VII. Bill of RightsA. Fundamental powers of the state (police power, eminent domain, taxation)1. Concept, application and limits2. Requisites for valid exercise3. Similarities and differencesDue process v. eminent domainChurchill v. RaffertyAct 2339 Authorized the CIR to remove any sign or billboard that is offensive to the sight or otherwise a nuisance, and collect an annual tax of P4 per sqm. The SC upheld the provisions. What was being regulated was the use of public thoroughfares, and the police power measure validly protected the comfort and convenience of the public, particularly the prevention of nuisance due to billboards which were offensive to the sight. Thus, what was involved here was NOT taking that would require just compensation, but regulation in accordance with due process.U.S. v. ToribioToribio was charged for violation of Act no. 1147, because he had a carabao slaughtered for human consumption. He claimed that the act constituted taking without just compensation. The court held that it was not taking for public use in the concept of eminent domain, but rather taking in the exercise of the States police power.4. DelegationB. Private acts and the Bill of RightsC. Due process the rights to life, liberty & property1. Relativity of due process2. Procedural and substantive due processProcedural:Banco Espanol Filipino v. PalancaEngracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his debt. Palanca left for China and never returned until he died. As Palanca was a non-resident, El Banco had to notify Engracio about the suit for the foreclosure of his property by publication. The lower court eventually allowed Banco to execute upon the property. 7 years later, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as his administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Engracio never received the summons.The SC ruled against Palanca, holding that the requisites for judicial due process had been met. The requisites are:1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and decide the matter before it2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property subject of the proceedings.3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.Ang Tibay v. CIRAng Tibay laid off workers belonging to the NLU. NLU protested this alleged unfair labor practice to the CIR, which ruled in its favor despite the lack of evidence. The SC in the instant case remanded the case to the CIR for a new trial, finding that the NLU may have been deprived of some primary rights when it tried to prove its case before the CIR. This case is considered to have codified the 7 elements of Administrative Due Process, namely:1. Hearing2. Tribunal must have considered evidence presented.3. Decision must find support in evidence.4. Evidence must be substantial.5. Decision must be rendered based on evidence presented at the hearing.6. Administrative agency must act on its own opinion on the law and facts of the controversy, and7. The decision must be made in such a manner that the parties know the issues involved and the reasons behind the decision made. De Bisschop v. GalangBisschop, an American citizen was allowed to stay in the Philippines for 3 years, until August 1, 1959. His application for extension of stay was by the Board of Commissioners, which ordered him to depart within 5 days. No decision was promulgated. The CFI ordered Commissioner Galang to desist and refrain from arresting and deporting Bisschop, until proper and legal proceedings are conducted by the Board in connection with his application for extension of stay.The SC overturned the CFI. A day in court is not a matter of right in administrative proceedings. In certain administrative proceedings, the right to notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law. David v. AquilizanDavid had a large parcel of land in Polomolok, Cotabato, which he left in the care of Felomeno and Ricardo Jugar. David later withdrew the land from the brothers and has not allowed them to return. Justice Aquilizan handled the case filed by the brothers against David. He rendered a decision in favor of the brothers without any hearing. J Aquilizan admitted that there was indeed no hearing conducted but he said the decision has already become final and executory as the period for appeal has already lapsed. The SC ruled in favor of David. A decision rendered without a hearing is null and void and may be attacked directly or collaterally. The decision is null and void for want of due process. And it has been held that a final and executory judgment may be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation when the judgment is void for lack of due process of law. In legal contemplation, it is as if no judgment has been rendered at all.Tanada v. Tuvera, Supra.There can be no finding of a violation of a law if the law has not been published, as that would be violative of procedural due process. Substantive:OldProtection of Property interestsPeople v. PomarAn act was enacted by Congress, providing that employers should grant pregnant female employees maternity leave. Pomar allowed his employee to take a vacation for her delivery but refused to pay her the wages during such period. The SCheld the pertinent provisions of the Act unconstitutional for infringing on ones right to contract. The constitution of the Philippine Islands guarantees to every citizen his liberty and one of his liberties is the liberty to contract. The law would deprive Pomar and all other entities employing women of the said liberty, without due process of law.Rubi v Provincial Boad of MindoroRubi filed a petition for habeas corpus after he and the rest of the Mangyans of Mindoro were relocated by the Government. The SC did not grant the petition. It held that the relocation of non-Christians was a valid exercise of the police power.NDC and AGRIX v. Phil. VeteransPVB attempted to foreclose a mortgage of Agrix, but the latter company invoked PD1717, rehabilitating Agrix and declaring all its obligations cancelled and its mortgages extinguished. The SC struck down the PD. There was not a sufficient public interest involved. The cancellation of the obligations was violative of due process, because it extinguished property rights and impaired contracts. Balacuit v. CFI, 163 SCRA 182 (2 Bernas 41) C2The Municipal Board of Butuan City issued Ordinance 640 to address the complaint of parents that it is too financially burdensome for them to pay the full admission price for their children. The Ordinance provided that admission tickets for movies, public exhibitions, games, contests, and other performances, should be sold at half the price for children between 7 and 12 years of age. Violators would be penalized with imprisonment and/or a fine. The SC ruled that Ordinance 640 is an invalid exercise of police power and, as a consequence, it violates the due process clause of the constitution. A valid exercise of police power requires that it should be for (a.) the publics interest, (b.) the means employed should be reasonable and it should not be oppressive. Here, the court did not find a tangible link between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, security, morals, or welfare. Furthermore, the means employed were judged to be unfair since they unjustly prejudice the affected businesses by restraining their right to trade and even violating their right to enter into contracts.Agustin v. Edu, supra.The proposed measure to compel each vehicle to supply reflective safety devise is a valid exercise of police power, it having been issued in order to protect public safety. NewProtection for Liberty Interests in PrivacyOple v. Torres, supra.The proposed national ID system violates the right to privacy of each individual, as it does not safeguard the information therein contained. White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, supra.The prohibition against quick-time stays in hotels is unconstitutional, being violative of due process and the right to privacy. While upholding morals is a valid state purpose, there are other purposes for renting a hotel for less than 5 hours. As an unreasonable means towards a valid end, the ordinance is unconstitutional and void.3. Constitutional and statutory due process4. Hierarchy of rightsPBMEA v. PBMThe Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization carried out a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969 in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police department, against the wishes of the PBM management. PBMEO was found guilty of bargaining in bad faith and its officers were ordered to be dismissed.The SC did not agree. The demonstration was not a strike; it was an exercise of their rights to engage in concerted activities for ... mutual aid or protection." Thus, the companys action constituted as interference to their right to engage in concerted activity. While it is true that PBMs right to property was infringe, such rights must be weighed against the human rights of the workers. In the hierarchy of rights, human rights outweigh mere property rights. 5. Judicial standards of review6. Void-for-vagueness doctrineD. Equal protectionPeople v. VeraCu Unjieng applied for probation after being convicted by the trial court in Manila. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by Cu Unjieng allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which granted provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted persons; nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila. The SC struck down the law of being unconstitutional.. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equal protection so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation. Onnoc Sugar Company, Inc. v. Treasurer of Ormoc CityThe Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 imposing on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to USA and other foreign countries. Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation.The SC ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, subject to the Cayat requisites. A perusal of the requisites shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central for the coverage of the tax.People v. CayatCayat was fined for possessing A-1-1 gin in contravention of the statute prohibiting non-Christian tribes from possessing liquors aside from native wines and liquors. He challenged the statute on the ground of violation of equal protection. The SC held the Act constitutional, as there was a valid distinction. This case laid down the classic requisites for reasonable classification, namely1. It must rest on substantial distinctions,2. It must be germane to the purpose of the law3. Not limited to existing conditions only, and4. Must apply equally to all members of the same class.International School Alliance v. QuisumbingA group of local teachers working at the International School of Manila claim that the fact that they are paid less than their foreign counterparts violates equal protection. The SC agreed, not on the ground that Filipinos and foreigners should be treated similarly, in fact holding that the foreign teachers were part of a different bargaining unit, but because it upheld the principle of equal pay for equal work.1. Concept2. Requisites for valid classification3. Standards of judicial reviewa) Rational Basis Testb) Strict Scrutiny Testc) Intermediate Scrutiny TestE. Searches and seizuresPeople v. MalmstedtMalmstedt (defendant) entered the Philippines in 1988. In 7 May 1989, defendant went to Baguio and the following day, went to Sagada and stayed there for 2 days. The NARCOM set up checkpoints near Sagada. Information was received that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. Malmstedts bus was stopped and NARCOM members conducted inspection. CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on defendants waist and suspecting that it was a gun, he asked for defendants passport and other documents but the latter failed to comply. Thereupon, Galutan ordered defendant to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. It turned out to be a pouch bag, which contained 4 suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape. The wrapped object contained hashish, a derivative of marijuana. Malmstedy was thus convicted for a violation of Dangerous Drug Act of 1972. The SC upheld the search, and thus the conviction. There was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime, arising fromoPersistent reports of drugs being transported from SagadaoInformation that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that day had drugsoThere was a bulge on the waist of defendant and he failed to present his passportMalmstedt, at the time of the arrest, was actually in possession of illegal drugs, and thus in flagrante delicto. As there was a valid warrantless arrest, there was a lawful search even without a search warrant. People v. CFIOne week before February 9, 1974, an undisclosed informer told RASAC (Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center) that dutiable (taxable) goods will be transported from Angeles to Manila in a Blue Dodge car. As a result of the information thus gathered, 4,441 wristwatches and 1,075 bracelets of assorted brands were found in the car. Eventually, Hope and Medina were found guilty of smuggling. On appeal, the SC upheld the warrantless search. The Tariff and Customs Code grants persons duly commissioned to do warrantless searches if there is reason to suspect that the code being violated (i.e. suspecting the existence of smuggled items). The fact that the search was made of a moving vehicle justified the finding of probable cause all the more. Burgos v. Chief of Staff

Roan v. GonzalesRoan claimed to have been a victim of an illegal search and seizure conducted by military authorities, evidence acquired thereby being used as evidence in his case for illegal possession of firearms. While a warrant was issued, none of the articles in the warrant were found. Rather, a Colt Magnum and 18 live bullets were found, which are now the bases of the charges against Roan. The warrant was void for absence of examination of the applicant. Even consent to the search cannot cure the invalidity of the warrant. As a result, the evidence gathered thereby is inadmissible. The plain view rule does not apply here. The weapon did not just appear. It was searched for by the authorities. Valmonte v. VillaOn 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region.As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.Valmonte et al sought thedeclaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional.The SC upheld the LOI. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is howeverreasonablyconducted, the former should prevail.Aniag v. COMELECIn preparation for the 1992 national elections, COMELEC issued a resolution ordering a GUN BAN and the summary disqualification of candidates found to be engaged in gunrunning, using/transporting firearms, etc. Due to this, petitioner was asked by the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Reps to surrender the firearms issued to him by such office. Petitioner ordered his driver, Arellano, to deliver the firearms to the Batasan Complex. However, the PNP already set up a check-point about 20m. from the Batasan entry. The car was searched, the firearms seized and Arellano was detained (but later released for his meritorious sworn explanation. Petitioner Congressman then went to the Office of the City Prosecutor to explain that the driver was just returning the firearms and that Arellano was neither a bodyguard/security officer. However, COMELEC still ordered the filing of Information against petitioner and his driver. The SC ruled that the search and seizure was invalid. It may be valid even if not authorized by authority, provided that the search conducted at police or military checkpoints which we declared are not illegal per se, and stressed that the warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. Also, a warrantless search could only be resorted to if the officers have probable cause to believe BEFORE the search that either 1) the motorist was an offender or that 2) the evidence related to the crime will be found in the vehicle searched.1. ConceptGuazon v. De VillaGuazon and the other petitioners claimed to be victims of saturation drives held by the military and police. The SC held that the saturation drives were unconstitutional, for having infringed on the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures. 2. Warrant requirementa) RequisitesPICOP v. AsuncionA raid was conducted on the PICOP compound, pursuant to a search warrant for that purpose. The raid yielded several illegally possessed firearms, and resulted in the conviction of various officers of PICOP for possession of illegal firearms. However, the SC found the issuance of the search warrant invalid, because the judge did not personally examine the complainant and other deponents, the policeman who testified during the hearing had no personal knowledge that there were illegal firearms, and the warrants failed to describe the place to be searched with particularity.3. Warrantless searchesManalili v. CAManalili was charged with Illegal Possession of Marijuana. He was arrested after being stopped and frisked, because he had reddish eyes and was walking in a swaying manner. He was convicted.Ruling on the validity of his arrest due to stop-and-frisk, the SC upheld the arrest. When dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation where there is no time to secure an arrest or a search warrant, policemen should employ limited, flexible responses like "stop-and-frisk" which are graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess, the lawmen being ever vigilant to respect and not to violate or to treat cavalierly the citizen's constitutional rights against unreasonable arrest, search and seizure.People v. MartiMarti was convicted of possession of marijuana. The marijuana had been found by the proprietor of a shipping company where he attempted to have 4 packages of marijuana delivered abroad. The proprietor opened the packages, leading Marti to challenge the search as illegal. However, the SC upheld the conviction. The bill of rights, particularly the prohibition against warrantless searches does not bind parties other than the government. Stonehill v. Diokno42 search warrants were issued, ordering police officers to search for documents, articles, etc, which could be used to violate the laws. The evidence found via the searches led to convictions for violations of Custom Laws, Tax Laws, and the Revised Penal Codes. The SC ruled that the warrants, being general warrants, were void. 4. Warrantless arrestsUmil v. RamosThe petitioners were arrested for various offenses without warrants. They all filed petitions for habeas corpus. The SC denied the petitions. All the petitioners were arrested for continuing offenses like rebellion or inciting to sedition. Thus, an arrest of an NPA member while being treated for injuries at hospital was valid even without a warrant, as the offense of rebellion continued to be committed. The arrest was thus in flagrante delicto.People v. Chua Ho SanChua Ho San was convicted of possession of shabu. He was arrested after landing on the shore in a motorboat. Upon landing, he fled the scene until the police caught him. He was searched and a bag containing 28.7 kg of shabu was found on his person. The SC reversed, and acquitted Chua. While a valid warrantless search may follow as a consequence of a valid warrantless arrest, here, the warrantless arrest, not being based on probable cause that an offense was committed, was void. As a result, the search and seizure was also void, and the bag of shabu was inadmissible as evidence.People v. AminnudinThe PC officers received a tip from an informant that Amminnudin was bound for Iloilo onboard MV WILCOM 9 carrying marijuana. Aminnudin was searched and arrested after disembarking from the vessel. The PC officers found 3 kilos of marijuana in his bag. He was charged and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana by the CFI of Iloilo. The decision was appealed to the SC. The SC ruled that there was no valid search and arrest so the evidence against him was inadmissible. He was acquitted. People v. BurgosRuben Burgos was convicted by the Davao del Sur RTC for Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Subversion. He was arrested while plowing his field. The Philippine Constabulary did not have a warrant. They based their operation on the sole testimony of Cesar Masamlok who allegedly was coerced by accused to join the NPA using his gun. SC ruled that the arrest and subsequent search was illegal because it did not fall under the warrantless arrests covered by Rule 113, Sec. 6. Personal knowledge on the part of the arresting officer is important. Applying the Stonehill doctrine, the evidence was inadmissible. Burgos was thus acquitted.5. Administrative arrests6. Drug, alcohol and blood testsF. Privacy of communications and correspondence1. Private and public communications2. Intrusion, when allowed3. Writ of habeas dataG. Freedom of expression1. Concept and scopePeople v. NabongNabong,lawyerofFeleo,gaveaspeechtoagatheringofcommunistssayingthatthey should overthrowthegovernment,establishtheirowngovernmentofthepoorandthattheyshouldusewhipsontheConstabularymen,whowerecorrupt. The SC ruled that Nabongs language advocatedanoverthrowofthegovernmentthroughviolentmeans,and wasthereforeseditious.National Press Club v. COMELECThree cases were filed, in the hopes of rendering void Section 11 of the RA 6646 or the Electoral Reforms Act, which prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time "for campaign or other political purposes," except to the Commission on Elections, on the ground of violation of the freedom of the press. The SC held that since the said section does not restrict news reporting by the mass media companies, nor does it reach commentaries and opinions of broadcasters and writers, the petition must be dismissed. The controversial provision has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods, which is granted to the COMELEC by the Constitution under Art IX-C.Adiong v. COMELECComelec Resolution No. 2347 was promulgated providing that campaign materials (stickers, printed materials, decals, leaflets etc.. ) may be posted only in authorized posting areas, as well as prohibiting the display of election propaganda in any places including mobile or stationary private/public except those in the allowable areas. The SC declared the resolution void on the grounds, that the prohibition of posting of stickers etc... on an individuals property does not only deprive the said individual from the use of his property -since owner is not allowed to place campaign materials on his property- but also deprive him of his right to free speech and information - since posting/placing such material or property reflects/expresses his political views or the candidates he believes in.US v. BustosIn the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, then prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The complainants charged that the justice of the peace solicited bribe money in consideration of favorable decisions. The judge of first instance, after investigation, recommended to the Governor-General that the justice of the peace be removed from office. After filing a motion for new trial, the judge of first instance ordered the suppression of the charges and acquitted the justice of the peace of the same. Criminal action was then begun against the petitioners, now become the defendants, charging that portions of the petition presented to the Executive Secretary were libelous. The trial court found thirty-two of the defendants guilty and sentenced each of them to pay a nominal fine. The SC acquitted Bustos et al. Express malice was not proved by the prosecution. Good faith surrounded the action of the petitioners. Their ends and motives were justifiable. The charges and the petition were transmitted through reputable attorneys to the proper functionary. The defendants are not guilty and instead of punishing them for an honest endeavour to improve the public service, they should rather be commended for their good citizenship.The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common good. Rising superior to any official, or set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary -- to any or all the agencies of Government -- public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled.In Re: JuradoEmil Jurado is a columnist-lawyer who wrote several articles about improper transactions in the judiciary. CJ Narvasa issued an administrative order creating an ad hoc committee to investigate corruption in the judiciary. Jurado was one of those invited to appear before the committee and to testify as to his knowledge as he had a lot to say about the topic in his columns. He refused. Some of the subjects of his writings also wrote to the SC saying that what he wrote were lies and asked the Court to take appropriate action.False reports about a public official or other person are not shielded from sanction by the cardinal right to free speech enshrined in the Constitution. Even the most liberal view of free speech has never countenanced the publication of falsehoods, specially the persistent and unmitigated dissemination of patent lies.

a) Prior restraint (censorship)Franciso Chavez v. Secretary Raul GonzalezAfter the 2004 National Elections, a controversy came out after cassette tapes that allegedly recorded conversations involving PGMA and Garcillano went on air. Given that such conversations were being aired all over broadcast media, Pres. Secretary Ignacio Bunye and the NTC, on separate occasions, issued warnings against broadcast companies to stop airing such information. Chavez asked that such warnings be declared null and void for violating freedom of speech, expression, and the press. The court agreed with the petitioner given that the warnings which were content-based restrictions failed to pass the strict scrutiny standard and the clear and present danger test. The evidence of the respondents fell short of satisfying such standards required.People v. PerezPerez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, met with Ludovice, and during their discussion said The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence." Leonard Wood was the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. He was convicted of Sedition. The SC upheld the conviction.A seditious attack on the Governor-General is an attack on the rights of the Filipino people and on American sovereignty. Perezs words were seditious. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious. But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State.Eastern Broadcasting v. DansRadio station DYRE, owned by Eastern Broadcasting, filed a petition to compel the respondents to reopen the station after it was summarily closed on grounds of national security. It was allegedly closed on the charge that it was used to incite sedition. No hearing was held and no proof was submitted to establish the factual basis for closure. While the case became moot and academic upon the withdrawal of EBC, The SC issued certain guidelines for similar circumstances:1.The seven requisites of administrative proceedings in Ang Tibay v. CIR should be followed before a broadcast station is closed or its operations curtailed.2.While there is no controlling and precise definition of due process, it furnishes an unavoidable standard to which government action must conform in order that any deprivation of life, liberty, or property, in each appropriate case, may be valid. 3.Media is entitled to the broad protection of freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression is the clear and present danger rule that words are used in such circumstances and are of such nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.4.Broadcasting has to be licensed. The freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than print media. This is because (1) broadcast media is more pervasive, and (2) easily accessible to children. Because of its pervasiveness, the impact of inflammatory or offensive speech on people would be difficult to monitor or predict. Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio (and television) audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze, and reject the utterance.5.The clear and present danger test must take the particular circumstance of broadcast media into account. There has to be a balance between the governments right to be protected against broadcasts which incite listeners to overthrow it, and the peoples right to be informed.6.The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy.7.Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution. (Sec. 1 and Sec. 4, Art. III).SWS v. COMELECSWS and Kamahalan Publishing seek to enjoin COMELEC from enforcing Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair Election Act) which prohibits the publishing of election surveys 15 days before the election of national candidates and 7 days before the election of local candidates. The petitioners wish to publish surveys covering the entire election period and argue that the resolution violates their right to free speech and expression. COMELEC on the other hand argues that the resolution is in pursuit of governmental interest, and that the impairment is minimal. It was held that the resolution is invalid as because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and that (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.b) Subsequent punishment2. Content-based and content-neutral regulationsa) Testsb) ApplicationsOsmena v. COMELECThis is a petition for prohibition, seeking a reexamination of the validity of 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, which prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge print space or airtime for campaign or other political purposes, except to the COMELEC. Petitioners are candidates for public office in the upcoming elections, who contend that the events after the NPC v. Comelec have shown undesirable effects because the ban on political ads has failed to level the playing field and has worked against the poor candidates. The petitioners seek for the re-argument of the issues already settled in NPC v. Comelec. The SC ruled that RA 6646 is a valid exercise of the power of the state to regulate media of communication to ensure equal opportunity. It merely regulates the time, place and manner of advertising of political ads and it does not abridge freedom of speech and of the press. Hence, the dismissal of the petition.Policarpio v. Manila TimesPolicarpio, executive secretary of the UNESCO National Commission, was charged with malversation of public funds and estafa through falsification of public documents.the Manila times ran a story exaggerating the charges against her. The Manila Times claimed immunity because of the freedom of the press. The SC ruled that damages should be awarded to POlicarpio. The freedom of speech and press immunity presuppose that the derogatory information they publish are both true and fair and made in good faith, without comments or remarks. Ayer Production v. Judge CapulongAyer Productions wanted to make a film about the EDSA Revolution, entitled The Four-Day Revolution. Sen. Enrile did not want to appear in the movie and sought to have the continued production enjoined. The SC did not grant the injunction. The subject matter of the film is of public interest. Even the right of privacy must yield to the freedom of expression, notwithstanding the fact that the film was made primarily for profit. Gonzalez v. Kalaw KatigbakGonzales, on behalf of Malaya Films, assails the Boards classification of their production Kapit sa Patalim as For Adults Only and its resolution to issue a permit only if the petitioner makes certain changes and deletions. It was held that the Board did not commit any grave abuse of discretion because its resolution was supported by the fact that a number of scenes in the movie are not fit for public viewing. Hence the court restated the test to determine obscenity: Whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.Pita v. CAOn December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials, including Pitas Pinoy Playboy magainzes, believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student organizations.Pita thus filed a case for injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. The SC dismissed the petition. Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications. However, It is easier said than done to say, that if the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. Using the Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall." Another is whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case and that the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it." 3. Facial challenges and the overbreadth doctrine4. Tests5. State regulation of different types of mass media6. Commercial speech7. Private vs. government speech8. Hecklers vetoH. Freedom of religion1. Non-establishment clauseAglipay v. RuizGregorio Aglipay, the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, filed for a writ of prohibition against Juan Ruiz, Director of Posts, to stop him from selling postage stamps which commemorated the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress organized by the Catholic Church in Manila. Petitioner alleges that this violates the Constitutional provision prohibitting the use of public money for the benefit of any religious denomination. The Court denied the petition. The Director of Posts acted by virtue of Act No. 4052 which appropriated 60,000 pesos for the cost of printing of stamps with new designs. The stamps themselves featured a map of the Philippines. The governments goal was to promote the Philippines. There was no religious goal. The proceeds of the sale of the stamps also went to the government and no to any church.Centeno v. Villalon-PornillosThe officers of a civic organizationSamahang katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikaylaunched a fund drive to renovate the chapel of Bgy Tikay in Malolos, Bulacan. Chairman Martin Centeno and Vicente Yco approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles and solicited P1500 from her. This was done without a license from the DSWD. Angeles filed a complaint, and because of that an information sa filed against Centeno, Yco, and Religio Evaristo for violating Presidential Decree 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law. As to the infringement of religious freedoms, the SC discussed the dual nature of legislation on the subject of religion. On one hand, it prevents the compulsion by law if the acceptance of any creed. On the other, it protects the free exercise of any chosen form of religion. Thus, there are two constitutional freedoms regarding religionthe freedom to believe and the freedom to act. While the former is absolute, the latter can be subject to regulation for the protection of society.In this case, the state may protect the public from fraudulent solicitation by requiring those who solicit to establish identity and authority to solicit. Even though the regulation resulting from such a policy may infringe religious acts, it is not invalid because the general regulation protecting citizens from unjust solicitation is not open to any constitutional objection.Victoriano v Elizalde Rope Workers UnionVictoriano is a member of Iglesia ni Cristo who is an employee at the Elizalde Rope Factory, and a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers Union. The company and the union are in a closed shop agreement where all employees must be a member of the collective bargaining union in order to maintain employment. RA 3350 was passed which states that CBAs shall no longer cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation in any labor organization. The union assails the constitutionality of RA 3350 because it infringes on the right of association, impairs contracts and discriminates in favor of such members of religious sects. The court upheld the constitutionality of RA 3350 because (1) the Union misread the law, which actually does not prohibit association, but only reinforces a persons right to refrain from association, (2) the right to religion is superior over contractual rights, (3) the government may pass laws in pursuit of a valid secular cause even though this may be beneficial to some religions.American Bible Society v. City American Bible Society (ABS) is a nonstock, nonprofit, religious missionary corporation distributing and selling bibles/gospel portions in the Philippines. ABS was informed that it has to comply with ORD 3000 (obtain a mayors permit) and ORD 2529 (pay municipal license fee for the period covering 1945 to 1953 and amounting to 5, 821.45). ABS paid in protest and filed a case to declare said ORD void and a refund. Trial court dismissed case. SC ruled that ORD 3000 is valid as it merely requires a mayors permit. ORD 2529 is also valid but cannot be made to apply to ABS because such license fee constitutes a restraint in the free exercise of religion. The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right could only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.Ebralinag v. Division SuperintendentPetitioners in this consolidated petition are high school and elementary students from Cebu who were expelled for not participating in the flag ceremony of their schools. They are represented by their parents. As Jehovahs Witnesses, they consider the flag as an idol which, according to their religion, should not be worshipped. They believe that the flag ceremony is a form of worship which is prohibited by their religion. Respondents counter by invoking RA 1265, DO 8 and the ruling of Gerona v. Secretary of Education which upheld that all students should participate in the flag ceremony. The Court reversed the Gerona ruling and ruled in favor of the petitioners. Expelling them based on their religious beliefs would be a curtailment of their right to religious profession and worship and their right to free education.Iglesia Ni Cristo v. CAThe Iglesia ni Cristo operates a TV program entitled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo. The Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television classified such program as rated X, being not fit for public viewing as it offends and constitutes an attack against other religions. The Supreme Court held that INC is protected by section 4 of the Bill of Rights. The Board failed to show any imminent or grave danger that would be brought about by the telecast of the show. Also, the show itself is not an attack against, but rather a criticism of, other religions. Such ground (criticism) is not a valid ground in order to prohibit the broadcasting of the show. SC also affirmed MTRCBs power to regulate these types of tv programs citing the 1921 case of Sotto v Ruiz regarding Director of Posts power to check w/n publications are of a libelous character. German v. BaranganGerman and company converged at JP Laurel Street in Manila to hear mass at the St. Jude Chapel, which is near Malacaang. Respondents Barangan and Lariosa blocked them, saying that (1) their actions show that they are not there to hear mass, but to stage a demonstration, and (2) the security of President Marcos is of utmost concern. Petitioners filed a case, saying that Barangan and Lariosa impaired their constitutional freedom to exercise religion. The SC held that this freedom is not absolute. Good faith is required to validly exercise this freedom, and the facts show that the petitioners are not exercising good faith. Also, if the freedom clashes with a social or national interest, which in this case is the safety of the President, then the former must yield to the latter. Hence, the petition was dismissed.a) Concept and basisb) Acts permitted and not permitted by the clausec) Test2. Free exercise clause3. Testsa) Clear and Present Danger Testb) Compelling State Interest Testc) Conscientious Objector TestI. Liberty of abode and freedom of movementVillavicencio v. LukbanJusto Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 without their consent and knowledge and shipped them to Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.Villavicencio thus filed for habeas corpus. The SC granted the petition. If the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. Public officials, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. Lorenzo v. Dir. Of HealthIn accordance with the Revised Administrative Code, Lorenzo was confined for having leprosy. He filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that his right to abode and freedom of movement was infringed. The SC denied the petition. The Director of Health was empowered to order lepers confinement in order to secure public health. 1. Limitations2. Right to travelRubi v. Provincial Board, supra.The right to travel can validly be suspended in the valid exercise of police power.Manotok v. CARicardo Manotoc Jr. was not allowed to depart for the States pending a case filed with the SEC. He was later charged with estafa and was allowed by the Court to post bail. Even though released on bail, he was not allowed to leave the country. He thus filed a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the prior orders and the SEC communication request denying his leave to travel abroad, alleging that his right to travel had been violated. The SC held that it had not. The court has power to prohibit persons admitted to bail from leaving the country because this is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his constitutional right to travel. In case he will be allowed to leave the country without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of courts. a) Watch-list and hold departure orders3. Return to ones countryMarcos v. Manglapus, supra.The right to return to ones country is separate from the right to travel and to abode. As such, it may be suspended by the President in the exercise of residual powers. J. Right to information1. LimitationsValmonte v. Belmonte, supra.While the people have the right to information, including court records, and they may access the said records, they cannot compel judicial officers to custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern2. Publication of laws and regulationsTanada v. Tuvera, supra3. Access to court recordsBaldora v. DimaanoIn a verified letter-complaint, the Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charged Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano with abuse of authority in refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated report on the peace and order conditions of the said municipality. The court ruled that the respondent did not act arbitrarily since he allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of respondent under certain conditions and under his command and supervision. It has not been shown that the rules and conditions imposed by the respondent were unreasonable.4. Right to information relative to:a) Government contract negotiationsb) Diplomatic negotiationsAkbayan v. Aquino, supra.The right to information does not include the records of diplomatic negotiations. K. Right of associationPeople v. FerrerHon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 outlawed the CPP and similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party as an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declared that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association. The SC upheld the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination with a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.) In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct not the person.

Membership of these organizations to be unlawful, must be shown to have been acquired with the intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. Thus it is the element of membership with knowledge that is punishable. Further, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act are given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been made. The declaration of that the cpp is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the philippine government should not be the basis of guilt. this declaration is only a basis of section 4 of the act. the existence of substantive evil justifies the limitation to the exercise of freedom of expression and association in this matter. PBM Employees v. PBM, supra.A demonstration against the abuses of police is protected as an exercise of the right to peaceably assemble to petition the government for redress of grievances.JBL Reyes v. BagatsingJBL Reyes, in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a permit to rally from Luneta Park until the front gate of the US embassy. Manila Mayor Bagatsing denied the petition. The mayor claimed that there had been intelligence reports that indicated that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless elements. He thus issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies within the 500 meter radius of the US embassy. The SC struck down the ordinance. While under international law, the receiving state is tasked for the protection of foreign diplomats from any lawless element, and while Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law, the same cannot prevail over the Constitutional rights to free speech and peacable assembly. L. Eminent domainPeople v. FajardoFajardo was convicted for violating an ordinance, which penalized constructing a building that destroys the view of the public plaza. The SC struck down the ordinance, ruling that it is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation.Republic v. PLDTThe BOT is a government arm engaged in the operation of telecommunication services in the country by utilizing such facilities as may be available in the area. After its creation, the BOT set up its own Government Telephone System (GTS) by renting the trunk lines of PLDT. BOT entered into an agreement with RCA Communications (a telecommunications company in the US with a domestic station in the Philippines), associate of PLDT, for joint overseas telephone service whereby BOT would convey overseas calls received by RCA to local residents. PLDT complained to the BOT that it violated their agreement since the trunk lines were used not only for the use of government offices but even to serve the general public in competition with the business of PLDT. When plaintiff failed to reply, PLDT disconnected lines rented by plaintiff. The plaintiff commenced suit against PLDT to execute a contract for the use of the facilities of PLDT's telephones system under such conditions as the court may consider reasonable. The CFI rendered judgment stating that it could not compel PLDT to enter into such agreement. Both parties appealed and it was held that: The state, may, in the interest of national welfare transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the state may not require a public utility to render services in the general interest provided just compensation is paid. Republic v. Castellvi Republic of the Philippines (Philippine Air Force) leased property of respondent Castellvi near Basa airbase on a yearly basis. On 1956 respondent decided to terminate the lease contract and asked the petitioner to vacate the place. Petitioner did not as such respondent filed an ejectment suit against petitioner. Respondent however filed expropriation proceedings warranting the dismissal of the ejectment suit. For the other respondent Gozun, her land was also being expropriated but there was no prior lease agreement with petitioner unlike the case of Castellvi. SC said that prices of 1959 will apply since in 1947), they did not possess the property with a permanent characteristic seeing that they were just leasing on a yearly basis. Their possession did not also deprived the owner of the benefits of the land since they were paying rent. It was only in 1959 when they filed the expropriation proceedings that they gained possession of a permanent characteristic when the lower court granted them such possession. The price of Php 10.00 however was quite high taking in consideration that the said properties could be sold on a range of Php 2.50 4.00 per sq meters and the fact that the value of the peso went down. The proper price is now at Php5.00 per square meters.This case is doctrinal for giving the elements of a compensable taking, to wit:1. The expropriator must enter a private property2. For more than a momentary period3. Under warrant or color of legal authority4. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected5. The owner must be ousted of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Ortigas v. Feati, supra.Takings" under Eminent Domain versus Takings" under the Social Justice ClauseDe Knecht v. BautistaAquino, as the Minister of Public Highways, made a plan for the extension of EDSA. The original plan was that the extension would cut through Cuneta Avenue. He changed this plan to a new one, wherein the extension would cut through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. Petitioner De Knecht is a resident that will be affected of the new plan. She went to Pasay CFI to file a case, in order to enjoin Aquino and the Republic to go through with the new plan. Respondent Judge Bautista issued a writ of possession in favor of the Republic. The SC set aside the writ saying that respondent judge acted with GADALEJ in issuing the writ. To justify its decision, the SC used the recommendations of the Human Settlements Commission as basis. The Commission said that although the original plan was more expensive, it was a better choice, taking into consideration the progress and development of the country.Republic v. De KnechtRepublic wanted to extend EDSA to Roxas blvd and also construct an outfall for flood waters. Along the planned extension route is De Knechts property who does not want to sell her property. Lower court granted writ of possession of said property to Petitioner after it deposited the required amount. De Knecht filed a case titled De Knecht v Bautista which she won in 1980. Court cited social impact factor making expropriation of the land arbitrary. 1983, Batasang Pambansa Passed BP340 expropriating said property. Lower Court granted Petitioners petition of dismissing expropriation proceeding citing said law. SC affirmed said ruling stating that since residents have moved already the social impact factor which was the basis in De Knecht v Bautista have already disappeared making the expropriation proceedings not arbitrary anymore. The court also said that expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owner but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation.1. Concept2. Expansive concept of public useAssoc, of Small Landowners v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 (2 Bernas 990) I0i7These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657.The SC ruled that agrarian reform under the Constitution is an exercise of the power of eminent domain. There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domainSumulong v. GuerreroNHA filed an expropriation complaint for petitioners land, which was granted by Buenaventura. Petitioners said that socialized housing was not public use, and that PD 1224, the law which the NHA used was unconstitutional. The SC held that the expanded notion of public use, supported by Constitutional provisions on social justice and land reform include the concept of socialized housing. They also held that eminent domain cannot be restricted just because the property is small individual interests must be subordinated to state/public interest. However, SC said that just compensation must take into account ALL factors the NHAs valuations did not take into account individual factors. Also, to deny petitioners the opportunity to challenge the correctness of the valuations of just compensation is a denial of due process. The SC remanded the case back to the court of origin in order to determine the proper compensation.City Government v. Judge ErictaQuezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ordinance regulating the establishment, maintenance and operation of private memorial type cemetery or burial ground within the jurisdiction of quezon city and providing penalties for the violation thereof. The law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power.The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.3. Just compensationEPZA v. DulayThe case concerns the land Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. San claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional. The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the courts findings. NHA v. ReyesThe NHA expropriated the Reyes land, for the purpose of relocating squatters from Metro Manila. However, it instead planned to build low cost housing units. Reyes thus challenged the expropriation, claiming that the judgment of expropriation was forfeited when the NHA used the land for another purpose.The SC disagreed. Reyes cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. The term "public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience." Thus, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use." In addition, the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns. Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, for the common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. The expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance of social justice.a) DeterminationAnsaldo v. CAAnsaldos land was taken by the Dept. of Pubic Wokrs, Transportation and Communication. 26 years later, Ansaldo moved to be compensated for the taking. The SC held that the determination of the value should be determined at the time of taking, not at the time of the filing of the suit.Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Supra.b) Effect of delay4. Abandonment of intended use and right of repurchase5. Miscellaneous applicationM. Contract clauseRutter v. EstebanEsteban bought 2 pieces of land on Aug. 20, 1941. He was able to pay the first 2 installments, but was not able to pay the next 2 installments, leading Rutter to file a suit to recover a sum of money. Esteban claimed that the enforcement of the payment was barred by RA 342, Sec. 2 of which provides that all debts and obligations contracted before Dec. 8 1941 shall not be due and demandable for 8 years after settlement of the war damage claim of the debtor by the Philippine War Damage Commission. The next section provided that if Sec. 2 was made void and unenforceable, then the moratoriums would be revived and continue.The SC struck down the RA and the related moratorium for impairing contracts. The determination of the constitutionality of the moratorium statute is the determination of a period for the suspension of the remedy. Further, laws altering contracts impair the obligation thereof when they are unreasonable in light of the circumstances. Finally,1. Impairment should only refer to the remedy and not to a substantive right, and2. Propriety of the remedy. Here, the RA, in effect, gives 12 years before creditors could enforce their obligations. This is unreasonable and oppressive under the circumstances. Ortigas v. Bel-AirJupiter Street was reclassified into a commercial zone (C3) from its former designation as a residential zone (R1). Presley, who leases the property owned by the Almendrases in Jupiter street, operates a pandesal store in that address. BAVA notified them to shut it down pursuant to their agreement annotated in the TCT that the property would be used for residential purposes only. The Court, pursuant to its ruling in the Sangalang case, held that there was no violation. Although the contract is binding between the parties, this may be impaired by a lawful exercise of police powerin this case, the reclassification of Jupiter into a commercial zone. Ortigas v. FeatiOrtigas sold two lots in a subdivision along EDSA to Emma Chavez. These lots were supposed to only be used for residential purposes, and this stipulation was annotated on the TCT. Chavez sold the lots to Feati, who wanted to use the lots for commercial purposes. Their basis was Mandaluyong Municipal Councils Resolution 27, classifying that area as commercial/industrial. The SC said that the non-impairment clause must be balanced with the proper exercise of police power, and that the stipulations should be subordinate to the resolution. If the exercise of police power is done properly, the individual interests must be subordinate to the general welfare.1. Contemporary application of the contract clauseN. Legal assistance and free access to courtsO. Rights of suspects1. Availability2. Requisites3. WaiverP. Rights of the accused1. Criminal due processEstrada v. SandiganbayanFormer President Joseph Estrada was charged with Plunder under RA 7080, the Plunder Law. He challenged the provision that For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. While not every act needs to be proven beyond reasonable doubt, there is no violation of criminal due process, as it must still be prove that there is an unlawful scheme or conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt. US v Ling Su FanLing Su Fan was convicted of exporting Philippine silver coins, pursuant to Act 1411. Ling Su Fan challenged the said act for being violative of due process. The SC upheld the Act, laying down the ff. requirements for due process of statutes:First. That there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the Government;Second. That this law shall be reasonable in its operation;Third. That it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; andFourth. That it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class.2. Bail3. Presumption of innocence4. Right to be heard5. Assistance of counselPeople v. EspirituEspiritu made an extra-judicial confession, assisted by Atty. Mangallay, who he did not retain personally, but who was retained by his uncle. He thus challenged the validity of the confession. The SC upheld the confession. The right to counsel does not mean that the accused must personallyhire his own counsel. The constitutional requirement is satisfied when a counsel is (1)engaged by anyone acting on behalf of the person under investigation or (2) appointed bythe court upon petition of the said person or by someone on his behalf.People v. ContinenteThe trial court convicted the accused of murder. Among the evidence the trial court relied upon were the confessions of the accused. The accused argued that their confession were inadmissible in evidence, since they were not informed of their constitutional right.The written statements contained an explanation that the investigation dealt with the participation of the accused who chose not to give any statement to the investigator and a warning that any statement obtained from the accused might be used against them in court. They contained advice that the accused might engage the service of a lawyer of their own choice and that if they could not afford the service of a lawyer, they would be provided with one for free. Despite the manifestation of the accused that they intended to give their statements, the investigator requested two lawyers to act as counsel for the accused. The lawyers conferred with the accused before their investigation. The accused were informed of their constitutional rights in the presence of their counsel. The confessions are admissible in evidence.People v. ObreroAt Obreros custodial investigation, he was assigned a lawyer who was the station commander of another precinct. The SC held that his right to counsel was infringed, as the said lawyer could not be considered independent.s6. Right to be informedPecho v. PeoplePecho was convicted of attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document. The decision was assailed on the ground that the accused may not be convicted of that crime because the information was for a violation of RA 3019. He thus alleged violation of his right to be informed of this charge against him in the filing of the information.The SC upheld the conviction. The objectives of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the crime of which he is charged are as follows:1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense;2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.In order that this requirement may be satisfied facts must be stated: not conclusions of law. The complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime. What determines the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a crime which although not the one charged, is necessarily included in the latter. It has been shown that the information filed in court is considered as charging for two offenses which the counsel of the accused failed to object therefore he can be convicted for both or either of the charges.7. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial8. Right of confrontation9. Compulsory process10. Trials in absentia Q. Writ of habeas corpusLansang v. Garcia, Supra.The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus has 2 requisites:1. Invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof2. Public safety requires the suspension.Here, the existence of the New People's Army is proof of rebellion regardless of how small it is. The absence of any other incident after the bombing is not proof of lack of rebellion. R. Writs of amparo , habeas data , and kalikasanS. Self-incrimination clauseChavez v CAChavez was convicted of qualified theft of a motor vehicle. During the trial, Fiscal Grecia asked Chavez to be thefirst witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness not an state witness. Counsel of accused answer that it will only incriminate his client. The testimony was permitted.The SC ruled that Chavez was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness. Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains valid. For the privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives protection even to the guiltyBeltran v. Samson and JoseBeltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting as ordered by the respondent Judge, claiming a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because such examination would give the prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have procured in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence against himself. The SC agreed. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, supra.The right against self-incrimination may be invoked by other witnesses only as questions are asked of them.Galman v. PamaranGalman was made to testify before the Agrava board following the assassination of Ninoy Aquino. He invoked his right to self-incrimination. The SC held that it applied even in non-criminal proceedings, as the word criminal had been deleted from the Constitutional provision. Villaflor v. SummersIn a criminal case before the CFI of Manila, Villaflor was charged with adultery. Upon petition by the fiscal, the court ordered Villaflor to submit her body to the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. Villaflor refused, claiming that it amounted to self-incrimination.The SC disagreed. Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that under the due process of law clause of theConstitution every person has a natural and inherent right to the possession and control of his own body. It is extremely abhorrent to one's sense of decency and propriety to have to decide that such inviolability of the person, particularly of a woman, can be invaded by exposure to another's gaze. To compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass. However, between a sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth to personal considerations, between a disregard of the public welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law and justice cannot hesitate. Fully conscious that the Court is resolving a most extreme case in a sense, which on first impression is a shock to one's sensibilities, it must nevertheless enforce the constitutional provision in this jurisdiction in accord with the policy and reason thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental influences. Once again the Court lays down the rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, on a proper showing and under an order of the trial court, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture or force shall be avoided. 1. Scope and coveragea) Foreign laws2. Application3. Immunity statutesT. Involuntary servitude and political prisonersRubi v. Provincial Board, supra.US v. PompeyaAn ordinance was passed, in accordance with Act 1309, requiring every able bodied male resident of the municipality of Iloilo to render service on patrol duty. Pompeya was convicted for refusing to render such service. The SC upheld Act 1309 and the ordinance, holding that he power exercised under the provisions of Act No. 1309 falls within the police power of the state and that the state was fully authorized and justified in conferring the same upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the provisions of the said Act are constitutional and not in violation nor in derogation of the rights of the persons affected thereby, in accordance with the time-honored obligation of the individual to assist in the protection of the peace and good order of his community.U. Excessive fines and cruel and inhuman punishmentsPeople v. Echegaray and Echegaray v. Sec. of JusticeEchegaray was sentenced to death. The imposition of the death penalty was challenged on the ground that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The SC ruled that the imposition of the death penalty, per se, is not cruel and unusual punishment. In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished. The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.People v. DionisioDionisio was fined for taking bets on a horse race without authority. He complained that the imposition of the fine was excessive, and constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Neither fines nor imprisonment constitute in themselves cruel and unusual punishment, for the Constitutional structure has been interpreted as referring to penalties that are inhumane and barbarous, or shocking to the conscience and fines or imprisonment are definitely not in this category. Nor does mere severity constitute cruel and unusual punishment.V. Non-imprisonment for debtsLozano v. MartinezThe constitutionality of BP 22 was challenged, as it was alleged that it violated the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for non-payment of debts. The SC upheld the law, ruling that the law punishes the act of issuing unfunded checks, not the non-payment of the debts which they represent.Serafin v. LindayagSerafin failed to pay a simple indebtedness for P1500. Thus, an case was filed against her. Complainant admitted complaint. Now complainant filed a case against respondent Judge for not dismissing the case and issuing a warrant of arrest as it falls on the category of a simple indebtedness, since elements of estafa are not present. Further she contended that no person should be imprisoned for non-payment of a loan of a sum of money. The court held that the judge committed grave abuse of discretion. Serafin did not commit any offense as his debt is considered a simple loan granted by her friends to her. Under the Constitution she is protected from imprisonment. W. Double jeopardy1. RequisitesPeople v. ObsaniaObsania was charged with Robbery with Rape before the Municipal Court of Balungao, His counsel moved for the dismissal of the charge for failure to allege vivid designs in the info. Said motion was granted. From this order of dismissal the prosecution appealed.The SC held that there was no double jeopardy here. In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecutiona) valid complaint, b) competent court, c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge, d) defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.Here, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Judge upon the defendant's motion to dismiss. The doctrine of double jeopardy does not apply when the case is dismissed with the express consent of the defendant. the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense because his action in having the case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right/privilege for the reason that he thereby prevents the Court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him.People v. RelovaThe People of the Philippines seeks to set aside the orders of Respondent Judge Hon. Relova quashing an information for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.. Opulencia was charged under a Batangas ordinance for installing illegal electric wiring devices. The case was dismissed. 2 months later, he was charged for theft of electricity under the RPC. The Court dismissd the complaint on the ground of double jeopardy. The SC held that double jeopardy had attached in this case. The bill of rights give two instances or kinds of double jeopardy. The first would be that No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense and the second sentence states that If an act is punishable by a law or an ordinance, the conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution for the same act. In the case at bar, it was very evident that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall on the 2nd kind or definition of double jeopardy wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. It further explains that even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing that the first charge constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the second charge was a violation against the revised penal code, the fact that the two charges sprung from one and the same act of conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other thus making it against the logic of double jeopardy. The fact that Mr. Opulencia was acquitted on the first offense should bar the 2nd complaint against him coming from the same identity as that of the 1st offense charged against Mr.Opulencia.2. Motions for reconsideration and appeals3. Dismissal with consent of accusedX. Ex post facto laws and bills of attainderRepublic v. FernandezFernandez was assessed War Profits Taxes. He challenged the tax for being an ex post facto law. However, the SC ruled that the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws does not apply to tax statutes. People v. Ferrer, supra.The Anti-Subversive Act Law is not a bill of attainder. It was prospective in application, and does not single out persons, but conduct.