Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark

Danida

Concept Note

for

South Sudan Country Programme, 2016-2018

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Strategic questions to guide the Programme Committee Meeting

Giving the unstable situation in South Sudan and the fact that the initial implementation of the recently signed peace agreement (August 2015) is occurring concurrently with the country programming process, does the Programme Committee agree with the approach that parts of the programme are currently relatively loosely defined? These aspects will be included in the formulation mission in January/February 2016, where opportunities for support to the peace process will also be clearer.

The proposed country programme 2016-2018 builds on three scenarios and two related indicative budgets. Does the Programme Committee see any obstacles to this approach?

Does the Programme Committee find the proposed country programme, i.e. the thematic programmes, engagements and indicative budgets, relevant and realistic, and that it includes the key focus areas which should form Denmark’s profile in and development cooperation with South Sudan?

1. INTRODUCTION

After 20 months of violent conflict, which has entailed a failing state building process, the warring parties in South Sudan signed a peace agreement (ARCRSS) in August 2015 giving cautious hope that South Sudan is now, slowly, on the road to peace. The situation is, however, still fragile - not least due to an economy on the brink of collapse, a deteriorating humanitarian situation with more than 2 million displaced people and an unsteady start-up of the implementation of the peace agreement. Moreover, the peace agreement envisages a transitional period of 30 months (from November 2015 until summer 2018), i.e. throughout almost the entire duration of the country programme. At this point in time it is thus difficult to predict how South Sudan will develop in the coming three years.

The concept note provides an outline of the Danish country programme for South Sudan 2016-2018, which is based on the analyses and strategic considerations outlined in the Danish interim country

policy paper 2016-2018.1 The overall objective of Danish support to South Sudan is to support the South

Sudanese people in building a united and peaceful country through support for the peace process, improved protection and security, inclusive governance, and enhanced living conditions for all. The country programme 2016-2018 will contribute to the achievement of the objective through two thematic programmes:

1. Support to the peace process, governance and enhancement of women’s rights

2. Strengthening community resilience and livelihoods

The concept note outlines a flexible and adjustable approach with prioritized engagements adaptable to the fluid situation in South Sudan. This approach is based on strategic lessons learned and results achieved in the current Danish development engagement with South Sudan (2012-2015) where the overarching development approach has been maintained, while interventions have been adjusted to quickly respond to the volatile situation after the outbreak of the conflict in December 2013.

In accordance with the Danish Country Policy Paper for South Sudan 2016-2018, Denmark will apply a scenario approach (to be outlined below). In line with the need for flexibility, the scenario approach includes two slightly different indicative budgets. The objective of the Danish engagement will remain constant in all scenarios, the key difference being that scenario 1 and 2 permits support to the peace agreement, while in scenario 3 Denmark would aim to support a renewed peace process. If this is not considered possible, support for the remaining engagements or other emerging areas related to the two thematic programmes would be scaled up.

1 The Danish Interim Country Policy Paper 2016-2018 is currently in the final stages of approval.

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In order to continue the Danish engagement with South Sudan, one of the most fragile states in Africa, it is considered highly relevant to move forward with the country programming process, despite the current unstable situation. This is not least in order to limit the funding gap between the current country programme which will end in December 2015 and the new country programme (2016-2018) which is set to reach final approval in the autumn of 2016, cf. the annexed Process Action Plan.

2. CONCLUSIONS FROM PREPARATORY ANALYSES JUSTIFYING THE ENVISAGED SUPPORT

2.1 Country context

1. South Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 2011 following a peace accord with Sudan in 2005 and decades of civil war involving forces loyal to Khartoum and warring South Sudanese factions. The long fight for self-determination left the population of 11 million people highly militarised, grossly underdeveloped, and deeply traumatised and fragmented. In December 2013, different factions of the ruling Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM) government split up, and the country degenerated into violent conflict having severe consequences for the state-building process of the young South Sudan. Since then, the international community supported an IGAD-led peace process, which in August 2015 finally produced a peace agreement between President Salva Kiir, and former Vice-President turned opposition leader, Riek Machar. This is a critical step towards a resumed state-building process– indeed a long-term process which will go beyond the duration of this country programme.

2. The peace agreement essentially puts the state building process back on track by providing for a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU), a permanent ceasefire, transitional security arrangements, a new constitution drafting process, humanitarian assistance, resource and economic reform, post conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction, and joint monitoring. It envisages a transitional period of 30 months with expected national elections in mid-2018 marking the end of the transition. It is still too early to predict if/to which extent the peace agreement and the transitional period will be respected by the parties, but it is likely that its implementation will be nonlinear and include reversals as well as deferred deadlines.

3. The recent conflict reflects the failure to establish a participatory, transparent and accountable system of governance since independence in 2011. In the World Bank’s most recent Governance Index (2014), the country performs poorly across all parameters. With the exception of regulatory frameworks, its performance has decreased since independence. Prior to the split in December 2013, good progress was being made on the New Deal, and a draft Compact provided a comprehensive road map for moving South Sudan beyond transition to development. The conditions for reviving the draft Compact are not yet in place.

4. South Sudan has adopted a decentralised system of government, which, in principle, devolves significant powers to the state authorities. Following a Presidential Decree issued in October 2015, the number of states is now to be expanded from 10 to 28. It is argued by the government that the expansion will strengthen state institutions and bring governance, participation, key services and accountability closer to the citizens. However, the move has also been widely criticised as being in contravention of the recent peace agreement as well as the present Constitution.

5. There is a clear need for a stronger and more active civil society capable of representing citizens and interacting with the government and other duty bearers. National human rights groups, women’s associations and youth groups are emerging, but their capacity is limited. A 2012 study reported that, although NGOs played an important humanitarian role during the conflict with Sudan, the concept of relations between the state and civil society is relatively new and will take time to define.

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Churches as well as traditional and religious leaders enjoy widespread credibility and are reported to play an important intermediary role, through organizing local peace conferences and local political consultations, among others.

6. South Sudan has a strong economic potential in the medium to long term due to its oil wealth and prospective agricultural development, but has since independence, been in a deep economic crisis. Oil has accounted for almost all exports, around 60 pct. of GDP, and for 95 pct. of government revenue. This dependency is reflected in the country’s economic performance, which saw a drastic fall in 2012-2013 as a result of the closure of the oil pipeline to Sudan, a recovery in 2014, and with an expected fall again in 2015 following continued low oil prices. The excessive cost of the conflict has overshadowed the development of other economic drivers, and compounding the situation are damaged oil facilities, fuel and other shortages, misalignment of exchange rates, near-hyperinflation, and a vicious debt cycle, which all have a negative impact on macro-budgetary indicators. Whereas the non-oil economy currently is based on subsistence farming, fishing and livestock-rearing, South Sudan has a huge potential within agriculture: abundant fertile land, water and a population of around 11 million. Less than 5 pct. of arable land is cultivated and few of the 12 million cattle are traded commer-cially. Other growth sectors include mining and forestry but developing these sectors requires heavy investments. Corruption is prevalent, and according to Transparency International’s 2014 corruption perception index, South Sudan ranked 171 out of 175 countries.

7. With regard to gender, the interim constitution guarantees the rights of women to equal pay and property ownership, and South Sudan has taken steps to develop its normative framework in line with international standards (including CEDAW). However, while women have held a quarter of the posts in the cabinet, many women are left in precarious conditions and experience discrimination in employment, access to court and services, pay, credit, inheritance, ownership and management of businesses or land. Moreover, female-headed households are significantly poorer than male-headed households. 72 pct. of females between 15-24 years-old are illiterate compared to 45 pct. of males of the same age and forced/early marriage of young girls - often linked to the family’s economic vulnerability - is common. Many see gender based violence (GBV) as a normal part of life and the burden of women and the acceptance of violence towards women are rarely challenged by men or by communities. Children also face significant abuse exacerbated by the conflict. Human rights organisations have called for the urgent reform of laws on marriage, separation, divorce, GBV and related matters.

8. The conflict has also had a negative impact on human development statistics with the majority of citizens still living at a subsistence level. Outside the oil sector, livelihoods are concentrated in low-productive, unpaid agriculture and pastoralist work, accounting for around 15 pct. of GDP. The population has remained overwhelmingly rural based (almost 83 pct.) and poverty has worsened (from 44 pct. in 2011 to more than 57 pct. in 2015) with a corresponding increase in the depth of poverty. Only 27 pct. of the population aged 15 years and above is literate, with significant gender disparities. Infant mortality is 105 (per 1,000 live births), maternal mortality is 2,054 (per 100,000 live births), and only 17 pct. of children are fully immunized. South Sudan also has a very young population (2/3 being under the age of 30) and unemployment amongst youth is high. Insufficient labour demand, lack of skilled labour, and absence of a coherent government employment policy limit the absorption of youth by the labour market.

9. The humanitarian situation has escalated to alarming levels causing the UN to issue warnings of risk of famine that may affect millions of internally displaced and marginalised people. Conflict, climate impact (e.g. drought, floods), crop diseases, pests, death or theft of livestock as well as (related) displacement are common setbacks for household income, and often leave thousands of families hungry. Citizens’ resilience to shocks is very limited. WFP statistics show that only between

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50-60 pct. of the population can normally be considered food secure and the recent crisis has increased food insecurity and poverty with 4.6 million considered food insecure in 2015. Moreover, 1.6 million people are internally displaced out of which more than 200,000 are currently living in ’Protection of

Civilians’ (PoC) camps managed by UN’s peace keeping operation (UNMISS).2 On top of this, South

Sudan hosts more than 260,000 refugees from conflicts in neighbouring countries and almost two million South Sudanese have returned from Sudan since 2007, putting additional pressure on scarce resources and services. More than 600,000 people have fled South Sudan to neighbouring countries.

10. The conflict has also precipitated a significant deterioration in human rights and a Commission of Inquiry established by the AU in early 2014 has concluded that both parties to the conflict have committed severe human rights violations and other abuses during the conflict. There is evidence of widespread GBV being used as a tool in the conflict, as well as the withholding of food supplies and medicines, and the destruction of villages and forced displacement. The forced conscription and recruitment of child soldiers has also been widespread. As part of the peace agreement, AU has announced the establishment of a Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS). Once established, the Hybrid Court is intended to investigate and prosecute individuals bearing the responsibility for violations of international law and/or applicable South Sudanese law, committed from the outbreak of the crisis in December 2013 through to the end of the Transitional Period in 2018.

11. Even before 2013, human rights protection in South Sudan had been seriously affected by the lack of accountable and transparent institutions as well as a comprehensive legal framework. The relationship between the state and its citizens is fragile and trust and social cohesion is limited. The population at large remains disconnected from the political process and public institutions in Juba and the state capitals, and poor standards of service delivery, security and justice, corruption and violations of human rights have not enabled social trust to be built. As the confidence in security and justice organs is low, people instead rely on customary mechanisms, which however have limited capacity and often do not reflect international norms. Freedom House assesses (2015) that South Sudan is “Not Free”, with particularly low political rights.

2.2 Strategic conclusions from the country analysis

12. South Sudan is currently at a critical crossroads and it is difficult to predict how the situation will develop in the coming years or if/to which extent the transitional period of 30 months will be respected. This lack of clarity suggests a need for flexibility and to maintain the possibility to ramp up certain support or reduce/redirect it depending upon developments. In accordance with the Danish Country Policy Paper for South Sudan 2016-2018, the country programme builds on a scenario approach taking its outset in the three (not exhaustive) scenarios described below.

13. In the volatile (most likely) scenario (1), there will be some degree of positive political will and progress, and the implementation of the peace agreement will move forward, albeit slowly and nonlinearly. Key milestones include the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity, allocation of key positions, the resumption of work on the constitution and preparations for the elections in 2018 (marking the end of the transitional period). There will be intense international pressure on the parties to stick to the agreement, and much international support is required to implement the process, which Denmark will take part in. In this scenario it is expected that fighting will continue in parts of the country, but at a reduced level, the economic situation will show slow signs of

2 The mandate of UNMISS is to help consolidate peace and security, protect civilians, secure humanitarian access and

monitor human rights. In October 2015, the UN Security Council ratified an interim change of the mandate to also include support to the implementation of the peace agreement. UNMISS comprises a troop level of 12,500, including 2,500 troops from neighbouring IGAD countries.

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improvement, and the government’s allocation of resources will still primarily be focused on the security sector.

14. The improving scenario (2) takes its outset in a positive demonstration of political will that leads to a full and timely implementation of the peace agreement leading to tangible progress on the transitional arrangements. The implementation of key milestones in the peace agreement will trigger the cautious resumption of development assistance based on a revised form of Compact and South Sudan Development Plan (currently 2011-2013). This would see a positive movement on governance reform, progress in reducing poverty and economic growth. In this scenario, the legitimacy of the Transitional Government of National Unity would gradually increase with its delivery on commitments in the peace process, a ceasefire that holds, inclusive governance, improvements in human rights, service delivery etc. With the resumption of oil flows, the economy and fiscal situation would gradually stabilise.

15. In the worsening scenario (3) takes its outset in a negative demonstration of political will illustrated by a collapse of the implementation process, possibly including a public renouncing of the peace agreement, resumed violent conflict throughout the country, increased poverty, increased human rights abuses, reduced or negligible oil exports, further economic deterioration, and the collapse of the formal market economy. A renewed peace mediation process might be established.

16. The overall objectives of the Danish engagement with South Sudan are expected to remain constant across the scenarios, although the development response will need to reflect what is doable in the actual situation. Key for the use of this scenario approach is constant monitoring and analysis of ongoing activities. Most of the envisaged engagements in the country programme are relatively flexible in this respect and can be pursued in all scenarios. The key difference will be that scenario 1 and 2 permits support to the peace agreement. In scenario 3, Denmark will aim to support a possible renewed peace process. If this is not considered possible, support for the remaining components or other emerging areas related to two thematic programmes would be scaled up.

3. KEY EXPERIENCES AND RESULTS OF PREVIOUS DANISH SUPPORT

17. Since the signing of the peace agreement between the regime in Khartoum, Sudan, and the SPLM in 2005, Denmark has supported South Sudan through a combination of development aid and humanitarian assistance. Some support was also channelled through the Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF). The most recent package of Danish development aid (2012-2015, DKK 205 million) was originally focused on governance and stabilisation (including inputs to decentralisation, capacity building, human rights/gender, security sector reform, and peace building/conflict prevention). In response to the events of December 2013, focus was shifted towards reconciliation at national and sub-national levels, the peace process and humanitarian response. Whereas the year-on-year development budget was left unaffected, the funding allocated to humanitarian support3 was increased with additional focus on local reconciliation and food security. After the outbreak, support was also provided to FAO to strengthen community resilience and to IGAD’s Monitoring and Verification Mission (MVM), which has had a role in overseeing the cessation of hostilities (of January 2014). Within the governance sector, the support to decentralisation (through the World Bank’s Local Governance and Service Delivery Programme) was maintained.

18. Results of Danish engagement with South Sudan since its independence have included: 1) strengthened local governance institutions and civil society, through the World Bank’s LGSD-

3 In 2014, Denmark provided humanitarian assistance worth DKK 236 million. These are channelled partly through UN

agencies (UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and UNFPA), ICRC and partly through Danish INGOs (including ADRA, DanChurchAid, Danish Red Cross, Danish Refugee Council, Doctors without Borders, and Save the Children).

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Programme, including capacity building of village and town councils to improve community participation and provision of local grants for community projects; 2) increased participation of women in decision-making, through UN Women’s country programme, whereby women leaders, including female Members of Parliament, among others have been trained in their roles and responsibilities as duty bearers; 3) increased access of girls to education, among others through support to the Yei Boarding School for Girls; 4) prevention of gender-based violence, through support to the International Rescue Committee’s GBV programme; and 5) increased community resilience through FAO, whereby the capacity of farmers to apply sustainable farming techniques.

19. The rapid adjustment of the Danish support in December 2013 constitutes valuable lessons learned and illustrates both Denmark’s ability to respond to these contextual changes, to maintain the overarching development approach and to apply flexibility in the design and management of programmes in fragile states. The choices in South Sudan were essentially between adjusting to (a) increase the response to immediate additional humanitarian needs, (b) maintaining, with adjustments, development-oriented engagements capable of continuing and thus maintaining anchors for post-crisis inputs (c) suspending engagements that were becoming politically sensitive and practically unrealistic, or where the emphasis needed to change to more short and medium term goals. While some of these options were covered through the unallocated funds within the programme, there was also a need to understand that some commitments had to be changed. As demonstrated, key is to engage early and to stay engaged through a flexible, risk-willing and integrated approach that allows for changes in response to altered circumstances on the ground. Even when the immediate focus is driven by humanitarian needs, a development perspective will be sustained to safeguard earlier investments and maintain anchors for post-crisis efforts. On the administrative side, lack of capacity of some locally based partners has been observed (also due to the difficult operating environment) compounded by constraints in implementation and monitoring mainly due to the security situation.

20. In adapting to contextual changes, it has been important to ensure that aid has been harmonised. Denmark is thus participating in and has aligned its support to the guidelines set by the international donor community in Juba (the G6+), which has sought to provide common messaging to the government and the opposition, for instance through the Government Partner Forum. Given the limitations of Denmark’s presence on the ground in Juba, it will be important that the support is informed by joint assessments and that Denmark participates as fully as possible in joint donor platforms so that interventions are coherent and complementary.

4. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AND JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROGRAMME

21. The strategy for the country programme is informed by the above lessons and reflects priorities in Denmark’s development cooperation (2016) including fighting poverty, addressing the causes of migration, enhancing women’s rights as well as peace and stability. Moreover, the programme builds on the human rights-based approach, and respect for human rights is thus a fundamental and cross-cutting theme in the programme. The programme also builds on Denmark’s policy for operating in fragile states, which prioritises: Stabilisation and security; livelihoods and economic opportunities; democratisation, good governance and human rights; conflict prevention; and local and regional conflict management. The programme will not address all of these areas, however, it will be able to contribute to many of them.

22. The rationale for the continued Danish development engagement takes its outset in Denmark’s history of support to the region which started years before South Sudan’s independence from Sudan in 2011. For Denmark (and other international actors), carefully tailored development support is relevant to preserve the results already achieved and the need to back up the peace

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agreement, all of which are major arguments for remaining engaged. As noted above, how South Sudan manages these opportunities will determine the path towards future development. Remaining engaged also means that Denmark will continue to influence, and contribute to, the response from the international community. Most importantly, and immediately, this entails earmarking development support for priority areas where the South Sudanese parties will need assistance, and supporting the peace agreement and providing positive incentives, alongside our partners.

23. As noted, South Sudan is expected to remain a high-risk environment (also security wise) for the coming years, and the operationalisation of the peace agreement presents many challenges that can be expected to delay the process. Concurrently, and disregarding possible progress in the implementation of the peace agreement, the consequences of the conflict, and the damage it has done to social trust, livelihoods, the economy, and confidence in national institutions, particularly security and law enforcement, is immense, and remedies will need to be carefully woven into the recovery and development process. These challenges are multi-dimensional and inter-related, and will have consequences for the implementation of the country programme, albeit to varying degrees. Moreover, if the peace process collapses and widespread violent conflict resumes, the country risks degenerating into a failed state. With a number of other fragile states in the region, this would represent a serious threat to broader peace and security, and have major humanitarian implications, which Denmark and its international partners have an interest in preventing.

24. While the most pressing humanitarian needs will be met through humanitarian assistance, it will be relevant to encourage more sustainable approaches to building community resilience to reduce the dependence on humanitarian assistance. Equally relevant (in all three scenarios) will be the maintenance of support to the most vulnerable and exposed segments of the population, in particular women and children. Denmark has previously had a focus on women and children, and responses to GBV which will be continued.

5. PRELIMINARY OVERVIEW OF ENVISAGED PROGRAMME SUPPORT

5.1 Outline of the support strategy and description of the design

25. In order to support the achievement of the overall objectives of Danish engagement in South Sudan, the programme will channel DKK 115 million between 2016 and 2018 through two thematic programmes, both of which, to varying degrees, apply to each of the scenarios outlined above. In view of the contextual risks and general weakness of fiduciary and planning systems, the programme

objective is not considered suitable for budgetary support.4

26. The future of South Sudan is hard to predict, and this concept note builds on three different scenarios. However, as the most likely scenario takes it outset in an implementation of the peace agreement, it seems reasonable to also use this scenario as the basis of the overall change logic (Theory of Change) for the programme, see box 1.

4 An assessment according to the budget support principles is thus not included in the annexes.

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27. Underpinning the Theory of Change is an assumption that, if established, confidence in the Transitional Government of National Unity will – in the longer-term – gradually increase as tangible benefits become more evident. As levels of security slowly improve, and states and local authorities provide services more or less in accordance with plans and budgets developed in a more transparent, inclusive and transparent way, citizens will be better equipped to withstand climate impacts, and the government will be more able to respond to them. Also contributing to this positive dynamic will be possible renewed oil flows, and income coupled with increasing control over fiscal policy and corruption.

28. However, South Sudan’s recent history does not provide confidence that this transition will be easy, also taking into consideration that the potential spoilers of the process include the same actors that must bring the country forward. A further assumption is thus, that positive drivers of change (including to some extent development actors) are able to act cohesively enough to apply the necessary external and internal (including bottom-up) pressure on the political elite and to counter spoiling tactics of political actors where these arise. It is, however, acknowledged that the above-mentioned development will most likely not be fully met within the duration of the country programme 2016-2018 - not even if the peace agreement is timely and fully implemented.

Thematic Programme 1: Support to the peace process, governance and the enhancement of women’s rights

This thematic programme is designed to enable Denmark to continue to support the peace process, governance and enhancement of women’s rights. The immediate objective is to contribute to the peace process leading to support for a resumed state-building process and an accountable transitional government, with increased capability of meeting citizens’ rights to protection and participation as well as enhancing women’s rights. The requirements for supporting the peace process are not yet fully defined, as the process has only recently been initiated and is now slowly moving forward. The support to enhancement of gender-equality and prevention of GBV will include support to UNWOMEN and the International Rescue Committee (IRC), in continuation of previous successful cooperation. The support to governance is to a certain degree mainstreamed in all of the engagements.

29. Development Engagement 1: Support to the Peace Process

Development partners are closely following the peace process and investigating ways and means to support the implementation of the peace agreement. At the present moment, Danish support might be

targeted at the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM),5 whose task it is to monitor adherence to the security aspects of the peace agreement throughout the 30-month transition period by all armed parties; and, by extension, to the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), whose monitoring and peace facilitation activities to a high degree will be based

on information provided by the CTSAMM. The parties to the peace agreement are considering to hold

5 Support to the CTSAMM is thus used as an example in the results framework.

Box 1: Theory of Change

- if Denmark joins other development partners, international interlocutors and local stakeholders in support for key development areas, delivering coherent messaging and supporting the peace process in South Sudan

- then progress will be made against key transition and other milestones, thereby slowly solidifying peace, strengthening civil society and resilience of the population, eventually enabling South Sudan to move into recovery, development and a resumed state-building process,

- because the combination of external and internal incentives and resources made available will be sufficient to generate the political will and the strength of the South Sudanese people that is necessary to move forward.

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a donor conference (probably before the end of 2015) to present the various needs for donor support to the implementation of the peace agreement, including support to CTSAMM and JMEC. The Embassy will seek to closely align the support - including common messaging - with other international donors.

30. The CTSAMM and JMEC are two out of the seven new institutions/mechanisms included in the peace agreement, others are e.g. the Special Reconstruction Fund (SPR), the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC) and Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH). The institutionalisation processes are slowly moving forward including the recent

appointments of the chairman of both the JMEC and the CTSAMM.6 The JMEC is envisaged to be

launched in late November 2015 marking the shift of responsibility for the monitoring of the implementation of the peace agreement from IGAD to JMEC.

31. Should the implementation of the peace agreement collapse (i.e. the worsening scenario), Denmark will aim to support a possible renewed peace mediation process. If this is not considered possible, the funds will be redirected to either the remaining engagements or to other relevant emerging areas within the two thematic programmes

32. Development Engagement 2: UN Women’s South Sudan Country Programme

This engagement will support the work of UN Women in South Sudan in alignment with the UN’s Development Assistance Framework and the South Sudan Development Plan. The overall goal is to strengthen institutional capacity to promote gender equality and empowerment of women. This will seek to enhance capacities of selected government institutions at national and state levels in the formulation/adoption of gender responsive legal and policy frameworks and mechanisms (including in relation to access to justice) and in mainstreaming gender in planning, budgeting and monitoring to overcome deep-rooted gender inequalities. It is essential for the development of South Sudan that women should no longer remain side-lined in issues concerning justice, politics and broader, day-to-day decision-making affecting their, and the country’s, welfare. The inclusion of women is vital to enable them to contribute to, and to become equal partners in peacebuilding and development processes.

33. The rationale for the engagement lies in the fact that, regardless the progress made by the country so far in terms of women’s participation and leadership, there are still tremendous challenges to be addressed. Inadequate laws and loopholes in legislative frameworks, poor enforcement of existing laws, and capacity and implementation gaps, make constitutional guarantees on gender equality hollow promises, having little impact on the day-to-day lives of women and girls. In particular, inadequate law enforcement capacity within the police and judiciary is one of the factors contributing to the perpetuation of GBV against women and girls.

34. The engagement will focus on the following specific objectives: a) enhancing women’s political leadership and participation in decision-making; b) promoting access to fair justice for women and girls and c) gender mainstreaming in national and sectorial planning, budgeting and monitoring. UN Women will provide a comprehensive package of activities targeting legislators, women parliamentarians, civil society and the private sector. The activities will include: capacity building, provision of technical support, mentoring and the establishment of monitoring systems for the implementation of laws and policies. In addition, the engagement has the potential to make a vital contribution in support of women’s participation in the peace process, in particular through supporting gender equality objectives in the specific bodies and areas indicated in the peace agreement. The precise tailoring of the engagement in these regards will be pursued during programme formulation and/or as greater clarity on the implementation of the peace agreement develops.

6 The chairman of the JMEC will be the former president of Botswana, Festus G. Mogae. The chairman of CTSAMM will

be the Ethiopian Major General, Molla Hailemariam.

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35. Development Engagement 3: IRC’s Gender Based Violence Programme

This engagement will build upon the existing IRC programme implemented with Danish support primarily in Lakes and Central Equatoria states and focused on building the capacity of local government and other institutions to prevent GBV, provide quality health and psychosocial services to survivors of physical and sexual assault and raise awareness at community level through campaigning. The engagement will contribute to the following objective: Women and girls live in a country where they are respected, have access to essential services and opportunities, influence how they are governed and live free from violence. 36. The rationale for the engagement is the pervasive presence of gender-inequality – which is one of the causes of all forms of GBV– that manifests in all aspects of life in South Sudan. South Sudan is a very patriarchal and traditional society, where women lack the power to claim their human rights and many of them see GBV as a normal part of life and the burden of women. Prior to December 2013, South Sudan had just started to build up its public service system within which services were to be provided to respond to GBV survivors. Very few GBV services (police, health, social services, legal) were available before the crisis, and those that were did not meet international standards. Before the ongoing crisis, only 40% of the population was able to access health care in South Sudan, and psychosocial interventions were entirely dependent on international aid agencies. Since the outbreak of the conflict in December 2013, the situation has deteriorated further.

37. The main outputs of this engagement are: a) Women and girls receive health, psychosocial, legal and safety support when they experienced GBV; (b) Women lead and are respected within their community; (c) Women and girls are free from GBV, rights violations and discrimination; (d) Women and girls have access and control over economic and social resources. These outputs will be achieved through the provision of a comprehensive package of activities at the local/community level, aimed putting in place and reinforcing both responsive and preventive mechanisms essential to promoting and protecting the rights and welfare of women in the two states. Activities will include the support of service providers relating to GBV, including case management for survivors in formal institutions as well as improving coordination and advocacy on women’s safety, protection and rights (including through support to Respect and Respond campaigns). Moreover, the engagement will focus on improving women’s economic and financial skills in order to support their increasing gain of financial independence. The local focus of the engagement will be further developed during the formulation process to ensure that it also complements the work of UN Women at the national level.

Thematic programme 2: Community resilience and livelihoods

This thematic programme is designed to maintain Danish support at community level so that local resilience against man-made and natural disasters is strengthened and protection is extended to key vulnerable groups, particularly farmers, child soldiers, women and children. The immediate objective is to contribute to ensuring that communities are able to manage adverse conditions brought about by man-made or natural disasters. The thematic programme consists of two development engagements: (1) support to FAO’s community resilience programme, and (2) support to UNICEF’s reintegration of former child soldiers programme.

38. Development Engagement 4: FAO’s community resilience programme

The current Danish support to community resilience being implemented by FAO in the Greater Upper Nile region will be continued and extended in the new programme. The expected outcome of the intervention will be to contribute to reduce risks and vulnerability at household and community level by protecting agricultural livelihoods and improving food security by addressing households and community levels risks.

39. Food insecurity in South Sudan remains multi-faceted, complex, dynamic and widespread, and the recent conflict and protracted crises have worsened the already high level of

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chronic food insecurity and malnutrition in the country. The oil-rich Greater Upper Nile states of Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity, which are severely affected by the conflict, were also the most food insecure prior to the conflict. The region has the highest cereal deficits in the country, high dependency on markets for staple foods, with insecure livelihoods overly dependent on the selling of natural resources (i.e., charcoal, firewood and grass), being the predominant sources of income. Central and Western States have also been sucked into the conflict, and the humanitarian situation is made worse by the mass movement of whole populations, that has eroded traditional risk management and coping strategies, and increased the vulnerability of rural communities. Competition for resources, especially land and water, interlocking with political tensions, has fuelled violent conflict and insecurity, both among livestock keeping communities, as well as between livestock keepers and sedentary farmers. Adaptive and transformative capacities that increase the resilience of households and communities are needed to avoid the impacts of shocks and stresses, and to break the cycle of chronic vulnerability.

40. The expected output areas will include: 1) Diversification of livelihoods (experiential learning leading to improved poultry, climate smart agriculture, effective livestock choices, and promotion of farm forestry); 2) Integrated land and water resource use (involving community based approaches to water resources, fishing and livestock management); 3) Climate-resilient agriculture (including diversification of staple food products); and 4) Improvement of livestock health and production (including community-based work on reducing transboundary animal diseases, improved animal breeding, and alternative livestock income generating activities).

41. Development Engagement 5: UNICEF’s reintegration of child soldiers programme.

This engagement will promote peace and stabilisation and children’s rights in the Greater Pibor Administrative Area by supporting the demobilisation of children from armed groups, preventing their future (re)recruitment, supporting alternative livelihoods and reducing armed violence. The overall objective is to ensure that children and adolescents formerly associated with armed forces and armed groups are released and receive age-appropriate social and economic services, leading to their sustainable reintegration and a reduction of youth involvement in violence.

42. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of children is a critical child protection priority in South Sudan, fuelled by the reported 15,000+ children recruited and used by government, opposition and other forces in the conflict since December 2013. Without effective rehabilitation and reintegration, these children and adolescents represent an additional risk for continued violence and/or criminal activity. In 2015, as the Cobra Faction was integrated into the SPLA, 1,755 children (including 5 girls) were released. They now need long-term socio-economic reintegration and related assistance to help them resume civilian life in their communities. This will build upon the rehabilitation and early reintegration work that UNICEF has already undertaken. Historically, the marginalization of the Pibor area, including a near complete lack of basic services, has been a key conflict driver in the area. It is assumed that supporting reintegration, through an approach that also provides livelihoods benefits to local communities, will thus also help reduce wider downstream risks.

43. This engagement will provide a comprehensive package of education, life skills, technical and vocational training enabling access to improved livelihoods and economic support. It will use a community-based approach, building on the lessons learned and positive outcomes from previous child DDR programmes in South Sudan and the on-going reintegration efforts in Pibor. The engagement will thus involve both former child soldiers and local communities within 5 output areas: 1) rehabilitation and reintegration of up to 2,000 children; 2) released community boys and girls have access to education, including through accelerated learning in the proximity of their family homes; 3) up to 4,000 adolescents and their families produce sufficient food and income in age-appropriate work; 4) socially engaged adolescents contribute to peace and development; and 5)

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improved access to basic commodities and services (e.g. water). The engagement will take a learning approach in its activities in Pibor, from which it will draw to respond to possible releases in other locations.

5.2 Management and monitoring

44. The need for flexibility in the Danish engagement with South Sudan is matched by a flexible management set-up. The programme will be managed by the Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa, in close collaboration with the Juba-based Danida senior advisor who will link into donor mechanisms, follow the peace process and developments on the ground, as well as keep a close contact with partners. Moreover, the Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa will frequently travel to Juba. This set-up, notably the presence in Juba, also facilitates the possibility of working with a more long-term and development-oriented perspective. Furthermore, the programme will minimise the management demands by partnering - and extending already existing partnerships - with strong partners capable of managing implementation, and by joining with other development partners wherever possible. Moreover, the Embassy will explore the possibility of channelling the funds to the three UN agencies included in the programme (UN Women, UNICEF and FAO) through one UN channel, in order to put less strain on the management of the programme. The possibility will be further explored during the formulation process.

45. The flexible scenario approach requires close monitoring in order to follow the development in South Sudan and adapt the Danish engagement accordingly. Since Denmark will work through multilateral channels and other like-minded organizations, indicators developed by the partners will be used in monitoring progress, in order to make monitoring as lean and effective as possible. Moreover, the Embassy will, together with the senior advisor in South Sudan, work closely with trusted cooperation partners, and ensure close coordination and contact with likeminded international donors and South Sudanese contacts. The Embassy might also make use of consultancies, initiate relevant studies, and apply short term technical assistance as deemed necessary, to closely monitor the developments on ground. It should, however, be noted that the monitoring (fields visits in particular) are subject to the security situation on ground. The country programme will undergo a formal review after 1-1½ years. Another review is planned towards the end of the programme period, before the possible onset of a new programme cycle. If the situation in South Sudan radically worsens (i.e. beyond the worsening scenario), the country programme will have to be reviewed.

5.3 Indicative budgets

46. Two indicative disbursement budgets related to the scenarios are set out in the tables below, underlining the necessary flexible approach. Due to the uncertainties relating to the current situation in South Sudan, the amounts shown may change during the formulation. The key difference between the two budgets is the support to the peace process, the remaining development engagements are wholly identical.

47. Budget 1 comprises Danish engagement with South Sudan in the most likely scenario, i.e. in a situation where the peace agreement is being implemented – either slowly, nonlinearly and with occasional setbacks (volatile scenario), or in a timely manner according to the stipulations in the peace agreement (improving scenario). However, if the situation in South Sudan moves towards the worsening scenario, the Danish engagement will take its outset in Budget 2. Support for the peace process (DE 1) will be scaled down and the support for DE 2 and 3 will be scaled up. If support to a possible renewed mediation process is not considered possible, the funds for DE 1 will be reallocated to either the remaining engagements, or to other relevant emerging areas within the two thematic programmes.

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48. In order to enable the programme to provide quick responses to emerging needs, an unallocated amount of DKK 6 million is included in both budgets. These funds can either be used to scale up support to existing partnerships, or for other relevant emerging areas within the two thematic programmes. Should the funds be used to include new partners, the Embassy will aim to only finance a maximum of two engagements throughout the period of the country programme, in order to keep the programme as lean and focused as possible. Moreover, the Embassy will conduct a review to document the capabilities of these potential partners before entering into any commitments. The Embassy will - in close consultation with others - have the final say on how the unallocated funds should be spent.

49. DKK 6 million is allocated in both budgets for the Danida senior advisor, including the lease for the Danida Juba-office, car, housing, security etc. Both budgets include DKK 4 million for review, studies and ad hoc technical assistance, in order to closely monitor the situation on ground, make use of technical assistance as needed, and initiate in-depth studies (e.g. an identification of drivers of change/mobility in South Sudan).

50. As the country programme is expected to be finally approved in the autumn of 2016 (cf. the annexed Process Action Plan), only a relatively small amount of funds are set to be disbursed in 2016 as compared to 2017 and 2018. All development engagements are foreseen to be committed in Q4 2016.

Disbursement Budget 1: Related to the most likely scenario (volatile/improving)

2016 2017 2018 Total

Thematic Programme 1 – The Peace Process, Governance and Enhancement of Women’s rights

DE 1 – Support to peace process 4 8 8 20

DE 2 - UN Women 2 6 7 15

DE 3 – IRC 2 7 7 16

Thematic Programme 2 - Resilience and Livelihoods

DE 4 – FAO 5 10 10 25

DE 5 – UNICEF 5 9 9 23

Other

Unallocated Funds 1 2 3 6

Danida Advisor, Danida Juba-office, housing, security, car etc.

2 2 2 6

Review, studies and ad hoc technical assistance

0,5 1,5 2 4

TOTAL 21,5 45,5 48 115

Disbursement Budget 2: Related to the worsening scenario

2016 2017 2018 Total

Thematic Programme 1 – The Peace Process, Governance and Enhancement of Women’s rights

DE1 - Support for possible renewed peace mediation process

4 4 8

DE 2 - UN Women 5 7 6 18

DE 3 – IRC 5 10 10 25

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Thematic Programme 2 - Resilience and Livelihoods

DE 4 – FAO 5 10 10 25

DE 5 – UNICEF 5 9 9 23

Other

Unallocated Funds 1 2 3 6

Danida Advisor, Danida Juba-office, housing, security, car etc.

2 2 2 6

Review, studies and ad hoc technical assistance

0,5 1,5 2 4

TOTAL 23,5 45,5 46 115

5.4 Preliminary assessment of risk

51. The overarching risk is that resumed and widespread violent conflict, further deterioration of the humanitarian crisis, economic collapse etc. (i.e. the worsening scenario) will further delay/hinder the resumption of the state-building process in South Sudan. In a worst case scenario this might entail that development aid to South Sudan will not be possible.

52. While the present situation offers an opportunity for Denmark to support the peace process and maintain its commitments to the most vulnerable members of society, this will take place in a context that is fluid, highly politicised, and with higher than normal levels of contextual, programmatic and institutional risk.

53. The overall security situation is likely to remain fluid and extremely fragile, with the potential for increased armed conflict in parts of the country. Localised inter-community conflicts are likely to continue and will impact on citizens’ security and livelihoods. The peace process and the Transitional Government of National Unity can expect to suffer set-backs – among others because the political parties are expected to continuously position themselves strategically, throughout the transitional period, in order to gain the best exposure up to the planned elections in the summer of 2018.

54. Similar risks apply to the complicated processes relating to DDR, where significant numbers of young men will need to be reintegrated into society, and to security sector reform (SSR). Without realistic alternative livelihoods, there will be a major risk that these individuals will destabilise the fragile peace. How this is managed will depend on the credibility and impact of the Transitional Government of National Unity, and the loyalty of the new integrated national armed forces.

55. South Sudanese public institutional capacity is low – in places non-existent - and corruption and impunity is pervasive. Overcoming these obstacles will require a civil service reform that was not effectively undertaken in the post-independence period. In this vacuum there will be a tendency to rely upon external advisors rather than local actors, and building sustainable capacity of local human resources will remain very important.

56. The ability of civil society and the media to hold the government to account is weak. Most CSOs are Juba-based and/or work on service delivery on behalf of humanitarian actors, and the media has been particularly targeted and threatened by the authorities, leading to the deaths of several journalists and the banning of various publications. The civil society base therefore needs strengthening, as does an independent and critical media. Without such checks and balances, there is an overwhelming risk that duty bearers will not be held to account and that impunity will continue.

57. South Sudan’s economy is on the brink of collapse, public financial management is weak and non-transparent, official debt is believed to be soaring and unsustainable, imports are curtailed and

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goods and petroleum products are in short supply, inflation is seriously impacting on the purchasing power of wage earners, market forces are made redundant and much of the economy is reverting to barter, and the artificial exchange rate is negatively affecting much development aid. Unless addressed, there is a serious risk that these factors will undermine attempts to get the economy moving again and diversify it.

58. Finally, there are risks that development actors will not act coherently and that the effectiveness of aid will be diminished. In view of the scale of South Sudan’s needs, it will be important to harmonise development partners’ inputs and leverage South Sudan’s own resources. Due to the massive public service (including military) wage burden, the latter is unlikely in the short term, but should be a medium term objective. If not, progress will be impeded, or not occur at all.

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ANNEX 1: Process Action Plan

Updated November 2015

TIME LINE ACTIVITY OUTPUT/REQUESTED DOCUMENTATION

RESPONSIBLE UNIT

Planning of design and formulation.

Process Action Plan Done

26 January – 4 February 2015

Scoping mission Context analyses Done

27 February 2015 Final Scoping report Done

23 April 2015 Float tender for consultants

Minutes of DPC meeting with recommendations (KVA).

Done

11-13 June 2015 Pre-formulation mission by consultants

Debriefing note (incl. gender assessment)

Done

10 November 2015 Forward Concept note to KVA.

Concept note with annexes

Addis Ababa

November 2015 Public consultation of Concept note.

KVA

3 December 2015 Meeting in Danida Programme Committee.

Concept note and annexes.

List of received responses from the consultation and summary conclusions.

KVA/ Addis Ababa

December - March 2016

Late January/early February: Formulation mission

Development of the Country Programme document and development engagement documents

Draft Country programme document, annexes and development engagement documents

Addis Ababa/ consultants

March 2016 Forward ToR for appraisal to TAS

ToR Addis Ababa

1 April 2016 Forward all draft documentation for the country programme to TAS

Draft country program document incl. development engagement documents and associated partner documentation

Addis Ababa

April-May 2016

Exact dates TBD

Appraisal mission TAS

June 2016 Appraisal process Appraisal report, TAS

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finalized recommendations summary

June 2016 Response to recommendation of approval report

Addis Ababa

13 August 2016 Forward Country Programme document with appropriation cover sheet to KVA prior to the meeting in the Danida External Grant Committee

Country programme document, annexes and development engagement documents

Addis Ababa

15 September 2016 (tbc)

Presentation of the country programme to the Danida External Grant Committee

Addis Ababa/KVA

September/October 2016

Approval of the country programme by the Minister of Foreign Affairs

Country programme and resumé from Danida External Grant Committee

Addis Ababa/UGS

October 2016 Signing of legally binding agreements with partners and booking of commitments

Government-to-government agreement(s) and/or other legally binding agreements

Addis Ababa

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ANNEX 2: HRBA/Gender Screening Note

Tool for Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) and Gender Equality Screening

Purpose: The HRBA and Gender Screening Note complement the HRBA Guidance Note and the up-coming Gender Equality Strategy and the Gender Equality Toolbox. The purpose of the note is to facilitate and strengthen the application of the Human Rights Based Approach and mainstreaming of gender equality programming related to Danish development cooperation. It can be used as an inspirational checklist by all staff.

The information in the note should be based on the analysis undertaken as part of the preparation of

the Country policy paper and should draw on major Human Rights and gender equality analysis

relevant for the country such as UPR-processes, reports and documents from OHCHR, EU HR

Strategy, CEDAW-reporting as well as relevant analysis prepared by other major donors. The Screening

Note should be attached to the country programme concept note, and the questions raised below

should be reflected in the country programme document. Appraisal of country programmes will include

a specific focus on HRBA and Gender Equality.

Basic info

Title Danish Country Programme for South Sudan

Country/ region South Sudan

Budget in DKK

mio.

DKK 115 million

Starting date and

duration

2016 - 2018

Human Rights Based Approach

Assess whether a Human Rights (HR) Based Approach has been applied in the programme:

Human Rights Assessment and Standards

Issues: yes no Explain:

Have major HR analysis relevant for the country been consulted (UPR, OHCHR, EU HR Strategy, other relevant donor documents)

X South Sudan has yet to introduce a full HR normative architecture. International treaties currently in force in South Sudan include:

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)

Optional Protocol to the Convention

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on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Convention on the Rights of the Child 1990

The programme is fully aligned to the CEDAW, to the convention on the Rights of the Child, and contributes to global Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) by addressing inequality and injustice experienced by women and girls in South Sudan.

Have key international HR standards and/or mechanisms influenced choice and formulation of outcome areas?

X Important HR standards relating to the programme include:

CEDAW entered into force on 30 May 2015, CEDAW – Optional Protocol entered into force on 30 July 2015,

Convention on the Right of the Child entered into force on 22 February 2015,

National Action Plan for the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000)

Where relevant, is application at national level, including major gaps between human rights in principle vs. human rights in practice, evaluated and identified?

X The programme documentation (including development engagements) includes human rights analysis

Are key recommendations from UPR for the thematic programmes and from any treaty bodies, special procedures, INGOs, HNRIs etc. that require follow up at national level considered?

X No UPR for South Sudan yet. Next round is in October 2016. Attempts have been made to appoint a UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in South Sudan but this has been resisted so far by the government of South Sudan

Are rights-holders identified? X The country programme identifies clearly target groups and beneficiaries including: women leaders and parliamentarians, victims of GBV, community leaders and members in targeted communities, demobilised child soldiers and other children in the targeted communities

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Are duty-bearers identified? X Key duty bearers are the government of South Sudan/Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) at national and state level. However, in the current context (where the TGNU has yet to be formed) not all of the country is under government control, so attention also has to be paid to areas controlled by the opposition

Assess whether Human Rights Principles have been applied in the preparation and in the design of the programme?

Non-discrimination: Are any groups among rights-holders excluded from access and influence in the thematic programme areas identified?

X The programme specifically targets vulnerable groups, including women and children. Access to services provided to different ethnic groups.

Are disaggregated data available on most vulnerable groups?

X Most project data from international agencies is gender disaggregated. However, on an overall level, there is a severe lack of data of any kind, and there is limited gender analysis and subsequent use for policy and programming impact of the gender disaggregated data.

List any key support elements included to promote non-discrimination

Activities aimed at increasing women’s leadership and participating in decision making at all levels; Activities targeting the more excluded and poorest women (demobilised girls associated with armed groups; adolescent clubs; poor rural women); Respect and Respond campaign, dialogue and sensitization sessions with different stakeholders including traditional leaders; men in communities;

Participation and inclusion: Are barriers for participation, inclusion and empowerment of rights holders identified?

X Included in programme documentation

List any key support elements included to promote participation and inclusion

UNICEF and FAO programmes include a community driven development approach that also includes local participation in decision-making.

UN Women works to ensure that women lead and participate in decision making at all levels.

IRC will ensure that individuals and communities are informed of their

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rights and participate in the development of policy and practices affecting their lives and their ability to claim rights where necessary.

Transparency: Is the extent to which information is accessible to rights holders including marginalised groups assessed?

Where relevant, whether information is available in other than official languages of the country in question should be indicated.

To some extent: Rights holders, including (when targeting is applied) marginalised women, girls and boys will have increased access to information on rights and available services. To be further defined during the programme formulation.

List any key support elements included to promote transparency

Local NGOs/CSOs/women’s groups will be engaged through training, technical assistance, institutional capacity building, mentoring and sub granting. Expanded knowledge and awareness increase their capacity to address the rights and safety of women, and provide information on available support services. Respect and Respond sensitization campaigns (IRC) will also contribute to an increased awareness on rights.

Are key accountability mechanisms in the relevant area – both horizontal and vertical listed?

X Through implementing partners, the programme will work in partnership with government authorities, duty bearers and service providers (National Ministry of Gender, Child, Social Welfare, Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management, National Ministry of Health and their respective State Ministries of Social Development and Health), building their capacity to ensure quality medical and psychosocial support services for survivors of GBV. This will promote greater focus on accountability towards meeting the health, safety and protection needs of women and girls.

Are obstacles, e.g. capacity and political-economy incentives that duty-bearers and rights holders face to exercise their obligations and rights listed?

X In the current situation, where emphasis continues to be on security, and where the Transitional Government of National Unity is not yet established, the current government (especially the central government) is not very receptive to criticisms, unresponsive, and rarely willing to engage in a discussion around rights and accountability.

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List any key support elements included to promote accountability

Training, support, working in partnership and mentoring for government officials including: the Special Protection Units (SPU) police, National Ministry of Gender, Child, Social Welfare, Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management, National Ministry of Health and their respective State Ministries of Social Development and Health

Results/Indicators

List any indicators designed to monitor the realisation of specific human rights

To be further defined during programme formulation

Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel

% of girls education

Number of cases of GBV reported and prosecuted

Number of gender policies applied at the local level

Total change in % of GDP invested in institutions dedicated to women equality, prevention and remedy of GBV

Number of women accessing basic health and reproductive services in the targeted areas

% of families that are sharing responsibility in the management of family budget in the community targeted by income generating programmes and village saving schemes

List any indicators designed to monitor the integration of the four principles

To be further defined during programme formulation.

Increased awareness of women on rights and options available to GBV victims contributes to greater transparency

Increased access to services available to the poor and marginalised (especially women, girls and boys) contributes to reduce discrimination

The existence and implementation

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of legal frameworks and policies to advance women’s rights to participate in decision making at national and subnational levels will strengthen women participation and inclusion

Women’s leadership platforms in Central Equatoria, Western Equatoria and Lakes states will strengthen the ability of women as leaders, to push forward a unified agenda for quality service delivery, policy implementation/reforms and accountability

Capacity building and mentoring of medical and psychosocial personnel will ensure quality support services for survivors of GBV and will promote greater focus on accountability towards meeting the health, safety and protection needs of women and girls.

Improved mechanisms for tracking progress on accountability for gender equality will be promoted by UN Women.

List any key indicators chosen to track capacity of key partners (both rights holders and duty bearers)

To be defined during programme formulation

Dialogue Partners

Define key dialogue partners (duty bearers) to be addressed by the country programme

Key dialogue partners of the implementation of peace agreement, e.g. IGAD, UN, AU, JMEC, CTSAMM, the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC), will be addressed, also through joint donor messaging.

The following key dialogue partners will be addressed through implementing partners: Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning, Ministry of Local Government, Women Parliamentarian Caucus, Special Protection Unit (SPU) Police, National Ministry of Gender, Child, Social Welfare, Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management, National Ministry of Health and their respective State Ministries of

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Social Development and Health. Equivalent ministries at state level.

Define key alliance partners, including other likeminded donors, multilateral partners and CSO’s

FAO, UNICEF, IRC, UNDP, UN Women, SIDA, EU, Norwegian Embassy, Dutch Embassy, DFID etc.

State major dilemmas/risks associated with the policy dialogue and proposed mitigation measures (incl. reference to Framework for Risk Assessment)

In the current crisis the government is not very available to engage in discussions around human rights and accountability. Until security will be prioritised, working with the government (the TGNU) on these issues and promoting accountability will remain a major challenge. The flexible approach of the programme represents a good mitigation measure. In the current situation, the Danish partners will continue the dialogue on accountability with government counterparts, and ensure that the issue remains on the agenda. The flexible programming allows for the possibility of steering more toward developmental activities according to the evolution of the situation. When the situation will allow the partners will be ready to scale up the dialogue on human rights and accountability with their respective state counterparts.

Gender Screening Tool

Are key challenges and opportunities for gender equality identified?

X Gender inequities have many manifestations in South Sudanese societies. Traditional gender norms and harmful practices such as bride price, early and forced marriages and early pregnancies subordinate women and girls and disable their efforts to contribute to development

Are references made to CEDAW-reporting, UPR, and other relevant gender assessments?

CEDAW. To be defined during programme formulation

Identify opportunities/constraints for addressing gender equality issues

There has been significant progress in development/review of gender sensitive policies and legal framework. However, the lack of effective implementation and monitoring and evaluation of progress remains a challenge. Most women and girls in South Sudan, especially those in the rural areas, still face exclusion from

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participating effectively in development processes including the rights to own land and inherit property. Limited capacity affects the performance of women in government leadership positions (legislative and executive branches) at both national and state levels.

GBV is rampant, deeply rooted in social and cultural norms, and exacerbated by, and indeed specifically targeted in, the conflict. Inadequate law enforcement capacity within the police, military and judiciary is one of the factors contributing to the perpetuation of gender based violence against women and girls.

Describe key strategic interventions to promote gender equality within each thematic programme?

Programme components will address gender issues, for example in terms of rights aspects addressed (violence against women, gender equality, leadership and participation), inclusion of vulnerable and marginalised groups (targeting of adolescents girls, inclusion and targeting of girls in DDR programmes), activities working on legislative and institutional aspects, capacity building of local government to promote gender equality.

Explain how gender specific purposes will be reached, which strategic approach, what activities are planned

The programme will use a mix of gender mainstreaming and targeting. UN Women and the IRC programme aim at promoting gender equality, prevent and respond to GBV. All other programmes will mainstream gender equality.

Define expected outputs. To be defined during programme formulation

Identify gender equality indicators aligned with national targets on gender if possible.

Some indicative indicators are listed below. These are to be further defined during the programme formulation:

There is a state entity/national machinery with resources to implement an action plan on all forms of violence against women as a key strategy in gender equality;

The state entity has resources to implement an action plan on GBV and UNSCR 1325 and 1820;

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There is inter-ministerial coordination on GBV policy, including high-level leads across ministries;

Rates of prosecution and conviction of all forms of violence against women;

Existence of victim-sensitive procedures and guidelines to be used by law enforcement officials and service providers;

Number of women/girls/boys reporting sexual violence per 10,000 population in the conflict/ emergency area;

Number and percentage of girls associated with armed forces or groups that receive benefits from disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes;

Indicators specific to the UNICEF’s reintegration of child soldiers programme:

Number of separated girls classes

Number of dropouts among girls and possible reasons

Completion rates as compared to boys

Number of female teachers/volunteers trained

Summary of overall Human Rights/Gender Equality context

As a new state still in the making, South Sudan has faced a significant challenge in establishing its human rights infrastructure, including adopting and domesticating international human rights instruments and developing human rights institutions. The obligation of the government to respect, uphold, and promote human rights is enshrined in a Bill of Rights and in the Interim Constitution.

South Sudan has ratified a number of international conventions including: the Convention against Torture and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention of the Rights of the Child. Three media bills, including a right to information law have been passed. Progress in the implementation of these instruments and their application in national policy and practices remains scarce and has been negatively affected by the recent conflict.

The South Sudan Human Rights Commission (SSHRC) is the primary national body mandated to monitor, document and report on human rights. It is operational and published its first annual report in August 2012. However, its resources, financial and logistic, and political independence of the Commission are limited, hampering its ability to implement its mandate. The SSHRC has reportedly

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not been able to dispatch field staff to investigate recent human rights violations in the country during the current crisis, a situation that limits its ability to fulfil its mandate and its credibility. Other relevant institutions with a human rights impact are the Ministry of Gender, the South Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission (SSACC), the Auditor-General’s Chamber, and the South Sudan Peace Commission (SSPC).

The slow progress in establishing South Sudan’s human rights framework is severely tainted by the grim human rights abuses catalogued in several international reports, including UNMISS and the AU Commission of Inquiry (October 2014). As part of the recently signed peace agreement, AU has announced the establishment of a Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS). Once established, the Hybrid Court is intended to investigate and prosecute individuals bearing the responsibility for violations of international law and/or applicable South Sudanese law, committed from the outbreak of the crisis in December 2013 through to the end of the Transitional Period in 2018.

More generally, rights holders suffer from high illiteracy rates (especially women), which impedes their ability to understand and claim their rights. Poor dissemination and language barriers limit awareness of applicable laws, particularly amongst rural communities. The population is also constrained in their ability to approach mechanisms to claim its rights (e.g. courts) as these do not reach out to where most of the population resides. In its 2013 justice perception survey, UNDP noted that only 20% of those asked reported that they felt well informed about their rights.

With regard to gender, the Interim Constitution guarantees the rights of women to equal pay and property ownership, and while women hold a quarter of the posts in the cabinet, decades of conflict have left many women in precarious conditions. Discrimination is evident in access to services and women's representation in political and civil service leadership positions. Women hold 17% of state minister posts and only 10% of commissioner posts. Women also experience discrimination in employment, pay, credit, inheritance, and ownership and management of businesses or land. Women risk discrimination in courts, especially customary courts in relation to issues such as gender based violence. Human rights organisations have called for the urgent reform of laws on marriage, separation, divorce, and related matters.

7 Cultural norms contribute to this discrimination.

Women and girls, particularly those who are internally displaced, returnees or from rural areas, are vulnerable to forced labour and sexual exploitation in urban centres or inter-ethnic abductions in some communities. GBV is an on-going problem. Children face a multitude of risks, including: abductions, early marriage, recruitment into armed groups, separation from families, harmful traditional practices, (e.g. “girl compensation”), child prostitution and child labour. Refugees, returnees and IDPs are vulnerable to discrimination, GBV and violence. Returnees face confrontation from local communities over land, housing, and other resources. All people living in rural areas face threats from unexploded ordinance.

7 HRW (January 2014), South Sudan Country Summary, p.2;

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ANNEX 3: Climate Change and Green Growth Screening Note

Basic Information

Programme title: Danish South Sudan Country Programme

Country/region: South Sudan

Estimated allocation: 115 Million DKK

Brief description of the Programme support:

The overall objective is to support the South Sudanese people in building a united and peaceful country through support for the peace process, improved protection and security, inclusive governance, and enhanced living conditions for all. The contribution to this goal will be achieved through two thematic programmes: 1) support to the peace process, governance and enhancement of women’s rights, and (2) support to strengthening community resilience and livelihoods. Under 1), prospective engagements include (a) contributions to key parts of the peace agreement implementation, together with other development partners, (b) IRC’s work in response to GBV, and (c) UN Women. Under 2), prospective engagements include (a) support to FAO’s strengthening of individual and community resilience and (b) support to UNICEF’s reintegrating of former child soldiers programme.

Dates (expected): Programme committee: 3 December 2015 // Appraisal: April/May 2016

Climate change screening

Assess the status of policies and strategies to respond to climate change in the country and sector. If the issue is inadequately dealt with (indicated by a tick in the “no” box), please add comments and assess the potential impact on the program (see also “next steps” section, below).

Issue: Yes No Comments and further work to be done:

1. Are the processes and impacts of climate change documented (e.g. in national communications to the UNFCCC)?

X Partly. There have been various impact assessments (e.g. UNDP, 2011). South Sudan has acceded to the UNFCCC and is a member of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) but has not yet completed enabling activities allowing access to funds. UNEP has been assisting the government of South Sudan to develop its enabling activities, including documentation of the impacts of climate change. However, this work is not yet complete and South Sudan has yet to submit a UNFCCC communication.

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2. Is there a national climate change policy or strategy, including estimates of the economic costs of adaptation?

X National environmental policy (2012) and a national environmental bill (2012) are in the final stages of parliamentary discussion.

3. Have nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) and or Low Carbon Development Plans been identified (e.g. targets for renewable energy production)?

X South Sudan’s National Petroleum Policy 2013 does not have any provision for climate change mitigation or any instruments that can reduce greenhouse gases. It does, however, call for environmental protection in the petroleum industry through environmental and social impact assessment, environmental audit and environmental management plan. It ties issuing licenses for petroleum activities to environmental assessments.

4. Has a national adaptation programme of action (NAPA) been approved identifying key sectors where adaptation is required?

X South Sudan is currently working on National Adaptation Programmes of Actions (NAPA), National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) and National Action Programme (NAP).

5. Are there effective and operational meteorological and disaster preparedness organizations?

X South Sudan Meteorological Service (SSMS). Before the second civil war between the central Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM) (i.e. before 1983), there were 43 meteorological stations. Most of these were destroyed. The following stations were operative: Renk, Raga, Wau, Malakal and Juba. Renk and Malakal are currently not operating due to the conflict

Summarize the overall assessment of climate change impacts and responses:

South Sudan faces a range of natural and man-made environmental challenges, including the impacts of the oil industry and desertification and seasonal rains/floods. After five decades of conflict, the environmental issues facing South Sudan have not only been neglected but are also complicated by post-conflict challenges. These include: rapid deforestation, land grabbing, insecure and vulnerable livelihoods for the majority of citizens, mineral exploitation, rapid privatization and a sudden increase in the population from people returning. The 2015 El Nino is expected to be one of the worst in recent years, and for South Sudan portends large amounts of rainfall during the otherwise dry months of December 2015 to March 2016, possibly, and probably, affecting the harvest season. The country has, however, only limited capacity to respond to these and its normative framework is still developing. Inter alia, the South Sudan Development Plan (currently 2011-2013) requires that environmental sustainability of economic development and related activities including oil extraction, logging and charcoal production is to

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be ensured. The use of environmental impact assessments (EIAs) is required for infrastructure and power supply development.

South Sudan has acceded to UN’s framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), UN Convention on Biodiversity (UNCBD) and UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). In addition, South Sudan has also joined the Global Environment Facility (GEF), which provides funding for the three conventions. However, the country has not yet ratified the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC. The country is also a partner country to REDD+. South Sudan is currently working on National Adaptation Programmes of Actions (NAPA), National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) and National Action Programme (NAP). South Sudan’s National Petroleum Policy 2013 does not have any provision for climate change mitigation or any instruments that can reduce greenhouse gases. It calls for environmental protection in the petroleum industry through environmental and social impact assessment, environmental audit and environmental management plan. It ties issuing licenses for petroleum activities to environmental assessments. An environmental ‘Impacts, Risks and Opportunities Assessment’ was carried out in 2011 by UNDP and the Ministry of Environment of South Sudan. This noted a number of threats relating to climate change and environmental degradation on water, soil, forests, biodiversity, agriculture and fisheries. The assessment recommended a number of actions, including (1) the development and mainstreaming of a green energy and low carbon policy, aiming to stop the degradation of forest, soil and water resources, and to link up with related global initiatives; (2) the consolidation of the institutional and regulatory framework for environmental management, aiming at the completion, endorsement and implementation of the environmental policy framework, addressing all current institutional and legal issues; (3) sectoral integration of natural resources policy planning and implementation with regard to forest, land and water through the introduction of Strategic Environment Impact Assessment (SEIA), the promotion of integrated land use planning, and integrated river basin management.

Screening of Country Green Growth Framework

Assess the status of policies and strategies for green growth and the procedures for environmental impact assessment in the country and sector. If an issue is inadequately dealt with (indicated by a tick in the “no” box), please add comments and indicate further work to be undertaken (see also “next steps” section, below).

Issue: Yes No Comments and further work to be done:

1. Do national procedures and legislation for Strategic Environmental Impact Assessment (SEIA) and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) exist?

X The programme will be aligned with existing government frameworks, inter alia requiring that environmental assessments are carried out for infrastructure.

2. Are there operational Green Growth Strategies/actions plans and/or National Environmental Action plans?

X Partially

3. Are there regularly updated state of the environment reports and green growth

X Partially

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monitoring systems with indicators?

4. Is there sufficient institutional and human capacity for green growth and environmental management in the sector concerned?

X Government lacks capacity in virtually every area including environmental policy

Summarize the overall impression of the Country Green Growth Framework:

As noted, South Sudan’s environmental policy and strategy, and presently very low HR capacity in these fields, is still developing. The programme’s engagements will be brought into line with this as necessary.

Climate change and Green Growth opportunities and risks of programme

Assess how climate change and environmental opportunities and risks will arise through the programme:

Will the programme ... Opportunity: Risk: None:

1. ... support green growth initiatives including livelihood improvements and resource efficiency

Through FAO

2. ... support the creation of decent and green job? X

3. ... contribute to effective management and efficient use of natural resources

Through FAO

4. ... have direct or indirect impact on climate change (e.g. through increasing or reducing emissions of greenhouse gases)?

Not relevant

5. ... have direct or indirect impact on occupational health and safety?

Not relevant

6. ... lead to changes in land and resource tenure and access rights, including the rights of indigenous peoples?

Through FAO, UNWOMEN,

IRC

7. ... include activities within or adjacent to protected or environmentally sensitive areas?

Through FAO

8. ... have direct or indirect impact on the resilience of communities in the face of natural disasters?

Through FAO

Summarize and explain climate change and green growth opportunities:

The proposed programme includes one engagement that respond to South Sudan’s climatic challenges (including desertification and heavy seasonal rains), in addition to man-made impacts. This is FAO’s programme which focuses on strengthening household resilience and food security. This includes a variety of environmentally relevant food production arrangements. The engagement is informed by environmental impact assessments. Potential negative impacts include the loss of vegetation from infrastructure works. The engagements will ensure that environmental due diligence is incorporated (e.g. through shallow bore holes and hand-driven pumps, awareness raising for communities).

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Summarize and explain climate change and green growth risks:

Minor, if any.

Identify requirements for undertaking an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). Categories are: [ A ] Full EIA required; [ B ] Partial EIA required; [ C ] No EIA required8. Not relevant to this programme Intervention Name Category A, B or C:

1: N/A Select category:

2: N/A Select category:

3: N/A Select category:

Will national regulations and procedures for EIA be applicable to activities of the programme that have potential environmental impacts? – Yes - No Not relevant When will the EIA be undertaken?

Next Steps – process action plan

Need for further work during the preparation, appraisal and implementation of the programme arising from the climate change and green growth screening: Suggested activity: Action needed Comments and elaboration:

1. Assessment of green growth and climate change opportunities in sector development plan.

Not relevant

2. Assessment of capacity for green growth and climate change management in the sector/country.

Not relevant

3. Prepare ToR for and conduct Country Analytical Work.

Not relevant

4. Prepare ToR for and conduct SEA(s) of sector policies or plans.

Not relevant

5. Prepare ToR for and conduct EIA(s) for programme interventions.

Not relevant

6. Initiate donor harmonisation in the sector on green growth and climate change.

Not relevant

7. Other...?

Signature of Screening Note

Addis Ababa, date ………………………………………………………. Danish Mission in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

8 Category A = Intervention is likely to have adverse environmental impacts that may be sensitive, irreversible, and

significant in scale/scope; B = Intervention is likely to have negative impacts, but which are less significant, not as sensitive, numerous, major or diverse; C = The environmental risk of the intervention are of little or no concern.

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ANNEX 4: Preliminary Results Framework

Thematic Programme 1

Support to the peace process, governance and enhancement of women’s rights.

Thematic Programme Objective

To contribute to the peace process leading to support for a resumed state-building process and an accountable transitional government, with increased capability of meeting citizens’ rights to protection and participation as well as enhancement of women’s rights.

Impact Indicator Establishment and operation of key Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) governance institutions, as set out in the recently signed peace agreement in August 2015 (ARCRSS). Gender-equality has improved, decreased number of GBV-cased and increased number of GBV survivors receiving health, psychological, legal and safety support

Baseline Year 2015 The establishment of the (30 month) TGNU has been delayed, from initially mid-November 2015, until, tentatively, the first quarter of 2016. The predecessor to the TGNU, i.e. the current government of South Sudan, is dysfunctional (and split), highly indebted, with limited service delivery, and unable to meet the basic rights and needs of citizens; women’s and girl-child issues, although enshrined in various laws and treaties, are not respected. The TGNU will thus commence from a very low level of governance capacity and resources; 0 sector/line ministry plans, budgets & monitoring systems that integrate gender equality (UN Women); % GBV survivors seeking support that receive appropriate health case, case management etc. (IRC)

Target Year 2018 The key transitional (unified government) institutions established and functioning with at least a minimum of progress against other key milestones to enable progress on the peace agreement to be maintained (leading to elections); 6 sector/line ministry plans, budgets & monitoring systems that integrate gender equality (UN Women); 100% of GBV survivors seeking support from IRC-centres receive appropriate health care, case management etc. (IRC)

Engagement Title 1

(An example of support to the implementation of the peace agreement )

Support to institutionalising the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM), being an element within Chapter II of the ARCRSS, i.e. the ‘Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements’ (PCTSA), and charged with compliance monitoring of the ARCRSS.

Outcome Adequate capacity established for the CTSAMM to conduct monitoring according to its mandate and to report directly to the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) on the progress of the implementation of the PCTSA throughout the duration of the 30 months Transitional Period.

Outcome indicator CTSAMM has the capacity and resources to conduct ARCRSS monitoring, issue and disseminate applicable reports, and follow up on the same.

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Baseline Year 2015 The Chairman of the CTSAMM has been appointed (in November 2015) as a first step in the establishment of the institutional framework.

Target Year 2018 The CTSAMM established and well-functioning throughout the 30-month transition period, and prepared to be dissolved together with the TGNU in late 2018.

Output

Output indicator

Baseline Year 2015

Target Year 2018

Output

Output indicator

Baseline Year 2015

Target Year 2018

Output

Output indicator

Baseline Year 2015

Target Year 2018

Engagement Title 2

Gender equality and women’s empowerment improved in South Sudan - UN Women

Outcome Women’s political participation and leadership enhanced; women have fair access to justice; gender equality and mainstreaming in policy, planning, budgeting improved.

Outcome indicators (1) # of legislation and policies that promote women's participation in decision making reviewed and adopted; (2) % women in the South Sudan National Legislative Assembly and State Councils; (3) % of people expressing confidence in justice system disaggregated by gender; (4) % change in number of SGBV cases prosecuted annually; (5) # of sector/line ministry plans, budgets & monitoring systems that integrate gender equality

Baseline Year 2015 (1) 1 legislation and 1 policy reviewed/ formulated and adopted; (2) 27% ; (3) TBD; (4) TBD (5) 0

Target Year 2018 (1) 2 legislations and 3 policies reviewed/ formulated and adopted; (2) 35%; (3) 50% of males and 30% of females in the sampled population; (4) 20% increase (5) 6

Output Strengthened legislative and institutional frameworks enables women’s

participation and leadership

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Output indicator (1) # of female and male parliamentarians at National and State level who have acquired knowledge on gender responsive legislation; (2) # of State women Caucus established and functional

Baseline Year 2015 (1) 0 State Women Caucus in place and functioning. (2) Female (50) and male (30)

Target Year 2018 (1) 6 State Women Caucus in place and functioning. (2) Female (120) and male (120) by 2019

Output Women have acquired leadership skills for political participation and decision-

making

Output indicator # of women leaders in executives and legislature trained on transformational leadership

Baseline Year 2015 55 female leaders in the executive and legislature

Target Year 2018 150 female leaders in the executive and legislature

Output Capacity of the justice sector institutions (police and judiciary) to respond to

gender-based violence and enforce women’s rights enhanced

Output indicator # of judges trained on gender equality principles; # of SGBV cases prosecuted annually

Baseline Year 2015 0, 0

Target Year 2019 40 (2016), 200

Output Capacity of the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare (MoGCSW) to deliver its mandates strengthened

Output indicator # of MoGCSW Staff including state ministries trained in sector policy formulation, review and analysis from gender perspective disaggregated by gender

Baseline Year 2015 0

Target Year 2018 Female 40 and male 2

Engagement Title 3

Promoting protection, accountability and voice for women and girls - IRC

Outcomes Women and girls receive health, psychological, legal and safety support in Lakes and Central Equatoria states; women leaders respected within their community; women and girls are free from GBV, rights violations and discrimination; women and girls have access and control over economic and social resources

Outcome indicator (1) Capacity of the local government and local organisations in Lakes and Central Equatoria states to provide health care; (2) % GBV survivors seeking support that receive appropriate health care, case management etc.

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Baseline Year 2015 TBD

Target Year 2018 50% capacity increase amongst IRC partners; 100% satisfaction in IRC health centres

Output Service provision & case management for GBV survivors strengthened

Output indicator # of formal strategic partnerships with local government institutions in Lakes and Central Equatoria states; % receiving appropriate health services and case management

Baseline Year 2015 2; 100% IRC clinics, TBD for others

Target Year 2018 4; 100% IRC clinics, 50% for others

Output Advocacy/sensitisation activities held by women leaders with local

government and other local actors in Lakes and Central Equatoria states

Output indicator # of local officials & other actors reached through workshops and other advocacy campaigns

Baseline Year 2015 200 per year

Target Year 2018 750 over 3 years

Output Women survivors of GBV in Lakes and Central Equatoria states have

accessed safe and appropriate legal services

Output indicator # of referrals to customary and statutory courts; # cases successfully ruled in favour of women survivors

Baseline Year 2015 TBD, 3

Target Year 2018 45 per year, 40 per year

Output Women have skills and savings necessary to generate income, play greater role

in decision-making, leading to reduced domestic violence

Output indicator % women investing in income generating ventures

Baseline Year 2015 0% for new groups

Target Year 2018 Over 40%

Thematic Programme 2

Resilience and livelihoods

Thematic Programme Objective

To contribute to ensuring that communities are able to manage adverse conditions brought about by man-made or natural disasters.

Impact Indicator Reduced vulnerability to risks that drive food insecurity. Life skills of former child soldiers, and other vulnerable children and adults, increased.

Baseline Year 2015 23% of households depending upon own production (FAO); 1755 released child soldiers being rehabilitated and reintegrated into their

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communities from armed groups (UNICEF)

Target Year 2018 28%+ of households depending upon own production (FAO); 2000 released child soldiers, and up to 3500 other vulnerable children and adolescents, are reintegrated into society through life skills training (UNICEF)

Engagement Title 4

Strengthening the resilience of households to food insecurity in South Sudan (FAO)

Outcome Vulnerability to risks that drive food insecurity reduced at household and community levels

Outcome indicator (1) Food Consumption Score (FCS) rating; (2) Coping Strategies Index (CSI) rating

Baseline Year 2015 (1) – 44% of the population in the target area has an acceptable FCS score, (2) – Targeted households have a CSI score of # out of a total of 56

Target Year 2018 (1) 65% of the target population has an acceptable FCS score; (2) the CSI disaggregated by sex of household head for 100% of targeted households is 11 or below

Output Diversification of livelihoods supported

Output indicator (1) Improvement of breeding and production of poultry; (2) improvement of breeding and production of local shoats; (3) promotion of farm forestry, fruit production and non-food revenues; (4) involvement of women and youth in resilient livelihood diversification

Baseline Year 2015 (1) # of farm schools undertaking local poultry feed formulation; (2) % of female headed households undertaking shoats production; (3) # farm schools with established nurseries; (4) # cash for work schemes involving women

Target Year 2018 TBD

Output Integrated land and water use promoted

Output indicator (1) Promotion of community managed disaster reduction (CMDRR); (2) improved fish farming methods introduced; (3) low scale drilling of wells for livestock and irrigation

Baseline Year 2015 (1) # state based Community Action Plans on CMDRR; (2) # of women and youth practicing cage farming; (3) # of small scale drillers formed

Target Year 2018 TBD

Output Climate resistant agriculture promoted

Output indicator Geo-spatial mapping and seed system security assessed and rapidly maturing seeds introduced

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Baseline Year 2015 # of protected seed bulking plots established

Target Year 2018 TBD

Output Livestock health and production improved

Output indicator (1) Arrangements for managing transboundary diseases; (2) women and youth involvement in resilient livestock livelihoods; (3) community based skilled enterprises

Baseline Year 2015 (1) # action plan on transboundary diseases; (2) # capacity on livestock disease surveillance and vaccination; (3) # trained blacksmiths, fabricators and other artisans

Target Year 2018 TBD

Target Year [Intended situation when activity under the engagement ends ]

Engagement Title 5

Reintegration of children and adolescents released from armed forces and other armed groups - UNICEF

Outcome Children and adolescents associated with Cobra faction have received age appropriate social and economic services, together with other children and adolescents in the at-risk community, leading to sustainable reintegration and reduction in youth involvement in violence in GPAA

Outcome indicator # of released child soldiers, # of other vulnerable children from host communities, # of released adolescent soldiers, and # of other vulnerable adolescents from host communities

Baseline Year 2015 1755/0/0/0

Target Year 2018 2000/2000/1500/1500

Output Released children receive effective interim care

Output indicator #of children receiving interim care, psychological support, health screening etc.

Baseline Year 2015 1755/0

Target Year 2018 2000/2000

Output Released children & adolescents have access to quality learning

Output indicator # of released child soldiers and adolescents, # of other vulnerable children and adolescents from host communities

Baseline Year 2015 1100/5400

Target Year 2018 2000/13000

Output Enhanced employability and sustainable business development

Output indicator # of released adolescents using their skills and have access to decent work and income, # of other vulnerable adolescents using their skills and have access to decent work and income, and % of initiated businesses operational

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after 2 years

Baseline Year 2015 0/0/0

Target Year 2018 1500/1500/50%

Output Capacities of local actors in child protection and service delivery strengthened

Output indicator Capacity development plans developed with the government

Baseline Year 2015 0

Target Year 2018 6

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Contextual Risks Context:

South Sudan Country Programme, 2016-2018 File No:

2015-27477

Risk factor

Likelihood Background to assessment

Impact Background to assessment

Risk response if applicable / potential effect on development cooperation in context

1 The complex political

context undermines the transition outlined in the peace agreement resulting in slower progress than stipulated in the peace agreement and setbacks limiting engagement with the government on development milestones. Likelihood that the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) will have difficulty reaching an agreement on a realistic and needs based reform agenda. Risk of the TGNU to suffer set-backs, including due to political positioning. Political parties

Almost Certain

Commitment from key political actors during and following the IGAD mediated peace process has been rather weak, and although a number of milestones have been formally met, at the present time, tangible and credible, progress on significant aspects of the peace agreement and transition arrangements is limited. Policy sustainability has weakened during the conflict and is currently weak in some areas (e.g. decentralisation).

Significant The effect will be to further damage the credibility of political actors in South Sudan and limit the degree of engagement possible with government with the consequence that external and civil society inputs continue to dominate support patterns. Government policies will be short-term and undermined by political agendas. Development inputs will be constrained by lack of access.

Close monitoring of the political and security situation is required by the Embassy in close collaboration with the Juba-based Danida senior advisor together with other donors, in particular the effects on on-going support. Use of a multi-faceted and flexible scenario approach adaptable to the fluid situation in South Sudan. Ensure dialogue channels remain open and maintain political pressure (esp. through the Troika, the UN, IGAD etc.) to enhance commitment.

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unwilling to make significant reforms on their internal governance.

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2 Overall security situation remains fluid and extremely fragile with the potential to return to conflict in parts of the country. Together with continued localised inter-community conflict and clashes between militias outside the control of the two parties to the peace agreement, this limits access and stresses individual and community security and livelihoods. In a worst case scenario, a resumption of conflict if the fragile peace between the major parties breaks down. This will also further delay/hinder the resumption of the state-building process.

Almost Certain

Inter community conflicts over land and water have been a long-standing feature of South Sudan's context, and are likely to continue in the face of human- and natural-caused famines, the return of IDPs to their original lands, the incursion of new IDPs, pastoralist incursions into cultivation zones, and conflicts orchestrated by the warring factions (e.g. divide-and-rule politics). Their scope and impact will depend upon the degree to which wider political factors also come into play. There is also a significant risk that the parties to the peace agreement will abandon the peace process and resort to military engagement, the consequences of this will be severe (including renewed international sanctions).

Significant Continued outbreaks of low level conflict will continue to undermine development, curtail human rights, and exacerbate humanitarian needs. Failure of transition and a return to full-scale conflict would result in further displacement and setbacks for development. It would severely limit the willingness of donors to cooperate with the parties and there would be continued (and increased) focus on humanitarian support. Serious deterioration in the political and security situation would push South Sudan further towards a fragile state with negative implications for the sub-region as a whole.

Close monitoring of the political and security situation is required by the Embassy in close collaboration with the Juba-based Danida senior advisor together with other donors, in particular the effects on on-going support. Important that monitoring also reaches down to local areas and considers possible adverse impacts of development inputs. Use of a multi-faceted and flexible scenario approach adaptable to the fluid situation in South Sudan. To reduce impacts on individual and community well-being, interventions should promote livelihood resilience, peace building and conflict management. Conflict sensitivity should be an integral part of all interventions.

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3 Public sector institutional capacity limits the government's ability to partner on programmes. Vested interests continue to permit elite capture of public goods. Government remains remote from the people.

Almost Certain

South Sudan performs poorly against all governance indicators (WB, 2014). The government remains dependent upon external technical capacity. Government policies will be short-term and undermined by political agendas and corruption. Budget preparation and execution is weak as are reporting, accounting and audit (PEFA, 2012)

Significant Reduces ability for the government to act as a viable partner and constrains state-building goals (as external actors remain service providers)

If a return to full conflict is avoided, it will be important to remain engaged with programmes that enhance the government's ownership and capacity to deliver services, where feasible. Promote capacity building at all levels. Resist tendency to develop parallel systems but encourage government-NGO cooperation.

4 Weak civil society and

media coupled with low levels of public financial management make it difficult to hold the government to account and contribute to a continued culture of corruption and impunity

Likely South Sudan currently rates at the bottom of governance assessments (WB, 2014). The national civil society remains nascent with limited engagement with government, although the churches are important (CSO assessment, 2012)

Significant Prevents democratic development and full use of national (human and other) resources

Opportunities to support democratisation, accountability and transparency should be highlighted. Strengthening of civil society and media to provide checks on the government and political parties will be relevant.

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5 Continued fiscal risks and deterioration in the economic situation (among others high inflation, deteriorating exchange rate, low revenue base, high debt serving demands, and fuel and consumer goods shortages) and failure to develop the country's economic base

Likely South Sudan has not made sufficient progress on utilising its oil exports or developing alternatives that diversify the economy. Government revenue continues to be disproportionately used to keep the military and public service afloat. Inflation (at 80% in October 2015) is seriously impacting on the purchasing power of wage earners and the impact of externally financed development projects. Revenues are less than half those expected (2015), affected by the low oil price. Continued Central Bank borrowing and printing of money will negatively impact on medium term fiscal stability but is likely to be unavoidable.

Significant Prevents diversification of the economy and represents a major lost opportunity in view of finite oil reserves. Linked to (lack of) progress on peace process and impact of kleptocratic governance. Despite this, limited funds continue to be disbursed to states and counties for service delivery

Joint donor messaging on and response to improvements of public financial management. Support better use of South Sudan's agricultural resources, including strengthening the introduction of sustainable agriculture and livestock techniques.

6 International actors do

not act coherently leading to diminished effectiveness of aid. International actors may also fail to hold South Sudan leaders to account for human rights failings

Likely It is possible that the imperative of achieving national consensus and movement on the transition will weaken calls for full accountability, thus permitting the culture of impunity that has characterised South Sudan since 2005 to continue.

Major In the short term, this may contribute to stability. In the medium to long term, it will damage the government's credibility. There is a reputation risk for the international community.

Ensure dialogue channels remain open. Promote African (e.g. AU/IGAD-led) solutions (including the recently announced Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS) to be established by the AU in accordance with the stipulations in the peace agreement) including a local reconciliation

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process.

46

Programmatic and Institutional Risks

Title:

South Sudan Country programme File No:

2015-27477

Programmatic Risks Risk factor

Likelihood Background to assessment of likelihood

Impact Background to assessment to potential impact

Risk response

Combined residual risk

P1 Government policy changes impact negatively on programme engagements already being implemented requiring them to be adjusted. The government is unable to act as a counterpart due to lack of funding and capacity.

Likely The government has demonstrated erratic policy processes (e.g. decision to increase the number of states from 10 to 28, and maintaining an artifical exchange rate). Persistent capacity shortcomings and budgetary crisis means that government is unable to act as a reliable counterpart (e.g. on service delivery) at present time.

Significant Depending upon the type of change and counterpart deficit, there would be a need for programme adjustments (possibly including implementation modality, counterpart training and rate of delivery)

Requires realistic assessment of role expected by government counterparts coupled with regular monitoring to ensure that deficits are reflected in implementation modalities.

Major

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P2 Capacity of implementing partners (including availability of staff, processes and systems) is increasingly weak - also due to the difficult operating environment - leading to lower than expected project delivery.

Almost Certain

Experience points to the generally low capacity of national and local partners (including NGOs) - also due to the difficult operating environment. The government systems lack capacity (WB, 2014) and previous Danish experience is that this is to some extent replicated amongst non-governmental partners.

Major Leads to lower than expected project delivery and higher management and oversight costs

Requires realistic programme planning, including results frameworks, based on assessment of organisational capacity and taking into account external factors, such as the difficult operating environment. Focus on support through international organisations.

Major

P3 Governance weaknesses (government & NGOs), including clarity of implementing agencies responsibilities, transparency, inclusion and adequacy of oversight processes

Almost Certain

South Sudan scores poorly against virtually all governance indicators in recent surveys (WB Governance indicators). The trend has been negative since the outbreak of the conflict in 2013

Major Weaknesses have been taken into account in programme preparation. Residual weaknesses arise where performance is lower than anticipated

Requires realistic assessment of role expected by government counterparts coupled with regular monitoring to ensure that deficits are reflected in implementation modalities.

Major

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P4 Continued unstable security situation (various scenarios ranging from local to widespread violent conflict) and climate impacts

Likely Continued localised conflict patterns, and huge numbers of IDPs and refugees, will contribute to wider patterns of insecurity making access to beneficiaries difficult and expensive. Similarly, some areas will be inaccessible during the rainy season. A serious breakdown in the peace process would lead to resumption of the conflict.

Major Continued conflict, seasonal climatic conditions and poor infrastructure will make access difficult limiting the ability to implement and monitor projects. A return to conflict will have major consequences against all parameters (depending upon the severity of fighting).

Build in flexibility in projects enabling them to shift focus if conflict prevents project implementation in particular areas. Maintain close monitoring of conflict patterns, use locally based partners where relevant, halt/pause programmes where conflict risks exceed acceptable levels

Major

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P5 Fiduciary risks (including corruption) resulting from weak financial management systems and poor budgeting and weak oversight. Elite capture of resources and decision-making leading to weak implementation of social development policies and continued marginalisation of vulnerable groups

Likely South Sudan continues to experience low levels of public financial management including budget formulation and execution, and weak reporting and audit (PEFA, 2012). Similar weaknesses are found in the NGO sector (CSO assessment, 2012). Moreover, recent political analyses point to the kleptocratic nature of governance in South Sudan resulting in high levels of corruption and rent seeking.

Major Evidence of corruption or misuse of donor financed programmes could result in project closure depending upon the precise circumstances. The weak systems require relatively ressource intensive management and oversight.

A zero tolerance for corruption requires correspondingly high levels of monitoring and reporting at project level. Ensure systems are in place and that capacity exists to manage them. Requires realistic assessment of role expected by government counterparts coupled with regular monitoring to ensure that deficits are reflected in implementation modalities.

Major

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Institutional Risks

Risk factor

Likelihood Background to assessment of likelihood

Impact Background to assessment of potential impact

Risk response

Combined residual risk

I1 Government policy changes impact negatively on programme engagements already being implemented requiring them to be adjusted. The government is unable to act as a counterpart due to lack of funding and capacity.

Likely The government has demonstrated erratic policy processes (e.g. decision to increase the number of states from 10 to 28, and maintaining an artifical exchange rate). Persistent capacity shortcomings and budgetary crisis means that government is unable to act as a reliable counterpart (e.g. on service delivery) at present time.

Major Political and reputational risk due to the active involvement of the government as a conflicting party and evidence of human rights abuses and incitement to conflict. Weaknesses of the government's policy commitment and systems could call into question validity of programming choices.

Ensure joint donor messaging and response+J10 to the government's commitments and actual performance. Where feasible, remain engaged and offer incentives for further engagement. Where not feasible, withdraw until situation stabilises. Maintain the pressure on the parties to the peace agreement to adhere to peace agreement and move forward.

Major

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I2 Capacity of implementing partners (including availability of staff, processes and systems) is increasingly weak - also due to the difficult operating environment - leading to lower than expected project delivery.

Almost Certain

Experience points to the generally low capacity of national and local partners (including NGOs) - also due to the difficult operating environment. The government systems lack capacity (WB, 2014) and previous Danish experience is that this is to some extent replicated amongst non-governmental partners.

Major Operational risks. Low capacity and weak systems and counterparts will result in slower and possibly erractic project progress affected also by external factors (e.g. insecurity, lack of access)

All projects support to include internal and external capacity building elements based on assessment of needs. All projects to include regular monitoring and reporting, including external review. Maintain close monitoring by the Juba based Danida senior advisor. Phase inputs/disbursements to reflect key milestones.

Major

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I3 Governance weaknesses (government & NGOs), including clarity of implementing agencies responsibilities, transparency, inclusion and adequacy of oversight processes

Almost Certain

South Sudan scores poorly against virtually all governance indicators in recent surveys (WB Governance indicators). The trend has been negative since the outbreak of the conflict in 2013

Major Political and reputational risk due to the active involvement of the government as a conflicting party and evidenc of human rights abuses and incitement to conflict. Weaknesses of capacity and systems could call into question validity of programming choices unless mitigating actions taken.

All projects support to include internal and external capacity building elements based on assessment of needs. All projects to include regular monitoring and reporting, including external review. Maintain close monitoring by the Juba based Danida senior advisor. Phase inputs/disbursements to reflect key milestones. Avoid direct financial support to the government.

Major

I4 Continued insecurity (various scenarios depending upon the response to the peace agreement) and climate impacts

Likely Continued conflict and seasonal climatic conditions and poor infrastructure will make access difficult limiting the ability to implement and monitor projects.

Major Operational and security risks due to fluidity of security at local level. Difficulties of access due to rainy season .

All projects to include regular security assessments and arrangements to minimise risk to personnel. Project implementation plans to take account of rainy season.

Major

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A return to conflict would have major consequences against all parameters (depending upon the severity of fighting).

I5 Fiduciary risks (including

corruption) resulting from weak financial management systems and poor budgeting and weak oversight. Elite capture of resources and decision-making leading to weak implementation of social development policies and continued marginalisation of vulnerable groups

Likely South Sudan continues to experience low levels of public financial management including budget formulation and execution, and weak reporting and audit (PEFA, 2012). Similar weaknesses are found in the NGO sector (CSO assessment, 2012). Moreover, recent political analyses point to the kleptocratic nature of governance in

Major Financial, fiduciary and reputational risks associated with possible corruption and lower than normal levels of financial planning, budgeting, monitoring and accounting. In the most likely case, this increases operating costs due to the need to maintain due diligence. In the worst case, it will result in loss of funds and project closure.

All projects to include regular monitoring and reporting, including external review. Maintain close monitoring by the Juba based Danida senior advisor. Phase inputs/disbursements to reflect key milestones.

Major

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South Sudan resulting in high levels of corruption and rent seeking.

I7

I8

I9

I10

Deviations and follow-up

Title:

South Sudan Country programme File No:

2015-27477

55

Planned date for first assessment:

Date of assessment: Date of assessment: Deviations from original assessment: Deviations from original assessment: Follow-up: Follow-up: Date for next assessment: Date for next assessment: Date of assessment: Date of assessment: Deviations from original assessment: Deviations from original assessment: Follow-up: Follow-up: Date for next assessment: Date for next assessment Date of assessment: Deviations from original assessment: Follow-up: Date for next assessment: