IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICOSHANE UTLEY, BETH UTLEY,LISA HAWS, and MATT WILCOX,Plaintiffs,v. CV_____________________BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, SAN JUAN COUNTY,SAN JUAN COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICE,KEN CHRISTESEN, in his individual capacity,RON ANDERSON, in his individual capacity, andBRICE CURRENT, in his individual capacity.COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTHAMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION42 U.S.C. 1983,BREACH OF AN IMPLIED CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT, ANDVIOLATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT CONDUCT ACTCOME NOW Plaintiffs Shane Utley, Beth Utley, Lisa Haws, and Matt Wilcox, by andthrough their counsel, Law Offices of Michael E. Mozes, P.C., and hereby submit theirComplaint for Violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United StatesConstitution42 U.S.C. 1983, Breach of an Implied Contract of Employment, and Violations ofthe Government Conduct Act. I. JURISDICTION1. This cases arises under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of the First and FourteenthAmendments of the United States Constitution and New Mexico common law.2. Plaintiff Shane Utley is, and at all times material hereto has been, a resident of theCounty of San Juan, State of New Mexico.3. Plaintiff Beth Utley is, and at all times material hereto has been, a resident of theCounty of San Juan, State of New Mexico.

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4. Plaintiff Lisa Haws is, and at all times material hereto has been, a resident of theCounty of San Juan, State of New Mexico.5. Plaintiff Matt Wilcox is, and at all times material hereto has been, a resident of theCounty of San Juan, State of New Mexico.6. Defendant Board of Commissioners, San Juan County is, and at all times materialhereto has been, a governmental entity of the County of San Juan, located and principally doingbusiness in, the County of San Juan, State of New Mexico.7. Defendant San Juan County Sheriffs Office [hereinafter SJCSO] is, and at alltimes material hereto has been, a governmental entity of the County of San Juan, located andprincipally doing business in, the County of San Juan, State of New Mexico.8. Defendant Ken Christesen [hereinafter Christesen] is, based upon informationand belief, a resident of the County of San Juan, State of New Mexico.9. Defendant Ron Anderson [hereinafter Anderson], is, based upon informationand belief, a resident of the County of San Juan, State of New Mexico.10. Defendant Brice Current [hereinafter Current] is, based upon information andbelief, a resident of the County of San Juan, State of New Mexico.11. The federal District Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Plaintiffsclaims through 28 U.S.C. 1331, federal question jurisdiction, and pendent jurisdiction onPlaintiffs state law claims.12. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the parties to this action.13. Venue is proper in this Court.2

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II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS14. Plaintiffs hereby adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 13 asset forth above.15. Christesen, at all times relevant to Plaintiffs claims, exercised the job duties andresponsibilities of the Sheriff of San Juan County. In his position of Sheriff, Christesenconstituted the policy-making authority and highest operational authority of the SJCSO. Christesen also constituted the ultimate authority in the SJCSO with respect to the application ofSan Juan County personnel policies and procedures.16. During the period of time relevant to Plaintiffs claims, Anderson exercised theduties and responsibilities of the Undersheriff of San Juan County. Anderson exercised policy-making authority and had operational authority over the nature of Plaintiffs duties and theapplication of San Juan County personnel policies and procedures.17. Current, who occupied principally the duties of a lieutenant or captain during theperiod of time pertinent to Plaintiffs claims, often acted as the proxy and spokesperson for thewill, opinions, and directions of Christesen and Andersonas set forth more fully below.18. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiffs were employees of the SJCSO. Plaintiffscontinue to remain employed with the SJCSO.19. Shane Utley, during all times relevant hereto, performed the job duties andresponsibilities of a Captain. In that position, Mr. Utleys principal job duties were related toSheriffs Office Operations Division Captain. Mr. Utley was directly supervised by Christesenand Anderson.20. Beth Utley, during all times relevant hereto, performed the job duties and3

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responsibilities of a Public Information Officer (PIO) and Community Relations Coordinator. Atall times relevant hereto, Ms. Utleys direct supervisor was Christesen and her indirect supervisorwas Anderson.21. Lisa Haws, during the relevant time pertinent to her claims, principally performedthe job duties and responsibilities of a Lieutenant. In that position, Haws mainly supervised thepatrol division. Haws supervisors were Mr. Utley and, indirectly, Anderson and Christesen.22. Matt Wilcox, during the period of time pertinent to his claims, performed theduties and responsibilities of a Lieutenant and Sergeant. Mr. Wilcoxs direct supervisors wereMs. Haws, Shane Ferrari and, indirectly, Mr. Utley, Anderson and Christesen.23. On March 1, 2010, Mr. Wilcox received a SJCSO promotion from Sergeant toLieutenant. The Sheriff at the time was Mark McCloskey. Based upon the feedback from thegreat majority of the Sergeants, McCloskey instituted in February 2010 a promotion process fromsergeant to lieutenant a Command Staff interview process. This process involved a writtenexercise, an interview with command staff, and staff evaluations. These same elements appearedin the discretionary assessment process set forth in Policy No. 3000-12 for promotions.24. As a result of the approved promotional process, the SJCSO promoted Mr.Wilcox into a Support Lieutenant position, effective March 7, 2010.25. On September 25, 2010, Captain Jim Smith of the SJCSO gave Mr. Wilcox a 6-month performance review, noting that Mr. Wilcox had done an excellent job as SupportLieutenant. The review concluded that Mr. Wilcox had no areas of performance that neededimprovement.26. In early 2011, the citizens of San Juan County elected Christesen as the new4

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Sheriff. During the election, Mr. Wilcox publicly supported the candidacy of Marlyn Wyatt forSheriff and vocally opposed Christesen.27. While the Sheriffs campaign was in full swing, a number of salaried SJCSOemployees approached Mr. Wilcox and advised him that Christesen was stating that Mr. Wilcoxwould be demoted if Christesen won the Sheriffs election.28. Shortly before the vote for Sheriff, Christesen went to Mr. Wilcoxs house andrequested that Mr. Wilcox cease speaking against Christesen. When Mr. Wilcox remarked thathe had heard that Christesen intended to demote him, Christesen promised Mr. Wilcox that inexchange for Mr. Wilcoxs refusal to publicly speak out against Christesen that if Christesenwere elected, he would not demote Mr. Wilcox.29. Christesen won the election for sheriff and took office in January 2011.30. On February 2, 2011, Christesen wrote Mr. Wilcox a memorandum, advising thatMr. Wilcoxs rank of lieutenant was being rescinded and a different assessment process wasbeing utilized. In addition, Christesen stated that Mr. Wilcox could not grieve this personnelaction. Christesen, by rescinding Mr. Wilcoxs lieutenancy, violated both the promotional policyin place and the Command Staff interview process established by McCloskey.31. While the assessment process Christesen explained ran its course, Mr. Wilcoxmaintained his Lieutenant rank and pay. On April 11, 2011, Christesen advised Mr. Wilcox thateffective April 17, 2011 Mr. Wilcox would be demoted to a sergeants position with reduced pay.32. According to the assessment administered by a panel under Christesens control,Mr. Wilcox scored out from among the seven eligible sergeants with the lowest point total for theassessment. This score is outlandish and constitutes Christesens attempt to not only foreclose5

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Mr. Wilcox from holding on to his lieutenants position, but also any future lieutenant opening. Christesen represented to other SJCSO employees that Mr. Wilcox would never be promotedwhile Christesen remained Sheriff.33. The recision of Mr. Wilcoxs rank, the failure to promote Mr. Wilcox into thelieutenant position, and the loss of pay and level of duties associated with the demotion areadverse employment actions in which Mr. Wilcoxs exercise of free speech and politicalassociations were a substantial or motivating factor.34. During the period of time Mr. Wilcox has performed duties as a sergeant hisperformance evaluations have been Excellent. In addition, during the period of time he hasbeen a sergeant, Mr. Wilcox has received awards and commendations for his performance.35. On January 31, 2013, the SJCSO, under Currents signature, issued Mr. Wilcox aletter of reprimand for allegations related to communications with SJCSO deputies. The letter ofreprimand was an unsupported, groundless, and retaliatory over-reaction to a minor incident. Written reprimands, pursuant to SJCSO Policy No. 3000-05, are to issue for substantial orrepeated violations of policy in which verbal warnings or verbal counseling is not appropriate orhas proven to be ineffective. A number of provisions in the SJCSO were violated, not the leastof which are the investigatory requirements. This was investigated, but no progressive disciplinewas handed out. There are no similar violations in Mr. Wilcoxs file.36. As of this date, Mr. Wilcox continues to be a target or retaliatory conduct anddisparate treatment because now, in the midst of another electoral season involving the Sheriff,Mr. Wilcox is not politically supporting Christesens re-election.37. Mr. Wilcox as recently as late March 2014 has reported to San Juan Countys6

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Human Resources Department (HR) that he is being subject to retaliation and a hostile workenvironment. Based on Mr. Wilcoxs knowledge, the HR Department has done nothing toprotect him and investigate his complaints. By and large, the HR Department has beenunresponsive to Mr. Wilcoxs concerns.38. Ms. Haws, who for a period of time has supervised Mr. Wilcox, has suffered anon-going campaign of retaliation, hostility, and disparate treatment from the SJCSO and theindividually-named defendants.39. Effective February 8, 2009, the SJCSO promoted Ms. Haws into the position ofPatrol Lieutenant in the SJCSO. Ms. Haws worked a few months on patrol before beingpromoted to the Detective Division, where she became the Detective Lieutenant of the SJCSO. Ms. Haws is the first and only female ever promoted into a lieutenants position at the SJCSO.40. During the 2010-11 campaign for Sheriff, Ms. Haws vocally supported thecandidacy of Marlyn Wyatt. Christesen repeatedly commented during the Sheriffs campaignthat he intended to get rid of the Haws mafia. Ms. Haws husband, Neil Haws, is also alieutenant with the SJCSO. 41. Christesen actually went door-to-door during the campaign and stated to votersthat if Christesen was elected he would get rid of the Haws mafia. There are numerouswitnesses to these comments. Indeed, on the night of his election, Christesen reiterated to agroup of people that he now intended to get rid of the Haws mafia.42. Shortly after being elected as Sheriff in January 2011, Christesen began hisretaliatory campaign. In April 2011, Christesen demoted Ms. Haws to a patrol lieutenantposition. Although the demotion did not result in a loss of pay to Ms. Haws, the demotion did7

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lead to reduced job duties, diminished promotional opportunities, and prestige. The male whoreplaced Ms. Haws in the detective lieutenant position was significantly lesser-qualified.43. Christesen communicated to other SJCSO employees that he had demoted Ms.Haws for the purpose of forcing Ms. Haws to involuntarily resign.44. At all times relevant during to Ms. Haws claims, she performed her job duties andresponsibilities in an excellent manner, as noted in the relevant performance evaluations. Inaddition, during the period 2011-2014, Ms. Haws has received a number of commendations forher outstanding performance.45. Ms. Haws has made known for years within the SJCSO her desire to attend theprestigious FBI National Academy (NA). The NA is a training for command stafflieutenantor abovethat has limited attendance. In July 2011, Shane Ferrari, who had recently received apromotion into a lieutenants position and was still a probationary employee was selected byChristesen to attend the NA. 46. In late 2011 or early 2012, Daniel Webb, another recently promoted lieutenant,advised Ms. Haws that he would be going to the NA next. Ms. Haws became rightfully upsetand complained to Christesen that although she was the senior lieutenant she was beingimproperly passed over to receive the NA training. Males were being regularly selected in theface of Ms. Haws known desire to attend the training. 47. The NA training can and does affect promotional opportunities within the SJCSO.48. In September 2012, Ms. Haws again learned that she was being passed over forthe NA training in favor of another recently promoted male lieutenant. Ms. Haws approachedChristesen and asked if she could be considered for the NA. Christesen responded Yes and8

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elaborated that it did not matter to him whether Ms. Haws or another male lieutenant attended thetraining first. Ms. Haws was senior to the male applicant in time in service.49. Nevertheless, time passed and Ms. Haws was not selected by Christesen to attendthe NA training.50. In September 2013, Luke Miller, the Albuquerque Coordinator of the NA,specifically stated to the SJCSO that the FBI wanted Ms. Haws to attend the training. Christesenrefused to allow Ms. Haws to attend the training. Even contact from the FBI SAC inAlbuquerque could not convince Christesen to allow Ms. Haws to attend the training. The FBIrequest was due, in part, to the shortage of females who qualified for and attended the NA.51. On March 12, 2014, Current entered Ms. Haws office to speak with her aboutMr. Utleys support for Christesen related to the upcoming June 2014 election for Sheriff. Current essentially stated that Mr. Utley was required to actively support Christesen during theelection. Otherwise, negative consequences would be attached to Mr. Utleys lack of support. On March 17, 2014, Christesen told Ms. Haws that Mr. Utley is playing a dangerous game andgoing down a dangerous road. Ms. Haws understood that Christesen was referring to Mr.Utley supporting the Sheriff during the election campaign.52. On March 17, 2014, Christesen advised Ms. Haws that she had been chosen toattend the NA but Christesen would not permit it at the time. Christesen also explained that hehad notified the FBI that his refusal was due to Christesens view that sending Ms. Haws becauseshe was a female was inappropriate. This conversation occurred in the context of the upcomingelections and Ms. Haws statement to Christesen that she would support him. Haws made thisstatement because she was tired of three years of disparate treatment and hardship. Ms. Haws9

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believed she had no other choice and feared further retaliation. 53. Ms. Haws commented to Christesen that she was being passed over repeatedly bymales who had lesser service time and experience in the SJCSO. Ms. Haws squarely askedChristesen if she was being discriminated against because of the fact that Ms. Haws had notsupported Christesen in the last Sheriffs election.54. When Ms. Haws requested on March 17th that Christesen give her a definitiveanswer on whether she would ever be able to attend the NA, Christesen responded that thedecision would not be made until after the upcoming Sheriffs election.55. Ms. Haws understood at that point that Christesen was connecting any possibilityof her ever attending the NA to her electoral support for Christesen. 56. On March 20, 2014, Ms. Haws attended a luncheon sponsored by the NA. Ms.Haws spoke with Miller. Miller related to Ms. Haws the fact that the FBI had provided twopositions in the NA to the SJCSO for the express purpose of having Ms. Haws attend. Milleralso shared the conversation the FBI had in which it was specifically requested of the Sheriff thathe allow Ms. Haws to attend the NA.57. On March 24, 2014, Ms. Haws filed an Equal Employment OpportunityCommission (EEOC) complaint, alleging that she had been treated differently from other maleswith respect to attendance at the NA because she is female.58. By the date of the filing EEOC complaint, Ms. Haws was senior in time in rankand service to the following males who had attended or were scheduled or promised to attend theNAShane Ferrari, Cory Tanner, and Daniel Webb.59. On March 25, 2014, Ms. Haws contacted the San Juan County HR for the purpose10

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of filing a complaint against the SJCSO and Christesen related to the workplace discriminationharassment, and hostility she encountered. San Juan County HR refused to take her complaints,improperly stating that since a complaint had been filed in the EEOC that HR could do nothingfor Ms. Haws. Such is not supported in the San Juan County Employee Handbook generally andspecifically in Sections 18 and 19.60. Following the filing of her EEOC Complaint, Ms. Haws has been subjected to ahostile work environment by the SJCSO, Christesen, and Anderson. The Sheriff no longerspeaks with Ms. Haws, ignores her in the workplace, and has created a work environment whereMs. Haws is isolated, alienated, and separate. 61. On March 27, 2014, Undersheriff Anderson met with the SJCSO staff and statedthat Anderson would henceforth monitor the comings and goings of staff. For many years thepolicy had been that SJCSO employees could come and go freely as long as they worked their40-hour weeks. This new policy was clear retaliation for the complaints lodged by Ms. Hawsand others.62. On January 1, 2011, Ms. Utley became the Public Information Officer (PIO) forthe SJCSO. Her direct supervisor was the Sheriff, Ken Christesen and her indirect supervisorwas the Undersheriff, Ron Anderson.63. In December 2011, Ms. Utley received an Exceptional Service Award for heroutstanding work ethic and job performance.64. During the period January 1, 2011 until April 11, 2013, Ms. Utley received nocomplaints from Anderson or Christesen related to her work performance. It is an obligation of aSJCSO to advise employees of any performance-related problems. Ms. Utleys performance was11

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evaluated by Anderson on April 25, 2012 for the 2011 work year. Anderson rated Ms. Utley as agood employee. No needs improvement ratings appear on this evaluation65. In January 2013, Ms. Utley received a certification that qualified her as the onlycertified PIO in San Juan County.66. On April 11, 2013, Christesen and Anderson met with Ms. Utley. Prior to thismeeting, Anderson and Current had for several weeks ignored Ms. Utley and refused to speakwith her. Ms. Utley did not know what caused this behavior. 67. Christesen and Anderson presented Ms. Utley with her 2012 evaluation, whichincluded an number of Needs Improvement ratings. Prior to presenting Ms. Utley with thisevaluation, neither Christesen nor Anderson had complained to Ms. Utley about any facet of herwork performance. 68. The anniversary date of Ms. Utleys employment with the SJCSO was January2012. The 2012 performance evaluation, according to San Juan County personnel policies, wasto be completed within 30 days of Ms. Utleys anniversary date. It was not.69. In such circumstances, the San Juan County Employee Handbook, Section 13.3,the presumption is that the employees performance is satisfactory and a step increase is awarded.70. Ms. Utley is the only female employee supervised by Anderson. Other maleemployees supervised by Anderson received notice of performance deficiencies and were givenopportunities to improve. Ms. Utley was not. In addition, Ms. Utley asserts that the needsimprovement ratings noted on the April 11, 2013 evaluation were fictitious, retaliatory, andmade with evil intent. Christesen and Anderson ignored and gave no consideration to Ms.Utleys explanations related to the allegations of poor performance. In large part, the12

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deficiencies noted on the performance evaluation were due to the negligence and failure torespond appropriately of Christesen and Anderson. 71. This evaluation meeting turned hostile and threatening when Ms. Utley opposedthe ratings given or tried to present explanations for the performance deficiencies alleged. 72. Christesen and Anderson forced Ms. Utley to resign from SJCSO FoundationBoard, of which she was President, as an order that surfaced during the evaluation conference.73. On April 11, 2013, as a condition of continued employment, Christesen andAnderson compelled Ms. Utley to sign a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP). Some of theconditions of the PIP were the following: (1) a monthly activity report to be presented toChristesen and Anderson; (2) any meetings with any and all contacts outside the SheriffsOffice were to be sent to Christesen and Anderson; and (3) on-going monthly meetings withChristesen and Anderson for the purpose of updating Ms. Utleys activities.74. These PIP requirements were not required of other SJCSO employees andconstituted harassment of Ms. Utley and an improper attempt to control the movements andinteractions of Ms. Utley.75. In August 2013, Ms. Utley met with Christesen and Anderson to supposedlyreview how Ms. Utley was performing under the provisions of the PIP. During the meeting,neither Christesen nor Anderson stated anything that directly corresponded to any of Ms. Utleysjob duties or her general work performance. This was supposedly the first meeting called forunder the provisions of the PIP. The meeting was a farce with Christesen and Anderson referringto golf games and television shows.76. Ms. Utley did not have another update meeting related to the PIP with13

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Christesen and Anderson until December 18, 2013. This meeting was not much better than theAugust meeting; however, Christesen and Anderson did communicate to Ms. Utley that she wasdoing a good job.77. In January 2014, the SJCSO, under the direction of Christesen, began to curtailthe PIO duties of Ms. Utleywithout reason or explanation. 78. In January 2014, Ms. Utley learned that Elizabeth Valdez was retiring from herposition of Office Manager with the SJCSO. At that time, Ms. Utley was the only qualifiedSJCSO employee who could meet the requirements of the position.79. Christesen mentioned that he was going to place an under-qualified male, EliLisko, into Valdezs former position. When Christesen received disagreement with this decision,he then promoted two under-qualified females into Valdezs former position. He also gave EliLisko a promotion.80. In order to make these personnel decisions, Christesen had to (1) change thequalifications for the position; (2) fail to provide any consideration for Ms. Utleys interest in theposition; (3) change the position(s) to a non-exempt job; and (4) manipulate and pervert thepromotion and classification policies of the SJCSO. At no point did Christesen engage therequired assessment process for this position.81. By now Current was speaking negatively about Ms. Utley in the workplace andcriticizing Ms. Utleys work performance. At no point in time did Current exercise any directsupervision of Ms. Utley. 82. Current stated to Shane Utley that Ms. Utley was just trying to sabotage theSheriff and make him look bad after Current believed Ms. Utley had not done all in her power14

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to make a SJCSO golf tournament a success. Current even told this to people outside theSheriffs Office. During a separate golf outing, Current spent a considerable amount of time badmouthing Ms. Utley to the Chief of Police of the City of Bloomfield, Mike Kovacs. Currentscharges were without any evidence and patently false.83. Current expressed that Ms. Utley was not a good PIO and should be fired. Duringa March 2014 meeting related to budget cuts, Current expressed publicly his opinion that if anyjobs are to be cut, then Beths should be the first to go. 84. Ms. Utley is an exempt employee. 85. It has been the custom and practice at the SJCSO for years that exempt employeescould take care of personal matters during a regular work dayas long as the employee made upthe time lost during the work week so that the total time at work amounts to at least 40 hours. Inaddition, if an exempt employee works over 40 hours a week, the employee could take the extratime off during a subsequent week. 86. Ms. Utley is the only exempt employee that is required to notify Anderson andChristesen of her whereabouts during the work day. 87. Current has stated that Ms. Utley makes too much money and that Valdez alsomade too much money. The only SJCSO employees Current has made these comments about arethese two females.88. The individually-named Defendants have isolated and alienated Ms. Utley in theworkplace by not speaking with her, refusing to address her work concerns and complaints, using ambush techniques to evaluate work performance, and spreading negative, false, and maliciousrumors about her as an employee and person. These efforts to discredit Ms. Utley have created a15

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hostile work environment in which Ms. Utley feels alone, without recourse, and abandoned.89. On March 24, 2014, Ms. Utley filed an EEOC complaint alleging that she hadbeen subjected to a hostile work environment and discriminated against because of her sex. 90. Ms. Utley also filed a harassment complaint with San Juan County HR. As of thedate of this complaint, Ms. Utley is unaware of any investigation or other activity related to thisharassment complaint.91. Mr. Utley learned in early March 2014 that a close family friend, Mike Kovacs,would be running for Sheriff of San Juan County. Although Kovacs was a long-time friend ofthe Utley family, Mr. Utley told Kovacs that Mr. Utley had already disclosed to Christesen thatMr. Utley would support Christesens re-election. The election for Sheriff is to be held in June2014. 92. During the course of the last three years, Christesen has represented to Mr. Utleyand others in the SJCSO on a number of occasions that Mr. Utley would be appointedUndersheriff should Christesen prevail in the June 2014 elections.93. In March 2014, Mr. Utley learned through other sources that Christesen wasunhappy with Mr. Utley because Christesen believed that Mr. Utley would support Kovacs in theupcoming election.94. Mr. Utley then spoke with Christesen in the SJCSO workplace that Mr. Utleyremained loyal to Christesen and would support Christesen in the election. 95. On March 11, 2014, a conversation took place in the SJCSO workplace thatinvolved Mr. Utley, Christesen, Shane Ferrari, Anderson, and Current. The conversationcentered on the June 2014 election for Sheriff. During the conversation Christesen stated he16

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needed to know that he had the support of all present. Current directly asked Mr. Utley ifChristesen could count on his support.96. Under the guise of taking a phone call, Christesen, Anderson, and Ferrari then leftthe room, leaving Mr. Utley and Current behind. Current, acting as the mouthpiece ofChristesen, then began questioning the support of Mr. Utley. When Mr. Utley reiterated hissupport for Christesen, Current responded by stating that Mr. Utley needed to get donations forChristesens re-election bid, needed to have a campaign sign put in his front yard that supportedChristesen, needed to get his entire family involved in getting Christesen re-elected, and neededto do more towards Christesens re-election.97. While this conversation ensued between Mr. Utley and Current, Christesenroamed the hallway outside the room, constantly looking inside. It was obvious that Current wasacting at the behest of Christesen and merely repeating questions and comments Current andChristesen had discussed beforehand. As proof of this motive, Current, who had no authority tospeak about or direct such matters, stated that Mr. Utley would only be Christesens Undersheriffif he complied with the demands Current was making. On March 12, 2014, Captain BriceCurrent, while on duty, reiterated the above conversation he had with Mr. Utley to LieutenantLisa Haws (Mr. Utleys subordinate) in Ms. Haws office.98. On March 18, 2014, Current again spoke with Mr. Utley in the workplace aboutsupporting Christesen during the election. Current noted that Mr. Utley did not sufficientlysupport the re-election of Christesen. Current complained once more that Utley needed tosupport Christesen financially and do more. Current demanded that Mr. Utley have his parentsplace a large campaign sign supporting Christesen on their property. When Mr. Utley responded17

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that he could not do that because his family supported Kovacs, Current angrily replied that Mr.Utley could force his parents to place such a sign. That evening Mr. Utley attended a campaignfunction with Christesen, demonstrating his support for Christesens re-election. 99. On March 18, 2014, Mr. Utley also spoke with Christesen, stating that he fearedfor his job security because of what Ms. Haws had communicated about Christesen remarkingthat Mr. Utley was playing a dangerous game. Mr. Utleys concern was genuine and he fearedthat he could be terminated at any time.100. A few days later Ferrari advised Mr. Utley that Christesen was concerned aboutwhether Mr. Utley would support Christesens re-election bid.101. Mr. Utley also learned through Lieutenant Neil Haws that Christesen wascomplaining about Mr. Utleys supposed lack of support. Lt. Haws also stated that Christesenmade the comment to him that Mr. Utley was playing a dangerous game. During this period,Christesen made known to a number of SJCSO employees that Christesen was unhappy with thelevel of Mr. Utleys political support.102. In an under-handed effort to try to win the Utleys campaign support, Christesendelayed giving both Mr. and Ms. Utley their yearly evaluations, which were due in January 2014. Based upon Christesens comments to other SJCSO employees, Christesen believed that heneeded the Utleys political support to win the June 2014 election; however, once that supportwas no longer necessary, it was rumored Christesen would remove both Utleys from the SJCSO.103. During March 2014, the SJCSO was permeated with political conversationsrelated to garnering support for Christesen. These conversations were coercive and placedenormous amounts of pressure upon the Utleys and others. In the Utleys case, Christesen made18

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it clear to that political support for his re-election equated with retention of employment in theSJCSO.104. In the midst of these circumstances, Mr. Utley decided to write Christesen in lateMarch 2014. Mr. Utley, by now mentally and emotionally worn down by the pressure exertedupon him to support Christesen, told Christesen that he would no longer support Christesens re-election. Mr. Utley also requested that Christesen notify Current to quit speaking poorly abouthis wife.105. On March 24, 2014, Mr. Utley filed a claim with the San Juan County HR,claiming that Christesen and Anderson were violating County policy by campaigning while onduty, violating the Governmental Conduct Act through their unethical behavior, and subjectinghim to a hostile work environment. 106. After filing his complaint, on the very same day, Christesen and Andersonconfronted Mr. Utley about the filing of his claims. Christesen asked Mr. Utley why Mr. Utleyhad gone to HR and filed his complaint. The conversation was inappropriate and caused Mr.Utley great discomfort because Mr. Utley was forced to justify the filing of the hostile workenvironment claim. 107. The head of San Juan County HR, Charlene Scott, notified Mr. Utley that hiscomplaint was going nowhereleading Mr. Utley to believe that he would be quickly retaliatedagainst and the hostile work environment would turn more hostile. Scott is required under thepolicies and procedures of Ordinance 34 of San Juan County to investigate Mr. Utleysclaimsnot summarily dismiss them.108. Unsurprisingly, retaliation quickly began. The custom and practice, as stated19

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above, was to allow employees time to handle personal and other matters during the workday aslong as the employee made the time up during the week. On March 27, 2014, Anderson advisedthe SJCSO staff that employees would henceforth be required to report any off-work activitiesdirectly to Anderson for approval. This by-passed the clear chain of command and removedsupervisory duties from Mr. Utleys and others purviews. Moreover, since the facts andcircumstances related to Mr. Utleys political support for Christesen arose and the filing of thehostile work environment complaint, Mr. Utley has been subjected to on-going harassment andworkplace hostility, including, but not limited to removal of some of his supervisory duties,workplace intimidation and alienation, and intimidation from the individually-namedDefendants. 109. Employees of the SJCSO were required to abide by the policies and procedures ofboth the SJCSO and the County. On repeated and numerous occasions, as set forth more fullybelow, Defendants violated these policies and procedures. COUNT I42 U.S.C. 1983VIOLATIONS OF FREEDOM OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONFIRST AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION110. Plaintiffs hereby adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 109 asset forth above. 111. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits publicemployers from disparately treating employees because of their political beliefs, associations, andaffiliations. The only exception to this prohibition corresponds to where the employment20

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includes a requirement of political allegiance.112. In this matter, due to the nature of the duties and responsibilities of Plaintiffs, norequirement of political allegiance exists. 113. The Plaintiffs were subjected to official pressure to work for the candidacy ofChristesen at the risk of losing their employment and/or suffering adverse employment actions. This coercion is a violation of each and every Plaintiffs fundamental constitutional rights.114. These Plaintiff have suffered a number of adverse employment actions where theirpolitical affiliations and beliefs were substantial or motivating factors, including, but not limitedto, the creation of hostile work environments, refusals to allow and attend trainings, demotion,retaliation, removal of job duties, unjustified and unfair disciplinary actions, disparate treatmentwith respect to the terms and conditions of employment, abuse and perversion of mandatorypolicies and procedures, unjustifiable performance evaluations and/or the lack thereof,banishment to what are now dead-end jobs without prospects of promotion, and the conditioningof employment privileges and rights on political support of Christesen.115. In violating the Plaintiffs First Amendment rights, the Defendants acted under thecolor of state law.116. Plaintiffs are entitled to all remedies and relief available to them under theprovisions of 42 U.S.C. 1983, including, but not limited to, punitive damages against theindividually-named Defendants for their willful, wanton, malicious, and grossly reckless conduct.

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COUNT II42 U.S.C. 1983VIOLATIONS OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH/RETALIATIONFIRST AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION117. Plaintiffs hereby adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 116 asset forth above.118. At no time with respect to the constitutional violations of the Plaintiffs freedomof speech rights did Plaintiffs speak according to their official duties.119. Plaintiffs, in expressing their political opinions and beliefs regarding their reasonsto support or not support Christesen, spoke out on matters of public concern. This speechconstitutes protected speech under the First Amendment.120. The governmental entities named as Defendants and the individually-namedDefendants interests in Plaintiffs comments related to political speech and other speech do notoutweigh the constitutional interests of Plaintiffs.121. As set forth in paragraph 113 above, the Plaintiffs exercise of free speech was asubstantial factors in a number of adverse employment actions that these Plaintiffs suffered andcontinue to suffer.122. The adverse actions Plaintiffs complain of in relation to their exercise of theirFirst Amendment rights of free speech would not have occurred but for the exercise of thatspeech. A causal connection exists between the adverse actions complained of and the protectedspeech.123. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants acted under the color of state law.22

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124. The Plaintiffs exercise of their free speech rights and privileges was not sufficientto disrupt the operations of the SJCSO.125. There exist no legitimate, constitutional reasons for the Defendants to haveretaliated against these Plaintiffs for the exercise of their free speech rights. 126. The retaliatory conduct Plaintiffs have suffered would have deterred a similarly-situated employee from exercising his or her constitutional rights. 127. Plaintiffs are entitled to all remedies available under 42 U.S.C. 1983, including,but not limited to, punitive damages against the individually-named Defendants for their willful,wanton, malicious, and grossly reckless conduct.COUNT III42 U.S.C. 1983VIOLATIONS OF EQUAL PROTECTIONFOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION128. Plaintiffs hereby adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 127 asset forth above.129. Plaintiffs were subjected by Defendants to a hostile work environment because ofeither their gender, political associations, or both.130. San Juan County and the SJCSO, as well as the individually-named Defendants,selectively and adversely subjected Plaintiffs to disparate treatment and actions because of theirgender, female, and/or their refusals to politically support Christesen and his illegal and unethicaladministration.131. The unlawful acts and failures to act Plaintiffs complain of constitute intentional23

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harassment and punishment for protected speech and classification.132. In subjecting Plaintiffs to adverse employment actions such as a hostile workenvironment, violations of policies and procedures that detrimentally affected their work status,failures to promote, failures to provide training, unlawful prohibitions on speech, coercionrelated to their political affiliations, and other adverse actions, Defendants acted under the colorof state law.133. When compared with other SJCSO employees, Plaintiffs were treated differentlyand deprived of workplace benefits and considerations freely given to other employees.134. The selective treatment Mss. Utley and Haws complain of was motivated by anintent to discriminate against them on the impermissible bases of gender as well as politicalassociation and free speech.135. The hostile work environment Mss. Haws and Utley complain of was objectivelysevere and pervasive that a reasonable person would have found hostile or abusive.136. Mss. Haws and Utley did find the work environment at the SJCSO to be hostileand abusive.137. The unlawful conduct Plaintiffs complain of unreasonably interfered with theirwork performance and duties.138. Plaintiffs decisions to not politically support and associate with Christesenspolitical campaign contributed to the formation of the hostile work environment.139. Defendants failed to appropriately address Plaintiffs complaints of this hostilework environment. Although Defendants knew about the hostile work environment Plaintiffsreported, Defendants did nothing to remediate the environment.24

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140. Defendants have no legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for engaging in theunlawful conduct Plaintiffs complain of. Any reason put forward by Defendants is but a pretextfor unconstitutional and unlawful conduct.141. Plaintiffs are entitled to all remedies and relief available under 42 U.S.C. 1983,including, but not limited to, punitive damages for the willful, malicious, wanton, and grosslyreckless acts and failures to act of the individually-named Defendants.COUNT IV42 U.S.C. 1983VIOLATIONS OF DUE PROCESSFOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION142. Plaintiff hereby adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 141 asset forth above.143. Christesen and the SJCSO acted under the color of state law when they decided todemote Mr. Wilcox.144. The demotion of Mr. Wilcox from a lieutenant to a sergeant resulted in the loss ofpay and benefits.145. At all times relevant hereto, Mr. Wilcox had and exercised a protectedconstitutional interest in his employment with the SJCSO.146. Constitutional due process requires that Mr. Wilcox have received a meaningfulopportunity to be heard prior to depriving him of any benefit associated with his protectedproperty interest in employment.147. Mr. Wilcox had no opportunity to participate in any process prior to the decision25

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being made to demote him. Indeed, the SJCSO and Christesen expressly prohibited Mr. Wilcoxfrom participating in any due process hearing prior to or after the demotion became effective onApril 17, 2011.148. Christesen, in deciding to demote Mr. Wilcox, and deprive him of hisconstitutional interests, was not impartial and had stated previous to the demotion that suchwould occur because Mr. Wilcox did not support him during Christesens election as Sheriff.149. Christesen engaged in this unconstitutional conduct for the sole purpose ofunconstitutionally retaliating against Mr. Wilcox. This unconstitutional conduct extends toprohibiting Mr. Wilcox from being promoted into other positions for which Mr. Wilcox iseminently qualified.150. The constitutional rights the SJCSO and Christesen deprived Mr. Wilcox of wereclearly established at the time of the deprivation and a reasonable public officer would haveknown of these rights.151. Mr. Wilcox is entitled to all remedies and relief available to him under 42 U.S.C. 1983, including, but not limited to, punitive damages against Christesen for his willful, wanton,malicious, and grossly reckless violations of Mr. Wilcoxs constitutional rights and privileges.COUNT V42 U.S.C. 1983CONSPIRACYFOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION152. Plaintiffs hereby adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 151 asset forth above.26

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153. The individually-named Defendants became significantly involved andintertwined in a concerted effort to unlawfully deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutionally-protected rights.154. These Defendants acted intentionally to cause the deprivation of Plaintiffsconstitutional rights. By so acting, these Defendants committed unlawful acts by unlawfulmeans, inflicting injuries upon Plaintiffs.155. These Defendants acted under the color of state law in conspiring againstPlaintiffs to deprive them of their substantive constitutional rights as set forth herein. 156. These Defendants conspired with and among themselves to cause the loss ofPlaintiffs constitutional rights and further the unlawful purposes of the conspiracy.157. These Defendants knew or should have known that their conspiratorial actionsviolated the Plaintiffs clearly-established constitutional rights and those rights and privilegessecure by New Mexico statute, common law, and San Juan Countys and the SJCSOs policiesand procedures.158. As a result of the conspiracy between the individually-named Defendants,Plaintiffs have suffered damages and are entitled to all remedies and relief available to themunder 42 U.S.C. 1983, including punitive damages for the willful, wanton, intentional, andgrossly reckless acts of the individually-named Defendants. COUNT VINMSA 1978 10-16-1, et. seq.VIOLATIONS OF THE NEW MEXICO GOVERNMENTAL CONDUCT ACT159. Plaintiff hereby adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 158 as27

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set forth above.160. Public officers are to treat their government positions as a public trust. Suchofficers are not to use the power and resources of their offices to advance personal and private interests over public interests. 161. Every public officer, including the individually-named Defendants, is prohibitedfrom directly or indirectly coercing or attempting to coerce another public officer or employee forcontributing anything of value to a person or party for a political purpose.162. Moreover, the Governmental Conduct Act provides that threatening to deny apromotion to an employee or advising an employee to take part in political activities in thecontext of job benefits is a violation of New Mexico statute.163. The facts here show that Christesen, Anderson, and Current engaged in grossviolations of the Governmental Conduct Act by basing employment decisions, promotionalopportunities, training opportunities, and other work-related benefits on politicalpatronageincluding the placement of campaign signs, financial contributions to Christesenscampaign, the recruitment of others for Christesens political benefit, the holding of campaignevents, and other matters that clearly violate the Governmental Conduct Act.164. Additionally, Plaintiffs have been threatened by the individually-namedDefendants with respect to job security, have had duties and responsibilities removed because ofpolitical patronage issues, and have had the terms and conditions of their employment alteredbecause of their political beliefs and support or lack thereof for particular candidates.165. As a result of these violations of the Plaintiffs have suffered damages. Plaintiffsare entitled to all remedies and relief available to them under the Governmental Conduct Act.28

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COUNT VIINEW MEXICO COMMON LAWVIOLATIONS OF AN IMPLIED CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENTDEFENDANT BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF SAN JUAN COUNTY166. Plaintiffs hereby adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 165 asset forth above.167. Defendant San Juan County maintained and published personnel policies andprocedures through an Employee Handbook made available to all County employees.168. The County required and expected all employees, including Plaintiffs and theindividually-named Defendants named herein, to comply with and abide by these policies andprocedures.169. Based upon the Countys representations regarding these policies and procedures,Plaintiffs reasonably expected that County authorities, including the Sheriff, Undersheriff, andthe Countys HR Department would follow these policies and procedures in relation to the termsand conditions of Plaintiffs employment.170. The Countys published policies and procedures constitute an agreement, animplied contract of employment between the parties which by the course of conduct and usagethe parties demonstrated an intent to be bound.171. This implied contract, per the Countys policies and procedures, provided, amongother things: (1) that cause would be needed to discipline Plaintiffs in any fashion; (2) that SanJuan County employees were prohibited from campaigning for political office during regularwork hours; (3) that employees could not be coerced into campaigning for an elected official to29

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ensure continued employment; (4) that all employees were required to abide by theGovernmental Conduct Act; (5) that performance evaluations will occur on and about theemployees anniversary date; (6) that a failure to conduct timely performance evaluations wouldresult in a presumption that the employees performance was satisfactory and that the employeemerited a step increase, if applicable; (7) that employees would enjoy a harassment-freeworkplace; (8) that an employee who believes he or she is being harassed or discriminatedagainst has a right to file a formal charge with the Countys Chief HR Officer; (9) that any chargeof harassment and/or discrimination will be promptly investigated and a written report prepared;(10) that the County prohibits retaliation against employees who submit harassment complaints;(11) that the County will encourage training opportunities for employees; (12) that the Countywill ensure that promotion, demotions, and other employment-related matters will be fair andnon-discriminatory; (13) that the County adheres to a progressive disciplinary action policy; (14)that County employees have adequate information regarding job performance prior todisciplinary action being meted out; (15) that an employee can only be demoted for a seriousoffense, a repeated minor offense, or for unsatisfactory performance or behavior that theemployee is unable or unwilling to correct; and (16) that all employees have rights to grievedeprivations of rights. 172. The County breached each and every one of the policy requirements set forth inparagraph 170, among others, in dealing with and deciding the terms and conditions of Plaintiffsemployment.173. As a result of these breaches, Plaintiffs have suffered damages.174. Plaintiffs are entitled to all remedies and relief available to them under New30

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Mexico law for these breaches of the implied contract of employment.III. DAMAGES AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF175. Plaintiffs hereby adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 174 asset forth above.176. Plaintiffs seek damages for past lost wages and benefits, where appropriate.177. Plaintiffs seek damages for future lost wages and benefits, where appropriate.178. Plaintiffs seek damages for mental, emotional, and psychological distress.179. Plaintiffs seek pre- and post-judgment interest.180. Plaintiff seeks attorneys fees and costs, as allowable by law, statute, or rule.181. Plaintiffs seek punitive damages against the individually-named Defendants fortheir intentional, willful, wanton, and grossly reckless conduct.WHEREFORE Plaintiffs pray this Court enter judgment in their favor, award thedamages sought herein, and such further relief the Court deems just and appropriate under thecircumstances. Respectfully submitted, /s/Michael E. MozesLAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL E. MOZES, P.C.Attorney for Plaintiffs5732 Osuna Road NEAlbuquerque, NM 87109-2527 (505) 880-1200(505) 881-2444

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