After Operation Lightning Thunder Protecting communities and building peace

Mareike Schomerus and Kennedy Tumutegyereize

April 2009

conciliation resources

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1 Summary 4

2 Methodology 6

3 TheLRAconflict 6

4 ThecurrentsituationintheDRCandWesternEquatoriaState 6

4.1 ConductofOperationLightningThunder 8

4.2 ImpactandperceptionsofOperationLightningThunder 9

4.2.1 Thehumanitariansituation 10

4.2.2 Security 10

4.3 Communitymilitarization 11

4.4 ImpactonSudan’speaceprocess 12

5 Strategiestoendtheconflict 13

5.1 Obstaclestoareturntodialogue 13

5.2 Themoodforapoliticalsolution 13

5.3 Seekingnewopportunities 14

5.4 Prioritizingsupportforcommunities 14

6 Recommendations 15

6.1 Onthepeaceprocess 15

6.2 Onsecurity 15

6.3 Onreconciliationandreintegration 15

Acknowledgements 16

Acronymsandabbreviations 16

Contents

OperationLightningThunder

ThemilitaryoffensiveknownasOperationLightningThunder,launchedon14December2008,markedtheendoftwoyearsofpeacenegotiationsbetweentheLord’sResistanceArmy’s(LRA)andtheUgandangovernment.TheUgandanarmy,inpartnershipwiththeforcesoftheDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC)andSouthernSudanandsupportedbytheUnitedStates,carriedoutaerialbombingofthemainLRAcampinGarambaParkintheDRC,followedbyathreemonthgroundoffensive.

Between2006and2008,asetofagreementswerenegotiatedbetweentheUgandangovernmentandtheLRA,underthemediationandfacilitationoftheSouthernSudangovernmentinJuba.ButtheFinalPeaceAgreement(FPA),pullingtogetherfiveseparatelysignedagreements,wasneversignedamidtheincreasedinsecurityandviolence.LRAleaderJosephKonyfailedtoturnuptoscheduledsigningceremonies,firstinAprilandtheninNovember2008.

BilledasastrategytoforceKonytosigntheFPA,OperationLightningThunderdestroyedtheLRAbasecampandscatteredtheLRAovertheDRC,SudanandtheCentralAfricanRepublic(CAR).TheUgandaPeople’sDefenceForce(UPDF)startedwithdrawingfromtheoperationinmid-March2009,handingovertotheArmedForcesoftheDRC(FARDC).TheoperationwasdeclaredasuccessthathadsignificantlyweakenedtheLRA’scommandstructure,ledtotherescueofabout300civiliansandthekillingofabout150LRA.Whiletheofficialobjectives–tomakeKonysign,ortocaptureorkillLRAsoldiers–wereonlypartiallyachieved,itremainstobeseenhowmuchtheLRA’scentralcommandhasbeenhurt.FewseniorLRAfigureswerecapturedandJosephKonyremainsatlarge.

Security

SecurityonbothsidesoftheDRC/Sudanborderworsenedduringthesecondquarterof2008.IncreasedLRAactivitywasreported,includingattacksandabductions.InJune,whenmilitarychiefsfromSouthernSudan,UgandaandtheDRCwereplanningstrategiesformilitarycooperation,theLRAattackedthesouthernSudanesePeople’sLiberationArmy(SPLA)stationedneartheLRAassemblysiteinRi-Kwangba.CiviliansintheDRCsufferedincreasedLRAattacksintheprovincesclosertotheborder.

SincetheonsetofOperationLightningThundersecurityformostpeoplelivingintheareahasdeteriorated.WhentheLRAcampwasbombed,LRAfightersscatteredinsmallgroupsinSudanandDRCandcontinuedtoattack.OnChristmasDaytheLRAlaunchedseveralcoordinated

massacresinCongolesetowns.Intotal,itisestimatedthatmorethan1000civilians1havebeenkilledandseveralhundredabductedbytheLRAsincetheyincreasedtheirviolentactivitiesin2008.

Protection

OperationLightningThundercommencedwithoutcleararrangementsforadequatecivilianprotectionandcivilianshavebornethebruntoftheoperation.TensofthousandsofCongoleseandSudanesehavebeendisplacedfleeingpossibleattacks.IntheDRC,citizenseitherfleetomajortownsoracrossthebordertoSudan.ThousandsofSudanesehavelefttheirvillagesalongtheborderandareseekingshelterandsecurityinmajortowns.Yetevenintownsprotectionislimited:itisunclearwhetheranyarmywasspecificallyassignedprotectionduties.TheUnitedNationsOrganizationMissioninDRC(MONUC)lackssufficienttroopstoprovideprotectiontociviliansonanappropriatescale.

Thereappearstohavebeennocoordinatedeffortbetweenthedifferentnationalarmiestoprotectciviliansandasignificantgapbetweenwhattheyofficiallyagreedandhowthisplayedoutontheground.Althoughofficialcooperationbetweenthethreearmieswasannouncedinmid-2008,SPLAmid-levelcommandersclaimtheyweresidelinedintheoperationalplanningandwerethusunwillingtosupportitfromtheSudaneseside.TheFARDC,havingtakenoverfullyfromtheUPDFinmid-March,lackcapacityduetounrestintheKivuregions.Duringtheoperation,theUPDF’sfocuswasclearlyonfightingtheLRA,ratherthanassigningmanpowertocivilianprotection.

Humanitariansituation

Thehumanitariansituationhasbeenequallydevastating.Withtensofthousandsdisplaced,ofteninextremelydifficultterritoryatthestartoftherainyseason,deliveringhumanitarianaidhasbeenchallenging.Lackoffoodandbasicserviceswillbecomeevenmorepronounced:citizenshavebeenunabletotendtheirfieldsduetotheinsecuritysolocalauthoritiesexpectseverefoodshortagesinthecomingmonths.

WhilethegoalofthemilitaryoperationwastorescueasmanypeopleaspossiblefromtheLRA,fewprovisionshavebeenmadetocaterforthosethatreturn,includingyoungwomenwithchildrenfromLRAsoldiers.Secureshelterandreliablemechanismsfortracingfamilymembersandpreparingfamiliesforreintegrationareneeded.

SUMMARY 1

4 • Conciliation Resources

1.EstimatebasedonUNsources,armyreportsandHumanRightsWatchresearch.

Communitymilitarization

Mostcommunitiesalongtheborderhavesetupciviliandefencegroupsasadirectconsequenceoftheincreasedinsecurity.ArmedwithanythingfrombowsandarrowstoAK-47s,thesegroupspatrolthestreetsandvillages,attimeswithsupportfromlocalarmybases.Communitiesseeaneedtoprovidetheirownprotectionsincetheydonotexpecttobeprotectedbynationalorinternationaltroops.Whilestressingtheimportanceofcommunityself-defence,somelocalauthoritiesandcommunityleadershaveexpressedconcernthiswillleadtorenewedmilitarizationandachangeinlocalpowerstructuresthatcouldhaveadamaginglong-termeffectonpeacebuilding.

Prospectsforaresolutiontotheconflict

ThepeacetalksinJubaareover,despitethefactafinishednegotiatedagreementliesunsignedonthetable.YetthemilitaryoperationhasalsofailedtoendtheconflictandforceLRAtosigntheFPA.IntheDRCandSouthernSudan,theLRAthreattociviliansisnowgreaterthanbefore.Itisunlikelythatmilitaryforcewillresultinanydealbeingsigned,andanytrustthatwasbuiltbetweenthenegotiatingpartiesinJuba–howeverfragile–hasgone.Thishascausedlocalfrustrationwiththemilitaryattempttoendtheconflict,andhasmaderevivingapoliticalprocessandestablishingchannelsofcommunicationwiththeLRAmoredifficult.TherecognitionthattheLRAconflictispartofthecomplexwebofviolentpoliticalconflictsandconflictsintheUganda,SudanandDRCborderregionsisanessentialsteptowardsprotectingthecivilianpopulationsoftheseareas.

Thereareotherobstacles.DuringtheJubanegotiations,theLRAdelegationwaslargelydrawnfromtheAcholi

diasporaandseriousriftsdeveloped,repeatedlyunderminingtheprocess.Thelegacyofinternationalinvolvementpresentsfurtherchallenges.Theintenseinternationalinvolvement,unprecedentedinpreviousinitiatives,hadcontradictoryeffects.Ononehand,itmadethepeacetalkspossiblethroughinternationalfundingandadvocacyforapoliticalsolution.Ontheother,itcreatedatremendouslycomplexenvironmentthatwashardfortheLRAtonavigate.Forexample,theLRAwasrequiredtotrustvariousactors,somewithveryconflictingviewsoninternationaljusticesystem.Theobstaclescreatedbythecomplexinternationalmachinerycanbeovercomebyasmaller,civilsocietydrivenprocess.

Anewapproachtoaconflictresolutionisurgentlynecessarytoavoidaprolongedlow-levelmilitarycampaignthatcausesextremeinsecurityforciviliansandagainfailstoendtheLRAcampaign.TherecentrejuvenationofdiplomaticcooperationbetweenKampalaandKinshasaprovidesnewopportunities.ThismaybeastartingpointtoanewregionalapproachtosolvingaconflictthatnowdirectlyaffectsfourcountriesandhasdestabilizedtheentireborderregionbetweenUganda,DRC,southernSudanandtheCAR.

MembersofcivilsocietyinSudan,DRCandUgandaarecallingforincreasedregionalcooperationthatincludescivilsocietyinordertorestartapoliticalprocessandcommunicationwithLRAleaders.Communityleadersstressacomprehensiveapproachtoconflictresolutionisneededsinceallaffectedareassufferparallelviolentconflicts.Aconsistentandinclusivepoliticalprocessacrossregionalbordersisnecessarytobringregionalpeaceandsecurity.

After Operation Lightning Thunder:Protectingcommunitiesandbuildingpeace • 5

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UgandaPeople’sDefenceForcearmouredvehicleinYambio,February2009.

Methodology

The current situation in the DRC and Western Equatoria State

“ This was the most peaceful side of southern Sudan during the war and now in peace, we have war.” Yambiogovernmentofficial

The LRA conflict

2

4

3

AsanappendixtotheConciliationResourcesreportPerilousBorder:SudanesecommunitiesaffectedbyconflictontheSudan/Ugandaborder,2thisreportlooksatthecurrentsituationintheborderareasoftheDRCandSudan’sWesternEquatoriastate.Itreflectstheattitudesofcivilians,governmentandarmyofficialstowardsrecentmilitaryoperationsandonthepeaceprocessbetweentheLRAandtheUgandangovernment.Theseviewswereexpressedinmorethan70interviewsconductedinFebruaryandMarch2009inBuniaandDunguinDRCandinYambio,Ganguran,Ibba,MaridiandJubaCountyinSudan.InSudan’sMakpandurefugeecamp,refugeesfromtheCongolesevillagesofLilika,Duru,Bitima,

Nawenangwa,Bagbele(Garamba),Nakale,Ngilima,Bayotewereinterviewed.

Inaddition,twoworkshopsinformthisreport.On3March2009representativesfromcivilsocietyandlocalgovernmentfromEasternandCentralEquatoriagatheredinJubatodiscusstheongoingproblemsassociatedwiththeLRA.InGulu,on16–18March,aregionalcivilsocietyjointanalysisworkshoponpeacebuildingacrosstheUgandan,SudaneseandCongoleseborderswasheldtodiscussthewayforward.Theworkshopwasattendedbytraditionalandreligiousleadersfromtheaffectedregions,representativesfromNGOsandgovernmentaswellasformerLRAcombatants.

TheLRAhasbeeninrebellionagainsttheUgandangovernmentsince1986.InitiallytheconflictplayedoutinnorthernUganda,andinparticularintheAcholidistricts.TheconflictspreadacrosstheSudaneseborderaround1994,whentheLRAstartedoperatingfrombasesinEasternEquatoria,whichishometo,amongothers,largepopulationsofethnicAcholi.TheLRAbecameaproxysupportedbytheSudanesegovernmentinKhartoum,ostensiblyinretaliationagainstUgandanandinternationalsupportfortheSudanPeople’sLiberationMovement/Army(SPLM/A).

TheLRAconflictenteredanewstagewiththesigningoftheComprehensivePeaceAgreement(CPA)betweentheSudanesegovernmentandtheSPLM/Ain2005.In

thesameyear,theInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC)unsealedarrestwarrantsforthetopLRAleadership.Throughouttheconflict,therehavebeenmanypeaceinitiativeswithdifferentlevelsofsuccess.Motivatedandresilientgrassrootssocial,culturalandreligiousnetworksandorganizationshaveplayedimportantrolesintheseprocesses,despitetheirweakcapacities.After19yearsofwar,theJubaprocessinitiatedin2006renewedhopeforapeacefulresolution.TheimmediatesecuritydividendsoftheJubaprocessweretangibleintheareashistoricallymostaffectedbytheconflict.AsemblanceofdefactopeacecameaboutwhentheLRAmoveditstroopsoutofnorthernUgandaandSudan’sEasternandCentralEquatoriastates.

Sudan’sWesternEquatoriaStateborderstheDRCandtheCAR.Comprisedoftencounties,itcoversanarearoughlythesizeofAustria,muchofitdenseforest.DuringSudan’scivilwartheareawasrelativelypeaceful,withmostfightingconfinedtoareasnearthestateborderstothenorth,quiteremovedfromthestatecapitalYambioortheDRCborder.Approximately360,000peoplearebelievedtoliveinWesternEquatoria,butrecentdisplacementsmakeestimatesunreliable.

OntheothersideoftheborderinDRCisDunguterritory,oneofsixterritoriesthatmakeupHauteUélédistrictoftheOrientaleProvince.Ithasanestimatedpopulationof225,000inhabitantscoveringatotalareaofapproximately32,000squarekilometres,abouthalfthesizeofWesternEquatoria.OtheraffectedterritoriesalongtheborderincludeFaradje,Watsa,Rungu,AngoandNiangaraandtheWandoCollectivitywhereGarambaParkislocated.DunguterritoryisaseverelydeprivedareaevenbyDRC

6 • Conciliation Resources

2.Detailscanbefoundathttp://www.c-r.org/our-work/uganda/documents/Perilous-Border.pdf

After Operation Lightning Thunder:Protectingcommunitiesandbuildingpeace • 7

3.Theexactnumberofdeathsisunclear–UNmilitaryobserverssaythat17SPLAand6civilianswerekilled.

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standards.FewservicesareavailableandagovernmentpresencewasrarelyfeltevenbeforetheLRAattackedthearea.

TheLRAhasbeenpresentinthisareasincelate2005,withapermanentbaseinGarambaParkandmobileunitsinWesternEquatoriabetweenEzoCountytowardstheCARborderandallthewaytoToreandYeitowardsJuba.DuringtheJubapeaceprocess,thenegotiationsheldbetweentheUgandangovernmentandrepresentativesoftheLRAunderthefacilitationoftheSouthernSudangovernment,theonlyLRAcampthatwasaccessibletooutsiderswasinRi-Kwangba,nearthevillageofNabangaontheSudan/DRCborder.

ThestoryoftheLRA’spresencehasbeenoneofgraduallydeterioratingsecurityconditionsandrelations.ResidentsinDRCreportthatfrom2005to2007,theLRAwasmoreorlessa‘friendlyforce’,freelymixingwithsomecommunities.OneofthechiefsofavillageinGarambaparkrecountedhow,“whenLRAcamefromUgandaforthefirsttime,theypassedanddidnotdisturbus.Theyjustpassedtothepark”.HeexplainedthatwhentheLRAcametoDRC,theyconveyedmessagestotheCongoleseciviliansthat

wedon’thaveaproblemwithCongolese,weonlyhaveaproblemwithSudanandCARpeople.Thismadeus[theCongolesecivilians]fearbecausewethought:iftheydon’tlikeSudaneseanditisnottheircountry,whyshouldtheylikeCongolese?

Abductionswerereportedthroughoutthisperiod,albeitonasmallscale.In2006,eightGuatemalanpeacekeepersdiedwhenMONUCengagedtheLRAincombat.

AnticipatingahumanitariancrisisandmilitaryforceagainsttheLRA,in2007MONUCstartedpreparingthenecessaryinfrastructure,includingrebuildingtheairstripinDungu.Aroundthesametime,astringofdefectionsfromtheLRAcausedbyaninternalleadershipstrugglebeganaperiodmarkedbyregularlooting,andattacksonvillagesbyLRAmembers.Inthoseattacks,localchiefswhoreportedlyhelpedsomeLRAcommandersdefectweredirectlytargeted.

WesternEquatoriansexperiencedperiodicLRAhostility,abductionsandlooting.AroundthedesignatedassemblyareainIbbaCounty,reportsoflooting,attacksandabductionsweremorefrequent.Inearly2008,UNmilitaryobserversreportedincreasedsuspectedmovementbytheLRAalongtheborderandwithinDRC.

ThesituationdeterioratednoticeablyafterLRAleaderJosephKonyfailedtoappearatascheduledsigningofthenegotiatedpeaceagreementinearlyApril2008.InJunetheLRAattackedanSPLAdetachmentinNabanga,killing15soldiersand12womenandchildren,accordingtoanSPLAcommanderondutythatday.3WhenaskedwhathefeltpromptedtheLRAattackontheSPLAafteralmosttwoyearsoffriendlyinteractions,hesaidthatjustbeforethatday,hehadheardontheradiothat“SPLA,UPDFandDRCweregoingtoteamupagainsttheLRA,soIthinkthatwasthereason.”

FromSeptember2008,theLRAintensifiedtheirattacksintheDRC,startinginDungutown.Sincethen,theLRAhasextendedtheiroperations,coveringapproximately450kmfromEastFaragitoWesternDuruma,aheavilyforestedandsparselypopulatedarea.Congoleseresidentsofthe

UgandanreligiousandtraditionalleaderswaitingforJosephKonyatthefailedsigningceremonyinRi-Kwangba,April2008.

affectedareashavefledtheirhomes,manymovingintoSudantowardsGanguran,nearYambio,aboutninemilesfromtheDRCborder.SomealsosimplyfledtothebushortowardsDuruinDRC.InSudan,theLRAiscurrentlyactivebetweenEzoandYei,withmostattackshappeningalongorsouthofthemainroadtowardstheDRCborder.

SincethebeginningofOperationLightningThunder,thesecuritysituationforthelocalanddisplacedpopulationhasagaindeteriorated.Afewdaysaftertheinitialaerialbombings,someLRAcommandersregroupedwithKony,havingbeengivenampletimetodosobya72-hourdelayinthearrivalofgroundtroops.TheythenreportedlyreceivedorderstoattackseveralCongolesevillagesonChristmasday.TheseattacksturnedintosomeofthemostgruesomemassacresinthehistoryoftheLRAconflict,withhundredsofpeoplekilled.Dozensofsmallattacksandseverallarge-scalemassacreshaveledtothedeathsofanestimated900civiliansinthreemonths,withtensofthousandsdisplaced.Around800peoplearereportedmissingandpresumablyabducted.ByFebruary2009,theSPLAandthecivilianpopulationreportedregularsightingofsmallLRAgroups(sometimesasfewasfivepeople,rarelymorethan20),whilealsodiscoveringtracesofsleepingplacesforlargergroupsof100ormorenearGanguran,closetoYambio.Sincethen,therehasbeenasteadytrickleofrefugeesandinternallydisplacedpersons(IDPs)tositesinDRCandSudan.

4.1ConductofOperationLightningThunder

ThepeaceprocesssufferedaseveresetbackwhenKonyfailedtosigntheFPAon10April2008.Healsofailedtoturnupforsubsequentmeetingsorganizedathisrequest.TheLRA’sattacksandabductionsofciviliansintheDRCandCARhadalreadybeenexacerbatinginsecurity.InoneincidenttheLRAreportedlyabductedover150peoplearoundObointheeasterncorneroftheCAR,anareacriss-crossedbyvariousarmedgroupsincludingunitsofSudanesejanjaweedandCongoleserebels.

Citingthelackofprogresstowardsapeacedeal,themilitarychiefsofUganda,theDRCandSouthernSudanagreedinearlyJunetocooperatemilitarilyagainsttheLRA.ThestatedobjectivewastoforceKonytosignthepeacedeal.On14December,theUPDFtooktheleadinlaunchingOperationLightningThunderbybombingLRAcampsinGarambapark.ThiswasfollowedbyathreemonthgroundoffensiveinSudanandtheDRC,ledbytheUPDFwithsomesupportfromCongoleseforces.Inmid-March2009,theUPDFwithdrew,declaringtheoperationasuccessandhandingovertotheFARDC,whorenamedtheoffensiveOperationRudia.

LRAreturneesinterviewedforthisreportsaidthatonthedaybeforethebombing,Konyannouncedtherewouldbeaplaneattackthenextdayandthatcampsneededtobeevacuated.Othersseemedtohavebeenlesswell

informed:inUgandaandDRC,parliamentarianssaidtheywerenotconsultedontheuseoftheUgandanmilitaryintheDRC.WhiletheSPLAwastheoreticallyinchargeofsealingofftheborderstopreventtheLRAfromfleeingtoSudan,inpracticeitisnotcleartowhatextenttheSPLAfeltresponsibleforthisorhadthecapacitytodoit.BordervillageslikeSakurehadnomilitarypresencewhenthebombardmentstartedandresidentsreportedtherewasnoreactiontoLRAmovementfromtheSPLA.CriticizingtheUPDF’sapproach,oneSPLAofficialexplainedthelackofSPLAparticipationstemmedfromamutuallackoftrustintheother’scapacity.FromtheSPLApointofview,hesaid,theUPDFwaswrongtoapproachOperationLightningThunder,

asiftheyweregoingtofightaconventionalarmy,butthatwasnotthecase.Theydidnotfollowtheprincipleofwar,whichissurpriseandspeed.Also,SPLA,UPDFandFARDCforcesneversatdowntogether.SPLAwassupposedtosealthebordersandtheyweredrunk.TheUShelpedplanthis,butWesternsystemsnormallyunderminehowoursystemswork.USofficerswillrelyonequipment.Theywanttodotheirownintelligencegatheringwithoutrelyingonbasiclocalintelligence.The[US]StateDepartmenthasnoexperiencewithrealitiesontheground.TheUPDFtroopswereinKobokofordays,itwasliketheyweregoingtoaparty.TherewasnoalliancebetweenSPLAandUPDF,thegovernmentofUgandawantedtokeeptheoperationsecretfrom[SouthernSudan’sVicePresidentandChiefMediator]Riek[Machar].TheSPLAwasnotveryhappy.TheSPLAjustsaidtosomeforces,justgoandsitthere,lettheUgandansseeiftheyreallyarethebest.

ThescopeoftheUPDFmilitaryoperationishardtodeterminewithprecision.Localwitnessescanonlygivesnapshots.Inonecase,theyreportedhavingseen23UPDFvehiclesandfourarmedtanksmovinginSudanfromMariditowardsMadebejustbeforeChristmas.

UponitswithdrawalinMarch2009,theUPDFreportedthattheLRA’spermanentbasecampsinGarambahadbeendestroyed,fiveseniorLRAcommandershadbeencaptured,150LRAkilledandaround300abducteesrescued.Moreover,theLRAcommandstructurehadbeenimpairedanditsabilitytoregroupdestroyed.4

However,theLRAoperatesextremelyeffectivelyinsmallgroupsandthishasbecomethemodeofoperationoncemore.SincethestrengthoftheLRAisunknown,itisimpossibletoverifytheUgandangovernment’sclaimthatafifthoftheLRAwerekilled.Rumoursofhigh-levelindividualorgroupsurrenderremainunsubstantiated.

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4.BarbaraAmong.‘NinetyDaysofWarinGarambaForest’,NewVision,13March2009.

4.2ImpactandperceptionsofOperationLightningThunder

“Theinternationalcommunityhascommunication,theyhavesatellites,yettheyhaveleftusandwearealone.” Yambioresident

OperationLightningThunderbroughtresidentsinDRCandSudanamixtureofhope,despairandeventuallydisappointment.Onelocalleadersaid,“Initiallylocalswereapprehensivethatthemilitarywasnotprotectingthem,butwithcombined[Ugandan,CongoleseandSudanese]forcestheyfeltbetter”.EchoingthehopethatthecampaignwouldconcludewithKony’sarrest,anothersaidthattheincreasedinsecurityandthebombingofLRAabducteeswasapainfulbutnecessarysteptotake:“AttackingKonywithFARDCandUPDFwastheonlyoption.Therearecasualties,butwehavetopaythem.Thereisnopeacewithoutbloodshed.”

Criticismofhowthemilitaryoperationwasexecutedhasbeenvoicedlocally,nationallyandinternationally.Asastrategytoendtheconflict,protectciviliansandencourageLRAmemberstoleavethebush,OperationLightning

Thunderhasbeenweak.ItsofficialobjectivewastoeitherforceKonytosigntheFPA,ortocaptureorkillLRArebels.

Theoperationutilized‘psyops’(psychologicaloperations)toencourageLRAmemberstoleavethebush.ThisincludeddroppingleafletsoverGarambaParkurgingtheLRAtocomehomeandassuringthemtheywouldbereceivedwithopenarms.Yetitwasill-prepared:theleafletinformedtheLRAthattheyshouldreporttothenearestchurchorarmyunits,butchurcheshadnotbeeninformedthattheyweresupposedtoreceivetheLRAorwhattodowiththem.

AlocalgovernmentofficialfromYambiosaidthemilitarycampaignwasdoomedfromthestartbecauseitfailedtotakeintoaccountlocalknowledge:

ThewayUPDFisdoingit,itisnottherightway.Thewaytheystartedwaswrong.Theyshouldhavecometotalktothecommunity.TheycamewithouttalkingtothegovernorofWesternEquatoria.Theyjuststartedbombing.Asaresult,theLRAhasscatteredlikeredants,buttheyareliketheredantsthatcomebackanddestroyyourhouse.

WhentheUPDFstartedtowithdrawitstroopsfromDRCinmid-March2009,themoveconfirmedwhatoneYambioresident’sstancethat“thepeopleknowUPDFis

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AcampsetupbyCongoleserefugeesinMakpandu,Sudan.

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notthesolution,itisonlytemporaryandtheycanleavetomorrow.”FewresidentshaveexpressedconfidenceinthecapacitiesofeithertheFARDCorSPLAtoactuallyarresttheLRAleadership.AlthoughthemilitarycampaignhasbeendeclaredasuccessbytheUPDF,JosephKonyremainselusiveandtheFPAhasnotbeensigned.OnelocalSPLAmemberfeltthatthetasklefttothemhadnowbecomeevenbiggerafterOperationLightningThunder:“Idon’tthinktheLRAwillbewipedout,”hesaid.“Ifanythingtheyhavejustmadethemstronger.”

4.2.1Thehumanitariansituation

Thehumanitariansituationisextremelysevere,andtheoutlookforthenextfewmonthsisbleak.InSudanandDunguterritory,localgovernmentofficialsandaidorganizationsarestillverifyingtheexactnumberofIDPsandrefugees.InMaridiCounty,localofficialsestimatethatmorethan10,000Sudanesehavebeendisplaced,butthatatleast30,000areaffectedalongtheborder.InYambiocounty,officialssaidthat1139individualshadbeendisplaced.TheexactnumberofSudaneseIDPsishardtodeterminesincetheyarenotinoneplace,butscatteredinthebushorwithrelatives.InFebruary,theUNOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs(UNOCHA)inDunguterritoryestimatedthatwere160,674CongoleseIDPsand20,000refugees,mostofwhomhadfledtoWesternEquatoriastate.

InbothDRCandSudan,humanitarianassistanceisscarceandthosereceivingassistancearelikelytobestayingwithinmajortownsorcamps.Hopesthatthesituationcanbeimprovedanytimesoonareslimonbothsidesoftheborder,madeworsebythestartoftherainyseason.InDRC,asofmid-February2009,theWFPhadaccessedonly54,511peoplewithfooditemsand27,065withnon-fooditems.

Outsidemajortowns,deliveryofhumanitarianassistanceisextremelydifficultduetoalackofroads.Tocoverthe500kmfromBenitoDungubyroadtakesaminimumof12daysduringdryseason.Inrainyseason,theroadsbecomeimpassable.Niangara(97kmwestofDungu)hosts11,000IDPswhocannotbeaccessed.IDPcampsinGangaraorBodioareconsideredunsafeforhumanitarianworkersduetothelackofanymilitarypresenceorpoliceforce.Protectionofbothciviliansandaidworkersisamajorchallenge.

Localauthoritiesexpectanevenworsefoodshortageinthemonthsaheadduetolackofcultivationinthelastfewmonths.Thosedisplacedorthosewithremotefieldshavenotbeenabletotendtotheircrops.Thelackofaharvestisamajorconcerntoauthoritiesandciviliansalike.

4.2.2Security

ThemajorcomplaintofthelocalpopulationsintheDRCandSudanisthattoolittleconsiderationwasgiventocivilianprotectionintheplanningandexecutionofthemilitarycampaign.InSudan,thekeycriticismisthataerialbombingstartedwithoutpositioningtheSPLAalongthebordertopreventLRAgroupsfromentering.TheareainneedofprotectionisvastanditishardtosaywithcertaintywhetheritwouldhavebeenpossiblefortheSPLAtosealofftheborders.ButintheabsenceofanyattempttodosotheLRAhasroamedfreely,splittingintosmallmobileunitstoavoidmilitaryconfrontationsandtoattackcivilians.

SudaneseandCongolesecivilianshave,intheirownview,becomecaughtbetweenarockandahardplace.ByallowingtheUPDFintotheircountries,theymadethemselvesmorevulnerabletoLRAattacks,asoneyouthleadersaid,because“theUPDFpresencemakesthemlooklikeenemiestotheLRA.”YetthewithdrawalofUPDFfromtheoperationhasleftcivilianswithonelessforcetoprotectthem.ThetaskofcivilianprotectionisnowinthehandsoftheFARDC,andwithCongoleseforcesengagedinfightingintheKivus,thereislittleexpectationthattheywillhavethecapacitytocountertheLRA.

Militaryobservershaveexpresseddoubtaboutthecapacityofthethreearmiesinvolvedtoprovideadequateprotection,whileMONUCforces,whosemandatetheoreticallyallowsthemtoengageinfightingforprotection,havelimitedfightingcapacity.TheUNSecurityCouncilauthorizedanincreaseintroopsforMONUCinNovember2008,5butithasbeenachallengetogetanycountrytocommittocontributingmoretroops.WiththeproblemsinKivus,theprospectsthatMONUCwillmobilizesufficienttroopsinDunguagainsttheLRAseemsunrealistic.

OntheSudaneseside,manyEquatorianshaveanuneasyrelationshipwiththeSPLA,basedonalonghistoryofdistrust.“Thefeelingofprotectionisnottherestrongly,”explainedoneEquatorianleader.“Onereasoncouldbeoneofthosedrunkardsoldierswho,when[theLRA]appear,sayswearetiredoffighting,youciviliansgo.Sowhenthatwassaidcivilianshadlittlehope.”DuringanLRAattackonthevillageofMboroko,amessengerwassenttoalerttheSPLAwhoreportedlysaid“youjustwait,wearecominglater.”Thepersonwhosentthemessengersaidthat,“thearmyisnowreallystrugglingtomakepeoplebelieveinthem.”ThislackofconfidenceisrootedinyearsofstrainedrelationshipsbetweentheEquatoriantribes(suchastheZandeintheYambioareaortheBakaaroundMaridi)andtheNilotictribes(suchastheDinka,whomakeupthemajorityofSPLAsoldiers).EquatorianciviliansperceiveSPLAsoldiers’behaviourandtheirfailuretoactasprotectorsinethnicterms,ratherthanasisolatedincidentsofarmymisconduct.

5.ResolutionS/RES/1843,20November2008.

TheinterventionoftheICChasraisedhopesofanimminentsolutionbasedoninternationallawthatarebothhighandunrealistic.6OnelocalgovernmentofficialinWesternEquatoriasaid,“nothingneedstobenegotiatedhere,thereisnothingtoreconcile.WearewaitingfortheICC.TheICCneedstocomehereandtakecareofthisissue.”Atthesametime,residentsrealizethattheinvolvementoftheICChascausedfrictioninthepeacenegotiationswiththeLRA:“TheICChasneverbeenhere.Maybeitwasjustcreatedtogetsomepeoplepaid.Theyseemtocreateproblemswithoutsolvingit.Konynowsayshewon’tsignpeace,sotheyhavecreatedaproblemwithoutsolvingthem.”

4.3Communitymilitarization

Asaresponsetothelackofprotection,civiliansonbothsidesoftheborderarenowarmingthemselves,eitherindividuallyoraspartoforganizedcivilianpatrols.Whilesomeuseguns,themostcommonweaponsarebowsandarrows.Civilianpatrolssaythattheirowneffortcouldbeseenasaddingtothemilitaryeffortinanattempttomoreeffectivelycoveralargerterritoryandworkwithbetterlocalknowledge.InDRC,thelocalself-defenceunitswerefirstformedin2000,butmostfelldormantuntiltheSeptember2008attacksonDungu.Incommunitieswhereself-defenceunitsareconsideredstrong,suchasBangadi

andDungutown,LRAattackshavebeenminimized.Initiallymadeupofidleyouthandhunters,theseself-defenceunitshavebeenrecognizedbytheterritoryadministratorsandcarryoutjointpatrolswithFARDC.Theymovefreelyintownwiththeirhuntingguns.ThebehaviourofthesegroupsandtheirrelationshipwiththeFARDCandthepolicehasbeenproblematic.Forexample,inNgilima,theselfdefenceunitsattackedpolicemen,woundingthecommanderandtakingfirearms.Insomeotherareas,theyarereportedtobeharassingex-abducteesorkillingthosethattrytoescapefromtheLRA.Thecreationoftheself-defenceunitsunderlinestheexistinggapinprotectioncapacities.

SudaneseresidentsreportthatduringOperationLightningThunder,theyweresometimessuppliedbymilitaryforces:“[TheUPDF]sometimesdistributeammunitionandgowiththecommunity.Andwhenthereis[noincident]theyaskforammunitionbackbecauseitbelongstothegovernment.Thatiswhatthecommunitywants.”HencealongtheYambio-Maridiroad,civilianpatrolshavebeenaregularsightsincemid-February.Makingarrowsduringtheday,thegroupsworkinorganizedpatrolshiftsfrom8pmthroughthenight.Theleaderofonepatrolsaidthatthe“communityhastobeencouragedtousetheirweaponsforfighting.Wecan’thavearmyeverywhereandthegovernmentcannotprovidearmstothecommunity.”

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6.In2005,theICCunsealedfivewarrantsforLRAcommanders,twoofwhomhavesincebeenkilled.InMarch2009,theICCalsoissuedawarrantforSudan’spresidentOmeral-BashirfromcrimescommittedinDarfur.Thefactthatthewarrantsinbothcaseswereissuedbeforepeaceagreementshadbeenmadehasdrawnmuchcriticism.CriticssaythewarrantshavemadeitimpossibletostrikepeacedealsforUgandaorDarfurwhilesupportersbelievethatthewarrantsbringpressuretoresolvetheconflicts.

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CiviliandefencegroupsalongtheYambio-Maridiroad.

Anotherlocalresidentsaidthatwasconfidentthatthecommunitysolutioncouldwork,ifsufficientlysupported:“Ifthelocalcommunityisempoweredtotakethesecurityofthearea,theLRAwillbeflushedout.Buteverybodyissoscaredtogivefirearmstocommunities...InUgandatheyhadthearrowboysanditworked.”OtherslookwithconcerntotheUgandanexample.“WiththearrowboysinUganda,”explainedonemanwhohadbeenarefugeeinUganda,“ittookonlyaverylittlewhileuntiltheystartedtosetuproadblocksandforcingpeopletopaythem.Itisnotavoluntaryforce.Theystartdoingthingsforthemselves.”

LocalleadersinYambioandMaridi,whilesupportiveoftheircommunities’attemptstodefendthemselves,arepessimisticabouttheprospectsofsolvingthegreatersecurityproblemthisway.“Thecommunityisnowdoingself-defencebutinrealitythatdoesnothelp,”saidalocalchurchleader.“Becauseinthelastattack,[theLRA]surprised[thelocals],thebowsandarrowswerethere,buttherewasnotime.Itisjustraisingofmorale.”Anothercivilsocietyleaderexplainedthatcommunitymilitarizationexposestheshortcomingsincommunityprotectionandpsycho-socialprogrammes:“Insomevillages,youngpeoplestartpatrollingthroughoutthenight.Itisabitlikecounselling.Whattheydohelpsthemind.Theydonotfeelpowerless.”

4.4ImpactonSudan’speaceprocess

WithciviliandisarmamentoneofthemajorchallengesinSudan’sownfragilepeaceprocess,rearmamentmayhavefar-reachingimplicationsforSudan’sCPA.Moreover,vastpartsofSudan,includingWesternEquatoria,areexperiencinganextremelyvolatilesecurityenvironmentinwhichtheLRAhasbecomeonemoreseriousdestabilizingfactor.ThisvolatilityunderlinestheurgentneedtofindasolutionfortheLRAconflict.

InWesternEquatoria,divisionsbetweenlocalstateresidentsandSouthernSudanesegovernmentrepresentativesinJubarundeep.LocalsfeelthatthecentralgovernmentandalackofcommunicationaboutthepeaceprocesshasleftthemexposedtoLRAattacks.

Peoplehereareverydisappointedintheprocess.Whatpeoplearesayingaroundnegotiationsisthattheexpenseoflife,theycan’ttolerate.Thatangerwasseenduringthelast[LRA]attack.ThatdeadbodyofanLRAwasputuptotownandeverybodycametoitandcuttheirknivesortheylashedorbeatitwithastick.HereinWesternEquatoriawereallyhadthathighexpectationbecausetheycameandourgovernmentmediated,wesawfoodtakentothem.

SeveralpeopleinterviewedexpressedtheirangerwithaSouthernSudaneseleadershiptheyseeasbiasedalongethniclines.Theyhave“badmemories”ofwar,saidoneWesternEquatorianwhousedtoworkwithaninternationalorganization:

Mostpeoplehavealotofhorribletalesfromourownsoldiers,rape,beating,younggirlsrapedwithbottlesandtheirorgansopenedwitharazorbladetopenetrate.Also,peopledonotnowdifferentiatebetweenSPLAandSPLM[thepoliticalwingoftheSPLA]…Tryingtorepairitmeansif[theSPLA]isthearmy,letitnotonlybeonetribe.Everyroadblockyoufind,itisthesamepeople.Itneedstobeatrulymixedarmyandbothsoldiersandciviliansneedtobeheldaccountable.

Anotherongoingsecurityconcernhasbeenthepresenceofarmedpastoralists,theAmbororo,inbothWesternEquatoriaandBasandHauteUélédistrictsintheDRC.Thisnomadtribeownslargeherdsofcattleandhasbeenseenwithsophisticatedcommunicationequipmentandmodernweaponry,fuellingsuspicionthatthegovernmentinKhartoumisequippingtheminordertofosterinstability.

TheAmbororoareconsideredathreattothelocalagriculturallifestyle:“Theyaredestroyingthelivelihoodbygrazingtheircattle,takingthewateranddestroyingbeehives,”saidalocalaidworker,addingthat,

suchanumberofanimalsdestroysWesternEquatoriafarms,itdestroyslivelihoods.Iftheycanfindbettergrazinglands,theyshouldgothere.WesternEquatoriansdon’tknowwhattheyreallyaredoing,theyaredeepintheforest.Weareconcerned.LRAandAmbororo,weneverknowwhattheydo.Wedon’tknowiftheyareconnected.

Duringseveralmeetings,WesternEquatorianssay,theAmbororochiefsagreedtoleavethearea,evensigningaceasefireandanagreementtoleavethestatebytheendofJuly2008.Butlocalresidentsandofficialssaytheyhavefailedtodoso.WhilesomeZandespokespeoplehavestatedpubliclythattheybelievetheLRAandtheAmbororoareworkinginconjunction,thisseemstobelittlemorethananassumption.Othersbelievethereisnocoordination,butthatthetacticsbehindtheirpresencearethesame:“TheLRAisathreatandalsotheAmbororo,theyareindirectlylinkedbecausetheyhavethesamebossinKhartoum.Buttheyhavenotcarriedoutcoordinatedattacks.”Eveniftheconnectionisnotdirect,thepresenceofthetwogroupsmakespeoplewonderiftheydonot,afterall,supporteachother:“TheAmbororoarelikebulldozerstotheLRA,”saidalocalgovernmentofficialinYambio.“TheytaketheircattlealongtheroadandthentheLRAtakethatroad.Ambororoareintruders.Thereisaverybigquestionabouttheirpresencehere.Theywerenothereduringthewar.OnlysincetheCPAaretheyhere.”Othersstatecategoricallythat“theAmbororosarefaraway,IhaveneverseenthemherewithLRA.”LRAreturneesreportthattheyhadexperiencedclashesbetweenLRAandAmbororo.Yetevenifadirectconnectionishardtoestablish,thedoublethreatfromtwoarmedgroupswithunclearaimsmakesitimpossibleforresidentstofeeltheyhavegainedanythingfromtheCPA.

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5.1Obstaclestoareturntodialogue

DespitethesuccessofOperationLightningThunderindamagingLRAcommandstructuresandrescuingabductees,itsoverridingfailurewasnotprovidingadequatecivilianprotection.WhilethecommandstructureoftheLRAmayhavebeenhurt,itscapacitytoattackandkillinsmallgroupshasnot.ThethreatposedbytheLRAtociviliansisnowgreaterthanbefore.Thishascausedlocalfrustrationwiththemilitaryattempttoendtheconflict,andhasmaderevivingapoliticalprocessmoredifficult.Itseemsunlikelythatmilitaryforcewillresultinanydealbeingsigned,andanytrustthathadbeenbuiltbetweennegotiatingpartiesinJuba–howeverfragile–hasgone.

TheUgandangovernmenthassignalleditisnotpreparedtorevivetheJubaprocessinanyway,althoughitisnotclearwhetherthesameappliestoanykindofpoliticalprocess.TheLRAisonceagainaforcethatcannotbereachedorcommunicatedwith,makingitveryhardforanyone–UN,civilsocietyorNGOs–toenvisionhowaprocesscouldberestarted.CommunicatingwiththeLRAremainsacrucialproblem,evenmoresosincetheyhavesignificantlyreducedtheiruseofsatellitephones.WhilereturneessaythatmanyLRAcommanderslistentotheradionews,itwillbedifficulttoreachthemanyLRAsoldierswhodonothaveaccesstoaradio.

Thereareotherobstacles.DuringtheJubatalks,theLRAdelegationwaslargelydrawnfromtheAcholidiasporaandseriousriftsdevelopedduringnegotiations,repeatedlyunderminingtheprocess.ItisunclearhowclosecommunicationisnowbetweentheLRAandthediasporasupporters.EvenifcredibleoutsiderepresentationfortheLRAwastoemerge,itisunlikelythattheUgandangovernmentwouldacceptanotherprocessofproxynegotiationaftertheexperienceofJuba.

Thelegacyofinternationalinvolvementpresentsfurtherchallenges.Intenseinternationalinvolvement,unprecedentedinpreviousinitiatives,hadcontradictoryeffects.Ononehand,itmadethepeacetalkspossiblethroughinternationalfundingandadvocacyforapoliticalsolution.Ontheother,itcreatedatremendouslycomplexenvironmentthatwashardfortheLRAtonavigate.ForexampletheLRAwasrequiredtotrustanumberofactors,somewithveryconflictingviewsoninternationaljusticeprocedures,thattheywouldnotbeextraditedoncetheyhadsignedtheagreement.Inthefinalmeetings,Konycitedproblemsunderstandingtheframeworkonjusticeandaccountability,drawnuptofulfiltheICC’srequirementsthatlocaljusticeproceduresprotecttheinterestofthevictimssufficiently.Theobstaclescreatedbythecomplexinternationalmachinerycanperhapsonlybeovercomebyasmaller,civilsocietydrivenprocess.

5.2Themoodforapoliticalsolution

CitizensofSouthernSudanandDRCstateclearlythattheyhavebeenleftexposedandvulnerablebytheirgovernmentsandtheinternationalcommunity.Yetdespitehugefrustrationwiththecurrentsituation,theyalsoexpressanunderstandingaboutwhatthenegotiatorshadtriedtoachieve:“Itwasnotamistake,itwasagoodinitiative,”saidoneYambioresidentaboutthepeacetalkswiththeLRA.“Thereisnopeacetalkswhichisperfect,mistakescanbecorrectedlater.Itisalwaysbettertodosomethingthannothing.”

YetsomeSudaneselocalsarenolongerpreparedtooffertheirsupportforpeacetalks:“Anybodywhoistalkingofnegotiationshouldrelocatethenegotiationstotheirowncountry,”saidonememberoftheSPLA.“WhentheSPLAnegotiatedinKenya,wedidnotkillKenyanswhileweweretalking.WhowantstonegotiatewithKonyshouldnotcometoSouthernSudan.Enoughisenough.”

Othersfeltthatallsidesweretoblameforthefailureofthepeacenegotiations.TheLRA,whileofficiallystillatthenegotiationtable,continuedandintensifiedattacksandabductions.TheUPDFonseveraloccasionsbroketheCessationofHostilitiesAgreement.“InSudan,governmentofSouthernSudanhastalkedandalsopreparedtofight,”saidoneyouthleader,referringtotheSPLA’sagreementtoalsopursuetheLRAwhilethepeaceprocesswasostensiblystillalive:

Ugandadidthesame.Thisisneversincerepeacetalk.Weneedpureandtruepeacetalks.UgandaandthegovernmentofSouthernSudanneedtoshowtheirtruecolours.Ifyouwanttonegotiate,don’tfightme.EitherthereneedstobeapropermilitaryresponseoryouhavetonegotiatebetterwithDRCandSouthernSudan.

WhilestressingtheimportanceofimplementingwhathadalreadybeensignedintheJubaprocess,amemberoftheSouthernSudangovernmentsaidthatitwasimpossibletobelievethatKonywouldevertrustUganda’sPresidentMuseveniwithregardtohisownsafety,butalsothattheoptionofstayinginSudanforsafety,

wasneverconveyed.Theinternationalcommunityshouldhavejustsaid‘signandgowherever’.WhenMuseveniseesopportunityforpeace,hisrhetoricchangesfrom‘partnerinpeace’to‘victorinpeace’.Youneedtoconcedeprideandegothatyouarethevictor.Ifyoudon’t,Iwillthinkyourpeacedealisbait.

AseniorSPLAfigureexpressedhisdisappointmentthatintheend,thepromiseofpeaceprovedweakerthanthe

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5Strategies to end the conflict

threatofaninternationalwarrant:“NobodycouldgiveKonystrongenoughguarantees,”hesaid.“Ultimately,thatiswhyitfailed.”

5.3Seekingnewopportunities

Despitethechallengesithasbecomeclearthatinordertomovetowardsaresolutionoftheconflict,strategiesthatgobeyondmilitaryoperationsarenecessary.Themilitaryoption,aimedatachievinganoutrightvictoryagainsttheLRA,hasremainedtheUgandangovernment’sfavouredapproach.YetthereisalitanyoffailedattemptstosecureadecisiveblowagainsttheLRA.InMarch2002,theUgandangovernmentembarkedonamilitaryoperationagainsttheLRAinSudanwiththeencouragementofSudanesegovernment.TheyhadcalculatedthatattackingtheLRAfromtherearwouldresultinadecisivevictory.AlmosteightyearsafterthelaunchofOperationIronFist,theUgandanforcesoperatinginSudanhavenotdefeatedtheLRA.Insteadtheoperationresultedinincreasedabductionsandhadseverehumanitarianconsequences,includingover1.8millioninternallydisplacedpersonsinnorthernUganda.OperationLighteningThunderhasequallyresultedintodevastatingconsequencesforthelocalpopulationinDRCandWesternEquatoriaState.

Continuingonapathtopeaceisnecessaryifanextendedregionalhumanitariancrisiswithlow-levelconflictistobeavoided.Abandoningtheinstitutionsofthepeacetalksandoptingforamilitarystrategyhasworsenedthesituationforthecommunities.Lackingacrediblepathtoanegotiatedalternative,communitieshaveableakoutlookonthefuture.Toavoidprolongeddeterioration,channelsofcommunicationwiththeLRAleadershipneedtobere-established.TheJubaprocessmadeanattemptatinclusivity,callingfortheparticipationofcivilsocietyactors,butitfocusedalmostexclusivelyonUgandanrepresentatives.Recentdevelopmentsseemtosuggestthatapeaceprocessneedstoincludecivilsocietyfromallaffectedcountriesandthatcooperationbetweencivilsocietyactorsacrossbordersneedstobestrengthened.

Strategically,OperationLightningThundermarksaneweraofregionalmilitarycooperation.Paradoxically,giventhedevastatingsecurityandhumanitarianeffectsoftheoperation,thecooperationitsignifiesmayhaveopeneddoorsforincreasedregionaldialogueifapoliticalprocesscanbestartedonthebackofit.

TherecognitionthattheLRAconflictispartofthecomplexwebofviolentconflictsintheUganda,SudanandDRCborderregionsisanessentialsteptowardsprotectingthecivilianpopulationsoftheseareas.Communityleadersfromallthreecountriesstressthatacomprehensiveregionalapproachtoconflictresolutionisnecessary.Communitiesalsoseeurgentneedtoimprovecivilian-militaryrelationsinordertoestablishasenseoftrustvis-à-vistheirownarmy.Theregionalapproachneedstoextendtotheinvolvementofcivilsociety.Communityleadersinallthreecountrieshaveexpressedawishtoengagemore

withtheircounterpartsacrosstheborderandtohaveamoreunitedvoicewhentalkingtogovernments,forexamplewhendiscussingtheimpactofmilitaryoperationsoncommunities.

CommunityleadershavecalledforgovernmentrepresentativesfromUganda,theDRC,andtheSudanesegovernmentsinJubaandKhartoumtocometogetherspecificallytodiscussissuesofcivilianprotection.Themandatesofforeigntroopsneedtobediscussedandconveyedinaclearmannertotheaffectedpopulations,possiblythroughpermanentcommunityrepresentationonaregionalsecuritycommittee.Suchcooperationwouldenablecivilianstoestablishbetterrelationshipswiththeirownarmies,usingtheinformationtoidentifywhethersoldiersweremovingoncommandorwereroguesoldiersposingathreat.SucharelationshipoftrustwasalsoseentobepotentiallybeneficialtoimprovedsecuritynetworksinwhichlocalrepresentativeswouldagreeonearlywarningsignalstoavoidsurpriseattacksbytheLRA.

5.4Prioritizingsupportforcommunities

InadditiontothehumanitarianandprotectionchallengesforrefugeesandIDPs,thecurrentsituationalsobringstolightmanyofthelong-termproblemsthatlocalcommunitieswillface.CongoleserefugeesinterviewedinSudansaidthatthelastsixmonthshadforeveralteredtheircommunities.“Thenumberofmenisnowreducedbecausetheyhavekilledsomanypeople,”explainedonechief.Furthermore,relativelyfewsupposedescapeesfromtheLRAhavereturned,reportingtheremightbeasmanyas500abductedSudaneseandCongolesestillwiththeLRA.

AlocalcommunitycentreinYambioiscurrentlyusedtohousereturneeswhiletheirfamiliesaretraced,butitisunderstoodthatthisisnotaworkablelong-termsolution,especiallyifthenumbersofreturneesincreases.Inadditiontoestablishingsuitableaccommodation,thelocalauthoritiesarepreparingtoputintoplacethemechanismsneededtotraceandpreparefamilies.Anenvironmentneedstobeestablishedthatfacilitatesreturnandreintegration,bothforreturningyoungmenandforyoungwomenwhoinsomecasesmightcomewithbabiesborninthebush,fatheredbytheirLRAhusbands.LocalchurchesintheDRChavedevelopedastrategyof‘fosterfamilies’.Whilethisisonlymeanttobeatemporarystrategy,itisdifficulttofindfamiliestofosterchildrenreturningfromtheLRA.Tracingfamilyisoftenimpossibleinthecurrentvolatilesituationwheremostfamiliesaredisplaced.

Yetlocalauthoritiesarealreadylookingaheadintofuturetasks,saidWesternEquatoria’sSocialDevelopmentMinister:

RealsupportisneededforLRAabductees,butweneedlong-termprojects,lookingintodealingwiththetraumaofthesepeopleandtheirfamilies….Weneedpackages,weneedtocomeupwitha

14 • Conciliation Resources

After Operation Lightning Thunder:Protectingcommunitiesandbuildingpeace • 15

systemtofollow-up.Weneedtodealwithtrauma,particularlymotherswhohavebeencarryingthebabiesoftheseguys.

Localleadersexpectagrowingneedforreintegrationsupportstructures.Communities,onemaninMaridisaid,aresimplynotpreparedforthetremendouslydifficulttaskofreintegration,andtheongoingsecuritythreatanddangertolivelihoodsmeansthatangerisexpectedto

beaimedatreturnees:“Youcanseethestigmanow,”explainedaseniorchurchleader.“Apersonofninetotenyearsoldiscapturedandcomesback.Theywillhearpeoplesaythattheyarerebels.Someofusherewillalsoneedtobecounselled.”

6.1Onthepeaceprocess

Allpartiesshouldrenewtheircommitmentto•endingtheconflictbyendingviolenceandre-establishingcommunication.ThisincludestheLRA,theUgandangovernment,otheraffectedgovernmentsaswellastheUNSpecialEnvoy,butalsodonorgovernments.

Inordertore-establishcommunicationwith•theLRA,itssupportersandallgovernmentsconcerned,aregionalcivilsocietycommitteeshouldbeestablishedasapermanentregionalbodyforconflictresolution.WhilefocusingonrevivingtheLRA/Ugandapeaceprocess,itshouldbemandatedtoaddresslong-termpeacebuildingandreconciliationinthevolatileborderareasinconjunctionwithgovernmentsandsecurityforces.

ThesignedagreementsoftheJubaprocessneed•tobehonouredbytheUgandangovernmentthroughimplementationofthecomprehensivesolutionasnegotiatedinJuba.AnassessmentofachievementsandfailuresoftheJubaprocesswillhelpinadvancingthepeaceprocessandlearningfrompastmistakes.

6.2Onsecurity

Civilianprotectionisapriority.Governments•oftheaffectedareasneedtoworktogethertoensurethattheirsecurityforcesenhancecommunitysecurity.

Humanitarianeffortsbytheinternational•communityneedtobesteppeduptoprovidefoodandshelterforthoserecentlydisplacedinSudanandDRC.

Thelocalcommunitiesneedtodevelopearly•warningmechanismsandcommunicationtobebetterpreparedforattacks.Thisneedstobefacilitated,withanemphasisoncommunicationatthecommunitylevelratherthancommunitymilitarization.

6.3Onreconciliationandreintegration

Therespectivegovernmentsneedtoestablish•aforuminwhichcross-borderissuescanbeaddressedonaregularbasis.Consistentmechanismsforcross-borderdialogueandinteractionareneededtomakethebordersmoresecure,stabilizetheregionandstartonthepathtoreconciliation,particularlyontheSudan/Ugandaborder.

Incommunitiesexpectingreturneesfromthe•LRA,mechanismsshouldbeestablishedtoreceivethosewhohavebeenwiththeLRAandreunitethemwiththeirfamilies.Thisincludessafeaccommodationforreturnees,preparingfamiliesbeforereintegration,andreliablefollow-upprocedures.

6Recommendations

conciliation resourcesConciliationResources173UpperStreetLondonN11RGUnitedKingdom

Telephone +44(0)2073597728Fax +44(0)2073594081Email cr@c-r.orgWebsite www.c-r.org

Acknowledgements

Thisreportwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthehelpofmanypeople.WeareindebtedtoCharlesTabanandCharlesTolitAityafortheirresearchworkandguidance.ThanksalsogotoFr.BenoitKinaleguinDungu,DRCwhomadethevisitpossible.Inalltheplacesvisitedwewerereceivedwarmlyandassistedbylocalleadersandelders.Wethankalltheinterviewees,andparticipantsintheJubadialogueandthefirstregionaljointanalysisworkshopheldinGulu,northernUgandainMarch2009.WearegratefultoAaronGriffithsandMelissaJonesforvaluableeditorialinput.

AllphotosbyMareikeSchomerus.

Acronyms and abbreviations

CAR CentralAfricanRepublicCPA ComprehensivePeaceAgreementDRC DemocraticRepublicofCongoFARDC ArmedForcesoftheDemocratic

RepublicofCongoFPA FinalPeaceAgreementICC InternationalCriminalCourtIDP InternallyDisplacedPersonLRA Lord’sResistanceArmyMONUC UnitedNationsOrganizationMission

intheDemocraticRepublicofCongoSPLA SudanPeople’sLiberationArmyUNOCHA UnitedNationsOfficeforthe

CoordinationofHumanitarianAffairsUPDF UgandaPeople’sDefenceForce

ConciliationResourcesisanindependentcharitywithoveradecadeofexperienceworkinginternationallytopreventandresolveviolentconflict,promotejusticeandbuildlastingpeace.

Ourpracticalandpolicyworkisguidedbytheneedsofpeoplelivingincountriesaffectedorthreatenedbywar.WeworkintheSouthCaucasus,Fiji,SierraLeone,Liberia,Guinea,UgandaandSudan,andaredevelopingaprojectinIndiaandPakistaninrelationtoKashmir.OureffortstoinfluencepeacemakingpolicyandsharethelessonslearnedalsoincludethepublicationAccord:aninternationalreviewofpeaceinitiativesandaprojectinColombiaandthePhilippines.Ourfundingisthroughgrantsfromgovernments,independenttrustsandfoundations.