conflict trends 2011 2

7/28/2019 Conflict Trends 2011 2

1/57

Env i r o nmen t , C l ima t e Change a nd Con f l i c t

ISSUE 2, 201 1


2/57

conflict trends I 1

EDITORIAL 2 byVasuGounden

3 ClimateChangeConflictNexus:Frameworkfor

Policy-orientedAction

byWilliamTsuma

9 ClimateConflictsintheHornofAfrica?

byMarcelLeroyandFanaGebresenbet

16 TransboundaryRiversandClimateChange:Africanand

AsianRivers

byAshokSwainandFlorianKrampe

22 KeySocialVulnerabilitiestoClimateChangeinSouth

AfricasCoastalZones:ThePotentialforConflict

byFathimaAhmed

29 AddressingClimate-relatedConflict:HumanSecurityand

LessonsfromtheSouthernSahelianBeltofSudan

bySalomBronkhorst

38 AddressingCharcoalProduction,Environmental

DegradationandCommunalViolenceinSomalia:TheUse

ofSolarCookersinBanderBeyla

byShukriaDini

46 CollusionandCriminalisation:FuelConflictintheNiger

Delta

byMelissaCawthra

55 ClimateChangeinAfrica

byMaxwellG.Hardy

FEATURES

contents

BOOK

REVIEW


3/57

2 I conflict trends

ByVASUgoUNDEN

editorial

VasuoundenistheFounderandExecutiveDirector

ofACCRD.

AsDurban,SouthAfrica,preparesforthe17 thmeeting

oftheConferenceofthePartiestotheKyotoProtocolin

Novemberthisyear,theworldisrecoveringfromaseries

ofclimateand environmental-relateddisasters,which

haveoccurredoverthepastfewyears.TheIndianOcean

tsunami,HurricaneKatrina,theHaitiearthquake,theNew

Zealandearthquake,theJapanesetsunamiandnuclear

crisis,amongothers,havekilledandaffectedmillions.

Atthesametime,silentandslowerdisastersrelated

totheeffectsofnaturalandanthropogenicclimateand

environmentalchangesareaffectingbillionsespecially

poorpeoplewhodependontheenvironmentfortheir

livelihood.

Sudden disasters and slow-onset environmental

changeshavethepotentialtotriggerconflicts,especially

insituationswherepeopleare alreadyvulnerableand

wherethesocio-economic,politicalandculturalcontext

exacerbatesexistingtensions.Watersecurityisarelated

andperhapsoneofthemostseriousstrategicissuesofourtime.Approximately18MiddleEasternandNorth

Africancountries somealready proneto instability

andconflictareatextremeriskofwaterinsecurity.

NotwithstandingthepotentialforconflictintheMiddle

EastandNorthAfrica,somearguethatwaterscarcity

andtheresultanthighfoodpricesarekeyfactorsinthe

MaghrebandMiddleEastuprisings.

InAsia,glacialretreatinKashmirisaffectingIndia

Pakistanrelations,whileinAfricaitisuncertainwhether

theNile Basin Initiative willweather climatechange

challenges and other regionalpolitical tensions.The

ThirdPoleortheHindu-KushHimalayaregioninAsia

ishometo10majorriversystemsthatprovidewaterto

morethan20%oftheworldspopulationBangladeshis,

Pakistanis, Afghans, Indians,Chinese,Nepalese and

othersdepend onit. The areais alreadysusceptible

to natu ra l d isasters and h igh leve ls o f warming,

earthquakes,glacialmeltingandsea-levelrise.

In Africa, in addition to serious water insecurity

predictedforsub-SaharanAfricaresultingfromdroughts,

desertificationandotherclimaticevents,theNileisthe

longestriverintheworldwiththegreatestnumberof

riparianstates(10)drawingonitswaterforlivelihoods

and asa source ofenergy for industry and homes.

Situatedinoneoftheharshestclimatesintheworld,the

Nilessensitivitytoclimatechangeandexistingtensions

overthesharingofitswatersalsocreatethepotentialfor

conflict.

Theseglobalchallengesaredaunting,andacademics,

practitioners andpolicy makersin conflictresolution

shouldnotonlyfocusonhumanresponsibilityforclimate

changebut,moreimportantly,ontheimplicationsofthe

environmentandclimatechangeforhumansecurityand

conflict.Ourfocusshouldbeonprovidingnewknowledge

andupdatedanalyses,newpoliciesandpracticaltoolsfor

conflict-sensitiveclimatechangeadaptation.Ourconcern

shouldbeforvulnerableindividualsandcommunities,to

reducetheirvulnerabilityandpreventandmitigatethe

effectsofenvironmentalchangeandwaterinsecurity,

andthusprevent relatedconflicts.Our assistancetogovernment and civilsociety in developing policies

andcreating interventionsto reducevulnerabilityand

ensuringclimateandconflictsensitiveadaptationisvital.

AsanAfricanconflictresolutionorganisationthat

aimstohaveaglobalimpactanddealwiththegreatest

conflictissuesofourtime,theAfricanCentreforthe

ConstructiveResolutionofDisputesobjectiveistoplay

a proactive rolein mitigating andpreventingclimate

change-relatedconflicts.Weknowthatclimatechange

will,attheveryleast,increaseexistingstressorsand

magnifycurrent socio-economicand politicalf actors

thatcouldtriggerandexacerbateconflict.Buthowwill

thishappen?Whatarethedynamicsatplay?Arethere

lessonsfromexistingenvironmentalconflictsthatcould

beapplied now and inthe futureto deal with such

challenges?Thesearejustsomeofthequestionsthatwe

seektoanswer,throughthispublication,andthroughour

ongoingworkonthiscriticaltopic.


4/57

conflict trends I 3

Introduction

Thedevastatingdroughtthataffectedlargeareasof

Kenyain 2009andtheupsurgein inter-community

violence in the north of the country highlighted

an apparent connection between climate change

andconflict. However, the evidence-base forthis

connectionislimitedanditisthereforeimperativeto

analyzehowthesefactorsinteractinrealityratherthan

tomakeassumptions.1

Theabovequoteprovidesthe basis onwhichthis

articleiswritten.Thisarticlebridgestheclimatechange-

conflictgapbyprovidingaframeworkorlensthrough

whichpolicy-actionresearchonthenexusbetweenclimate

changeandconflictcanbedesignedandimplemented.

Theframeworkthatissuggestedisderivedfromspecific

fieldcasesandexperiences,aswellasareviewofrelevant

literaturebybothacademicsandpractitionersinthefield.

Thearticlebeginswithabriefdiscussionoftheconceptofclimatechange,asprovidedbytheIntergovernmental

PanelonClimateChange(IPCC).Thisdiscussionisthen

linkedtoclimatechangehazards,whereitisarguedthat

climatechangedoesnothappeninavacuum,butratherit

Climate ChangeConfliCt

nexus: framework for PoliCy-

oriented aCtion

ByWILLIAmTSUmA

Above:TheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChanges

2007reportrecognisedthatwaterscarcityhasincreased

and predicted that it will continue to increase in

thefuture.

UNPHOTO/CARLPURCELL


5/57

4 I conflict trends

is embedded in a socio-ecological system. Climate

changehazards,therefore,createimbalancesinthesocio-

ecologicalsystemthathavethepotentialtoexacerbateor

eventriggerviolenceinsomecontexts.Havinglaidthis

foundation, three analysistoolsare suggested. These

providealensthroughwhichpolicyrecommendations

onthenexusbetweenclimatechangeandconflictcanbe

properlyunderstood.

ClimateChange

AccordingtotheIPCCshistoricaloverviewofclimate

science,inits2007report,onemustfirstunderstandthe

systemofclimate(seeFigure1)beforeunderstanding

whatismeantbyclimatechange.Climateinitselfrefers

totheaverageweatherincludingtemperaturevariances,

precipitationandwind overa select period oftime.

It is important to understandthat the earths climate

system evolvesover timedue tonaturaloccurrences,

aswellasduetohumaninfluences.Anexampleofthis

hasledtowhatisoftenreferredtoasglobalwarming,whereanincreaseduseandcirculationof greenhouse

gaseswhichpartiallytraplong-waveradiationtothe

earths surface haveled to a warmer earthsurface.

This,inturn,warmssurroundingecosystemsandleads

torapidlymeltingglaciers,whichaffectsalllevelsofthe

climatesystem.2Climatechangeoveraperiodoftime

thendisruptsthenormalfunctioningoftheecosystemthat

interactswithhumans,andaffectshowtheyaccesscertain

vitalresourcesfortheirsurvival.

ClimateChangeHazardsasDriversforViolenceThe disruption of the normal functioning of an

ecosystemduetoclimatechangeiswhatisreferredto

asclimatechangehazards.Theseincludefloodingdueto

heavyrains,erraticweatherseasonsand,insomeareas,

prolongeddryspells.Whatwevisualiseinrealityisthen

heavy droughts and famine, unproductive farmlands

duetowatershortageand,insomecaseslikeinSudan,

extended deserts. These climate change hazards or

impactsarerarelyifeverthesolecauseofviolent

conflict.However,theincreasedevidenceofthesehazards

canbeimplicatedinallphasesoftheconflictcyclefrom

contributingtotheoutbreakandperpetuationofviolenceto undermining prospects for peace and security.3

Inthefollowingsection,someofthesehazardsarebriefly

discussedandanargumentforhowtheirmanifestation

Figure1:TheVaryingComponentsoftheClimateSystem 4

Changes in the Ocean:

Cirulation, Sea Level, BiogeochemistryChanges in/on the Land Surface:

Orography, Land Use, Vegetation, Ecosystems

Changes in the

Cryosphere:

Snow, Frozen Ground,

Sea Ice, Ice Sheets,

Glaciers

Changes in the Atmosphere:

Composition, Cirulation

Changes in the

Hydrological Cycle

N2, O

2, Ar, H

2O, Co

2, CH

4,

N2O, O

3etc.

Aerosols

Human Inuences

Atmosphere-IceInteraction

Atmosp

here-BiosphereInteraction

Land-

AtmosphereInteract

ion

Soil-Biosphere

Interaction

Atmosphere

Biosphere

Land Surface

Volcanic Activity

SeaIce

Ice Sheet

Clouds

Glacier

Changes in

Solar Inputs

Ice-OceanCoupling

Hydrosphere:Ocean

Hydrosphere:Rivers and Lakes

Terrestrial

Radiation

Precipitation

Evaporation

HeatExchange

Win

dStress


6/57

conflict trends I 5

t

REUTERS/THEBIGGERPICTURE

ExpansionofthedesertsinAfricahasledpastoraliststoencroachontofarmlandsforwaterandpasture.

has the potential for driving conflicts, especially in

developingcountries,ispresented.

1. ClimateChange-inducedEnvironmentalDegradation

Irregular weather patterns, influenced by heavy

rainfallinsomeregionsandstrongsunshineinothers,

leads to environmental degradation by lowering the

environmentalconditionsnecessaryforhumansurvival.

SuhrkehighlightstensionsinSudanduetotheexpansion

ofthedesert.5Accordingtohisanalysis,expansionof

thedesertdoesnotmanifestinavacuum,butratherina

socio-ecologicalsystemwherepeopleareforcedtoseek

alternativesourcesoflivelihood.Heusestheexampleof

nomadicpastoralists,whofoundthemselvesincreasingly

limitedandrestrictedintheirsearchforpastureandwater.

Hisanalysisrevealed thatanincreasein theincidents

of armed violence between pastoralist communities

and farming groups was largely due to pastoralists

encroachingontofarmlandsforwaterandpasture.This

wasbecausethespreadingdesertlinkedtoclimatechange

haderadicatedallthepastureandwatercorridorsthat

servedasbuffersduringthedryseasons.Thisobservation

isverysimilartoSaferworlds6viewofnorthernKenya,

aswellasWalkers7perspectiveonthedrystretchesin

Senegal,wherepastoralistandfarmingdisputeshaveled

toviolentconflicts.

CLIMATECHANGEOVERAPERIODOF

TIME THEN DISRUPTS THE NORMAL

FUNCTIONING OF THE ECOSSTEM

THATINTERACTSWITHHUMANS,AND

AFFECTSHOWTHEACCESSCERTAIN

VITALRESOURCESFORTHEIRSURVIVAL


7/57

6 I conflict trends

Erraticrainfallhasreducedtheavailablewaterforirrigatingfarmlandsandhinderedtheexpansionofpastures

foranimals.

2.ClimateChange-inducedNaturalResourceScarcity

Build ing on the d iscuss ion on envi ronmenta l

degradation,climatechangedoesplayadirectroleinthe

shrinkageofkeynaturalresourcesforexample,land

andwater.TheIPCCs2007reportplacesspecialemphasis

onwaterbylookingatwatersystems,floodsandwater

sources.Thereportrecognisesthatwaterscarcityhasincreased and is predicted to continue to increase

inthefuture.Thiscanbearguedtobeanoutcomeof

unusualerraticrainfallpatterns,prolongeddryspellsand

drought.Forexample,floodingasaclimatechangehazard

reducestheamountoflandavailableforfoodproduction

andotherfarm-basedactivities,whiledroughtsdueto

erraticandirregularrainfallreducethewateravailable

to communities that depend on rain-fed agriculture

andanimal-rearingfortheirlivelihoods.8Thiscanbea

driverforsocialtensionsandviolenceinsomecontexts,

especiallythosepronetoresource-basedconflicts.

AgoodexampleisdemonstratedintheKaseseand

ArualocationsofnorthernUganda.9Thesetwolocations

dependlargelyonrain-fedagricultureforboththeirfood

productionandincome-generationactivities.Asignificant

numberofinhabitantsfromthesetwolocationsrelyon

large tracks ofpastureand waterfor theirpastoralist

l ivelihoods. Empirical evidence from these regions

demonstrates that, over a period of time, continued

climatechange leadingto erraticrainfall hasnotonly

reducedtheavailablewaterforirrigatingfarmlands,but

hasalsohinderedtheexpansionofpasturesfortheanimal

keepers.Duringthedryseasons,pastoralistcommunities

havehadtoleadtheiranimalsintofarmlandsinsearchof

pastureapracticethathasledtoincreasedtensionsand

conflictsbetweenthefarmingandpastoralistgroups.

10

Competition over these scarce resources induced by

climatechangehas,insomecases,resultedinviolentand

destructiveconflict.

3.ClimateChange-inducedigration

A third dimension for investigating the cl imate

changeconflict nexusis that of migration. Statistics

revealthat,in2008,1.4billionoftheworldsinhabitants

indevelopingcountriesalonereliedonagriculturefor

theirfoodproductionandincomegeneration.Closeto

98%ofthesamegroupwereemployedintheagricultural

sector.11 Theclimatechange hazardsdescribed above

eitherleadtothedestructionoflandresourcesthrough

f looding or deserti f ication, on the one hand, and

shrinkageof available ecologicalresources likewater,

ontheother.Thishasadirectimpactonfoodproduction

and income-generation efforts, while also reducing

employment opportunities for themajority of people

livingindevelopingcountries.Increasedfoodshortages

UNPHOTO/JEFFREyFOxx


8/57

conflict trends I 7

andthereductionofemploymentopportunitiesasaresult

ofdiminishedfarm-basedactivitieshasbeenacauseand

sourceofrapidoutwardmigrationinAfrica.InGhana,

forexample,themovementofruralcommunitiesfrom

thedrierpartsofthenorthernregion,wheretherainsare

erratic,tothemoreecologicallystablesouth,hasbeen

arguedtobeathreattoexistingresourcesinthesouth

leadingtosocialtensionsandconflicts.

12

In-migrationduetoclimatechange-inducedfactorsisnowdrivingdebates

onclimatechangeconflictissues.Increasedmigration

generallymeans thatpopulated areas simply become

morepopulatedespeciallywhenthereisamovement

ofpeoplefromruralareastourbanareas.Theincreased

concentrationofpeopleleadstoincreasedcompetition,

bothfornaturalresourcesandforgovernmentassistance.

Figure2:FrameworkfortheAnalysisandUnder-

standingoftheClimateChangeConflictNexus.

Policyand

ResearchImplications

Thisarticlebeganby

arguingthatscientificandpolicy-relatedresearchneeds

toinvestindocumentingspecificcasesasevidence,to

demonstratethelinksbetweenclimatechangeandarmed

violence.Therelationshipneedstobegroundedonthe

systematicanalysisof trends andhowthese relate to

humanbehaviourandchoices.Theframeworkproposed

inFigure2isaframeworkofanalysisthatcouldguide

theworkofsuchresearchefforts.Whileunderstanding

that climate hazards provide useful evidence about

environmentalchange,investigatinghowthesehazards

influencehumanbehaviourintermsofpeopleschoices

andactionsinpursuitoftheirlivelihoodswillbecrucial.

Climate change, as discussedin this article, leadsto

environmental degradation, which has an impact onavailablenaturalresources.Competinglivelihoodsystems

incommunities especially those residing infragile

ecologicalsystemsaresubjectedtostiffcompetition,

leadingtosocialtensionsand,insomecases,violence.

Inotherincidences,environmentallyinducedmigration

be it by nomadic communities, farming groups or

displacedpeoplehascontributedtocompetitionover

shrinkingresourcesinhostcommunities,andisarecipe

for violence. Policy research should, therefore, focus

on providing empirical evidence around these three

cl imate change hazards as building blocks towards

understanding the climatechange

and conflict nexus. From a policy

perspective, investments geared

a t address ing c l ima te change

issues ought to integrate conflict-

sensitiveapproachestoresilienceor

adaptation,toensurethatconflict-

prevention measures become an

integralaspectofanyclimatechange

interventions.

WilliamTsumaistheProgramme

anager of lobal Partnershipfor the Prevention of Armed

Conflicts (PPAC) Preventive

Action and Human Security

Programs. He also coordinates

PPACsactivitiesinthesouthern

and wes te rn A fr ic a r eg io ns

respectively.Thisarticlerepresents

theviewsoftheauthoralone.

Endnotes1 Saferworld(2008)WaterandConflict:MakingWaterDelivery

Conflict-sensitiveinUganda,Availableat:.

2 LeTreut,HerveandSomerville,Richardetal.(2007).Historical

OverviewofClimateChange.InClimate Change 2007: The

Physical Science Basis.ContributionofWorkingGroupItothe

FourthAssessmentReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelon

ClimateChange.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

3 Christensen,JensHesselbjergandHewitson,Bruceetal.(2007)

RegionalClimateProjections.InClimate Change 2007:

The Physical Science Basis.ContributionofWorkingGroupIto

Climate

changehazards

destabilisetheusual

functioningofasocial-

ecologicalsystem.This

couldbeacountry,

regionorvillage.

Climate

change

naturalresource

scarcityand

conflict

Climate

change

induced

migrationand

conflict

Climate

change

environmental

degradationandconflict


9/57

8 I conflict trends8 I conflict trends

theFourthAssessmentReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelon

ClimateChange.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

4 Brzoska,Michael(2010)ClimateChangeasaDriverofSecurity

Policy.PaperpreparedforSGIR2010,heldon911September.

Stockholm:InstituteforPeaceResearchandSecurityPolicy.

5 Suhrke,Astri(1993)Pressure Points:Environmental Degradation,

Migration and Conflict.OccasionalPaperofProjectonEnvironmentalChangeandAcuteConflict.Washington,DC:

AmericanAcademyofArtsandSciences.

6 TheConservationDevelopmentCentre(CDC),theInternational

InstituteforSustainableDevelopment(IISD)andSaferworld

(2009)Climate Change and Conflict Lessons from Community

Conservancies in Northern Kenya.Nairobi,Winnipegand

London:CDC,IISDandSaferworld.

7 Walker,B.H.,Anderies,J.M.,Kinzig,A.P.andRyan,P.(2006)

ExploringResilienceinSocial-ecologicalSystemsThrough

ComparativeStudiesandTheoryDevelopment:Introductionto

theSpecialIssue.Ecology and Society,11(1),p.12.Availableat:

.

8 OxfamNovib(2010)The Right to a Sustainable Rural Livelihood:

Strategies, Lessons Learned and Actions (20082010).TheHague:

OxfamNovib.

9 Saferworld(2008),op.cit.

10 Pantuliano,SaraandPavanello,Sara(2009)Taking Drought into

Account: Addressing Chronic Vulnerability among Pastoralists in

the Horn and East Africa.HPGPolicyBrief,35.London:OverseasDevelopmentInstitute.

11 OxfamNovib(2010),op.cit.

12 Laube,Wolfram,Awo,MarthaandBenjaminSchraven(2008)

Erratic Rains and Erratic Markets: Environmental Change,

Economic Globalisation and the Expansion of Shallow

Groundwater Irrigation in West Africa.ZEFWorkingPaperSeries.

Bonn:CentreforDevelopmentResearch,UniversittBonn;and

Tsuma,W.(2010)Gold Mining in Ghana Actors, Alliances and

Power. Berlin:ZEFDevelopmentStudies.

Climatechange-inducedmigrationisasignificantconflictfactorinAfrica.Peoplemoveawayfromclimatechange

hazardstomoreecologicallystableareas,buttheincreasedconcentrationofpeopleleadstoincreasedcompetitionfor

resourcesandtensions.



10/57

conflict trends I 9

Asclimatechangehasmovedupthepoliticalagenda

overthelasttwodecades,therehasbeenaconcomitant

increase in the number of scientific exercises dealing

withenvironmentalandclimatesecurity.Onthebroader

issueofenvironmentalsecurity,therehasbeenagrowing

understandingofthewaysinwhichenvironmentalscarcity

maytriggerviolentconflict.Beforethisdebateregarding

theroleofenvironmentaldegradationandscarcityissues

inthecausationofconflictswasfullysettled,however,the

morespecificaspectofclimatechangecametothefore.The

phenomenonofclimatechangehassocio-economic,political

anddemographic(throughmigration)impacts,whichmany

fearwilllead toincreasedsocietaltensionsandviolent

conflict.

Thisarticlefocusesontheclimatechangeconflictnexus

intheHornofAfrica(HoA)aregionthathasexperienced

highconflictlevels,andisalsopronetoclimaticfluctuations

andnatural disasters. Arethe twophenomenacausally

linked? Will the impact of climate changeworsen the

prospectsforstabilityintheHoA?

Climate ConfliCts in the horn

of afriCa?

BymARCELLERoyANDFANAgEBRESENBET1

Above: Higher surface temperatures in Africa will

negativelyaffectagriculturalproductivityandeconomic

performance,therebyraisingtheincidenceofcivilunrest

andconflicts.



11/57

10 I conflict trends

TheFearofClimateConflicts

Theyear2007wasawatershedintermsofliteratureon

thesecurityaspectsof climatechange.Itwasinthisyear

thatboththeAfricanUnion(AU)andtheSecurityCouncil

oftheUnitedNations(UN)heldtheirfirst-everdebateson

thesecurityimplicationsofclimatechange.Thesentiment

duringtheAUdebatesisbestcapturedbythewordsofthe

Ugandanpresident,oweriMuseveni.Helabelledclimate

changeanact ofaggressionby thedevelopedworld

anddemandedcompensation.AtthedebateinNework,

theNamibianrepresentativetotheUN,KaireMbuende,

equatedthecontinuedemissionofgreenhousegasesbythe

developedworldwithlow-intensitybiologicalorchemical

warfare.Atthesamemeeting,MargaretBecket,former

UnitedKingdom(UK)ForeignSecretary,recognisedthatthe

consequences[ofclimatechange]reachtotheveryheartof

thesecurityagenda.2

Thesameyearalsosawthecommissioningofmajor

worksonthesecurityimplicationsofclimatechangebythe

GermanandUnitedStates(US)governments. 3TheGerman

studyfocusesonhowgovernanceandpoliticalsystemsare

expectedtobeaffectedbyclimatechange,andidentifies

fourpathwaysthroughwhichclimatechangeandconflict

riskmaybelinked:degradationoffreshwaterresources;

decliningfoodproduction;increasesinextremeweather

events;andenvironmentallyinducedmigration.Themilitary

officerscommissionedbytheUSDepartmentofDefence

contendthatprojectedclimatechangeposesaseriousrisk

toAmericasnationalsecurity4,simultaneouslystatingthat

securityimpactswillbemoresevereunderconditionsof

weakgovernance,hencelikelytoaffectthedevelopingworld

moreprofoundly.

Politicians and journalists often use more alarmist

languagewhenlinkingclimatechangeandconflict.In2007,

UNSecretary-GeneralBanKiMooncalledclimatechange

theculpritfortheDarfurcrisis.Followingthesamelineof

reasoning,FrenchpresidentNicolasSarkozywarned:Ifwe

keepgoingdownthispath,climatechangewillencourage

migration.TheDarfurcrisiswillbeonlyonecrisisamong

dozensofothers.5

IsThereEvidencetoLinkClimateChangetoConflict?

Globally, themost convincingwork linking climate

change and conflict is based ondata for thenorthern

hemisphere.Zhangetal. 6showedthatthefrequencyof

conflictbetween1400and1900wasconsiderablyhigherin

colderyears.ThisfindingappliesbothtowesternEurope

andtoChina,withtheincidenceofconflictsduringtheLittle


The loss ofhouseholdassets - inparticular, livestock- dueto droughts, has affected livelihoods and ledto

widespreadfamine.


12/57

Anarmedherderleadshisgoatsashelooksforpastureinadryregion.

conflict trends I 11

REUTERS/THEBIGGER

PICTURE

IceAgeinthefirsthalfofthe17 thcenturyinbothregions

beingaboutdoublethatformilderperiods.

A substantial body of qualitative research tries to

establish a link between climate change and conflict,

focusingonAfrica.7 Usingdifferentwarming scenarios,

theresearchersstudywhichconditionswillincreasethe

likelihoodand/ortheintensityofconflicts.Theyalsoattempt

toestablishpathwaysthroughwhichphysicalmanifestationsofclimatechangemayleadtovarioussocio-economicand

politicalimpacts and,if notmanagedwell,to violent

conflict.Theseresearcherscouldbecategorisedascautious

inlinkingclimatechangedirectlywithincreasedconflict.

Quantitativefindingsaboutthesecurityimplicationsof

climatechangeinAfricaarenotnumerousandarerather

contradictory.Burkeetal.8analysedhistoricaltemperature

and civilwar linkages and concluded that temperature

increases coincidedwitha higherincidenceof civilwar.

TheyexpectthathighersurfacetemperaturesinAfricawill

negativelyaffect agriculturalproductivity andeconomic

performance,therebyraisingthe incidenceofcivilunrest

andofconflicts.

HendrixandGlaserarguethatconflictismorelikelyif

climateactsasatrigger(asaresultofextremesinclimate

variability)ratherthanasaresultoflong-termtrends(climate

change).Theyarguethatlowrainfallinagivenseasonor

yearyieldsahigherprobabilityofcausingconflictinthe

followingyearthanacontinuouslydecreasingtrendover

decades.Severalauthorstrytoestablishmigrationinduced

throughclimate-affectedchangesintheenvironmentas

themainpathwaythroughwhichclimatechangeleadsto

conflict.However,othersreportratherdifferentfindings,

arguingthatclimatechangecannotexplainAfricascivilwars

andthatonthebasisofareviewofrainfalldataforseveraldecades climate changeisnot thecauseof theDarfur

crisis.9

ClimateChangeintheHornofAfrica

Livesandlivelihoodsin theHoAhavebeenseverely

affectedbydroughts,whichhaveledtowidespreadfamine,

oftenfannedbyill-conceivedsocio-economicpolicies.The

ensuinglossofhouseholdassetsinparticular,livestock

meansthathouseholdsfacedifficultiesinrebuildingtheir

livelihoodsevenafterconditionshaveimproved.

TheHoAishometosomeofAfricaspoorestpeople,and

isinhabitedbytheworldslargestremainingconcentration

ofpastoralists.TheHoAalsoexhibitsahighlevelofhuman

insecurity,havingwitnessednumerouscivilandcommunal

wars,aswellasseveralinterstatewarsnotablybetween

EthiopiaandSomalia(197778,1982)andbetweenEthiopia

andEritrea(19982002).


13/57


Areviewby theInstitutefor EnvironmentalSecurity

(IES)10notesthefollowingclimaticchangesintheHoAover

thepastfewdecades:highernight-timetemperatures;an

increaseinrainfallinthenorthernareasandadecrease

insouthernareas;andanincreaseinwetextremes,often

causingflooding.Overall,acontinuedriseintemperatures

isexpected,alongsideanincreaseinrainfall,morefrequent

extremeweather events and rising sea levels,putting

largenumbersincoastalstatesatriskfrominundationand

intensificationofstormsurges.

Theseclimatechangeswillfurtheraffectfoodsecurity.

Pastoralistsandsubsistencefarmers,whoareparticularly

vulnerable, are likely to formthe bulkof eco-migrants

intheHoA.Migrationhasbeenlinkedto anincreased

riskofconflict,asitoftenresultsinpeopleencroaching

ontothelandofothertribesorgroups,amplifyingsocial

tensions.Thelowleveloftechnologicaldevelopmentand

limitedinstitutionalcapacitywillfurtherlimittheregions

ability to adapt to climatechange, thereby amplifying

itsconsequences.

Some studieshave looked at the relation between

climateandtheincidenceofconflictamongpastoralists.One

suchstudy11foundthatviolentsocialconflicts(including

cattleraiding)inEastAfricaaremostcommoninwetyears.

Itisnotclear,however,whethersuchaconclusionadvances

explanationofthelinkbetweenclimatechangeandconflict,

ascattleraidingislinkedtocomplexsocialtraditionssuchas

thepaymentofdowrytotheparentsofaprospectivebride.

Thepracticeseemsmorerelatedtoresourcepredationthan

todesperation resulting fromresourcescarcity.Anotherstudy12,analysingdatafromtheConflictEarlyWarningand

ResponseMechanismoftheIntergovernmentalAuthority

onDevelopment(IGAD-CEWARN),foundthatvegetation

coverratherthanprecipitationisassociatedwithahigher

incidenceofcattleraidingintheKaramojaCluster,situated

intheborderzonesofKenya,Uganda,SudanandEthiopia.

Avoidingdetectionandalesserneedtowateranimalswhile

trackingthem to another destinationmayhave greater

explanatoryvaluethanthehigherrainfallitself.

Pastoralistsandsubsistencefarmers,whoareparticularlyvulnerabletoclimatechange,arelikelytoformthebulkof

eco-migrantsintheHornofAfrica.



14/57


IsClimateChangeattheHeartoftheDarfurConflict?

Given theamountof attentionwhichhas been paid

totheconflictinDarfurespeciallyinthemassmediaa

certainamountofsimplificationoftheissuecanbeexpected,

includingpositingadirectcausallinkwithclimatechange.

Inreality,however,thecausalityoftheDarfurconflictcan

bedisaggregatedintodifferentlevels:theperennialnatural

resource conflicts, linkedwith landandwaterresourcesandexacerbatedbyclimatechange;thestrugglebetween

thegovernmentandrebelgroupsoverpoliticalpowerand

wealth;andtheregionalcross-borderconflictsinvolving

neighbouringstates,inparticularChadandLibya.

AresearchprojectcarriedoutthroughtheUniversity

forPeaceAfricaProgrammehasfocusedonhowclimate

changeaswellas environmentalandresourcefactors

contribute toAfrican conflicts,with particularfocuson

Darfur.13OurownresearchagreeswithfindingsofDarfur-

basedacademicsandconclusionsofinternationalscholars

whohavespentmanyyearsdoingfieldworkinwestern

Sudan:whileclimatechangeandextremeweatherevents

mayhaveactedasariskmultiplier,theycannotprovidethe

soleexplanationfor thesharpincreaseinintensityofthe

conflictstartingin2003.

Blamingonlyclimatechangereducestheconflicttoaprocessoverwhichtheactorsonthegroundhavelittleor

nocontrol,virtuallyabsolvingthemofresponsibility.Sucha

stepisnotagenuineexplanation:blamingallproblemson

naturebelittleshumaningenuityandignorestheroleplayed

bysocialfactorsandpoliticalinterests.

Lack of development, coupled with the absence

of efficient naturalresourcemanagement, is themain

underlying cause of theDarfur crisis. Darfur andother

peripheralareashavebeenneglectedbytheGovernment

ofSudanfordecades,leadingtoenormousdifferencesin

incomelevelsandpoliticalinfluenceacrossthecountry.

Sudanese governing elites have promoted irrigation

schemeslocatedincentralSudanasawaytoboostfood

productionandtosupplycommoditiesforexport,neglecting

rain-fedagricultureandpastoralism,whichhadbeenthe

strengthofDarfurseconomy.

Climate,EnvironmentandovernanceinDarfur

Darfurhasexperiencedsevereclimaticshiftsoverrecent

decades. Reduced rainfall has turnedmarginal grazing

landintodesert,placingsignificantstressonthelivelihood

systemsoflocalgroups.InnorthernDarfur,a30%dropin

precipitationwasrecordedover80years.Thedroughtsof

197475and198485havealteredthediverseecological

featuresoftheregion.14

BothpastoralistsandfarmersinDarfurhavesufferedas

aresultofgovernmentfailuretoensureanadequatesupply

ofwater,andhavebecomemorevulnerabletodrought.Until

the1970s,westernSudanhadagoodshareofSudanstotal

numberofwaterworks,pondsandhafirs(excavatedwaterstoragetanks).Sincethen,lackofmaintenanceandfailure

toprovideadditionalwaterpointshassignificantlyreduced

thecapacityforwateringlivestockandforsustainingthe

human population. This has hampered the traditional

migrationpatternsofpastoralists:ifthenumberofwater

pointsisreduced,differentpopulationgroupsandlivestock

concentrate aroundthe remainingwater sources,which

leadstolocalisedenvironmentaldegradation,andpossibly

conflict.15

Competinglegalsystemsandinstitutionsareanother

aspectofthefailureofgovernance.InDarfur,traditional

mechanismsforaddressingresourceconflictshavebeen

supersededbyinstitutionsandlawsissuedundersuccessive

Sudaneseregimes.Likewise,land-usegrantsinaccordance

with customarylawwereissuedbytheSultanofDarfur

priorto1916,andremainedineffectaftertheterritorysincorporationinto Anglo-EgyptianSudan. This wasthe

hakura system,whichgovernsrightsfor accessto land

andbestowsresponsibilitiesformanagingit,ratherthan

grantingexclusiveuseorownership.Asaresultofdiverging

legislationissuedby post-independenceadministrations,

conflicting land-use claims have increased the level of

uncertaintyandtension.

Thestrugglebetweensedentaryfarmersandnomads,

whichhasoftenbeenadvancedasthemaincauseofthe

conflict,hadbeencontainedforcenturiesthroughtraditional

conflictmanagementmechanismsandestablished rules

for access to land and water. It is clear that climatic

variations,as wellas thegovernanceissuesmentioned

above, have affected the intensity of disagreements

over access to resources.Moreover, a quadrupling of

populationandlivestocknumbersoverthepast50years

placedgreat strainson existingland-use arrangements.

Asaresultofovergrazing,low-qualityfodderthatincluded

invasivespeciesbegantodominatewhich,inturn,ledto

intensificationoftheconflictasherderslackingsufficient

grazing resources beganto trespass onto thelands of

sedentary farmers. Simultaneously, there has been a

ATTHEDEBATEINNEWORK,THENAMIBIANREPRESENTATIVETOTHEUN,KAIRE

MBUENDE,EQUATED THE CONTINUEDEMISSIONOFGREENHOUSEGASESBTHE

DEVELOPEDWORLDWITHLOW-INTENSITBIOLOGICALORCHEMICALWARFARE


15/57



risingtendencyamongstfarmerstocultivatemorelandto

compensatefordecliningproductivity,thusreducingthe

availablestockoflandforgrazingandaffectingthecorridors

throughwhichnomadsmoveduringtheirannualnorth

southmigrations.

AdaptingtoClimateChangeintheHornofAfrica

While cl imate change is undeniable, i ts impact

throughoutAfricahas been uneven,with some regions

receivinglessrainfallwhileothersreceivemore.Continuing

shiftswilloccur,andthefuturemightnotdevelopalongthe

linesthatarecurrentlybeingpredicted.Itremainsimportant

tocarryoutrealitychecksandreviewadaptationstrategies

andplansonaregularbasis.

Thelinkbetweenclimatechangeandconflictsimilarly

needstobeapproachedwithcaution.Whileclimaticshifts

willstraindevelopmenteffortsandhumansecurityinthe

HoA,themannerinwhichtheseeffectsrelatetoconflict

risksneedstobeinvestigatedfurther.Governanceiscrucial.

Thegovernmentsabilitytomanageandregulateaccessto

naturalresourcescanprotectagainsttheill-effectsofclimate

changeandenvironmentaldegradation.Stronginstitutions

andleadershiplimittheconsequencesofconflict,drought

andfamine;weakgovernanceworsenstheoutcomes.

Theadaptivecapacitiesofcommunitiesin theSahel

andinsub-SaharanAfricatorespondtochangingclimatic

and ecological conditionshavebeenquite impressive.

Pastoralistshavebeenabletosurvivebymigratingover

ASudanesewomanfromtheahlivillageinthesouthernDarfurregioncollectsrainwatertobeusedfordrinking

andcooking.


16/57


wideareasandbyadaptinglivelihoodstrategies.However,

state borders, population increase and global climate

changeareposingnewchallengestotraditionaladaptation

mechanisms.Itisimportanttounderstandhowandtowhat

extent impactsof climatechange canbe absorbed, and

underwhatcircumstancestheyarelikelytoleadtostrains

thatcontributetoconflicts.

Development efforts in the HoA will have to takeaccountoftherisksresultingfromclimatechange.Policies

andprojectswillneedtobedesignedinsuchawaythat

theycaninstituteremedialmeasurestolimitthenegative

consequences of climate change. There is a growing

realisation about theneed for mainstreaming such an

approach intodevelopment policy.However, concerted

effortstoacquiretheunderstandinguponwhichtobase

policiestoreducethesecurityrisksofclimatechangein

Africaarejustgettingofftheground,suchasthroughthe

Africa,Climate Change and Security Dialogue Process

(ACCES),launchedinAddisAbabainOctober2010.16

Anychangepresentschallengesandoffersopportunities.Increasedtemperaturesandalteredpatternsofprecipitation

intheHoAwillfurthercomplicatefoodsecurityandsocial

stabilityinthepoorestpartofthecontinent.etclimate

changealsooffersanopportunitytorethinkdevelopment

policy and land use. Adapting agricultural production

should be the first priority. While climate wars are

ratherunlikelyintheHoA,domesticstressesresultingin

populationdisplacementmaycauseasubstantialamount

ofupheaval.Approachestolandusethatallowthebulkof

theruralpopulationtoimprovetheirlivingstandardswhile

stayingputsuchasthroughagro-forestryandshort-cycle

vegetableandfodderproductionwouldappeartobeafirst

lineofdefence.

Dr arcel Leroy is a Senior Researcher at the

UniversityforPeace(UPEACE)AfricaProgramme.

Fana ebresenbetis a Research Assistant at the

UPEACEAfricaProgramme.

Endnotes

1 TheauthorswishtothankMarianneChaumelandIslayMactaggartfortheirvaluablecommentsandassistancewiththe

manuscript.

2 Brown,O.,Hammill,A.andMcLeman,R.(2007)ClimateChange

astheNewSecurityThreat:ImplicationsforAfrica.International

Affairs,83(6),pp.11411154;andUNSCDPI,(2007)United

NationsSecurityCouncilHoldsFirstEverDebateonImpactof

ClimateChangeonPeace,Security,Hearingover50speakers,

Availableat:Accessedon:17July2007.

3 CenterforNavalAnalysis(CNA)(2007)NationalSecurity

andtheThreatofClimateChange,Availableat:Accessedon:26March2011.

4 Thecommissionedworkscanbeaccessedat.

5 BanKiMoonswordscanberetrievedfromthe15July2007

editionofThe Washington Post(Availableat:andthatofNicolasSarkozyfrom

AgenceFrance-Presse(AFP)(Availableat:.

6 Zhang,D.D.,Brecke,P.,Lee,H.F.,He,.andZhang,J.(2007)

GlobalClimateChange,War,andPopulationDeclineinRecent

HumanHistory.Proceedings of the National Academy of

Sciences,104(49).

7 SeeBrown,O.andCrawford,A.(2008)Assessing the Security

Implications of Climate Change for West Africa: Country Case

Studies of Ghana and Burkina Faso.IISD;Brown,O.,Hammill,A.

andMcLeman,R.(2007)op.cit.;Buhaug,H.,Gleditsch,N.P.and

Theisen,O.M.(2008)ImplicationsofClimateChangeforArmed

Conflict,Availableat:

Accessedon:26March2011.

8 Burke,M.B.,Miguel,E.,Satyanath,S.,Dykema,J.A.andLobell,

D.B.(2009)WarmingIncreasestheRiskofCivilWarinAfrica.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,106(49).

9 Thesourcesusedinthisparagraphare:Hendrix,C.andGlaser,

S.(2007)TrendsandTriggers:Climate,ClimateChangeand

CivilConflictinSub-SaharanAfrica.Political Geography,26(6),

pp.695715;formigration-relatedstudies,seeGleditsch,N.P.,

Nordas,R.andSalehyan,I.(2007) Climate Change and Conflict:

The Migration Link.CopingwithCrisisWorkingPaperSeries,

May2007;andReuveny,R.(2007)ClimateChange-induced

MigrationandViolentConflict. Political Geography,26(6),pp.

656673.Forworksarguingthatthereisnolinkbetweenclimate

changeandconflict,seeBuhaug,H.(2010)ClimateNottoBlame

forAfricanCivilWars.Proceedings of the National Academy

of Sciences,earlyedition;andKevane,M.andGray,L.(2008)

Darfur:RainfallandConflict.Environmental Research Letters,3.

10 VandeGiessen,E.(2011)HornofAfrica:EnvironmentalSecurity

Assessment,Availableat:Accessedon:26March2011.

11 Hendrix,C.andSalehyan,I.(2011)TheBrewingStorm?Climate

Change,Rainfall,andSocialConflictinAfrica,Availableat:

1299598361Accessedon:26March2011.

12 Meier,P.,Bond,D.andBond,J.(2007)EnvironmentalInfluences

onPastoralConflictintheHornofAfrica.Political Geography,26

(6),pp.716735.

13 Fortheprojectsconclusions,seeLeroy,M.(ed.)(2009)

Environment and Conflict in Africa: Reflections on Darfur.

UniversityforPeaceAfricaProgramme(alsoavailableat:

.The

projectwassupportedbytheBelgianMinistryofForeignAffairs.

14 UNEP(2007)Sudan:Post-conflictEnvironmentalAssessment,

Availableat:Accessedon:

26March2011.

15 ElZain,M.(2009)TheOriginsofCurrentConflicts:Rural

WaterProvisionandReshapingofHumanSettlementsand

EnvironmentalResourcesinWestSudan.InLeroy,M.(ed.)

Environment and Conflict in Africa: Reflections on Darfur.

UniversityforPeaceAfricaProgramme,pp.123160.

16 ACCES(2010)ClimateChangeandSecurityinAfrica:

VulnerabilityReport,Availableat:Accessedon:26March2011.


17/57


RiversandClimateChange

Water is a basic condition for life. It also playsa

fundamentalroleinhumandevelopment.Besidesdailyuse,

itiscrucialforagricultureandindustry.Inequalityofaccess

totheresourceaswellasitsmismanagementundermines

welfare,affectshumansecurityandcreatesriskofconflict.

Thus, waterscarcityis not limited to environment and

developmentconcern,ithasbecomepartofthepolitical

agendaandanimportantnationalsecurityissue.However,

inspiteofmanyattemptsinthepost-ColdWarperiod,the

globalwatercrisisremainsunresolvedandwatershortages

havethepotentialtothreatenglobalpeace,prosperityand

stability.AstheWorldWaterCouncilargues:Thiscrisishas

beenaggravatedbyfactorssuchasacceleratingpopulation

growth,increasinginequalities,nationalorregionalconflicts

andtheinfluenceofclimatechangeonthewatercycle.1

Approximately900millionpeoplealreadylivewithoutclean

drinkingwater,2.6billionpeoplelackadequatesanitation,

and2.2millionchildrendieeveryyearfromunsafewater

relateddiseases.2

transboundary rivers and ClimateChange: afriCan and asian rivers

ByASHoKSWAINANDFLoRIANKRAmPE

Above:TheKaribaDam,oneofthelargestintheworld,

isahydroelectricdamintheKaribaorgeoftheZambezi

RiverbasinbetweenZambiaandZimbabwe.

WHERE WATER IS BSS, THE LAND MST BE.Africanproverb

GETTyIMAGES


18/57


REUTERS/THE

BIGGERPICTURE

Theoriginsoftheglobalwatercrisisarewellknown

andarenotlimitedtoclimatefactorsalone.However,the

crisisisofsuchamagnitudethatitisgrowingintoanissue

ofcommonglobalconcern.Thisperspectiveputsthefocus

oninternationalrivers,asapproximatelyhalfoftheglobal

freshwaterisavailablefrom263internationalbasinsinthe

world:ofthem,59areinAfricaand57inAsia. 3About1400

millionpeopleinhabitriverbasinsthatsufferfromwater

stress,definedaslessthan1000m3/capita/year.4National

politicscomplicatepoliciestowardsenhancedriverbasin

managementofsharedrivers.Moreover,themanagement

ofinternationalriversindifferentpartsoftheworldcannot

followaparticulargoldenprinciple,asthevalueofwater,

itsdemandandsupplyvaryfromonebasintoanother.5The

existingknowledgeandinstitutionswehaverelatingtothe

governanceofinternationalriversareincreasinglyturning

volatile,duetotheincreaseddemandanddecreasedsupply

offreshwater.Furtheraddingtotheproblem,thethreatof

globalclimatechangehasstartedunderminingtheongoing

regimesandinstitutionsrelatingtowatersharingandthemanagementofinternationalrivers.6

While theexact impactof climate changeis notyet

known,itwill have clearbearinguponaccessto shared

waterresourcesasitaffectshydrologicalcyclesfromglobal

tolocallevels.Someregionswillbecomemuchdrier,some

wetter. Theincreasein theglobal surface temperature,

throughthegreenhouseeffect,isexpectedtoincreasethe

amountofwaterin theair.As aconsequence,droughts

willbecomemore frequent,withmore andmorewater

vaporisingfromthelandintotheair.Atthesametime,

thelargeramountofwaterintheairwillproducemore

intense,heavyprecipitationandtriggerfloods.Theresults

ofdroughtsandfloodswillcausetheresilienceofoldand

posenewregionalsecuritychallengestostates,particularly

inAfricaandAsia.

Duetomutualdependence,thewithdrawalorpollution

ofriverwaterofoneriparianstatecanpotentiallynotonly

leadtodisputes,butalsobringcooperationinthebasin.

Particularly in thelast twodecades,several competing

ripariancountriesinAsiaandAfricahavemovedtowards

establishing regimes and institutions for cooperation.

River-sharingagreementsfortheZambeziandNileriversin

AfricaandMekongandGangesriversinAsiaincreasedin

the1990s.However,theseagreementsarepresentlybeing

severelystressed,duetoincreasingdemandanddecreasing

supplyofwaterresources.Moreover,the threatofglobal

climatechangehasraisedseriousdoubtsaboutthefuture

oftheseagreements.Thisarticletakesamacro-comparative

perspectiveontransboundaryriverissuesinAfricaandAsia,

andoutlinesforeseeablechallengesfor regionalsecurity,

consideringtheimpactofclimatechange.

Droughts,whichdryupmajorriversandsharedwaterresources,areoneofthesignificantimpactsofclimatechange.


19/57


ajorTransboundaryRiverBasinsinAfricaandAsia

andRiparianRelations

Thegeneralclimatetrendsuggestsanincreaseinglobal

surfacetemperatures,but climatedataof thetwentieth

century shows that Africa is and will continuously be

warming faster than the global average. Scholars are

certain that therewill be nogeneralised, singleeffectof climate change/variability onAfrica, because of the

long geographical stretch of thecontinent. As per the

IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)findings,

tworegionalpatternsarelikelyforAfrica.Northernand

southernAfricawillbecomemuchhotter(minimumplus4C)

anddrier(about1020%lessrain).EasternandcentralAfrica

willexperienceincreasedrainfallbyabout15%.Ingeneral,

moreregionswilloftensufferfromdroughtsandfloods.

Consideringtheexpectationofmorefrequentdroughtsand

floods,theforecastofriverflowsandtheirinteractionwith

extremevariationsinprecipitationbecomescrucial.

Progress ing desert if ication through increased

vaporisationandchangingrainweatherpatternsarecause

forconcerninriparianstates,particularlyintheChadLake

Basin(Niger,Nigeria,Chad,CameroonandCentralAfrican

Republic);theZambeziBasin(Zambia,Angola,Zimbabwe,Malawi,Botswana,MozambiqueandNamibia);andtheNile

Basin(Rwanda,Burundi,Congo,Tanzania,Kenya,Uganda,

Eritrea,Ethiopia,SudanandEgypt).Therealeffectofclimate

changeontheflowofriversystemsinAfricaisapparently

unpredictable. Nevertheless, specialists estimate that,

indrierareas,adecreaseinrainfallby10%wouldhavea

severeeffectonriversystemsliketheZambeziandLimpopo

insouthernAfrica.TheZambeziRiverwillbeparticularly

vulnerableto climatechange, and alreadytodaycauses

IntheIndusBasin,despiteasignedwater-sharingagreementbetweenIndiaandPakistanin1960,waterisoneofthe

conflictissuesbetweentheseripariancountriesduetoincreasingwaterscarcityintheregion.

GETTyIMAGES


20/57


Waterpollution,fromindustrialdevelopmentalongmajorriversbyupperripariancountries,affectslowerriparian

statessignificantly.

contestation among its riparian countries, particularly

betweenZambiaandZimbabwe.TheNileBasinisconsidered

bymanyofhavinghighpotentialtoinducewaterconflictsin

theregion,duetoincreasingwaterdemandandtheunequal

distributionofwaterandpowerinthebasin.In1999,when

theWorldBankencouragedtheNileBasinstatestoformthe

NileBasinInitiative,therewashopeandexpectationthat

sharedwaterresourceswouldbringpeaceandcooperation

inthebasin.However,morethanadecadelater,thatdream

hasnotyetbeenrealised.Inthefaceofmountingpressure

fromupstreamcountries,EgyptandSudanareworkinghard

tomaintaintheirhistoricrightsovertheNilewater.Ethiopia

istryingeverythingpossibletocaptureitsshareoftheNile

water,whichhasbeendeniedtoitinthepastduetoitsown

politicalandeconomicweaknesses.

Amajorchallengetotransboundaryrivercooperationis

rootedinnationalpolitics.Thedirectandimmediatenational

securitychallengesfortheeconomyandthepopulationis

sacrificingbasin-basedcooperation.Agriculture,asthemajor

economicactivityinAfrica,willbemoreseverelyaffectedby

changingclimatethantheindustrialsectors.About60%of

employmentinAfricaisprovidedbytheagriculturalsector

and,inmanycountries,thissectoraccountsfor50%oftheir

grossdomesticproduct(GDP).7Theagriculturalsectoris

verysensitivetochangesinclimateespeciallytoshifting

rainfallpatterns.Someresearchersclaimthat,by2020,the

cropyieldinsomecountrieswillhavehalvedandagricultural

profitsdecreaseby90%.TheSahararegionisseenasmost

vulnerabletoagriculturallosses,whichareexpectedtolose

about27%ofitsGDP.WesternandcentralAfricawilllose

about24%ofoverallGDP,whiletheimpactonnorthernand

southernAfricaisanticipatedtobeabout0.4%to1.3%of

overallGDP.Somemodelssuggestadecreaseinsuitable

rain-fedlandforcrops,anda58%increaseinaridorsemi-

aridlandby2080.Itispredictedthat,consequently,wheat

productionwilldisappearfromAfricaandmaizeproduction

insouthernAfricawillbenotablyreduced.8

InAfrica, the scarcityofwaterresourceswillaffect

regionalsecurityandincreasepoliticaltensionsforemost

amongthesouthernAfricanandNileBasinstates.Thewater

scarcityofrain-fedriversinAfricasuchastheNile,Orange

andZambezi willaffect the agricultural sector, which

dominatesAfricaneconomies,particularlyseverely.Thiswill

leadtochallengesinfoodandwatersecurityintheregion.

GETTyIMAGES


21/57


Topre-empttheimpactonitspopulations,stateswillmost

likelysecuritisewaterandwilltrytoannexasmuchwater

aspossibleunilaterallyfromthesharedsources.Thissortof

watercapturepolicywillnotonlyharmtheexistingwater-

sharingagreements,itmightalsocreatenewconflictsover

waterissues.Duetoclimatechangechallenges,thescenario

ofwaterwarsinthenearfutureinpartsofAfricacannotbe

ruledout.

MostofAsiaishighlypopulatedandalsohousesalarger

numberoftheworldspoor.Inrecentyears,besidesthe

rapidlyincreasingpopulation,alargepartofthecontinent

isalsoexperiencingunprecedentedeconomicgrowth.The

impactsofglobalclimatechangearelikelytobeseverein

thenearfutureinmanyAsiancountries,wherepeopleare

highlydependentonnaturalresourcesfortheirlivelihoods.

Globalclimatechangepresentsseriousriskstotheaccessof

waterresourcesinsouthandsouth-eastAsia.Inparticular,

theimpactofclimatechangeonglacierswilldirectlyaffect

waterflowinmanyofthemajorinternationalriversintheseregions.IntheHimalayanBasin,duetotheincreasedrate

ofmeltingoftheglacialarea,thewaterflowinspringhas

increasedandwaterflowduringtheremainingseasons

especiallyduringsummerwhenitismostneededhas

decreased.ThesizeoftheHimalayanglaciershasdecreased

from 2 077square kilometresin 1962 to1 628 square

kilometres in 2007, an overall reduction of 21%.9 This

increasedrateinglaciermeltingmayaddtotherun-offof

theriversforsometimebut,atthesametime,itwillalso

bring moresnow avalanches andglacial lake outburst

floods(GLOFs)athighelevation.Thisphenomenonwillnot

onlyposeariskfortheexistingdamsandotherprojectsat

theupperreachesoftheriversystems,butwillalsomake

itdifficulttoplananyhydroprojectsinthefuture.Ifthe

presenttrendcontinues,riversoriginatingintheHimalayas

willsoonexperienceanincreaseinthefrequencyofspring

floodsandseriousflowreductioninthesummermonths.10

Climate change-inducedglaciermelting will impact

somemajorAsianriverbasinsinparticularsuchasthe

GangesBasin(Nepal,IndiaandBangladesh);theIndusBasin

(IndiaandPakistan);andtheMekongRiver(China,Burma,

Thailand,Laos,CambodiaandVietnam).Thequantityand

natureofrun-offis expectedto changesubstantially in

theseHimalayanriversasaresultofclimatechange.While

uncertainty remains regarding the accuracy of various

climatechangepredictions,forecastsindicatethatchanges

inclimatewillfurtherexacerbatetheexistingvariabilityof

waterflowintherivers.Changesinthespatialandtemporal

distributionofprecipitationandtemperatureareexpectedto

interactincomplexwaysthatchangetheequilibriumandattributesofrun-offthatreachestheserivers.

In theGangesBasin, climate change is expectedto

increasetemperatures,resultingintheretreatofglaciers;

increasedalterationintheprecipitationpattern,whichwill

resultinagreaterdegreeandrateofrecurrenceofdroughts

andfloods;andevenleadtoasea-levelrise.11Thereis

enoughwaterintheGangesRiverduringthewetseason

forbothmajorripariancountries(BangladeshandIndia)

nottoargueoverthewatersupply;instead,floodcontrol

istheirpriority.Duringthedryseason(Decemberthrough

May),thewatersupplydwindlesandduringthisperiod,ice

andsnowmeltfromtheHimalayasbecomescritical.Inthe

IndusBasin,waterisoneofthemainconflictissuesbetween

India andPakistan,with India securingwater resources

foritsgrowingmetropolisareas.Whileboththesehostile

neighbourshavesignedawater-sharingagreementonthe

Indusin1960duetoincreasingwaterscarcityintheregion

internaloppositioninbothcountriesisgrowingagainstthe

agreement.IslamicfundamentalistgroupsinPakistanhave

beenusingthewaterissuetomobilisetheirsupportbase

againstIndia.IntheMekongBasin,upperriparianChina

requireshugeamountsofwatertosupportitsimmense

economic growth.Thishassevereeffectsonthe lower

riparianstatesalongtheMekong,whichexperienceextreme

watervariabilitybecauseoftheconstructionofmajordamsontheChineseside.TheMekong,IndusandGangesarealso

experiencingseverefloodsthroughheavyrains,asseenin

2010.Atthesametime,waterpollutionthroughindustrialuse

isextremeandaffectsthelowerriparianstates.Increasing

uncertaintyover the availability ofwaterfrom rainfall,

riverrun-offandgroundwaterrechargeduetotheimpact

ofclimaticchangeposesaseriousthreattofoodsecurity

inAsia.Overall,themanagementofinternationalrivers

inAsiaisnotconducivetolong-termwatersustainability.

Due to climate change, increasing population growth

andgrowingeconomies, ripariancountries aretaking

andwilltakeunilateralactionstosecurewaterresources,

whilepotentiallydamagingtheriveraswellasrelations

betweenriparianstates.

ThesharingofinternationalriversinAsiainthefaceof

climatechangemightalsoleadtothesameregionalsecurity

tensionsasinAfrica,consideringAsiasneedtofeedits

largepopulation.Butsuchtensionsmightbenotofthesame

intensityasanticipatedforAfrica.Thereasonforthisisthat

theinternationalriverbasincountriesinAsiamaybeableto

adapttoclimatechangechallengesbetterthantheirAfrican

counterparts:

THE NILE BASIN IS CONSIDERED B

MAN OF HAVING HIGH POTENTIAL

TO INDUCE WATER CONFLICTS IN

THE REGION, DUE TO INCREASING

WATERDEMAND ANDTHEUNEQUAL

DISTRIBUTIONOFWATERANDPOWER

INTHEBASIN


22/57


1. ManycountriesinthesemajorAsianriverbasins,

particularlyChinaandIndia,aregraduallyshifting

theireconomicfocusfromtheagriculturalsectorto

theindustrialsector.Industryconsumesmuchless

waterthanagriculture.Thus,thiseconomicshift

mighthelpAsiancountriestoadaptbettertowater

scarcitychallenges.

2. Climate change raises the certain possibilityoflarge-scalevariationinthewaterflowofsharedriver

systems.Withthehelpoflargewaterdevelopment

projects,basincountriesmightbeabletoaddress

theserun-off variationsand uncertainty,at least

forsometime.MostAsiancountriesalsopossess

bettertechnologicalstrengthandlargerfinancial

capability tomeetthese climatechange-induced

watermanagementchallenges.

3. Climatechangeisrapidly emerging asacritical

issue inthe sharingof internationalriverwater

negotiationprocesses.ManylargeAsianriparian

countriespossesssufficientnumbersof qualified

diplomatstonegotiatesuccessfullycomplexclimate

changechallengesovertheirsharedwaterresources

comparedtoAfricanbasinstates,thusdecreasing

theirriskofviolentwaterconflicts.

AddressingClimateChangeChallenges

Withoutadoubt,AfricaandAsiastransboundaryriver

managementisadvancingtowardsuncertaintimeswiththe

increasingimpactofclimatechange.Tosustainanddevelop

theresourcethatsatisfiesabasicconditionoflifewillbethe

biggestchallengeforbasinstatesinthiscentury.Thekey

totransboundaryrivermanagementtowardscooperation

ratherthanconfrontationwillbethesmartgovernanceofnaturalresources,andhowpoliticsdealswithwaterissues

andemergingthreats.WhileAsiamightbeslightlymore

resourceful, itis likely toface thesamechallengesand

tensionsthatarealmostinevitableforAfrica.

Theexistingwater-sharingregimesinAfricaandAsiado

nothavethecapacitytoaddresstheemergingchallenges

that climate change wil l pose. Most of the ongoing

cooperationintheinternationalriverbasinsinAsiaand

Africaoriginatedfromtheactiveinvolvementofinternational

donoragencies.Manyoftheseinitiativesonlybarelysurvive

becauseofexternalhelpandassistance.Suchrelianceon

minimalexternalhelpaloneexposesthelackofinterest

ofthebasinstatesinAsiaandAfricaincreatingeffective

andsustainablemanagementofsharedriverresources.

Toaddresstheimminentproblemsoftheexistingwater

crisisandthemassivechangeintherun-offstructuredue

toclimatechangetheownershipand,mostimportantly,the

accountabilityoftransboundarywatermanagementmust

berestoredbacktothecountriesintheregions.Ofcourse,

theinternationalcommunityshouldnotstayoutofregional

water-sharingpoliticsentirely,butmuststarttoencourage

ripariancountriestofinddistinctemancipatoryapproaches

tobasin-basedrivermanagement.Theseapproachesshould

addresstheregionsuniquecultureandhistory,aswellas

theireconomicdisparityandecologicalsensitivities.

DrAshokSwainisaProfessorinPeaceandConflict

ResearchandtheDirectoroftheUppsalaCentrefor

SustainableDevelopmentatUppsalaUniversityin

Sweden.

Florian Krampe is a Doctoral student at the

DepartmentofPeaceandConflictResearch,anda

pre-DoctoralResearchFellowattheUppsalaCentre

forSustainableDevelopmentatUppsalaUniversity

inSweden.

Endnotes1 WorldWaterCouncil(2006)The Right to Water: From Concept to

Implementation.Marseilles:WorldWaterCouncil.

2 WHO(2010)N-Water Global Annual Assessment of Sanitationand Drinking-Water (GLAAS).Geneva:WHO.

3 UNEP(2002)Atlas of International Freshwater Agreements.

Nairobi:UnitedNationsPublications.

4 Arnell,N.W.(2004)ClimateChangeandGlobalWaterResources:

SRESEmissionsandSocio-economicScenarios. Global

Environmental Change,14,pp.3152.

5 Swain,A.(2004)Managing Water Conflict: Asia, Africa and the

Middle East.London:Routledge.

6 Drieschova,A.,Giordano,M.andFishhendler,I.(2009)

ClimateChange,InternationalCooperationandAdaptionin

TransboundaryWaterManagement.InAdger,W.N.,Lorenzoni,

I.andOBrien,K.(eds)Adapting to Climate Change: Threshold,

Values, Governance.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,pp.

384398;andGleick,P.(ed.)(2009)The World s Water 2008-2009.

London:IslandPress.

7 Collier,P.,Conway,G.andVenables,T.(2008)ClimateChange

andAfrica.xford Review of Economic Policy,24,pp.337353.

8 Boko,M.,Niang,I.,Nyong,A.andVogel,C.(2007)Africa.In

Parry,M.L.,Canziani,O.F.,Palutikof,J.P.,VanderLinden,P.J.and

Hanson,C.E.(eds)Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation

and Vulnerability.ContributionofWorkingGroupIItotheFourth

AssessmentReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimate

Change,2007.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

9 Kulkarni,A.V.,Bahuguna,I.M.,Rathore,B.P.,Singh,S.K.,

Randhawa,S.S.,Sood,R.K.andDhar,S.(2007)GlacialRetreatin

HimalayaUsingIndianRemoteSensingSatelliteData.Current

Science,92(1);andHosterman,H.R.,McCornick,P.G.,Kistin,

E.J.,Pant,A.,Sharma,B.andBharati,L.(2009)Water, Climate

Change and Adaption: Focus on the Ganges River Basin.Nicholas

InstituteforEnvironmentalPolicySolutionsWorkingPaper,

August2009.

10 Swain,A.(2010)EnvironmentandConflictinSouthAsia:Water-

sharingBetweenBangladeshandIndia. South Asian Journal,28,

pp.2734.

11 Cruz,R.V.,Harasawa,H.,Lal,M.,Wu,S.,Anokhin,.,Punsalmaa,

B.,Honda,.,Jafari,M.,Li,C.andNinh,N.H.(2007)Asia.In

Parry,M.L.,Canziani,O.F.,Palutikof,J.P.,VanderLinden,P.J.and

Hanson,C.E.(eds)Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation

and Vulnerability.ContributiontoWorkingGroupIItotheForth

AssessmentReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimate

Change.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,pp.469506.


23/57


Introduction

SouthAfricas3000kmcoastlineextendsfromNamibias

borderinthewesttoMozambiqueintheeast,andcomprises

diverseclimaticandbiodiversitypatterns.Thesenatural

endowmentshavefacilitatedcoastaldevelopmentintermsof

infrastructureandbusiness(industry,mining,ports,fisheries,

tourismandrealestate).SouthAfricaiscurrentlyemerging

asanimportantinvestordestinationwithanunparalleled

spatialfocusonthecoast,withmoredevelopmentimminent.

However,coastaldevelopmenttrendssuggestthatcoastal

areasarebeinglargelytransformedandthatthenatural

resourcebaseisbeingdegradedasaresult. 1Hence,the

coastisoftensubjecttoaplethoraofconflictingusergroups

competingforaccesstorelativelyunspoiledportionsofthe

coastline,butarefrequentlyalsoexposedtoecosystem

degradationand/orover-exploitation.

South Africa isalso diverse in terms of its socio-

economicandinstitutionalsettings,largelyreconstructed

intheaftermathofapartheid,whichdeniedthemajority

access to coastal resources and services. Apartheids

legacy hasleft sharplydivided socio-spatialpatternsof

developmentandunderdevelopmentalongthecoast,where

GETTyIMAGES

key soCial vulnerabilities to Climate

Change in south afriCas Coastal

Zones: the Potential for ConfliCtByFATHImAAHmED

Above:Coastaldevelopmenttrendsindicatethatcoastal

areasarebeingsignificantlytransformedandthenatural

resourcebaseisbeingdegradedasaresult.


24/57


GETTyIMAGES

themajoritymainlyblackAfricansremaintrappedinviciouscyclesofpovertyandenvironmentaldegradation.2

Hence,SouthAfricascoastalsocietyismarkedbyvaried

levelsofinequalities,whichsuggestthatdivergentlevelsof

socialvulnerabilitiesrequireconsiderationinclimatechange

dialogues.Intermsofitsinstitutionalsetting,restructuring

since 1994haswitnessedsignificant changes in policy

andlegislation,withspecificenvironmentalmanagement

mandatesandasignificantlyreviseddevelopmentagenda.

However,anundeniabletensionexistsbetweentheneedto

introduceenvironmentalissuesandconcernsintoplanning

anddecision-makingprocesses(oftenforthefirsttime),and

theneedtoacceleratedevelopmenttoaddresssignificantsocioeconomicneeds.3AsRobertsstates:Thistensionis

exacerbatedbythefactthatenvironmentalconcernsare

regardedasbeingoflesssignificancethandevelopment

prioritiesinSouthAfrica.4

Coastalpovertyisparticularlysevereinruralcoastal

areas(southernCape,EasternCapeandnorthernKwaZulu-

Natal),formerhomelandsandinformalsettlementswithin

cities.5AsituationanalysisconductedbytheUnitedNations

DevelopmentProgram(UNDP)in2006revealedthefollowing

onSouthAfrica:persistentlyhighunemploymentrate(29%);

poverty(34%subsistingonlessthanUS$2/day);largewealthdisparities(Ginicoefficientof0.59);highHIV/AIDSinfection

rates;adualformal/informaleconomy;lowskillsbaseand

wideurban/ruraldisparities.6Thecoastisahugecontributor

to the countrys gross domestic product (GDP). The

economicbenefitsthatSouthAfricansocietyderivesfrom

itscoastalecosystemsreflectcontributionsofanestimated

35%(R168billion)annuallytotheGDPfromdirectbenefits,

andafurther28%(R134billion)fromindirectbenefits.7

SouthAfricascoastalurbancentres(Durban,PortElizabeth,

CapeTownandRichardsBay)lendthemselvestoportsand

infrastructure,propertydevelopment,industry,tourismand

netin-migrationofjobseekers,andhaveasignificantroleinmeetingthebasicneedsandimprovingthewell-beingof

coastalcommunities,where40%ofthecountryspopulation

islocated.8However,GDPaloneisnotaneffectivemeasure

ofdevelopment.Itdoesnot,forexample,reflectsocialcosts

(healthproblemsresultingfromenvironmentaldegradation),

incomedistributionand thedestructionof ecosystems,

bornelargelybythepoor.

Climatechangeisnowanacceptedrealityandisbeing

incorporatedintopoliciesinSouthAfrica,albeitfocusing

largelyonmitigation(energyefficiency,powergeneration,

Coastalpovertyisparticularlysevereinruralcoastalareas.


25/57


sustainabletransport,andwastemanagement)ratherthan

adaptation.Whilemitigationisnecessary,SouthAfricas

coastlineisincreasinglypronetotherealitiesofclimate

changeimpacts includingsea level rise, severe storm

events,shorelineerosionandcoastalresourcedegradation,

which is linked to increasinghuman transformation of

the coastline.9 Without adaptation, there will be dire

consequencesforsocietyandtheeconomy,exacerbatingalreadyexistinginequalitiesand,ultimately,sustainability.

Competition for resources in the coastal zone and

divergentinstitutionalfactors,setagainstthebackdropof

climatechange,cantriggerandexacerbateconflictsover

naturalresources.10Attheirmostextreme,environmental

conflictscanescalateintoviolence,butoftenemergeas

nonviolent,yetdestructiveissuesthatimpedesocialequality

andsustainabledevelopment.11

SocialVulnerabilitiestoEcosystemChangeand

PotentialConflicts

BarnettandAdger12drawsignificantnegativefeedback

betweenincreasedhumandependenceonclimate-sensitive

formsofnaturalcapital(suchascoastalzones)asopposed

to economic and/or social capital,and exposure torisk

fromclimatechangeandtheabilitytoadapttochangesin

ecosystemgoodsandservices.CelliersandMackay 13link

therapidtransformationofSouthAfricascoastlinedirectly

tohumandependenceonthecoastsrelativelyuntapped

naturalcapital,thatis,thenaturalcoastalenvironment

[with]mostvaluableandmarketableassets.Theyassert

thatkeyeconomicsectorssuchasminingarebecoming

coastal dependent, and are severely exploiting and

degradingthenaturalresourcebase.Ecosystemdegradation

onacontinualandlong-termbasissuchaspoor-quality

water supply, energy overuse with dependence on

non-renewablesupplies,andevenpovertycouldincrease

societysinabilitytocopewithclimatechange.Manyaspects

ofsuchecosystemdegradationareapartoflifeforlarger

society.

Green14arguesthattechnicallanguageusedbyscience

tocommunicateadaptationislessaction-oriented,anda

middlegroundcanbefoundintheconceptofriskasamore

effectivecommunicationstrategy(riskofwhat?,riskto

whom?andriskwhen?)whenidentifyingvulnerability

to climate change.Green expands:Furthermore,risk

capturestheinherentlyuncertainnatureofthefuture,andis

widelygraspedbystakeholdersingovernment,theprivate

sectorandthepublic.15

Cartwright16statesthatdirectrisksfromtheimpactsof

climatechangearenotbornebythepoor,asthelegacyof

apartheidsspace-economywitnessesmuchofthecountrys

coastalpropertyundertheownershipofaffluentpeopleand

localauthorities.Thelocalauthoritiesexperiencerisk,either

directlyorindirectly,as:

Shoreline erosionis a realityof climate changeand

impactsSouthAfricascoastline.

COMPETITION FOR RESOURCES IN

THE COASTALZONE AND DIVERGENT

INSTITUTIONALFACTORS,SETAGAINST

THEBACKDROPOFCLIMATECHANGE,

CAN TRIGGER AND EACERBATE

CONFLICTSOVERNATURALRESOURCES

GETTyIMAGES


26/57


vulnerabilitytodirectphysicalimpacts,whichinvolves

risktoinfrastructure,amenities,propertyandlossof

humanlife,typicallymanifestingduringorinthehours

immediatelyafteranextremeevent;and

vulnerabi li ty to indirect impacts , resul ting from

biophysicalrisks,andsometimesastheresultofthe

biophysicalrisksonmarketsandgovernancewhich

includestourismlosses,thereallocationofthefiscustowardsdisaster relief at theexpense of planned

development,higherinsurancepremiumsforcostal

property,impactsonfisheriesandwithheldinvestment.

However,thevulnerabilityofthepoortoclimatechange

impacts(includingunderminingsecurity)manifestindirectly

through maladaptation, by way of access to housing,

insurance,mobilityandmigration,resourcedegradation

(particularly linkedto thequantityandqualityofwater)

andlosstolivelihoods.Thisisalldisproportionatelyborne

bypoorpeople.Green 17identifieswaterasSouthAfricas

keyadaptationchallengetoclimatechange,highlighting

thedetrimentalimpactscurrentlywitnessedwithwater:

flooding,shortagesleadingtopowercuts,interruptionsto

suppliersofkeyinputsandincreasesinstakeholderconflict.

Furthermore,detrimentalimpactsrelatingtowateralready

sufferedrepresent88%oftheSouthAfricanaverage,as

comparedto39%globally.18

Thecombination ofnon-climaticstressorsactingon

ecosystemssuchaspoverty,inequalitiesandinstitutional

weaknesses are significant in developing countries

particularlyonthepoorwithinthesecountriesandcould

heightensocialvulnerabilityandpotentialconflictunder

conditionsof climatechange.BarnettandAdger19draw

attention to theimminent interaction between climate

change,humansecurityandconflictbyintegratingthree

keyaspectsofresearchonthevulnerabilityoflocalplaces

andsocialgroupstoclimatechange,onlivelihoodsand

conflict, and therole of thestate in development and

peacemaking(seeTable1).Whattheauthorsfailtointegrate

arethegenderimplicationsofclimatechangeonsociety

andlivelihoods.Womeninsub-SaharanAfricahaveahigher

prevalenceofHIV/AIDSthanmen,and80%ofthe45million

refugeesarewomenandchildren.Inaddition,womenare

under-representedindecision-making,representtwo-thirds

oftheworldsilliterate,areincreasinglybecomingheads

ofhouseholdsandareoftenmoresubjectto violence.20

Womens situationsare often characterised bya lack of

fac ac cc Pc a ca ca c ac/xaca

Vulnerablelivelihoods Climatechangeislikelytohavewidespreadimpactsonwateravailabilityincoastalregionsand

foodsecurity,andcauseextremeeventsanddiseases.Impactsonlivelihoodswillbesignificant

amongstthepopulationwithhighresourcedependency,andinmoreenvironmentallyand

sociallymarginalisedareas.Someclimate-drivenimpactsarelong-termandchronic(declining

productivityofagriculturalland),whileothersareepisodic(floods).

Poverty

(relative/chronic/transitory)Poverty(particularlyrelativedeprivation)isaffectedbythespatialdifferentiationofclimate

impactsandthesensitivityofplacestothem.Climatechangemaydirectlyincreaseabsolute,

relativeandtransientpovertybyunderminingaccesstonaturalcapital.Itmayindirectlyincrease

povertythroughitseffectsonresourcesectorsandtheabilityofgovernmentstoprovidesocial

safetynets.Stressesfromclimatechangewilldifferentiallyaffectthosemadevulnerableby

political-economicprocesses.

Weakstates Theimpactsofclimatechangearelikelytoincreasethecostsofprovidingpublicinfrastructure

such aswater resources and services, andmay decrease government revenues, thereby

decreasinggovernmentcapacitiestoadaptandrespondtoclimatechange.

Migration Migration,inconjunctionwithpoliticallyinducedlossofsocio-economicopportunities,maybe

aresponseofpeoplewhoselivelihoodsareunderminedbyclimatechange,andmayincrease

theriskofconflictinhostcommunities.

Table1:TheRelationshipbetweenDeterminantsofHumanInsecurity,ConflictandClimateChange

Source:adaptedfromBarnettandAdger21

CLIMATE CHANGE IS NOW AN

ACCEPTED REALIT AND IS BEING

INCORPORATED INTO POLICIES IN

SOUTH AFRICA, ALBEIT FOCUSING

LARGEL ON MITIGATION (ENERGEFFICIENC, POWER GENERATION,

SUSTAINABLE TRANSPORT, AND

WASTEMANAGEMENT)RATHERTHAN

ADAPTATION


27/57


controlorownershipof,andaccessto,resourcesand,

hence,theyrepresentthemostvulnerableofthevulnerable.

Cumulatively,non-climaticstressorshavesensitised

climate change agendas from being perceived as an

environmental risk to becoming a growing threat todevelopmentandsustainability.Therelationshipbetween

thedeterminantsofhumaninsecurity,conflictandclimate

changehaveparticularsignificancetoSouthAfrica,which

isconstitutionallyarights-basedsocietyandalocalpartner

intheglobalcompactconcernedwithhumanrightsand

sustainability;forexample,thePlanofImplementationand

theUnitedNationsMillenniumDeclaration.Celliersand

MacKay22cautionthatthecurrentSouthAfricancoastal

socio-spatialstatusisunsustainable,wheredevelopment

forprogress(benefitsforall) anddevelopmentcausing

communalregression(benefittoaselectfewintheshort

term)arelikelytoaccrueimpactsforbothpresentand

futuregenerations.

AdaptationtoClimateChange

Adaptationreferstotheabilityofasystem(ecological,

social or economic) to respondto actual or expected

climate change impactsin order tomitigate potential

damagesand/orleverageopportunities.Itnecessitates

change in the processes, practices and structures

that perpetuate theproblems.Activities required for

the enhancement of adaptive capacity are essentially

equivalenttothosepromotingsustainabledevelopment,

including:23

EconomicwealthThereisawideperceptionthat

wealthycountries,withbettereconomicresources,are

betterpreparedtofitthecostsofadaptationtoclimate

changeimpacts and risksthan poorercountries.24

There is alsoevidence that poorer countriesanddisadvantaged groupswithin themare especially

vulnerabletodisasters.25

Technology Adaptive capacityis l ikely to vary,

dependingonavailabilityandaccesstotechnology

(warningsystems,protectivestructures,settlement

relocation)atvariouslevelsandinallsectors.26

InformationandskillsThereneedstobeadequate

capacityto respond to climatechange adaptation.

Skills enablepeople to diversify livelihoods and

options,therebyreducingtheir vulnerability.There

needstobecollaborationbetweenscienceandthe

economicsofclimatechangeinadaptationplanning,

andstakeholderparticipationisa requirement.The

awarenessandeducationofstakeholderstoimpacts

ofclimatechange,mitigationandadaptationiscrucial.

InfrastructureThepoorsitingofinfrastructurecan

contributetoimpactsofclimatechange,suchasthe

erectionofartificialstructurestocombatsea-levelrise

ortheplanningofdevelopmentinsensitivelocations.

Alackofnecessaryinfrastructuresuchasdrainage

canamplifyimpactssuchasflooding.Infrastructure

includesnaturalcapitalsuchasdunecordons,which

shouldbemaintainedtobufferimpactsofchange.

Furthermore, access to public infrastructure like

Waterisakeyadaptationchallengetoclimatechange.neofthesignificantdetrimentalimpactsthatisexperiencedin

SouthAfricascoastalareasisflooding.

GETTyIMAGES


28/57


UNPHOTO/BWOLFF

housingandtransportequipspeoplebettertoadapt

tochanges.

InstitutionsIngeneral,countrieswithwell-developed

social institutions tend to have greater adaptive

capacitythanthosewithlesseffectiveinstitutional

arrangements. TheSouthAfrican institutional and

policyenvironmentindicatesthatamiddleground

needs to be identifiedbetweenprioritisingeither

environment or development. Disclosure by

government,institutionsandsectorsoverthestate

ofnaturalresources,forexample,water,needstobe

evident.Thereis,furthermore,alackofdiscussion

onbusinessasastakeholderinclimatechange.By

contributingtoclimatechange,businessispartofthe

problemandalsopartofthesolution.Arecognition

oftheroleofbusinessasasourceoffinance,provider

ofsolutionsandthebearerofrisksisneeded.27

EquityEntitlementandaccesstoresourcesneedto

beequitablydistributed.Thebenefitsareimmediate

aswellaslongterm.

AccordingtoTheronandRossouw,28locallyapplicable

methodstomitigatetheimpactsofclimatechangehaveto

bedevelopedurgentlytoquantifyrealisticallytheimpacts

alongSouthAfricas coast.Furthermore, theauthors

statethatmitigationnecessitatesanunderstandingof

theadaptationoptionsavailabletoSouthAfricansociety,

whichisconsiderablydifferentfromfirstworldapproaches

andstilllargelyundefined.

29

Conclusion

South Africas coastal zones reflect characteristics

that define both their value and vulnerability, which

challengesthenotionofdisaggregatingtheroleofclimate

changefromotherenvironmental,socio-economicand

politicalfactors,ifat allpossible.Ecosystemsunderpin

socio-economicdevelopment;however,almostexclusive

relianceonecosystemsthataresubjecttoclimatechange

cancreaterisksfordevelopmentandexacerbateconflicts.

Thisarticleunderlinesthepremisethatwaterpresentsthe

biggestchallengetoclimatechangeadaptation.Green 30

underscores theneedto consider aspectssuchas the

geographyofwater,natureandsource,impactsonother

sectorsandstakeholders.Furthermore,whileasituation

analysisisreadilyavailable,thereexistsaresearchgap

onactualandperceivedvulnerabilitiestoclimatechange

impactsin theSouthAfrican coastalcontext, and this

requiresmoredetailedandcontext-specificresearch.

Adaptation strategies arelikelyto beimplemented

onlyiftheyareintegratedwithdecisionsthataddress

non-climaticstresses,andnecessitatetheinclusionofall

stakeholders.Burton31suggeststhefollowingfactorsfor

urgentaction-orientedadaptation:

Climatechangecannotbetotallyavoided. Anticipatoryandprecautionaryadaptationismore

effectiveandlesscostlythanlast-minute,emergency

adaptationorretrofitting.

Climatechangemaybemorerapidandpronounced

than current estimates suggest, and unexpected

eventsarepossible.

Immedia te benef its can be gained f rom bet ter

adaptationtoclimatevariabilityandextremes.

Immediate benefits can be gained by removing

maladaptivepoliciesandpractices.

Climatechangebringsopportunitiesaswellasthreats.

Futurebenefitscanresultfromclimatechange.

Withregardtothelastthreepointsabove(immediate

andfuturebenefits),althoughclimatechangeexacerbates

impacts,itmayunderscorethesignificanceofadaptation

enough andset the levelof ambitionhigherwithin

institutionsandthepublictohelpavoiddamagefromfar

morethanextremeclimateevents.Forexample,preparing

foraonce-in-100-yearseventmeansthatpeopleareready

foraonce-in-10-yearsevent.32

Climatechangeislikelytohavewidespreadimpactson

wateravailabilityandfoodsecurity,incoastalregions.


29/57


In order to endorsethe welfare andlivelihoodsof

thepoorest and most susceptible members of South

Africansocietyandmitigatepotentialconflicts,climate

adaptationstrategiescannotobviatefromaligningwith

equitygoalsforexample,byimprovingfoodsecurity

and improving access to safe water and healthcare.

Astrategyis,therefore,requiredthatwillenabletheuseof

coastalresourcestotakeplaceinamannerwhichisbothconstitutionallydemocraticandessential.

DrFathimaAhmedisaeographerwholecturesat

theSchoolofEnvironmentalSciences,Universityof

KwaZulu-NatalinSouthAfrica.

Endnotes1 Celliers,L.andMacKay,F.(2005)CoastlineforSale:TheReal

Coast?African Wildlife,59,Availableat:Accessedon:14October

2006.

2 May(1998);McCarthyetal.(1998)citedinGlavovic,B.and

Boonzaier,S.(2007)ConfrontingCoastalPoverty:Building

SustainableCoastalLivelihoodsinSouthAfrica, cean and

Coastal Management,50,pp.123.

3 Roberts,D.(2008)ThinkingGlobally,ActingLocally

InstitutionalizingClimateChangeattheLocalGovernment

LevelinDurban,SouthAfrica,Availableat:Accessedon:2March2011.

4 Ibid.

5 Glavovic,B.andBoonzaier,S.(2007)op.cit.

6 UNDP(2006)Country Programs and Related Matters, Draft

Country Program Document for South Africa (20072010),New

orkSecondRegularSession.Nework:UNDP.

7 DEAT(2000)The White Paper for Sustainable Coastal

Development in South Africa.Pretoria:GovernmentPrinter.

8 DEAT(2006)South African Environment utlook: A Report

on the State of the Environment Report,Chapter7.Pretoria:

DepartmentofEnvironmentalAffairsandTourism.

9 Cartwright,A.(2008)CoastalVulnerabilityintheContextof

ClimateChange:ASouthAfricanPerspective,Availableat:

Accessedon:2April2011.

10 Homer-Dixon(1994);Hellstrom(2001)citedinWhite,R.M.,

Fischer,A.,Marshall,K.,Travis,J.M.J.,Webb,T.J.,DiFalco,

S.,Redpath,S.M.andVanderWal,R.(2009)Developingan

IntegratedConceptualFrameworktoUnderstandBiodiversity

Conflicts.Land se Policy,26,pp.242253.

11 Woodroffeetal.(2005)citedinWhite,R.M.,Fischer,A.,

Marshall,K.,Travis,J.M.J.,Webb,T.J.,DiFalco,S.,Redpath,

S.M.andVanderWal,R(2009)op.cit.

12 Barnett,J.andAdger,W.N.(2007)ClimateChange,Human

SecurityandViolentConflict.Political Geography,26,pp.

639655.

13 Celliers,L.andMacKay,F.(2005)op.cit.

14 Green,V.(2011)TheSouthAfricanBusinessResponse

toClimateChangeMitigationandAdaptation.WIOMSA

Conference,23March2011,Mauritius.

15 Ibid.

16 Cartwright,A.(2008)op.cit.

17 Green,V.(2011)op.cit.

18 Ibid.

19 Barnett,J.andAdger,W.N.(2007)op.cit.

20 Murray,S.andStewart,M.(2002)Gender, Population and the

Environment: Finding Common Ground for Coastal Managers.

RhodeIsland,USA:Intercoast.

21 Barnett,J.andAdger,W.N.(2007)op.cit.

22 Celliers,L.andMacKay,F.(2005)op.cit.

23 Smit,B.,Pilifosova,O.,Burton,I.,Challenger,B.,Huq,S.,Klein,

R.,ohe,G.,Adger,N.,Downing,T.andHarvey,E.(2001)

AdaptationtoClimateChangeintheContextofSustainable

DevelopmentandEquity.InMcCarthy,J.J.,Canziani,O.,Leary,

N.A.,Dokken,D.J.andWhite,K.S.(eds) Climate Change 2001:

Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.Cambridge:Cambridge

UniversityPress,p.893.

24 Goklany(1995);Burton(1996)citedinSmit,B.,Pilifosova,O.,

Burton,I.,Challenger,B.,Huq,S.,Klein,R.,ohe,G.,Adger,N.,

Downing,T.andHarvey,E.(2001)op.cit.,p.896.

25 Banuri(1998);Munasinghe(2000)citedinSmit,B.,Pilifosova,

O.,Burton,I.,Challenger,B.,Huq,S.,Klein,R.,ohe,G.,Adger,N.,Downing,T.andHarvey,E.(2001)op.cit.,p.896.

26 Burton(1996)citedinSmit,B.,Pilifosova,O.,Burton,I.,

Challenger,B.,Huq,S.,Klein,R.,ohe,G.,Adger,N.,Downing,

T.andHarvey,E.(2001)op.cit.,p.896.


28 Theron,A.andRossouw,M.(2008)AnalysisofPotential

CoastalZoneClimateChangeImpactsandPossibleResponse

OptionsintheSouthernAfricanRegion,Availableat:Accessedon:2April2011.

29 Ibid.


31 Burton(1996)citedinSmit,B.,Pilifosova,O.,Burton,I.,Challenger,B.,Huq,S.,Klein,R.,ohe,G.,Adger,N.,Downing,

T.andHarvey,E.(2001)op.cit.,p.891.

32 Ibid.


30/57


Introduction

Whilescepticsandalarmistswastetimeoverwhether

humansareresponsibleforclimatechange,wehavebeen

presentedwithstrongevidencethatourworldwillexperience

arangeofpositiveandnegativeclimaticeffectswhichwill

affectthelivesofmillions.Someregionswillbecomedryer,

withmorerapiddesertification;otherswillgetwetterand

warmer,improvingconditionsandextendingplantingseasons.

Theeffectsof climatechange droughts, desertification,

precipitationchangesandotherweathereventsespecially

affectsocietieswherepeopledependontheenvironmentto

makealivingandwheretheylackthecapacitytocope,prevent

oradapttosuddenorslower,systematicchanges.InAfrica,

andespeciallysub-SaharanAfrica,wheretheenvironment

isthemainsourceoflivelihoodfor the poor, conflicts

relatedtotheenvironmentandothersocio-economicand

politicalfactors arecommon. Itis likely, therefore, that

additional environmentalstressfactorsbroughtaboutby

climatic changeswill exacerbateconflictsorlead tonew

ones.1Practitionersandpolicymakersinthefieldsofconflict

resolution,peacebuilding,developmentandadaptation,to

namea few,should thereforedevelopmeasuresto assist

Africancommunitiestopreventandmitigateenvironment

andotherrelatedconflictsandtocreateconditionsforstability

andpeace.

This article makes two arg

conflict trends 2011 2

Documents