complexity in the social world

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Internationa l Journa l of Social Research Methodolog yISSN 1364-557 9 print/ISSN 1464-530 0 online# 2002 Taylor & Francis Ltd

http://www.tandf.co.uk/journalsDOI: 10.1080/1364557011009809 1

Complexity and the social world

WILL MEDD

(Received 1 November 2000; accepted 31 August 2001)

This paper is concerned with two related methodological problems. First, presented with acomplex social scenario of a meeting between the representatives of different social welfareagencies, how should we make sense of this meeting? Second, in the context of the potentialinsights that the complexity sciences offer for understanding the social world, how can wetranslate those models to make sense of complex social dynamics? The example of themeeting, taken from an ethnographic study of collaboration in social welfare, is used tosituate debates about the use of complexity science in knowing the social world. Drawingupon the work of Luhmann, I argue that we need to re-think the insights complexitysciences in order to situate the problem of complexity in the social world itself. Doing solocates the problem of knowing the social world in the social world itself, and highlights thenecessary role of ignorance both in social life itself, and in knowing the social world.

Introduction

While we might want to argue that complexity has been central to debatesabout knowing the social world, it was in systems theory that the problemof complexity first became formulated as being specifically deserving ofattention (Munch 1987). Systems theory, however, fell out of mainstreamsociology for its alleged dependence on an underlying teleology, organi-cism, emphasis on stability and inability to explain adequately the

mechanisms of social change (Johnson et al. 1984, Waters 1994, Mouzelis1995). Recently, though, there has been a revival of systems theory inspiredby the work of complexity science, a term that refers to different schoolsof thought in the natural sciences which share in common an emphasis onnonlinear processes, system self-organization, and far-from-equilibriumprocesses which bring together order and chaos in evolutionary dynamics(Khalil and Boulding 1996, Eve et al. 1997, Byrne 1998, Cilliers 1998).Interestingly this revival of systems theory has coincided with thedevelopment of post-structural and post-foundational theory, which

similarly emphasizes the nonlinear, contingent and unstable, both in socialtheory and in social life (Lyotard 1984, Hayles 1991, Dillon 2000). Wherepost-structuralism and post-foundationalism tend to identify discontinu-ities in social life, complexity science promises, by contrast, a focus on both

Will Medd, Institute of Public Health Research and Policy, Humphrey Booth House, Hulme Place,

University of Salford, Salford, M5 4QA, UK; e-mail: [email protected]

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contingency and necessity, stability and instability, and continuity andchange. One of the difficulties that social sciences face in drawing upon thecomplexity sciences is to establish the basis upon which complexity sciencecan be used to make claims about social systems. Drawing upon the work of

the German social systems theorist, Luhmann (1995) and an example froman ethnography of collaboration in social welfare, I want to explore theimplications of complexity for knowing the social world.

My argument concerns two related methodological problems. The firstis, presented with a complex social scenario of a meeting between therepresentatives of different social welfare agencies, how should we makesense of this meeting? The second is, in the context of the potential insightsthat the complexity sciences offer for understanding the social world, howcan we translate those models to make sense of complex social dynamics?

My argument is that we need to re-think the insights of complexity sciencesin order to situate the problem of complexity, and of knowing the socialworld, in the social world itself. Doing so means highlighting themultiplicity of social reality, and the centrality of ignorance as acharacteristic in the social world as well as in knowing it. To develop theargument, the paper is written in three sections. In section one, I overviewthe complexity research programme and show the relevance of Luhmannswork in this context. In section two, I draw upon the problem of makingsense of a meeting to show the relevance of complexity and Luhmanns

theory in relation to ethnography. In the final section I explore some of theimplications and questions that arise out of this approach.

Section 1: complexity in theory

The complexity sciences (which incorporate research in a variety ofdisciplines, for example biology, mathematics, thermodynamics, chemistry

and physics) constitute an area of research that has been stimulated largelyby the advent of computers able to solve nonlinear equations and to offerdynamic simulation models (Waldrop 1992, Lewin 1993, Casti 1994,Cohen and Stewart 1994, Brockman 1995, Capra 1996). This researchwithin the sciences has led to some interesting insights in terms of how wecan understand dynamic systems. Of particular significance has been thedevelopment of the concept of self-organization (in which emergentproperties cannot be analysed through the parts) and reconsideration ofthe importance of nonlinearity through recursivity (where small changes

can lead to surprising results). The implication for the social sciences is thatthere is a need to give more consideration to recursive processes ofinteraction, emergent phenomena which are self-organized, and therelationships between chaos and order, simplicity and complexity,determinism and indeterminism, and continuity and change (see for e.g.Eve et al. 1997, Byrne 1998, Cilliers 1998).

A central problem for understanding the implications of complexityscience models for understanding the social world is the methodologicalbasis upon which we can apply the insights of those models to the socialworld. Arguably, all theorizing involves metaphor (Urry 2000), and the

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issue is what claims we make about the metaphors. For example, drawingupon biological use of metaphor, Khalil (1996: 47) notes that we might usemodels from complexity science as similes (superficial metaphor) or asmetaphors which indicate systems characteristics which emerge from

similar contexts (homologous metaphor), similar analytical functions(heterologous or analogous), or similarities which arise from the samegoverning laws of the systems (unificational). Whatever form of metaphorwe use, the models from complexity science are concerned with systems,and a central question that we must ask is, what is a social system? Thisquestion implies further questions, for example: what are the boundaries ofsocial systems? What are the components of social systems? What are thedynamics of social systems? These questions are important, even fordeveloping superficial metaphors; the answers to them have implications

for both theoretical and empirical investigation. And yet these questionshave hitherto been neglected.

To illustrate the need examine the question of the relationship betweenthe models of complexity science and the social world, I want to highlight aproblem one faces when developing a model of the social world based oncomplexity science. Although there are different methods involved in thecomplexity sciences, there is a basic distinction is between mathematicalmodels, which popularized Chaos Theory (e.g. see Glieck 1987), andsimulation techniques, which popularized Complexity Theory (e.g. see

Lewin 1993). The problems of applicability to the social world apply toboth and the key here is the a priori assumptions one would need to makeabout social relationships. In the case of mathematical models, this involvesstructuring the relationships between the various variables into thenonlinear equations. The structure of these equations are entirelydeterministic, and while their reiteration has proved interestingtheoutcomes of patterns of relationships are not predictabletheir applicationto the social world would imply that social dynamics could be characterized

by such deterministic structures. In the case of simulation models, theconcern is more with interacting relationships. These models do involveemergent patterns of interrelationships but the underlying dynamics whichlead to these emergent interrelationships are predetermined in setting upthe model. This occurs even where claims are made that the models canlearn and be trained (see e.g. Cilliers 1998), because the way in whichlearning or training takes place is already predetermined by the modeller.These issues are exacerbated when there is a need to locate parameterswithin which the interactions take place. These problems raise questions

about the characteristics of the models used in the complexity sciences andalso demonstrate the difficulty of making simplistic claims about therelevance of these models for knowing the social world, particularly becauseof the implied assumptions about what a social system is, what are itsboundaries, its components, its underlying dynamics etc.

Within the social science literature, two approaches are emerging inapplying complexity science to the social world. On the one hand, there arethose who analyse the social world in terms of complex social orders (e.g.Richards 1990, Brown 1994, Byrne 1998), and on the other hand, there arethose who analyse the social world through models of complex social

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orderings (e.g. Gilbert and Conte 1995, Cilliers 1998). Those studyingcomplex social orders are concerned with analysing social dynamicsthrough the emergent patterns represented by variables, thus involvingex post observations of the underlying social dynamics. Byrnes work

(1997, 1998) addresses the weakness of importing the nonlinear methodsinto the social world, and develops methods using quantitative data todescribe the emergent dynamics of complex social orders. By contrast,those concerned with complex social orderings are concerned withsimulating the underlying interactive dynamics which involves making exante assumptions about those dynamics. Understanding complex socialorderings requires assumptions about the underlying social relationships.This brings attention more directly to the problem of what constitutessocial relationships, and in what sense they are part of social systems.

My concern is with complex social orderings which is motivated by theway in which simulation techniques are based on assumptions ofinteracting agents through which social processes emerge. However, oneof the most crucial insights from the complexity sciences, that ofemergence, is not taken far enough in these models. For example, whileCilliers (1998) offers an interesting account of connectionist simulation, hisapproach to social systems leads him to claim, for example, that theeconomic system is composed of interacting individuals, where banks, forexample, are nothing more than an aggregate of individuals. This gives no

consideration of hierarchy, how banks may be social actors themselves, andhow banks may appear very differently to different people. What is thesocial system in this case? What makes the economic system different fromother social systems, for example, the legal system? If we take emergenceseriously, what could the emergence of social systems refer to?

To address these issues, there is value in drawing upon the work ofLuhmann (1990, 1995) who draws upon ideas from cybernetics, function-alism, phenomenology and autopoiesis in developing a theory of social

systems. Central to his theory has been the role of complexity, emergenceand self-reference as central to understanding system dynamics. ForLuhmann, complexity refers to the impossibility of complete observationand representation of phenomena that would require connecting eachelement with every other element. For example, the operations of a socialwelfare organization involve selecting particular relationships from a rangeof possibilities about a clients situation. A complete representation of aclient would be impossible. However, this problem is not just a problem ofexternal observation, it is also a problem within a system itself. Indeed,

Luhmann argues, it is through selections that system formation takes place;for example, it is the particular relationships between agents (which couldhave been otherwise) of a social welfare organization that constitute thatorganizations as a particular system (of social welfare) and not somethingelse (of arms production). Emergence through this approach refers to thedifferentiation of selected relationships from their environment, where thesystem is formed through a system/environment difference constitutedthrough the selections. The emergence of a social welfare organizationrefers then to the relationships through which it is differentiated from itsenvironment, the relationships which constitute a system environment

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difference. Finally, self-reference refers to the way in which the systemdetermines the selections itself; the relationships of a social welfareorganisation are continually reproduced within that system.

There is not the space to develop these concepts further here (see

Luhmann 1990, 1995), however, the significance of them for my purposesis the ways in which complexity, emergence and self-reference are implicitto the models of complexity science, but in ways that have not beenacknowledged nor the implications examined. For example, a model ofcomplex social orderings would involve interacting agents based onparticular selective relationships (complexity reduction), differentiatedfrom other possible relationships (emergence), where these selectiverelationships are structured within the rules of the agents (self-reference).However, these models are largely concerned with the emergence of spatial

patterns and dynamics, and do not address the question: what is a socialsystem? As such, it is not clear what these models can actually represent.What, for example, do the agents represent? How is it actors become actorsin social systems? What is the relationship between social systems and theiractors?

Luhman is important here because he elaborates the concepts ofcomplexity, emergence and self-reference in relation to meaning and thesocial world to address these questions. His elaboration is through hisproblem oriented functional methodology (1995: 5258) which does not

involve identifying generic principles describing the characteristics of allsystems, but instead involves identifying problems that systems mustovercome to be constituted, and be maintained, as systems. Thismethodology involves processes of abstraction, generalisation and re-specification which enable more adequate consideration of the dynamics ofcomplexity, emergence and self-reference, and Luhmann gives particularattention to what constitutes a social system. For Luhmann, the socialworld emerges from the problem of double-contingency in which one

systems action is dependent on the former systems action. Since thecomplexity of each system means neither system can know the othersystem, each requires a means to determine their action by reducing thecomplexity of possibilities of the others systems action. This refers to a co-ordinated selectivity constituted in communication which is not reducibleto either system but, rather, is differentiated from the systems. However,communication is complete, constituted, back-to-front, which refers to theobservation by the recipient of intended information communicated by theutterer. Communication refers to the emergent level of the social world

which is differentiated from other complex worlds.Of course, Luhmanns work does not resolve all the problems of

understanding complex social dynamics. What he does do, however, is turnthe emphasis of interest upside down and back to front. The emphasisbecomes upside down because, in contrast to the complexity sciences whichemphasize bottom up emergence, Luhmann opts to take a top downapproach (1995a: 22) in which the elements of systems can be understoodby understanding the differentiations of the social system. Luhmann turnsour attention back to front by defining the social in terms of communica-tion, where communication requires understanding (as an observation) by



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the recipient rather than by the intent of the actor (as in the voluntaristictradition and bottom up emergence). This top down and reversed approachraises questions about how to theorise complex social dynamics, but it alsooffers important directions for empirical research (although this is not

Luhmanns concern). From the starting point of complexity the problemsof observation are not just a problem for theory, but for the social world ingeneral. The implication is that our method should be one of observing theobservations of the social world, and exploring how those observations dealwith, and reproduce, the complexity of the social world.

Section 2: complexity in the wild

While Luhmanns work involves an immense degree of abstraction intheorizing complexity and social systems, my interpretation of his workleads to empirical questions which I have explored through an ethno-graphic study of collaboration in social welfare (Medd 2000). UsingLuhmanns approach to social systems means that an important implicationfor knowing the social world is to situate the problem of complexity in thesocial world itself. Thus to explain complex social dynamics, we need tounderstand the observations of complexity that are constituted throughcommunications of the social world. There is not the space here to

elaborate my ethnographic work, however I want to use an example fromthe study to illustrate the problem of complexity in the social world and theimplications for knowing the social world.1

Imagine a meeting between four managers from four policy fundingbodies (a health agency, social services, community services, regenerationfunding) and two managers from a social welfare project (Ill call itInterface) who is being offered funding through a joint agreement betweenthe agencies. Go on Ann, you lead says May from community services;

Ann (from Interface) replies, Well, to clarify the understanding of themeeting, it is to understand what the agencies want for the future ofInterface and how to put this in writing, and how to monitor and measurethe project. May, Yes, but it is also to explore agreement between thefunding partners, as well as agreement between those four partners andInterface. Ann then suggests that each of the funding managers couldexplain what they expect from the project. The regeneration fund managergave seven outputsfrom employment to womens self-defenceaccord-ing to which the project would be assessed. The representative from the

health authority wanted to make sure the project generated outputs fortheir inter-agency strategies for community care. The representative ofsocial services also wanted the project to meet to their community careoutputs and the objectives of the anti-poverty strategy for the countycouncil. The representative from community services wanted clearmonitoring of clients in relation to housing and other council services.The representatives from the funding agencies told the managers ofInterface that it was no longer to do case-work with individuals but torefer them to appropriate agencies. They told the managers of Interfacethat the project should no longer be involved in community development.

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They also told the managers of Interface that they would have to increasethe monitoring and representation of their work to show that they met thecriteria of the funding contract. This was all for one year of funding, afterwhich the future would need to be negotiated. The meeting came to an end

with an agreement that a draft contract would be drawn up by socialservices.The question I want to ask is how should we make sense of this

meeting? One of the central themes of complexity science is withemergence. But there are two problems which immediately confront us.First, what are the interactions we are interested in? How are theyconstituted? Is it the interpersonal dynamics? Is it the non-verbal bodylanguage? Is it the discourses drawn upon? Is it the manner ofargumentation? Is it the role of materials in co-ordinating those dynamics?

Is it the role of power? All of these are of possible interest to socialscientists, and this is not exhaustive. The second problem is what is theemergent phenomena we are interested in? How is this constituted? Is itthe result of different arguments? Is it the individuals well psychologicalbeing? Is it notes from the meeting? Is it the implications for Interface? Forthe funders? All of these are of possible interest, and again this is notexhaustive. A complex scenario like a meeting offers any number ofpossible events which we might want to explain. What is clear is that thecomplexity of a social situation like this is such that many perspectives are

possible. Indeed, the perspectives of the managers and mine all contributedifferent meanings to the meetings, just as yours does now. Clearly this isproblematic for building models from complexity science.

I want to explore the implications of Luhmanns methodology forunderstanding a scenario such as this meeting. This methodology refers toobserving the observations constituted in communications, communica-tions which constitute the social world. At one level then, we could use thismethod to explore the communications of the meeting itself, as an

interaction system (Luhmann 1995: 412413). Doing so would involveexploring the ways those communications attributed particular action tothe different actors involve. This would be one way to understand themeeting. However, another possibility is to explore the effects of themeeting outside of the meeting itself. Now, noting that communications areconstituted back to front, the question is how was utterance andinformation attributed to the meetings? In other words, for example, whatis the meaning of the meetings for the different agencies as systems ofcommunication?

One point to make here is that while the meetings themselves constituteparticular interaction systems, they do not constitute communication of thedifferent systems in which each manager is a representative. The meetingsare not communications of Interface. The managers of Interface clearlycommunicate in the meetings, but these communications do not constitutecommunications of the project itself. These are not operations of the systemInterface. Similarly, the different managers of the funding agenciescommunicate in the meetings, but these are not communications of thoseagencies. They are not operations within those systems. The actualprocesses of these meetings do not form, in themselves, meanings for the



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different funding agencies, nor for Interface. These meetings themselvesconstitute a temporal space in which the managers negotiate the contract.However, what the managers negotiate is constrained by their roles asrepresentatives of particular agencies. The agencies construction of those

roles determines what constitutes an action by those managers. To give ablunt example, while a manager slurping his or her coffee may affect theinterpersonal interactions, and even their psychological state, this wouldnot constitute action within their agencies. However, the managers haveroles to present the contracts to the appropriate people within theiragencies (this is the utterance), such that the contracts constituteinformation, which is observed through the codes and programmes of theagencies, thus constituting communication. So the meaning of the meetingsfor the different agencies refers to the information that is observed by the

communications of the agencies.Temporality is important here. Communications about Interface will

only take place within the agencies once the formal decision is made to fundthe project. This is anticipated by all the managers, because, of course,decision making is an action attributed by the agencies to the managers.Further communication within the communications of the fundingagencies, will take place as specified in the contract. This refers tocommunications about a six month review that will take place, for examplelooking at what values are presented for the relevant funder (number of

health enquiries etc.), and also whether the project should continue to befunded after the contract has ended. Communication may also take placethrough the specified communications between particular named managersin the contract. They may use information from Interfaces work forcommunications in the agencies. The implication is that the dynamics ofInterface itself, therefore, are temporally autonomous from the commu-nications of funding agencies. However, it is by restricting the temporalautonomy of Interface that the funding agencies restrict the contingency of

the project for them. Interface is to open for a specified number of hoursand is funded for one year with a six month review.The point that I am developing here is that emergence here is not about

bottom-up dynamics, nor simply top-down determination, it is about theemergence of system/environment difference. The outcomes of dynamicswe observe are not some sort of moulded middle-ground, but refer to theconstruction of differences. For Interface, the contract specifies theboundaries within which its operations must take place. And it will bemonitored accordingly, such that its temporal autonomy is relative to the

possibility of funding being withdrawn or a future funding not being given.For the different agencies, Interface will be observed according to the codesand programmes articulated through the contract. These agencies havetemporal autonomy from Interface, their communications need not havepoint to point correspondence with the project. Rather, they have accepteda degree of uncertainty by the project performing operations which willsubsequently provide collated information for the funders. There is riskhere, but it is constrained through temporality. If Interface does not meettargets and provide meaningful information, it will not get funding beyondthe contract. Each of the systems are constituted in communications which

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are autonomous and determined by each system. And the funding systemsdominate, because they specify the criteria through which funding issecured, funding which provides the resources for the project to continue.

Section 3: complex implications

I used the example of the meeting above to illustrate a number of importantpoints in relation to the role of complexity in knowing the social world, andin the social world itself. Complexity denies the possibility of completerepresentation, and in this sense knowing the social world must not onlyinvolve abstraction but it must also involve recognition that the processes ofabstraction involve making selections. However, with complex situations,

one can make numerous selections, they are contingent for they could havebeen otherwise. We can make numerous observations about a meeting, andwhich observations we select will be determined by our questions andinterests. And this occurs within social dynamics themselves. A multitudeof scenarios are occurring in a meeting, and the actors engaged in meetingshave to select what is relevant to them. Complexity raises questions aboutthe status of the real. The complexity of the meetings that I describedwere such that different perspectives were possible. There is a key questionhere: what was the status of reality in this account? One response might be

to suggest that the meeting was a reality, but about which we could havedifferent perspectives. An alternative response might be to suggest wecannot make any claims to reality in this context, but rather look at themultiple constructions possible. However, taking Bhaskars (1989) pointthat things are real in so far as they produce effects, and Luhmannsargument that the social is constituted in so far as communication isreceived, then different questions emerge. In Luhmanns account the effectcannot be attributed to the event, for it depends on the systems responses to

the event (see discussions on autopoiesis for this, Capra 1996). Oneimplication then is that events do not have singular realities but that theybecome multiple (cf. Mol 1998). Putting this another way, if we can onlymake sense of events through the relations in which they are constituted,where these relations are multiple, then again, it implies the need to thinkabout the multiple status of these realities, and suggests that processes ofknowing the social world need to explore the ways in which these realitiesare constituted.

In looking at how realities get made, there is an important aspect of this

process of selection to consider: that complexity refers to the impossibilityof complete observation refers to the necessity of ignorance as acharacteristic of claims made upon the world (Luhmann 1995, 1997). Thisrefers to our problem of knowing the social world, but also to the problemsof actors in the social world for the implication of ignorance is contingency,and contingency means risk (Luhmann 1995: 25). In a sense then, ourfocus on complexity becomes a question of how we can deal with ignorancein the world. Unless we can repeat the system and build a model ascomplex as the system itself (Cilliers 1998: 10), then we have to ignore. Andan important part of this ignorance is that we cannot observe ourselves in



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the processes of observing. We cannot stand outside. In Luhmanns terms,we live in an ecology of ignorance (1998). However, it is not just thatignorance is a problem, it also makes things possible. For how could wemake any claims to know the social world if we had to account for

everything? And how could the managers of the funding bodies fundInterface if they had to account for everything possible? Ignorance becomesnecessary for knowing the social world.

Acknowledgements

This article is developed from my PhD work in the Department ofSociology, Lancaster University (19951999) funded by the ESRC. Im

grateful to my supervisors and colleagues for their support in developingmy arguments. Im also grateful to the difficult questioning at Knowing theSocial World, University of Salford where I first presented this paper, andto Jane Kilby and the anonymous referees for specific comments.

Note

1. All names given here are pseudonyms to ensure anonymity.

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