conflict resolution in cyprus: the absence of committed leadership
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Conflict resolution in Cyprus: theabsence of committed leadershipRobert I. Rotberga Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University ,Cambridge , United StatesPublished online: 20 Apr 2013.
To cite this article: Robert I. Rotberg (2013) Conflict resolution in Cyprus: theabsence of committed leadership, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 19:1, 60-74, DOI:10.1080/11926422.2013.773550
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Conflict resolution in Cyprus: the absence of committed leadership
Robert I. Rotberg∗
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, United States
Keywords: Cyprus; mediation; leadership; negotiation; Canada; Turkey
Neither mediation nor negotiation works well in conflicts concerning nation-states when there islittle drive for a solution on the part of politically powerful persons. In the absence of such a com-mitment, and especially absent the kind of hot conflict between contending parties that mightcompel political commitment, it is extremely difficult to bridge differences between communitiesthat have long been established, set in their ways, and persuaded of the justice of their opposing per-spectives. Those are among the many obstacles to resolving the long-running political disagreementthat divides the island of Cyprus and its peoples. But foremost is the repetitive failure of leadership.
Canada, and other like-minded polities, could play a powerful role in (a) strengthening localleadership on both sides by holding workshops for nascent political leaders in Canada andCyprus, thus building political will among contenders, and (b) by stimulating a negotiated settle-ment in Cyprus (as a model for other intractable conflicts in small states) if it sponsored andhelped to facilitate a serious Track I.5 exercise along the lines described below. Indeed, giventhe inability of the United Nations (UN) to broker an effective meeting of the Cypriot politicalminds, Canada brings neutrality, objectivity, and distance to the Cypriot case. It also lacks anyprior involvement in Turkey’s candidacy for European Union membership. Legitimately,Canada could bring Greek-speaking and Turkish-speaking senior officials and politicianstogether to seek a mediated or negotiated solution to the Cypriot dilemma.
The forces of disarray
Cyprus, half the size of Connecticut, is an eastern Mediterranean island of considerable charmand immense character that has been contested for millennia, at critical moments by Ottomansand Venetians and now by descendants of the Greeks and Turks who settled the island before,during, and following Britain’s colonial suzerainty from 1878 to 1960. The majority of Greeks
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∗ Robert I. Rotberg is the Fulbright Research Chair in International Development at the Norman PatersonSchool of International Affairs (Fall 2012) and at the Balsillie School of International Affairs (Winter2013). He is President Emeritus of the World Peace Foundation and Founding Director of HarvardKennedy School s Program on Intrastate Conflict. He was President of Lafayette College, Academic Vice-Pre-sident of Tufts University, and Professor of Political Science and History at MIT. His most recent books areAfrica Emerges: Consummate Challenges, Abundant Opportunities (2013) and Transformative Political Lea-dership: Making a Difference in the Developing World (2012).Email: [email protected]
Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 2013Vol. 19, No. 1, 60–74, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2013.773550
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(now two-thirds to three-quarters of the total citizenry of the island) and Turks lived essentiallytogether under the colonial yoke, sharing a localized culture, a comingled education, a commonEnglish lingua franca and common law heritage, similar foods, and the vicissitudes of a smallisland where Turkish- and Greek-speaking Cypriots lived and worked together from one endof the island to the other.
In 1960, after five years of agitation by Greek Cypriots and mainland Greeks, and after vio-lence fomented by Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA), the National Organization ofCypriot Fighters, Britain opted for a strategic withdrawal from the island and granted indepen-dence to the Republic of Cyprus; a Greek Cypriot President (Archbishop Makarios III) and aTurkish Cypriot Vice-President were supposed to preside cooperatively over the future of theisland with Britain, Greece, and Turkey serving as guarantors of the post-colonial dispensation.The Turkish-speaking minority was given a veto over a range of crucial decisions as well.
Unhappily, this complicated method of safeguarding the rights and property of both islandcommunities worked imperfectly. Greek Cypriots harassed and dispossessed Turkish Cypriotsfrom time to time, especially from 1963. There were innumerable human rights violations,largely but not exclusively by the majority. Ethnic cleansing on the part of the majoritybecame a reality after 1964. The UN dispatched a small force to protect the Turkish speakersand to separate the contending sides in 1964. The guarantors failed to intervene.1
The realities of that period savagely pull Greek and Turkish Cypriots apart. Turkish Cypriotsremember how Makarios eroded provisions in the 1960 constitution that had been intended topreserve the communal rights of the minority. Abandoned Turkish Cypriot villages in westCyprus still testify to the ways in which Greek-speaking vigilantes hounded farmers from theirhomes in the 1960s.
The island’s peoples were more or less already separated (where once they had been inte-grated) when Nicos Sampson, a guerrilla fighter and publicist, forcibly ousted Makarios in1974 with help from a mainland Greece-backed military operation. The goal of the coup wasto end the “Turkish problem” once and for all and to unite Cyprus with Greece. This putschled, two weeks later, in July 1974, to what Greek Cypriots call a mainland Turkish invasion ofthe island (from the north) and what Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks call an interventionto protect “its” people and its southern flank. For this article it hardly matters whether the “inva-sion/intervention” was or was not justified by the Sampson coup. What matters is that after a fewweeks of fighting the much more powerful Turkish army easily captured and “occupied” a fullthird of Cyprus and, in time, set up a Turkish-backed Cypriot administration in the northernthird of the island, bisecting Nicosia (the traditional island capital) and accelerating a massivenorth-south, south-north population transfer of Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots from their ances-tral homes.
Since 1974, the island has been bifurcated, with the UN-administered Green Line separatingthe two sides and, until 2003, with almost no movement of indigenous peoples across the GreenLine. Since then, there has been increasingly free movement across the no longer obstructedGreen Line, but the two governments have remained: the Republic of Cyprus – a member ofthe European Union and internationally recognized – in the south, and the Turkish Republicof Northern Cyprus – unrecognized by any other state bar Turkey – in the north.
Track I.5
Aware of how little had been accomplished by mediators and negotiators by the mid-1990s, itwas ambitious (even foolhardy) to suppose that a private initiative could attempt to reconcileboth sides through a combined process of mediation and negotiation. Nevertheless, in the late1990s, the World Peace Foundation developed a variation of the Track II diplomacy initiatives
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that had been employed with mixed practical success but to academic acclaim in other conflictsfor many years.
For Cyprus, what was distinctive was the decision to move from a Track II discussion (mostoften composed of persons representative of both intellectual sides in a conflict but not close tothe real power configurations involved) to an innovative Track 1.5 arrangement, where the par-ticipants were each very close to the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot wielders of real politicalpower. The organizers of the meeting proposed that directly engaged and well-connected partici-pants would participate both more realistically and more forcefully in such proceedings but, moreso, they would also help to influence any ultimate resolution of the conflict through any standardTrack I negotiations. This shift from the powerless to the persons close to power made themediation effort much more robust and dynamic than a Track II exercise would have been.Additionally, instead of letting the participants dictate the subjects and contours of the discussion(the usual practice in Track II matters), in this case the initiative was consciously directed towarda practical and workable solution.
Most of the persons considered for membership in the Cyprus Working Group were experi-enced politically, close to the leadership on both sides of Cyprus, experienced in bicommunalactivities, and believed to be ready for the intensive Track I.5 dialogue that was envisaged bythe sponsor and the convener of the Group. A number had participated in a broad-rangingWorld Peace Foundation-convened discussion of Cypriot problems in 1998.2
The members who were finally convened as the Cyprus Working Group in 1999 includedpersons on the Greek Cypriot side who were intimate with President Glafkos Clerides and hisgovernment, and others who represented civil society. Two subsequently became ministers inthe Clerides government. Another was a serving MP from Clerides’ party and family. On theTurkish Cypriot side were several persons extremely close to President Rauf Denktash and hisgovernment, and several well-connected persons from civil society. Several reported directly toDenktash. Two had held ministerial positions in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.On both sides, the participants spanned the existing political spectrum, from right to left.
The political and economic context
At the time of the first meeting of the Group in 1999, Cyprus remained de facto partitioned.Although several international attempts to reunite the island had been launched since 1974,none had succeeded, not even the ambitious UN negotiations in 1992 based on then-Sec-retary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s ideas on a framework agreement for Cyprus.3 A succes-sion of UN and American emissaries had sought energetically but unavailingly to broker asustainable bargaining exercise between Clerides in the south and Denktash in the north. Justbefore the Group convened for the first time, Cyprus had become a candidate for membershipin the European Union, and accession negotiations had begun, irritating north Cyprus andTurkey. Clerides had also purchased but not yet taken delivery of missiles from Russia. Denktashhad meanwhile banned all bicommunal activities, making it impossible for the Group to meet onCyprus, even within the UN-administered border zone. Tensions were high, particularly sinceDenktash had begun demanding recognition for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus asa prior condition to negotiation and Clerides just as firmly had refused. The south was embar-going trade with the north and creating as many difficulties as possible for what it considereda usurping and illegal regime. The north was responding, tit for tat, to the best of its ability.
In 1999, north Cyprus consisted of about 38 per cent of the land area of the island and about18 per cent of the total population. Approximately 40–45 per cent of the population in the northconsisted of settlers from Anatolia. More than 35,000 Turkish troops remained in bases through-out the north. A few thousand Greek solders were present in the south. Indeed, by 1999, a
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surprising rapprochement between Greece and Turkey had warmed relations between the tra-ditional enemies, but had produced not even a tepid improvement on Cyprus. Relationsbetween north and south had probably reached their lowest point since 1974–1975.
Politically, the two sides of Cyprus were sharply opposed and at very different stages in thematurity of their democratic arrangements. Economically, the divergence in 1999 was demon-strably great, and that disparity was to grow. In 1999, Greek Cypriot annual per capita grossdomestic product (GDP) was five or six times greater than Turkish Cypriot annual percapita GDP, about $16,000 per head compared to $2900. The wars in Lebanon had benefitedSouth Cyprus. Greek Cyprus had made its beaches a tourist destination for northern Eur-opeans. Its open trade and receptivity to market-based answers had transformed andbrought unanticipated levels of wealth to the south. In great contrast, the northern entityhad been tied since 1974 to the Turkish lira, and had suffered the soaring rates of inflationexperienced by the mainland throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The north was also cut offfrom most trade relations, and was largely kept afloat by large loans from Ankara. It hadalso experienced a regular “brain drain” of its young professionals and entrepreneurs toLondon and Istanbul. Although Turkey often threatened to annex the Turkish Republic ofNorthern Cyprus, that was not a preferred option economically for most of the TurkishCypriot residents of the north. They had always enjoyed comparatively higher standards ofliving than inhabitants of the mainland.
Trust building
Given the official atmosphere of antagonism between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots andthe palpable fears that each had of the other side’s motives and assumptions, the tasks of theGroup, mutually conceived and arrived at after ample discussion and much facilitation, were:to build trust between members of opposing sides; to develop a common vision for the futureof an island that was conscious of but not intimidated by past and present realities; to suggestmethods of removing obstacles to high-level negotiations; to produce powerful ideas whichmight lead to creative solutions, and to find a way to reduce conditions of stalemate.
After an extensive amount of preparation, the Working Group held six multi-day meetings inEurope and the Middle East. To bolster continuity, those meetings were held twice or three timesa year for three years. Its facilitator was frequently in Cyprus conferring with participants and theirprincipals. He also functioned as a mediator. A key objective of the entire proceedings was to bringcohesion to the Group sufficient to develop recommendations for the Track I political leaderswhich could provide them with credible cover if and when they chose to reunite Cyprus.
The Group’s first meeting and part of its second meeting were devoted explicitly and con-sciously to trust building. (During the remaining four meetings, trust between both sides had reg-ularly to be nurtured and, if necessary, renewed. It could never, in this type of high-stakes TrackI.5 negotiation, be taken for granted.) Doing so meant seeking a common definition of the Cyprusproblem. That is, were there common aspirations and political, social, and economic goals whichcould be called mutual? Could the needs of the two sides and of individuals from the two com-munities be shared? Could their separate requirements for security, justice, equality, and powerbe reframed as a joint endeavor?
At the commencement of the meetings of the Group, it was evident that levels of communalmistrust (and mistrust of individual motives) were high. Greek Cypriots suspected that TurkishCypriots would use the quest for recognition or legitimacy to walk away from any island-widegovernment. Turkish Cypriots presumed that Greek Cypriots wanted to revert to pre-1974power arrangements. Both sides were divided by different definitions of equality, the GreekCypriots naturally wanting “one man, one vote” to prevail, Turkish Cypriots equally naturally
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wanting bimodal group equality to reign. Both sides blamed the other side for abuses in the past,with Turkish Cypriots refusing to be cast as helots ever again. Turkish Cypriots viewed GreekCypriot negotiations with the European Union as a dastardly underhanded maneuver. GreekCypriots could not forgive Turkish Cypriots for the conquest of 1974 and the refusal to returnGreek Cypriot-owned territory and property.
Guidelines and boundaries
The facilitator refused to permit speeches or too much accusatory denunciation. He ruled endless“blaming” out of order. He eschewed abstract philosophizing, preferring to focus on real issuescapable of being confronted realistically, in real time. He consciously refrained from definingpotential political compromises as confederal or federal, and tended to avoid equating sover-eignty, recognition, or other mantras with particular paths to a consensual resolution of theCyprus conflict. He consciously reframed the problem as one that need not be resolved by ortho-dox strategies, many of which had long been rejected by leaders on both sides. To assist in theattainment of that end, the organizers invited to the various meetings academic and practicalexperts on different kinds of political systems, electoral arrangements, economic possibilities,central banks, human rights, bicommunality, the European Union, the Northern Irish experi-ence, the South African transition, and so on. The experts were asked to educate the groupand to try to extend the array of realistic alternatives for a Cyprus settlement. The experts tookpart in group discussions from the first, and were especially effective in broadening theGroup’s collective appreciation of cross-communal trust building through creative reconfiguringof legislative and electoral requirements and expectations. The visitors showed how “federal” and“confederal” meant nothing in themselves, but precise variations and constructions could enableimaginative win-win solutions to Cypriot problems.
The Group gradually embraced the notion that differing approaches to realizing the goal ofreunification did not necessarily imply insincere motives on the part of their opponents. Theycame to appreciate that conflict resolution and an enduring peace for Cyprus would arriveonly as a result of a process of consensus building, not by conversions to another’s way of think-ing, nor by regressing to a common mean. They appreciated that neither side could hope toprevail, that one side could not fully achieve its goals without some significant assistance fromthe other and that a Cyprus permanently divided would be in the interests of no one. Theyneeded each other, and as the chemistry of working together seriously on common problemsof great moment fused personal relationships, so the Group as a whole, and individuals onboth sides, grew to respect and then to trust their sometime antagonists. Laboring side by sideto eradicate misperceptions and conquer miscommunications, and then to solve hitherto intract-able important problems, they forged strong cross-linguistic bonds.
Achieving a durable consensus
Although harmonious decision-making came later, if at all, by the end of the second meeting itwas evident that the Group was prepared to consider tough choices. Those tough choices wouldmean the abandonment of long and dearly held shibboleths about what each side could concedeto the other by way of settlement, and according to what time frame. At the second meeting, apossible basis of a potential new set of ideas for the governing of Cyprus was introduced,debated in plenary and then in smaller groups, and parsed into digestible questions. Forexample, who would legislate on behalf of whom? One of the strengths of the Americanfederal system is that elected representatives at the center act on behalf of local constituentsand voters. Who would the legislators of a settled Cyprus represent? Another question was:
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What kind of incentives could be created to meet the needs of the island, and of ethnic-only con-stituencies, simultaneously? What kinds of incentives could be devised to meet the not unreason-able personal aspirations of the leaders on both sides? Could moderation and centrist rather thannationalistic electoral appeals be encouraged?
The third and fourth meetings were devoted, with the help of specialists, to exploring a rangeof substantive outstanding structural and implementational questions, and then refining theoutline and details of what was to emerge as a broad consensus in favor of a tri-governmentalarrangement. For example, the Group learned that sovereignty was not indivisible, that itcould be delegated, and that there were horizontal and vertical methods of configuring sover-eignty. States could be recognized as states and governments recognized as governments; recog-nition generally, however, was a purely subjective political instrument, i.e., it was declaratory. Thevirtues and flaws of consociationalism were examined. An expert spoke favorably of the value ofconstructive ambiguity in recovering from long sustained ethnic insult. Another advised that billsof rights and impartial administration of the rule of law should, especially in a joint common lawterritory like Cyprus, or Cyprus within the European Union, prevent any repetition of the discri-minatory abuses of the past. An Israeli academic and engaged politician reminded the Group,finally, that mutual agreement on outcomes was critical; both sides should have consonantvisions and those visions should be spelled out (which appeared to contradict the proceduralnostrum of constructive ambiguity, but did not).
By the fourth meeting, it was generally accepted by the members of the Group that solving theCyprus problem in a sustainable manner could only be achieved by shifting from thinking about“us v. them” to thinking about “we and the whole.” They had successfully moved (for the mostpart) from nullifying the interests of the other side to satisfying those interests, and from helpingoneself first to helping the other side achieve mutually beneficial rewards. This is a key product ofany successful mediation.
A United States of Cyprus
In Jerusalem, at the fourth meeting, the Group’s vision of a Cyprus settlement, massaged, inter-rogated and mulled in New Hampshire and Ireland, finally jelled in a recognizable form. Its “phil-osophy of partnership” stated that:
[T]he two sides come together to build a United States of Cyprus (USC), a joint vision of a newCyprus that enhances the potential of the two political entities, offering both sides benefits for afuture together. The relationship between the two communities is based on the principles of politicalequality and partnership (of a Greek Cypriot state and a Turkish Cypriot state that are sovereign withrespect to their political structures and authority within their territory). The USC will consist of anisland-wide governmental structure and Turkish and Greek Cypriot states.4
“States” was specifically substituted for “entities.” But the word “autonomous,” as an adjectivebefore “states,” was withdrawn. The reasons were obvious, removing several sensitivities.
After much debate, it was informally (never formally) agreed that the United States of Cypruswould be responsible for multilevel legislative coordination, setting island-wide standards andregulations, and meeting international legal and political obligations. It would specifically beresponsible for foreign affairs, for granting citizenship, providing passports, and regulating immi-gration. The island-wide government would control defense, subject to international securityarrangements and the phasing out of foreign troops. The United States of Cyprus would adopta single currency and create a single central bank. The United States of Cyprus would writeand enforce a bill of rights modeled on the United States’ Bill of Rights, or adopt the European
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Convention on Human Rights as its own bill of rights. A United States of Cyprus supreme courtwould serve as an island-wide court of appeals and hear cases brought under the bill of rights. TheUnited States of Cyprus would set standards and regulate environmental matters and energymatters, and oversee environmental questions. There would be a common heritage policy, runfrom the center. The United States of Cyprus would develop a postal system and regulate tele-communications. Customs, fishing, open ship registry matters and shipping regulation wouldbe dealt with at the central level. So would civil aviation. This comprehensive blueprint wasforward-looking and imaginative.
The Group envisaged an island-wide budget, prepared by the executive branch and ratified bythe legislature. The United States of Cyprus’s revenue sources would include customs fees, ship-ping registry fees, and some form of limited income tax. Alternatively, the entities could tax exclu-sively and give a stated proportion of their tax revenues to the United States of Cyprus.
The Group talked about an executive branch that would consist of:
. Ceremonial co-presidents
. Ceremonial rotating presidents
. A ceremonial president and an executive prime minister
. Executive co-presidents
. Executive rotating presidents, or
. Executive presidents and prime ministers, rotating.
The rotational principle considered was a four-year term, with a rotation after two years.The legislature ultimately configured by the Group, after many iterations and much heated
argument, would consist of a 70–30 or 60–40 lower house of parliament, where legislationwould be initiated, and a 50–50 upper house of parliament which would modify acts passedby the lower house and also exercise some form of a veto. The lower house would be elected,either island-wide or separately from each entity. The upper house would either be elected,half from each community, or appointed by the leaders of the two entities. There was somefeeling that the legislators, and the presidents and prime ministers (or the co-presidents)should be elected island-wide, running as pairs, or (lower house legislators) from paired consti-tuencies. There was ample discussion of transferable voting, cross-voting, and weighted voting –even forms of preferential voting. Some such method was meant to make it impossible for GreekCypriot or Turkish Cypriot candidates to be elected without a measure (modest or substantial) ofsupport from the linguistic community opposite his/her own.
The Group, given the experience of the first Cyprus republic, was concerned to avoid dead-locks and gridlock. It therefore discussed complicated methods of achieving parliamentary con-sensus “at every stage,” and set out a series of prescriptions intended to avoid any breakdown ofthe central government. It was thought that members of the supreme court should be drawnequally from both entities, nominated by the United States of Cyprus president from a panelapproved by a judicial services commission and ratified by both houses of the parliament.
The United States of Cyprus would have its own buildings, its own territory, its own policeforce, and its own bureaucracy. It would function in Turkish, Greek, and English.
Rights of return and freedom of movement
The fourth and subsequent meetings also wrestled with the difficult right of return and associatedissues. In principle, there was widespread acceptance that all refugees were entitled to the right ofreturn. But, in practice, that right had to be regulated by the entity governments. Thus, the rightof return would, in practice but not in principle, be limited according to the absorptive capacity of
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each entity. “The public interest,” i.e., availability of schools and public structures, would be takeninto account. The right of return would also be a right which could only be exercised for a limitedperiod, perhaps one year from the time of final settlement. Moreover, the right would berestricted in practice to refugees or returnees who were born before some cutoff date, perhaps1964, 1974 or 1984. Compensation, presumably provided by the United States or the EuropeanUnion, would be offered instead of return in many if not most instances.
Freedom of movement was a given, and border controls would be relaxed and then removed.The Group identified four shared principles to govern the thorny and bitterly disputed issue
of territorial adjustment:
. There would be some territorial adjustment
. Preference should be given to territory with a high pre-1974 Greek Cypriot populationdensity
. The dislocation of Turkish Cypriots should be minimized
. The demography of the Turkish Cypriot entity should not be altered significantly.
Greek Cypriot members of the Group suggested that the transfer of generous allotments ofTurkish-controlled land to the other side could help balance Greek Cypriot refugee claims.There was some talk, but no agreement, on a set figure for territorial transfer. Five per cent ofthe Turkish-controlled territory was suggested, plus the obvious case of Varosha.
Stress and temporary dissensus
At the fifth meeting, which took place after the announcement that the UN would sponsor proxi-mity talks between Clerides and Denktash, there was significant backsliding by Greek Cypriotmembers of the Group. They accused the Turkish Cypriots of “taking” but not “giving,” ofdemanding concessions but acceding few. The Turkish Cypriots responded in kind. It is a prin-ciple of Track II diplomacy, and of conflict resolution generally, that when the external negotiat-ing climate is not particularly stressful, members of a negotiating group think more creatively.When there is stress – when personal responsibility for a product (the draft summary of pre-viously “agreed” principles prepared by the organizers on the basis of the Jerusalem discussions)and the dissemination of that product becomes possible – anxiety occurs.5 This heightenedanxiety is elevated still further when the participants’ closeness to real negotiations, and thestakes in those negotiations, comes to the fore.
The stress level was indeed high on both sides in Jordan, especially among Greek Cypriots,several of whom had new Track I as well as their accustomed Track II personas. As a result ofthe new hesitation that emerged in Jordan, the Group revised downward many of the consensusesthat had emerged in Jerusalem, especially jibing at the use of the word “state” to describe theTurkish Cypriot communal entity that would be part of the United States of Cyprus. However,the Group, and the Greek Cypriot component of it, did not disavow its earlier acceptance of aUnited States of Cyprus, nor of the array of responsibilities that had been allocated between theumbrella government and the other two. Indeed, after the newly aroused rancor had beenreduced, the Group went on effectively to ratify virtually all that had been “decided” in Jerusalem.
Historical clarification
Members of the Group in Jordan also advanced their discussion of how best to investigate andsettle disputes concerning the bitter events of the past. Issues of whom to blame for what, andon what bases the newly envisaged joint history books would be written, were to be decided,
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according to the Group, by a Historical Clarification Commission. The group rejected the SouthAfrican model – a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. They thought that “truth” would bedifficult to ascertain, and that holding public hearings when so many “victims” had died would bedifficult and capable of unnecessarily opening up old wounds. So the Group favored a joint exer-cise, with members appointed by the United States of Cyprus president from among the ranks ofsages, historians, and jurists, to sift the past and apportion responsibility. The establishment of aHistorical Clarification Commission would be, in and of itself, a confidence building measure.Ideally, it would bring closure to the wounds of both sides and encourage members of both com-munities to acknowledge responsibility and apologize. Exceptional cases worthy of compensationwould be identified.
Negotiating and euphoria
Twenty months later, on the immediate heels of the sudden rapprochement between Clerides andDenktash, and with the perceived likelihood at long last of a face-to-face Track I negotiating pro-gress, the Cyprus Study Group was able to conclude its own Track I.5 negotiations in a pro-nounced atmosphere of mutual bonhomie. The Group returned to Jerusalem in mind andspirit, and with little dissent re-accepted and updated its preferred sketch of a final settlement.That is, the United States of Cyprus would have the powers and configuration advancedearlier, although this time there was greater and better informed discussion of how best toelect a lower house of parliament responsive to island-wide, not communal, needs. Drawingvotes from both communities had a distinct appeal, although the precise percentages and mech-anisms were left to later expert evaluation. Likewise, the Group welcomed the idea that prospec-tive legislators and presidents could run as linguistic pairs. There was an earnest desire amongnearly all members of the Group to recreate a single Cyprus, and thus to foster moderateinstead of extreme candidates for United States of Cyprus office.
The members of the Group reiterated their separate concerns and their mutual accommo-dation of Turkish Cypriot fears regarding rights of return, freedom of movement, and territorialexchange. However, they strengthened their acceptance of the principles and practices alreadydiscussed. They made an important new suggestion, too: that the leaders of both sides shouldappoint a special commission to gather factual details about numbers of returnees and refugees,numbers of contested properties and dunums, and so on before making final decisions on theright of return and territorial exchange questions. At its final meeting, the Group further ratifiedthe Historical Clarification Commission idea anew.
Security
Although discussed in earlier meetings, the Group’s approach to security and security guaranteesat the sixth meeting was newly focused. Almost all of the Turkish Cypriots not only accepted butfavored the demilitarization of the island and the staged withdrawal of troops. The entire Group,with one possible exception, was favorably disposed to the positioning of the North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO) as a guarantor (in place of Britain) and, indeed, was open to thepossibility that NATO contingents might be stationed on Cyprus to protect both communities.
The Group strongly favored measures that would improve the economic opportunities of thosewho lived in the north. They wanted the Greek Cypriot government to begin assisting the northeconomically, as well as to begin to remove obstacles to development. All members of theGroup looked forward to the day, preferably in the near future, when Turkish Cypriots wouldjoin Greek Cypriots in negotiating an accession to the European Union for the entire island.
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The Group endorsed the notion that the United States of Cyprus government should have aministry of rapprochement to sponsor bicommunal confidence building measures and to helpbroker an atmosphere of enduring mutual respect.
Confidence building
With enthusiasm, the Group recommended a host of confidence building measures, the moststriking of which was the first:
. Switch Cypriot currency on both sides to the euro.
. Facilitate joint, publicized visits by officials of Turkey and Greece to both sides of Cyprus.
. Facilitate the European Union ambassador’s travel between both sides of the island.
. Reduce troops bilaterally. (One suggestion was that Turkish troops should begin leaving atthe rate of 2000 a month.)
. Invest in the north Cyprus economy.
. Avoid offensive symbols by removing controversial flags and posters from prominentlocations and replacing them with more neutral tourist posters.
. Lift the travel embargo to the north (which might involve circumventing existing travelregulations).
. Ease restrictions on tourists so that they could travel more easily to both sides of the island.
. Improve mutual infrastructure – hospitals, insurance, schools, postage, airports.
. Increase mutual use of airports.
. Make a statement about the development of mutual intelligibility of languages, andpromise to introduce the teaching of other languages (English, Turkish, Greek) in theschools on both sides.
. Create a cross-communal public television station.
. Create bicommunal school projects, youth camps, cultural festivals, concerts, academic lec-tures, and sports activities.
. Facilitate home visits to either side.
. Create a committee to design a new United States of Cyprus flag.
Greek Cypriots suggested several ways in which Clerides could promote confidence in thenorth:
. Invest, promise, and provide economic aid to the north.
. Recommend that the European Union adopt Turkish as an official language.
. Recommend that Cyprus and Greece promote Turkey’s accession to the European Union.
. Allow Turkish Cypriots to become European citizens automatically when Cyprus joins theEuropean Union.
. Give Turkish Cypriots the same children’s benefits that Greek Cypriots receive (1500Cyprus pounds per year). Use the 1960 constitution’s institutions, such as municipalities,to work out issues and problems that cannot be dealt with by the face-to-face negotiations.
Turkish Cypriots suggested several ways in which Denktash could promote confidence in thesouth:
. Publicly demonstrate a determination to solve the Cyprus problem and a commitment to aunited island.
. Support bicommunal activities.
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. Attempt to determine the fate of those who went missing on both sides. Create a memorialfor all who lost their lives in the conflict.
. Promise that the Turkish forces would eventually leave Cyprus.
. Allow Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north more freedom to travel, establishschools, etc.
. Accept in principle the right of return of Greek Cypriot refugees.
. Express empathy for Greek Cypriot security concerns.
. Encourage European Union negotiations, and find a way for northern Cyprus to play a rolein them.
Method
By building trust in standard ways, but by focusing a group’s efforts on specific real issues (notabstract ones), the Cyprus Study Group functioned with greater efficacy than many other similarmediation efforts. The careful composition of the Group, and the high-level and engaged qualityof its participants, was directly related to its success. So was the facilitator’s insistence onforward-looking thinking; wallowing in past differences is always unhelpful. The facilitator alsoreframed a number of issues to encourage innovative problem solving. He kept pushing theGroup to be more and more creative. He was unwilling to settle for good feelings and limited accom-plishments. The mutual striving for serious solutions to serious problems enhanced the credibility ofthe process, and gave it legitimacy inside the Group and, as it developed, outside the Group as well.
Reporting back to the Group after each meeting was helpful in summarizing accomplish-ments and readying the Group for its next move forward. Also helpful in the beginning wasthe decision to meet as continuously as possible – every two months in the beginning.Keeping in touch with the members, and visiting both sides of Cyprus during the long hiatusbetween meetings five and six, was also constructive.
Results
The operations and conclusions of the Group’s energetic Track I.5 methods demonstrated that ahigh-level assembly of involved, concerned, and experienced Cypriots, encouraged, chided, andguided by an impartial facilitator concerned not only to build trust and nurture good feeling, butalso to produce a workable set of ideas that could influence civil society and to guide eventualTrack I negotiations, in fact could develop new concepts and forge a usable consensus. TheCyprus Study Group successfully thought “out of the box” in creative ways, and showed thatCypriots from both sides could come together to invent and advance a governmental formulacapable of bridging the existing divide between north and south. The Group did not producethe solution, but it did produce a fully developed package of plausible solutions to real issues.
Perhaps the best testimony to the success of the Group and the methods employed is thatseveral of the ideas and definitions developed by the Group became the coin of common currencyon the island. The Group came to believe that a creative settlement of the Cyprus problem wasplausible.
The Annan Plan
The Group was optimistic because its discussions had, by chance, paralleled in time and content asubstantial Track I UN effort. Tabled in early 2003, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s 192-page“Basis for a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem” provided a carefully developed, fully
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integrated program for the reunification of the contested island.6 It had developed out of a call byAnnan in 1997 for serious talks between north and south to end Cyprus’ partition. In 1999, the G-8 also urged serious negotiations on both parties.
Annan assigned the bundle of demands and counter-demands that was the Cyprus conflict toUN Undersecretary-General Alvaro de Soto, a Peruvian diplomat and multi-year UN official withexperience in El Salvador and Burma. By early 2000, de Soto’s careful invigilations of the problemand of Clerides and Denktash were translated into proximity talks and, later, face-to-face talks.These meetings under de Soto’s guidance became serious, however, only in 2002 (when theCyprus Study Group was beginning to conclude its own efforts).
Throughout 2002, Denktash and Clerides and their aides, and de Soto and his team,met in Cyprus three times each week. By August, however, it was clear that the principalswould talk around the subject until a document was set before them. De Soto, on behalf ofAnnan, tabled the initial version of his “Basis for a Comprehensive Settlement.” But by then,Republic of Cyprus presidential elections had been scheduled for February 2003 and talkswith the European Union regarding Turkey’s accession had been scheduled for December2002. In December 2002, as well, the European Union was poised to invite Cyprus intothe European Union.
By the time that a final draft of the Settlement was ready in 2003, Tassos Papadopoulos hadreplaced Clerides as the president of Cyprus, probably because voters feared a settlement favor-able to North Cyprus. Papadopoulos could have taken a political plunge in the subsequent SouthCyprus referendum vote on the Annan Plan, urging Cypriots to endorse the Plan, but by thenGreek-speaking Cypriots had perceived the Plan as giving too many concessions to NorthCyprus. Although de Soto had bent over backwards in the final drafting to assuage the fears ofthe north, especially an intransigent Denktash, it was the voters of the south who in 2004 scuttledthe Plan and all of the UN’s extraordinary constitutional innovations (many of which paralleledthose invented by the Study Group).7
The Cypriot stalemate
The optimism of the members of the Group was misplaced. A solution to Cyprus’ long enduredpartition is still distant, largely because political leadership within the island has been plagued byunexpected periods of temporal asymmetry. When a Greek-speaking leader was ready to commit,a Turkish-speaking leader was not. When, at last, a Turkish-speaking leader was ready, the Greekspeakers were elsewhere.
Mediating conflict resolution in Cyprus has always been difficult for a number of distinctivereasons:
(1) Since the 1970s, conflict in Cyprus has rarely been hotter than tepid. Aside from a handfulof long-ago episodes, guerilla combat has been absent. Insurgents have hardly ever been in thefield. Greek-speaking Cypriots and their government have never seriously tried to take backthe north by force; a standing contingent in the north of Turkish soldiers numbering between30,000 and 40,000 has proved a stable deterrent. Without an ongoing hot conflict to preventor mediate, neither side to the Cyprus dispute has been compelled or strongly persuaded to nego-tiate seriously enough to abandon or modify fundamental beliefs or objectives. De facto partition-ing of the island has worked well enough.
(2) Under the de facto partition that has existed from the 1970s and 1980s, both sides ofCyprus govern themselves fully. Once the Republic of Cyprus entered the European Union in2003, it had even less national interest than before in uniting with the Turkish Republic of North-ern Cyprus on any terms that would compromise its sovereignty. By incorporating the north,
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South Cyprus would (from its point of view) regain its own territory, restore national pride, rightgrievous wrongs, and justify its moral stance of decades.
(3) The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus functions perfectly adequately in its smallerpart of the island despite not being inside the European Union or recognized by any nationbar Turkey, its patron and protector. However, until the 2009–2013 (and continuing) economicdownward spiral in the European Union, and especially in Greece, South Cyprus’ GDP per capitawas substantially more than that of North Cyprus. Thus, a major incentive for northerners tomodify the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and accept some joint political relationshipwith the south was for long nakedly economic. By rejoining the Republic of Cyprus, the inhabi-tants of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus would gain access to the European Union andthe chance of seeing per capita incomes rise. Moreover, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cypruswould then be able to attract international investment and tourism on a scale that is todayimpossible. Many political leaders within the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus no longerdesire to be global outcasts; many wish to return fully to the European and global system towhich they always belonged. There is a large faction within Turkish Republic of NorthernCyprus politics that is much more progressive and engaged than the leaders of modernTurkey. For many, Turkish protection and patronage have also been a constraint.
(4) South Cyprus seeks to regain control over the entire island. In international law, theRepublic of Cyprus still consists of the entire island. The Republic of Cyprus, its politicalleaders, and its people (according to opinion polls) all believe that the Turkish military invasionof 1974 was illegal and has led to the illegal occupation of their territory.
Of the total population of the island, about 1.2 million, a solid 862,000 live in South Cyprus,nearly all speaking Greek (and English); these numbers mean to Greek Cypriots that they are suf-ficiently numerous legitimately to rule the entire island.
(5) Many residents of South Cyprus lost their homes in what is now North Cyprus when theTurkish army invaded and population transfers began. Notionally, South Cypriots want theirproperties back, or appropriate compensation. Likewise, many Turkish Cypriots fled or were for-cibly evicted from their homes in South Cyprus and had to make new lives in the north after 1974.They want restoration or compensation as well.
(6) Because of the many physical persecutions of the 1960s by Greek Cypriots against TurkishCypriots, the discrimination against Turkish speakers that accompanied the breakdown of lawand order in the 1960s and early 1970s, and the failure of the political safeguards that were explicitin the 1960 constitution that created the Republic of Cyprus, Turkish-speaking Cypriots havelittle trust in any political guarantees that might be set forth in a brokered re-uniting of theisland under straight majority rule (by Greek Cypriots) or according to a clever arrangementthat would modify that majority rule but still lead to the political pre-eminence in a reunited,democratic Cyprus of Greek Cypriots with more voters.
(7) Negotiations to end the partition of Cyprus have, because of the above factors, alwaysfoundered on the shoals of power. The Republic of Cyprus seeks power over the entire island,regarding such power as justice restored. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus refuses togive up the power that it now has to pursue its own destiny in safety and security. TheTurkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has in recent decades advocated a bicommunal federationcomposed of equal halves joining together to govern the island. The Republic of Cyprus hasaccepted such a formula, but wants the half with the larger population to exert de factor politicalpower commensurate with its numbers.
(8) Given this so-far-intractable stalemate, the two presidents talking together and a raft ofUN mediators have often been able to reach agreement on a number of important but subsidiaryissues (such as population return, compensation, redrawing borders, and so on) but not on the
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fundamental issue of wielding hard power. Who ultimately controls Cyprus is the massive rockagainst which successive ships of international state have crashed time and again.
(9) Until 2012, the Republic of Cyprus was prosperous. In 2012, the mainland Greek melt-down saddled Cypriot banks with depreciated and depreciating Greek sovereign bonds, leadingto a serious fiscal crisis and to the probable need for an International Monetary Fund (IMF)or a European Union bailout of Cypriot banks. Russian loans to the Republic of Cyprus tempor-arily staved off this necessity, but in 2013 a European bailout of Cyprus and its effectively insol-vent banks was initially rejected by Cypriot legislators, leading to compromise terms dictated bythe European Union. Given these unexpected and unwitting developments, the political climatein the Republic of Cyprus in 2013 is even more febrile and perilous than before. Its new president,Nikos Anastasiadis, must both satisfy Europe, impose austerity on the Cypriots that elected himeasily in early 2013, and attempt to negotiate successfully with the north. Given South Cyprus’economic troubles and the understandable anxieties of the south Cyprus public, it is difficultin early 2013 to envisage an irruption of political courage in the south. Without lateral thinkingor a burst of bravery, conceiving easy breakthroughs over Cyprus’ future is difficult and unlikely.
(10) There were only two periods in recent Cyprus history when political leadership mightconceivably have delivered a meaningful and sustainable settlement. Glafkos Clerides was presi-dent of South Cyprus from 1993 to 2003. He not only led a sizable parliamentary majority formuch of that time and had been president of the Cyprus House of Representatives from 1960to 1976, he was the grand old man of Republic of Cyprus politics, having been part of the Makar-ios government and several successor governments. He was well respected and credible. He wouldhave been able to sell a compromise agreement to his citizens and followers. Moreover, he wantedas a man of considerable years (b. 1919) to be the Republic of Cyprus president to bring about anend to Cyprus’ division. Unfortunately, for much of his last years, Clerides contended with Denk-tash, his old colleague from British colonial times. But as the first president of the Turkish Repub-lic of Northern Cyprus, Denktash often behaved obdurately and suspiciously. Denktash wouldhave lost personal power by reunification. He was also responsive to mainland Turkish politics;the ruling party on the mainland was not ready in 2002–2003 for reunification unless it couldsatisfy the mainland’s larger political agenda vis a vis the European Union.
Nevertheless, the residents of the north supported the Annan Plan in 2004 just as their Greek-speaking compatriots rejected it. Denktash, having obtained crucial concessions from de Soto andthe UN, was unable to convert those concessions into any direct lasting benefits for his followers.
Dentash’s retirement from the presidency in 2005 ended an era in Cypriot confrontation, just asClerides’ electoral defeat concluded an era when the key negotiators on both sides had been nur-tured in colonial times, with colonial friendships and common experiences. Both served Cyprus inimportant political roles from 1960 and had been active politically under the British administration.
Denktash was succeeded by Mehmet Ali Talat, who won the 2005 Turkish Republic of North-ern Cyprus presidential election over a candidate favored by Denktash. A long-time Marxistanxious to introduce social change and political compromise to the north, Talat sought a con-clusion to Cyprus’s long separation. When Papadopolous was succeeded in 2008 by DemetrisChristofias, the leader of South Cyprus’s Communist Party, it seemed that the two parts ofCyprus could indeed be brought back together.8
The two sides set about negotiating directly, with regular but not facilitated involvement of theUN under Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and Alexander Downing, former foreign minister ofAustralia, his Special Advisor on Cyprus. After Talat lost the 2010 election to Dervis Eroglu, thenegotiations ensued without the bonhomie of the Talat-Christofias era. But they continued, if ina desultory manner. From time to time, Downing intervened and prodded. Ban also intervened per-sonally on several occasions. But little of a definitive nature was concluded despite weekly meetingsin 2010 and 2011. Indeed, all forward motion was probably brought to a close when Christofias
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announced that he would not contest the 2013 Republic of Cyprus elections, having lost his legiti-macy and mandate during the economic crisis and as a result of some dramatic governing lapses.
(11) Clerides had the stature and the clout to have forged a compromise with Denktash thatwould have made good political sense for both southerners and northerners. He was sufficientlyesteemed as a leader to have sold the result to his constituents. But Denktash, despite the readi-ness of his followers, was never ready to take his chances on a compromise that might havediminished his own standing and, over time, might have resulted in the creation of a nation,rather than two states, in Cyprus.
Likewise, Christofias never led boldly on reunification and Talat, who was ready to lead, losthis partner in what could have been a splendid moment for Cyprus and for reunification. Thusthe moment for effective compromise passed, largely because of leadership timidity. Alternatively,Christofias sensed – as his successor certainly does – that Greek-speaking Cypriots are not readyfor any reunification that compromises their pride and their power.
Only political leaders who possess the legitimacy of a Makarios, a Clerides, or a Denktash willbe able to reunite Cyprus in the manner that the Cyprus Study Group and the Annan Plan fore-told. Just as did Nelson Mandela and Frederik W. DeKlerk in South Africa, they will need todemonstrate consummate courage in the face of unremitting political hesitancies.
Notes1. Instructive for this period is Linda B. Miller, Cyprus: The law and politics of civil strife (Cambridge, 1968).2. See the report of that meeting and the interpretive transcript of its proceedings: Robert I. Rotberg and
Ericka A. Albaugh, Cyprus 2000: divided or federal? (Cambridge, MA, 1998).3. For the Boutros-Ghali bi-zonal community proposal and earlier and later UN initiatives, see Robert
I. Rotberg, Cyprus after Annan: next steps toward a solution (Cambridge, MA, 2003).4. “Basis for a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem” (Nicosia and New York, 2003), UN
Working Document5. Because the consensus draft no longer received the support of the entire Group, it was withdrawn in
Jordan by the organizers and all copies were confiscated and destroyed. However, at least oneTurkish Cypriot refused to return his copy of the draft, despite repeated requests. Apparently, thatcopy eventually found its way into Track I quarters in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprusand, much later, surfaced inappropriately as an official “plan.”
6. See Alvaro de Soto, “Can Cyprus be Solved?” Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, XXIV (2012),398–405. See also Rebecca Bryant, The Past in Pieces: Belonging in the New Cyprus (Philadelphia, Uof Pennsylvania Press, 2010).
7. De Soto met with the Study Group on one occasion and was kept fully informed of its discussions. For asummary of the Plan, see Rotberg, After Annan, pp. 9–11; Margaret W. Bartlett, Cyprus, the UnitedNations, and the quest for unity (Ely, UK, 2007), pp. 100–110.
8. See Giorgos Charalambous, “The February 2008 presidential election in the Republic of Cyprus: thecontext, dynamics and outcome in perspective,” Cyprus Review, XXI (2009), 97–122.
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