compiled digest part 1

8/3/2019 Compiled Digest Part 1

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MARBURY V MADISONMARSHALL; February 1803

ANGARA V ELECTORAL COMMISSIONLAUREL; July 15, 1936

VARGAS V RILLORAZAHILADO, February 26, 1948

OCCENA V COMELECFERNANDO; April 2, 1981

NATURE- two prohibition proceedings against the validity ofthree Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposingconstitutional amendments- decision EN BANC

FACTS- Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales,both members of the Philippine Bar and formerdelegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention thatframed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers.

- Resolution No. 1 proposes an amendment allowing anatural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in aforeign country to own a limited area of land forresidential purposes (approved by the vote of 122 to 5)

- Resolution No. 2 deals with the Presidency, thePrime Minister and the Cabinet, and the NationalAssembly (vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention)

- Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article onthe Commission on Elections (vote of 148 to 2 with 1abstention)

- The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitionsis the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is notthe fundamental law- The suits were filed March 3, 6 and 12, 1981,respectively

ISSUES1. WON the 1973 Constitution is valid and in effect2. a. WON the Interim Batasang Pambansa has thepower to propose amendments and how such may beexercised if ever. (More specially as to the latter, theextent of the changes that may be introduced, thenumber of votes necessary for the validity of a proposal,and the standard required for a proper submission.)b. WON the propositions proposed were too extensive

that they go beyond the limits of authority conferred on

the Interim Natl Assembly as success of the interimNatl Assembly

HELD- all petitions dismissedRatio1. It is the ruling of the Court, as set forth at the outset,that the petitions must be dismissed; it is much too latein the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973Constitution.- In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The ExecutiveSecretary, this Court stated by a vote of six7 to four:"This being the vote of the majority, there is no further

judicial obstacle to the new Constitution beingconsidered in force and effect."- Such a statement served a useful purpose. It mademanifest that as of January 17, 1973, the presentConstitution came into force and effect.- Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts wereresolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law.- On the function of judicial review : has both a positiveand a negative aspect; the Supreme Court can check as

well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it maynot only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but mayalso sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is anaffirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized asconstitutionally deficient.- The' mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices.

That is the meaning of the concluding statement inJavellana. Since then, this Court has invariably appliedthe present Constitution.2. a.- "The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the samepowers and its Members shall have the same functions,responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualificationsas the interim National Assembly and the regularNational Assembly and the Members thereof."- One of such powers is precisely that of proposingamendments.- The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisionsvested the Interim National Assembly with the power topropose amendments upon special call by the PrimeMinister by a vote of the majority of its members to beratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments.- When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, uponthe call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E.Marcos, met as a constituent body, it acted by virtue ofsuch competence. Its authority to do so is clearly beyonddoubt. It could and did propose the amendmentsembodied in the resolutions now being assailed b.

- It suffices to quote from the opinion of Justice Makasiar,in Del Rosario v. Commission on Elections to dispose ofthis contention: "And whether the ConstitutionalConvention will only propose amendments to theConstitution or entirely overhaul the presentConstitution and propose an entirely new Constitutionbased on an ideology foreign to the democratic system,

is of no moment; because the same will be submitted tothe people for ratification.- "The fact that the present Constitution may be revisedand replaced with a new one is no argument against thevalidity of the law because 'amendment' includes the'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. Atany rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended inpart or revised or totally changed would becomeimmaterial the moment the same is ratified by thesovereign people."- popular American principle: a constituent body canpropose anything but conclude nothing.- On the number of votes required to proposeamendments.The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sittingas a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that

capacity, only a majority vote is needed.- It is not also a requirement as in this case, that theInterim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituentpower to propose amendments.- Moreover, even on the assumption that therequirement of three-fourth votes applies, suchextraordinary majority was obtained.- On the requisite standard for a propersubmission 2 considerations: (1) the period that mustelapse before the holding of the plebiscite and (2) fromthe standpoint of such amendments having been calledto the attention of the people so that it could notplausibly be maintained that they were propertyinformed as to the proposed changes.- As to the period, the Constitution indicates the way thematter should be resolved. "Any amendment to, orrevision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratifiedby a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shallbe held not later than three months after the approval ofsuch amendment or revision."- The three resolutions were approved by the InterimBatasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly onFebruary 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang PambansaB1g. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981.It is thus within the 90-day period provided by theConstitution.- As for the people being adequately informed, it cannotbe denied that this time, the proposed amendmentshave "been intensively and extensively discussed at the


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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 A2010 PROF.CARMELO SISONInterim Batasang Pambansa, as well as through themass media

SEPARATE OPINION

TEEHANKEE [dissent]- Consistently with his dissenting opinion in Sanidad vs.Comelec- I the transcendental constituent power to propose andapprove amendments to the Constitution as well as toset up the machinery and prescribe the procedure forthe ratification of the amendments proposals has beenwithheld by the Constitution from the President (PrimeMinister) as sole repository of executive power- the proposed amendments to be valid must come fromthe constitutional agency vested with the constituentpower to do so, i.e. in the Interim National Assemblyprovided in the Transitory Article XVII which would thenhave to be convened and not from the executive poweras vested in the President from whom such constituentpower has been withheld.

- the October 1976 constitutional amendments whichcreated the Interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu of theInterim National Assembly were invalid and the proposedamendments at bar having been adopted by the InterimBatasang Pambansa are also invalid- Teehankee also reiterates his stand in Sanidad that thedoctrine of fair and proper submission requiredconstitutional twothirds majority vote of the Court (ofeight votes, then) in Tolentino is fully applicable in thecase at bar.- the word 'submitted' can only mean that thegovernment, within its maximum capabilities, shouldstrain every effort to inform every citizen of theprovisions to be amended, and the proposedamendments and the meaning, nature and effects

thereof

PACU V SECRETARY OF EDUCATIONBENGZON; October 31, 1955

NATUREOriginal action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.

FACTS- Petitioning colleges and universities assailed theconstitutionality of Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No.3025 and Commonwealth Act No. 180.

Petitioners' Claim1. They deprive owners of schools and colleges as wellas teachers and parents of liberty and property withoutdue process of law;2. They deprive parents of their natural right and duty torear their children for civic efficiency;3. Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of

Education unlimited power and discretion to prescriberules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation oflegislative power.Respondents' Comments1. The matter constitutes no justiciable controversy;2. The petitioners are in estoppel to challenge thevalidity of the said acts;3. The acts are constitutionally valid.

ISSUESProceduralWON the case is justiciableSubstantiveWON Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3025 andCommonwealth Act No. 180 is unconstitutional

HELDProceduralRatio The court, notwithstanding the fact that thepetitioners did not present an actual case orcontroversy, and did not have standing to sue, decidedto look into the matter.Reasoning- Petitioners contend that the right of a citizen to ownand operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution,and section 3 of Act No. 2706 which provides that beforea private school may be opened to the public it mustfirst obtain a permit from the Secretary of Education,amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practiceabhorrent to our system of law and government.

- None of the petitioners has cause to present this issue,because all of them have permits to operate, and areactually operating. They also do not assert that theSecretary of Education has threatened to revoke theirpermits. They have suffered no wrong under the termsof the lawand naturally, need no relief.- Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Educationmight under the law withdraw the permit of one ofpetitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy.Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questionsto satisfy scholarly interest therein.- The above notwithstanding, the court decided to lookinto the matter, to see if there was a violation offundamental personal rights of liberty and property.Substantive

Ratio Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3025 andCommonwealth Act No. 180 is not unconstitutional.Reasoninga. The requirement that before opening a school theowner must secure a permit from the Secretary ofEducation is within the police power of the State.Art.XIV, sec.5 of the Constitution provides that All

educational institutions shall be under the supervisionand subject to regulation by the State. The power toregulate implies the power to require a permit or license.b. Petitioners contend that the statutes conferring onthe Secretary of Education unlimited power anddiscretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute anunlawful delegation of power.- Petitioners argue that nowhere in the Act can one findany description of what constitutes general standard ofefficiency, or adequate instruction to the public.Neither does it provide any statement of conditions orfactors which the Secretary of Education must take intoaccount to determine the efficiency of instruction. (asused in sec.1 of Act No. 2706)- Petitioners also attacked sec 6 of the same article

saying that the section leaves everything to theuncontrolled discretion of the Secretary of Education orhis department.- The Court answered this by saying that despite allegedvagueness, the Secretary of Education has fixedstandards to ensure adequate and efficient instruction,and the system of private education has beensatisfactorily in operation for 37 years, which only showsthat the Legislature did and could, rely upon the trainingand educational experience of those in the Dept ofEducation to ascertain and formulate minimumrequirements of adequate instruction.- Also, petitioners do not show how these standards haveinjured them.c. Petitioners also contend that the assessment of 1 per

cent levied on gross receipts of all private schools foradditional government expenses in connection with theirsupervision and regulation is unconstitutional, because itis a tax on the exercise of a constitutional right.

This issue is not within the jurisdiction of the SC but ofthe CFI.d. Petitioners questioned the validity of RA No. 139,section 1 of which allows the government, through theBoard on Textbooks, to regulate what textbooks may beused by private schools.- The Court noted that no justiciable controversy hasbeen presented regarding this matter considering thatthe Court has not been informed that the Board on

Textbooks has prohibited this or that text, or thatpetitioners refused or intend to refuse to submit some


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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 A2010 PROF.CARMELO SISONtextbooks, or are in danger of losing substantialprivileges or rights for so refusing.- The court also said that with the States power ofregulation and supervision, it may prohibit the use oftextbooks that are illegal or offensive to the Filipinos oradverse to governmental policies.

DUMLAO V COMELECMELENCIO HERRERA;1980

NATUREProhibition with Preliminary Injunction

FACTS- This is a case filed by Patricio Dumlao and Romeo Igotand Alfredo Salapantan who seek to enjoin theCommission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementingprovisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, 52, and 53.Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Viscaya whileIgot is a tax payer, as well as Salapantan.- Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of

Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as it is discriminatory andcontrary to the constitutional clause on Equal Protection.The provision disqualifies retired elective provincial, city,or municipal officials who have already received theirretirement benefits who are aged 65 or older at the timeof the commencement of the term of office. Igot andSalapantan on the other hand, questions the validity ofProvisions on Sec. 7 and 4 of the BP No. 52 whichdisqualifies candidates for any office or theirparticipation in political activities when they commit actsof disloyalty to the state (subversion, insurrection, orother similar crimes) given that a judgment of convictionshall be a conclusive evidence and filing of charges afterpreliminary investigations shall be prima facie evidenceof such fact.

ISSUESProcedural1. WON it is an actual case2. WON the petitioners are proper parties in the case3. WON the review of constitutionality is the lis mota ofthe case4. WON it should be heardSubstantive1. WON Sec. 4 of BP No. 52 is unconstitutional2. WON Sec. 7 of BP No. 52 is unconstitutional

HELDProcedural1. No, it is not. Dumlao is not adversely affected by the

application of that provision. No petition has yet been

filed before the COMELEC to disqualify Dumlao. What thepetrition does then is to simply seek an advisory opinion.2. No, neither Igot nor Salapantan fall under the requisitecriteria for disqualification. They are not adverselyaffected through which there are no personal norsubstantial interest at stake. Neither is it a taxpayerssuit for it does not directly involve the disbursement of

public funds.3. No, Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan are without anycause of action.4. Yes, because the case is of paramount public interestfor the elctions are to be held a few days away.Substantive1. No. Classification is reasonable and is based uponsubstantial distinctions. It is not arbitrary andunreasonable. The disqualification is not based solely onage but also about the retirement of the person in office.2. Yes. The provision places an accused on the samelevel as that of the convicted. It becomes a step on theassumption of innocence of the accused. Although it isbut prima facie evidence, time constraints affect theaccused from disproving such charges.

Disposition 1st paragraph of Sec. 4 of BP No. 52 is validwhile the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 4 of BP No. 52 is null andvoid.

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION (PBA) VCOMELEC

CLERK; December 19, 1985

NATUREPetition for Prohibition

FACTS- The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883calling for a special (snap) election for President and

Vice President was assailed by PBA, et al. They contendthat it is violative of the Constitution because the officeis not vacant. Then President Marcos, although tendereda letter of resignation, gave condition that hisresignation will be effective only when the election isheld and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified asPresident by taking his oath of office ten (10) days afterhis proclamation. The plaintiff contends that vacancymust be real and in esse, not a parody or shadow of thereal thing. In the same way that death, disability, orremoval from office must be actual and permanentbefore the pertinent provisions of Section 9, Art. VII ofthe Constitution (1973) may come into play, so must aresignation be real and irrevocably permanent.

ISSUEWON BP Blg. 883 is unconstitutional and should thisCourt therefore stop and prohibit the holding of theelection.

HELDBy a 7-to-5 vote the SC decided to uphold the

constitutionality of said law.Reasoning (deduced from the opinions of the Justices)1. There is no clear case has been made of an absolutevoid of power and authority that would warrant itsnullification and that prohibition is not a remedy for actsdone that can no longer be undone (Teehankee).2. It is a political question.3. An examination of the Constitution, particularly Art.VII, Section 9, does not yield the conclusion that BP Blg.883 is offensive to its provisions. What is clear is thatthe Consitution does not prohibit the President fromtendering a resignation that is not immediately effective.Indeed, there is no provision whatsoever regarding suchkind of resignation.4. The enactment of BP 883 falls within the legislative

authority of the Batasang Pambansa.DispositionThe case is dismissed and the prayer forthe issuance of an injunction restraining respondentsfrom holding the election on February 7, 1986 is denied.

ROMULO V YIGUEZPATAJO; February 4, 1986

NATUREPetition for prohibition to review the judgment of theBatasan Committee on Justice, Human Rights and GoodGovernment.

FACTS- Petitioners, more than 1/5 of all members of theBatasan, filed Resolution No. 644 calling for theimpeachment of President Marcos, w/ a verifiedcomplaint for impeachment. The Speaker referred thematter to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights andGood Government. The Committee found the complaintinsufficient in form and substance, disapproved theResolution and dismissed all charges.- Ramon Mitra filed a motion praying for recall from thearchives of the Resolution and verified complaint.Motion was disapproved by the Batasan.- Petitioners also claim that sections of the Rules onImpeachment are violative of the Constitution bec:


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- they empower smaller body to supplant complaintto impeach endorsed by 1/5 of all members ofBatasan- they vest in Committee the power to impeach/notto impeach when such is vested only in the Batasan

ISSUESProceduralWON SC can order Committee to recall fr the archivesthe Resolution and complaint

SubstantiveWON Sections 4, 5, 6, 8 of Batasan Rules onImpeachment is unconstitutional and WON theCommittee Report dismissing the Resolution should bedeclared null and void

HELDProceduralNo.- Resolution of the constitutionality of the questionedprovisions of the Rules is not even necessary. What

petitioners want is for SC to compel Batasan to hear theimpeachment case.- When Batasan denied motion of Mitra to recall fr thearchives, it in effect confirmed the action of theCommittee. It follows that a majority vote of themembers of Batasan confirming the act of theCommittee makes impossible the required at least 2/3vote of all members to support conviction.- Dismissal by the Batasan is beyond the power of SC toreview. SC cant also order the Committee bec an orderto the Committee is an order to the Batasan itself.SubstantiveNo.- The Batasan pursuant to its power to adopt rules ofproceedings may adopt rules of procedure on

impeachment proceedings. These rules are notinconsistent with the Constitutional provisions.- Also, while the Batasan assigned to the Committee thetask of determining whether petition is sufficient, theCommittee is still required to submit its report to theBatasan. The report may be approved or not.- That the rules on impeachment of the Interim Batasanare better is no argument against the validity of theRules on Impeachment of the Batasan. The Rules arealways within the power of the Batasan to modify.

These are merely procedural and not substantive. Also,generally, courts may not take cognizance of mattersregarding rules of public deliberative bodies.Petition is dismissed.

FERNANDEZ V TORRESFELICIANO; 1992

FACTS- Petitioners are seven qualified entertainers betweenthe ages of 18 and 22 who are questioning DOLE Circular

No. 01-91 (Prescribing Additional Requirements,Conditions and Procedures for the Deployment ofPerforming Artists). They attack it for violating theequal protection clause, the due process clause and thestate policy on protection of labor.- The circular limits Filipino entertainers to be deployedoutside the Philippines to those who have a reputabletrack record for at least one year and should be at least23 years old. Exemptions are possible for justifiablereasons.- They seek to prevent the POEA and DOLE fromimplementing the said circular.- This circular aims to prevent abuse of foreign workers,adopting a selective prohibition of Filipino entertainersfrom performing abroad.

ISSUES1. WON the court has jurisdiction2. WON the DOLE circular

HELD- The petition must fail for prematurity because the firststep should be the application for exemption with theSecretary of Labor, which the petitioners did not do.- The exemption in the circular is not absolute andcomprehensive.- The discretionary authority of the DOLE is not unlimitedand arbitrary.- Petitioners have failed to allege that they hadpreviously applied for the exemption and have been

arbitrarily denied.- Two applicable presumptions:o Administrative orders and regulationsare entitled to presumption of constitutionality.o Official duty has been or will beregularly performed.

MARIANO, JR. V COMELECPUNO; March 7, 1995

NATUREPetitions to declare certain provisions of R.A 7854unconstitutional.

FACTS

Two (2) petitions were filed assailing the constitutionalityof certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854, entitled"An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into aHighly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati",on the following grounds:1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify theland area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes

and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation ofSection 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation toSections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code;2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter orrestart the "three consecutive term" limit for localelective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X andSection 7, Article VI of the Constitution. Petitioners stressthat under these provisions, elective local officials,including Members of the House of Representative, havea term of three (3) years and are prohibited from servingfor more than three (3) consecutive terms. They arguethat by providing that the new city shall acquire a newcorporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restartsthe term of the present municipal elective officials ofMakati and disregards the terms previously served by

them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent JejomarBinay, who has already served for two (2) consecutiveterms. They further argue that should Mayor Binaydecide to run and eventually win as city mayor in thecoming elections, he can still run for the same position in1998 and seek another three-year consecutive termsince his previous three-year consecutive term asmunicipal mayorwould not be counted. Thus, petitionersconclude that said section 51 has been convenientlycrafted to suit the political ambitions of respondentMayor Binay.3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only byspecial law (the Charter) in violation of the constitutional

provision requiring a general reapportionment law to bepassed by Congress within three (3) years following thereturn of every census;(b) the addition of another legislative district in Makati isnot in accord withSection 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of thelatest survey (1990 census), the population of Makatistands at only 450,000.

ISSUES1. WON Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 violates Section 10,Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and450 of the Local Government Code;2. WON the Court can entertain the challenge to theconstitutionality of section 51.


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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 A2010 PROF.CARMELO SISON3. WON Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 violates Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution

HELD1. No. The territorial boundaries of a local governmentunit must be clear for they define the limits of the itsterritorial jurisdiction. It can legitimately exercise powers

of government only within the limits. Needless to state,any uncertainty in the boundaries of local governmentunits will sow costly conflicts in the exercise ofgovernmental powers which ultimately will prejudice thepeople's welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided bythe Local Government Code in requiring that the landarea of a local government unit must be spelled out inmetes and bounds, with technical descriptions. Giventhe facts of the cases, it cannot be perceived how thisevil can be brought about by the description made insection 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have notdemonstrated that the delineation of the land area of theproposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to itsboundaries. The delineation did not change even by aninch the land area previously covered by Makati as a

municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, ormultiply the established land area of Makati. In languagethat cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, thecity's land area "shall comprise the presentterritory ofthe municipality."2. No. The Court cannot entertain this challenge to theconstitutionality of section 51. The requirements beforea litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law arewell delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actualcase or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionalitymust be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutionalquestion must be raised at the earliest possibleopportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutionalquestion must be necessary to the determination of thecase itself.

Petitioners have far from complied with theserequirements. The petition is premised on theoccurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that MayorBinay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections;that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that hewould seek re-election for the same position in the 1998elections. Considering that these contingencies may ormay not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypotheticalissue which has yet to ripen to an actual case orcontroversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig(except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raisethis abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issuein a petition for declaratory relief over which this Courthas no jurisdiction.

3. No. These issues have been laid to rest in the recentcase of Tobias v. Abalos. In said case, the court ruledthat reapportionment of legislative districts may bemade through a special law, such as in the charter of anew city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congressshall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty(250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus

worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress fromincreasing its membership by passing a law, other than ageneral reapportionment of the law. This is its exactlywhat was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854and providing for an increase in Makati's legislativedistrict. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can onlybe made through a general apportionment law, with areview of all the legislative districts allotted to each localgovernment unit nationwide, would create aninequitable situation where a new city or provincecreated by Congress will be denied legislativerepresentation for an indeterminate period of time. Theintolerable situations will deprive the people of a newcity or province a particle of their sovereignty.Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is

indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is notsovereignty.Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of anotherlegislative district in Makati is not in accord with section5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latestsurvey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands atonly four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Saidsection provides, inter alia, that a city with a populationof at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shallhave at least one representative. Even granting that thepopulation of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at fourhundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative districtmay still be increased since it has met the minimumpopulation requirement of two hundred fifty thousand(250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended

to the Constitution provides that a city whose populationhas increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand(250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressionalrepresentative.Disposition The petitions are DISMISSED for lack ofmerit

BOARD OF OPTOMETRY V JUDGE COLETDAVIDE; July 30, 1996

GUINGONA, JR. V COURT OF APPEALSPANGANIBAN; July 10, 1998

NATUREPetition for review on certiorari to partially set aside the

June 28, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals

FACTS- In the last quarter of 1995, the NBI conducted aninvestigation on the alleged participation and

involvement of national and local government officials in"jueteng" and other forms of illegal gambling.- Potenciano Roque, claiming to be an eyewitness to thenetworking of national and local politicians and gamblinglords, sought admission into the Government's "WitnessProtection, Security and Benefit Program." Allegedly, hegained first-hand information in his capacity as Chairmanof the Task Force Anti-Gambling (TFAG) during the termof former President Corazon C. Aquino.- Convinced of his compliance with the requirements ofRepublic Act No. 6981, otherwise known as the "WitnessProtection, Security and Benefit Act," the Department of

Justice (DOJ) admitted Roque to the program.- Roque executed a sworn statement before NBI agentsalleging that during his stint as Chairman of the TFAG,

several gambling lords, including private respondentRodolfo Pineda, and certain politicians offered himmoney and other valuable considerations, which heaccepted, upon his agreement to cease conducting raidson their respective gambling operations.- The DOJ Task Force on Illegal Gambling (composed ofthe petitioner-prosecutors), created by petitionerSecretary Teofisto Guingona conducted a preliminaryinvestigation of the case and subpoenaed all therespondents.- Pineda filed a Petition for Reconsideration ofAdmittance of Potenciano A. Roque to the WitnessProtection Program, which was denied by petitioner.- Pineda filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition andMandamus with Application for Temporary Restraining

Order and Preliminary Injunction with the respondentCourt of Appeals.- Private respondent contended that Roque's admissionwas illegal on two grounds: first, his testimony could notbe substantially corroborated in its material points; andsecond, he appeared to be the most guilty or at leastmore guilty than private respondent, insofar as thecrimes charged in the Informations were concerned.Court of Appeals Ruling- Respondent Court found that private respondentsought to bribe Roque several times to prevent him fromconducting raids on private respondent's gamblingoperations. Such "passive participation" in the crimes didnot make him more guilty than private respondent.


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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 A2010 PROF.CARMELO SISON- Respondent Court initially ruled that, by expressprovision of Sections 3 and 10, the requirement ofcorroboration is a condition precedent to admission intothe Program. However, it upheld petitioners' alternativeposition that substantial corroboration was neverthelessactually provided by Angelito Sanchez' and retired Gen.Lorenzo M. Mateo's testimonies. Hence, it disposed in

favor of the government.- Despite ruling in their favor, Respondent Court isassailed by petitioners for opining that admission to theProgram requires prior or simultaneous corroboration ofthe material points in the witness' testimony.Petitioners Claim- Petitioners contend that said provisions merely requirethat the testimony of the state witness seekingadmission into the Program "can be substantiallycorroborated" or is "capable of corroboration." So long ascorroboration can be obtained when he testifies in court,he satisfies the requirement that "his testimony can besubstantially corroborated on its material points."

ISSUEWON the facts and the issue raised by petitionerswarrant the exercise of judicial power.

HELDNO. The Court found the petition fundamentallydefective.Ratio Judicial review demands the following: (1) theremust be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicialpower; (2) the question must be ripe for adjudication;and (3) the person challenging must have "standing";that is, he has personal and substantial interest in thecase, such that he has sustained or will sustain directinjury. The first requisite is that there must be before acourt an actual case calling for the exercise of judicialpower. An actual case or controversy exists when there

is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of oppositelegal claims, which can be resolved on the basis ofexisting law and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversyadmits of specific relief through a decree that isconclusive in character, whereas an opinion only adviseswhat the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.Closely related to the requirement of an "actual case,"

is the second requirement that the question is "ripe" foradjudication. A question is ripe for adjudication when theact being challenged has had a direct adverse effect onthe individual challenging it.Reasoning It is apparent that petitioners are notrequesting that the Court reverse the ruling of theappellate court and disallow the admission in evidenceof Respondent Roque's testimony, inasmuch as the

assailed Decision does not appear to be in conflict withany of their claims. Petitioners filed this suit out of fearthat the assailed Decision would frustrate the purpose ofsaid law, which is to encourage witnesses to come outand testify. But their apprehension is neither justified norexemplified by this particular case. A mereapprehension, does not give rise to a justiciable

controversy.- After finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part ofthe government prosecutors, Respondent Court allowedthe admission of Roque into the Program. In fact, Roquehad already testified in court against the privaterespondent. Thus, the propriety of Roque's admissioninto the Program is already a moot and academic issuethat clearly does not warrant judicial review.- The petition involves neither any right that was violatednor any claims that conflict. In fact, no affirmative reliefis being sought in this case. The Court concurs with theopinion of counsel for private respondent that this actionis a "purely academic exercise," which has no relevanceto the criminal cases against Respondent Pineda. Afterthe assailed Decision had been rendered, trial in those

cases proceeded in earnest, and Roque testified in all ofthem. Said counsel filed his Memorandum only to satisfyhis "academic interest on how the State machinery willdeal with witnesses who are admittedly guilty of thecrimes but are discharged to testify against their co-accused."Petitioners failed not only to present an actualcontroversy, but also to show a case ripe foradjudication. Hence, any resolution that this Court mightmake in this case would constitute an attempt atabstraction that can only lead to barren legal dialecticsand sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.DispositionThe petition was DENIED.

MILITANTE V COURT OF APPEALSPUNO; April 12, 2000

NATUREPetition for review on certiorari of CA decision upholdingconstitutionality of PD 1315.

FACTS-Petitioner Pilo Militante is the registered owner of 3contiguous parcels of land all derived from TCT No.71357, which is part of 40 hectares of land in BagongBarrio, Caloocan City expropriated by PD 1315 issued in1975 by Pres. Marcos. These lots were occupied by 24squatter families.

-The NHA undertook the implementation of P.D. 1315 in7 phases called the Bagong Barrio Project (BBP). Theproperties covered by Phases 1 to 6 were acquired in1978 and 1979. BBP Phase 7, which includes petitioner'sland remained unacquired due to insufficient funds.-Sept 11, 1979: PN1893 declared the entire Metro Manilaarea as Urban Land Reform Zone. This was amended on

May 14, 1980 by PN1967 which identified 244 sites inMetro Manila as Areas for Priority Devt and Urban LandReform Zones.-Sept 24, 1981: petitioner sought declaration of non-coverage from the Urban Land Reform Program of thegovernment. This was granted on Oct 2, 1981. With thiscertificate, petitioner asked the NHA to relocate thesquatters on his land. A census was conducted; thesquatters were invited to a dialogue but none attended.NHA recommended the issuance of a demolitionclearance. This was granted; a clearance addressed toMayor Asistio also granted for the relocation of the 24families to the Sapang Palay Resettlement Project. Butthe demolition did not take place.-4 years later, (1986) NHA started negotiations with

petitioner, but they did not reach any agreement on theprice.-Sept 8, 1990: Militante requested for a revalidation ofhis demolition clearance and relocation of the squatters.

This was also granted by NHA, informing Mayor Asistiothat the NHA was making available enough servicedhome lots in Bagong Silang Resettlement Project for the24 families.-Respondent Annabelle Carangdang, NHA ProjectManager in Bagong Barrio, refused to implement theclearance to eject the squatters on petitioner's land. Sheclaimed that petitioners land had already been declaredexpropriated by P.D. 1315.-Petitioner then filed with CA a "Petition for Prohibitionand Mandamus with Declaration as Inexistent and

Unconstitutional PD1315" against the NHA andCarangdang.-CA dismissed the petition and held that petitioner failedto overcome the presumption of the decree'sconstitutionality. MFR was also denied.

ISSUES1. WON petitioner is entitled to the writ of prohibition.2. WON he is entitled to the writ of mandamus.3. WON his procedure in assailing constitutionality ofPD1315 is proper.4.WON he is estopped from assailing theconstitutionality of PD1315.

HELD


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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 A2010 PROF.CARMELO SISON1. Ratio NO. Prohibition is a preventive remedy. It seeksfor a judgment ordering the defendant to desist fromcontinuing with the commission of an act perceived tobe illegal.Reasoning Petitioner challenges Carangdang's refusalto implement the demolition clearance issued by heradministrative superiors. The remedy for a refusal to

discharge a legal duty is mandamus, not prohibition.2. Ratio NO. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy thatmay be availed of only when there is no plain, speedyand adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Apetition for mandamus is premature if there areadministrative remedies available to the petitioner.Reasoning There is no direct order from the NHAGeneral Manager addressed to Carangdang to evict thesquatters and demolish their shanties on the subjectproperty. Petitioner has not exhausted his administrativeremedies. He may seek another demolition order fromthe NHA General Manager this time directly addressed toCarangdang or the pertinent NHA representative. Or heshould have brought Carangdang's inaction to theattention of her superiors. There is therefore no extreme

necessity to invoke judicial action as the administrativeset-up could have easily corrected the alleged failure toact.3. Ratio NO. The privilege of assailing theconstitutionality of an act should not serve a pettypurpose.Reasoning Petitioner's principal concern is therelocation of the squatters on his land. If he could attainthis aim, petitioner himself admits in his petition thatthere may not be a need for declaring PD1315 null andvoid.-Moreover, petitioner's land is not in clear danger ofexpropriation. Considering the long lapse of time(PD1315 was issued in 1975), it is doubtful if thegovernment would still desire to expropriate petitioner's

lot which only measures 1,590 sq. m.-Also, HSRC has already certified that petitioner's lot isoutside the declared Urban Land Reform Zone. Takingpetitioner's tiny lot of 1,590 sq. m. will serve no socialpurpose.4. Ratio Questions of constitutionality have to be raisedat the earliest possible opportunity. Estoppel mayoperate to prevent a party from asserting that an act isunconstitutionalReasoning Petitioner did not question PD1315sconstitutionality when it was decreed in 1975. In 1987,he even negotiated with NHA for the price of his land.Implicitly but clearly, he recognized the validity of thedecree. The negotiation unfortunately fell and thegovernment did not take any further step to expropriate

his land. It was only in 1991 after respondentCarangdang refused to eject the squatters in petitioner'sland that he questioned the acts constitutionality.Disposition Petition dismissed. No costs.Voting 10 concur fully. 2 concur in the result.1 concur & dissent. 2 no part.

SEPARATE OPINION

MENDOZA [concur in the result]-Petitioner has no cause of action fro prohibition ormandamus against respondents. What he should do is tobring an action for ejectment against the squatters and,as an incident thereof, raise in issue the constitutionalvalidity of PD1315.

DE LEON, JR. [dissent and concur]-It is an ejectment case that he should file in the MTC.-PD1315 is unconstitutional for inherently violating thedue process and just compensation guarantees in the

Constitution.-Petitioner is not estopped from assailing theconstitutionality of PD1315.-If property is taken by the government without thebenefit of the proper expropriation proceedings and isdevoted for public use for many years, the propertyowner may no longer bring an action for recovery of hisland but may only demand payment of justcompensation thereof. BUT any action for recovery ofthose other lots purchased and acquired by thegovernment in 1978 and 1979 and/or for justcompensation has already prescribed.

CUTARAN V DENR

GONZAGA-REYES; 2001NATUREPetition for certiorari of decision of CA

FACTS- Cutaran et.al. assails the validity of DENR Special Order31, Special Order 25, and Department AdministrativeOrder 2 for being issued without prior legislativeauthority.- Special Order (SO) 31 (1990): Creation of a Special

Task force on acceptance, identification, evaluation anddelineation of ancestral land claims in the CordilleraAdministrative Region- Special Order (SO) 25: Creation of Special Task Forces

provincial and community environment and natural

resources offices for the identification, delineation andrecognition of ancestral land claims nationwide- DAO 2: Implementing Rules and Guidelines of SpecialOrder no. 25

The same year SO 31 was issued, relatives of petitionersfiled separate applications for Certificate of AncestralLand Claim (CALC) for the land they occupy inside the

Camp John Hay Reservation. -These petitions weredenied. Also pursuant to the SOs, the heirs of ApegCarantes filed application for CALC for some portions ofland in the Camp John Hay Reservation, overlappingsome of the land occupied by the petitioners. Thepetitioners contend that if not for the respondentstimely resistance to the Orders, the petitioners would betotally evicted from their land.- Petitioners filed in the CA petition to enjoin respondentsfrom implementing Orders on ground that they are voidfor lack of legal basis. CA ruled that SO31 has no forceand effect for preempting legislative prerogative for itwas issued prior to the effectivity of RA7586 (NationalIntegrated Protected Systems), but it sustained SO25and DAO 2 on the ground that they were issued pursuant

to powers delegated to DENR under RA7586.- Petitioners now contend that CA erred in upholding thevalidity of SO25 and DAO 2 and seek to enjoin the DENRfrom processing the application of CALC of Heirs ofCarantes.

ISSUEWON SO 25 and DAO 2 are valid

HELDNot a justiciable controversyRatio The petition was prematurely filed. There is yetno justiciable controversy for the court to resolve. Theadverse legal interests involved are the competingclaims of the petitioners and heirs of Carantes to

possess a common piece of land. Since the CALCapplication of the Heirs of Carantes has not yet beengranted or issued, and which the DENR may or may notgrant, there is yet no actual or imminent violation ofpetitioners asserted right to possess the disputed land.- Definition of justiciable controversy: a definite andconcrete dispute touching on the legal relations ofparties having adverse legal interests which may beresolved by a court of law through the application of alaw.- Subject to certain well-defined exceptions, the courtswill not touch an issue involving the validity of a lawunless there has been a governmental act accomplishedor performed that has a direct adverse effect on thelegal right of the person contesting its validity.


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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 A2010 PROF.CARMELO SISON- This Court cannot rule on the basis of petitionersspeculation that the DENR will approve the application ofthe heirs of Carantes. There must be an actualgovernmental act which directly causes or willimminently cause injury to the alleged legal right of thepetitioner to possess the land before the jurisdiction ofthis Court may be invoked. There is no showing that the

petitioners were being evicted from the land by the heirsof Carantes under orders from the DENR.

PIMENTEL, JR. V HRETCARPIO; 2002

NATUREBefore this Court are two original petitions for prohibitionand mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminaryinjunction. Petitioners pray that respondents alter,reorganize, reconstitute, and reconfigure composition ofHRET and CA to include party-list representatives.Petitioners further pray that HRET and CA b enjoinedfrom exercising their functions until they have been

reorganized.

FACTS- Art.VI, SEC. 5 of the 1987Constitution provides for aparty-list system in the House as follows:

(1) The HoR shall be composed of xxx andthose who, as provided by law, shall be electedthough a party-list system of registerednational, regional and sectoral parties ororganizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shallconstitute 20% of the total number ofrepresentatives including those under theparty-list.

- On May 11, 1998, in accordance with Party-List SystemAct, national elections were held which included, for thefirst time, the election through popular vote of party-listgroups and organizations whose nominees wouldbecome members of the House.- Subsequently, the House Constituted its HRET and CA

contingent by electing its representatives to these twoconstitutional bodies. The procedure involves thenomination by the political parties of House memberswho are to occupy seats in HRET and CA. From availablerecords, it does not appear that after the May 11, 1998elections the party-list groups in the House nominatedany of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As ofthe date of filing of the instant petitions, the Housecontingents to the HRET and the CA were composed

solely of district representatives belonging to thedifferent political parties.- Art. VI, Sec. 17. Congress shall each have an Electoral

Tribunal which shal be the sole judge of all contestsrelating to the election xxx. Xxx Each ET shall becomposed of nine Members xxx who shall be chosen onthe basis of proportional representation from the

political parties and the parties or organizationsregistered under the party-list system representedtherein.- There shall be a Commission on Appointmentsconsisting of xxx twelve Senators and twelve Membersof HoR, elected by each House on the basis of

proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-listsystem represented therein.Petitioners Claim

- Under the Constitution and the Party-List SystemAct, ,party-list representatives should have 1.2 or atleast 1 seat in HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA. Petitionerscharge that respondents committed grave abuse ofdiscretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of

Senator Pimentel.- Sen. Pimentel filed the instant petitions on the strengthof his oath to protect, defend, and uphold theConstitution and in his capacity as taxpayer and as amember of the CA.Respondents Comments- At the time the petitioners filed the instant petitions theHouse had 220 members, 14 of whom were party-listrepresentatives, constituting 6.37% of the House.

ISSUESProcedural1. The SG argues that the instant petitions areprocedurally defective and substantially lacking in meritfor having been filed prematurely

Substantive1. WON the present composition of the HRET and CAviolates the constitutional requirement of proportionalrepresentation because there are no party-listrepresentatives in the HRET.2. WON the refusal of the HRET and the CA toreconstitute themselves to include party-listrepresentatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

HELDRatio The procedural questions that petitioners wantthe Court to brush aside are not mere technicalities butsubstantive matters that are specifically provided for inconstitutional provisions cited by petitioners.

ReasoningThe Constitution expressly grants to the HoRthe prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, tochoose from among its district and party-listrepresentatives those who may occupy the seats allottedto the House in the HRET and the CA. Art. VI Sec. 18 ofthe Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and onthe House the authority to elect among their members

those who would fill the seats for House members in theCA.Rule 3 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET:Rule 3. Composition. The Tribunal shall be composedof 9 Members xxx the remaining six shall be Members ofthe HoR who shall be chosen on the basis of proportionalrepresentation from the political parties and the partiesof organizations registered under the party-list systemrepresented therein.Rule 4. Organization. (a) upon the designation of the

Justices of the Supreme Court and the election of theMembers of the House of Representatives who are tocompose the HRET xxx.- Even assuming that party-list representatives comprisea sufficient number and have agreed to designate

common nominees to the HRET and the CA, theirprimary recourse clearly rests with the House ofRepresentatives and not with this Court. Only if theHouse fails to comply with the directive of theConstitution on proportional representation of politicalparties in the HRET and the CA can the party-listrepresentatives seek recourse to this Court under itspower of judicial review. There is the doctrine ofprimary jurisdiction; prior recourse to the House isnecessary before petitioners may bring instant case tothe court.- Also, under the doctrine of separation of powers,the Court may not interfere with the exercise by theHouse of this Constitutionally mandated duty, absent aclear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.- The five party-list representatives who are petitionersin the instant case have not alleged that they areentitled to, and have been unlawfully deprived of, seatsin the HRET and CA. Neither have they claimed that theyhave been nominated by the party-list groups in theHouse to the HRET or the CA. NO LOCUS STANDI.

ATLAS FERTILIZER CORP. V SEC. OFDAR

ROMERO; June 19, 1997

NATURE


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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 A2010 PROF.CARMELO SISONConsolidated petitions questioning the constitutionalityof some portions of Republic Act No. 6657(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law)

FACTS-The petitioners Atlas Fertilizer Corporation, PhilippineFederation of Fishfarm Producers, Inc. and petitioner-in-

intervention Archies Fishpond, Inc. and Arsenio Al.Acuna are engaged in the aquaculture industry utilizingfishponds and prawn farms.Petitioners ClaimPetitioners assail constitutionality of Secs. 3(b), 11, 13,16,(d), 17 and 32 of RA 6657 as well as of AdministrativeOrder Nos. 8 and 10 Series of 1988 issued by therespondent secretary on the following grounds:

1. Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of CARLextend agrarian reform to aquaculture lands [violatesSection 4, Article XIII of the Constitution w/c limitsextend agrarian reform only to agricultural lands].

-Court has already impliedlyruled in Luz Farms, Inc. v.Secretary of Agricultural Reform that lands devotedto fishing are not agricultural lands

-only 5% of the total investment in aquacultureactivities, fishponds, and prawn farms, is in the formof land (so cant be classified as agricultural activity)

-there are no farmers, farm workers who till lands, noagrarian unrest so no beneficiaries under Sec 4, ArtXIII 1987 Consti

2. Provisions similarly treat of AQUAculture lands andAGRIculture lands when they are differently situated,and differently treat AQUAculture lands and otherINDUSTRIAL lands, when they are similarly situatedin violation of the constitutional guarantee of theequal protection of the laws.

-Constitutional Commission debates show that landsdevoted to aquaculture, fishponds, and fish farmsbelong to INDUSTRIAL LANDS, not to AGRICULTURAL

LANDS so treating the said lands as underAGRICULTURAL LANDS violate EPC

3. Provisions distort employment benefits and burdensin favor of AQUA culture employees and against otherINDUSTRIAL workers [violate Sections 1 and 3, ArticleXIII of the Constitution State promotion of equality ineconomic and employment opportunities].

4. Provisions deprive petitioner of its government-induced investments in aquaculture [violatesSections 2 and 3, Article XIII of the Constitution -State to respect the freedom of enterprise and theright of enterprises to reasonable returns oninvestments and to expansion and growth].

On A.O. Nos. 8 and 10: void as they implement theassailed provisions of CARL.

ISSUEWON the case is justiciable

HELDNO, the question concerning the constitutionality of theassailed provisions has become MOOT and ACADEMIC

with the passage of RA No. 788Ratio While the court will not hesitate to declare a lawor an act void when confronted squarely withconstitutional issues, neither will it preempt theLegislative and the Executive branches of thegovernment in correcting or clarifying, by means ofamendment, said law or act.Reasoning On February 20, 1995, Republic Act No.7881 (An Act Amending Certain Provisions of RepublicAct No. 6657) was approved by Congress, exemptingfishponds and prawn farms from the coverage of CARL,providing processes for the exclusion to be applied tothose already subjected to the CARL, removing landsdevoted to AQUACULTURE from the classification ofCommercial Farms, and providing incentives for

fishponds and prawn farms workers organizations.Dispositon The petition is dismissedVoting Narvasa, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Melo, Puno,Vitug, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganipan and

Torres, Jr. concurPadilla, Bellosillo, Kapunan, Francisco on leave

UNITED PUBLIC WORKERS V MICHELLREED; October 1946

NATURE

Appeal from the District Court of the United States forthe District of Columbia

FACTS- The Hatch Act enacted in 1940 declares unlawfulcertain specified political activities of federal employees.Section 9 forbids officers and employees in theexecutive branch of the Federal Government, withexceptions, from taking any active part in politicalmanagement or in political campaigns. Section 15declares that the activities theretofore determined bythe United States Civil Service Commission to beprohibited to employees in the classified civil service ofthe United States by the Civil Service Rules shall bedeemed to be prohibited to federal employees covered

by the Hatch Act. These sections cover all federal

officers and employees whether in the classified civilservice or not and a penalty of dismissal fromemployment is imposed for violation.- Certain employees of the executive branch of theFederal Government and a union of such employeessued to enjoin the members of the Civil ServiceCommission from enforcing the provision of Section 9 (a)

of the Hatch Act, which forbids such employees to takeany active part in political management or in politicalcampaigns and for a declaratory judgment holding theAct unconstitutional. The District Court dismissed thesuit. Petitioner appealed.

ISSUES1. WON the complaint state a controversy cognizable inthis Court.2. WON such a breach of Hatch Act and Rule 1 of theCommission can, without violating the Constitution, bemade the basis for disciplinary action against Poole.

HELD1. For adjudication of constitutional issues, concrete

legal issues, presented in actual cases, not abstractions,are requisite.Reasoning

They declare a desire to act contrary to the rule againstpolitical activity but not that the rule has been violated.In this respect, the case at bar differs from the type ofthreat adjudicated in Railway Mail Association v. Consi.In that case, the refusal to admit an applicant tomembership in a labor union on account of race wasinvolved. Admission had been refused. In the Hill case aninjunction had been sought and allowed against Hill andthe union forbidding Hill from acting as the businessagent, the union and the union from further functioningas a union until it complied with the state law. Thethreats here in the case at bar are closer to a general

threat by officials to enforce those laws which they arecharged to administer than they are to the direct threatif punishment against a named organization for acompleted act that made the Mail Association and theHill case cases justiciable. These appellants seekadvisory opinions upon broad claims of rights protectedby the Constitution. The generality of the objection is anattack on political expediency of the Hatch Act, not thepresentation of legal issues. Such is beyond the courtscompetence to render a decision. Should the Courts seekto expand their powers so as to bring under their

jurisdiction ill-defined controversies over Constitutionalissues, they would become the organ of politicaltheories. The determination of the trial court that theindividual appellants other than Poole, could maintain


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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 A2010 PROF.CARMELO SISONthis action was erroneous (The court dismissed it thoughfor finding the Act Constitutional).2. Congress may regulate the political conduct ofgovernment employees within reasonable limits.Reasoning

The determination of the extent to which politicalactivities of governmental employees shall be regulated

lies primarily with Congress. It is only partisan politicalactivity that is interdicted. It is active participation inpolitical management and political campaign.Disposition Affirmed

RESCUE ARMY ET AL V MUNICIPALCOURT OF LOS ANGELES

RUTLEDGE; June 9, 1947

NATUREAppeal from the California Supreme Courts judgmentdenying appelants application for writ of prohibition totest the jurisdiction of the municipal court to tryappellants for alleged violations of a municipal code

governing the solicitation of contributions for charity,which they challenge as unduly abridging the freeexercise of their religion contrary to the First andFourteenth Amendments.

FACTS- The Rescue Army is a religious group engaged insolicitation for charity.- Such solicitation is governed by Article 4 Chapter IV ofthe Municipal Code of the City of Los Angeles. Itspurpose is to make available to all persons soliciteddetailed information concerning the persons soliciting,their causes, and the uses to which donations will beput.- Murdock, an officer of the Rescue Army, has been

charged in the municipal court for three cases, of whichhe has had two convictions and with respect to the thirdcase trial has not been had pending the writ prayed forin the present case.- He has been charged with violating sections 44.09 (a),44.09 (b), 44.12 of the Municipal Code together with theother provisions necessarily incorporated in them byreference (i.e. because the provisions are very intricatelyinterrelated, not only on their face, but also in theCalifornia Supreme Courts disposition of them).- It is not clear from the briefs received by the Courtwhich particular charges he has been found guilty of inwhich specific case, or if charged on the basis of morethan one provision, whether conjunctively oralternatively.

ISSUESWON the Court should exercise its jurisdiction over theappeal at bar.

HELDRatio The Constitutional issues come to the Court in

highly abstract form. Record presents only bareallegations that Murdock was charged criminally withviolating Sections 44.09 (a), 44.09 (b), 44.12, and thatthose sections are unconstitutional, as applied to hisalleged solicitations. The Court is therefore withoutbenefit of the precision which would be afforded by proofof conduct made upon trial.- The Courts doubts as to the lower courts meanings,and the other uncertainties in this cause, may beremoved in the municipal court proceedings yet to takeplace.- Consistently with the policy, jurisdiction here should beexerted only when the jurisdictional question presentedby the proceeding prohibition tenders the underlyingconstitutional issues in clean-cut and concrete form,

unclouded by any serious problem of constructionrelating either to the terms of the questioned legislationor to its interpretation by the state courts.Reasoning- Note the Courts policy of refusal to render advisoryopinions and the necessity for reasonable clarity anddefiniteness, as well as for timeliness, in raising andpresenting constitutional questions.

- Deciding this cannot be reduced to any preciseformula. They are of the same nature as thecase and controversy limitation, differing only indegree. To the more usual considerations oftimeliness and maturity, of concreteness,definiteness, certainty, and of adversity of

interests affected, are to be added in casescoming from state courts involving statelegislation those arising when questions ofconstruction, essentially matters of state law,remain unresolved or highly ambiguous. Theyinclude, of course, questions of incorporation byreference and severability, such as this caseinvolves. Necessarily, whether decision of theconstitutional issue will be made must dependupon the degree to which uncertainty exists inthese respects.

- Here, relief is neither sought nor neededbeyond adjudication of the jurisdictional issue.

The writ seeks only, in substance, a judicialdeclaration that jurisdiction does not exist in

the Municipal Court. Those reasons comprisenot only obstacles of prematurity andcomparative abstractness but also includerelated considerations growing out ofuncertainties resulting from the volume oflegislative provisions possibly involved, andtheir intricate interlacing not only with each

other on their face but also in the CaliforniaSupreme Courts dispostion of them

Disposition The appeal is dismissed, without prejudiceto the determination in the future of any issues arisingunder the Federal Constitution form further proceedingsin the Municipal Court.

EDU V. ERICTAFERNANDO; OCTOBER 24, 1970

NATUREPetitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land TransportationCommissioner, in a proceeding for certiorari (todemonstrate that the Reflector Law was not

constitutionally invalid ) and prohibition againstrespondent Judge Ericta, to annul and set aside Erictasorder for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunctiondirected against Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner.

FACTS- Other respondent Galo on his behalf and that of othermotorists filed on May 20, 1970 a suit for certiorari andprohibition with preliminary injunction assailing thevalidity of the Reflector Law as an invalid exercise ofthe police power, for being violative of the dueprocess clause. This he followed with a manifestationwherein he sought as an alternative remedy that, in theevent that respondent Judge would hold said statuteconstitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of Edu,

implementing such legislation be nullified as an undueexercise of legislative power. Respondent Judgeordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction directedagainst the enforcement of such administrative order.Motion for its reconsideration was filed by the Solicitor-General representing Edu. The answer before the lowercourt was filed by petitioner Edu on June 4, 1970.Respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsiderationof the order of injunction. Hence this petition forcertiorari and prohibition.

- The Reflector Law reads in full: "(g) Lights andreflector when parked or disabled. Appropriate parkinglights or flares visible one hundred meters away shall bedisplayed at a corner of die vehicle whenever suchvehicle is parked on highways or in places that are not

well-lighted or is placed in such mariner as to endanger


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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 A2010 PROF.CARMELO SISONpassing traffic. Furthermore, every motor vehicle shallbe provided at all times with built-in reflectors or othersimilar warning devices either pasted, painted orattached at its front and back which shall likewise bevisible at night at least one hundred meters away. Novehicle not provided with any of the requirementsmentioned in this subsection shall be registered."

- Administrative Order No.2 which took effect on April 17,1970. has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducingwhat was set forth in the Act, Thus: "No motor vehiclesshall he registered if not equipped with reflectors Theluminosity shall have in intensity to he maintainedvisible and clean at all times such that if struck by beamof light shall be visible 100 meters away at night." Thencame a section on dimensions, placement and color.Penalties resulting front a violation thereof could beimposed. Non-compliance with the requirements shall besufficient cause to refuse registration of the motorvehicle affected and if already registered, its registrationmay be suspended.

ISSUES

ProceduralWON this case is ripe for adjudication.Substantive:1. WON the Reflector Law and Administrative Order No.2 violate the due process clause2. WON there was a violation of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power.

HELDProcedural

The case is ripe for adjudication. The main thrust of thepetition is to demonstrate that the challenged legislationdoes not suffer from alleged constitutional infirmity.Since the special civil action for certiorari and prohibitionfiled by Galo before respondent Judge would seek a

declaration of nullity of such enactment by theattribution of the violation on the face thereof of the dueprocess guarantee in the deprivation of property rights,it would follow that there is sufficient basis for the Courtto determine which view should prevail. Moreover, anyfurther hearing by respondent Judge would likewise belimited to a discussion of the constitutional issues raised,no allegations of facts having been made. The questionof validity is ripe for determination. *There is a greatpublic interest to be served by the final disposition ofsuch crucial issue.

Substantive:1. Was there a violation of the Due Process clause

Ratio No. It is obvious that the challenged statute is alegislation enacted under the police power to promotepublic safety. Justice Laurel, in the case of Calalang v.Williams, identified police power with state authority toenact legislation that may interfere with personal libertyor property in order to promote the general welfare.- The attack on the challenged statute ostensibly for

disregarding the due process safeguard is singularlyunpersuasive. It would be to close one's eyes to thehazards of traffic in the evening to condemn a statute ofthis character. Such an attitude betrays trick of concernfor public safety. No constitutional objection toregulatory measures adversely affecting property rights,especially so when public safety is "it aim, is likely to beheeded, unless of course on the clearest and mostsatisfactory proof of invasion of rights guaranteed by theConstitution. On such a showing, there may be adeclaration of nullity, but not because, the laissez-faireprinciple was disregarded but because the due process,equal protection, or non-impairment guarantees wouldcall for vindication.ObiterRejection of Laissez-fair concept and expansion

of Police Power: For a long time, legislation lending toreduce economic inequality foundered on the rock thatwas the due process clause, enshrining as it did thel iberty of contract, based on such a basicassumption.Undeniable is that by 1943, laissez-fairewas no longer the dominant theory. Justice Jackson inthe leading case of West Virginia State Board ofEducation v. Barnette stated:" the laissez-faire conceptor non-interference has withered at least as to economicaffairs, and social advancements are increasingly soughtthrough closer integration of society and throughexpanded and strengthened governmental controls."TheConstitutional Convention saw to it that the concept oflaissez-faire was rejected. Our Constitution which tookeffect in 1935 erased whatever doubts there might be

on that score. Its philosophy is a repudiation of laissez-faire. One of the leading members of the ConstitutionalConvention, Manuel A. Roxas: the "vast extensions in thesphere of governmental functions" and the "almostunlimited power to interfere in the affairs of industry andagriculture as well as to compete with existing business"as "reflections of the fascination exerted by [the then]current tendencies" in other jurisdictions.)- Reflector Law is thus immune from the attack sorecklessly hurled against it can survive, and quite easilytoo, the constitutional test. It is not to be lost sight ofthat under Republic Act No. 4136, of which the ReflectorLaw is an amendment, petitioner, as the Land

Transportation Commissioner, may, with the approval ofthe Secretary of Public Works and Communications,

issue rules and regulations for its implementation aslong as they do not conflict with its provisions.2. Ratio No. What cannot be delegated is the authorityunder the Constitution to make laws and to alter andrepeal them; the test is the completeness of the statutein all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands ofthe legislature. The legislature does not abdicate its

functions when it describes what job must be clone, whois to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.- To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must bea standard, which implies at the very least that thelegislature itself determines matters of principle and laysdown fundamental policy. A standard thus defineslegislative policy, marks its limits, maps out itsboundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.

Thereafter, the executive or administrative officedesignated may in pursuance of the above guidelinespromulgate supplemental rules and regulations.- The standard may be either express at implied. If theformer, the non-delegation objection is easily met. Thestandard though does not have to be spelled outspecifically. It could be implied from the policy and

purpose of the act considered as a whole. In theReflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is publicsafety. What is sought to be is safe transit upon theroads.- The rule is that, if the law authorizing the delegationfurnishes a reasonable standard which 'sufficientlymarks the field within which the Administrator is to actso that it may be known whether he has kept within it incompliance with the legislative will.- The Reflector Law construed together with the Land

Transportation- Code, Republic Act No. 4136, of which itis an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress andemphasis on public safety which is the primeconsideration in statutes of this character. There islikewise a categorical affirmation of the power of

petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner topromulgate rules and regulations to give life to andtranslate into actuality such fundamental purpose. Hispower is clear. There has been no abuse. HisAdministrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack,far-from-formidable, launched against it by respondentGalo.Disposition The writs of certiorari and prohibitionprayed for are granted.

TAN V MACAPAGALFERNANDO; February 29, 1972

FACTS


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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 A2010 PROF.CARMELO SISON- Petitioners Eugene Tan, Silvestre Acejas and RogelioFernandez filed a five-page petition assailing the validityof the Laurel-Leido Resolution which dealt primarily withthe scope of authority of the 1971 ConstitutionalConvention. They sought declaration from the Court thatthe said Convention is without power, under Art. XVSec.1 of the Constitution and under R.A. 6132. They

claimed that the Convention is merely empowered topropose improvements to the present Constitution; itcannot alter its general plan. They asked the Courttherefore to consider, discuss and adopt other proposalswhich seek to revise the Constitution by adopting a formof government other than the one outlined in thepresent Constitution. The Court dismissed their petitionfor being devoid of merit, taking exception to the no. ofpages petitioners used to express a plea of utmostseriousness.- Petitioners now filed this case, a 32-page motion forreconsideration relying mainly on American

jurisprudence which the Court considered as merelysecondary authority. As regards the object of thepetition, the Court invoked the principle of separation of

powers saying that it cannot exercise the competencepetitioners erroneously assumed it possesses.

ISSUES1. WON petitioners had legal standing to seek adeclaration of the alleged nullity of a resolution of theConstitutional Convention2. WON the case is ripe for adjudication

HELD1. No.A taxpayer has standing to nullify a law providingfor the disbursement of public funds for the purpose ofadministering an unconstitutional act which wouldconstitute a misapplication of funds, through ataxpayers suit. The Court however has the discretion as

to whether or not such a suit should be entertained. Inthis case, the Court held that the petitioners have nocause for legitimate resentment. Moreover, where aconstitutional question is raised, a Senator has usuallybeen considered as possessed of the requisitepersonality to bring a suit as it held in Mabanag v. LopezVito and likewise in Tolentino v. Comelec. Petitioners inthe present case cannot be heard to assert that they doqualify under such a category.2. No.The requisite for judicial inquiry is that somethingmust have been accomplished or performed by eitherbranch of Govt before a court may come into the pictureand even then, it may pass on the validity of what wasdone only when properly challenged in an appropriatelegal proceeding. The Constitutional Convention is a

coordinate agency whose powers are transcendent andas such not to be interfered with until the appropriatetime comes. Courts are devoid of jurisdiction as long asany proposed amendment is still unacted on by it. Onlyafter it has made concrete what it intends to submit forratification may an appropriate case be instituted. TheCourt here cited petitioner Gonzales (in Gonzales v.

Comelec) who had the good sense to wait until afterthe enactment of the statute for the submission to theelectorate of certain proposed amendments to theConstitution before filing his suit, thereby making hiscase ripe for adjudication.Disposition MFR is denied

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VCOMELEC

FELICIANO; May 22, 1995

NATURESpecial Civil Action in the SC. Certiorari and Prohibition

FACTS- PPI challenges the constitutionality of ResolutionNo.2772 issued by the COMELEC that (Section2) theCommission shall procure free print space of not lessthan in at least one newspaper of general circulationin every province or city as use as COMELEC space xxxand that the (Sections 3 and 4) COMELEC space shall beallocated, by the Commission, free of charge, among allthe candidates within the are in which the newspaper,magazine or periodical is circulated to enable candidatesto make known their qualifications, stands on issues,platforms of government. More so, Sec. 8 of theResolution prohibits news articles, opinions and featureswhich would manifestly favor or oppose a candidate or apolitical party.

- Commissioner Maambong sent letters to BusinessWorld, Malaya, PhilStar and Philippine Times Journal etc.directing them to provide free print space of not lessthan page for use as COMELEC space, pursuant to theResolution No.2772, notwithstanding informing thecandidates that election materials pertinent to theCOMELEC space be submitted directly to thenewspapers.

ISSUES1. WON Resolution violates prohibition that governmentshall not take private property for public use without justcompensation2. WON Resolution constitutes a valid exercise of thepolice power of the state

3. WON Sec 8 of the Resolution is violative of theconstitutional guaranteed freedom of speech, of thepress, and of expression.

HELDPre-Ratio- Solgen contends that the resolution is only establishes

guidelines to be followed in connection with theprocurement of COMELEC space. Even if it weremandatory, is would still be valid in the exercise of thepolice power of the state, and that Sec 8 is a permissibleexercise of the power of supervision and regulation ofthe COMELEC to ensure fair and impartial elections.- Even if COMELEC promulgated Resolution 2772-A toclarify the questioned provisions and which rendered thepetition moot and academic, the Court still deliberatedon the constitutional issues to prevent repetition and toput the issue to rest

Ratio1. Compelling print media companies to donateCOMELEC space amounts to the taking of private

personal property intended for public use or purpose,even if there were no sanctions to be imposed if theordered not be followed. The extent of the taking issubstantial as the monetary value of the donatedCOMELEC space may be very substantialA. Requites for expropriation for public use of privateproperty necessity for the taking and the legalauthority to effect the taking. The necessity element hasnot been shown by the COMELEC, notwithstanding itsinability to show a reasonable relationship between thepower of eminent domain and the enforcement andadministration of election laws by the COMELEC. Thiscannot simply be assumed.B. Taking private property for public use with justcompensation is authorized by the Constitution but this

just compensation is exactly what the COMELEC soughtto avoid by requiring the publishers to donate free printspace.2. The police power has not been delegated to theCOMELEC, nor can does the Resolution fit the requisitesof a lawful taking under the police power. There was noshowing of a national emergency, impetuous publicnecessity to warrant the disregard of individual businessconditions of the newspapers.3. Section 8 seems to represent the effort of theCOMELEC to incorporate the distinction and doctrinegiven by the NPC case, distinguishing paid politicaladvertisements and news reports, commentaries andthe like. But this distinction can only be given operative


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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 A2010 PROF.CARMELO SISONmeaning in actual cases or controversies, on a case-to-case basis, in terms of very specific sets of factsA. As the PPI has not alleged COMELEC action to this endthat one of its members has suffered direct or imminentinjury, this issue is not ripe for review for lack of anactual case or controversy involving, as the very listmota thereof, the constitutionality of Sec 8

SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITYVS. COMELEC

PANGANIBAN; September 26, 1996

NATUREAction for certiorari and prohibition to nullify therespondent Commission on Elections' Ruling dated April17, 1996 and Resolution No. 2848 promulgated on June27, 1996 denying petitioner's plea to stop the holding ofa local initiative and referendum on the proposition torecall Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, ofthe Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan.

FACTS- On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted Republic Act No.7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of1992), which among others, provided for the creation ofthe Subic Special Economic Zone, thus:"Sec. 12, Subic Special Economic Zone. - Subject to theconcurrence by resolution of the SangguniangPanlungsod of the City of Olongapo and the SangguniangBayan of the Municipalities of Subic, Morong andHermosa, there is hereby created a Special Economicand Free-port Zone consisting of the City of Olongapoand the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, thelands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and itscontiguous extensions as embraced, covered anddefined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between

the Philippines and the United States of America asamended, and within the territorial jurisdiction of theMunicipalities of Morong and Hermosa, Province ofBataan, hereinafter referred to as the Subic SpecialEconomic Zone whose metes and bounds shall bedelineated in a proclamation to be issued by thePresident of the Philippines. Within thirty (30) days afterthe approval of this Act, each local government unit shallsubmit its resolution of concurrence to join the SubicSpecial Economic Zone to the Office of the President.

Thereafter, the President of the Philippines shall issue aproclamation defining the metes and bounds of the zoneas provided herein."- In April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong,Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye

1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, asrequired by said Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7227, to join theSubic Special Economic Zone, On September 5, 1993,the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong submittedPambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993 to theOffice of the President.- On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia, Calimbas and

their companions filed a petition with the SangguniangBayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993.- Not satisfied, and within 30 days from submission oftheir petition, respondents resorted to their power ofinitiative under the Local Government Code of 19914Sec. 122 paragraph (b) of which provides:"Sec. 122. Procedure in Local Initiative. - (b) If nofavorable action thereon is taken by the sanggunianconcerned, the proponents, through their dulyauthorized and registered representatives, may invoketheir power of initiative, giving notice thereof of thesanggunian concerned.- On July 6, 1993, COMELEC, En Banc, in ComelecResolution No. 93-1623 denied the petition for local

initiative by private respondents on the ground that thesubject was merely a resolution (pambayangkapasyahan) and not an ordinance. On July 13, 1993,public respondent Comelec, En Banc, (thru ComelecResolution no. 93-1676) further directed its ProvincialElection Supervisor to hold action on the authenticationof signatures being solicited by private respondents.- On August 15, 1993, private respondents instituted apetition for certiorari and mandamus before this Courtagainst the COMELEC and the Sangguniang Bayan ofMorong, Bataan, to set aside Comelec Resolution No. 93-1623 insofar as it disallowed the conduct of a localinitiative to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10,Serye 1993, and Comelec Resolution No. 93-1676 insofaras it prevented the Provincial Election Supervisor of

Bataan from proceeding with the authentication of therequired number of signatures in support of the initiativeand the gathering of signatures.- On February 1, 1995, pursuant to Sec. 12 of R.A. No.7227, the President of the Philippines issuedProclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds ofthe SSEZ. Said proclamation included in the SSEZ all thelands within the former Subic Naval Base, includingGrande Island and that portion of the former naval basewithin the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality ofMorong.- On June 18, 1996, respondent Comelec issuedResolution No. 2845, adopting therein a "Calendar ofActivities for local referendum on certain municipalordinance passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong,

Bataan," and which indicated, among others, thescheduled Referendum Day (July 27, 1996, Saturday).- On June 27, 1996, the Comelec promulgated theassailed Resolution No. 2848 providing for "the rules andguidelines to govern the conduct of the referendumproposing to annul or repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan."

- On July 10, 1996, petitioner instituted the presentpetition for certiorari and prohibition contesting thevalidity of Resolution No. 2848 and alleging, inter alia,that public respondent "is intent on proceeding with alocal initiative that proposes an amendment of a nationallaw x x x."ISSUES1. WON this petition seeks to overturn a decision whichhas long become final and executory; namely, G.R.111230, Enrique Garcia vs. COMELEC.2. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse ofdiscretion in promulgating and implementing itsResolution No. 2848.3. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subjectwithin the powers of the people of Morong to enact; i.e.,

whether such initiative seeks the amendment of anational law.

HELD1. No.Ratio A prior decision is not a bar to a new one if theissue raised in the former is different from the questionsinvolved in the latter.Reasoning Our decision in the earlier Garcia case is nota bar to the present controversy as the issue raised anddecided therein is different from the questions involvedhere. The only issue resolved in the earlier Garcia case iswhether a municipal resolution as contradistinguishedfrom an ordinance may be the proper subject of aninitiative and/or referendum. In the present case,

petitioner is not contesting the propriety of a municipalresolution as the form by which these two newconstitutional prerogatives of the people may be validlyexercised. What is at issue here is whether PambayangKapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, as worded, is sufficientin form and substance for submission to the people fortheir approval; in fine, whether the Comelec actedproperly and juridically in promulgating andimplementing Resolution No. 2848. Moreover, wereviewed our rollo in G.R. No. 111230 and we found thatthe sole issue presented by the pleadings was thequestion of whether or not a Sangguniang BayanResolution can be the subject of a valid initiative orreferendum.2. Yes.


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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 A2010 PROF.CARMELO SISONRatio Initiative is a process of law-making by the peoplethemselves without the participation and against thewishes of their elected representatives, whilereferendum consists merely of the electorate approvingor rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by alegislative body.Reasoning While initiative is entirely the work of the

electorate, referendum is begun and consented to by thelawmaking body. Initiative is resorted to (or initiated) bythe people directly either because the lawmaking bodyfails or refuses to enact the law, ordinance, resolution oract that they desire or bec

compiled digest part 1

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