residence is“seven months.” On April 24, 1995 COMELEC enbanc declared her not qualified to run for theposition of Member of the House ofRepresentatives for the First Legislative District ofLeyte.

Now the petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction ofthe COMELEC had already lapsed considering thatthe assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24,

1995, fourteen (14) days before the election inviolation of Section 78 of the Omnibus ElectionCode. She also contends that it is the House ofRepresentatives Electoral Tribunal and not theCOMELEC which has jurisdiction over the electionof members of the House of Representatives inaccordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of theConstitution.

ISSUE: Does the COMELEC have jurisdiction asregards to this case?

HELD: Yes. Although it is a settled doctrine that astatute requiring rendition of judgment within aspecified time must be followed, it does notinvalidate the judgment especially when suchjudgment is essential to effect the aim and purposeof the Legislature. The court said that the fact thatour courts and other quasi-judicial bodies wouldthen refuse to render judgments merely on theground of having failed to reach a decision within agiven or prescribed period is a great mischief onthe part of the petitioner. Moreover, the House ofRepresentatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed tojudge of all contests relating to the elections,returns and qualifications of members of Congressbegins only after a candidate has become amember of the House of Representatives.

Still, because of the fact that a clear and positiveproof was not showed that there wasabandonment of domicile of origin of the petitioner(keeping close ties to Tacloban even if she’s inManila because of President Marcos’ regime), thispetition was granted.

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONALADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY

(BANAT), v. COMELECGR. No. 179271. July 8, 2009

FACTS: Petitioners in G.R. No. 179271 and inG.R. No. 179295 seeks to reverse the Resolutionpromulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commissionon Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 andNBC Resolution No. 07-60 which made useVeterans formula in the declaration of winners in14 May 2007 elections and of a partialproclamation of parties, organizations andcoalitions that obtained at least two percent of thetotal votes cast under the Party-List System. Theyfurther say that using the Veterans formula, ascoming from the decision Veterans FederationParty v. COMELEC, is in contrast with the Section5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and Section11(b) of RA 7941.




ISSUE: Would the contention of the petitioners begranted?

HELD: Partly. Beforehand, Section 11 of RepublicAct No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides inpart, “The parties, organizations, and coalitionsreceiving at least two percent (2%) of the totalvotes cast for the party-list system shall be entitledto one seat each: provided, that those garneringmore than two percent (2%) of the votes shall beentitled to additional seats in proportion to theirtotal number of votes: provided, finally, that eachparty, organization, or coalition shall be entitled tonot more than three (3) seats;” and Veteran’sFormula would be:

No. of votes ofconcerned party

No. of additionalAdditional seats for = ------------------- x

seats allocated toa concerned party No. of votes of

first partyfirst party

Then Section 5, Article VI of theConstitution provides :(1) The House ofRepresentatives shall be composed of not morethan two hundred and fifty members, unlessotherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected fromlegislative districts apportioned among theprovinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila ....(2) The party-list representatives shall constitutetwenty per centum of the total number ofrepresentatives including those under the party-list….

The court resolve that Section 5(1), ArticleVI of the Constitution states that the “House ofRepresentatives shall be composed of not morethan two hundred and fifty members, unlessotherwise fixed by law.” Thus, the Constitutionallows the legislature to modify the number of themembers of the House of Representatives whichalso coincides with the provisions of the VeteransFormula. However, Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941is declared unconstitutional because the SC findsthat the two percent threshold makes itmathematically impossible to achieve themaximum number of available party list seats whenthe number of available party list seats exceeds 50(given the fact that there are 220 DistrictRepresentatives in the 14th Congress which showsonly 55 to be elected Party-List Representatives).Thus again, this petition was partly granted notSETTING ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELECdated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as

well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBCNo. 07-60.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INC. v. COMMISSION ONAUDIT

GR. No. 91890. June 9, 1995

FACTS: Philippine Airline Inc. is a domesticcorporation duly organized and existing underPhilippine laws, principally engaged in the airtransport business, both domestic andinternational. Later on August 17, 1989, COAwrote PAL a letter 4 stating: “It has come to ourattention that PAL international fuel supplycontracts are expiring this August 31, 1989. In thisconnection, you are advised to desist from biddingthe company's fuel supply contracts, consideringthat existing regulations require government-owned or controlled corporations and otheragencies of government to procure their petroleumproduct requirements from PETRON Corporation.”Now, PAL says that COA gravely abused its powerand that it seeks to review, annul end reverseDecision No. 1127 of COA dated January 5, 1990.

ISSUE: Was there a grave abuse of discretion ofCOA?

HELD: NONE. The COA is clothed under Section2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution with the"exclusive authority, subject to the limitations inthis Article, to define the scope of its audit andexamination, establish the techniques andmethods required therefor, and promulgateaccounting and auditing rules, and regulationsincluding those for the prevention anddisallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,extravagant or unconscionable expenditures, oruses of government funds and properties." Thisenables COA to adopt as its own, simply byreiteration or by reference, without the necessity ofrepromulgation and may also expand the coveragethereof to agencies or instrumentalities under itsaudit jurisdiction. However, PAL's corporatecomplexion have changed during the pendency ofthe instant petition from government-controlled toprivate ownership, this means that PAL havingceased to be a government-owned or controlledcorporation, which, consequently, is no longerunder the audit jurisdiction of the COA. Therebythe court dismissed the petition for being moot andacademic.




ANIANO A. ALBON v. BAYANI F. FERNANDO

GR. No. 148357. June 30, 2006FACTS: In May 1999, the City of Marikinaundertook a public works project to widen, clearand repair the existing sidewalks of MarikinaGreenheights Subdivision. It was undertaken bythe city government pursuant to Ordinance No. 59,s. 1993 like other infrastructure projects relating toroads, streets and sidewalks previously undertakenby the city.

On June 14, 1999, petitioner Aniano A.Albon filed with the Regional Trial Court ofMarikina, Branch 73, a taxpayer’s suit for certiorari,prohibition and injunction with damages againstrespondents. Petitioner claimed that it wasunconstitutional and unlawful for respondents touse government equipment and property, and todisburse public funds, of the City of Marikina forthe grading, widening, clearing, repair andmaintenance of the existing sidewalks of MarikinaGreenheights Subdivision. He alleged that thesidewalks were private property because MarikinaGreenheights Subdivision was owned by V.V.Soliven, Inc. Hence, the city government could notuse public resources on them. In undertaking theproject, therefore, respondents allegedly violatedthe constitutional proscription against the use ofpublic funds for private purposes as well asSections 335 and 336 of RA 7160 and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner furtheralleged that there was no appropriation for theproject.

On November 15, 1999, the trial courtrendered its decision dismissing the petition. Itruled that the City of Marikina was authorized tocarry out the contested undertaking pursuant to itsinherent police power. Petitioner sought areconsideration of the trial court’s decision but itwas denied. Thereafter, petitioner elevated thecase to the Court of Appeals via a petition forcertiorari, prohibition, injunction and damageswhich was also denied.ISSUE: May a local government unit validly usepublic funds to undertake the widening, repair andimprovement of the sidewalks of a privately-ownedsubdivision?HELD: Section 335 of RA 7160 is clear andspecific that no public money or property shall beappropriated or applied for private purposes. Thisis in consonance with the fundamental principle inlocal fiscal administration that local governmentfunds and monies shall be spent solely for publicpurposes.

Therefore, the use of LGU funds for thewidening and improvement of privately-ownedsidewalks is unlawful as it directly contravenesSection 335 of RA 7160. This conclusion findsfurther support from the language of Section 17 ofRA 7160 which mandates LGUs to efficiently andeffectively provide basic services and facilities. Thelaw speaks of infrastructure facilities intendedprimarily to service the needs of the residents ofthe LGU and "which are funded out of municipalfunds." It particularly refers to "municipal roads andbridges" and "similar facilities."

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

ROMEO ACOP v. OFFICE OF THEOMBUDSMAN

GR. No. 120422. September 27, 1995FACTS: On May 18, 1995, eleven (11) suspectedmembers of the notorious robbery gang, "KuratongBaleleng," were killed in an alleged shootout withcomposite teams of the National Capital RegionalCommand, Traffic Management Command,Presidential Anti-Crime Commission, CentralPolice District Command and CriminalInvestigation Command. On May 22, 1995, SPO2Eduardo de los Reyes of the Central IntelligenceCommand made an expose', stating that there wasno shootout. De los Reyes stated that the eleven(11) suspected members of the "KuratongBaleleng" gang were victims of summaryexecution. The following day, he executed a swornstatement to this effect.

On May 26, 1995, Acting OmbudsmanFrancisco A. Villa, in a handwritten note, directedpublic respondent Deputy Ombudsman Casaclangto monitor the investigations being conducted bythe Commission on Human Rights, the SenateCommittee on Justice and Human Rights, and thePhilippine National Police (PNP) Director forInvestigation regarding the alleged shootout. OnJune 14, 1995, public respondent Casaclangissued the questioned order directing petitionersand nine others to submit their counter-affidavitsand controverting evidence within ten days fromreceipt thereof.

The petitioners did not comply with the 14June 1995 order, neither did they move forreconsideration. Instead, the petitionersquestioned the conduct of the preliminaryinvestigation without the required preliminaryevaluation in their respective petitions filed with thisCourt.




ISSSUE: Whether or not Casaclang committedgrave abuse of discretion when he set the case forpreliminary investigation and required thepetitioners to submit their counter-affidavits beforeany preliminary evaluation of the complaint asrequired by Section 2, Rule II of AdministrativeOrder No. 07 of the Office of the Ombudsman.HELD: No. In the case, no evidence to that effectwas adduced. On the contrary, as shown by thesummary of antecedent facts, the Panel ofInvestigators submitted its evaluation report on 8June 1995, and it was only on 14 June 1995 thatrespondent Casaclang issued the questionedorder. Section 2, Rule II of Administrative OrderNo. 07 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Rules ofProcedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), onthe process and nature of the evaluation required.It cannot be denied that the evaluation required ismerely preliminary in nature and scope, not adetailed inquiry. Likewise, the conduct of suchevaluation involves the exercise of discretion whichhas not been shown to be abused in the instantcase.

GLORIA G. LASTIMOSA v. OMBUDSMANCONRADO VASQUEZ

GR. No. 116801. April 6, 1995

FACTS: Gloria G. Lastimosa is First AssistantProvincial Prosecutor of Cebu. Because she andthe Provincial Prosecutor refused, or at any ratefailed, to file a criminal charge as ordered by theOmbudsman, an administrative complaint for gravemisconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of dutyand maliciously refraining from prosecuting crimewas filed against her and the Provincial Prosecutorand a charge for indirect contempt was broughtagainst them, both in the Office of theOmbudsman. In the meantime the two were placedunder preventive suspension.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of theOmbudsman can charge the accused for indirectcontempt.

HELD: Section 15(g) of the Ombudsman Act givesthe Office of the Ombudsman the power to "punishfor contempt, in accordance with the Rules ofCourt and under the same procedure and with thesame penalties provided therein." There is no meritin the argument that petitioner and ProvincialProsecutor Kintanar cannot be held liable for

contempt because their refusal arose out of anadministrative, rather than judicial, proceedingbefore the Office of the Ombudsman. As petitionerherself says in another context, the preliminaryinvestigation of a case, of which the filing of aninformation is a part, is quasi judicial in character.

Whether petitioner's refusal to follow theOmbudsman's orders constitutes a defiance,disobedience or resistance of a lawful process,order or command of the Ombudsman thus makingher liable for indirect contempt under Rule 71, §3of the Rules of Court is for respondents todetermine after appropriate hearing. At this point itis important only to note the existence of thecontempt power of the Ombudsman as a means ofenforcing his lawful orders.

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v.FACTORAN

GR. No. 98332. January 16, 1995

FACTS: Former President Corazon Aquino issuedExecutive Order Nos. 211 and 279 in the exerciseof her legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribesthe interim procedures in the processing andapproval of applications for the exploration,development and utilization of minerals pursuant toSection 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EONo. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary tonegotiate and conclude joint-venture, co-production, or production- sharing agreements forthe exploration, development, and utilization ofmineral resources.

The issuance and the impedingimplementation by the DENR of AdministrativeOrder Nos. 57 which declares that all existingmining leases or agreements which were grantedafter the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution…shallbe converted into production-sharing agreementswithin one (1) year from the effectivity of theseguidelines.” and Administrative Order No. 82 whichprovides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent andMineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2years from the effectivity of the DepartmentAdministrative Order No. 57 shall cause theabandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand andgravel claims, after their respective effectivity datescompelled the Miners Association of thePhilippines, Inc., an organization composed ofmining prospectors and claim owners and claim




holders, to file the instant petition assailing theirvalidity and constitutionality before this Court.

ISSUE: Are the two Department AdministrativeOrders valid?

HELD: Yes. Petitioner's insistence on theapplication of Presidential Decree No. 463, asamended, as the governing law on the acceptanceand approval of declarations of location and allother kinds of applications for the exploration,development, and utilization of mineral resourcespursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous.Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertainsto the old system of exploration, development andutilization of natural resources through "license,concession or lease" which, however, has beendisallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987Constitution. By virtue of the said constitutionalmandate and its implementing law, ExecutiveOrder No. 279 which superseded Executive OrderNo. 211, the provisions dealing on "license,concession or lease" of mineral resources underPresidential Decree No. 463, as amended, andother existing mining laws are deemed repealedand, therefore, ceased to operate as the governinglaw. In other words, in all other areas ofadministration and management of mineral lands,the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, asamended, and other existing mining laws, stillgovern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279provides that all provisions of Presidential DecreeNo. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws,and their implementing rules and regulations, orparts thereof, which are not inconsistent with theprovisions of this Executive Order, shall continue inforce and effect.

Well -settled is the rule, however, thatregardless of the reservation clause, mining leasesor agreements granted by the State, such as thosegranted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211referred to this petition, are subject to alterationsthrough a reasonable exercise of the police powerof the State.

Accordingly, the State, in the exercise ofits police power in this regard, may not beprecluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying andamending the mining leases or agreementsgranted under Presidential Decree No. 463, asamended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211.Police Power, being co-extensive with thenecessities of the case and the demands of public

interest; extends to all the vital public needs. Thepassage of Executive Order No. 279 whichsuperseded Executive Order No. 211 providedlegal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry intoeffect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the1987 Constitution.

UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN, INC v. COURTOF APPEALS

GR. No. 100588. March 7, 1994

FACTS: Private respondents were third yearNursing students of petitioner University of SanAgustin (USA) who were refused re-admission inthe summer classes of 1989 and last twosemesters of school year 1989-1990 on thealleged ground that they failed to obtain grades ofnot lower than 80% in Nursing 104 (NursingPractice II with Related Learning Experience).They filed this petition because of their belief thatthe persistent refusal to re-admit them prejudicedtheir right to freely choose their field of study andfinish a college degree.

ISSUE: Were the petitioners deprived of theirrights?

HELD: No. Article XIV, Section 5(2) of the 1987Constitution reiterates that academic freedom shallbe enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.Academic freedom of educational institutions hasbeen defined as the right of the school or collegeto decide for itself, its aims and objectives, andhow best to attain them — free from outsidecoercion or interference save possibly when theoverriding public welfare calls for some restraint. Ithas a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extendingto the choice of students. While it is true that aninstitution of learning has a contractual obligationto afford its students a fair opportunity to completethe course they seek to pursue, since a contractcreates reciprocal rights and obligations, theobligation of the school to educate a student wouldimply a corresponding obligation on the part of thestudent to study and obey the rules andregulations of the school. When a student commitsa serious breach of discipline or fails to maintainthe required academic standard, he forfeits hiscontractual right. In this connection, this Courtrecognizes the expertise of educational institutionsin the various fields of learning. Thus, they areafforded ample discretion to formulate reasonablerules and regulations in the admission of students,including setting of academic standards. Within theparameters thereof, they are competent todetermine who are entitled to admission and re-




admission. Thus it could be seen in the petitioners’performances that they are still academicallydeficient for failure to meet the standards set bypetitioner USA. Thereby, this petition was granted.

ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY v. IGNACIOM. CAPULONG

GR. No. 99327. May 27, 1993

FACTS: As a requisite to membership, the AquilaLegis, a fraternity organized in the Ateneo LawSchool, held its initiation rites on February 8, 9 and10, 1991, for students interested in joining itsranks. As a result of such initiation rites, Leonardo"Lennie" H. Villa, a first year student of petitioneruniversity, died of serious physical injuries. He wasnot the lone victim, though, for another freshmanby the name of Bienvenido Marquez was alsohospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acuterenal failure occasioned by the serious physicalinjuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion.

In a notice dated February 11, 1991,petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a JointAdministration-Faculty-Student InvestigatingCommittee which was tasked to investigate andsubmit a report within 72 hours on thecircumstances surrounding the death of LennieVilla. Although respondent students received acopy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply.In the meantime, they were placed on preventivesuspension. The school alleges that therespondent students clearly violated Rule 3 of theLaw School Catalogue entitled "Discipline."

ISSUE: Was the suspension by the petitioneracceptable?

HELD: Yes. When petitioner Cynthia del Castillo,as Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified andrequired respondent students on February 11,1991 to submit within twenty-four hours theirwritten statement on the incident, records showthat instead of filing a reply, respondent studentsrequested through their counsel, copies of thecharges. This shows that the respondent studentswere given ample opportunity to adduce evidencein their behalf and to answer the charges leveledagainst them, but did not do so. Further, asmandated in Article XIV, Section 5(2) stating:"Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in allinstitutions of higher learning," it and in Garcia v.Loyola School of Theology, that the court hasconsistently upheld the salutary proposition thatadmission to an institution of higher learning isdiscretionary upon a school, the same being a

privilege on the part of the student rather than aright. These rules are basically incidents to thevery object of incorporation and indispensable tothe successful management of the college whichmay include those that are governing studentdiscipline. Thus, this petition was granted.

UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS v. COURT OFAPPEALS

GR. No. 79237. October 18, 1988

FACTS: Private respondent Jennifer C. Lee filedan action for mandamus with damages againstpetitioners University of San Carlos and Victoria A.Satorre, asking that petitioners be compelled toconfer upon her the degree of Bachelor of Sciencein Commerce, major in Accounting, cumlaude,retroactive to March 28, 1982, to execute anddeliver to her all necessary credentials evidencingher graduation with honors, and to pay herdamages. After trial, the lower court rendered itsDecision dated January 29, 1986 in favor ofplaintiff. Petitioners appealed to the respondentCourt of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed intoto the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus is the properremedy to compel a university to confer a degreewith honors.

HELD: It is an accepted principle that schools ofteaming are given ample discretion to formulaterules and guidelines in the granting of honors forpurposes of graduation. This is part of academicfreedom. Within the parameters of these rules, it iswithin the competence of universities and collegesto determine who are entitled to the grant ofhonors among the graduating students. Itsdiscretion on this academic matter may not bedisturbed much less controlled by the courts unlessthere is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise.

In this case, the petitioner's bulletin ofinformation provides all students and all otherinterested parties advice on the University policiesand rules on enrollment and academicachievements. Therein it is provided, amongothers, that a student may not officially withdrawfrom subjects in the curriculum if he does not havethe written permission of his parents or guardian.For an incomplete grade, there must be anapplication for completion or removal within theperiod announced by the school calendar andwhen not removed within one (1) year, itautomatically becomes final. A "DR" (Dropped)




subject which is in the same category, as a "5"disqualifies a student from receiving honors. Afailure in any subject disqualifies a student fromhonors. Good moral character and exemplaryconduct are as important criteria for honors asacademic achievements. Private respondentshould know and is presumed to know thoseUniversity policies and is bound to complytherewith. It is precisely because she knew ofthese rules that she exerted all efforts to have herfinal grades of "5's" in Architecture 122 andArchitecture 123 be disregarded in thecomputation of honors. Nevertheless, even if shesucceeded in removing her failing grades, it wasstill within the sound discretion of the petitioners todetermine whether private respondent was entitledto graduate with honors. The Court finds thatpetitioners did not commit a grave abuse ofdiscretion in denying the honors sought by privaterespondent under the circumstances. Indeed, theaforesaid change of grades did not automaticallyentitle her to the award of honors.

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OFREGENTS v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR. No. 134625. August 31, 1999

FACTS: Private respondent Arokiasawamy WilliamMargaret Celine is a citizen of India and a holder ofa Philippine visitor’s visa. She enrolled in adoctoral program in anthropology of the Universityof the Philippines. After completing her units ofcourse work required in her doctoral program, sheleft the country to work in Rome. After two years,she returned to the Philippines to work on herdissertation. Upon her presentation of herdissertation for approval to the panel, Dr. Medina,a dean’s representative to the panel, noticed thatsome portions of her work were lifted from otherworks without the proper acknowledgement.Nonetheless, she was allowed to defend herdissertation. She passed her oral defense, whichwas approved by four of the five panelists with thecondition that she shall incorporate certainamendments to the final copy of her dissertation.However, in her final submission of the copy of herdissertation, she failed to incorporate thenecessary revisions. With this development, Dr.Medina formally charged her with plagiarism andrecommended that the doctorate granted upon herbe withdrawn. After an investigation, the College ofSocial Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) CollegeAssembly recommended the withdrawal of herdoctorate degree, which was approved by the U.P.Board of Regents. Private respondent filed a

petition for mandamus with prayer for a writ ofpreliminary injunction and damages againstpetitioners herein, alleging that they had unlawfullywithdrawn her degree without justification. The trialcourt dismissed her petition. However, on appeal,the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’sdecision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erredin its decision.

HELD: The narration of facts showed that variouscommittees were formed to investigate the chargesthat private respondent committed plagiarism. In allinvestigations held, she was heard in her defense.Where it was shown that the conferment of anhonor or distinction was obtained through fraud, auniversity has the right to withdraw the honor ordistinction it has conferred. Under the U.P. Charter,the Board of Regents is the highest governingbody of the U.P. In the case at bar, the Board ofRegents’ decision to withdraw private respondent’sdoctorate degree was based on records, includingher admission that she committed the offense. TheSupreme Court reversed the decision of the Courtof Appeals and the petition for mandamus wasdismissed.

AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THECONSTITUTION

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO v. COMMISSION ONELECTIONS

GR. No. L-34150. October 16, 1971

FACTS: The case is a petition for prohibition torestrain respondent Commission on Elections"from undertaking to hold a plebiscite onNovember 8, 1971," at which the proposedconstitutional amendment "reducing the votingage" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution ofthe Philippines to eighteen years "shall be,submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant toOrganic Resolution No. 1 of the ConstitutionalConvention of 1971, and the subsequentimplementing resolutions, by declaring saidresolutions to be without the force and effect of lawfor being violative of the Constitution of thePhilippines. The Constitutional Convention of 1971came into being by virtue of two resolutions of theCongress of the Philippines approved in itscapacity as a constituent assembly convened forthe purpose of calling a convention to proposeamendments to the Constitution namely,




Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions ofCongress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17,1969 respectively. The delegates to the saidConvention were all elected under and by virtue ofsaid resolutions and the implementing legislationthereof, Republic Act 6132.

ISSUE: Is it within the powers of the ConstitutionalConvention of 1971 to order the holding of aplebiscite for the ratification of the proposedamendment/s?

HELD: The Court holds that all amendments to beproposed must be submitted to the people in asingle "election" or plebiscite. We hold that theplebiscite being called for the purpose ofsubmitting the same for ratification of the people onNovember 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1of Article XV of the Constitution; hence all acts ofthe Convention and the respondent COMELEC inthat direction are null and void. lt says distinctlythat either Congress sitting as a constituentassembly or a convention called for the purpose"may propose amendments to thisConstitution,". The same provision also asdefinitely provides that "such amendments shall bevalid as part of this Constitution when approved bya majority of the votes cast at an election at whichthe amendments are submitted to the people fortheir ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt asto how many "elections" or plebiscites may be heldto ratify any amendment or amendments proposedby the same constituent assembly of Congress orconvention, and the provision unequivocably says"an election" which means only one.

The petition herein is granted. OrganicResolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Conventionof 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutionsof the Convention, insofar as they provide for theholding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, aswell as the resolution of the respondent COMELECcomplying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) arehereby declared null and void. The respondentsCOMELEC, Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountantand Auditor of the Constitutional Convention arehereby enjoined from taking any action incompliance with the said organic resolution. Inview of the peculiar circumstances of this case, theCourt declares this decision immediatelyexecutory.

LAMBINO v. COMELECGR. No. 174153. October 25, 2006

FACTS: Petitioners (Lambino group) commencedgathering signatures for an initiative petition tochange the 1987 constitution, they filed a petitionwith the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that willratify their initiative petition under RA 6735.Lambino group alleged that the petition had thesupport of 6M individuals fulfilling what wasprovided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petitionchanges the 1987 constitution by modifyingsections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 andby adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shiftthe present bicameral- presidential form ofgovernment to unicameral- parliamentary.COMELEC denied the petition due to lack ofenabling law governing initiative petitions andinvoked the Santiago vs. COMELEC ruling that RA6735 is inadequate to implement the initiativepetitions.

ISSUE: Whether the Lambino Group’s initiativepetition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of theConstitution on amendments to the Constitutionthrough a people’s initiative.

HELD: According to the SC the Lambino groupfailed to comply with the basic requirements forconducting a people’s initiative. The Court heldthat the COMELEC did not grave abuse ofdiscretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply withSection 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on DirectProposal by the People. The petitioners failed toshow the court that the initiative signer must beinformed at the time of the signing of the natureand effect, failure to do so is “deceptive andmisleading” which renders the initiative void.

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