computational models that exploit the embodiment of cognition
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16th International Summer School in Cognitive Science, New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria, 2009. Computational Models that Exploit the Embodiment of Cognition. Michael J. Spivey Department of Cognitive Science University of California, Merced. Models with Embodied Cognition. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Computational Models that Exploitthe Embodiment of Cognition
Michael J. SpiveyDepartment of Cognitive ScienceUniversity of California, Merced
16th International Summer School in Cognitive Science, New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria, 2009
Bacsjy; Ballard et al., 1997
Brooks, 1991; Steels, 2003
Tensegrity robot guy at cornell
howell jankowicz & becker
Scheutz et al.
Yu ballard aslin
Roy, 2005
• Embodied Artificial Intelligence
• Embodied Simulations of Human Cognition
• Embodied and Embedded Cognition: Spreading out your mind to include the world
OUTLINE
Internalistic Approaches to Computer Vision & AI
External W
orld
Behavior
Stim
ulus Features
Obje cts /C
oncepts
Interna lized World
SHRDLU (Winograd, 1970)
Internalistic Approaches to Computer Vision & AI
External W
orld
Behavior
Prim
al Sketch
2 1/2 -D S
ke tc h
3D M
ode l
(Marr, 1982)
After Decades of “Internalist” Computer Vision & AI
Ruzena Bajcsy (1984)"Active Touch and Robot Perception"
(see also Braitenberg, 1984)
Agre & Chapman (1987)“Pengi: An Implementation of a Theory of Activity”
AI has generally interpreted the organized nature of everyday activity in terms of plan-following. Nobody could doubt that people often make and follow plans. But the complexity, uncertainty, and immediacy of the real world require a central role for moment-to-moment improvisation. Before and beneath any planning ahead, one continually decides what to do now. Investigation of the dynamics of everyday routine activity revealsimportant regularities in the interaction of very simple machinery with its environment. We have used our dynamic theories to design a program, called Pengi, that engages in complex, apparently-planful activity without requiring explicit models of the world.
Pengi(Agre & Chapman, 1987)
Pengi(Agre & Chapman, 1987)
Pengi uses “indexical-functional aspects”(Agre & Chapman, 1987)
Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook, & Rao (1997)“Deictic codes for the embodiment of cognition”
Model
SourceWorkspace
Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook, & Rao (1997)
M-P-M-D P-M-D M-P-D P-D Other0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Hypothetical Data(if Working Memory was maxed out)
Eye Trace Classification
Relative Frequency
Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook, & Rao (1997)
Model
SourceWorkspace
Model
SourceWorkspace
Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook, & Rao (1997)
Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook, & Rao (1997)
M-P-M-D P-M-D M-P-D P-D Other0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5 Actual Data(Working Memory IS NOT maxed out)
Eye Trace Classification
Relative Frequency
Internalistic Approaches to Computer Vision & AI
External W
orld
Behavior
Stim
ulus Features
Obje cts /C
oncepts
Interna lized World
Kirsh & Maglio (1994)
Kirsh & Maglio (1994)
Kirsh & Maglio (1994)
Kirsh & Maglio (1994)
Chapman & Agre (1987)“Abstract Reasoning as Emergent from Concrete Activity”
Rodney Brooks (1991)“Intelligence Without Representation”
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Rodney Brooks’ Robots
Rodney Brooks’ Robots
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Rodney Brooks’ Robots
Brooks & Breazeal
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Brooks & Breazeal
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Deb Roy’s Robots
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Deb Roy’s Robots
• Embodied Artificial Intelligence
• Embodied Simulations of Human Cognition
• Embodied and Embedded Cognition: Spreading out your mind to include the world
OUTLINE
Scheutz, Eberhard, & Andronache (2005)
Scheutz, Eberhard, & Andronache (2005)
Scheutz, Eberhard, & Andronache (2005)
Mayberry, Crocker, & Knoeferle (2009)
Mayberry, Crocker, & Knoeferle (2009)
Howell, Jankowicz, & Becker (2005)
Kaup, Lüdtke, & Zwaan (2006)
Anderson, Huette, Matlock & Spivey (2009)
Anderson, Huette, Matlock & Spivey (2009)
• Embodied Artificial Intelligence
• Embodied Simulations of Human Cognition
• Embodied and Embedded Cognition: Spreading out your mind to include the world
OUTLINE
Spatially extending one’s definition of thought (e.g., Clark & Chalmers; O’Regan & Nöe)
Temporally extending one’s definition of thought
“Nothing is, everything is becoming.” -Heraclitus
The Continuity of Mind
0
0.5
1
x-space
y-space
0
0.5
1
x-space
y-space
“shared manifold of intersubjectivity” -Gallese
The Continuity of Minds