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15Conflict Prevention: Theory inPursuit of Policy and Practice

M i c h a e l S . L u n d

AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COMEAND GONE?

The world seems to be getting more dan-gerous. Terrorism and the ‘war on terrorism’are straining relations between Muslims andthe West. Despite interstate wars being indecline, five attacks by a state on another haveoccurred in the new century. Competitionfor oil and other essential natural resourcesmakes inter-state wars over territory, viewedas a thing of the past (John Mueller, 1989),more imaginable. Confrontations over nuclearweapons have arisen with North Korea andIran. Longstanding arms control regimesare unraveling. Further intra-state conflictscould erupt, as closed regimes face violentoppositions; fledgling democracies destabi-lize; and post-conflict countries fall backinto war (Gurr and Marshall, 2005). Trendssuch as environmental degradation, climatechange, population growth, chronic poverty,globalization, and increasing inequality riskfuture conflicts (e.g., CNA, 2007).

Facing such threats, governments andinternational bodies could be pursuing how to

prevent escalation of emerging tensions intowars, thus avoiding the immense human suf-fering and problems that wars always cause,both for the countries involved and the restof the world.1 Compared to the huge costs ofwar, the costs of preventing it are dramaticallyless.2 Many people are convinced the horrifichuman costs of the current Iraq War wereavoidable. Statistical research on third-partydiplomacy also supports the belief that actingbefore high levels of conflict intensity is betterthan trying to end them (Miall, 1992: 126;Berkovitch, 1986, 1991, 1993).3 To try tohead off more future conflicts seems possible,moreover, for armed conflict has declinedsince the end of the Cold War, in part becauseof an ‘extraordinary upsurge of activism bythe international community that has beendirected to conflict prevention, peacemaking,and peacebuilding’ (Human Security Report,2005: 155).4 Indeed, conflict prevention isnow official policy in the UN, the EU, the G-8,and many states (Moolak, 2005: G-8). It hasbeen tried in places where the risk of conflictwas present but they were averted, such asSouthAfrica, Macedonia, the Baltics, Crimea,

288 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

and the South China Sea.5 In short, preventionis not simply a high ideal, but a prudent optionthat sometimes works (cf. Jentelson, 1996;Zartman, 2001: 305f; Miall, 2007: 7,16,17).

Given the evidence that inaction is waste-ful and preventive labors can bear fruit,international actors could be collecting andapplying what has been learned from recentexperience to manage the tensions aroundthe world from which future conflicts willemerge: mitigating sources of terrorism andextremism; averting genocides and other massatrocities; buttressing fragile governments;reducing weapons of mass destruction; alle-viating competition over oil and water; anddefusing inter-state rivalries such as China–Taiwan and among the major powers. Yetthese actors show little interest in building onrecent accomplishments to reduce the currentrisks (e.g., the deterioration of Zimbabweand possible renewed war between Ethiopiaand Eritrea).6 Why this apparent gap existsbetween the promise of conflict preventionand its more deliberate pursuit is the puzzlethis chapter seeks to unravel.7 The followingsections seek to get beyond conventionalanswers by examining three facets of conflictprevention that define its current status: con-cepts, activities, and impacts. The conclusionsums up the state of the art and offers ideas toadvance it.

WHAT IS CONFLICT PREVENTION?A DISTINCT PERSPECTIVE

As the idea has come into vogue, ‘conflictprevention’and synonyms such as ‘preventivediplomacy’and ‘crisis prevention’are bandiedabout more loosely. New government unitsand non-governmental organizations havesprung up that tout the term in their logos. Tobe au courant, established organizations addit to mission statements. But though ‘conflictprevention’may now be heard more often thanthe previously dominant ‘conflict resolution,’it is not clear whether the activities carriedout under this new rubric are actually new.Despite the ambiguity due to the idea’s rise tofame, however, close analysts have hammered

out a core definition. Knowledge can cumulatewhen people use the same terms for inquiry.

Conflict prevention applies to peacefulsituations where substantial physical violenceis possible, based on typical indicators ofrising hostilities. Everyday spates where noblood is spilled, or public controversies thatget so rancorous that social groups stopcommunicating are socially unhealthy, butmuch less grievous than states or groupsabout to kill each other with deadly weapons.8

A coup d’etat is less grave than the genocideof hundreds of thousands of people.9 Thoughthus narrowed to conflicts with potentiallywide lethality (hereafter ‘conflicts’ for short),specialists’ definitions have varied in twomain respects: a) the stage or phase duringthe emergence of violence when preventioncomes into play; and b) its methods ofengagement, which are geared to the differingdrivers of potential conflicts that preventiveefforts address.10

Moments for prevention

Conflict prevention has been distinguishedfrom other approaches to conflict mainly bywhen it comes into play during a conflict,not how it is done. When UN SecretaryGeneral Hammerskjold first coined ‘preven-tive diplomacy’ in 1960, he had in mind theUN keeping superpower proxy wars in third-world countries from escalating into globalconfrontations. When the end of the Cold Warbrought unexpected intra-state wars such as inYugoslavia, UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali extended Hammerskjold’s term inan upstream direction to mean not simplykeeping regional conflicts from going global,but from starting in the first place (UN,1992). This conceptual breakthrough shiftedthe moment for taking action back to stageswhen non-violent disputes were emerging buthad not escalated into significant violence orarmed conflict.

Just how far back in the etiology ofconflicts might preventive action go to work?Leaving the pre-violent period open to apossible infinite regress might extend it toto causes as primordial as original sin or

CONFLICT PREVENTION: THEORY IN PURSUIT OF POLICY AND PRACTICE 289

as dispersed as child-rearing practices, thusdooming the concept to impracticality.11

To mark a beginning point when pre-emptive actions first become practicable, Peck(1995) usefully delineated early and lateprevention. The former seeks to improve therelationship of parties or states that are notactively fighting but deeply estranged. Leftunaddressed, such latent animosities mightrevert to the use of force as soon as acrisis arose.12 Late prevention pertains towhen fighting among specific parties appearsimminent.

Boutros-Ghali also extended conflict pre-vention downstream to actions to keep violentconflicts from spreading to more places.But because such ‘horizontal’ escalationseemed to go beyond averting the riseto violence (‘vertical’ escalation) and thusto include containing open warfare, someanalysts worried that it implied suppressingphysical violence at any subsequent stagein an armed conflict. This would conflateit too easily with actions in the middleof wars (even though Boutros-Ghali offeredthe separate term ‘peacemaking’ for those).Bringing prevention into the realm of activewars would eclipse its proactive nature behindthe conventional interventions that occur latein conflicts, for which terms like conflict man-agement, peace enforcement or peacekeepingwere more fitting. This merging would vitiatethe pre-emptive uniqueness of preventioncompared to those other concepts (cf. Lund,1996). It would forego the opportunity totest the central premise that had animatedthis new post-Cold War notion: that actingbefore violent conflicts fully breaks out islikely to be more effective than acting on awar in progress. To think of prevention asoccurring while wars are already waging notonly disregards most people’s connotation of‘prevention,’ but would relegate the interna-tional community to remediating costly warafter costly war in a perpetual game of catch-up, foregoing the chance to ever get aheadof the game. While some analysts continuedto apply prevention to any subsequent levelof violent conflict (Leatherman et al. 1999),most now confine it to actions to avoid the

eruption of social and political disputes intosubstantial violence, keeping the emphasissquarely on stages before, rather than duringviolent conflicts.

In particular, the focus of this chapteris ‘primary prevention’ of prospective newor ‘virgin’ conflicts, where a peaceful equi-librium has prevailed for some years, butfundamental social and/or global forces areproducing new controversies, tensions anddisputes.13 However, imperative later inter-ventions are for minimizing loss of life, theyare less humane and likely more difficultbecause the antagonists are organized, armed,and deeply invested in destroying eachother.14 Graph 15.1 locates this particularmoment in conditions of unstable peace anddistinguishes it from actions at other conflictstages.

Methods of prevention

Notions of prevention have also variedwith regard to the means of engagement,but here too a consensus has emerged.The tools used depend on which causesof conflict are targeted, and thus whichproviders of tools get involved. Boutros-Ghalilisted early warning, mediation, confidence-building measures, fact-finding, preventivedeployment, and peace zones. But subsequentUN policy papers of the 1990s (e.g., ‘Agendafor Development’) greatly expanded preven-tive measures to a panoply of policies thataddress the institutional, socio-economic, andglobal environment within which conflictingactors operate – as diverse as humanitarianaid, arms control, social welfare, militarydeployment, and media.15 It can now involvealmost any policy sector, whether labeledconflict prevention or not. Recent UN usageof ‘preventive action’ (e.g., Rubin, 2004) isbetter suited to this range of potentially usefulmodalities.

Direct and structural instrumentsTo classify its array of methods, interces-sory initiatives aimed at particular actorsin manifest conflicts are distinguished fromefforts to shape underlying socio-economic


PEACEMAKING(Conflict management)

PEACE ENFORCEMENT(Conflict mitigation)Chechnya,

early 1995cease-fireKenya, 2007

CRISIS DIPLOMACY(Crisis management)

PEACEKEEPING(Conflict termination)

South Ossetia, 2008

Bosnia, early 1996

outbreak of violence

settlementNorth Korea, 1994

Greece, Turkey, 1996Kosovo, 1997

PREVENTIVEDIPLOMACY

(Conflict prevention)POST-CONFLICTPEACE BUILDING

(Conflict resolution)

Kosovo, 1993confrontation

rapprochement

Cambodia, 1995

PEACETIMEDIPLOMACYOR POLITICS

Stages of Peaceor Conflict

WAR

CRISIS

UNSTABLEPEACE

STABLEPEACE(Basic order)

DURABLEPEACE(Just order)

rising tension

reconciliationU.S.-China, 1995

U.S.-Britain, 20th Century

South Africa, 1995

Duration of ConflictMid-conflict Late StageEarly Stage

Graph 15.1 Basic life-history of conflicts and the phases of engagement

conditions and political institutions and pro-cesses. The former ‘direct,’ ‘operational,’or ‘light’ prevention (Miall, 2004) is moretime-sensitive and actor- or event-focused –for example, diplomatic demarches, medi-ation, training in non-violence, or militarydeterrence – and seeks to keep divisiveexpressions of manifest conflicts from esca-lating, and thus it targets specific partiesand the issues between them.16 Integral alsois ‘structural’ or ‘deep’ prevention, mean-ing actions or policies that address deepersocietal conditions that generate conflictsbetween interests and/or the institutional,procedural and policy deficits or capacitiesthat determine whether competing interestsare channeled and mutually adjusted peace-fully. These more basic factors make upthe environment within which contendingactors operate and thus policies toward themcan create constraints or opportunities thatshape what the actors do. Diverse exam-ples are reducing gross regional disparitiesin living standards, reforming exploitativeagricultural policies, and building effectivegoverning institutions.17 These structuraltargets make prevention more than simply

avoiding violence, or ‘negative peace,’ butrather aspiring to positive peace. In pragmaticterms, it means being able to meet theinevitable arrival of disruptive social andglobal forces with the ability to bring aboutchange peaceably (cf. Miall, 2007). In recentyears, for example, it conflict preventionhas been integral to the larger post-ColdWar agenda of creating peaceful democraticstates out of societies in transition fromauthoritarianism and patrimonialism (Lund,2006).

Accordingly, the actors that may beinvolved in prevention have expanded fromofficial emissaries to a host of third-partygovernmental and non-governmental actors insocial, economic, cultural, and other agencies,such as within the UN system; internationalfinancial institutions; regional organizations;and major governments through bi-lateraldevelopment and security assistance. Noris it limited to the governmental worldbut may include NGOs, the private busi-ness sector through trade, finance, and pri-vate investment (Ouellete), even celebrities.Preferably, prevention starts through theefforts of the government and other actors in


the countries where violent conflicts mightemerge. Secretary General Annan deemedthis multi-tooled, multi-actored, multi-leveledconcept a ‘culture of prevention.’18

Ad hoc and A priori instrumentsA less recognized expansion of preventionextends it ‘up’ from actions directed atspecific countries facing imminent conflicts(ad hoc prevention) to include global- andregional-level legal conventions or othernormative standards, such as in humanrights and democracy. These regimes seekto influence entire categories of countries oragents, where violations might contribute toconflicts although no signs of conflict haveyet appeared (a priori prevention). Whereasthe former actions are hands-on ways (eitherdirect or structural) to respond to country-specific risk factors, the latter are genericinternational principles agreed on by globaland regional organizations as guideposts thatwhole classes of states are expected to staywithin. There are two varieties: a) supra-national normative regimes, such as humanrights conventions, and b) international reg-ulations of goods that may fuel or easeconflict such as arms, diamonds, and othertrade. Examples of a priori direct preventionare the International Criminal Court andWar Crimes Tribunals for Yugoslavia andRwanda, which are believed effective indeterring future crimes against humanity,not just prosecuting those who have alreadycommitted them; the OAS’s proscribing ofmilitary or executive coups as threats todemocracy; and international regulation ofarms transfers. Adherence to internationalstandards and rules before any violationsoccur is conflict prevention where suchviolations could lead to violent repression,resistance, and conflict.19 This socializingof governments in international expectationshas been applied most vigorously in easternand southern Europe (e.g., Schneider andWeitzman, 1996; 15), where the EU, NATO,OSCE, and Council of Europe uphold similarstandards.Analogous compacts are being triedthrough NEPAD, the USA’s partnership forAfrican Development.

To illustrate the wide range of possiblemethods for conflict prevention, Table 15.1lists illustrative possible prevention instru-ments under these cross-cutting categories.20

Despite this variety of moments andmethods for prevention, a core concept hasemerged. Not a specific instrument, conflictprevention is a distinctly pro-active stancethat, in principle, many actors could taketo respond to unstable, potentially violentsituations before violence becomes the waytensions and disputes are pursued. Not asingle technique, it is a disposition towardincipient stages of conflict that may draw upona repertoire of responses that would help tokeep tensions and disputes from escalatinginto significant violence and armed force, tostrengthen capabilities of parties to resolveissues peacefully, and to progressively reducethe underlying problems that produce seriousdisputes.21 The challenges this expansivenotion poses for timeliness, coherence, andefficacy are discussed in later sections.

Conflict prevention, management,resolution, transformationIn the context of the school of conflictresolution that emerged in the 1970s, this post-Cold War concept marked new conceptualground. Differing stages and interventiontools for conflict were implicit but nottheoretically central concepts, and the terms inthat field still tend to be used interchangeablyfor any stage. Founders such as Bouldingenvisioned a global network of ‘social datastations’ to monitor and warn about emergingconflicts, but in the Cold War context ofthe time, conflict resolution came to meanaddressing already-tense international crises,or active internal wars, rather than keepingthem from starting in the first place.22 Anotherfounder sought to greatly deepen the causesof conflict to include “basic human needs”(e.g., Burton). Yet, the chief instruments thefield has promoted are confined to inter-active techniques such as problem-solvingworkshops or other direct intercession, allof which engage small groups representingparties already tied up in manifest conflicts.Structural and a priori prevention have placed


Table 15.1 Taxonomy of illustrative conflict prevention instruments

A Priori Measures Ad Hoc Measures(Generic norms and regimes for classesof countries)

(‘Hands on’ actions targeted to particular placesand times)

Structural Measures(Address basic societal,

institutional and policyfactors affectingconflict/peace)

Standards for human rights, goodgovernance

Environmental regimesWorld Trade Organization negotiationsOAS and AU’s protocols on protecting

democracyInternational organization membership

or affiliations

Economic reforms and assistanceEnterprise promotionNatural resource managementDecentralization, federalismLong-term observer missionsGroup assimilation policiesAid for elections, legislaturesHuman rights and conflict resolution educationAid for police and judiciaryExecutive power-sharingSecurity sector reform

Direct Measures(Address more immediate

behaviors affectingconflict/peace)

International Criminal CourtWar Crimes TribunalsSpecial Rapporteurs for Human RightsArms control treatiesGlobal regulation of illegal trade (e.g.,

Kimberly Process for ‘conflictdiamonds’)

EU Lome and Cotonou processes ondemocracy, governance, and humanrights

Human rights capacity-buildingInter-group dialogue, reconciliationConditional budget supportFact-finding missionsArms embargoes‘Peace radio’Good offices, facilitation, track-two diplomacy‘Muscular’ mediationPreventive deploymentEconomic sanctionsThreat of forceRapid reaction forces

this micro-focus within the macro-focus of thelarger processes of nation and state-building,in which interactive techniques are only oneamong a much larger set of instruments.

Prevention by other namesTable 15.1 reveals also that many defacto direct, structural and generic preven-tive instruments may not be recognized assuch because they operate under aliases.Historically, the Congress of Vienna, Leagueof Nations, the United Nations system ofagencies, Marshall Plan, European Union,and NATO and other security alliances wereall established to reduce the potential forfuture inter-state or intra-state conflicts andare thus fundamentally preventive (Lund,1996a, 1997). During the Cold War, détenteand co-existence, arms control treaties, andthe CSCE sought to keep the tense superpowerrelationship from erupting into conventionalor nuclear war. Since the Cold War, many

other policies and institutions encouragepeaceful management of disputes, suchdemocracy-building and as rule of law pro-grams, nuclear non-proliferation, and regionalorganizations.23 Whether any of these toolsexplicitly bear the term conflict preventionis immaterial, as long as features are builtinto them that perform prevention effectively.Conflict prevention is also at stake in currentdebates over current potential crises, such asIran’s nuclear plans, although those wordsare not used (Ignatius, 2006). All in all, oneanswer to our question of why it seems thatprevention is not tried more often is that it mayactually be operating, but under other labels.

WHAT IS BEING DONE? A WELL-KEPTSECRET

The examples so far show that conflictprevention is neither hypothetical nor new.


Although Darfur, the Russia–Georgia conflict,and other unaverted conflicts reflect a frequentfailure to act when violence is growing, sig-nificant effort has been devoted to preventiveaction and capacity-building, especially sincethe ending of the Cold War.

1. Early warning and advocacy

From Quincy Wright to Paul Collier, leaguesof social scientists have identified causes ofinter-state and intra-state conflict. Databasestrack the global trends and locuses of conflicts(SIPRI, Human Security Report, 2005) andassess the prospects for conflict or peacein particular countries (e.g., the formerConflict Prevention Network). Some countryrisk indicators and early warning systemsare university-based and open-sourced (e.g.,CIDCM, CIFP), and some provide politicalrisk assessments commercially. Helped bythe connectivity of the Internet, NGOs issueperiodic alerts to official bodies and thepublic, with recommended responses (e.g.,International Crisis Group, Human RightsWatch, International Alert, the former Forumfor Early Warning and Early Response[FEWER]). Intergovernmental and bi-lateralagencies have set up in-house systems (UN,OSCE, USAID, CIA, ECOWAS, IGAD).More recently, USAID outlined a ‘fragilestates’ strategy including a ‘watch list’ toidentify priority countries for attention. Inshort, what one book foresaw as an ‘emergingglobal watch’ seems to be gradually takingconcrete shape (Ramcharan, 1991).

Conflict prevention defined above hasbeen taken up by several successive non-governmental programs,24 and was studiedand promoted by the Carnegie Commission.In public advocacy, the Global Partnershipfor Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) isseeking to capacitate NGOs for early warningand peacebuilding. Efforts are being made tosensitize private corporations to the impactstheir commercial activities may have on con-flicts, negatively or positively (Wenger andMöckli, 1991). A recent initiative, ENOUGH,is seeking to garner public support for actionin Darfur and other African mass atrocities.25

Though such efforts to rouse public supportfor preventive action are useful in the longrun, they depend on media coverage of remoteevents and a distracted public that is touchedonly by highly emotive material (cf. Kristoff,2007), and so are prone to belated responses,not pro-active ones. Preventive action has tobecome largely a full-time professional andgovernmental endeavor.

Policy agendaSince the 1990s, more and more intra-state conflicts have burdened the UN andother organizations’ humanitarian caseload,the number of UN peacekeeping missionshas far exceeded all previous ones since theUN was founded, and the financial costsin post-conflict countries have mounted. Asover and over, new conflicts caused humansuffering and diplomatic and peacekeepingtravail, world leaders and organizations wereincreasingly swayed by the appealing argu-ment that it would be more humane and cost-effective to try to keep as many bloody anddevastating wars as possible from occurringat all. Conflict prevention came speciallyto the fore after the embarrassing failuresby the UN, the USA, and others to stemthe massive genocide in Rwanda in 1994.Numerous conferences on particular wars orpeacekeeping issues solemnly concluded thatwhat really ought to have happened wasmore vigorous effort at the outset to avoidsuch conflicts from occurring in the firstplace.

Conflict prevention entered the officialpolicy statements of the USA and other majorgovernments, the UN, the EU, and manyregional bodies. The title of the 1999 annualreport on all the activities of the UN systemsummed them up as ‘Preventing War andDisaster.’ Conflict prevention was the topicof two UN Security Council discussions in2000 and 2001; a priority urged in July,2000 by the G–8 Okinawa Summit; and thefocus of major reports of the UN SecretaryGeneral in June, 2001 and 2006. Since 9/11,the notion that failed states breed extremismand conflict added to this impetus under therubric of preventing state failures, and the


UN has sought to promote more pro-activeattention on conflict and other global threats(e.g., UN High Level Panel Report on GlobalThreats).

Initiatives on the groundPrevention has gone considerably beyondexhortation and policy into actual efforts inspecific countries. Though little-publicized,direct and structural activities have beenapplied in such diverse places threatenedby conflict as Slovakia, Indonesia, andGuyana. These activities range from bi-lateraland regional high-level diplomacy (e.g.,by ECOWAS) to NGO projects in peacebuilding at the local level, such as dialogues,peace radio, and inter-ethnic communitydevelopment programs, to mention a few.The UNDP local community developmentprogram in southern Krygyzstan was explic-itly entitled ‘preventive development.’Again,many programs in potential conflict settingsare intended as conflict-preventive but notso labeled, like the UN good offices’ effortswith the Myanmar regime, and the WorldBank offer in 2000 to help fund land reformin Zimbabwe as its political crisis over landworsened.26

Institutional capacity-buildingOngoing response mechanisms have been setup to trigger actions automatically based onrisk criteria, at least in principle. The UN Sec-retariat, the European Commission, and inter-governmental, regional, and sub-regionalbodies have staffed small units to watch forearly warning signs and consider preventiveresponses. At UN headquarters, the Secre-tariat’s ‘Interagency Framework Team forCoordinating Early Warning and InformationAnalysis’identifies countries at risk of conflictand applicable UN preventive measures. Inaddition to the most active regional mech-anisms of the OSCE and OAS, all Africansub-regional organizations have agreed toprevention mechanisms (e.g., AU; ECOWAS;IGAD; SADC; ECCAS). Although many arenot fully operational,27 some have been usedto respond to threatening situations, such as inCongo-Brazzaville and Guinea-Bissau.

Ahead of foreign and defense ministries,major development agencies have taken thelead in intra-state conflict prevention. Count-less training workshops have been carriedout by the UN for staff and donor imple-menting partners.28 NGOs and universitiesoffer institutes for training in conflict analysisand ‘peace and conflict impacts assessment.’Conflict and peace-building units exist in allmajor development agencies including theWorld Bank. These agencies have supportednumerous assessments of the conflict driversand peace capacities in particular countries.While they have funded unofficial diplomaticinitiatives, such as in Georgia, Uganda,Senegal, and the DRC, their preventiveefforts have been shifting from speciallydedicated activities such as dialogues to‘mainstreaming’ conflict and peace-buildingcriteria into all development sectors, suchas agriculture, health, education, economicgrowth, environment, youth, democracy- andstate-building, civil society building, as wellas security sector professionalism, and intothe full programming cycle from assessmentthrough design, monitoring, and evaluation.USAID’s Office of Conflict Mitigation andManagement is producing practical ‘toolkits’that provide lessons learned about how toaddress typical sources of conflicts arisingfrom issues such as water, minerals, forests,land, youth, human rights, and livelihoods(e.g., CMM). Consultants are tasked withdoing assessments of programs for theireffects specifically on conflicts and peace(e.g., Lund and Wanchek, 2005) and howthey might be improved or at least ‘dono harm’ by inadvertently exacerbating riskfactors (Anderson, 1999). A host of practicalanalytical tools have been developed for theseassessments and formulating appropriate pro-gram designs,29 published in practical guides.These present the typical sources of conflicts,how to assess the impacts of programs onconflict, and how they might be improved.The UN and some donor and multi-lateralorganizations are also trying to incorporateconflict-sensitive development into country-wide development strategies such as PRSPsand the UN’s CCA and DAF.


Changing normsNew international norms appear to be emerg-ing, albeit slowly and tacitly, that affirm aninternational obligation to respond to potentialeruptions of violence, especially genocide.As successive bloody wars have hit theheadlines, one no longer hears that they areinevitable ‘tragedies’ resulting from ‘age-old hatreds.’ Instead, concerns are voicedthat the calamity could have been avoided,and about what went wrong and who isresponsible. UN Secretary GeneralAnnan andUS President Clinton both acknowledged thatthey could have acted more vigorously to haltthe 1994 Rwanda genocide. Parliamentarypublic inquiries were held in France andBelgium on the roles that their governmentsmay have played in neglecting or worseningthe genocide, and in the Netherlands aboutthe roles of their forces under the UNduring the atrocities at Sbrenica. In 2001, theInternational Commission on Intervention andState Sovereignty asserted a ‘responsibilityto protect’ (R2P) ordinary people who areat risk of crisis or conflict.30 This dutyrests first with sovereign governments abouttheir own citizens, but if states are unwillingor unable, the responsibility to intervene toprotect those in harm’s way devolves to theinternational community.31 R2P may becomea critical impetus for conflict prevention,for the Commission argued that the dutyto protect also ‘implies an accompanyingresponsibility to prevent’ such threats (ICISS,2001: 19).

Governments in potentially conflict-pronecountries often object to this trend asundue interference in their domestic affairs,especially as it implies possible militaryintervention. But the more that late andpossibly non-consensual armed interventionsare justified and necessary to halt atrocities,the more acceptable earlier and consensualpreventive engagement may become as analternative. Moreover, the norm of outsideresponsibility for avoiding threats to citizensis gaining some hold in such countries aswell. The African Union now includes afifteen-member Peace and Security Councilthat if authorized by the Assembly can deploy

military force in a member state in theevent of genocide, war crimes and crimesagainst humanity. Though such authority tostop an humanitarian calamity or genocideis very late prevention, this moves upstreamin the conflict cycle the point at whichinvolvement is considered legitimate withouta government’s consent.32

In sum, conflict prevention is now morecommon. In addition to these explicit efforts,much of it is hidden in plain sight underother rubrics such as nuclear arms control,democratization, non-violent regime change,people power, power-sharing, conditional aid,and counter-terrorism. Though such activitiescan contribute to preventing conflict, they aretaken for granted and not registered in theconflict prevention column. Media tend toreport on wars, not how peace is maintainedmuch of the time.33 The failures to preventin Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo are widelyreported, the successes in Albania (Tripodi)and Romania (Mihailescu) go unnoticed.This lack of awareness outside professionalcircles of advances and achievements maydeflate the preventive enterprise, perpetuatingunwarranted pessimism regarding its value.So another part of the answer to our questionas to why conflict prevention is disregardedis that lack of awareness of what is actuallybeing done keeps it off the table of actionsthat could be taken in current potential conflictsituations. If one does not believe an activityexists, one does not consider it an option ordevote resources to it.34

Obstacles

Despite incremental progress in pro-activism,international actors often fail to applyvigorous measures to unraveling societieswhen they are first significantly threatenedby social turmoil, state breakdown, grosshuman rights violations, and violence. Inone study to ascertain the most activethird parties in the early stages of recentconflicts, the U.N. and the USA led otherthird parties, but the responses occurredat late stages of crisis or actual war andin salient arenas such as the Middle East


(Moller and Svensson, 2007: 17). U.S.foreignpolicy debates constantly dwell only on thenarrow question of how “tough” to be towardenemies and whether to go to intervenemilitarily here or there, thus totally ignoringthe options available before such adversariesare created and crisis points are reached.Although humanitarian and development aidhave increased, resources earmarked forconflict prevention, with the exception of afew dedicated funds, have not.

Dispersion of willsThe conventional explanation of why majorinternational organizations do not respondto potential conflicts is a ‘lack of politicalwill.’ But this is vague and does notexplain how it can be that preventive actionssometimes are taken.While it may be assumedthat Western publics are opposed to theuse of force abroad to stop genocide orhumanitarian crises, it is not clear theywould balk at strengthening the capacity toavert crises and avoid later costs. (Jentleson,1996: 14). Public opinion is also not the finalarbiter, for political leaders can circumventor influence it. Several recent preventiondecisions have been taken quietly with littleor no wider consultations (Lund, 1999). In2002–3, the USA’s handwringing throughoutthe 1990s about humanitarian interventionsand disdain for nation-building were quicklyswept aside with regard to Iraq by WhiteHouse arguments justifying the more drasticand costly choice of preventive war andforceful regime change.35

More often, the problem may be that there isan excess of political wills. The major powersand international community are presentextensively in most developing countries,including those vulnerable to conflict. Thispresence takes many forms such as diplo-matic missions, cultural activities, health andeducation and infrastructure development,trade and commerce, military assistance, aswell as efforts to promote democracy, humanrights, and civil society. But this multi-tude of activities building schools, trainingnurses, assisting elections, digging wells,teaching good business practices, you name

it, is pursuing a variety of differing policygoals that are not necessarily supportiveof conflict prevention. If many actors arealready engaged in conflict-prone places,often in sizeable numbers, the problem isnot what is commonly depicted as receivingan early warning from some remote countryand then pressuring international actors torush to it before a crisis erupts. Internationalactors are already there. Yet each missionis expending energy and resources in manydispersed directions other than preventingviolent conflicts. An effective preventionsystem does not operate in potential conflictareas because everyone is busily pursuingother mandates. While some of these conflict-blind activities may help, some enable orworsen conflicts.

Even the most prevention-relevant activ-ities listed above are too segmented. Earlywarning and conflict indicators come upthrough separate reporting channels andprogram desks, such as for human rights,humanitarian aid, and development, arrivingat differing definitions of local problemsand interpretations of conflict causes. Thisinformation is not synthesized to revealpossible overlap and complementarity. Forexample, genocide prevention is advocatedas if it is a separate problem from intra-stateconflict. But most genocides by far occurduring wars (Harff, 2003), and wars are hardto stop, so the best way to prevent genocideis to prevent the wars in which they usuallyarise.

Clash of professionsLying behind the problem of disparate willsare differing values and paradigms of separatedisciplines and professions such as conflictresolution, peace studies, human rights, eco-nomic development, political development,and security studies. Contradictions arise overthe often-inescapable need to make tradeoffsbetween these fields’ desirable but competinggoals. The prevailing Western liberal modeloften assumes that the democracy, humanrights, rule of law, free markets, and economicgrowth are all compatible with one anotherand with peace. But in many situations,


such compatibility does not hold, yet thereis no common understanding or procedurefor prioritizing goals at differing stages ofconflict.

These value conflicts reflect differingworldviews of diverse professionals regardinghow to conflict. Diplomatic, military, andsecurity communities often ignore the need toaddress underlying, longer-term factors thatcontribute to conflicts, as they pursue pre-dominantly elite-oriented and state-centeredapproaches to already armed conflicts. Onthe other hand, development agencies andNGOs generally fail to recognize the need forsufficient diplomatic clout or other forms ofpower to confront the immediate drivers ofintra-state conflicts, such as political leaderswho can mobilize popular followings andarmed groups. On their part, the humanrights community often takes a legal-juridicalapproach to exposing violations of humanrights principles and punishing the guilty –justice over peace – whereas the conflictresolution school emphasizes stopping vio-lence, strengthening human relationships andachieving reconciliation.36 But these philo-sophical differences lead the various fields toelevate one value above others and pursuediffering policy goals, thus frustrating theachievement of effective overall preventionstrategies. All good things do not necessarilygo together. Empirically speaking, one kindof leverage without others may have seriouslimits or cause harm (see the followingsection). What is required is recognition thatno one value necessarily can be achievedabsolutely; compromises need to strike bal-ances between competing values in differingcircumstances.

These dissonances may be getting morecrossfield attention, however. Procedurally,efforts to achieve policy coherence arebeing made by country-level coordinatorssuch as the UN Secretary General’s specialrepresentatives and UNDP resident repre-sentatives. Whole-of-government efforts arereflected in such entities as the US StateDepartment’s new Coordinator for Recon-struction and Stabilization. Inter-agency har-monization is being attempted by the UN’s

Peacebuilding Commission, at least forpost-conflict countries.37 Some developmentagencies are funding non-official diplomacyinitiatives that are intended to influencedomestic power politics, while the notionof ‘soft power’ encourages diplomats andmilitary officials to explore the utility ofdevelopment and other non-coercive policies.In sum, another part of the lack of suffi-cient proactive response is the dispersion ofinternational activities and goals already incountries threatened by violence. The problemis not deploying them anew. A downsideof the expansive notion of prevention isthat these various activities are pursued withno procedures for galvanizing them intoconcerted prevention strategies.Alternatively,a considerable multiplier effect would beachieved if the multiple efforts in a givencountry were each made more ‘conflict-smart,’ for their aggregate impact would bemore potent. Conflict prevention might belargely a matter of re-engineering the manydiplomatic, development and other programsthat already operate in developing countries sothat they serve conflict prevention objectivesmore directly and in a more concerted way(Lund, 1998a).

WHAT KINDS OF PREVENTION AREEFFECTIVE? GETTING AHEAD OF THECURVE

Much extant research looks at failure: coun-tries that faced potential violent conflict,and where no preventive effort was triedor opportunities were missed (e.g., Zartman,2005). However, the simple antidote to ‘actearly’ has given way to a deeper concernabout getting those actions right. This isbecause misapplied preventive efforts, evenif timely, may be worse than taking no actionat all. (cf. Lund, 1998a). Thus, the growingresearch on ‘success’– preventive actions thatwere tried and no escalation occurred – isespecially policy relevant. Instruments in thepotential prevention toolbox are not ipso factoeffective, for that hinges on which is appliedwhen, where, and how.


Basic ingredients

The first wave of this research looked mainlyat preventive diplomacy (direct prevention),and thus relatively late stages of confrontation(e.g., Miall, 1992; Manuera, 1994; Lund,1996). It suggests convergence around ele-ments that appear to be associated witheffective avoidance of violence:38

1. Act at an early stage (Miall, 1992: 198)., that isbefore a triggering event (Wallensteen, 1998:15), “early, early, early” (Jentleson, 2000: 337).

2. Be swift and decisive, not equivocal andvacillating (Wallensteen; Jentleson, 2000: 343;Hamburg, 2002: 146; Harff, 2006: 6).

3. Use talented, influential international diplomatswho command local respect (Jentleson, 2000:336; Miall, 1992: 193).

4. Convince the parties that the third parties arecommitted to a peaceful and fair solution, andoppose the use of force by any side (Jentleson,2000: 341).

5. Use a combination of responses, such as carrotsand sticks, implemented more or less coherently(Hamburg, 2002: 146–47; Wallensteen, 1998:15; Jentleson, 2000: 336; Leatherman, 1999:182–94; Zartman, 2005: 14; Byman, 2002: 217).

6. Provide support and reinforcement to moder-ate leaders and coalitions that display non-violent and cooperative behavior Zartman,2000: 310.

7. Build local networks that address the variousdrivers of the conflict, but avoid obviousfavoritism and imbalances (Wallensteen: 15;Jentleson, 2000: 336; Hamburg, 2002: 147;Leatherman, 1999: 199).

8. If necessary to deter actors from using violence,use credible threat of the use of force or otherpenalties such as targeted sanctions (Jentleson,2000; Zartman, 2005: 202).

9. Neutralize potential external supporters of oneside or the other, such as neighboring countrieswith kin groups to those in a conflict (Miall,2000; Hamburg, 2002: 147).

10. Work through legitimate local institutions tobuild them up (Wallensteen: 15).

11. Involve regional organizations or regionalpowers, but don’t necessarily act entirelythrough them (Wallensteen: 15) Jentleson: 339;Miall: 198).

12. Involve major powers that can providecredible guarantees, but use UN or othermulti-lateral channels to ensure legitimacy

(Jentleson: 337; Wallensteen: 15; Hamburg,2002: 147; Leatherman et al. 1999: 216;Zartman, 2005: 13).

The studies also find that certain local andregional conditions significantly enhance thechances of success (e.g., Miall):39

1. Domestic leaders who are relatively secure andfeel a self-interest in stability, and thus areopen to third parties facilitating or mediatingemerging disputes.

2. Major factions that show some mutual ability tomanage societal disputes and carry out publicpolicies that benefit all communities.

3. Accommodative policies and procedures such asvoting systems and opportunities for politicalparticipation that blunt the impact of grievancesfelt by one side or the other.

4. Relations between major political groups thathave been peaceful in the recent past.

5. One side is not much more powerful thananother.

6. Weak group solidarity or political mobilizationwithin one of the protagonists, such that theycannot mobilize beyond a certain level.

7. The country is small and relatively dependenton the international community economically,politically, and militarily.

Toward a theory of prevention:timing and sequencing

While very useful, these findings do notreveal the utility of particular instruments atdifferent stages. It is widely accepted thatdifferent interventions are needed at differentmoments (e.g., Lund, 1996: 191; RothchildCAII, 1996: 44). As indicated, it is alsobelieved that several kinds of instruments areneeded. But such a multi-pronged strategycannot mean everyone doing everything inevery stage and place. More is not necessarilybetter. Consequently, the leading currentresearch question being urged for the fieldis which mixes of differing instruments aremost effective in which stages of conflict andcontexts, other things being equal (e.g., Miall,1992; Nicolaides, 1996; Harff, 2005).40 Case-studies and ‘large n’ quantitative studies havebegun to mine recent experience (e.g., Rubin,


1998, 2004; Nicolaides; Rowsbotham andMiall; Leatherman et al.,)41 to get at thisissue. Differing levels of analysis, typologies,and cases have impeded the task of cumu-lating and verifying findings, and many arepartly deductive rather than empirical (e.g.,Lund, 1997; Leatherman; Kriesberg, 2003:Rothchild, 2003: 45). Nevertheless, gather-ing up what extant findings and groundedreasoning suggest so far can provide usefulheuristic guidelines for policymakers aboutwhich combinations of instruments to applyto the early stages of conflict.42

To explore the available evidence, weexamine below what research suggests aremost useful of the basic types of preventionat each of three distinguishable early phasesof conflicts. These phases lie in the realm ofunstable peace between a peaceful equilib-rium where conflicts are managed predictably,on the one hand, and tensions are beginningto escalate into confrontation, significantviolence or organized armed conflict, onthe other (cf. e.g., Mitchell, 1981; 2006;Lund, 1996; Lund, 1997; Kriesberg, 2003;Ramsbotham and Miall, 2005).43 To frame thefollowing discussion, we pose here a familiarassumption that “soft” measures must befollowed by “hard” ones, the more a conflictescalates – e.g., diplomacy must precede theuse of force. The UN Charter envisions thatthe procedures in Chapter Six for peaceful set-tlements of disputes may have to be followedby the more coercive measures in ChapterSeven of sanctions and peace enforcement.Others subscribe to this graduated ‘ladder ofprevention’ (Eliasson). Similarly, regardinginteractive conflict resolution methods, thecontingency model hypothesizes that thegreater the intensity of conflict, the morethat non-assertive techniques of facilitationmust give way to the directive techniquesof mediation, arbitration and adjudication(Fisher and Keashly, 1991).

Latent conflicts

These arise when exogenous or endogenouschanges are generating underlying but unac-knowledged strains among societal groups but

they have yet to mobilize to express theirinterests.44

A priori instruments: structural and directAs described earlier, one prominent a prioriinstrument involves global and regionalorganizations promulgating standards or reg-ulations backed by incentives in order toencourage present or prospective memberstates to respect human rights, adopt demo-cratic procedures, settle disputes peacefullywith their own minorities and neighboringstates, or submit to restrictions on termsof trade (e.g., Lund, OECD-DAC, 1998;Jentleson, 2000: 338; Hamburg, 2002: 147;Cortright, 269–72).45 The evident effective-ness of this instrument in reducing potentialcauses of conflict seems to derive fromthe conditional incentives offered to leaderswho have already subscribed to particularnorms, at least nominally, and are already inpower before particular conflicts ensue, thusavoiding the difficulties of intervening whereparties have already violated the norms andbecome entrenched in opposed positions onspecific disputes. When agreeing to them, aregime’s future stakes are not immediatelyapparent, compliance can be voluntary, thereis time to adjust a country’s policies, andindividual actors cannot argue they are beingsingled out. If the penalties for violationsare significant, ‘the sunk costs borne bythe parties … are not so overwhelming asto dwarf the public good provided by theinstitution’ (Nicolaides: 60, 46–48). A possi-ble negative side-effect occurs if the benefitsof incorporating some states into internationalorganizations and excluding their neighborsintensifies tensions between ‘ins’ and ‘outs’(Bonvicini, 1996; 9; Shambaugh, 1996).46

Ad hoc structural instrumentsVigorous structural measures can help specificgovernments to alleviate underlying socio-economic sources of conflicts or institu-tional and policy deficits that keep countriesfrom addressing those problems meaning-fully and peacefully. When in the 1980s,international lending institutions began topressure developing countries to privatize


para-statals, reduce public spending, removeprice subsidies, stabilize monetary systems,and liberalize trade regulations (Muscat,2002: 196), the rationale was not solelyeconomic productivity and growth, but polit-ical stability, an implicit theory of peace. Infact, considerable large ‘n’ research suggeststhat economic liberalization such as freetrade policies are highly correlated withlower levels of poverty, and that developmentcorrelates with lower levels of conflict (e.g.,Hegre et al., 2002; Goldstone et al., 2003).Failing to enact reforms, on the other hand,is likely to deepen poverty and inequities thatincrease the chances for upheaval.

However, critics argue that structuraladjustment measures can increase politicalinstability and thus risk of conflict, especiallyin the poorest countries by reducing incomeand increasing competition among prospec-tive losers and gainers during de-statalization.In this view, globalization increases vulner-ability to complex humanitarian emergen-cies by liberalizing trade, increasing capitalmobility, raising debt, lowering commodityexport prices, and reducing foreign directinvestment (e.g., Rapley, 2009). In countrieswith governments run by ethnic minoritiessuch as Sri Lanka, for example, elites canhold onto their position by securing accessto privatized industries. If other minori-ties are shut out, the economic inequal-ity, or at least its perception, producesinter-group resentment and tensions (Chua,2003).

This debate revolves in part around differ-ing time frames. To derive the ingredients ofpeace from ahistorical econometric methodsthat pinpoint the highest correlations amongindicators in large numbers of countriesex post facto is not to understand how thesecorrelations came into being over time andthe ways that the variables actually behavedand interacted within particular countries.47

Though austerity measures may provokeviolent protests in the short run, the evidenceof political instability is mixed and context-specific (Muscat, 1995). Such adjustmentpolicies may not create fundamental threats toregimes (Bienen, 1986). In fact, early policies

toward natural resources, trade access, diver-sification, corruption, price shocks, and ethnicquotas can boost growth (Collier, 125–40).48

Whether such policies mitigate or worsenconflict also depends on how these interna-tional and domestic policies are designed,introduced, and implemented.49 Social safety-net programs can be used to compensategroups that are especially hard-hit by short-term effects of economic austerity.50 In anycase, normal policies of international lendinginstitutions applied automatically withouttailoring them to each country context maybe especially destabilizing in the poorest andleast capable states.51 In short, economicreform may have better chances of successat this stage, than when politics are morepolarized, but they need to be conflict-sensitive and accompanied by compensatorymeasures.

As against such conditional aid,52 donorsalso provide outright aid such as in health andeducation to alleviate social needs and thusencourage economic activity. Such supportprograms are believed to have stabilizingeffects because they can create new marketsand increase social interaction (Cortright,1997; Collier, 134). A drawback is that suchassistance is implemented through divisibleprojects and programs, so benefit allocationsmay reflect the differential access of asociety’s ethnic groups, causing ‘horizon-tal inequities’ (Stewart, ), especially whereprebendal or patronage mechanisms distributeresources and life chances as is commonin Africa. When the competitive pressuresof democratization arise, ruling parties haveespecially strong incentives to use socialand economic programs to win and rewardsupporters. Thus, conflict-blind aid intendedto alleviate poverty may actually privilegecertain and identity groups and intensify inter-group rivalries (Graham, 1994).53 Donorsoften find that even well-intentioned supportmay visibly affect the relative position ofpolitically significant groups in a societyand thus exacerbate the sources of conflict(Collier, 138). Where there are politicizedethnic divisions, aid programs may contributemore to conflict than do macro-economic


reforms because they are more or less‘lumpy.’54 Implementing programs throughmulti-group and locally–run mechanisms mayhelp to avoid obvious partiality and bridgesuch cleavages (e.g., Anderson).55

Both economic reform and outright aid areless likely to provoke conflict if developingsocieties have institutions that manage thesocial strains and inequalities that global-ization can cause (Rodrik, 1997). As manydonors concluded that structural adjustmentcould not work unless bolstered by effectivegovernance (Stokke, 1995: 26), the latterbecame another entry point for structural con-flict prevention. International agencies nowwidely subscribe to the view that democracy-building is an effective way to achieve domes-tic stability.56 Again, the evidence arises fromstrong cross-sectional statistical associationsin a large number of countries betweendemocracy and peace between and withinnations (e.g., Russett, 1993). At the stageof latent conflict, such support for buildinginstitutions that can regulate emerging socialconflicts is promising (Nicolaides: 53). Somecountries like Indonesia though ethnicallyfragmented have taken genuine steps towardpopular democracy and maintained relativestability.

However, views that any steps toward moredemocracy are gains for conflict reduction(e.g., Diamond, 1996: 40–8) do not recognizethat democratization also risks destabiliza-tion. Studies of actual dynamics of changein particular countries find that the riskof conflict often rises during periods whenauthoritarian systems are shifting to morepluralistic structures (e.g., Mansfield andSnyder, 1995a,b).57 Alternatively, transition-ing polities may remain ‘partial’ or ‘illiberal’democracies (Ottaway, 2003; Zakaria, 1997)in which the regime’s hold on power isnot challenged, political and civil rights areabridged, and representation occurs throughinformal power-sharing within cliques. If suchautocratic or oligarchic regimes (‘anocracies’)continue to resist meaningful democraticreform, they could simply stagnate econom-ically as well as politically, inviting statebreakdown and violent conflict.

At the same time, it is unclear whethersuch regimes necessarily lead to stagnationand violent conflict or can evolve grad-ually toward more openness and stability.Informal power-sharing among less thanfully accountable political leaders, thoughfalling short of formal democracy in aWestern sense, does not lead inevitablyto conflict.58 In fact, intra-elite co-optativebargains, though less than ideal by Westernstandards, may be a pre-requisite for politicalstability and thus eventual development(e.g., Rothchild, 2004, Byman). So onceagain, the likelihood of conflict may bedetermined more by whether governmentsmake accommodative adjustments, such asallowing for some political activity (cf.Cramer and Weeks, 2002: 41f).59 Positivediscrimination programs to increase access ofminorities to government jobs and servicescan co-opt group resentments (Rothchild,2004: 47). These diverging scenarios makethe current national politics in authoritariancountries such as Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan,and Egypt, and more pluralistic but weaksystems like Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan,crucial focuses for early warning and conflictprevention.60

Appropriately, especially since 9/11, ana-lysts have looked increasingly to ‘supply-side’programs that support institutions of the stateto make governments more effective from theinside. Several analysts argue that before rep-resentative democracies can function effec-tively, basic institutions of the state needto operate effectively.61 Fragile and failedstates need to have effective ministries, localauthorities, and judiciaries delivering health,education, roads, sanitation, and justice.62

State strengthening includes professionalizinga country’s security forces, both to restrainthem from abusing its citizens and enablethem to provide security.63 National lawsalso need to provide guarantees such asproperty rights (Kapstein, 2004), enforcepolicies governing the economy, establishregulatory agencies such as for banking andtrade, and respect civil and political rightsand criminal laws through courts,64 includingprotections for minorities and other limits


on arbitrary power: ‘constitutional liberalism’(Zakaria, 2003).65

On a broader plane, much research hasweighed the utility for preventing ethnicconflicts of constitutional engineering thatallocates political authority through differingoptions: unitary systems versus federalism,autonomy or partition; presidential versusparliamentary systems, and proportional ver-sus plural electoral rules (see e.g., Horowitz;Wimmer, 2004). Federalism is often presentedas a possible means of conflict resolutionor prevention, for devolving policymakingcan shield minorities and be more responsiveto regional or local interests. But decen-tralization has both calmed and dividedsocieties (Siegle and O’Mahony, 2007).Proportional representation and winner-take-all voting helped in South Africa and not inNorthern Ireland. Again, how such differingarrangements affect the risk of conflict ina given country depends on other particularfactors, such as the political relationshipbetween contending identity groups and thepolitics of change.

In sum, all such economic, political andconstitutional structural changes envisionultimate states of affairs that, if attained,would undoubtedly reduce conflicts signifi-cantly. But the challenge is getting to theseendpoints without destructive conflict. Inthe short run, reforms such as structuraladjustment and majoritarian elections arenot always feasible, and can be counter-productive if applied too quickly or withinsufficient attention to a country’s balanceof power, political economy, and potentialfor backlash and deeper polarization. Liber-alizations that fragment power have to bebalanced by stabilization that consolidatesit (cf. Paris, 2001), such as state andsocietal institutions with authority to reconcilecompeting interests and force compromises.Many ideal liberal-internationalist solutionsset aside the difficulties and pitfalls ofgetting reforms adopted and do not calculatethe risk of destabilization in view of thecapacities of differing societies for peacefulchange.66 Merely prescribing ultimate ide-als is as useful as a doctor advising an

obese patient with heart trouble to ‘loseweight.’67

Ad hoc direct instrumentsStructural policies do not necessarily engagethe specific stakeholders in emerging nationalconflicts, although they require consent or atleast toleration by host governments wherethey are applied. Critical to their adoptionand implementation are the processes andchannels through which governing elitesmake decisions about them, steps that affectthe prospects for social conflict. This realitythus calls for direct forms of preventiveengagement even at this stage of latentconflict.68 But despite the frequent obeisanceexpressed to the idea of engendering ‘localownership,’ structural programs often treatthe leaders in a country not as active agentsof change but automatons who respondto incentives and disincentives in somePavlovian stimulus–response internationalexperiment.

Obviously, direct prevention is prematureif no conscious sense of a serious prospectiveharm or opportunity is present (Berkovitch;Nicolaides 1996: 52). Where societies see noserious problem that needs fixing, it is hardfor third-party would-be preventors to explainwhy they are needed. Pointing to a conflictof interests might actually destabilize thesituation (Kemp: 50ff).69 Or, if no aggrievedparties have stepped forward, it is unclearwhom one can talk to. But once underlyingproblems are beginning to surface as con-tentious issues, direct engagement fostered bytrusted third parties is best carried out withinexisting institutions and ruling processes, thusgiving standing regimes the chance to respondin ways that do not immediately threatentheir status while allowing them to addressemerging problems. State elites acting earlyon to deal with structural conditions can beeffective prevention (Rothchild, 2003: 46).Whether or not governments have acceptedinter-national standards through agreementsthey have signed, they may take umbrage atcriticism and dismiss outside pressure. Butfact-finding missions from institutions such asthe UN can overcome resistance, especially


if complemented with direct support thataddresses the deficiencies (Rothchild, 2003:46–7). As it is better to foster compliancethan rely only on ex poste condemnationsof deviations (Nicolaides, 1996: 54), multi-lateral organizations have also moved fromsimply promulgating and pressing standardson a government to hands-on assistance. TheOffice of the UN High Commissioner onHuman Rights, for example, has shifted fromsimply monitoring human rights to help-ing governments comply, through creatingnational institutions that build human rightscapacity. A related approach is the Lomeconsultations the EU holds with governmentsin Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific forincrementally establishing democratic institu-tions, thus allowing for flexibility regardingwhich countries are expected to meet whichbenchmarks by when.

Manifest limited conflict

The stakes of conflict increase when widerforces of change elicit awareness of conflict-ing interests and energize affected groups,issues come into the open, and potentiallydiverging positions are decided upon andvoiced (Miall, 2007). Accepted forms ofprotests may be underway as well as irregularacts, including violence. The aim is bothto prevent confrontations that escalate, hard-ening of positions and polarization, risingfears, and mutual defensive measures thatcreate security dilemmas and to find basesfor cooperation. For some, this is the moststrategic moment for prevention, as the tasksof earlier and more basic structural preventionare seen as too demanding and complex(Ottaway and Mair, 2004). Some rawness ofsores of discontent may be needed to expectpositive change to occur (cf. Stedman, 1995).Structural measures continue to be useful –but now, less for alleviating the underlyingsources of the conflict than as ‘purchase’(Rothchild, 2003), to ‘sweeten’ an agreement,that purveyors of direct prevention can usetactically.

Direct measures thus become more essential.Opposed groups often have little inclination to

initiate mutual engagement, at least until theyfail to achieve their objectives unilaterallythrough first trying coercive or violent means.Still, some may seek outside help at thisearly stage more often than may be realized(Nicolaides, 1996: 49), as when the Barreregime was under challenge by various clans.Direct methods through which third partiescan intervene peacefully include the classicarray of official and non-official interactivemethods. All these are intended to get partiesin closer contact and communication for moreaccurate information about mutual interestsand needs, dispel ignorance and fear, andexpose them to more options, possibly leadingto agreements (e.g., Rothchild, 2003: 46;Zartman and Rasmussen, 1997).70

One direct approach uses non-bindinginteractions such as various types of conflicttransformation workshops that precede, fol-low or operate under or alongside official‘track one’ diplomacy or political processes(Fisher, 2005; cf. Ropers, 2005). Ratherthan take up substantive issues to seeksettlements through adversarial, judgmentalapproaches, these gentler methods or ‘softmediation’ (Nicolaides, 1996: 51) create anon-threatening milieu to simply facilitateinter-party communication, thus expectingto elicit more committed participation andpave the way to locally decided and‘owned’ accommodations (e.g., Zartman andRasmussen). One study found that extensivemutual communication rather than hard bar-gaining has been more effective (Bercovitch,1998: 243). In 2003, for example, UNDP andGuyanese leaders agreed to a whole series ofgovernmental and civil society dialogues thatresulted in the country’s first ever non-violentelections in 2006. Success may depend greatlyon whether they are spearheaded by prominentoutsiders who command respect (Lund andMyers, 2007). Yet, even if a small societyand government is immersed in workshops, ifimproved relationships are not translated intolegal and policy changes that institutionalizeand uphold agreed rules even on stormy days,the usual political styles can return (Lundand Myers, 2006). It is difficult to instill newhabits unless they are embedded in locally


run institutions (Nicolaides, 51). A point isreached when the question is whether a bodypolitic adopts such habits on its own withoutthird-party therapy. Such non-formal methodsare not intended as alternatives to tougherapproaches, but complementary (Fisher, inZartman and Rasmussen, 1997: 241).

A innovative hybrid of a priori, ad hoc,structural and direct engagement that liesbetween non-formal facilitation and formalmediation is the work of the OSCE High Com-missioner on National Minorities (HCNM),an office mandated to become proactivelyengaged in ethnic disputes arising in the1990s. The first able incumbent and hissuccessors have made innumerable visits toEastern Europe and newly independent statesto meet with leaders and minority groups.They facilitate dialogues, recommend policyremedies to chief executives and parliaments,and show how OSCE norms may apply,including drafting model legislation. Onlyvery rarely have they publicly pressured theparties, but crucial to the success that manyanalysts judge this innovation has often hadin reducing divisive tensions and elicitingaccommodation is the eventual reward forgood behavior of economic aid and member-ship in the EU, NATO, and other Westernbodies (e.g., Hopmann, Mychajlyszyn).

Still, leaders in conflict-vulnerable soci-eties and weak states are often disinclined tocompromise and/or they affirm positions andagreements they cannot enforce (Nicolaides,1996: 52). If their recalcitrance breaks offcommunication or thwarts opportunities forjoint problem-solving, third parties may needto get more directive by engaging parties in‘muscular mediation’ or formal negotiationswith teeth (e.g., Jakobsen, 1996: 24), such asproferred aid or ‘coercive diplomacy,’ such asthreats to cut off aid (Rothchild, 2002: 48f),impose economic sanctions, or use force (e.g.,George, 1994: 199).

Military measures can also be used fordirect prevention, but not yet in the formof a threat or actual use of force. Theusual foreign policy debate over ‘force versusdiplomacy’ tends to pertain to high levelsof confrontation. But before that stage,

the overlooked but promising instrumentof preventive deployment (Nicolaides, 44f)can act as a deterrent by inter-positioningforces even before any hostile actions haveoccurred. The only clear example has beenUNPREDEP, the UN force that posted1100 troops along Macedonia’s border withAlbania and Serbia from 1992 until 1999.Though its firepower could not withstand aYugoslav army attack, UNPREDEP createda tripwire that would likely trigger moreforceful responses. Its removal in 1999 wasfollowed two years later by an insurgency thatoriginated in border areas UNPREDEP hadonce patrolled (Lund, 2005). As significant,it had a calming effect on domestic inter-ethnic relations (Lund, 1997).71 Similarly,peace zones secured militarily can containactual or potential conflict by cordoning offspecified areas, with or without the consentof a government (Nicolaides 45), such as inNorthern Iraq under Hussein.72

Escalating violent conflicts

Positions are hardening, relationships break-ing off, parties disengaging. Irregular expres-sions of grievances grow into wider violence,foretelling possible organized conflict. Majorhostilities look imminent. The aim is to avoidan irrevocable spiral.

To pre-empt increasing intransigence,invoking and enforcing a priori norms mightstill be effective. Less than totally punitivemeasures can activate those in the countrywho support peaceful resolution. But usingcoercive diplomacy in the absence of a clearpattern of overt violence or gross violations ofnorms may be seen as unfair and illegitimate(Nicolaides, 1996: 44) because it presumesactions would occur for which the evidenceis equivocal. Another mistaken reflex is totry to address the supposed ‘root’ causes of aconflict such as ethnic or religious differences,economic disparities, or lack of democracy,as if they mainly now drive the violence.But such ad hoc structural measures are lessand less useful as well as feasible, when itis the violence that drives violence. What is


most urgent is to halt the spiral through potentpolitical and military direct prevention.73

The tougher tools of formal diplomacy,though difficult, may arrive at short-termsettlements to buy time such as ceasefires(Nicolaides, 1996: 52; Rothchild, 2002: 54;Heldt, 8). These are more likely to be effectiveto the extent a strong mediator or teamis skillful in instilling the parties with anurgent sense of the costs that can come fromfurther bloodshed (Rothchild, 2002: 55). Theyalso work better if accompanied by potentialrewards that buy off the parties and help themfulfill an agreement, including the offer ofdevelopment aid (Cortright, 1998, Rothchild,2002), and/or punishments that pressure themto agree. Where there is asymmetry in powerbetween the parties, measures to strengthenthe power of the weaker party may budge thestronger.

Where the parties remain obdurate, coer-cive diplomacy such as sanctions or threatof force may be needed to reverse undesiredactions or compel desired actions. Threats ofthe use of force were used when, for example,Presidents Bush and Clinton issued severalwarnings to President Milosevic not to supportany armed activity in Kosovo as he had inBosnia. Such threats are more likely to beeffective if issued before possible escalationsof hostile actions occurs, or if they followimmediately upon initial manifestations ofviolence (Nicolaides, 44–5), not ex postfacto. Threatening to expel a state from aninternational organization is less effectiveonce significant investment in a violent coursehas occurred. The more that the conflictingparties inflict physical harm on each other,they cannot just back down the ladder theyclimbed up, for mutual hurt and increasingfear remain (Mitchell, 2005; cf. Rothchild,2002: 51). By the same token, indictment bya war crimes tribunal is not likely to preventthe perpetrator continuing to fight, and can becounter-productive, once they are named andbeing hunted down, as they have no incentiveto refrain from fighting, unless some provisionallows amnesty. If sanctions are actually used,they must be comprehensive to be effective(Jentleson, 2000: 337). But such coercive

diplomacy is less applicable when the threatis a breakdown of a state since the source ofthe problem is hard to target (Nicolaides, 42).Similarly, non-targeted sanctions have beenwidely criticized as having considerable neg-ative side-effects for the general populationwhile benefitting well-positioned elites.

One of the few joined debates in thisscattered literature pertains to this stage: whenare conflicts ‘ripe for prevention?’ Some ana-lysts believe it more propitious to act beforethe outbreak of any significant violence.Violence ‘crosses a Rubicon’ from which itis very difficult to return (Jentleson, 2000),creating huge challenges for intervenors (cf.Edmead, 1971 cited in Berkovitch, 1996:251). Others believe that some initial fightingthat gets nowhere, a ‘soft stalemate,’ is neededbefore parties will no longer be tempted totry violence to see if it gets them gains(Berkovitch, 1996: 251). Thwarted violenceor blocked confrontation are thus needed tosoften parties up to compromise.74

Third-party willingness to use force canalso influence the calculations of actorsregarding their use of force. Much discourse inconflict prevention assumes military force tobe antithetical to peace. Some NGOs that firststepped up to undertake conflict resolutionresponsibilities in threatened countries tendto oppose any form of force ideologically,or to downplay the role of any coercion infavor of non-coercive methods and policiessuch as diplomacy and, lately, developmentassistance. But some analysts suggest thatsticks as well as carrots need to be exertedmore or less simultaneously – with flexibilityshown regarding what quotients of eachare applied in specific situations (Jentleson,2000; Byman, 2002: 219). ‘…while coercionrarely is sufficient for prevention, it often isnecessary’ (Jentleson, 2000: 5). Deterrencethrough the threat of using force may oftenbe a pre-requisite for effective negotiationsand, by implication, structural initiatives.Threats of force can encourage allies withina country to spring up. Still, threat of forcemust be made clear and credible by clearlyconveying a concrete demand and the cer-tainty that non-compliance will be punished


(Jakobsen, 1996: 3), such as through pos-sessing capabilities and having domestic andinternational backing that can be sustained.They also need to be targeted precisely atspecific actors who might otherwise escalatetheir actions, be potentially more costly tothe parties than their persevering, identify theproscribed behaviors, and be accompaniedby realistic alternative solutions (Nicolaides,42–4).75 The chances increase if the balanceof power favors the threat sponsor and thevalue to the targeted actor of ignoring thethreat is greater than the costs of compliance(Jakobsen, 1996: 3–5).76

Alternatively, if the threat of force is notbacked up with credible force when there isnon-compliance, they run the risk of encour-aging aggression by calling the bluff of theinternational actors (Nicolaides, 45).77 A lackof follow-through or half-hearted measurescan embolden their target (Nicolaides, 1996:42–3) if that party comes to believe that thethreat is empty. Empty threats toward BosnianSerbs had adverse effects when the latter didnot follow through in protecting safe areassuch as in Sbrenica (Jakobsen, 1996: 24).78

Actual use of force may be needed to limitemerging violence such as being visited upona threatened minority group (Nicolaides, 42).Several argue that timely introduction of arelatively small force in Rwanda in May of1994 would have stopped Hutu extremistsfrom continuing to carry out their plans tokill thousands of Tutsi and Hutu moderates(Feil, 1998; Feil (1998) cited in Jentleson,2000: 16; cf. Melander, 10f.). But this has beenquestioned (Kuperman, 2000). The tacticalquestion is what amount is sufficient torestrain or reverse the undesired behavior.79

If violence does cease, security guaranteesare in place and diplomatic processes arein play, neither freezing of the violence nordiplomatic agreement is sufficient by itself tomove the actors to tackle the abiding politicaland socio-economic problems that occasion aconflict. For these, assistance is also neededfor programs in institution building anddevelopment, now that they can operate in anenvironment that is basically stable and notconstantly threatened by violence.

All in all, this quick review supports thenotion that differing kinds of interventionsare needed at particular settings and stages ofconflict, and in certain combinations of hard,soft, and other kinds of measures. However,they complicate the simple sequencing that isoften presumed: that the greater the hostilitiesin a conflict, the more that coercive measuresare needed.

If one looks at the whole early period,the research does support a general picturein which increasingly coercive measures areneeded to the degree a conflict escalates.However, the emerging literature qualifiesthat simple formula and adds altogether newelements to the equation. Before societalstrains become salient, a priori regimes whosespecific implications are unforeseeable buthold out attractive incentives can socializeleaders into international expectations. Ifenforced and resourced, these standards canfoster structural and institutional changes thatmake more likely the peaceful managementof transitional stresses from economic reformand democratization. But such liberalizationneeds to be accompanied by compensatorymeasures. Democratization needs incrementalsteps for effecting peaceful transition suchas power-sharing arrangements, accompaniedby conditional material aid for implementingchanges. As political and policy disputesover such changes inevitably arise, sym-pathetic international envoys or missionswith significant authority can usefully enterthe picture, much earlier than usual, tomidwife their resolution – playing ‘goodcop’ by persuading incumbent leaders toinaugurate changes before they lose control.During such potentially unstable periods –contrary to the assumed sequence wherebymilitary power is a last resort following theexhaustion of diplomatic efforts – securityassurance may be essential for undergirdingthe ensuing domestic political negotiations.Where regimes choose to resist openingsand move to repress them violently, firmcoercive sanctions and credible threat ofmilitary force can deter them, and actualuse of effective deadly force can halt theirextremes. In short, the conventional scenario


(derived perhaps from a Cold War crisisparadigm in which sovereignty is supremeand engagement comes late in the formof diplomacy or military action) does notsufficiently factor in structural measures,hands-on institutional support and positiveincentives, and deterrent military measures.Regrettably, however, as useful as all theseresearch findings may be as guidelinesto action, they are not followed becausedecisionmakers do not have such lessons attheir fingertips.80

NEXT STEPS: TAPPING THEPOTENTIAL

To answer the puzzle this chapter first posed,conflict prevention is still a relatively marginalinternational concern for several reasons: aplurality of possible instruments and agents;its de facto operation under other names, lackof conceptual closure about stages and typesof interventions; a lack of confidence due inpart to dim awareness of the actual extent ofrecent capacity building and effective actionson the ground; dispersed activism globallyand in a given country by diverse professionsand overstretched governmental and non-governmental international organizations; andscattered research agendas and findings,yielding little usable guidance for would-be preventors. Yet, pro-active responses tohead off potential conflicts are happening, andprima facie evidence suggests that combinedwith certain conducive factors, they can beeffective. To tap the unfulfilled potential ofconflict prevention, this state of the art couldbe advanced through three steps:

1. Consolidate what is known. Lack of suf-ficient knowledge does not excuse why morefrequent and effective responses to incipientconflicts are not undertaken. Policymakerstend to ignore the useful knowledge thatalready exists. Professionals need to gainaccess to top officials to present promisingoptions and evidence of their results. Themain problem is not epistemological butorganizational. We need not wait until social

scientists have found the universally highestcorrelations among the limited set of variablesalready most plausibly known as relevantbefore we continue as in the previous sectionto gather, synthesize, and disseminate theexisting findings among policymakers andfield practitioners. Enough is known toproduce heuristic guidance, for even the mostverified conclusions are cannot be imple-mented mechanically in any particular conflictsetting, but used as action-hypotheses to becombined with astute political judgments.A structured framework could pull togetherthe preventive instruments available withguidelines about which are likely to be mostfeasible and productive in what conditions.

2. Focus the knowledge on emerg-ing conflicts. Conflicts do not emerge inWashington, New York or Brussels, but inparticular developing countries at specifictimes. To have practical value, any gatheredpolicy wisdom needs to be applied on theground in real time. Many currently early-warning-identified poor societies and weakstates (e.g., Papua, Kyrygystan, Guinea)would benefit from pro-active and concertedefforts that apply peaceful policies to avoidescalation to crises and violent conflicts. Thecountry level is where the diverse agendas andtools are most clearly juxtaposed and con-cretely reconciled. This requires organizingconsultations through which key actors (USG,UN, EU, regionals, governments, NGOs) canjointly assess the country situations and deviseand implement diagnosis-driven targetedstrategies, both at the field and desk officerlevel. Such processes would (a) apply conflict-sensitive indicators to identify systematicallythe most important short- and long-term risksin a country that are affecting the prospects forescalating conflict as well as its capacities forpeaceful management of conflict; (b) identifywhat actions each actor can contribute withinthe strategy; and (c) consult the lessonslearned from actual experience with variouscombinations of instruments.81 To harnesstheir global influence, leading actors suchas the USA and other governments, theEU, and the World Bank, in cooperation


with agencies in the UN system, could con-vene these multi-lateral country consultationsto develop jointly formulated, analyticallybased, multi-faceted strategies. The processescould be linked to existing country-specificdevelopment planning procedures such asthe PRSP and CAS, but should also involvediplomatic and military agencies as well asinside stakeholders.

3. Conduct more basic prevention research.Though would-be preventors need not beinhibited by overly fastidious methodologicalstandards, existing findings must be treatedas preliminary hypotheses that research needsto test further.82 More rigorous and com-prehensive policy research is still needed toestablish what types of preventive actionsat both a priori and ad hoc levels, in whatcombinations, are likely to have what positiveor negative effects in different stages ofconflicts and contexts.83 Promising structuraland direct instruments have received little ifany research, such as positive incentives togovernments to encourage compliance withaccepted international norms, special envoyswith preventive mandates such as the HCNM,institutional support for strengthening equi-table state service-provision, and preventivedeployment.84

NOTES

1 Describing civil wars as ‘development in reverse,’Collier lists the costs for the countries in conflictas military and civilian deaths, disease (HIV/AIDS,malaria), physical destruction, population displace-ment, high military expenditures, capital outflows,policy and political breakdown, psychological trauma,and landmines. The costs to other nations duringand after conflicts include refugees, humanitarian aid,reconstruction aid, disease, increased military expen-ditures and tasks such as peacekeeping, reducedeconomic growth, illicit drugs, and internationalterrorism (Collier, 2003). Africa’s two dozen internalwars in 23 countries from 1990–2005 are calculatedto have cost $18 billion a year, which could havegone to HIV/AIDS and other disease protection,education, health, and water infrastructure. ‘AfricaWars Costs Billions,’ a report by Oxfam can befound at www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/africa/10/11/africa.billions.ap/index.html.

2 Estimates have been made of the costs ofinterventions in recent wars compared with the costsif preventive action had been taken, and of the actualcosts of preventive action taken in vulnerable societiesthat did not break out into wars compared withthe estimated costs had war occurred. All showedhuge possible savings. Prevention was significantlycheaper in all cases, with the ratios of preventionto war ranging from 1–1.3 to 1–479, an average of1–59 (Brown and Rosecrance, 1999). In an estimateof Macedonia, the actual cost of UNPREDEP was$255 million, or 0.02% of the estimated cost of$15 billion for a two-year conflict (Thayer: 62).Chalmers finds all 12 of the retrospective andprospective conflict prevention packages that wereestimated for the Balkans, Afghanistan past andfuture, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uzbekistan to be cost-effective (Chalmers, 2005: 6f.).

3 ‘High fatalities encourage further hostility andcontentious behavior, and these diminish the likeli-hood of mediation effectiveness (just as they diminishthe chances of an agreement in negotiations) (seePruitt, 1981). Dispute complexity, which in any eventis associated with lengthy, protracted conflicts andhigher fatalities, also appears to be incompatiblewith successful mediation. … dispute duration alsohas a strong inverse relationship with successfulmediation, but only when it combines with fatalitiesand complexity’ (Bercovitch, 1993: 688–689). Theparties discover more and more grievances againsteach other, and more parties may join the fray.

4 The report claims that ‘whatever conflict preven-tion policies were being attempted in this period werea dismal failure…[because] there were twice as manyconflict onsets in the 1990s as in the 1980s… the rateof new conflict onsets between 2000 and 2005 hasremained higher than it was in the 1970s and 1980s’(Human Security Center, 2006: 4). Yet, although eachwar since the end of the Cold War could be consideredfailed prevention, to reach such a conclusion requiresfactoring in all the situations with a high risk of conflictthat did not break out due to various preventiveefforts. This is an especially turbulent period. On thesurprisingly low number of ethnic conflicts occurringas the Soviet Union broke apart, see Fearon andLaitin, 1996 who attribute the result to local self-regulating mechanisms (cf. Wallensteen and Moller,2003: 15f, 19.).

5 One study counts 47 disputes since the end ofthe Cold War that had a history or likelihood of conflictbut where third parties took action and no armedconflicts ensued in the following year (Wallensteenand Moller, 2003: 27).

6 In contrast, governments and institutes devoteimmense resources to learning how to avoid relapseinto war in post-conflict situations (e.g., Stedman,1995; Dobbins, Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). Yet allthat work could be characterized as glorifiedambulance-chasing, for it comes into play only after


wars have wreaked great damage. The imbalancedattention to post-conflict situations has been fed bythe widely cited belief that the existence of futureconflicts is one of the strongest predictors of futurewars. Yet the empirical basis of that claim hasshifted downward from 40 to 50 percent to around23 percent (Suhrke and Samset, 1996). Even acceptingthe upper estimate, over 50 percent of wars are notpreceded by earlier ones. Were prevention done moreoften, the market for the chapters in this volume onpost-conflict peacekeeping, reconciliation, intractableconflicts, and civil war would shrink considerably.

7 Though some insights here may apply topotential inter-state conflicts, the chapter focuseson intra-state wars such as civil wars, insurgencies,uprisings, major inter-communal conflicts, genocides,politicides, and revolutions, and indirectly to fragileand failing states. Intra-state conflict may cause statefailure (e.g., Somalia) or be caused by it (e.g., Zaire),and either phenomenon may occur without the other,(e.g., Colombia, Zimbabwe).

8 ‘Violence prevention’ may be more apt, butthat evokes trying to break up a gang rumble, nastyfight on the playground, or spousal dispute. For lessharmful conflicts below the threshold of collectiveviolence, ‘dispute resolution’ may be more fitting. TheCarnegie Commission adopted ‘preventing deadlyconflict’ (Carnegie Commission on Preventing DeadlyConflict, 1997), which helpfully implies that the con-flicts of concern might cause widespread bodily harm.This chapter does not cover the growing researchon violent localized conflicts, such as pastoralistmassacres and ethnic riots (see e.g., Horowitz,1985).

9 ‘Conflict prevention’ is actually a misnomer, for itimplies avoidance of all conflict. If the classic definitionof conflict is any real or perceived incompatibilitybetween interests, not all conflicts are harmful andshould be prevented. Conflict is normal in social andinternational relations and, as in the competition inpolitics, business, science, and the arts, is encouragedfor society’s benefit (cf. Kriesberg, 2003). What is tobe prevented is not any conflict, but destructive andviolent forms: wars between and within countries,oppression, inter-communal bloody quarrels – wherefew redeeming consequences can be imagined andproductive alternatives exist.

10 We use ‘engagement’ to not conjure upthe military connotations of ‘intervention,’ althoughmilitary activities may be one method used (seebelow).

11 There was also concern about Boutros-Ghali’speculiar implication that disputes could or should beprevented from arising, for some can be constructiveas long as they are conducted non-violently.

12 Some conflict theory makes room for address-ing latent conflicts, and thus not restricting conflictto observable groups that are conscious of mutualincompatibilities (cf. Dahrendorf, 1959).

13 Of course, wars not prevented but endingcan break out again. Though mid-conflict stagesmight be relegated to other terms, the violence pre-emption in prevention logically also entails keepingrecently terminated wars from re-erupting (althoughBoutros-Ghali had designated this phase ‘post-conflictpeacebuilding’). Thus, prevention also is applied toavoiding post-conflict relapse. Because action at sucha moment would come only after many lives havebeen lost, it is a fall-back option when earlier ‘primaryprevention’ has failed. Such ‘secondary prevention’in post-conflict countries has a vast literature and isaddressed in several other chapters.

14 This focus still allows for deterrent or contain-ment actions to protect a country that is threatenedby the spillover of an already violent conflict in aneighboring country, as well as the cordoning off oflocalities within a country where war rages elsewherewithin its borders.

15 Analysts since have demarcated several basicentry points for engagement in conflicts that arevirtually parallel: lack of resources, lack of protectionfrom violence, lack of solutions, lack of a process, andlack of trust (Lund, 1996: 140–43), conflicting actors’behaviors; the relationships between conflictingactors; the capacities of peaceful actors and processes;and the social and economic environment that affectsconflicting actors and peace processes (Uvin, 2002);structural transformation; change in the players orpersonnel who have influence; issue transformation,or personal transformations of leading figures (cf.Miall 1992, 2008: 5).

16 Clearly, prevention cannot ignore ‘the crys-tallizing agent…the personally motivated politicalactor who sees a described situation as vulnerableto his blandishments and ready for conflict…loosetinder lying around only excites pyromaniacs, it doesnot create them; they must pass by and see theopportunity’ (Zartman, 1998: 1f).

17 Actually, Dag Hammerskjold had mentionedeconomic development programs as among possibletools for ‘preventive diplomacy.’ Such instrumentsof structural prevention could also be called pre-ventive peacebuilding. This facet of prevention canaddress either manifest or latent incompatibility ofinterests.

18 Whether these various measures and actors areactually effective is a separate issue, however. Thatdepends on their timing, design, targeting and otherfactors, discussed in a subsequent section.

19 Systemic and targeted measures may becombined in the same institutions, such as seenin the efforts of the OSCE’s High Commissioneron National Minorities to assist particular countriesto meet the OSCE’s general standards for humanrights and governance, and in the OAS’s automaticmechanism for dispatching an emissary to membercountries where democratic institutions appear to beunder threat.


20 This descriptive taxonomy draws fromNicolaides (1996), Lund (1996), and Rubin (2004).As seen, these forms may convey various degrees ofpositive incentives and negative disincentives, suchas coercion, persuasion, support (e.g., Ball, 1992;Rothchild, 2002; Moller et al.).

21 Some argue that trying to trace the effectson conflicts of systemic and structural instruments iscausally too indirect (e.g., Ottaway). But this ignoresthe extensive conflict research on their indirect sourcesand narrows the goals of prevention to negativepeace. To focus only on highly time-sensitive measuresalso would narrow prevention to the acts of outsidethird-party intervenors and divert it from examiningthe benefits or harms that flow from many currentinternational policies at the global level, such as tradepolicies.

22 Differing stages of conflict, such as emergence,escalation, de-escalation, (re)construction, and recon-ciliation, have since been adopted as an organizingframework by more recent conflict textbooks (e.g.,Kriesberg, 2003; Miall et al., 1999; 2004).

23 An illustration of unacknowledged preventiveaction is found in a prestigious journal in which leadingAmerican scholars of ethics and international relationsdiscussed how to deal with violations of human rights.While the articles mainly deal with the mid-conflictoption of military interventions to save people fromimminent slaughter and the largely ex post factooption of war crimes tribunals, a few passages implythat pro-active responses try to prevent gross humanrights violations and conflicts such as genocide beforethey occur. Yet these passages never use the termconflict prevention or a synonym, treating the ideaunder rubrics such as the OSCE, democratization,a NGO culture of human rights, and transnationalnetworks (Daedalus, Winter 2003).

24 The NGO, International Alert, had calledattention to the need for conflict prevention in the1980s and early 1990s, but the first post-Cold Warproject exclusively focused on it may have been thePreventive Diplomacy Initiative at the US Instituteof Peace (USIP) in 1994–95, which grew out of aUSIP/US State Department Study Group on PreventiveDiplomacy in 1993–94. The subject was subsequentlytaken up by the Carnegie Commission on PreventingDeadly Conflict until 1999, the Center for PreventiveAction at the Council of Foreign Relations from about1995, the EU’s Conflict Prevention Network of theStiftung Wissenschaft und Politik from 1996 to 2001,and since then, the International Peace Academy,the Woodrow Wilson International Center, and theCenter for International Cooperation at New YorkUniversity.

25 An earlier World Federalist project sought togenerate broad-based interest in prevention throughits grass-roots members.

26 There are often good reasons not to labelsuch activities as conflict prevention, for that can

cause alarm, and instead, to use euphemisms suchas national reconciliation and social cohesion.

27 Even ASEAN has addressed conflict preventioninformally through the Asian Regional Forum, thoughunder the rubric of inter-state military confidencebuilding measures.

28 Week-long training workshops by the UN StaffCollege since 1998 have ‘graduated’ over 1800 stafffrom all major UN agencies, each of whom have beenintroduced to early warning, conflict, and preventiveresponses.

29 Other donor agencies (UNDP; DFID; USAID;SIDA; CIDA; the Dutch Cooperation Ministry and mostother major multi-lateral and bi-lateral agencies) havealso carried out country conflict assessments throughconflict offices that provide technical assistance tocountry missions. Trends are surveyed by Leonhardt(2000a, 2000b). Early examples of such an analyticaltool are Lund et al. (1997) prepared for USAID; Lund(1999) for country desk officers of the EuropeanCommission, and Lund (2000) for the UN FrameworkTeam. For a recent example and overview, seeClingendael (2005).

30 The UNSG 2000 report on prevention ofarmed conflict argued that the first responsibilityfor preventing conflict lies with the country itself.Similarly, analysts have proposed the concept of‘responsible sovereignty,’ which implies state obliga-tion and accountability to its own citizens in a waythat is potentially enforceable by the internationalcommunity. In this view, states have the right tosovereignty only in so far as they are willing and ableto fulfill their responsibility to their own citizens byupholding their human rights and fulfill other basicneeds.

31 Leaving the door open to possible interventiondoes not justify intervention by a state into anotherusing just any altruistic rationale, such as loose claimsthat a regime has oppressed its people and theydeserve democracy.

32 If R2P gains more acceptance, it wouldreinforce the shift occurring in the balance betweenthe rights of sovereign states and the human rights ofindividuals. Article 2(4) in the UN Charter upholdingnon-intervention was intended mainly to protectstates from military aggression by other states. Butsubsequent to the Charter, international conventionssuch as the UN Declaration of Human Rights estab-lished rights for individuals such as against tortureand suppression of free speech their governments.The tension between these principles also occurswhen large numbers of people are threatened bymassive suffering, yet their own governments areunable to either prevent it or protect them from it.Since a responsibility thus exists for the internationalcommunity to uphold individual human rights, thetwo sets of rights clash if sovereign governments aredirectly responsible for creating conflicts by carryingout massacres or oppressing their own people.


In fact, many more people have been killed in recentdecades by their own governments than by othergovernments.

33 Another unheralded example is the OASSecretary-General’s recent efforts to mediate dis-putes between the government and opposition inVenezuela. Not simply an ad hoc discretionarymission, his action was required by a procedure theOAS adopted in 1991 that automatically activates adiplomatic response to possible threats to democracyin member states. In June, 1991, the OAS GeneralAssembly adopted Resolution 1080, which boundthe Secretary General and Permanent Council toimmediate action in the event of a ‘sudden or irregularinterruption of the democratic political institutionalprocess or of the legitimate exercise of power bythe democratically elected government’ of any of theOAS member states (OAS, 1991). Such threats triggerthe agency’s automatic and immediate response. Thefollowing year, the OAS was allowed to suspend amember state should its democratic government beoverthrown by force (OAS, 1992). In 1995, ExecutiveOrder 95–6 created more specialized agencies tosupport democratic institutions, oversee elections,and promote dialogue (OAS, 1995). The mechanismalso has been used to address attempted executivecoups in Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela.

34 In this light, the conclusion that ‘conflictprevention is still more an aspiration rather than anestablished practice’ (Human Security Report, 16) isglib and likely uninformed by how much preventiveaction actually has occurred.

35 Notwithstanding that the attacks on 9/11provided a rationale for military actions againstAfghanistan and Iraq, the extent to which theUS public has accepted the lost lives and othersacrifices of the Iraq war, even under the subsequentrationale of establishing democracy, suggests that thepower of the presidential ‘bully pulpit’ for promotingforeign engagement was previously underestimatedor underutilized.

36 An illuminating discussion of how such con-tending approaches lead to different action prescrip-tions is found in Rubin, 2002, pp. 161–166. Thetension between conflict resolution and human rightsreflects a classic value conflict between peace, in thesense of avoiding violence, and justice (USIP, 2006).This antinomy is usually discussed in connection withmid- or post-conflict situations. As seen recently innorthern Uganda, seeking to bring perpetrators ofcrimes against humanity to justice might prolong awar if the violators can only avoid prosecution bycontinuing to fight. Where perpetrators have alreadycommitted egregious human rights violations, insist-ing they be brought to justice could be incompatiblewith conflict termination, because doing the first maydelay or block the second. The pursuit of justiceby enforcing human rights can often conflict withpeace (in the sense of cessation of violence) where

powerful parties have to be accommodated if theyare to be induced to desist from further humanrights violations. A similar value conflict can arisebetween stability and political justice, in the sense ofdemocracy, where authoritarian regimes face possiblerapid transitions to more liberal systems and thusviolent conflict is a risk (Lund, 2006). In essence,these are conflicts between negative and positivepeace, the present and the future. The challenge isto understand how power is distributed and find anappropriate balance between staying engaged withoffenders in an effort to transform them, while notenabling further oppression.

37 Precedents for closer consultations acrossdevelopment sectors exist in the aforementionedUN’s Common Country Assessments (CCA) andDevelopment Assistance Framework (UNDAF) andthe World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Process(PRSP). But so far, these latter rarely build in as explicitcriteria for the reduction of a country’s conflict sourcesand strengthening of its peace capacities.

38 This research concerns the strategic questionof which basic types of actions have what effects,not how to implement a particular tool. We alsoset aside which actors use which tools where (seeMoller et al., 2007). The focus here is also moresubstantive than the widespread truisms that urgecertain general attitudes and practices in preventiveplanning and implementation, such as: do an analysisof the situation; be flexible, engender local ownership;develop clear, comprehensive, and coherent policies;and involve women and youth (e.g., OECD-DAC,2001). These generic reminders to practitioners areapplicable to almost any international conflict ordevelopment activity, but offer nothing specific aboutwhat types of activities have what effects in whatcircumstances.

39 For example, in Estonia’s ‘success’ story, wheremany of the international ingredients above werepresent, several local and regional factors also helpto explain why the language and citizenship disputesbetween its Russian speaking population and ethnicEstonians did not escalate to violence. Russian identitynever solidified despite conditions of exclusion.Russian elites were accommodated by the electoralsystem and the formation of ethnically polarizedparties inhibited extremism. Electoral data showthat Russian-speakers supported a range of Estonianparties, especially left-wing parties and the CentreParty, which showed willingness to cooperate withRussian speakers. Many Russians weren’t registeredto vote in the 1992 elections and after the 1995elections, internal problems between Russian partyleaders made them ineffective for a few years. Thissystem tended to discourage politicians from resortingto ethnic stereotyping and public denigration ofother groups. Meanwhile, political volatility in Russiadistracted Moscow’s attention from the ‘near abroad’(Khrychikov and Miall, 1992: 204).


40 The most useful findings would be conditionalgeneralizations in the form: ‘If A (action), then B(impact), under x, y, and z (limiting conditions)’(cf. George, 1993: 120–125; Moller et al., 17f).

41 Some conflict-sensitive evaluations of individ-ual programs and projects can also be useful as proxiesfor generic types of instruments (e.g., Lund, 2004,2006).

42 Also useful for producing testable hypotheseswould be generic theory in inter-group and interna-tional conflict, such as on the social psychology ofconflict, techniques such as GRIT, escalation dynamics,the logic of collective action (mobilization), andcooperation theory. See Miall, 2007: 19–84.

43 The notion that conflicts go through certainstages and reflect overall cycles has been questioned(e.g., Berghof, 2006; Leatherman et al., 2000). True,like the shaded hues on a color wheel, distinctionsamong stages are not sharp. Nor are the phasescompletely objective. Movement through them isneither deterministic nor always uni-directional (e.g.,Lund, 1996; Miall, 2007; Kriesberg, 2003: 370),and conflict indicators are not one-dimensional anduni-layered. Nevertheless, most analysts agree thatconflicts reflect great variations in intensity and ‘havea beginning, middle, and end’ (Kriesberg, 2003: 22).While some conflicts are the unfinished businessor re-configurations of previous conflicts, and so-called ‘intractable’ conflicts rise and fall over longperiods of time, all conflicts are not simply episodes ofprevious conflicts. Where long periods with peacefulequilibriums set in, the subsequent conflicts are new.Thus, the notion of a life-cycle and phases is veryuseful.

44 As discussed above, conflict preventionincludes efforts to address the underlying sources oflatent conflicts. One of the most critical focuses forinquiry is how formal or implicit social contracts thathave achieved some stabilizing equilibrium beginto unravel due to internal and external pressures.In particular, the post-independence years of newnations involve severe pressures and constraintsthat test their elites’ political skills for establishinglegitimate and effective states (e.g., Ayoob). It isalso useful to put the recent intra-state conflictsinto a historical perspective by recognizing that theythus existing formal or implicit social contracts areunraveling equilibrium.

45 In return for compliance, concrete benefitsmay be offered such as membership and aid andtrade favors. Violations are subject to sanction suchas exclusion from privileges or the organization(KN 48). Thus, countries need to be monitoredto detect discrepancies so potential violations canbe forestalled or penalties imposed for violations.Countries are periodically assessed for their progressin qualifying, and provisional arrangements marktheir status and establish schedules for conformance(Nicolaides, 47).

46 Exits from such organizations or their disinte-gration have been followed by use of force, evenamong former alliance members. Countries of Centraland Eastern Europe and Taiwan entering internationalorganizations have been seen as threats by rival states(Russia, the ROC, and PRC respectively), thus possiblyincreasing the risk of conflicts. This may abate to theextent that ‘outs’ are brought into the organization(Shambaugh, 1996).

47 See Sambanis (2003), Lund (2006) and Uvin(2005).

48 These different conclusions have to do in partwith differing research methods, country contexts,varied degrees of adjustment policy, difficulties inobtaining data on impacts, and other factors (Cramerand Weeks, 2002: 44f).

49 Structural adjustment and stabilization policiesmay elicit conflict depending on whether govern-ments are sufficiently inclusive and accommodativesuch as by allowing political activity, the extent theyare done, whether they are transparent, the sharpnessof divisions in society, and other policies (cf. Cramerand Weeks, 2002: 41f). For example, exporting ofagricultural goods is more conducive to poverty andinequality and thus potential political instability, thanis exporting manufacturing goods (Gissinger andGleditsch, 1999; Collier, 126). In Yugoslavia, the debtcrisis, decline in terms of trade, and global credittightening in the 1980s, forced austerity and low livingstandards, but instead of adjusting, its leaders fell backonto ethnic nationalist appeals that weakened stateauthority and invited inter-republic conflict (Nafziger,2002: 14, drawing on Woodward, 1995).

50 Social safety nets in Zambia and Chile werefound not only to reduce poverty and increase politicalsupport for economic adjustment programs (Graham).In that way, they may help as well to maintaingovernmental legitimacy and political stability.

51 Among the recommendations to the WorldBank, IMF, and WTO are less dependence of thepoorest countries on them and their rules ratherthan other sources; and special policies regardingbi-lateral and multi-lateral transfers and agreementsaffecting trade, banking services, currency rates, andaid, such as for agriculture. These would cushionexternal price shocks and improve foreign investment,debt rescheduling, and capital movements (Nafziger,2002: 5). There should be less concern aboutinflation rates and budget deficits, and more aboutbuilding regulatory systems and economic institutions(Nafziger, 2002: 15). Domestic growth strategies needto stabilize prices and exchange rates and spending,create appropriate economic institutions, improvingthe ability of the state to collect taxes and provide basicservices, agrarian reform and land redistribution, andsecuring property rights. Due attention is also neededto their effects on the poor, minorities, rural andworking people, and women and children (Nafziger,2002: 5).


52 Compliance to structural adjustment policieswere often presented as a condition for budgetsupport.

53 Aid allocations in Kenya and Sri Lanka fromthe 1970s to the 1990s reveal strong evidence thatdonor toleration of or participation in the practiceof allocating benefits according to ethnic, tribal, andregional criteria helped to fuel later inter-communalconflict (Cohen 1999, Herring).

54 Donors may go along with such practicesto soften the blow of economic adjustment, keepa working relationship with governments, or showresults (Herring), but thus perpetuating group compe-tition can fuel hostilities, especially when the economydeclines. Aid in Kenya after President Moi’s governingcoalition came to power in 1978 shows how thegeographic allocation of local development projectsand monies as well as implementation choices suchas awarding consulting and construction contracts,were largely shaped by the government’s desireto expand and buttress the emerging Kalenjin-ledcoalition by rewarding past supporters and recruitingnew members (Cohen). Because program aid wasgrafted onto a largely unreformed one-party state,it became subject to inter-ethnic patronage politics,and as multi-party political competition intensified, itindirectly contributed to the tribal strife later in the RiftValley.

55 Although it deals with a mid-conflict situation,an illuminating example was established in Sri Lanka,where a donor financed irrigation project deliberatelydelegated to both Tamil and Singhalese farmersallocation decisions and encouraged selection of theirleaders on non-political grounds. Apparently, this keptthe ethnic strife that was waging more widely in thatcountry from spilling over into at least that project area(Uphoff).

56 However, the widely used terms such as‘governance,’ ‘democracy,’ ‘rule of law’ and, morerecently, ‘state-building,’ are such broad rubrics,they are not concrete enough to delineate specificinstitutions and alternative choices that might producediffering results. ‘Demand-side’ democracy promotionprograms, for example, seek to make governmentsmore accessible and accountable to their citizens.Thus, development programs may aid representativeprocesses like elections and parties to expand accessto government decision-making by the people, aswell as help finance executive and judicial servicefunctions that governments perform through publicadministration, courts and other regulatory functions,and security forces, to improve government servicesfor the people.

57 Full-fledged democracies and autocracies areboth the most politically stable. But partial democra-cies, and weak full democracies, are the most unstablesystems, even more so than strong quasi-democracies(Goldstone et al., 2003). They have an irregular, non-institutionalized pattern of political competition that

tends to cause executive leaders to be constantlyimperiled by rival leaders, and encourage elites tomaintain themselves in power despite the existenceof democratic procedures. One growing form inthe developing world are ‘anocracies.’ If autocracyand democracy are placed at the opposite endsof a continuum, an anocratic regime possesses amixture of democratic and autocratic features in themiddle of that continuum. Anocracy may apply to anautocracy where electoral and competitive featuresare in place and to a democracy where existingprocedural democratic features are undermined (Gurr,1974: 487; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995: 9).

58 The pace of overall change in many post-Soviet states toward consolidating democracy hadslowed significantly by 1998, prompting questionswhether they were in transition at all but instead‘… represent relatively stable new political andeconomic arrangements that are neither free marketnor socialist’ (Karatnycky: 2–4) – notwithstanding thefact that a few years later, three on the post- Sovietlist – Serbia in 2000, Georgia in 2003, and Ukrainein 2005 – experienced non-violent transitions fromtheir first post-Cold War regimes to more liberalgovernments. Patrimonial, corporatist regimes cansurvive for long periods through currency stability,restraining the growth of the state sector, maintainingbalanced budgets, and allowing export-drive growth(Karatnycky: 7, 9) Serbia in 2000, Georgia in 2003, andUkraine in 2005 – experienced non-violent transitionsfrom their first post-Cold War regimes to more liberalgovernments.

59 Although oligarchical regimes may tend toadopt policies that favor their bases of support, notall elite-dominated regimes have opposed reformsand thus encouraged conflict, and fuller democraciesare not always more inclusive. In Malaysia andMauritius, governments led by political elites havemade explicit decisions to work together in policycoalitions that addressed potential imbalances amongethnic groups, deliberately enacting redistributivepolicies that ameliorated inequities and pre-emptedthe emergence of inter-group resentments. A crucialquestion seems to be whether ‘crony capitalism,monopolism, and corruption within such systems’as in the former Soviet Union will thwart sustainedgrowth and provoke economic crises, and even then,whether they will open up to emerging interests thatbring democracy peacefully, or instead, repressivemeasures will restrict human rights and democracyand plunge them into instability and civil conflict(Karatnycky).

60 At the local level, development tools such asparticipatory community development projects, whichare ostensibly aimed at producing useful materialbenefits such as improved local infrastructure, areincreasingly being used by donor agencies as waysto create social capital and capacities for conflictmanagement. Through creating capable local civil


society leaders and organizations, they are thoughtto provide a yeast that over time may producea middle class and professional ranks that helpto develop a country and transform authoritariansocieties. These programs may operate under theradar of a government or be tolerated as long as theydo not stimulate activities that are seen by elites tothreaten the status quo. But as such, they can beeffective in regard to localized conflicts, such as overwater or ethnic tensions, and thus as possible safety-valves, but not as leverage directly or in the short termon the national-level conflicts that have been typical ofthe post-Cold War period (Lund and Wanchek, 2004).

61 ‘An effective and legitimate state is essentialnot only to promote economic development but alsofor democratic governance’ (De Zeeuw and Kumar,2006). Before moving toward mass democraticparticipation, strong political institutions are necessary(Mansfield and Snyder, Zakaria).

62 This argument resonates with Fukuyama’shelpful distinction between the scope of the state,or the extent it plays roles in the society and theeconomy, and its strength in carrying out whateverbroad or limited roles it has (Fukuyama).

63 Security sector reform includes national orlocal bodies mandated to use deadly force; adjudica-tory institutions, civilian management and oversightbodies.

64 While economic growth encourages the emer-gence of democratic institutions, the specific mech-anism through which this occurs is not clear.Democratic politics do not spring spontaneously fromcreating opportunities for markets to operate, or ifestablished, these institutions will not last withoutlaws protecting individual rights. This is because mostof the developing societies into which markets areintroduced are governed by ethnic, clan, or othergroup loyalties that determine how public as well asprivate goods are distributed.

65 It remains unclear whether the object of suchstrengthening of the rule of law is institutionalattributes or cultural values, how change towardthe rule of law occurs, the effects of the changes,and what forms of assistance are most effective(Carothers, 2006).

66 Similarly: ‘…rather than a one-size fits allapproach in foreign policies and aid strategies thatpresses for the same liberalizing reforms everywhere,individual countries need to be differentiated accord-ing to their capacity to absorb disruptive shiftsin unregulated power and consequent instabilitywithout violent conflict. A more balanced, holistic,contextualized approach to fostering desirable changeneeds to be applied. Clearly, moves toward democra-tization and other reforms can themselves often beamong the adaptive mechanisms that help ensurea peaceful transition in particular settings. But theoverarching and overriding policy goal perhaps shouldnot be simply democracy or human rights or markets,

at any cost. It should rather be peaceful transitiontoward, ultimately, more democratic, or at leastlegitimate and effective governments, increasinglymore productive economies, and more humanesocieties’ (Lund, 2001).

67 Another structural approach to domestic insta-bility, not taken up here, works through ideologicalcampaigns and other programs to engender socialsolidarity and cohesion by eroding the bases fordivisive group identities (e.g., Byman, 2002: 100–25).Similarly, the concept of social capital has beenadvocated as a useful focus for conflict preventionand resolution (Morfitt, 2002). Instruments such astruth and reconciliation commissions, for example,are promoted as ways to prevent future conflict bybalancing the yearning for justice with the needof societies to move on. But…‘while socializationcan be a powerful tool when used in combinationwith appropriate resources and coercive incentives,socialization alone is a weak reed’ (Leatherman: 188).Little rigorous research has been done on whethersuch instruments actually achieve reconciliation.

68 What applies to implementing developmentalso applies to prevention: ‘…political will andindigenous leadership are essential for sustainablepolicy reform and implementation. No amount ofexternal donor pressures or resources, by themselves,can produce sustained reform. It takes ownership,both of the policy change to be implemented andof any capacity building efforts intended to enhanceimplementation. Unless someone or some group inthe country where policy reform is being pursuedfeels that the changes are something that it wants tosee happen, externally initiated change efforts…arelikely to fail. Such individual or groups serve as “policychampions” or “policy entrepreneurs”’ (Brinkerhoffand Crosby, 2002: 6).

69 ‘Preventive mediation is more effective when itis initiated early, but not before the parties’ positionsand interests have crystallized. It is impossible toguide the parties toward a settlement, facilitatediscussion of issues, or structure the interactions untilthe full implications of a conflict, and the optionsrelated to it, are well understood by those involved.Early intervention should never become prematureintervention’ Bercovitch (1996).

70 Official forms include conciliation, goodoffices, mediation, negotiation, arbitration, and adju-dication. Non-official forms are facilitation, dialogue,track-two diplomacy, pre-negotiations, problem-solving workshops, and leadership training. Subse-quent chapters reflect the extensive study of thesewell-known methods, but mainly when applied atmid- or post-conflict stages as in official peaceprocesses. Little explicit attention has been paidto which intercessory methods may apply best atincipient stages of conflicts (e.g., see Greenberg;Zartman). ‘The question that scholars need to askis the extent to which mediation practice and


negotiations theory need to be adapted when theultimate goal is preventing deadly conflict insidestates…’ (Nicolaides, 49–50).

71 It was deemed effective to a great extentbecause almost one-third of its 1100 troops wereAmerican.

72 Similarly, analysts have argued that smallmilitary protective corps can help to prevent escalationof violent conflict by protecting multi-ethnic govern-ments that are under threat, as was needed in Burundiin 1993 and 1994, thus enabling them to function soas to prove their utility and legitimacy (Lund et al.,1997).

73 A critique frequently raised against the ideathat prevention effectiveness can ever be demon-strated appears to pertain mainly to this stageof late and direct prevention. Despite the claimedsuccesses, a widely uttered conventional wisdomclaims it is not possible epistemologically to assesswhether preventive action has made a difference.The argument is that there is no way to tellwhether such efforts are effective because onecannot know whether the conflict in question wouldhave otherwise escalated without them and so didnot because of them. Since no violent conflicterupted, it cannot be assumed that it would haveoccurred if the preventive action was not applied. Butcombining conflict research, evaluation methods, andprocess-tracing can increase the plausibility of sucharguments.

The critique is more telling when it comes toknowing whether specific violent acts would haveoccurred at a given moment if a given action of directprevention was not taken. Analysts would not eventry to claim success except where typical warningsigns of violent conflicts are not actually present thathave been gathered from extensive conflict research.Still, in such contexts, specific violent acts cannot beprecisely predicted because they could occur or bewithheld at the highly uncertain discretion of specificwould-be perpetrators of violent acts. Targeted actorsneed to have intended to take the action that thepreventive action identified as unacceptable but thencease doing so, but not for other reasons besides thepreventive action, such as running out of resources.To establish that such perpetrators refrained fromviolence because of a given preventive action requiresgetting inside their heads to see how they interpretedtheir immediate circumstances and whether thepreventive action or other factors played a part intheir decision not to act violently. However, whereactual acts of violence have begun to occur, analysiscan show through process-tracing plausible causal linkbetween its leading agents and their actions and themeasures taken. In cases like Rwanda in May, 1994,the comparison between the capacity of direct militarymeasures applied compared to the efficacy of a killingmachine and its forces may not be definitive but it isnot impossible to do. If low-level violence broke out, it

could be demonstrated how it was actually containedand kept from escalating due to the constraints ofa deterrent force. Other plausible linkages can beargued regarding the influence on specific actors ofother direct diplomatic or other actions taken towardthem.

The objection is less daunting when applied tostructural preventive measures because they dealwith the proximate processes, behavior-conditioningfactors, and deeper societal conditions that indirectlyinfluence the probability of violent acts. Where suchsigns are present but violent conflict has not brokenout, a host of institutions, processes, and incentivesand disincentives may also be in place that preserverelationships and communication among disputingparties and otherwise shape the environment ofincentives and disincentives in which actors makechoices whether they will act in violent or restrainedways. If potentially violent conditions are present,and it can be shown that well-targeted, timed, andproportional preventive actions are directed at themthat empirical research suggests have affected theseparticular conflict factors in like cases, the primafacie evidence makes it possible to infer with greaterconfidence that the actions are likely to have had someimpact in lowering the relative probability of violence,especially if indicators such as level of hostilities orpeaceful interaction between protagonists also showchange following the intervention.

To expect definitive proof of such impact wouldbe like going to the doctor after signs of possibleheart trouble and dismissing his professional recom-mendation that you quit smoking, simply because thestatistical link between cigarettes and heart diseasedoes not always occur in every individual case, and somight not apply to you. Though technically correct,most prudent people would honor the professional’sadvice.

74 The notion is analogous to the ‘mutual hurtingstalemate’ noted at levels of armed conflict asconducive to war termination, but this deadlock arisesat lower levels of hostility based on a shared sense thata greater harm to them looms. What is at issue is howreadily a point of sufficient mutual anxiety is reachedeven before the parties spill each other’s blood.A substantial difference would seem to exist betweenstalemates after many people have been killed, thanin, for example, a stalled but physically benignaltercation such as in trade, environmental, boundary,arms control, and labor negotiations (e.g., Zartman,2001: 4, 202; cf. Heldt, 8). Is some early thresholdof bloodshed reached when it becomes qualitativelymore difficult to dissuade the parties from avoiding avortex of violence that becomes significantly harder tohalt? Is such a threshold exceeded as well where low-intensity violence, even though it periodically subsides,as in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? In any case, tothe extent such moments come late in an increasinglyviolent on and off again conflict, the less the action


is preventive, and the more it is management andtermination.

75 Six major threats of the use of force were issuedby the USA and its European allies to try to stopthe fighting in Bosnia, but all failed until a bombingcampaign against the Bosnian Serbs in 1995.

76 In Bosnia, deadlines were not issued, publiccontroversy arose in the West over the possibleuse of airstrikes, publics were unwilling to provideground troops, and the Bosnian Serbs were moremotivated to pursue force than the allies (Jakobsen,1996: 22–3). Because the Western powers did notsee Bosnia as in their vital interests, they were notas willing to commit ground troops to stop the killingas the Serbs were willing to suffer the possible conse-quences of what were unconvincing threats of force(p. 25).

77 International actors must be prepared to applyeither carrots or sticks to induce desired responses bythe parties. The threatened must not be able to useforce except at very high cost. If these elements are notpresent, the best fall-back option is not half-heartedcoercion but seeking out opportunities to bring theparties into consultation that rely on persuasion.

78 Kuperman makes a related argument from thecases of Bosnia, Rwanda and Kosovo that a form of‘moral hazard’ occurs when minorities that are weakermilitarily than majorities but seek secession or auton-omy provoke the majorities so that the latter retaliate.This repression prompts the international communityto come to the minority’s aid, and a local conflict thusbecomes internationalized (Kuperman, n.d.; 2008).A similar hypothesis with regard to the possible roleof well-intentioned international policies in fosteringthe onset of some conflicts is that ‘…a certain patternhas characterized the international responses to pre-genocide Rwanda, 1993–94; Burundi, 1993; Kosovo,1992–98; and East Timor, 1999, and possibly othercases. The international community’s sympatheticpolitical championing of an ethnic minority’s rights,such as through honoring unofficial referendumsand denouncing the human rights violations of theiroppressors, may tend to polarize the local politicalrelations further by demonizing the perpetrators, andthus help to catalyze violence. The forces of violentbacklash in those settings may be encouraged topre-empt militarily the impending threat of politicalchange, but the international community is notprepared to deter that reaction. Ostensible violenceprevention can become violence precipitation, if well-intentioned advocacy of human rights promotion,provision of humanitarian aid, or other internationalmeasures are advanced on behalf of a vulnerablegroup, but actually puts them at greater risk bytempting the more powerful and better-armed forcesof reaction to strike while they can pre-empt theforces of change, because adequate internationalprovision is not made to protect their victims’ (Lund,1999).

79 Such forces will be more feasible as well aseffective to the extent they have the approval of thegovernment of the host country. Introducing suchstabilization forces without such acquiesence mayprovoke violence instead, as was threatened whenthe OAU discussed sending a multi-lateral force intoBurundi in 1998.

80 ‘The shift that needs to be consolidated ismultifold: toward an increasingly insider approachto conflict prevention; toward earlier mediation; andtoward bottom-up approaches aimed at societies as awhole.’ (Nicolaides 1996: 50).

81 NGOs such as FEWER, International Alert, andthe International Project on Peace and Prosperity (IPPP)have acted as informal hosts and conveners of multi-actor consultations in countries such as southernGeorgia, Kenya and Guinea-Bissau. UNDP countryconsultation projects are also catalyzing concertedpreventive initiatives in threatened countries suchas Fiji and Guyana. Given sufficient training overtime in conflict assessments and conflict-sensitiveprogramming, these processes might garner morediscretion for the country level to decide on appropri-ate prevention decisions and strategies. The stovepipestructure of most development organizations has tobe altered by giving more analytical power, policyauthority, flexibility, and implementation resourcesto country missions and cross-agency bodies atregional and country levels, which is where necessaryvalue tradeoffs as well as tactical decisions need tobe made.

82 One key research question is how significantsuch the local and other non-intervention conducivefactors must be for prevention to succeed. Many ofthese factors tend to be present in the more successfulcases in Europe. So what is unclear is how effective orlimited external intervention can be in the absence ofsuch favorable endogenous environments, such as inAfrica and Asia.

83 Such as through the new Uppsala MILCdatabase on direct prevention measures vis-à-visminor armed conflicts (Moller et al., 2007; Heldt,2007).

84 These analyses need to be organized arounddistinct intervention categories and the levels andcontexts in which they operate in order to cumulateknowledge and be subject to further testing andrefinement. A consistent framework for presentingthe lessons is needed to provide comparable profilesof different instruments. The categories most fruitfulfor comparative policy research should correspond toconcrete, observable, alternative activities that corre-spond to choices that policymakers can actually make,and not remain abstractions. But they also cannotbe based simply on descriptive, sectoral goals orprogram labels, which may prove analytically barren.Research designs also need a typology of contexts intowhich interventions are introduced, such as the levelof hostilities, power balances of contending parties


(symmetric or asymmetric conflicts), and the degreeof support. Although every individual application of ageneric instrument encounters a unique combinationof circumstances, it is possible to identify typesof conditions whose variations seem to be mostimportant in producing differing impacts, so as toapply findings to analogous situations.

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