“consistency” and “contradiction” in the development of gender role characteristics

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"CONSISTENCY" A N D "CONTRADICTION" IN THE D E V E L O P M E N T OF GENDER ROLE CHARACTERISTICS*

L I T A FURBY

The Wright Institute, 1201 Oak St. Eugene, OR 97401, U.S.A.

Abstract There is currently an increasing amount of theoretical and empirical work arguing that stereotyped sex role behavior is maladaptive in our culture and that "androgyny" or "sex role transcendence" is a preferred mode of being. The latter, however, seems to require individual inconsistency and self-contradiction in behaviors and attitudes (since the individual is both active and passive, both independent and dependent, etc.). Theories of cognitive consistency maintain that individuals avoid self-contradiction and inconsistency, and therefore that androgyny runs counter to important motivational principles. This article examines this issue in some detail, and concludes that theories of cognitive dissonance and consistency reflect particular socio-cultural conditions rather than universal motivation principles. There is nothing inherently uncomfortable or "inconsistent" about androgyny and sex role transcendence.

GENDER-LINKEI) CHARACTERISTICS AS ABSOLUTKS

Conceptualizations Mascu l ine a n d f e m i n i n e charac te r i s t i c s are c o n s t r u e d in o u r socie ty as po la r

oppos i t e s -- as categorical absolutes. O n e c a t e g o r y is the oppos i te o f the o t h e r (e.g. i n d e p e n d e n t - d e p e n d e n t , ac t ive-pass ive) . I n add i t ion , m a s c u l i n e a n d f e m i n i n e are cons ide red to be relat ively s table trai ts -- temporal absolutes. A n ind iv idua l ' s m a s c u l i n i t y or f emin in i t y is no t viewed as s i t u a t i o n - d e p e n d e n t , b u t r a t h e r as a relat ively e n d u r i n g cha rac te r i s t i c o f t ha t ind iv idua l m a n i f e s t e d across m a n y d i f f e r en t s i tuat ions . Final ly, b e h a v i n g consis tent ly wi th one ' s g e n d e r role a s s i g n m e n t is cons ide red to be h e a l t h y a n d adap t ive . Mascu l ine a n d f e m i n i n e s te reo types are viewed as universa l ly app l i cab le to all m e m b e r s o f e a c h g e n d e r -- as prescriptive absolutes.

Social scientists ' r e sea rch on this topic has t e n d e d to p e r p e t u a t e the t radi- t iona l p a r a d i g m o f g e n d e r role s te reo types [1]. Th i s view emphas izes the posit ive r ewards o f cogni t ive a n d e m o t i o n a l cons i s tency wi th respec t to an ind iv idua l ' s g e n d e r role charac ter i s t ics , a n d the nega t ive consequences to an ind iv idua l o f b e h a v i n g in ways tha t a p p e a r c o n t r a d i c t o r y or con f l i c t i ng f r o m the s t a n d p o i n t o f g e n d e r role s te reo types [2]. Desp i te cons ide rab l e ev idence sugges t ing d e t r i m e n t a l effects o f c o n f o r m i n g to g e n d e r role p resc r ip t ions (e.g. [3, 4]), o u r socie ty takes an o v e r w h e l m i n g l y nega t ive view of those w h o s t ray very fa r f r o m g e n d e r role n o r m s [5, 6].

Requests for reprints should be sent to the author at the above address. *By "gender role" I am referring to what is often termed "sex role": "The constellation of

qualities an individual understands to characterize males and females in this culture" [71 . l prefer the term "gender role" to the tern1 "sex role" because it has less excess meaning.

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Developmental aspects Several authors [1, 7, 8] have recently noted the similarity between stages of

gender role development and other aspects of human development such as moral reasoning and ego development. In these several areas, the child begins at a "global" or "undifferentiated" stage. The nature of this first stage in gender role development seems to be that a conceptual distinction is being made between male and female, but no differential behavioral characteristics are yet assigned to these categories.

Subsequent to the first stage, the child moves to what is termed a "conformist" or "conventional" stage in these various areas of development. Not only are distinctions made (relevant to moral judgments, gender role conceptualizations, etc.), but they are made in a categorical or absolute fashion. Polar opposites are the rule of thumb (something is either good or bad, either male or female, but nothing in between). There is a conformity to externally defined roles, categories, or rules.

It is interesting that a somewhat similar stage sequence occurs in langnage acquisition. After first using certain irregular forms correctly (e.g. feet as the plural of foot; went as the past tense of go), the child moves to a stage where mistakes are made in these irregular forms (e.g. foots, goed). These mistakes appear to be the result of a kind of all-or-none interpretation of the regularities that the child has apparently begun to uncover. We thus have a first stage of "undifferentiated" understanding of plurals (or of past tenses) in that the 1distinction between singular and plural (or between present and past) is made (as evidenced by their correct usage), but underlying regularities are apparently not yet recognized. Once those regularities are recognized, they are overgeneralized in an absolutist fashion (i.e. with no exceptions under any cir- cumstances) (cf. [9, 10]).

What all of this suggests, I believe, is that we often have this two-stage sequence in the child's cognitive development. Note that although moral and gender role development might be termed "social" development, the theories which utilize the above two stages are also distinctly cognitive theories, and in fact are often referred to as "cognitive-developmental" theories (of moral development, or gender role development, etc.).

Although a great deal of developmental theory and research stops at this second stage, further development is often postulated which modifies the categorical and temporal absolutes, such that the individual's concepts and behavior become much more relativistic or qualified. Theories of both moral development [11] and ego development [12] describe stages beyond this conventional or conformist one. In moral development, the "post-conventional" stage no longer consists of absolute rules, but rather of complex ethical principles which reflect an awareness of the relativism of values and opinions, and which incorporate exceptions and qualifications to previously absolute rules. Interestingly, however, until the very recent discussion of "gender role transcendence" or "androgyny", stages beyond the conventional-conformist one in gender role development have not even been considered. In gender role development, "psychological androgyny" or "sex-role transcendence" likewise

"Consistency" and "contradiction" 287

does not depend upon absolute prescriptions for gender stereotypic behavior, but rather envisages behavior as relative to the specific situation and to the particular individual's temperament.

While at least a portion of adults in our culture move beyond the second stage of moral and ego development, most of the psychological literature would lead us to believe that no one goes beyond that stage of gender role development. However, it has recently been argued [3, 7, 8, 13, 14] that mov- ing beyond stage two of gender role development constitutes a much preferred way of being, reflecting greater psychological adjustment and self- actualization (it is likewise made clear in the moral development literature that movement beyond the conventional stage is desirable, although authors often resist stating this preference explicitly).

Given that a transcendence of gender role stereotypes is seen by many as desirable, it seems important to analyze in detail why so few individuals operate in that fashion, and why the psychological literature has ignored those who do [15]. If we are to argue that psychological androgyny is indeed a preferred mode of living, we must understand the reasons why most individuals remain at an absolutist conceptualization. Hefner, et al. [8] have pointed out that "dichotomies and polarities are ways in which human beings perceive and order the world around them" (p. 147). Does the gender role dichotomization then reflect some basic cognitive tendency to find order and organization in an irregular and inconsistent environment? Certainly the extensive literature postulating a universal motivation toward cognitive consistency [16] would support such a position. That literature would suggest that an individual is uncomfortble with two seemingly contradictory cognitions such as "I am independent and self-sufficient" and "I am dependent and need another's help". Although the individual may feel and act in both of these ways, cognitive consistency theory suggests that there will be a tendency to minimize this intra- individual "contradiction". If so, we must ask ourselves, is it really desirable to foster a more pluralist and intra-individually "inconsistent" conceptualization of gender roles? Relatedly, is it even possible to achieve a society where gender role transcendence is the rule rather than the exception?

I shall argue that the prevalence of an absolutist orientation toward gender- linked characteristics stems from our culture's emphasis on bipolar categoriza- tion and cognitive consistency. While there are reasons that the social structure has encouraged this kind of individual consistency, I shall argue that it has severely restricted the development of both males and females, and that gender role transcendence requires a capacity for dialectical operations which involve multiple and mutually tolerant categorical dimensions.

"CONSISTENCY" AND "CONTRADICTION"

Psychological theories of consistency Common to most theories of cognitive and social development is the assump-

tion that conflict and contradiction are states which the organism seeks to avoid. In most cases, this assumption is made very explicit. Contradiction is seen as a motivator for development since the individual seeks new formula-

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tions which permit "integration" of previously conflicting aspects of development. For example, Loevinger [12] sees the "autonomous" stage of ego development as one of "coping" with conflict, and the "integrated" stage as one of "reconciling" inner conflict. Kohlberg's higher stages of moral development are directed toward "resolving" self-contradictions [11]. The message is clear: conflicting or contradictory aspects of a given issue are bothersome to the individual, and movement to a later stage comes from efforts to overcome such conflicts.

This viewpoint enjoys very wide support in the literature. A number of theories of cognitive "consistency", "congruity", or "balance" have been for- mulated and they have inspired a vast experimental effort on the topic (see [ 16, 17]). Although there appears to be much empirical support for the notion that people attempt to maximize the internal consistency of cognitions and emotions, there are also a number of conflicting results as well as theoretical ambiguities. Most important for the present discussion is the fact that cognitive consistency has been assumed to be a universal motivational principle, thus neglecting the possibility that it might be a product of particular societal or cultural conditions. Recently, however, it has been pointed out that much of the existing literature in social psychology may tell us much more about North American culture than it does about universal psychological principles [18].

With respect to consistency theories (and "cognitive dissonance" in particular), Israel [19] has argued convincingly that the tendency to maximize consistency is closely related to two other greatly researched processes, social comparison and level of aspiration. He argues that all of these reflect a competitive economic system based on possessive individualism rather than universal principles of human behavior. Briefly, his argument is that an achievement-oriented and competitive social structure fosters the setting of realistic goals by the individual ("level of aspiration"). The correct evaluation of one's own capabilities is certainly instrumental in this goal-setting process, and it requires a constant comparing of oneself with the achievement of similar others ("social comparison"). The individual's affiliative needs, however, lead to a desire to be accepted by the group. In a mechanized productive system, acceptance by others requires a disciplined labor process, and thus conformity

the "deviant" is subject to social rejection (see [20]). The pressure for self- assertive and individualistic behavior required by a competitive orientation, however, would lead to social isolation which clearly conflicts with pressures for conformity necessary to obtain acceptance by the group. Israel argues that conflicts that are inherent in the social structure have been "relocated" by cognitive consistency theories. Because a market society sees conflicts as disruptive forces to be eliminated (rather than as basic characteristics of any society), such a society fosters "dissonance reduction". The individual harbors the conflicting cognitions, and harmony is achieved by modifying those cognitions (even though the contradictions in social reality remain unchanged).

I will not present Israel's argument in more detail here the interested reader is invited to consult his article. Most important for the present analysis is that viewpoints like those of Moscovici and Israel should cause us to ask:


What is so great about cognitive consistency, anyway? And especially, what is so great about it when we know that the world is actually full of all kinds of in- consistencies? What is wrong with dissonance and inconsistency? This question has never been seriously addressed (and Israel's article attempts to explain why). The assumption is usually that it is adaptive for the organism to seek order and regularity in a complex and ever-changing environment. But that is too simple. Is there really a basic and universal human tendency to dichotomize and polarize the world and to maximize cognitive consistency? Is it not just as adaptive to see the world like it is? If there actually is inconsistency, are we not better off knowing about it? In order to answer this question with respect to the masculine-feminine dichotomy, the following section examines exactly what is "conflicting" in the process of gender role development.

Internal and external correspondence Brickman [32] has proposed the following useful distinctions. (1) Internal correspondence (behavior corresponds with feeh'ngs). There is

internal correspondence to the degree to which "a person's behavior expresses feelings that are both substantial and appropriate to the behavior". This is a kind of genuineness in a person's actions.

(2) External correspondence (behav,br corresponds with consequences). There is external correspondence to the degree to which "a person's behavior elicits responses that are both substantial and appropriate to the behavior". This is a kind of effectiveness or internal locus of control.

Brickman elaborates considerably on these two concepts, and argues that our perception of a situation as real is dependent upon the degrees of internal and of external correspondence characterizing that situation. For present pur- poses, I would like to focus not on the perception of what is real, but rather on the development of gender role characteristics and the nature of internal and external correspondence in that process.

It seems clear that early in the process of involvement in any role, including gender role, the individual will often experience low internal correspondence. In role-appropriate behavior, the individual's actions are determined by external prescription more than by internal feelings. While these two may sometimes coincide, they often conflict; if they didn't, we would have no use for the concept of external prescription and no reason to characterize behavior as role-appropriate or role-determined.

In gender role development, early stages are thus characterized by low internal correspondence. However, as in the early stages of any role involvement, external correspondence must be fairly high. Otherwise, the individual would never be engaging in role behavior. There must be external consequences which are substantial and appropriate to the role behavior. In the case of gender role, there are external rewards (and punishments), societal approval (and disapproval), for role-appropriate (and role-inappropriate) behavior. It is this external correspondence which leads the child to engage in role appropriate behavior in the first place, and to continue to do so even when it does not reflect his/her internal feelings (see also Ickes & Barnes [4] for a discussion of this phenomenon with adults). The stronger the external cor-

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respondence, the more willing the child is to forgo internal correspondence. If a boy loses all his friends because he cries when he is sad, which is considered inappropriate for boys ("sissy"), then he is likely to cease his crying and thereby diminish internal correspondence.

Brickman points out that there is often conflict between internal and external correspondence one cannot always maximize both simultaneously. But 1 believe that gender role development presents an extreme case in this regard for the following reason. The nature of the external correspondence is extremely powerful. That is, the consequences of role-inappropriate behavior are very negative. Furthermore, the message is very consistent ("sissy" behavior on the part of boys is strongly disapproved). Thus, there is a strong reason for never engaging in behavior inappropriate to one's gender role.

Another particularly significant feature of gender role, as compared to other roles, is that the internal correspondence which is sacrificed in gender role prescription deals with several very basic characteristics of humans. From an evolutionary point of view, the very strength of the sanctions against gender- inappropriate behavior suggests that they must be suppressing some fundamental human tendencies (or else those strong sanctions would not be necessary see Campbell [21]). These tendencies are generally labeled com- nzunion (or expressive behavior) and agency (or h~strume~ttal behavior) [7, 22]. Gender-role prescriptions (i.e. external correspondence) require: (1) males to suppress behavior corresponding to inner feelings of interpersonal affect and communtbn; (2) females to suppress behavior corresponding to inner feelings of effectance and agency. During the course of gender role development, then, expression of inner feelings leads to negative consequences when those feelings are "inappropriate". The strength of the sanctions is so great that the individual modifies his or her behavior. Furthermore, in order not to con- tinually have such a disparity between inner feelings and behavior, the individual attempts to adopt the feelings that are more consonant with that behavior. This sequence is represented in Fig. 1.

Because of the frequent conflict between inner feelings and external consequence, behavior cannot correspond perfectly to both. In the case of gender role, I am arguing that the external consequences are powerful enough so that the individual sacrifices inner correspondence, and in the long run probably alters inner feelings in an effort to recover inner correspondence.

In some areas other than gender role, where external consequences are relatively mild, the individual may instead choose to sacrifice external correspondence by maintaining behavior perfectly consonant with inner feelings despite the slightly negative consequences (and in the long run the individual may try to change, or at least to ignore, those consequences, thereby minimizing the lack of external correspondence).

To recapitulate: An individual's characteristics have meaning in at least two very important ways: (a) the degree to which a behavior expresses inner feelings (internal correspondence), and (b) the degree to which a behavior is accompanied by significant consequences in the environment (external correspondence). Both of these types of correspondence are desirable to the organism. Indeed, they are "natural" in the sense that (a) the young child's

"Consistency" and "contradict ion" 291

behavior is quite straightforwardly an expression of inner feelings (internal correspondence), and (b) infants and young children are motivated to experience a correspondence between their actions and environmental responses to those actions [23] (external correspondence). In the process of gender role development, behavior is determined by external correspondence considerations (which are very powerful), and internal correspondence is sacrificed (which involves girls suppressing agency and boys suppressing com- munion).*

Time 1: Behavior corresponds to inner feelings, bu t meets with negative consequences.

Active behavior

®

Inner feelings External consequences

Time 2: Behavior has been modified to correspond with desired external consequences, no longer reflecting original inner feelings, so inner feelings are modified.

e.g.

Passive behavior

L x,

Inner feelings External consequences

× = Some form of agency, such as effectance or competence motivation for girls.

Y = Docility, passivity (lack of agency) for girls. 1 = Parenta l disapproval. 2 = Parenta l approval.

Fig. 1. In ternal and external correspondence in gender role development.

*Garnets and Pleck's model of sex role strain deals with a related but not identical issue of the correspondence between inner feelings ("real self-concept") and inner ideal ("ideal self-concept") [33].

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TRANSCENDENCE OF GENDER-LINKED CHARACTERISTICS

Developmental aspects

Now let us return to a consideration of gender role transcendence or androgyny. First, it is important to note that the term "androgyny" has been used in a number of different ways. Here I am using it as essentially synonymous with Hefner et al. 's "sex role transcendence" (which is comparable to Bem's vision of androgyny [34], although her operationa~ measures reflect a different model of the concept). It refers to "the achievement of a dynamic and flexible orientation to life in which gender [role prescription] is irrelevant" (Hefner et al. [8], p. 143).

My original concern in this discussion was an understanding of why the vast majority of adults in our society remain at a categorical or absolutist stage with respect to gender role characteristics [3]. From the above analysis, I think the answer which emerges is simply that the external sanctions are potent, and that in order to maintain external correspondence, an individual adopts society's bipolar and categorical role prescriptions. We do not need to postulate some fundamental discomfort or cognitive dissonance with the idea that a single individual might be both independent and dependent, both active and passive, etc. The real conflict is between internal correspondence and external correspondence, and it is that conflict which motivates the individual's gradual assumption of gender role characteristics.

Thus, the conflict between internal and external correspondence must be distinguished from the conflict between cognitions dealt with by theories of cognitive consistency. The latter postulate a universal tendency to minimize logical contradictions among cognitions (or emotions) within the individual. While the empirical evidence is generally supportive of consistency theories, I have argued that the main reason we observe the maximization of cognitive consistency is that external correspondence in our society fosters it. The individual does not experience anything inherently uncomfortable about being strong on one occasion and weak on another, or being both nurturant and desirous of nurturance, etc. It is only because gender role prescriptions in our society divide these characteristics into polar opposites, with one pole being appropriate to one gender and the opposite pole to the other. This emphasis on absolutist conceptualization is by no means limited to gender role; it is a generalized feature of our culture. With respect to moral judgment, for example, although Kohlberg describes a "postconventional" stage which some l)eopl( • attain, a large number remain at the second stage, which is characterized by categorical absolutes. Why would this be? Well, at Kohlberg's conventional stage of moral development, the social rules or laws determine moral judgments with no ifs, ands, or buts. There are no exceptions. Clear-cut, absolute categories of good and bad are required, with no qualifications. The more people who are at this stage, the more society is spared conflict and disruption (for example, draft resistors and other forms of civil disobedience). Our social system certainly discourages such disruption and encourages categorical absolutes (e.g. communists are all evil). Israel [19] has argued that a liberal view of the nature of society (which underlies current capitalist


democracies) sees conflicts as disruptive and as something to be eliminated -- the social system is seen as striving for balance. Thus, an emphasis on consistency and balance is not surprising. But this is not an "innate" cognitive tendency. It reflects a particular cognitive stage of development (see [24]) in a particular social setting. Figure 2 represents the relationship between cognitive consistency and internal and external correspondence.

& Inner Feelings, Cognitions

Cognitive Consistency

-~Behav ior ~ - -I~ I ~

\ / ~ /

\ / External \ / Consequences In te rna l /

Correspondence External Correspondence

Fig. 2. The relation of cognitive consistency to internal and external correspondence. (Although not discussed here, consistency among external consequences can also be of interest, for example in Bateson's Double Bind theory of schizophrenia.)

Theories of gender role transcendence and androgyny [3, 8, 13] argue that the elimination of bipolar conceptualizations of gender role leads to better adjustment and self-actualization. Why? Because internal correspondence does not have to be sacrificed. * Applying strong external sanctions to behavior (which then require one to sacrifice internal correspondence) solely because of a person's physical characteristics (gender) is difficult to swallow, especially when it is realized that others (or the other gender) do not have to compromise the same internal correspondence solely because they have certain physical characteristics (which have nothing to do with the behavior in question ... Note that this situation is very analogous to processes in race discrimination). Although it's hard to swallow, the strength and consistency of the external consequences of role behavior leave little choice to the individual.

Let's examine the possibility for transcendence of these categorical imperatives. Consider again the case of language acquisition. There, the external situation supports a less absolute situation: There is no absolute rule for forming past tenses, nor for plurals of nouns. There are some generalizations, but they must be qualified, and depend upon the exact verb or noun one is dealing with. Young children have no trouble adapting to this "contradictory" or "inconsistent" situation. They quickly learn that there is no simple and categorical rule for past tenses, and they manage to form the past tense in one way with one verb, and in another way with another verb, even though in both

*Here, as elsewhere in this article, I am referring only to Bem's vz~zon of androgyny. Her operational measures have tended to be much more situationally prescriptive, requiring that a person behave in a specific fashion in a given situation (e.g. nur turam when presented with a kitten).

294 i.ita Furby

cases they are deal ing with verbs and their past tenses. I do not want to push this analogy too far, bu t I hope it will encourage us to give more considerat ion to the role played by social sanctions in de te rmin ing what we see as "conflic- t ing" or " inconsistent" . Society encourages different past tense forms depen- d ing on the individual verb; it does not encourage different personal character is t ics such as agency or c o m m u n i o n depend ing on an individual 's t e m p e r a m e n t and needs.

Conceptualizations

I began this article by charac ter iz ing cur ren t gender role concept ions as categorical , tempora l , and prescript ive absolutes. Masculine and feminine are seen as polar opposites, as const i tu t ing relatively stable traits, and as universal- ly appl icable prescript ions for all members of each gender. We have seen that these concept ions do not reflect inheren t proper t ies of cognit ion, but ra the r a par t i cu la r social system and the result ing pressures toward bipolar categoriza- tion and individual consistency with such a bipolar f ramework. Fur ther , it has been suggested that these absolutist concept ions should be t ranscended and tha t a more androgynous view of individual characterist ics is desirable. In this section, I would like to offer some thoughts on what gender role t ranscendence really means.

He fne r et al. [8] character ize what they term "sex-role t ranscendence" as follows:

The individual can move freely from situation to situation and behave and feel appropriately and adaptively. Choice of behavioral and emotional expression is not determined by rigid adherence to "appropriate" sex-related characteristics. In- dividuals express their human qualities without fear of retribution for violating sex role norms (p. 151).

W h a t does this def ini t ion imply abou t the characterist ics of gender role t ranscendence?

First of all, we would no longer have the bipolar opposi t ion of the categories mascul ine and feminine. Al though we may have difficulty now thinking of the at t r ibutes usually described as "mascul ine" and " femin ine" in any fashion except a b ipolar one, this may be due more to the history of Western thought t ha n to any inheren t proper t ies of ou r cognitive system.

Alper t [25] suggests tha t we may t race our emphasis on polar opposites to Plato. In the course of developing the "dialect ic", his m e th o d for grasping the t rue na tu re of things, Plato rejected multiple divisions of categorizat ion in favor of the binary division. T h e emphasis on bipolar categorizat ion of the world became f irmly en t r enched in Western thought with Aristotle's use of b inary division as f u n d a m e n t a l to the syllogism, the lat ter being his basic tool of logical thought . But b ipolar categorizat ion m ay not in fact be the most na tu ra l way of unde r s t and ing the world. Indeed, Maslow [26] makes the following comments regard ing a less b i furca ted , more " in te rpene t ra t ing" kind of though t which he sees as character is t ic of self-actualizing:

"Consistency" and "contradiction"

It is as if the less developed people live in an Aristotelian world in which classes and concepts have sharp boundaries and are mutually exclusive and incompatible, e.g. male-female, selfish-unselfish, adult-child, kind-cruel, good-bad. A is A and everything else is not-A in the Aristotelian logic, and never the twain shall meet. But seen by self-actualizing people is the fact that A and not-A interpenetrate and are one. that any person is simultaneously good and bad, male and female, adult and child (quoted in Alpert, 1973, p. 156).

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Ge nde r role t r anscendence is consistent with Maslow's descript ion of what he calls self-actualizing people. T h e world is not seen in terms of polar opposites, and in par t icular , h u m a n characterist ics are not seen or exper ienced that way. Wi th respect to gender role, this means that mascul ine and feminine would not exist in their present form of polar opposite categories. Those characterist ics or dimensions t radi t ional ly associated with gende r -appropr i a t e behavior (e.g. i n d e p e n d e n c e - d e p e n d e n c e ; active-passive) may often be irrelevant to charac te r iz ing an individual. T h e work of Bem and Allen [27], Markus [28], a nd McGui re and Padawer-Singer [29] has a l ready suggested that a given dimension of the self can be cent ra l for some individuals, yet essentially non- existent for others. T h e same can be expec ted to hold for cur ren t gender- re la ted dimensions once there are no longer any prescript ive absolutes.

If the b ipolar and absolutist conceptua l iza t ion of gender role did not exist, societal gender role prescript ions could not exist either. If there were not mutua l ly exclusive categories, it would be essentially impossible to give a clear message about being "mascul ine" or " feminine" . T h e cont rad ic t ion between the two categories, as well as the cont rad ic t ion between internal and external cor respondence , would disappear . It may be helpful to consider a similar example in the area of affective and emot ional development .

Ha r t e r [30] has discussed the diff iculty that young chi ldren in therapy often have of recognizing and accept ing apparen t ly "confl ict ing" feelings toward o ther people, a n d / o r judgments of themselves. However, these feelings are really only "con t rad ic to ry" or "confl ic t ing" f rom a view that emphasizes categorical absolutes and cognitive or emot iona l "consistency" within such an absolutist f ramework . A conceptua l iza t ion which emphasizes bo th categorical and tempora l flexibility and change sees this not as cont radic t ion , but simply as life. A girl can accept that she is tall on some occasions and short on others -- tall when with her classmates at shool, bu t short when with her parents at home. And fur ther , bo th tall and short on the same occasion, tall with respect to her younger siblings, bu t short with respect to her parents . In the emot iona l realm, she can recognize that she likes her fa ther on those occasions when he plays scrabble with her, and dislikes h im on those when he spanks her. Fur ther , since he is a person who sometimes spanks her and sometimes plays scrabble with her, and has the potent ia l to do either, it is clearly advantageous that she accept both the positive and the negative emotions as const i tu t ing her feelings toward her fa ther .

T h e t r anscendence of an absolutist o r ien ta t ion to gender- l inked characterist ics results in a relativistic and pluralist view of individual characterist ics. Psychological androgyny is approached , where behavior reflects inner needs and feelings to a m u c h grea ter extent . It is no longer rigid-

296 Lita Furby

ly d e t e r m i n e d by society 's g e n d e r role s te reotypes (see [31]), a l t h o u g h we m u s t be ca re fu l to recognize tha t in ou r c u r r e n t cu l t u r e it will no t be tota l ly obl ivious to t h e m ei ther . M o v e m e n t will be t o w a r d m u c h g r ea t e r in te rna l co r respondence .

Externa l i t ies will no t be total ly ignored , however . Psychologica l ly a n d r o g y n o u s w o m e n , for e x a m p l e , m a y feel like r e m o v i n g thei r shirts on a hot s u m m e r day while r i d ing thei r bicycles on the col lege c a m p u s . But , society says only m e n m a y do tha t a n d the sanc t ions are stiff e n o u g h tha t this role s t e reo type will p r o b a b l y be a d h e r e d to, even by the mos t " l i be ra t ed" o f w o m e n . T h e p o i n t of this s implist ic e x a m p l e is t h a t m o v e m e n t t o w a r d psycho log ica l a n d r o g y n y , given p resen t societal condi t ions , is itself a d ia lec t ica l process.

W e s h o u l d also be ca re fu l a b o u t t h i n k i n g tha t once g e n d e r role s te reotypes are t r a n s c e n d e d then all res t r ic t ions to se l f -ac tua l i za t ion a re r emoved . Cer ta in - ly a very power fu l a n d u b i q u i t o u s one is, b u t we m u s t no t fo rge t tha t g e n d e r role t r a n s c e n d e n c e is only one o f m a n y role t r anscendenc i e s which m i g h t be benef ic ia l to ind iv idua ls in ou r society.

Re la ted ly , we m u s t no t j u m p to the conc lus ion tha t the psycholog ica l ly a n d r o g y n o u s ind iv idua l ' s b e h a v i o r will be the u l t i m a t e in flexibili ty, no r will it be tota l ly s i t u a t i o n - d e p e n d e n t . I n t r a - i n d i v i d u a l cons i s tency across s i tua t ions a p p e a r s to be a val id c o n c e p t for at least some indiv iduals some of the t ime [27].

Acknowledgement Meda Rebecca and Philip Brickman helped significantly in improving an earlier version of this manuscript.

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“consistency” and “contradiction” in the development of gender role characteristics

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