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Council Special Report No. 58November 2010

Kay King

Congress andNational Security


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Congress and

National Security


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Council Special Report No. 58

November 2010

Kay King

Congress andNational Security


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The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think

tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource or its members, government ofcials, business execu-

tives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order

to help them better understand the world and the oreign policy choices acing the United States and othercountries. Founded in 1921, CFR carries out its mission by maintaining a diverse membership, with special

programs to promote interest and develop expertise in the next generation o oreign policy leaders; con-

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Foreword viiAcknowledgments ix

Council Special Report 1Introduction 3The Congress o Today 6The Congress o Tomorrow 31

Endnotes 42About the Author 45

Advisory Committee 46

Contents


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vii

Foreword

The U.S. Congress is among the most maligned institutions in the coun-try. In July o this year it registered an 11 percent approval ratebelow

banks, television news, and health insurance companiesand decryingpartisan gridlock has all but displaced baseball as the national pastime.Yet while the perils o this institutional ailure are obvious or domesticpolicy, their consequences or oreign policy are under-explored. TheConstitution delegates to Congress considerable responsibility or or-eign aairs, including the right to declare war, und the military, regu-late international commerce, and approve treaties. At least as importantare such congressional authorities as the ability to convene hearings

that provide oversight o oreign policy. A ailure to perorm these unc-tions could have signicant results, leaving the United States hobbledby indecision and unable to lead on critical global issues.

In this Council Special Report, Kay King, CFRs vice president orWashington initiatives, explores the political and institutional changesthat have contributed to congressional gridlock and examines their con-sequences or oreign policy making. Some o these developments, shenotes, are national trends that have developed over a number o decades.

Successive redistricting eorts, or example, have all but eliminatedinterparty competition in some House districts, leaving the real com-petition to the primaries and the most ideologically driven voters. Kingurther notes that the rising cost o elections has increased the timedevoted to undraising at the expense o substantive priorities, and thetwenty-our-hour news cycle has decreased the time and incentive orreective debate. More subtlebut equally importantinstitutionalchanges have likewise diminished Congresss eectiveness. A declinein committee chairmens authority and expertise, tighter control over

voting by party leaders, and the relaxation o traditional customs limit-ing the use o procedural tools to practical ends have all, she writes, ledto a breakdown in comity. The consequences she highlights are both


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broad and signicant, rom delayed presidential appointments to apoorly coordinated budget process or critical oreign policy areas suchas intelligence, diplomacy, and development.

Solving these well-entrenched problems will likely prove impos-sible, but King issues a number o recommendations that can make adierence. Congress, she writes, should restore traditional restraint inprocedural maneuvering, rationalize the budget process, and revampcommittee structure in both houses to better address the ast-moving,interrelated threats the United States aces today. The Executive Branchshould improve its coordination and consultation with Congress, while,she concludes, the public should hold Congress accountable by becom-

ing better inormed on international issues.As the 112th Congress takes shape during the coming months, Con-

gress and National Security will provide sensible guidance to partyleaders interested in establishing a more constructive oreign policy-making process. As the complexity and interconnectedness o theworlds problems grow, there can be little doubt that such reorms areboth timely and desirable.

Richard N. HaassPresidentCouncil on Foreign RelationsNovember 2010

Forewordviii


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ix

I am extremely grateul to the members o this reports advisory com-mittee, who provided candid and constructive eedback, invaluable

insights, and numerous reality checks throughout the drating process.They include Edith Bartley, Sarah Binder, James Dyer, Richard Fon-taine, Daniel Glickman, James Jones, Mark Nichols, Walter Oleszek,Norman Ornstein, and Wendy Sherman. I am particularly indebted toormer Congressman Mickey Edwards, who chaired the group withgreat skill and sensitivity and critiqued the report with the keen eyeo a constitutional scholar and Capitol Hill veteran. Three additionalcommittee membersGordon Adams, Thomas Mann, and Charlie

Stevensonoered indispensable advice on the raming o the study.Daniel Silverberg and Carl Meacham participated in review sessions asobservers and provided essential Capitol Hill perspectives. All o thecommittee members and observers were extremely generous with theirtime, expertise, and suggestions, but any errors in act or judgment aremine alone.

In shaping this report, I reached out to many individuals in the leg-islative and executive branches o government and nongovernmental

organizations, and I thank them or their insights and advice. Goodriend and CFR member Anne C. Richard was particularly generouswith her time and extraordinarily helpul with her advice. In addition,I relied on many excellent studies that address the topic o Congressand national security, including the Project on National Security Stud-ies, the HELP Commission Report on Foreign Assistance Reorm, thePrinceton Project on National Security, and the U.S. Commission onNational Security/21st Century (Hart-Rudman) report, as well as thewritings o ormer Congressman Lee H. Hamilton and many others

with expertise on the subject.This report would not have been possible without the extraordinary

research skills o Tim Westmyer, my special assistant at the Council

Acknowledgments


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x Acknowledgments

on Foreign Relations, who tracked down every possible lead and pro-vided thoughtul eedback at every stage o the process. The equallytalented Kate Collins took over rom Tim as my research assistant atthe drating stage and was immensely helpul in editing, rewriting, andact-checking right up to the publication date.

I am grateul to CFR President Richard N. Haass or his review andcomments and or providing the opportunity to write this study. Mythanks also go to CFR Senior Vice President and Director o StudiesJames M. Lindsay, who, as an observer on the advisory committee, pro-vided incisive comments that ocused the analysis and arguments inthe report. Patricia Dor receives special mention or her patience and

kinder, gentler approach to editing, along with her team o Lia Nortonand Elias Primo. Thank you to Lisa Shields, Anya Schmemann,Melinda Wuellner, Leigh-Ann Krap Hess, and Lucy Dunderdale inCommunications and Marketing or their unparalleled skill in promot-ing and distributing the report. I am also grateul to Patrick Costello,Elise Letanosky, Thomas Bowman, and Aimee Carter, who assisted inthe distribution o this report to targeted constituencies in Washing-ton, DC, including the corporate community. The CFR Library and

Research Services department, particularly Marcia Sprules and LauraPuls, were wizards in tracking down sources and suggesting additionalreading material. Betsy Bryant and Chelsi Stevens, o CFRs congres-sional outreach team, oered expert guidance on the subject matter,and interns Alexandra Wilson and Elizabeth Burns provided superbresearch support.

Kay King


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Council Special Report


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3

Introduction

Much has been written, blogged, and broadcast in the past several yearsabout the dysunction o the U.S. Congress. Filibusters, holds, and

poison pill amendments have become hot topics, albeit intermittently,as lawmakers on both sides o the aisle have increasingly exploitedthese tactics in pursuit o partisan or personal ends. Meanwhile, suchpressing national issues as decit reduction, immigration reorm, andclimate change have gone unresolved. To be air, the 111th Congress hasaddressed many signicant issues, but those it has addressed, such ashealth-care reorm and economic stimulus, exposed Americans to aawed process o backroom deals that avors obstruction over delib-

eration, partisanship over statesmanship, and narrow interests overnational concerns. Although partisan politics, deal making, and parlia-mentary maneuvering are nothing new to Congress, the extent to whichthey are being deployed today by lawmakers and the degree to whichthey obstruct the resolution o national problems are unprecedented.This may explain why Congress registered a condence level o only 11percent in July 2010, marking its lowest rating ever in the annual Gallupinstitutional condence survey and ranking it last among sixteen major

U.S. institutions.

Most o the recent attention devoted to Congresss dysunction hascentered on its impact on domestic issues and has overlooked its eecton national security. Yet Congresss inability to tackle tough problems,both domestic and international, has serious national security conse-quences, in part because it leads the world to question U.S. global lead-ership. Reporting rom the World Economic Forum in Davos in January2010,New York Times columnist Tom Friedman wrote, Political insta-bility was a phrase normally reserved or countries like Russia or Iran

or Honduras. But now, an American businessman here remarked to me,people ask me about political instability in the U.S. Weve becomeunpredictable to the world. Furthermore, when Congress ails to


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4 Congress and National Security

perorm, national security suers thanks to ill-considered policies,delayed or inadequate resources, and insufcient personnel. Withoutcongressional guidance, allies and adversaries alike devalue U.S. poli-cies because they lack the support o the American people that is pro-vided through their representatives in Congress.

Given the mounting global challenges the United States conronts, itcannot aord to have a dysunctional national legislature. To get Con-gress back on track, it is important to understand both the internal andexternal sources o the dysunction and how they aect Congresssnational security role with regard to deense, oreign policy, and intel-ligence. Establishing how a healthy, ully unctional Congress should

perorm in the national security arena will ollow rom this understand-ing and lead to institutional proposals to restore Congress as a con-structive partner with, check on, and balance to the executive branch onnational security matters. The resulting Congress will improve the U.S.image in the world, strengthen its leadership position, and increase itsability to advance U.S. interests and values worldwide.

Examining Congresss national security role in a globalized, post-9/11 world presents special challenges. One o them is dening national

security in a changing domestic and international environment. Tra-ditionally, national security has been limited to issues o deense, or-eign policy, and intelligence and handled by congressional committeesocused on the U.S. global role: armed services, oreign aairs/oreignrelations, and intelligence. In recent years, however, the denition onational security has broadened to encompass a wide range o issues,including trade, energy, immigration, and border security. But theseissues are handled primarily by congressional committees with largely

domestic responsibilities (i.e., nance/ways and means, energy, judi-ciary, and homeland security) that devote little attention to interna-tional actors. Thereore, to maintain a ocus on the U.S. global role,in the current context, national security will be dened in the narrowsense and ocus on issues o deense, diplomacy, development, andintelligence, as well as on the committees that handle them. In the nearuture, Congress would benet rom an examination o ways to create acommittee inrastructure that enables an integrated, strategic approachto national security policy, embracing nontraditional issues and giving

higher priority to U.S. economic security.Another challenge in studying Congress lies in providing objec-

tive analysis in the ace o the inherent tension between lawmakers


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5Introduction

constitutional responsibilities and their political role as elected of-cials. It is important to recognize that, to some, a legislators eort tocut unding or health-care programs in Arica is heartless; to others, itis a principled stand meant to reduce government spending. The ailureto act on a treaty, though a letdown or advocates, is a positive develop-ment or those who oppose the treaty on substantive grounds. Placing ahold on a presidential nominee is obstruction to some, but it can be seenas constructive by others i it results in a desired policy change. None-theless, the level o dysunction and politicization today has led even themost ardent congressional supporters to recognize that the recurringcycle o obstruction and delay, recrimination and revenge, that contrib-

uted to the decisions by Senator Evan Bayh (D-IN) and Representa-tive John Shadegg (R-AZ) to retire rom ofce prematurely are beyondpolitics as usual and need to stop or the good o the country.

These two lawmakers leave behind an institution that, despite itsproblems, includes representatives and senators who are committed,hardworking people with relentless schedules that require them towork long hours, live away rom their amilies, travel weekly, and askstrangers or money. Only a handul o the 435 House members and the

100 senators ever get the opportunity to pass major legislation, achievea leadership position, or receive the accolades that make the job trulyrewarding. Instead, lawmakers are oten held in low esteem, derided bythe public and the media, and generally scapegoated or problems orwhich the entire nation shares responsibility. The executive branch, themedia, and the public have also contributed to the breakdown in comityand governance in the nation and must do their part to reverse it i theUnited States is to continue to lead on the world stage. With a new Con-

gress on the horizon, there is no better time to start.


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6

The U.S. Congress is a great institution with a rich tradition. It is thebranch o government that most directly represents the interests o

the American people and most closely reects the electorates views.Congress shares signicant authority with the executive branch toshape and make oreign and deense policy. The Constitutions ramersestablished the presidents explicit authorities in this realm as servingas commander in chie o the armed orces, negotiating treaties, andappointing ambassadors and senior ofcials. They gave Congress thepowers to declare war, appropriate unds, raise and support armies, pro-vide and maintain a navy, and regulate oreign commerce. To the Senate

alone the ramers bestowed the responsibility o providing advice andconsent on treaties and presidential nominees. Since the ounding othe republic, this shared authority between the executive and legislativebranches has been an invitation to struggle or the privilege o direct-ing U.S. oreign policy.

Congress, however, has not always lived up to its constitutionalrole to serve as a partner with, check on, and balance to the executivebranch on national security matters. Since the end o the Cold War, its

perormance has been mixed. In the deense arena, Congress has otenunctioned smoothly, providing annual authorization bills and consis-tent unding o the Deense Department and armed services. Yet it hasrelinquished its authority concerning military base closings to a serieso independent commissions, and it is oten reluctant to cut wasteulweapons programs, thus undermining its own credibility. On questionso military intervention, it has requently deerred to the executivebranch, ailing to provide the scrutiny essential to a successul oreignpolicy. On matters o diplomacy, development, and intelligence, Con-

gress has been inconsistent and occasionally counterproductive. In itsappropriations role, it has ailed to provide timely unding or diplo-macy and development agencies, delaying the start o programs and the

The Congress o Today


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7The Congress o Today

hiring o personnel, thus diminishing U.S. capacity around the world.In its oversight role, despite globalization, it has not overhauled theForeign Assistance Act since 1985, impeding a coherent approach tooverseas programs, and it has resisted making vital structural changesto the intelligence committees, undermining accountability in the intel-ligence community. In its advice-and-consent role, the Senate has takenambassadorial and national security nominees as political hostages orlong periods o time, depriving the nation o sufcient representationoverseas and political leadership in government agencies. It has chosento allow treaties to languish or years, weakening partnerships and alli-ances in the process. Equally troubling is the act that at the very time

the complex global arena demands their attention, many lawmakers areincreasingly ill-inormed about the oreign policy, deense, and intel-ligence issues on which they vote.

When Congress has ocused on the international arena and usedits authority constructively and consistently, it has made importantcontributions to national security. It was proactive in providing sup-port or the ormer Warsaw Pact nations at the end o the Cold Warthrough the 1989 Support or East European Democracy Act. During

the 1991 debate and vote on Operation Desert Storm, Congress playeda valuable role in the United States decision to go to war against Iraq.More recently, despite some serious dierences, the Kerry-Lugar-Berman billa $7.5 billion aid package or Pakistan enacted in theall o 2009was an example o consultation between the politicalparties and the executive and legislative branches that advanced U.S.interests in an important country at a crucial time. On all these occa-sions, Congress played its ull constitutional role, demonstrating

why it is so essential to the advancement o U.S. interests and valuesaround the world.Although todays institutional dysunction certainly contributes

to Congresss uneven perormance on matters o deense, diplomacy,development, and intelligence, it is not the only cause. Congresss rolein the national security arena has been eroding over the past twentyto thirty years thanks to globalization and a deeply divided domesticpolitical landscape. The integration o the global economy and the pro-lieration o imminent security threats posed by the post-9/11 world

have produced a more complex and challenging international environ-ment or the United States, orcing Congress to undertake a role orwhich it is ill-equipped: grappling with a rising number o complex,


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interconnected issues at great speed. At the same time, the nationspolitical landscape has been realigning since the 1970s, ushering in deeppartisanship, severe polarization, a combative 24/7 media, and dimin-ished civility. Over time, this environment has given lawmakers greaterincentive to advance personal and partisan agendas by any means,including the manipulation o congressional rules and procedures. Ithas politicized the national security arena that, while never immune topartisanship, more oten than not used to bring out the country rstinstincts in lawmakers. It has also driven oreign policy and deensematters, short o crises, o the national agenda, marginalizing impor-tant issues like trade. Combine this increasingly toxic political climate

with an institutional stalemate in the ace o mounting global challengesand it is not surprising that Congress has struggled or years to play aconsistent and constructive role as a partner to as well as a check andbalance on the executive branch on international issues.

ol al laa

The divisive political battles over civil rights and the Vietnam War inthe 1960s and 1970s led to a realignment o the two major parties thattransormed the American political landscape. The result was a nation-wide ideological segregation along geographic lines, with the Southand rural areas avoring a Republican Party espousing sel-relianceand small government (yet a robust deense budget) and the two coastsand urban areas supporting a Democratic Party promoting economicopportunity or all, government activism, and multilateral coopera-

tion in the global arena.

The homogeneity o the parties intensiedthanks to gerrymandering, which redrew congressional boundaries toheavily avor the incumbents party and dilute the oppositions votingstrength. As a result, a signicant number o House contests today areso one-sided that they are settled in the primaries, which attract themost ardent and ideologically committed voters, orcing candidatesto move to the extremes o their respective parties. Once elected, theseofcials have little incentive to move to the middle, thus diminishingany hope or compromise within the party, let alone across party lines.

Consequently, strict party-line votes have been increasing, especiallyin the House, producing measures that are unable to garner the sixtyvotes oten required to pass in the Senate. The polarization has been


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spreading to the Senate, which currently includes orty-eight sittingsenators who ormerly served in the House.

Opportunities or compromise have been urther reduced by thepermanent campaign. As campaign costs skyrocket, lawmakers mustdevote more and more timesometimes as much as 50 percenttoundraising. At the current pace, victorious candidates must beginlooking or support or their next run or ofce on election night, creat-ing a permanent-campaign environment that results in zero-sum think-ing and a winner-take-all attitude. In addition, the two major partiesnow require lawmakers to raise money or national committee coers.

Campaign undraising also has opportunity costs. Time devoted

to raising money is time not spent interacting with other lawmakers,denying opportunities to build the collegiality and trust essential orcompromise on tough issues. Demanding campaigns also produceincreasingly distracted lawmakers, who leave more and more o theirlegislative and constituent-service duties to sta, diminishing their ownability to understand, much less develop expertise on, the wide range oissues on which they must vote. This also leaves them vulnerable to thethousands o registered lobbyists and special-interest groups who come

well equipped to inuence lawmakers on behal o their clients or cause,oten polarizing the debate in the process.

Other deterrents to constructive behavior are the 24/7 news cycle andthe inormation technology (IT) revolution. With the advent o cablenews, lawmakers quickly learned that public posturing and demagogu-ery received television coverage at the expense o thoughtul debateand compromise. Similarly, the relentless presence o the electronicmedia makes deliberation obsolete, orcing lawmakers to respond to

blog reports instantly and without careul consideration in an eort tocounter negative stories beore they go viral. The Internet has alsotended to encourage incivility, enabling rantings and misinormation tospread without the benet o an editor. Once in the blogosphere, inac-curate inormation is virtually impossible to correct and is repeated asgospel by both those who do and those who do not know better. Blogsand cable TV news also tend to ampliy the echo chamber, reinorcingrather than challenging views already held. This inamed rhetoric hasserved to urther polarize politics, making it even more difcult or law-

makers to nd common ground on issues.O course, American voters are not much interested in nding

common ground in the current environment. In an unusual turn o the


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political tide, the throw the bums out sentiment in the run-up to the2010 midterm elections had even incumbents ghting or their politicallives. But the voters need to reect on their contributions when assign-ing blame or Congresss shortcomings. Uninterested in public policy,especially national security (except when aced with a crisis), typicalAmericans take little time to understand the issues or study the candi-dates who are running or ofce. Oten disengaged or easily distractedby straw men or celebrities, Americans get the representation theyvote ori they vote at all. Turnout in the 2008 elections, or example,reached a ty-our-year high o nearly 62 percenta weak showingor the worlds leading democracy, especially when compared with the

75 percent voter turnout rate in the 2005 Iraqi parliamentary elections,which were conducted at the height o the insurgency there. Voterindierence to international issues usually translates into tepid supportor and sometimes even outright hostility toward oreign-assistanceprograms by lawmakers, as their constituents, understanding littleabout these initiatives, oten oppose them.

oal yam

The transormation o the domestic political landscape that began inthe 1970s brought Congress to the dysunctional cli, and lawmakersintensied manipulation o the institutions rules, practices, and proce-dures pushed it over the edge. Many o these rules and procedures dateback to the ounding o the republic and, despite periods o great polar-ization in Congress, were only occasionally used and rarely abused. But

today the motivation to deprive the opposition o victory or to scorepolitical points oten overtakes the aspiration to serve and problemsolve, so rules are used to rustrate and impede action as never beore.

Both parties in both houses o Congress are guilty o exploiting therules at ever-increasing rates. In the Senate, which the ramers struc-tured to temper the populist excesses o the House, lawmakers take thisright too ar by threatening libusters not just to delay but to completelyobstruct action. In the House, which was established to be more imme-diately responsive to popular opinion but still cognizant o minority

views, open debate is oten stied by means o closed and restrictiverules that severely limit or even prevent the bringing o amendmentsto the oor or debate and a vote. This results in a breakdown o the


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legislative process, or regular order. Unortunately, in a deeplypolarized environment, regular order provides the minority withopportunities to play politics and embarrass the majority. As a result, tohead o such behavior, the majority eels compelled to advance its leg-islative agenda by limiting hearings and markups, reducing oor time,and passing legislation with a minimum o debate or delay, thus severelyrestricting the minoritys role.

Over the past two decades in the House, both parties, when in themajority, have deployed a range o tactics, such as closed and restrictiverules, to impede the opposition. Furthermore, at the end o sessions,the House majority leadership oten waives the rules to create omni-

bus appropriations bills, which enable enactment o provisions that theleadership knows could only be approved when wrapped inside a large,must-pass spending bill.

Regular order has been breaking down in the Senate as well. A grow-ing number o libuster threats have led the leadership in both par-ties, when in the majority, to limit opportunities or the debate andamendment o legislation that could be libustered or used as vehiclesor poison pill or killer amendments rom reaching the oor. Unique

to the Senate, which requires the consent o all one hundred members(through a unanimous consent agreement) or sixty votes or clotureto move orward on any matter, the libuster allows a single senatorto block or delay Senate business simply by threatening to engage inextended debate. Rarely used in the Senates rst two hundred yearsand then usually reserved or major measures, the libuster cameinto greater use in the late 1970s. At that time, Senate majority leaderRobert Byrd (D-WV) instituted an inormal dual-track practice that

set aside libustered bills to allow managers to work out dierencesas other business was sent to the oor. Senate leaders in both partieshave continued the practice, demonstrating the law o unintended con-sequences. Because the dual-track system has made the libuster lesspainul to use, more senators take advantage o it. Majority leadershave responded by ling a cloture motion at the mere anticipation o alibuster. To avoid oor action that invites libusters, they sometimesutilize every rule and procedure at their disposal to shut out the minor-ityand thus impede the very deliberative process that libusters were

intended to promote.Although cloture motions are led occasionally or head counting

and other purposes, most are intended to overcome a libuster, and


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they are thereore a good measure o libuster threats. According toU.S. Senate data, in the twenty-plus years between 1985 and 2006,when each party controlled the Senate at one point or another, thenumber o cloture motions led increased rom orty in the 99th Con-gress to sixty-eight in the 109th Congress. However, ater the Demo-crats took control o the Senate in the 110th Congress (20072008),cloture lings soared to 139a more than 200 percent increase in oneyear (see Figure 1).

Holds, also unique to the Senate, are inormal threats to libusterthat are oten registered anonymously (by one senator on behal o anunnamed other) and almost always honored by the leadership. A prac-

tice established when senators had to travel great distances to get toWashington, holds were intended to provide lawmakers with time toreview a bill or nomination beore it was put to a vote. Recently, holdshave been deployed more to prevent presidential nominees or legisla-tion rom coming to a vote, as leverage to orce action on an unrelatedmatter. Use o holds as a hostage-taking tactic has been borne out bythe act that, once released, most nominees go on to be conrmed bywide margins. For example, in May 2010, thirty-ve nominees had

FRE 1. CTRE MTNS FE N TE .S. SENATE

Source: United States Senate, Senate Action on Cloture Motions, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/

reerence/cloture_motions/clotureCounts.htm.


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been on the Senate calendar awaiting a nal vote or more than tenweeks. A total o sixteen o these nominees were conrmed by the mid-September recess: teen by unanimous consent and one by a roll-callvote o seventy-one to twenty-one.

Although libusters and holds have received the lions share opublic attention recently, Congresss shortcomings in its criticalrole o oversight o the executive branch deserve as much attention.Institutional changes in both chambers in the 1970s opened up con-gressional committees to public scrutiny and gave junior lawmakerssome responsibility, striking a blow to the seniority system, therebyreducing loyalty to committee chairmen and engendering greater indi-

vidualism among members. Their stature diminished, committees,especially those with responsibility or producing the authorizationbills that determine policy and spending guidelines or the agencies intheir jurisdiction, stopped serving as the principal centers o expertiseand authority in their respective realms. Party leaders on both sideso the aisle stepped into the vacuum, increasing their authority (andtheir stas) at the expense o committee chairmen, devaluing impor-tant sources o congressional expertise and oversight and escalating

partisanship in the process.This is not to say that Congress never engages in oversight o the

executive branch. One o Congresss preerred methods o keeping tabson the executive branch is the reporting requirement. Oten a useultool or gaining insights into policy execution, executive branch agencyoperations, and compliance with legislative language, reporting require-ments have prolierated in recent years. Many, however, are nuisances,ordered by a lawmaker or sta member out o rustration over a lack

o consultation or responsiveness rom an agency. These requirementsusually place onerous tasks on the executive branch, diverting precioustime and attention rom policy ormulation and implementation.

Another method or exerting authority over the executive branchis to attach strings to unding measures to either restrict spendingor establish earmarks. The practice o requiring dened amounts omoney to be spent on avored projects gives congressional appropria-tors signicant power. Despite widespread criticism o earmarks likethe bridge to nowhere in Alaska, they represent less than 1 percent

o what in scal year 2011 is projected to be a $1.4 trillion discretion-ary budget. Furthermore, earmarks allow lawmakers, who usuallyare better inormed on local issues than executive branch ofcials, to


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determine where unds or projects in their own states or districts couldbe utilized most eectively.

As important as rules, practices, and procedures is the work environ-ment in Congress today. Negative press notwithstanding, the congres-sional workload can be onerous. Lawmakers travel back and orth totheir home bases requently, oten weekly, meeting with constituents,tackling local issues, undraising, and campaigning. When in Washing-ton, they divide their time among committee assignments, sta brie-ings, constituent services, and undraising, as well as legislating. Theyvote on just about every imaginable issue that aects the lives o Ameri-can citizens.

Globalization has increased the volume and interdependence oissues acing lawmakers, thus expanding the workload. At the sametime, IT has provided constituents with greater, real-time access to theirrepresentatives in Congress, exponentially increasing the quantity oconstituent mail that congressional ofces must tackle. The IT revolu-tion has also made access to inormation ar easier or lawmakers andsta members. Yet the sheer volume o inormation available in cyber-space puts signicant demands on the relatively small personal stas,

who must spend precious time separating the wheat rom the cha.The never-ending news cycle is another omnipresent orce that must bemanaged. The result is signicantly increased demands on already lim-ited time and resources. In more collegial eras, lawmakers would otenrely on each other or guidance on votes, turning to a colleague withexpertise on a particular subject or inormation. But diminishing civil-ity and rising polarization have led to the breakdown o this inormalsystem, putting more pressure on limited sta to produce the answers

or pushing lawmakers to rely on the party leadership or guidance,which contributes to the politicization o the legislative process.The shortage o collegiality on Capitol Hill is relatively recent. As

transportation and communication technologies advanced, travel tohome districts became easier, increasing pressure on lawmakers tospend more time in their districts. Over time, rising anti-Washingtonsentiment and steep housing prices in the national capital area ledmore and more House and Senate members to leave their amilies backhome. In response, the House and Senate leadership gradually reduced

the Washington workweek, scheduling votes on only three days. Theresult has been a Congress that packs votes, meetings, hearings, andother business into a seventy-two-hour time rame in which there is


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little time to think, let alone socialize with other lawmakers. This robsmembers o Congress o both the time to deliberate on issues and theopportunity to develop the relationships that are so critical to orgingcommon ground and compromise.

aoal y aa

Congresss perormance in the national security arena over the pasttwenty to thirty years has been, in a word, uneven. As noted, Congresshas had some shining moments, rising to the occasion on major initia-

tives, such as its recent assistance to Pakistan. But it has been inconsis-tent in ullling its constitutional roles o providing advice and consenton nominations and treaties and overseeing and unding the agenciesthat have national security responsibilities, especially or diplomacy,development, and intelligence.

Oversight

One o Congresss most important roles is oversight o the execu-tive branch. When unctioning properly, Congress works through itscommittee system in much the same way a board o directors guidesa corporation, providing the executive branch with policy guidance,reviewing its perormance, and holding it accountable or carrying outlaws as intended. The national security committees use a range o toolsor conducting oversight, including hearings, briengs, letters, holds,and reporting requirements. Although the nature o their work requires

the intelligence committees to conduct most o their oversight behindclosed doors, the armed services and the oreign relations/oreignaairs committees are skilled at holding public hearings on the range opolicy issues within their jurisdictions. Each committee, however, hasdiering success rates with respect to routine oversight o agency pro-grams, operations, and budgets.

One shortcoming that all the national security committees shareis their outdated structure. Designed during the Cold War era andupdated little since then, the committees that handle oreign policy,

deense, and intelligence in both chambers are not organized to ade-quately address the ast-paced, cross-jurisdictional issues o the worldtoday. Their stove-pipe congurations reinorce divisions and diminish


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opportunities to work systematically to connect issues o common con-cern, especially in postconict environments. The executive branchscurrent eort to restructure its interagency process to better deal withtodays interconnected world, particularly with diplomacy and develop-ment, presents Congress with the perect opportunity to ollow suit.

As noted, this lack o strategic coherence is evident throughoutCongress, where issues that cut across the domestic and internationalarenassuch as immigration, energy, and tradeare assigned to com-mittees (judiciary, energy, and ways and means/nance, respectively)that ocus primarily on domestic matters. These committees oten ailto give sufcient consideration to the international acets o such cross-

jurisdictional issues. At the same time, the national security commit-tees, which oer international expertise and perspective, seldom engagedirectly on these issues, thus reducing their inuence and depriving thecountry o their insights. For example, trade not only opens markets toU.S. exports; it is an important way or developing nations to expandtheir economies and improve the lives o their citizens, while at thesame time reduce opportunities or terrorists to use those countriesas breeding grounds or sae havens. Yet this dimension is sometimes

absent rom congressional trade discussions because the committees ojurisdiction (as well as the congressional leadership) ocus primarily onthe domestic aspects o the issue.

Comparing the national security committees, it is clear they have di-ering levels o success. As noted, there has been an imbalance in theeectiveness o congressional oversight o deense activities comparedwith oreign policy, development, and intelligence matters since the1980s. Deense oversight in the postCold War era has worked, in part

because appropriators and authorizers consistently enact an authoriza-tion bill on a bipartisan basis that inorms the annual deense spendingbill. In act, because they are enacted regularly, deense authorizationbills oten attract measures, including on oreign policy, that otherwisemight not be approved. In addition, the House Armed Services Com-mittee (HASC) and the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC)appeal to members with seniority and national clout because serviceon them not only supports the military but enables lawmakers to directprojects that benet constituents o their home districts or states. The

HASC and SASC have also traditionally worked well with their coun-terparts on the deense and military construction appropriations sub-committees, as well as with the Department o Deense (DOD) and themilitary, which has improved their eectiveness.


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Nonetheless, the HASC and SASC must share in the responsibil-ity or Congresss ailure to sufciently challenge the executive branchon the use o military orce. In recent years, acquiescence to PresidentBill Clintons troop deployments in Haiti in 1994 and in Bosnia in 1995,along with congressional support or the 2003 invasion o Iraq despitea serious lack o inormation rom the Bush administration about thethreat, cost, and likely consequences o the war, represent troubling ail-ures in Congresss exercise o its constitutional authority. This tendencytoward deerence is oten reinorced when the majority in Congress andthe president are o the same party. Yet this may be changing; nearly twoyears into the Obama administration, Democrats in Congress have not

been shy about challenging the presidents Aghanistan policy.Critics o the deense authorization process also worry that, in their

zeal to support the military, the armed services committees can be lessvigilant than they should be, sometimes endorsing unwanted or bloatedprograms or ailing to hold the Pentagon sufciently accountable or itsweapons systems and operations. Here again, changes may be on thehorizon; or the rst time in decades, disagreements among the legis-lative and executive branches and the two political parties threaten to

derail enactment o the annual deense authorization bill. Disputesabout the dont ask, dont tell policy and the F-35 alternate enginebrought the scal year 2011 authorization process to a halt as Congressrecessed or the 2010 midterm elections without clear plans to take upthe bill in a possible lame-duck session. So it remains to be seen whetherthe congressional dysunction has spread to the deense bill.

Oversight by the intelligence committees has been consistently prob-lematic since their inception in the late 1970s. In recent years, these

committees have been criticized or lax supervision o the intelligencecommunity (IC), enabling some o the intelligence ailures surroundingthe 9/11 terrorists attacks as well as the inaccurate assessment o IraqsWMD capabilities in 2003. Limited expertise, competing demands,ractured accountability, and partisanship all contributed to the intel-ligence committees less than rigorous oversight in the rst part o thedecade. To address the intelligence breakdowns, the committees under-took a reorganization o the IC in 2004, which created the Ofce o theDirector o National Intelligence (DNI), among other things. While well

intended, the legislation was hastily reviewed and created a positionwith little real authority, one that remains awkward to this day.

In the past several years, the intelligence committees have struggled tokeep pace with the growing demands or post-9/11 intelligence. Recent


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incidents like the Christmas Day 2009 attempted bombing and con-troversies over alleged electronic-surveillance abuses have let many inCongress rustrated by a lack o inormation rom the executive branch.In the atermath o 9/11, concern about leaks prompted the executivebranch to increase restrictions on congressional access to the most sen-sitive intelligence inormation. It limited access to the ull membershipo the intelligence committees by signicantly expanding the numbero briengs on sensitive covert actions provided only to the Gang oEightthe chairmen and ranking members o the House and Senatecommittees, the House speaker and minority leader, and the Senatemajority and minority leaders. Critics, including many in Congress,

believed the executive branch was overusing restricted notications tocontrol inormation by preventing all members o the two panels romreceiving intelligence essential to perorming eective oversight. Thiswas particularly troubling given that Congress is the intelligence com-munitys only independent source o scrutiny.

A stando on the access issue developed between the two branchesin 2004, preventing enactment o an authorization measure until Sep-tember 2010, when the Obama administration and several Gang o

Eight members, including House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), endedthe impasse. They cut a deal requiring the executive branch to revealnew covert-action ndings to all members o the intelligence commit-tees within six months, unless the president provides an explanation asto why limited access is essential. When limiting access to only theGang o Eight, the president must notiy the ull membership o the twocommittees about the relevant nding and provide a general descrip-tion o the nding, according to the new legislation.

The 9/11 Commission ound congressional oversight o the intelli-gence community dysunctional in other respects, noting in particu-lar a lack o unity o eort caused by a multiplicity o splintered andoverlapping committee jurisdictions in both chambers, which createdredundancies and hampered accountability. While authorizing unc-tions are shared primarily between the intelligence committees andthe armed services committees, many other committees have a pieceo intelligence oversight, including oreign aairs/oreign relations,homeland security, judiciary, and appropriations. And intelligence

appropriations are made through the deense appropriations subcom-mittees. Yet Congress chose not to implement the commissions rec-ommendation to establish either a joint House and Senate intelligence


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committee or to maintain separate committees in each chamber thatcombine authorizing and appropriating unctions. Both chambers did,however, adopt some o the commissions other recommendations,such as including on the House and Senate intelligence panels mem-bers who also serve on the armed services, judiciary, oreign aairs/oreign relations committees and on the deense appropriations sub-committees. The Senate also ended term limits on committee mem-bership as a means to enhance expertise.

Oversight o the diplomatic and development realms brings with itunique challenges. Thanks to public indierence about internationalaairs, the typical lawmaker has little incentive to devote time to oreign

policy matters and instead ocuses on the domestic issues that got himor her elected. Most resist membership on the Senate Foreign RelationsCommittee (SFRC) or the House Foreign Aairs Committee (HFAC),because neither committee provides opportunities to bring home thebacon to constituents and because the oreign policy community is toosmall and disparate a bloc to wield any meaningul political inuence.At the top ranks, the two committees are home to accomplished seniorlawmakers rom both parties, who issue authoritative reports and con-

duct serious and productive public hearings on oreign policy matters,but the committees thin out in the middle and lower ranks; in recentyears members have begun to rotate o ater only brie tenures. Onebenet o membership on the SFRC or HFAC is that a lawmaker canuse the position to launch a national image or a possible run or higherofce or to advance an ideological goal. And some lawmakers nd theHFAC particularly attractive because they represent districts with sig-nicant ethnic American or diaspora populations that have a special

interest in a specic region o the world.When the broader congressional membership engages in oreignpolicy or development matters, it usually ocuses on narrow, domesti-cally driven issues that overlook the national interest and thereore canbe counterproductive. For example, Cuban-American activists in Flor-ida shape policy toward Cuba, which ater nearly ty years has ailed tochange the political situation there. Armenian Americans regularly per-suade lawmakers to support measures that recognize the mass killingso Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in 1915 as genocide. Undertaken

despite the protests o Turkey, an important NATO ally in a criticalpart o the world, the most recent eort was advanced at a time whenArmenia and Turkey had been making progress toward reconciliation.


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Pursuit o narrow interests can sometimes place other lawmakers andthe executive branch in untenable positions, as pro-lie lawmakers didor many years. By linking UN dues payments to unding restrictionson assistance to groups that allow abortions as part o reproductive-health programs overseas, they orced pro-choice lawmakers to decidebetween supporting a womans right to choose and ending the nationsdeadbeat status at the United Nations.

The lack o serious, sustained interest in diplomacy and developmentissues is shared by the congressional leadership, which oten ails, par-ticularly in the Senate, to make oor time in its crowded schedule orauthorization bills. The SFRC and HFAC have allen victim to this dys-

unction or years; Congress has ailed since 1985 to overhaul the legis-lation that provides strategic guidance or oreign-assistance programs,instead making piecemeal changes that have oten led to incoherenceand excessive bureaucracy. Congress has produced a bill to guide StateDepartment activities only sporadically since 2000. This has not beenor lack o eort, as the HFAC and SFRC oten hold hearings, markup bills, and vote them out o committee (and, in the House, get thempassed by the ull chamber), only to see them all victim to concerns

about poison pill amendments or more urgent business on a Senate leg-islative calendar crowded with ripening cloture motions.

Administrations have been only too happy to live without annualauthorization bills or the State Department or oreign-assistance pro-grams because Congress tends to use them to apply provisions thatrestrict executive action and impose onerous reporting requirementson agencies. Instead, administrations, with the support o Congress,have created discrete programs that provide help to specic regions

o the world or tackle particular problems, such as HIV/AIDS. Forexample, the George W. Bush administration chose to go around theU.S. Agency or International Development (USAID) to create newprograms, such as the Presidents Emergency Plan or AIDS Relie(PEPFAR) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation.

Unortunately, the prolieration o separate initiatives and theincreasing role o domestically ocused agencies that have not tradition-ally had a oreign policy unction has led to a splintering o U.S. oreign-assistance programs, which has weakened U.S. development capacity.

Currently, international activities are carried out by twelve depart-ments, twenty-ve agencies, and nearly sixty government ofces. Andas worthy as many o these programs are, the lack o a comprehensive


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approach sometimes has unintended consequences, such as abundantunding to one overseas program (e.g., HIV/AIDS) at the expense oanother equally important one (e.g., general public health programs).Should the Obama administration succeed in achieving the goals o itsSeptember 2010 Presidential Policy Directive on Global Developmentand its Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (due out inDecember 2010), development will likely be integrated with deenseand diplomacy into a comprehensive approach to national security.This promises to provide Congress with a useul template.

Purse strings

On the unding ront, the international aairs budget is included in thenondeense, discretionary spending category, so it competes or dollarswith domestically ocused budgets. This is an uphill battle made moredifcult by the lack o both authorizing legislation and a strong con-stituency ghting or international aairs programs. As a result, sincethe end o the Cold War, the international aairs budget has requentlybeen shortchanged by Congress.

Rarely completed by the end o the scal year, appropriations ordiplomacy and development are oten the subject o a stopgap spendingmeasure known as a continuing resolution, or they are sometimes oldedinto an end-o-session omnibus bill that is usually passed well ater thestart o the new scal year. This holdup o unds urther impedes thework o an already resource-strapped State Department and USAID,which are orced to interrupt or delay programs and the hiring o per-sonnel until unds become available. Such expensive shortcuts as no-bid

contracts then become necessary, increasing costs, which are passed onto the taxpayer. Furthermore, in the absence o authorization bills,appropriators requently insert programmatic language into spendingbills oten with, but sometimes without, the input o authorizers. Thiscan deny the State Department and USAID the consistent and com-prehensive expertise that the HFAC and SFRC oer and underminesthe committees authority by depriving them o a mechanism to elicitcooperation rom the agencies they oversee.

Meanwhile, the deense budget has always been somewhat sacro-

sanct. As noted, or the past several decades, deense appropriators haveproduced an annual spending bill that is guided each year by a deenseauthorization bill. Despite occasional dierences about a specic


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weapons program or policy, the unding process has proved highlysuccessul or the Pentagon. But since the FY2011 deense authoriza-tion bill is in jeopardy, this may be changing. Furthermore, Secretary oDeense Robert M. Gates, in the ace o the nations spiraling decits,has begun a budget-cutting eort at the Department o Deense thathas some lawmakers concerned about the potential loss o deense dol-lars or their states or districts.

In the intelligence realm, unding decisions are made by the deenseappropriations subcommittees, so IC spending has been guided byindividuals with relatively little expertise on intelligence matters, whotend to tie IC unding to trends in deense spending. To address this

problem, the House Appropriations Committee recently created anIntelligence Oversight Panel that includes three members o the HousePermanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) along with tenappropriators.The panel assesses budget requests rom the IC andmakes recommendations on intelligence unding to relevant appro-priations subcommittees, particularly the deense subcommittee. TheSenate did not create a similar panel but is undoubtedly tracking theHouse experience.

Why must the State Department, with its diplomacy role, andUSAID, with its development assistance unction, beg or attentionand unding while the Deense Department receives more than it wantsrom Congress? Part o the answer lies in the act that hard power, ormilitary support, is an easier concept to sell than sot power, or diplo-macy and development assistance. In addition, DOD represents a largeconstituencythe military, including active-duty, reserve components,and retireeswith clout. Through the use o earmarks, lawmakers also

make sure that deense projects, which provide jobs or constituents,reach just about every congressional district in the United States. Fur-thermore, the deense industry lobbies Congress very intensely andeectively, expending larges sums o money to win congressional andPentagon support or its products. In the 2008 election cycle alone, thedeense industry spent nearly $24 million on campaign contributions,according to the Center or Responsive Politics.

Although the State Department serves the same constituencythe American peopleit has ar ewer resources and less muscle than

the Pentagon. Foreign Service ofcers, though well educated and asaccomplished and proessional as their counterparts in todays mili-tary, spend large portions o their careers overseas; they are oten


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viewed by Congress as elitists and are sometimes suspected o advanc-ing a oreign agenda over U.S. interests. As noted, with little constitu-ency in the American electorate, the State Department must battleeach year to und the international aairs account, which representsonly 1.4 percent o the U.S. budget, while the Pentagon, with over18 percent o the U.S. budget (including intelligence unding), endso demands rom Congress to accept unds to continue programs itwould preer to suspend. In addition, sot power is a nuanced andsometimes intangible concept that is hard to explain, especially in asound bite. Success can be difcult to measure or prove, especially icrises have been prevented. Finally, unlike the deense eld, U.S. diplo-

macy and development programs have ew heavy-hitting lobbyists intheir corner. Instead, they are supported by eective but less poweruladvocacy groups, such as the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition, thatoten succeed by making the case or the international aairs budgeton national security grounds.

Unortunately, Congress has been slow to recognize that the imbal-ance between the hard power and sot power components o U.S.national security undermines the nations ability to ormulate and

execute missions eectively, especially in increasingly murky postcon-ict environments like Iraq and Aghanistan. Lacking a joint approach,several jurisdictional clashes have occurred, including the ongoing ghtover which departmentState or Deenseshould have responsibilityor assistance programs in a zone o conict once combat has ceased.Years o inadequate unding have hindered the State Departments andUSAIDs capacities to deploy large-scale development assistance pro-grams in sometimes nonsecure, postconict environments, so DOD,

which has the resources readily available, assumes these nonmilitaryroles, thus raising concerns about the militarization o oreign policy.This is not a part the military wants to play, not only because devel-

opment work is not its core competency but also because it recognizesthe value o civilian expertise in this arena. Secretary o Deense Gatesafrmed this view recently when he said, . . . you talk to a colonel whosa brigade commander in Aghanistan, and ask him about the contribu-tion a single civilian proessional brings a PRT [Provincial Reconstruc-tion Team], and he will tell you they are a gigantic orce multiplier. So

having civilians who understand this, who know what theyre doing,and or whom it is a calling and a proession makes all the dierence.Time and again, the evidence supports Gatess point. For example, U.S.


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oreign-assistance programs have helped to reduce the burden on theU.S. military by training over 100,000 peacekeepers rom around theworld in the past ve years. They have also assisted in stablizing ail-ing states by improving lives through the support o initiatives suchas global health programs that have cut worldwide deaths in childrenunder age ve by 50 percent.

In an eort to address this imbalance and win congressional sup-port or adequate unding o diplomacy and development, secretarieso state and deense, including, most recently, Hillary Rodham Clintonand Robert Gates, have gone beore Congress in tandem, stressing howhard power and sot power complement each other and require a better

balance in resource allocation. But most lawmakers have little time orpatience to deal with the long-range and difcult-to-measure outcomesinherent in the diplomacy and development arenas. Understandably,they are more comortable pursuing the tangible solution o buildingmore weapons systems than making the intangible, time-consuminginvestment in the people and programs that have the potential to miti-gate conict or rebuild ater combat ends.

O course, the State Department shares some o the responsibil-

ity or the lack o congressional support. To be successul on CapitolHill, career proessionals must work with political appointees and civil-ian personnel to advance the administrations oreign policy agenda.But Foreign Service ofcers, who are steeped in the culture, history,politics, economics, and language o other nations, oten do not seemadequately aware or appreciative o how their own national legislatureworks, nor do they have the inclination or skill set to engage Congressand make the case or diplomacy and development. Furthermore, work-

ing successully with Congress or mastering the complicated legislativeand political processes in the United States is not rewarded in the dip-lomatic corps. Rising Foreign Service ofcers have little incentive tounderstand the unique culture o Congress or develop the relationshipson Capitol Hill that are so critical to success there. As a result, ew top-ranking Foreign Service ofcers comprehend Congress and some evendisdain it, contributing to what can sometimes be a toxic relationship.

This reluctance to work Congress oten leads to the withholding oinormation, which results in communication gaps and misunderstand-

ings in every aspect o the State Departments relationship with CapitolHill. For example, State Department ofcials oten hold o until thelast minute to inorm Congress o developments in policy matters or


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raise concerns about legislative initiatives when it is too late or lawmak-ers to aect administration proposals beore they become public. Thisundermines the departments ability to gain support rom not only itsoversight committees but also the broad congressional membership orits policies, programs, unding requests, and nominees.

Advice-And-cOnsent rOe

The Senate plays a critical, singular role in the national security arena byproviding advice and consent on treaties and the presidents nomineesor senior government positions and ambassadorial posts. The soar-

ing use o holds in recent years, however, has let increasing numberso nominees in limbo or lengthy periods. One year into the Obamaadministration, 177 appointees were awaiting conrmation, a signi-cant increase over the 70 nominees pending at the same juncture in theGeorge W. Bush administration. Some o the increase can be attrib-uted to the Obama administrations arduous vetting process, under-taken in anticipation o problems on Capitol Hill, but a large number onominees were subject to Senate holds. In the Bill Clinton and George

W. Bush administrations, the nominees or permanent representative tothe United Nations were held up by the Senate or ve and six months,respectively, denying the country top-level guidance at an importantmultilateral institution.

This obstruction diminishes U.S. representation around the worldand deprives the country o leadership in vital positions and at criticaltimes, especially at the start o a new administration, when the demo-cratic system is most vulnerable. The delay also conuses and angers or-

eign partners, who view the lack o timely U.S. representation in theircapitals or senior interlocutors in Washington as an insult. Secretary oState Clinton reerred to this problem in testimony beore the Senateoreign operations appropriations subcommittee in February 2010: Ihave to coness that when it came to some assistant secretary positions,some ambassadorial positions, it became harder and harder to explainto countries, particularly countries o signicance, why we had nobodyin position or them to interact with.

O course, the Senate has an obligation to ully review presidential

nominees, but too many candidates are held up or reasons unrelatedto their qualications. The most agrant recent example dates to Feb-ruary 2010, when Richard C. Shelby, the senior senator rom Alabama,


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placed a blanket hold on nearly ty nominees rom many agencies. Hedid this in an attempt to get the attention o the Obama administra-tion regarding two stalled programs that had the potential o bringingsignicant ederal dollars to his state. Once exposed, the glare o mediaattention persuaded Shelby to release all but three holds. Since the vastmajority o nominees subjected to holds eventually get conrmed bylarge margins, it is difcult or both nominees and the public to takethe holds too seriously and uels the widening cynicism and distrusto Congress.

The abuse o holds has other consequences. The delays and theinvasiveness cause some nominees to drop out o the process and dis-

courage other qualied candidates rom even accepting nominationsso, ultimately, the nation suers. Congress also undermines its ownauthority when it abuses holds. Presidents nd other ways to move theiragendas orward and use their authority to make recess appointments,as was the case with John R. Bolton, President George W. Bushs choiceas ambassador to the United Nations. In some instances, presidentschoose to skirt the conrmation process entirely by naming specialenvoys to important national security positions, as President Obama

did in naming twenty-our special envoys and special representatives toState Department assignments at the start o his administration.

Just as Congress sometimes obstructs nominations, it occasionallyallows treaties to languish. The Convention on the Elimination o AllForms o Discrimination Against Women, submitted in to the Senatein 1980, and the UN Convention on the Law o the Sea, submitted in1994, provide two examples. First reported out o the SFRC in 1994and 2004, respectively, they have yet to be considered by the ull Senate.

Such inaction, although inrequent, nonetheless erodes alliances andpartnerships with those nations that have ratied the treaties.Some lawmakers contend that the ailure to take up a treaty repre-

sents a deliberate choice to stop a awed document rom advancing. Ina rare instance, such inaction may be justied. In most cases, however,the Senate is alling short in its job, especially when one considers thatover the past twenty years the executive branch has conveyed only asmall number o treaties to the Senateon average, about thirty-twoper Congress, or sixteen each year. On the relatively ew occasions

that an agreement rises to the level o a treaty, the nation benets whenthe Senate takes the time to debate and then vote on the pact, oer-ing its advice, i not its consent. For example, many who supported the


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Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) wanted to prevent it romcoming to a vote when it became apparent that they did not have thetwo-thirds majority required or approval. But, as difcult as the out-come was or them, without an up-or-down vote, the issues raisedduring the debate on the deeated CTBT might never have been airedand eventually addressed to allow or the day when an improved treatycould be resubmitted with an enhanced chance o garnering enoughvotes required or approval.

Senate inaction on treaties also invites bad behavior on the part othe executive branch: it provides presidents with an excuse to go aroundCongress and conclude executive agreements that do not require

Senate approval on matters that really should have Senate input. Asit is, over the past twenty years, on average treaties have accounted orless than 7 percent o all international agreements conducted by theUnited States.

ePertise gAP

Although 535 individuals serve in the House and the Senate, the short-

age o general knowledge, not to mention expertise, on national secu-rity matters is serious. Although lawmakers who do not sit on nationalsecurity committees have never been expected to be experts on deense,oreign policy, or intelligence issues, in earlier eras they took the time tobecome well enough inormed to be able to vote responsibly. Today, thisis increasingly difcult to do. Not only is time in short supply, but thereis a relatively small pool o experts readily available to advise typicallawmakers or their stas on an expanding agenda o sometimes arcane

global issues.

For unbiased research and analysis, lawmakers oten rely on theninety-one sta members in the Foreign Aairs and National DeenseDivision o the Congressional Research Service (CRS) as well as staworking on national security issues at the other congressionally man-dated support institutions, such as the Government AccountabilityOfce (GAO) and the Congressional Budget Ofce (CBO). However,budgets at many support agencies have not kept pace with escalatingdemands or international expertise in the past twenty years, result-

ing in smaller stas at CRS and the GAO. And with so much on theirplates, sta members in lawmakers personal ofces have limited timeto engage experts outside Congress. They can occasionally call on


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committee stas, but the talented proessionals on committee stasanswer rst and oremost to committee members and have limited timeto spare or other lawmakers.

Interestingly, the size o national security committees stas has notchanged signicantly in the past twenty years despite the explosion ointernational issues. According to the CRS (see Figures 2 and 3), thenumber o proessional and support sta serving on the armed services,oreign aairs/oreign relations, and intelligence committees in bothchambers was about the same in 2009 as it was in 1989. Both the HFACand SFRC showed noticeable drops in sta size during that period, butin 2010 they appear to have begun increasing personnel to slightly above

1989 levels. Nonetheless, given the growing complexity and numbero issues conronting the country, the size o committee stas ought tobe considerably larger than during the Cold War to enable lawmakersto not only keep up with world events and oversight responsibilities butto directly shape oreign policy.

FRE . ST A FFN F NA T NA SEC RT Y C M M T T EES:SENATE, 1989009

Source: R. Eric Petersen, Parker H. Reynolds, and Amber Hope Wilhelm, House o Representatives and

Senate Sta Levels in Member, Committee, Leadership, and Other Ofces, 19772010, Congressional

Research Service, August 10, 2010, pp. 2628.


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29

This expertise decit in Congress is quite dramatic when comparedto the size o the workorces at the agencies that the national securitycommittees oversee600,000 civilians at the Deense Department,45,000 employees (including oreign nationals) at the State Depart-ment, and 8,800 in the USAID workorce. Since much o the work isclassied, the actual number o individuals employed by the intelligencecommunity is unknown, but the Washington Post reported in July 2010that an estimated 854,000 people across the nation hold top-secretsecurity clearances. O course, there is an overlap between this groupand individuals with top-secret clearances at DOD, State, and USAID,but the number is nonetheless stunning.

As important, Congress is oten impeded by the executive branch inits eorts to become inormed about national security matters. Invok-ing security concerns, administrations resist sharing inormation onoreign policy, deense, and intelligence matters with Congress andusually reserve consultation or times o crisis. Oten, however, the realmotivation is to deprive what the executive branch views as an unwieldygroup o 535 lawmakers o the opportunity to undermine careully nego-tiated agreements or well-developed policies or personal, political, or

The Congress o Today

FRE 3 . ST A FFN F NA T NA SEC RT Y C M M T T EES:SE, 1989009

Source: R. Eric Petersen, Parker H. Reynolds, and Amber Hope Wilhelm, House o Representatives and

Senate Sta Levels in Member, Committee, Leadership, and Other Ofces, 19772010, Congressional

Research Service, August 10, 2010, pp. 2022.


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ideological reasons. This sentiment is not without basis. Members oCongress have been known to demagogue issues, sometimes scoringcheap political points at the expense o oreigners. But lawmakersare elected ofcials representing the interests o the American peopleand have a shared constitutional role to play in making national securitypolicy. Unortunately, the stando between the two branches regardinginormation sharing ill serves the nation, because it orces lawmakersto cast ballots knowing too little about the matters they are voting on.


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31

Congress alone cannot change the global environment or the nationalpolitical landscape, but it can alter the way it does business by reorming

the institutional behavior, rules, and procedures that are holding it backrom ully discharging its constitutional responsibilities, especially onnational security matters. Many o the rules and procedures in bothchambers were created in an era o horse travel and the quill pen. Theydo not reect the twenty-rst-century world. They waste time, drainenergy, and are exploited by lawmakers or individual or party advan-tage at the expense o the national interest.

It is time or Congress to update its rules and return to the practice

o using them, along with an orderly legislative process, to advancesolutions, not obstruct them. The time is ripe, because there are alarge number o relatively new lawmakers in both chambers who wantchange and are less invested in the current system than their longer-serving colleagues. Currently, orty-nine senators and more than hal oHouse members have been in ofce or no more than ten years. Thanksto retirements and primary deeats, these numbers will grow by ten inthe Senate and by nearly thirty in the House, even beore a ballot is cast

in the 2010 midterm elections.

Combine this development with thedeep anger o the American electorate and the daunting challenges con-ronting the nation and there is reason to believe that reorm is not onlypossible but also essential.

In a perect world, Congress would serve as an equal branch o gov-ernment in the national security arena. It would be a ully inormed bodyproviding prompt and inclusive action on annual budgets, congressio-nal proposals, and executive branch initiatives; supplying realistic andeective oversight o the executive branch; and oering knowledgeable

and timely consideration o treaties and nominations. It would devotetime and resources to strengthening its own expertise, and it wouldcommit to engaging in a regular consultative process with the executive

The Congress o Tomorrow


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branch on matters o national security, especially regarding the use omilitary orce.

I such a Congress were to materialize, it could partner with theexecutive branch to provide the insights and perspectives on deense,diplomacy, development, and intelligence matters that only the mostrepresentative branch o government can oer. It could assist in atransition to a comprehensive, integrated approach to national secu-rity that utilizes diminishing resources judiciously and guides policieswisely to diminish external threats; prevent conicts and reduce theneed or military interventions; cultivate new markets or U.S. tradeand investment; and improve health, education, and entrepreneurial

opportunities in developing states. A revitalized Congress could serveas a proud embodiment o the nations democratic tradition and valuesand contribute to maintaining, and, where necessary, restoring U.S.leadership, ensuring the admiration o allies and the respect o adver-saries worldwide.

What ollows is a menu o options to help Congress start down thispath. The period beginning ater the 2010 midterm elections and con-tinuing as the 112th Congress gets under way presents the leadership

o both parties in the House and Senate with the perect opportunityto tackle those recommendationssuch as reducing each lawmakerscommittee assignmentsthat are achievable in the short term. Bothparties can use their postelection party caucus meetings as a jumping-o point to engage rst with each other and then across the aisle and upPennsylvania Avenue to crat new rules, procedures, and practices thatcan be adopted at the start o the new Congress, no matter which partyis in control o each chamber.

om a l

B a lawmak

To achieve a healthy and unctional Congress that provides promptand inclusive action on budgets and legislation, both chambers shouldrestore regular order, ending practices that obstruct and delay aswell as shut out the minority. This would require a return to complete

adherence to the legislative process: holding hearings, marking up leg-islation, voting it out o committee, debating and amending it on theoor beore a vote o the ull body, convening a conerence between the


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33The Congress o Tomorrow

two chambers, and voting on the conerenced measure. Too oten thisorderly process is bypassed in both chambersin the House or expe-diency and in the Senate to obstruct. A return to regular order wouldput both chambers back on track to taking up authorization and appro-priations bills in tandem, thus providing, beore the start o the scalyear, the policy guidance and unding that are Congresss constitutionalresponsibilities. Restoring this process would also curtail the produc-tion o continuing resolutions or voluminous, catch-all omnibus bills,which lawmakers are currently orced to vote on with little notice andno opportunity to read, let alone understand, the hundreds o provi-sions within them.

In the House, a return to regular order would require a reduction inthe use o closed and restricted rules and emergency meetings that shutthe minority out o the deliberative process. In exchange or opportu-nities to oer amendments in committee and on the oor and to par-ticipate in conerences with the Senate, the minority would have toagree to resist such tactics as regularly oering poison pill amendmentsintended solely to undermine the process or embarrass the majority. Itwould be in the interest o both parties to pursue this approach, because

it allows the majority to pass bipartisan legislation that has a reasonablechance to survive in the Senate, with its unanimous-consent and super-majority requirements. Regular order also oers the minority a voiceand a stake in the process and a claim to being part o the solution ratherthan part o the problem.

In the Senate, regular order would require changes to the rules toprohibit debate on some procedural motions, limit debate on urgentmatters such as appropriations and executive branch nominees, and

create a new mechanism to end libusters on controversial measures: Prohibiting debate. Current Senate rules allow debate on procedural

motions seeking consent to move to the next piece o business, thusopening up additional opportunities to libuster on a single piece olegislation. The rules should be revised to prohibit debate on thesemotions to proceed.

imiting debate. To allow important matters such as appropriationsbills to move orward without denying opponents the opportunity to

be heard, a time limit should be set on debate o specic items suchas appropriations and executive branch appointments subject toconrmation.


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Cutting of debate. There is no shortage o suggestions or reorm-ing the cloture motion. One option would revise the cloture rule toset declining benchmarks on each subsequent roll call until a simplemajority o ty-one votes is reached. Another approach suggeststhat ater a period o time the majority be relieved o the responsibil-ity or ending debate and the onus or continuing debate be shited tothe minority.

These are just a ew o the several libuster reorm proposals thatshould be considered because they preserve the Senates role as themore deliberative chamber, provide the minority with opportunities to

orce debate on important issues, and promise to reduce the number olibustered measures in each Congress.

On budgeting issues, Congress would benet rom enorcing thetimetables prescribed in the 1974 Budget Act and requiring that amend-ments be restricted to spending, as opposed to legislative, matters.Combined with the proposal to limit debate on appropriations bills, thiscould signicantly speed up the budgeting process, resulting in ewercontinuing resolutions and omnibus spending bills to und the govern-

ment, thus helping agencies to plan and execute their missions eec-tively. In the national security arena, Congress should adapt its budgetprocess to handle a unied deense and international aairs budget.

A combination o rustration with gridlock, abysmal approval rat-ings, a large number o new lawmakers, and the realization that U.S.global leadership is at stake may be the conuence o events that, orthe rst time in thirty-ve years, motivates lawmakers to adopt some othe measures outlined here. These reorms, signicant in todays grid-locked environment, represent a restoration o sound practices or the

most part. Returning to regular order, enorcing the budget process, andinitiating some strategic rules and procedural changes should enableCongress to better keep pace with the demands o the twenty-rst cen-tury. These steps promise ultimately to ree up oor time or votes onmatters o import that are now crowded out o the schedule, such asthe State Department and oreign-assistance authorization bills, andshould create time to complete all twelve appropriations bills, eliminat-ing or severely reducing the need or continuing resolutions or omni-

bus spending bills. Also, they will likely preserve the Senates role asbrakeman or the House without stopping House initiatives cold. Mostimportant, they will result in a balanced and integrated national secu-rity policy that provides adequate unding to all elements o national


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35The Congress o Tomorrow

securitydeense, diplomacy, development, and intelligencethusproviding not only the military but the civilian capacity to work on pro-grams that promise to advance U.S. goal

congress and national security

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