ADOPTION

A. Adoption: History and RationaleB. Types and Nature of Adoption

1. Types of Adoption

People v. MarquezG.R. No. 181440

Date of promulgation: April 13, 2011Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J.Petition: reviewPlaintiff-Appellee: People of the PhilippinesAccused-Appellant: Aida Marquez

Facts:Aida Marquez was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor.

Merano MarquezCarolina Merano met Marquez at the beauty parlor where she was working as a beautician and easily trusted Marquez so when Marquez asked to borrow Merano’s baby Justine to buy her clothes, milk, and food, she agreed.

Merano got a call from Marquez who promised to return Justine the next day and demanded 50K for expenses she incurred for Justine’s needs.

When Marquez failed to return her, Merano sought help from the authorities and found out that Marquez sold Justine to Sps. Castillo for 60K supposedly for Merano.

She then learned from Castillo that in an effort to legalize the adoption of Justine, the Castillos turned over custody of Justine to the RSCC of the DSWD.

Marquez claimed that Merano offered Justine to her for adoption, but she was not interested but referred her to Castillo. She said that Merano then left Justine with her maid while she was out and Castillo picked Justine up.

One of the officers who accompanied Merano to Castillo’s house was presented to testify that after the adoption agreement was put into writing, they all signed the document, entitled "Kasunduan sa Pagtalikod sa Karapatan at Pagpapa-ampon sa Isang Anak," with Castillo and Merano as parties to the agreement, with him and another officer as witnesses. He claimed that he was surprised that Merano gave up Justine for adoption when they supposedly went there to get Justine back.

RTC found Marquez guilty and the CA affirmed the decision.

Marquez now argues that her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because the elements constituting the crime of serious illegal detention or kidnapping are not present in this case.

Issue/Held:WON the lower courts erred in convicting Marquez of the crime – NO

Ratio:The act imputed to Marquez was not the illegal detention of a person, but involves her deliberate failure to restore a minor baby girl to her parent after being entrusted with said baby’s custody.

Contrary to Marquez’s assertions, she was charged with violation of Art. 2701, and not Art. 2672, of the RPC.

Under Art. 260, while one of the essential elements of this crime is that the offender was entrusted with the custody of the minor, what is actually being punished is not the kidnapping but the deliberate failure of that person to restore the minor to his parents or guardians.

It is undeniable that in both versions of the story, Marquez was entrusted and agreed to temporarily take custody of Justine, and so the 1st element is present. Marquez’s deliberate failure to return Justine, a minor at that time, when demanded to do so by the latter’s mother, shows that the 2nd element is likewise present in this case.

Marquez’s insistence on Merano’s alleged desire and intention to have Justine adopted cannot exonerate her because it has no bearing on her deliberate failure to return Justine to Merano.

Even if it were true that Merano subsequently agreed to have Castillo adopt Justine, as evidenced by the "Kasunduan sa Pagtalikod sa Karapatan at Pagpapa-ampon sa Isang Anak," this would still not affect Marquez’s liability as the crime of kidnapping and failure to return the minor had been fully consummated upon her deliberate failure to return Justine to Merano.

Decision:Decision of CA affirmed.

2. Proceeding in Rem

Lazatin v. CamposG.R. No. L-43955-56

Date of Promulgation: July 30, 1979Ponente: Teehankee, J. Petition: Petition to review decision of CAPetitioners: Renato Lazatin (Renato Sta. Clara)Respondents: Hon. Judge Jose Campos Jr., Nora De Leon, Bernardo De Leon, Arlene De Leon, and Irma Veloso

Facts: In 1974, Dr. Mariano Lazatin and his wife Margarita de Asis died just 4 months apart from each

1 Art. 270. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon

any person who, being entrusted with the custody of a minor person, shall deliberately fail to restore the latter to his parents or guardians.25

This crime has two essential elements:1. The offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and2. The offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or guardians.2

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made.4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.

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other. They adopted twin daughters, Nora and Irma, who married Bernardo and Francisco respectively. Petitioner filed a motion for intervention in the probate proceedings of the estate of Dr. Mariano Lazatin as an admitted illegitimate child and of the estate of Margarita de Asis as an adopted child. His basis was an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of the deceased, that petitioner was an “illegitimate son” of Dr. Lazatin and was later adopted by him. The said affidavit was then modified to state that both the spouses adopted the petitioner.

Petitioner presented no decree of adoption in his favor but instead attempted to prove it through secondary evidence the following:

1. That he had recognized deceased spouses as his parents2. That he had been supported by them until their death3. That he was formerly known as “Renato Lazatin” but was compelled to change his

surname to “Sta. Clara” when the deceased spouses refused to give consent to his marriage to his present wife

4. That at first he and his wife stayed at the residence of Engracio de Asis, father of Margarita, but a few months later, they transferred to the Mercy Hospital at Taft Ave., Manila, owned by the deceased spouses, where they continuously resided up to now.

Photographs were also intended to be presented by petitioner:1. Photograph of Irma Veloso where she addressed herself as sister of petitioner2. Photograph of deceased Margarita and petitioner when he was a boy

and a document showing that petitioner’s real name is “Renato Lazatin”.

Petitioner’s son filed a motion in the probate court claiming that Margarita had executed a will subsequent to the will already submitted for probate and demanding its production. He also prayed for the opening of a safety deposit box owned by Margarita. Nora admitted that she opened the box in good faith and did not find any will or document resembling a will.

In 1976, respondent barred the introduction of petitioner’s evidence. The court held that the evidence that petitioner produced tends to prove a status of a recognized natural child which, however, is not the legal basis for which he can seek to intervene in the probate proceedings.Later on, petitioner filed, in both cases, a motion to declare as established the fact of adoption in view of respondent Nora’s refusal to comply with the orders of the court to deposit the items she had removed from the safety deposit box of Margarita de Asis. Petitioner claimed that the order of the court for the production of the items in the safety deposit box could be considered as an order for the production and inspection of documents under Rule 27.

Issues/Held: WON the evidences presented by petitioner are sufficient to prove that he was judicially adopted by the deceased spouses - NO

Ratio:1. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons

a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence. On the contrary, the absence of a record of adoption has been said to evolve a presumption of its non-existence. Where, under the provisions of the statute, an adoption is effected by a court order, the records of such court constitute the evidence by which such adoption may be established.

2. Petitioner's flow of evidence in the case below does not lead us to any proof of judicial adoption. No judicial records of such adoption or copies thereof are presented or

attempted to be presented. Petitioner merely proceeds from a nebulous assumption that he was judicially adopted between the years 1928 and 1932.

3. The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as provided by the statute, cannot be substituted by parole evidence that a child has lived with a person, not his parent, and has been treated as a child to establish such adoption. Even evidence of declaration of the deceased, made in his lifetime, that he intended to adopt a child as his heir, and that he had adopted him, and of the fact that the child resided with the deceased, as a member of his family, from infancy until he attained his majority, is not sufficient to establish the fact of adoption. Nor does the fact that the deceased spouses fed, clothed, educated, recognized and referred to one like petitioner as an adopted child, recognized and referred to one like petitioner as an adopted child, necessarily establish adoption of the child. The attempts of petitioner to prove his adoption by acts and declarations of the deceased do not discharge the mandatory presentation of the judicial decree of adoption. The thrust of petitioner's evidence is rather to establish his status as an admitted illegitimate child, not an adopted child which status of an admitted illegitimate child was — the very basis of his petitioner for intervention in the estate proceedings of the late Dr. Lazatin, as above stated.

We do not discount though that declarations in regard to pedigree, although hearsay, are admitted on the principle that they are natural expressions of persons who must know the truth. Pedigree testimony is admitted because it is the best that the nature of the case admits and because greater evil might arise from the rejection of such proof than from its admission. But, before a declaration of a deceased person can be admitted to prove pedigree, or ancestry, the relationship of the declarant, by either of blood or affinity to the family in question, or a branch thereof, must ordinarily be established by competent evidence.

4. Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records of adoption proceedings were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents; although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. Assuming the mere fact that the deceased spouses treated petitioner as their child does not justify the conclusion that petitioner had been in fact judicially adopted by the spouses nor does it constitute admissible proof of adoption.

5. As a necessary consequence, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara cannot properly intervene in the settlement of the estate of Margarita de Asis, as an adopted child because of lack of proof thereof. For one to intervene in an estate proceeding, it is a requisite that he has an interest in the estate, either as one who would be benefited as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor. A child by adoption cannot inherit from the parent creditor by adoption unless the act of adoption has been done in strict accord with the statue. Until this is done, no rights are acquired by the child and neither the supposed adopting parent or adopted child could be bound thereby.

Decision:Petition denied.

DSWD v. BelenA.M. No. RTJ-96-1362

Date of Promulgation: July 18, 1997Ponente: Regalado, J.Petition: Administrative ComplaintPetitioners: Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Field Office No. 1, San

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Fernando, La Union, represented by Corazon LayugRespondents: Judge Antonio Belen, Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Lingayen, Pangasinan, and Elma Vedana, Social Welfare Officer II, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Lingayen, Pangasinan

Facts:Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are naturalized American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea.

Judge Belen granted the petition. He based his decree primarily on the "findings and recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents on the one hand and the adoptee on the other hand have already developed love and emotional attachment and parenting rules have been demonstrated to the minor” as contained in the "Adoptive Home Study Report" and "Child Study Report" prepared by the DSWD through Vedaña.

However, it turned out that the DSWD did not have any record in its files regarding the adoption and that there was never any order from the judge for the DSWD to conduct a "Home and Child Study Report.”

DSWD then filed the present administrative complaint against the judge charging him with violating Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 3 which requires, inter alia, that petitions for adoption shall be granted only after the DSWD has conducted and submitted a case study of the adoptee, the natural parents and the adoptive parents.

Respondent’s defense:Belen claimed that he directed respondent Vedaña to conduct the home and case study because this was among her duties under the Manual for Clerks of Court, and so, there was no need for him to order Vedaña to coordinate with the DSWD as he assumed that it was routine procedure for her to do so.

In her comment, Vedaña pointed out that there never was any directive from respondent judge for her to coordinate with the DSWD. She was only ordered to conduct the case study and submit her report. She flatly denied that she ever asked for money from the spouses.

Issues/Held: WON respondent judge issued an erroneous decree of adoption. – YES

Ratio:The error on the part of both respondent judge and social worker is all too evident. Pursuant to Circular No. 124, the judge should have notified the DSWD.

3 Art. 33, PD 603. No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of Social Welfare, or the Social Work and Counselling Division, in case of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, has made a case study of the child to be adopted, his natural parents as well as the prospective adopting parents, and has submitted its report and recommendations on the matter to the court hearing such petition. The Department of Social Welfare shall intervene on behalf of the child if it finds, after such case study, that the petition should be denied.4 SC Circular No. 12 definitively directs Regional Trial Courts hearing adoption cases:(1) to NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development, thru its local agency, of the filing of adoption cases or the pendency thereof with respect to those cases already filed;(2) to strictly COMPLY with the requirement in Article 33 of the aforesaid decree . . .

xxx xxx xxxThe Staff Assistant V. (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if any, shall coordinate with the Ministry of Social Services and Development representatives in the preparation and submittal of such case study. . . .

The case study should have been conducted by the department because it has the necessary competence, more than that possessed by the court social welfare officer, to make the proper recommendation.

By respondent's failure to do so, he may have placed in jeopardy the welfare and future of the child whose adoption was under consideration. Adoption is a legal device by which a better future may be accorded an unfortunate child, like Zhedell Bernardo Ibea in this case.

Decision:ACCORDINGLY, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely by this Court, respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan is hereby CENSURED for violating Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 and Circular No. 12 of this Court; and respondent Elma P. Vedaña, Social Welfare Officer II of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is REPRIMANDED for violating Circular No. 12.

Republic v. CarantoG.R. No. 157043

Date of Promulgation: March 15, 1996Ponente: Mendoza, J.Petition: certiorariPetitioners: Republic of the PhilippinesRespondents: CA and Sps Jaime and Zenaida Caranto

Facts: Herein Respondents filed a petition for adoption of Midael Mazon w/ prayer for correction of name from Midael to Michael. Midael, who was then 16 y/o at the time of the petition, stayed w/ the respondents since he was 7 years old.

Thereafter the case was heard during which Zenaida Caranto (adopting mother), Florentina Mazon (natural mother), and Midael testified.  Also presented was Carlina Perez, social worker of the DSWD, who endorsed the adoption of the minor, being of the opinion that the same was in the best interest of the child.

OSG opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the name of the child. RTC granted both the adoption and the correction of name despite such opposition. Hence, this petition.

Issue/Held:WON the RTC erred in granting the correction of name – YES

Ratio:First, OSG argues that the notice of publication was not sufficiently complied w/ as the publication states Michael and not Midael w/c is not the true name of the minor child. This is untenable for the correction involves merely the substitution of the letters “ch” for the letter “d,” so that what appears as “Midael” as given name would read “Michael” and thus such error is purely a clerical one.

Changing the name of the child from “Midael C. Mazon” to “Michael C Mazon” cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both names “can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig).”

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Second, OSG correctly finds that the RTC erred in granting the correction of name. Under Rule 108, the case, w/c involves a correction of an entry in the civil register, should have made the local civil registrar a party to the proceeding because w/o whom, no final determination of the case can be had. [§ 25 and 36]

While there was notice given by publication in this case, it stated only the petition for adoption and nothing was mentioned about the correction of his name. The local civil registrar was thus deprived of notice and, consequently, of the opportunity to be heard.

Decision:MODIFIED insofar as the change the name “MIDAEL” to “MICHAEL” is denied.

C. Evolution of Philippine Laws on Domestic Adoption

In re Adoption of Emiliano Guzman, Petronilo Ramirez, and Anacleta CamandreG.R. No. L-47790

Date of Promulgation: June 30, 1941Ponente: Moran, J. Petition: CertiorariPetitioners: Emiliano Guzman, Petronilo Ramirez, Anacleta Camandre

Facts:Spouses Petronilo Ramirez and Anacleta Camandre filed in the Court of First Instance a petition for the adoption of Emiliano Guzman, the natural son, who is of age, of said Petronilo Ramirez with one Cristina Guzman.

The petition alleges that petitioners are childless, that the person sought to be adopted has been reared and brought up by them until he finished his course as forest ranger, and that he, together with his natural mother, consents to the adoption.

The lower court, declaring that a person of age cannot legally be adopted under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, denied the petition, and from this order of denial, petitioners appealed.

Issue:WON Emiliano Guzman can be adopted – NO

Held:The law applicable to the case is the old Code Procedure, the petition having been filed prior to July 1, 1940, when the new Rules of Court took effect. Sections 765 to 769 of the Code of Civil Procedure speak only of "minor" as the subject of the adoption proceeding provided therein and, as correctly ruled by the trial court, the use of the term "minor" precludes, in the absence of specific provisions to the contrary, the adoption of adults.

5 RULE 108 §2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. - Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.6 § 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

Petitioners contention that the provisions of article 178 of the Civil Code, which impliedly sanctions the adoption of a person of age, cannot be deemed repealed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure is untenable.

It will be noted that Chapter XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure appears to be a complete enactment on the subject of adoption, and may thus be regarded as the expression of the whole law thereon. So viewed, that chapter must be deemed to have repealed the provisions of the Civil Code on the matter.

While, as a general rule, implied repeal of a former statute by a later one is not favored, yet if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act.

Decision:Petition dismissed.

D. Domestic Adoption: Eligibility and Consent Requirement1. Eligibility of Adopters

In the matter of adoption of the minor Edwin VillaG.R. No. L-22523

Date of Promulgation: Sept 29, 1967Ponente: Angeles, J.Petition: Appeal from decision of Juvenile and Domestic Relations CourtPetitioner: Luis Santos Jr, Edipola SantosRespondent: Republic of the Philippines

Facts:Spouses Luis Santos and Edipola Santos filed a petition for the adoption of Edwin Villa v Mendoza, 4y/o, and the natural younger brother of Edipola. Both spouses are professionals (Luis – a lawyer, and Edipola, a nurse). Edipola and Edwin’s parents were common law spouses.

Edwin was born sickly. Due to his impairing health, his parents entrusted him to the petitioners who reared and brought him up for the years, which resulted to the spouses’ developed love for the child.

However, the trial Court did not allow the adoption as it would result in an “incongruous” situation where the minor Edwin, legitimate brother of the petitioner-wife, will also be her wife.

Issues/Held:WON an elder sister (Edipola) may adopt a younger brother (Edwin) – YES

Ratio: There is no law barring the adoption by a sister of her younger brother. The only objection raised is the alleged incongruity that will result. The theory is that adoption among people thus related by nature should not be allowed, in order that dual relationship should not result. This theory stems from jurisprudence which disallowed such adoption.

However, a study of American precedents would reveal that there is a variance in the decisions of the courts in different jurisdictions regarding the matter of adoption of relatives. It cannot be stated as a general proposition that the adoption of a blood relative is contrary to the policy of

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the law, for in many states, no restriction of that sort is contained in the statutes authorizing adoption.

To say that adoption should not be allowed when the adopter and the adopted are related to each other is to preclude adoption among relatives no matter how far removed or in whatever degree that relationship might be is not the policy of the law. The interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be of paramount consideration. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, and designed to provide homes, care and education for unfortunate children, should be construed so as to encourage the adoption of such children by person who can properly rear and educate them.

With respect to the objection that the adoption in this particular case will result in a dual relationship between the parties, that the adopted brother will also be the son of the adopting elder sister, that fact alone should not prevent the adoption. One is by nature, while the other is by fiction of law. The relationship established by the adoption is limited to the adopting parents and does not extend to their other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have after the adoption except that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter.

Decision:Petition granted.

Republic v. CA and BobilesG.R. No. 92326

Date of Promulgation: 24 January 1992Ponente: Regalado, J. Petition: Review on CertiorariPetitioners: Republic of the PhilippinesRespondents: Court of Appeals, and Zenaida Bobiles

Facts: On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six (6) years old and who had been living with her family since he was four (4) months old, before the RTC Legaspi City.

The court a quo, found the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, thus issuing an order on February 15, 1988 setting the petition for hearing on March 28, 1988. Having complied with the jurisdictional requirements, the testimonies of spouses Zenaida and Dioscoro Bobiles, and DSWD representative Ma. Luz Salameno were taken and admitted.

The RTC thereby granted the petition freeing Jason Condat from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural parents and, for all intents and purposes, be the child of Sps. Bobiles, and have his surname changed from Condat to Bobiles.

The petitioners assail the said granting on the basis that the petition for adoption was filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1988, when the law applicable was PD No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code). Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them.

However, after the trial court rendered its decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, EO No. 209 (Family Code), took effect on August 3, 1988 and under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.

On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends that the petition for adoption should be dismissed outright for it was filed solely by private respondent without joining her husband, in violation of Art. 185 FC7, which requires joint adoption by the spouses. It argues that the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her

petition for adoption.

Issue/Held: WON Art. 185 of the FC be retroactively applied to Zenaida Bobiles’ petition – NO

Ratio:Art. 185 must not be retroactively applied since it will impair Zenaida Bobiles’ vested right to adopt Jason Condat, with respect to Art. 2568.

‘Vested right’ expresses the concept of present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested. 

Under then CYWC, Zenaida had the right to file the petition solely by herself. Upon filing, her right to file alone was in accordance to the law in force at that time, was already vested and thus cannot be impaired by the enactment of a new law.

As a general rule, jurisdiction of the courts is determined by the statute enforce at the time of the commencement of action - petition was filed on February 2, 1988 while the FC was only promulgated on August 3, 1988.

Art. 185, FC is remedial in nature. Procedural statutes are ordinarily accorded a retrospective construction in the sense that they may be applied to pending actions and proceedings, as well as to future actions. However, they will not be so applied as to defeat procedural steps completed before their enactment. 

If Art. 185,FC is to be applied retroactively, in arguendo, Dioscoro, even if he is not a co-petitioner in the petition to adopt, has signed an affidavit of consent which was attached to his wife’s petition which shows that he actually joined his wife in adopting the child – proving that either way there was compliance to either statutes.

The Court further held that in determining the whether or not to set aside the decree of adoption the interests and welfare of the child is of paramount consideration. In the case at bar, Jason’s adoption is with the consent of his natural parents. Also, the DSWD, in its study of the adopters, has found unqualifiedly recommended the approval for the adoption.

7 Art. 185, FC. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. (29a, E. O. 91 and PD 603)

8 Art. 256, FC. This code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

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---“We are of the opinion and so hold that the decree of adoption issued by the court a quo would go a long way towards promoting the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life.

Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopted, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.” ---

Decision:Petition DENIED. Petition for Adoption AFFIRMED.

Notes: If asked about the issues on non-joiner and jurisdictional defect, these matters simply refer to the fact that courts should not take cognizance of cases wherein some procedural aspects therein are not complied with. In the case at bar, petitioners are asking for the outright dismissal of the petition for adoption since the husband was not able to participate as a co-petitioner.

Republic v. ToledanoG.R. No. 94147

Date of Promulgation: June 8, 1994Ponente: Puno, J.Petition: certiorariPetitioner: Republic of the PhilippinesRespondents: HONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 69, Iba, Zambales and SPOUSES ALVIN A. CLOUSE and EVELYN A. CLOUSE

Facts:Respondent spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of respondent Evelyn A. Clouse.

Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the United States of America. On August 19, 1988, Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United States of America in Guam.

His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son. - Lower court granted the adoption.

Solgen contended that lower court erred because THE RESPONDENTS ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO ADOPT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.

Issue/Held:WON Solomon can be adopted by the Spouses Clouse – NO

Ratio:Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.:

“(3) An alien, except:(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.”

Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision.

In the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse.

When private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988.

Though it may appear that Evelyn may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209, since she was a former Filipino citizen who sought to adopt her younger brother, unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Art. 185. which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife.Art. 185 FC:   “Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.” Alvin is neither of the above.

Decision:Petition granted.

Republic v. MillerG.R. No. 125932

Date of Promulgation: April 21, 1999Ponente: Pardo, J. Petition: CertiorariPetitioners: Rep. of the Phils.Respondents: Claude & Jumrus Miller

Facts: Claude and Jumrus Miller were a married American couple , based on Angeles City (because of Claude’s work at the Clark Airbase). They could not bear children since Jumrus has some medical problem.

Marcelo Madayag Jr. and Zenaida Magno were a poor Filipino couple, who has a son named Michael Magno Madayag. Due to poverty and concern, they had their son adopted by the American couple.

Affidavits were executed, giving the irrevocable consent of the Filipino couple regarding the adoption. The DSWD also approved of the said adoption.

The Solicitor General then petitioned against this adoption, stating that it was not allowed in the Family Code (since both husband and wife were Americans, with either having no Filipino citizenship).

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The RTC decision which legalized Michael’s adoption was appealed in the CA, which then certified the case to the SC.

Issue/Held: WON a petition to adopt filed by aliens prior to enactment of the Family Code is allowed – YES

Ratio:While Art. 184, FC 9generally prohibits aliens from adopting Filipino children (except for certain factors), adoption by aliens was allowed by the Child and Youth Welfare Code10 (the law in force prior the enactment of the Family Code).

The petition for adoption was filed 29 July 1988, while the Family Code was enacted 3 Aug 1988, hence the said adoption was legal.

Decision:Appealed Decision is AFFIRMED.

In re Petition for Adoption of Michelle LimG.R. No. 168992-93

Date of promulgation: May 21, 2009Ponente: Carpio, J.Petition: certiorariPetitioners: Monina P. LimRespondents:

Facts:Monina and Primo Lim were a childless couple who took care of Michelle and Michael, entrusted to them by Lucia Ayuban. They were so eager to have children so they made it appear that they were their real parents.

Primo later died and Monina married Angel Olario, an American citizen and on 2002, Monina decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty provided for in RA 855211 for those who

9 Art. 184, Family Code The following persons may not adopt:

xxx(3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoptions as may be provided by law.10

Art. 28, PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) Who May Not Adopt. - The following persons may not adopt:xxx(4) An alien who is disqualified to adopt according to the laws of his own country or one with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations.11

Sec. 22. Rectification of Simulated Births.- A person who has, prior to the effectivity of this Act, simulated the birth of a child shall not be punished for such act: Provided, That the simulation of birth was made for the best interest of the child and that he/she has been consistently considered and treated by that person as his/her own son/daughter: Provided, further, That the application for correction of the birth registration and petition for adoption shall be filed within five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act and completed thereafter: Provided, finally, That such person complies with the procedure as specified in Article IV of this Act and other requirements as determined by the Department.

simulated the birth of a child.

She filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael, who were 25 (already married) and 18 years old respectively. Michelle, her husband, Michael, and Olario all gave their Affidavits of Consent to the adoption.

DSWD issued a certification stating that Michelle and Michael were abandoned children whose natural parents’ whereabouts are unknown. However, RTC still denied the petition ruled that since Monina had remarried, she should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband.

Monina appealed and argued that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.

Issue/Held:WON the petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt – NO

Ratio:The law is explicit in that husband and wife must adopt jointly except for exceptions allowed by law12, and Monina does not fall under any. The use of the word “shall” means that the provision is mandatory and that the couple must jointly adopt.

The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec. 713 of RA 8552 and none of these

12 Art. III of RA 8552, Sec. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:

(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent;(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:

(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or

(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.13

(1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for

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qualifications were shown and proved during the trial. These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived since he does not fall under the exceptions provided for.

Also, parental authority14 is merely one of the effects of adoption. Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, it does not do away with the requirement of parental consent since the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as support and successional rights.

The fact that Olario already filed a petition for dissolution for dissolution of the marriage is of no moment because until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists and joint adoption is required.

Decision:Petition denied. RTC decision affirmed.

2. Eligibility of the Adoptee3. Consent Necessary for Adoption

In re Adoption of Anonymous345 NYS 2d 430

Date of Promulgation: 1973 Ponente:---Petition: Petition for adoptionPlaintiff: AnonymousDefendant: Anonymous

Facts: The husband and the wife had a child born out of Artificial Insemination Donor. It was consensual and was subsequently recorded in the birth certificate of the child.

After some time, they separated and got a divorce. The wife was awarded with custody of the child, while the husband had visitation rights. The wife remarried. Her new husband wanted to adopt the child.

Under Sect 11 of Domestic Relations Law, parental consent of both parents was required for adoption. In this case, the father of the child did not give his consent.

The wife and the new husband contended that because the child was born out of AID, the father’s consent was not needed.

adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child.

14 Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the

development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children.

Issues/Held: WON the father’s consent is required for adoption in case of AID – YES

Ratio: The Domestic Relations Law requires consent of both parents over the adoption of a child. The term ‘father’ is not limited to the biological or natural father, for what is considered is the legal relationship of the father and the child. The child in this case is legitimate, even if it was conceived out of AID.

Decision:Petition DENIED.

Lehr v. Robertson463 U.S. 248

Date of Promulgation: June 27, 1983Ponente: Stevens, J.Petition: appealPetitioners: Jonathan LehrRespondents: Lorraine Robertson

Facts:Jonathan Lehr is the putative father of a child born out of wedlock on November 9, 1976, Jessica M. Jessica’s mother, Lorraine Robertson, married Richard Robertson 8 months after her birth.

When Jessica was over 2 years old, the Robertsons filed an adoption petition in the Family Court of Ulster County, New York.

Jonathan filed a petition to vacate the adoption order on the ground that it was obtained in violation of his rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

1. He contends that a putative father's actual or potential relationship with a child born out of wedlock is an interest in liberty which may not be destroyed without due process of law.

2. He contends that the gender-based classification in the statute, which both denied him the right to consent to Jessica's adoption and accorded him fewer procedural rights than her mother, violated the Equal Protection Clause.

Issues/Held: WON New York has sufficiently protected an unmarried father's inchoate relationship with a child whom he has never supported and rarely seen in the 2 years since her birth. – YES

Ratio:New York maintains a "putative father registry." A man who files with that registry demonstrates his intent to claim paternity of a child born out of wedlock and is therefore entitled to receive notice of any proceeding to adopt that child.

Before entering Jessica's adoption order, the Ulster County Family Court had the putative father registry examined. Jonathan had not entered his name in the registry.

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New York law also requires that notice of an adoption proceeding be given to several other classes of possible fathers of children born out of wedlock.15

Appellant was not a member of any of those classes.

DUE PROCESS:Where an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by "coming forward to participate in the rearing of his child," his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause.

But the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent protection. If the natural father fails to grasp the opportunity to develop a relationship with his child, the Constitution will not automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the child's best interests lie.

The right to receive notice was completely within appellant's control. He could have mailed a postcard to the putative father registry. The possibility that he

may have failed to do so because of his ignorance of the law cannot be a sufficient reason for criticizing the law itself. 

EQUAL PROTECTION:The legislation at issue in this case, N. Y. Dom. Rel. Law 111 and 111-a is intended to establish procedures for adoptions. Those procedures are designed to promote the best interests of the child, to protect the rights of interested third parties, and to ensure promptness and finality.16

The existence of a substantial relationship between parent and child is important. If one parent has an established custodial relationship with the child and the other parent has either abandoned or never established a relationship, the Equal Protection Clause does not prevent a State from according the two parents different legal rights.

Appellee mother had a continuous custodial responsibility for the child, whereas appellant never established any custodial, personal, or financial relationship with the child.

Decision:The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

Santos v. Aranzanso

15 N. Y. Dom. Rel. Law 111-a (2) and (3) provided:"2. Persons entitled to notice, pursuant to subdivision one of this section, shall include:"(a) any person adjudicated by a court in this state to be the father of the child;"(b) any person adjudicated by a court of another state or territory of the United States to be the father of the child, when a certified copy of the [463 U.S. 248, 252]   court order has been filed with the putative father registry, pursuant to section three hundred seventy-two-c of the social services law;"(c) any person who has timely filed an unrevoked notice of intent to claim paternity of the child, pursuant to section three hundred seventy-two of the social services law;"(d) any person who is recorded on the child's birth certificate as the child's father;"(e) any person who is openly living with the child and the child's mother at the time the proceeding is initiated and who is holding himself out to be the child's father;"(f) any person who has been identified as the child's father by the mother in written, sworn statement; and"(g) any person who was married to the child's mother within six months subsequent to the birth of the child and prior to the execution of a surrender instrument or the initiation of a proceeding pursuant to section three hundred eighty-four-b of the social services law.

16 To serve those ends, the legislation guarantees to certain people the right to veto an adoption and the right to prior notice of any adoption proceeding. The mother of an illegitimate child is always within that favored class, but only certain putative fathers are included.

G.R. No. 23828

Date of Promulgation: February 28. 1966Ponente: Bengzon J.P., J.Petition: certiorariPetitioners: Paulina and Aurora SantosRespondents: Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura

Facts: Herein petitioners, Paulina and Aurora Santos were legally adopted by Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes. The petition for adoption alleged that the whereabouts of the minors' parents, were unknown; that since the outbreak of the warm they have been abandoned by their parents; and that for years, since their infancy, they have continuously been in petitioners' care and custody. It was thereafter granted.Eight years later, Juliana died intestate.

Simplicio then filed a petition for the settlement of her estate declaring himself, as surviving spouse, Paulina and Aurora Santos as surviving heirs. In the same petition, he asked that he be appointed administrator of the estate.

Herein respondents, both allege that Juliana is their first cousin, asserted that Simplicio Santos marriage to the late Juliana Reyes was bigamous and thus void: and that the adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was likewise void ab initio for want of the written consent of their natural parents, who were then living and had not abandoned them.

Issue/Held:1. WON the court lacked jurisdiction over the adoption proceeding for lack of consent of the natural parents – NO2. WON an adoption order may be attacked collaterally – NO17

Ratio:1. WON the court lacked jurisdiction over the adoption proceeding for lack of consent of the natural parents – NO

Under Rule 100 § 318, consent of the parents is not an absolute requisite. If the child was abandoned, consent by the guardian ad litem suffices.

Going back to the decision, it can readily be seen that altho the CFI judgment did not use the word "abandoned,” its findings sufficiently contain a set of facts and circumstances which truly constitutes a finding of abandonment.19 As seen in its decision, the minors are and for years have been living under the care and custody of Simplicio and Juliana.

Furthermore, it held that the parents of the minors have long been unheard from and in spite of diligent efforts to locate them, they could not be found.

17 Please lang, ang layo po ng 1st cousin. Ang sipag nyo po maghanap ng butas para lang makakuha ng mana ng di

nyo naman nanay/tatay/kapatid/anak—chai -_-18 Rule 100 § 3 Consent to adoption.—There shall be filed with the petition a written consent to the adoption signed by the child if over fourteen years of age and not incompetent, and by each of its known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such child, or if there are no such parents by the general guardian or guardian ad litem of the child x x x19 Abandonment — under persuasive American rulings — imports "any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child". It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe to their children."

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2. WON an adoption order may be attacked collaterally – NO

An adoption order may not be attacked collaterally as in a proceeding for a settlement of an estate. If this were not the rule, the status of adopted children would always be uncertain, since the evidence might not be the same at all investigations, and might be regarded with different effect by different tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one court to have been valid, while another court would hold it to have been of no avail.

Respondents, as alleged first cousins, cannot intervene, as such, in the settlement proceedings, in view of the fact that in the order of intestate succession adopted children exclude first cousins.

Decision:Adoption AFFIRMED thereby declaring respondents w/o right to intervene as heirs in the settlement of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes.

Cang v. CAG.R. No. 105308

Date of Promulgation: September 25, 1998Ponente: Romero, J. Petition: CertiorariPetitioners: Herbert CangRespondents: CA, Spouses Ronald Clavano and Maria Clara Clavano

Facts:Herbert Cang, petitioner, and Ana Marie Clavano were married and begot three children. Ana Marie upon learning of her husband's extramarital affairs filed a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite, which was approved.

Petitioner then left for the United States where he was able to obtain a divorce decree, which granted sole custody of the children to Ana Marie, reserving rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places to petitioner.

Ronald Clavano (brother of Ana Marie Clavano) and his wife Maria Clara Clavano, the respondents, then filed a petition for adoption of the three minor children of Herbert and Ana Marie. Ana Marie gave her consent on the grounds that his brother, Ronald, had been taking care of the children and that she will be going to the US for employment, and that petitioner had long forfeited his parental rights. The 14-year-old son also gave his consent.

Petitioner, upon learning of the adoption proceedings, immediately came back to the PH and opposed the adoption.

The trial court granted the adoption. The CA affirmed the judgment holding that although the written consent of the natural parents of the children to be adopted is required, the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not. The CA held that petitioner had abandoned his children and thus, his consent is not necessary.

Issue:WON the adoption may be granted – NO

Held:

The written consent of the natural parents to the adoption remains a requisite for its validity. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is insane or hopelessly intemperate.

In the present case, only the consent of the natural mother was present. Petitioner’s consent, being the natural father, is lacking. Nonetheless, the petition sufficiently alleged the fact of abandonment of the children.

However, in cases where the parent opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue.

The word “abandon” means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports any conduct of the parent which manifests a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.

In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to constitute abandonment.

Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims. The courts below attached a high premium to the prospective adopter’s financial status (they were affluent businessmen) and emphasized the meagerness of the amounts petitioner sent to his children. There should be a holistic approach, taking into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child and not merely the material needs of the child.

Decision:Petition is GRANTED. The adoption is DENIED.

Landingin v. RepublicG.R. No. 164948

Date of Promulgation: June 27, 2006Ponente: Callejo Sr., J.Petition: Review on certiorariPetitioner: Diwata Ramos LandinginRespondent: Republic of the Philippines

Facts:On Feb 2002, Diwata Landingin, a citizen of the USA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos. The minors are the biological children of Manuel Ramos, Landingin’s brother, and Amelia Ramos.

According to the petition, when Manuel died, the children were left with their paternal grandmother. Meanwhile, Amelia went to Italy, remarried there and now has two children by that marriage. Throughout the years, Landingin and Amelia supported the minors. Landingin claimed that she is qualified to adopt the children. She already acquired the minors’ written consent to

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the adoption and her children’s affidavit of consent, which was notarized in Guam.

The Court gave due course to the petition and ordered the DSWD to conduct a case study. The recommendation favored the adoption of the minors by their aunt, Diwata. However, during the trial, she failed to present the DSWD social worker who conducted the case study. She also failed to offer in evidence Amelia’s consent to the adoption. Nevertheless, the TC granted the petition. CA reversed and held that Landingin failed to adduce in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia. Moreover, the affidavit of consent of Landingin’s children could not be admitted in evidence as the same was executed in Guam and was not authenticated before a Phil consular office.

Issues/Held:1. WON adoption may proceed even without the mother’s written consent – NO2. WON the affidavit of consent notarized in Guam is admissible – NO

Ratio: 1. WON adoption may proceed even without the mother’s written consent – NO

The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.

Petitioner contends that in any case, the children were abandoned, hence, parental consent was not necessary.Petitioner’s contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.

Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without his consent, is a conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties. The term means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. If a parent withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and neglects to lend support and maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the child.

Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.

When Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her children, or to permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to leave the country by financial constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly obligations of rearing the children to her now deceased mother-in-law, for, as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for serious personal problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial support to the children, though in minimal amounts as compared to what her affluent in-laws provide.

Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the minors herein will have the effect of severing all legal ties between the biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the same shall then be vested on the adopter. It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his/her children. More proof has to be adduced that Amelia has

emotionally abandoned the children, and that the latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if they are given to an adopting parent. Again, it is the best interest of the child that takes precedence in adoption.

2. WON the affidavit of consent notarized in Guam is admissible – NO

Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao’s Report and of the Joint Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to prove. The joint written consent of petitioner’s children45 was notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of Court in the same way as a document notarized in this country it needs to comply with Section 2 of Act No. 210320

As the alleged written consent of petitioner’s legitimate children did not comply with the afore-cited law, the same can at best be treated by the Rules as a private document whose authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the makers.

Decision:Petition denied.

Duncan v. CFIG.R. No. L-30576

Date of Promulgation: 10 February 1976Ponente: Regalado, J. Petition: Review on CertiorariPetitioners: Robin FrancisRadley Duncan and Maria Lucy ChristensenRespondents: Court of First Instance Rizal, preside over by Hon. Judge Herminio C. Mariano

Facts: Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen are husband and wife, the former a British national residing in the Philippines for the last 17 years and the latter an American citizen born in and a resident of the Philippines. Having no children of their own but having previously adopted another child, said spouses filed a petition with respondent court for the adoption of a child previously baptized and named by them as Colin Berry Christensen Duncan.

Colin was only three years old when he was given to Dunan and his wife for them to razon de Leon-Velasquez. The child was baptized with Robin and Maria as his parents.

On the other hand, Atty. Velasquez received the infant from the child’s unwed mother who told her the former not to reveal her identity because she wanted to get married and did not want to destroy her(mother’s) future. She instructed Atty. Velasquez to look for a suitable couple who will adopt the child. The mother did not provide for the maintenance

20 Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated in a foreign country shall be

considered authentic if the acknowledgment and authentication are made in accordance with the following requirements:

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, chargé d affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, acting within the country or place to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary public or officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done.

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and support of Colin.

Learning from the testimony of Atty. Velasquez that the natural mother of the child was still alive, the respondent Court asked her to divulge the identity of the said mother but she refused claiming that there existed an attorney-client relationship between them. She had been instructed not to reveal the latter’s identity and she could not violate such privileged communication.

The petition was dismissed by the respondent Court. The principal reason being that the consent was improper and falls short of the express requirement of law which provides that the written consent of the guardian or the person in charge of the person to be adopted shall be necessary (Art. 340, CC).

Issue/Held: WON Atty. Velasquez is the proper person to give the consent required by Art. 340, FC –YES

Ratio:Atty. Velasquez stands as Colin’s guardian in the light of the natural mother’s abandonment of the child.

The Court holds that there are two persons particularly described by law who may be considered as legally capable of giving the required written consent. Art. 34021, CC provides that the “parent, guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted” while the other one is mentioned in Sec. 3, Rule 9922, ROC, describing it as each of the known living parents “who has not abandoned such child.” The child’s natural father’s consent is out of the question as the child is illegitimate and unrecognized.

Sometime in May of 1967, Colin was turned over by his mother to Atty. Velasquez. From that date up to the present, the mother has not bothered to inquire into the condition of the child, much less contribute to the livelihood, maintenance and care of the same. She is the antithesis of that described in the law as "known living parent who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such child."

The Court is of the opinion that the said natural mother has abandoned and foregone all parental claims to the child and that Atty. Velasquez is a person standing in loco parentis of said infant as contemplated in Art. 340,CC.

Atty. Velasquez took care of the infant who was in dire need of someone to give it protection and sustain its delicate and fragile life. She was not under any legal compulsion to accept the child and extend to it such protection that it needs.

“It was she who had actual, physical custody of the infant and who, out of compassion and motherly instinct, extended the mantle of protection over the hapless and helpless

21 Art. 340, CC. The written consent of the following to adoption shall be necessary:

(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;(2) The parents, guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted.22

Sec. 3. Consent to adoption. — There shall be filed with the petition a written consent to the adoption signed by the child, if fourteen years of age or over and not incompetent, and by the child's spouse, if any, and by each of its known living parents who is not an insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such child, or if there are no such parents by the general guardian, or guardian ad litem of the child, or if the child is in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home, or benevolent society or person, by the proper officer or officers of such asylum, home, or society, or by such person; but if the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the consent of its father to the adoption shall not be required.

infant which otherwise could have suffered a tragic fate, like being thrown into some garbage heap as had often happened to some unwanted illegitimate babies. The least this Court could do to recognize and acknowledge her good Samaritan deed is to extend, as it hereby extends, to her the recognition that she was a de facto guardian exercising patria potestas over the abandoned child.”

The trial court in its decision had sought refuge in the ancient Roman legal maxim "Dura lex sed lex" to cleanse its hands of the hard and harsh decision it rendered. While this old adage generally finds apt application in many other legal cases, in adoption of children, however, this should be softened so as to apply the law with less severity and with compassion and humane understanding, for adoption is more for the benefit of unfortunate children, particularly those born out of wedlock, than for those born with a silver spoon in their mouths.

---The law is not, and should not be made, an instrument to impede the achievement of a salutary humane policy. As often as is legally and lawfully possible, their texts and intendments should be construed so as to give all the chances for human life to exist.The fact that even before they have applied for legal custody and adoption of the infant they have already showered it with love and care and had it baptized, with them appearing in the records of the baptism as the parents of the child, speaks well of the genuine desire of petitioners to have the child as their very own.

The child was born in May, 1967, and he will be at this time, 1976, about 9 years of age. In all the years, from the time he was turned over to the herein petitioners when he was only about a week old. He must have known no other parents than these persons. If we are now to sustain the decision of the court below, this Tribunal will be doing a graver injustice to all concerned particularly to said spouses, and worse, it will be imposing a cruel sanction on this innocent child and on all other children who might be similarly situated. ---Decision:CFI Decision ANNULLED. Petition for Adoption GRANTED.

E. Procedure for Agency Adoption1. State Policy2. Pre-Adoption Procedure3. Adoption Procedure

DSWD v. BelenA.M. No. RTJ-96-1362

Date of Promulgation: July 18, 1997Ponente: Regalado, J.Petition: Administrative ComplaintPetitioners: Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Field Office No. 1, San Fernando, La Union, represented by Corazon LayugRespondents: Judge Antonio Belen, Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Lingayen, Pangasinan, and Elma Vedana, Social Welfare Officer II, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Lingayen, Pangasinan

Facts:Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are naturalized American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea.

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Judge Belen granted the petition. He based his decree primarily on the "findings and recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents on the one hand and the adoptee on the other hand have already developed love and emotional attachment and parenting rules have been demonstrated to the minor” as contained in the "Adoptive Home Study Report" and "Child Study Report" prepared by the DSWD through Vedaña.

However, it turned out that the DSWD did not have any record in its files regarding the adoption and that there was never any order from the judge for the DSWD to conduct a "Home and Child Study Report.”

DSWD then filed the present administrative complaint against the judge charging him with violating Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 23 which requires, inter alia, that petitions for adoption shall be granted only after the DSWD has conducted and submitted a case study of the adoptee, the natural parents and the adoptive parents.

Respondent’s defense:Belen claimed that he directed respondent Vedaña to conduct the home and case study because this was among her duties under the Manual for Clerks of Court, and so, there was no need for him to order Vedaña to coordinate with the DSWD as he assumed that it was routine procedure for her to do so.

In her comment, Vedaña pointed out that there never was any directive from respondent judge for her to coordinate with the DSWD. She was only ordered to conduct the case study and submit her report. She flatly denied that she ever asked for money from the spouses.

Issues/Held: WON respondent judge issued an erroneous decree of adoption. – YESRatio:The error on the part of both respondent judge and social worker is all too evident. Pursuant to Circular No. 1224, the judge should have notified the DSWD.

The case study should have been conducted by the department because it has the necessary competence, more than that possessed by the court social welfare officer, to make the proper recommendation.

By respondent's failure to do so, he may have placed in jeopardy the welfare and future of the child whose adoption was under consideration. Adoption is a legal device by which a better future may be accorded an unfortunate child, like Zhedell Bernardo Ibea in this case.

Decision:ACCORDINGLY, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely by this Court, respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan is hereby CENSURED for violating

23 Art. 33, PD 603. No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of Social Welfare, or the Social Work and Counselling Division, in case of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, has made a case study of the child to be adopted, his natural parents as well as the prospective adopting parents, and has submitted its report and recommendations on the matter to the court hearing such petition. The Department of Social Welfare shall intervene on behalf of the child if it finds, after such case study, that the petition should be denied.24 SC Circular No. 12 definitively directs Regional Trial Courts hearing adoption cases:(1) to NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development, thru its local agency, of the filing of adoption cases or the pendency thereof with respect to those cases already filed;(2) to strictly COMPLY with the requirement in Article 33 of the aforesaid decree . . .

xxx xxx xxxThe Staff Assistant V. (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if any, shall coordinate with the Ministry of Social Services and Development representatives in the preparation and submittal of such case study. . . .

Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 and Circular No. 12 of this Court; and respondent Elma P. Vedaña, Social Welfare Officer II of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is REPRIMANDED for violating Circular No. 12.

Reyes v. SoteroG.R. No. 167405

Date of Promulgation: February 16. 2006Ponente: Ynares-Santiago., J.Petition: certiorariPetitioners: Ana Joyce ReyesRespondents: Hon. Cesar Sotero, RTC Judge, Corazon Chichioco, Angelito Lising, Erlinda Espacio, Gonzalo Zalzos, Ernesto Lising

Facts: Respondents filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising claiming that she was the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate. They claim that the real and personal properties were in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, herein petitioner, who is a grandniece of the deceased.

Ana Reyes opposed the petition, claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and the latter’s husband and asserting that the petition be dismissed since she was the only heir of Lising25

Petitioner Respondents

Petitioner adduced evidence as to her adoption, i.e. certification of her adoption from the local civil registrar’s office that the adoption decree was registered therein and a copy of a Judicial Form and a certification issued by the clerk of court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac.

Respondents claimed that no adoption proceedings took place in since the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and the OSG had no records of it. Accdg to them, Ana’s natural mother connived w/ the court personnel to make it appear that Ana was adopted and that the CFI’s order for initial hearing was published in a weekly newspaper not authorized to do such.

Lower court refused to dismiss the petition stating that petitioner needs to prove validity of her adoption first.

Issue/Held:WON petitioner has to prove the validity of her adoption due to imputations of irregularities – NO

Ratio:Petitioner need not prove her adoption by any evidence other than those already presented.

The certifications issued by the local civil registrar and clerk of court regarding petitioner’s adoption w/c are entered in the records kept under their official custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of

25 Serafin Delos Santos (husband) already passed away

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petitioner’s adoption, hence, mere “imputations of irregularities” will not cast doubt on the adoption decree since these are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.

Moreover, it must be pointed out that such contrary proof can be presented only in a separate action brought soley for the purpose of nullifying the adoption decree. It cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s estate, as was held in Santos v. Aranzanso. Petitioner, whose adoption is presumed to be valid, would necessarily exclude respondents from inheriting from the decedent since they are mere collateral relatives of the latter.

Decision:Petition GRANTED. Special Proceedings pending before the RTC are hereby dismissed.

4. Confidentiality and Permanency of Sealed Records

F. Effects of Adoption and Recission1. Effects of Adoption

Republic v. CA and WongG.R. No. 97906

Date of Promulgation: May 21, 1992Ponente: Regalado, J. Petition: CertiorariPetitioners: Republic of the Philippines Respondents: CA, Maximo Wong

Facts:Respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Alcala. When he was 2 and a half years old, he and his sister were adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Wong. As a result, respondent’s name was changed from Maximo Alcala, Jr. to Maximo Wong. The couples showered their adopted children with parental love and treated them as their own.

Upon reaching 22, respondent filed a petition to change his name back to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname (Note: adoptive father already deceased).

The trial court granted the petition. The CA affirmed the decision. The Republic appealed.

Issue/Held:WON the reasons given by respondent in his petition for change of name are valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the granting of said petition – YES

Respondent’s allegation of ridicule and embarrassment due to use of his present surname is very much substantiated.

From the testimony of respondent and of his adopter mother, it is clear that the petition for change of name was filed because of the embarrassment and ridicule respondent’s family name

"Wong" brings in his dealings with his relatives and friends, he being a Muslim Filipino and living in a Muslim community. Another cause is his desire to improve his social and business life.

Justice dictates that a person should be allowed to improve his social standing as long as in doing so, he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interest of the State or other persons. Nothing whatsoever is shown in the record of this case that such prejudice or injury to the interest of the state or of other persons would result in the change of petitioner's name.

While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the effect that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must nevertheless be borne in mind that the change of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of adoption proceedings. The act of adoption fixes a status - that of parent and child. It has been defined as the taking into one's family of the child of another as son or daughter and heir and conferring on it a title to the rights and privileges of such. The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to effect this new status of relationship between the child and its adoptive parents, the change of name which frequently accompanies adoption being more an incident than the object of the proceeding.

It is the usual effect of a decree of adoption to transfer from the natural parents to the adoptiveparents the custody of the child's person, the duty of obedience owing by the child, and all other legal consequences and incidents of the natural relation, in the same manner as if the child had been born of such adoptive parents in lawful wedlock, subject, however, to such limitations and restrictions as may be by statute imposed.

Lastly, we reject the contention of the Republic that the change of name will result to a cross ingratitude to respondent’s adoptive parents. In fact, respondent’s first asked permission from his adoptive mother and the latter gave her consent. She even executed an affidavit proving this. This only shows respondent’s respect and reverence to his parents. In the same way, had respondent’s adoptive mother viewed him as ungrateful, she would not have executed an affidavit, much less testify at court.

Decision:Judgment affirmed.

Notes:A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivosor mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.

Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) When the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) When the change will avoid confusion; (d) Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of her alien parentage; (e) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

Tamargo v. CAG.R. No. 85044

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Date of Promulgation: June 3, 1992Ponente: Feliciano, J.Petition: ------Petitioner: Macario tamargo, Celso tamargo, Aurelia TamargoRespondent: Hon CA, Hone Judge Ariston Rubio, Victor Bundoc, Clara Bundoc

Facts:In 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura filed a petition to adopt the ten-year-old minor Adelberto Bundoc. Before the petition was granted, Adelberto shot Jennifer with an air rifle causing injuries that resulted in her death. A civil complaint for damages was then filed by Petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer’s adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, her biological parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto’s biological parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident.

In addition to this case for damages, a criminal info for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed against Adelberto who was, however, acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he had acted without discernment.

In their answer, the spouses Bundoc claimed that as a result of adoption, the adopting parents were the indispensable parties to the action as parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.

Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of the petition for adoption.

The TC ruled that respondent spouses Bunduc indeed were not indispensable parties to the action. Due to failure to appeal on time, the CA dismissed the petition.

Issues/Held:WON the natural parents, not the adopting parents, should be the ones liable for the damages incurred by Adelberto – YES

Ratio: The law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them. This is based on Article 218026 of CC.

This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents — their parental authority — which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child.

26 The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for

those of persons for whom one is responsible.The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.

xxx xxx xxxThe responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied)

The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control.

In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occurred when parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

The claim of spouses Bundoc that parental authority was vested in the adopting parents as of the time of filing of the petition, is untenable. This is because the decree of adoption cannot be retroactively applied. Such would be unfair and unconscionable.

Decision:Petition granted.

Johnston v. RepublicGR No. L-18284

Date of Promulgation: April 30, 1963Ponente: Labrador, J.Petition: Appeal from the decision of CFI-RizalPetitioners: In The Matter Of The Adoption Of The Minor, Ana Isabel Henriette Antonia Concepcion Georgiana, Isabel Valdes JohnstonRespondents: Republic of the Philippines

Facts:Isabel Johnston filed a petition to adopt a 2 yo minornamed Ana Isabel Henriette Antonio Concepcion Georgiana [POOR KID ANG HABA NG NAME NIYA] from Hospicio de San Jose as she is in a childless marriage with Raymond Arthur Johnston. The petition was granted and the child was given Isabel’s maiden surname, Valdez. Isabel filed a motion to change the child’s surname to Valdez-Johnston, Isabel’s married name. [TAPOS PINAHABA PA LALO NG MOM NIYA]

Issues/Held: WON the child can use the surname of the father who did not adopt her. – NO

Ratio:Art. 341 (CC) provides that the adoption shall: 1) Give to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter; 2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by nature; 3) Make the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter; and 4) Entitle the adopted person to use the adopter's surname.

Par. 4 refers to the adopter’s own surname, which is her maiden name, and not her married surname; She entered the adoption not as a married woman.

Adoption created a personal relationship between the adopter and the adopted, and the consent of the husband to the adoption did not have the effect of making him an adopted father.

To allow the minor to adopt the surname of the husband of the adopter, would mislead the public into believing that she had also been adopted by the husband (who did not concur with the

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adoption), which is not the case.

Decision:Petition DENIED.

Republic v. Hernandez and Sps. MunsonG.R. No. 117209

Date of Promulgation: 9 February 1996Ponente: Regalado, J. Petition: Review on CertiorariPetitioners: Republic of the Philippines Respondents: Hon. Jose Hernandez, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC – Pasig and Sps. Van Munson and Regina Munson

Facts: On March 10, 1994, Van and Regina Munson, filed a petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, under the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99, ROC, their fitness to be adoptive parents, and circumstances by which the adoption of the minor was sought. Also, respondents herein sought for the change of the first name of the adoptee to Aaron Joseph, a name the child was baptized with and by which he was called by his adoptive family.

Petitioners herein opposed the joinder of the petition for adoption and change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petitions should be pursued in separate proceedings. This was denied by the respondent Court and granted the petition applied for by the respondent spouses.

The SC upheld the decision of the trial court in as far as the adoption is concerned basing from sufficient evidential support and accorded with it high respect and considered it conclusive. However, it seeks to resolve on the legality of the change in name which was granted by herein respondent Court.

Issue/Held: 1. WON there was lawful ground for the change of name - NO2. WON the court a quo erred in granting the prayer for the change of name –YES

Ratio:1. WON there was lawful ground for the change of name – NO

An adoption decree does not entitle the adoptee to a change of first name, but only to a change of surname. According to Art. 189, FC: “ For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters.”

The change of surname was deemed a natural consequence of an adoption. In contrast, the creation of the adoptive relationship does not give the adopter license to change the adoptee’s registered first name. Such a change is beyond the scope of an adoption proceeding.

The change of first name may only be done by strictly complying with Rule 103, ROC. It is an independent and separate proceeding whose result cannot be granted through any other

proceeding. The grounds for change of name recognized by jurisprudence are the following:

a. The name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;b. The change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; c. The change will avoid confusion; d. One has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and

was unaware of alien parentage; e. The change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and f. When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired

change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

The Court held that Kevin’s baptism under the new name or the continuous use of it by him, his family and their friends do not constitute proper and reasonable ground for a legal change of name. When a name given in church records or by which one is known by the community is different from that in the civil register, it is unofficial and cannot be recognized as one’s real name.

The change of name without proper proceeding will be prejudicial to the State. Because the State is naturally interested in the methodical administration of justice and the maintenance of its system of identifying its citizens, it stands to be prejudiced by the wanton disregard of Rule 103 in this case.

2. WON the court a quo erred in granting the prayer for the change of name –YES

The adoption and the change of name are not actions that warrant a joinder.A joinder of causes of action is the union of two or more civil causes of action in the same complaint, declaration or petition, even if each of them could be made the basis of a separate suit. Joinder is usually left to the discretion of a litigant party, though there are certain requisites:

a. It will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and b.The causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands for money, or are of the same nature and character

Decision:RTC Order MODIFIED. Child shall be officially known as Kevin Earl Munson.

In Re Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga GarciaG.R. No. 148311

Date of Promulgation: March 31, 2005Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. Petition: CertiorariPetitioners: Honorato Catindig.Respondents: ---

Facts: Honorato Catindig, who is now a widower, filed to adopt his illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. Part of the petition is changing Stephanie’s surname (Garcia to Catindig) and middle name (Astorga to Garcia).

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Pursuant to Art. 189, FC27, the RTC granted the petition, so the child’s name was now Stephanie Nathy Catindig (no Garcia).

Honorato filed a motion for classification and/or reconsideration, so that Stephanie could use her mother’s surname as her middle name (Garcia). This was denied by the lower court, stating that there was no law allowing the adopted child to use her mother’s surname as her middle name.

Issue/Held: WON an illegitimate child can use her mother’s surname as her middle name, upon adoption by her natural father. – YES

Ratio:There is no law prohibiting an adopted child to use his/her mother’s surname as his/her middle name.

Art. 189, FC and Sec. 17 (RA 8552)28 lays down that the adopted child is entitled to all the rights and privileges of a legitimate child, including the right to use the mother’s surname as middle name.

Art. 176 (FC, as amended by RA 9255, An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father)29 and Art. 365, NCC30 does not specifically say anything regarding the use of mother’s surname as the middle name, for adopted children.

Art. 10, NCC31 states that in case of doubt of interpreting a law, the intent of the lawmaking body should prevail. In this case, it was the intent of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees to recognize the Filipino custom that the mother’s surname would immediately precede the surname of the father (middle name).

Decision:Petition GRANTED. Appealed Decision PARTLY MODIFIED.

Sayson v. CA

27 Art. 189, Family Code Adoption shall have the following effects:

(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and be vested in the adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives.28

Sec. 17, RA 8552(Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) Legitimacy. – The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the family.

29 Art. 176, Family Code Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.30 Art. 365, New Civil Code An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.31 Art. 10, New Civil Code In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

G.R. No. 89224-25

Date of promulgation: January 23, 1992Ponente: Cruz, J.Petition: review by certiorari from the decision of the CAPetitioners: Mauricio Sayson, Rosario Sayson-Malonda, Basilisa Sayson-Lirio, Remedios Sayson-Reyes, and Juana C. BautistaRespondents: CA, Delia Sayson assisted by her husband Cirilo Cedo, Jr., Edmundo Sayson, and Doribel Sayson

Facts:Eleno and Rafaela Sayson had 5 children. The couple died intestate. One of their children, Teodoro, married Isabel and when they died, their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, who claim to be their children.

The 4 surviving children of Eleno and Rafaela, along with the mother of Isabel, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel, to the exclusion of the alleged children.

The children filed their own complaint, this time for the partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela against the 4 surviving children. They claimed that Delia and Edmundo were adopted and Doribel was a legitimate child and therefore, they are entitled to inherit their father’s share from the estate of Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation.

Both cases were decided in favor of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel.The first case: On the basis of the decree of adoption of Delia and Edmundo and the birth certificate of Doribel, they are entitled to inherit from their grandparents by right of representation. The second case: With them being the heirs of Teodoro, their uncle and aunts were excluded from sharing in Teodoro’s estate.

The uncle and aunts appealed the 2 cases to the CA.1 st decision: modified in that Delia and Edmundo were disqualified from inheriting from their grandparents by right of representation.2 nd decision: affirmed that the 3 are entitled to inherit from parents

The uncle and aunts are now questioning the 2nd decision, claiming that the birth of Doribel disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo under Art. 33532, CC. Contradicting themselves, they also claimed that Doribel was not a legitimate child, but a child of another woman.

Issues/Held:1. WON Delia and Edmundo were legally adopted – YES2. WON Doribel is a legitimate child – YES3. WON Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel are exclusive heirs to Teodoro and Isabel’s estate – YES4. WON Delia and Edmundo are entitled to inherit from their grandparents by right of representation – NO

Ratio:1. WON Delia and Edmundo were legally adopted – YES

Inconsistent argument! They seek to annul the adoption by saying they had a legitimate

32 Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:

(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction; xxx

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daughter but also question the legitimacy of the daughter.

They also should have brought this to the court even before the adoption was decreed. Not having info of Doribel’s birth to Teodoro and Isabel, the trial court can’t be faulted for finding that the adopting parents were disqualified. Also, the validity of adoption cannot be challenged collaterally. It should be challenged in a direct proceeding.

2. WON Doribel is a legitimate child – YES

The birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence.

It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under Art. 26533, CC and Art. 172, FC, and no contrary evidence were presented to refute it. Doribel’s legitimacy also could not be challenged collaterally.

3. WON Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel are exclusive heirs to Teodoro and Isabel’s estate – YES

Legitimate and adopted children have the right to inherit from their parents.

With Doribel being legitimate and Delia and Edmundo being legally adopted, they are entitled to inherit their parents’ estate according to Art. 97934, CC.

4. WON Delia and Edmundo are entitled to inherit from their grandparents by right of representation – NO

Adoption creates a relationship only between the adoptive parents and the adopted; it does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.

As a legitimate child of Teodoro, Doribel has the right to represent her decease father and inherit his share35. However, Delia and Edmundo may not represent their adoptive parent because the grandparents are considered strangers to the adopted children.

Decision:Decision of CA affirmed.

2. Recission of Adoption

33 Art. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or

by an authentic document or a final judgment.Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; xxx34

Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages.An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate child.35

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one who the person represented would have succeeded.Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation.

Lahom v. SibuloG.R. No. 143989

Date of promulgation: July 14, 2003Ponente: Vitug, J.Petition: review by certiorari Petitioners: Isabelita LahomRespondents: Jose Melvin Sibulo (previously referred to as Dr. Melvin S. Lahom)

Facts:Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom adopted in 1971 the latter’s nephew, Jose Melvin Sibulo. However, in December 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption because of the following reasons:1. Melvin refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom and Dr. Diosdado expressed

his desire to revoke the former’s adoption before the latter died2. Melvin continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the feelings of herein

petitioner3. Melvin remained indifferent to the petitioner and would only come to see her once a year4. Melvin remained callous and utterly indifferent towards Isabelita despite the latter’s leg

ailment5. Melvin recently has been jealous of Isabelita’s nephews and nieces whenever they would

find time to visit her6. Melvin’s insensible attitude resullted in a strained and uncomfortable relationship between

him and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that after all respondent's only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner and her late husband

Trial court dismissed the petition due to the fact that prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.

Issues/Held:1. WON the subject adoption can be revoked or rescinded by the adopter after the

effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 – NO2. WON the adopter’s action has prescribed – with or without the passing of R.A. No.

8552, the answer is YES

Ratio:1. WON the subject adoption can be revoked or rescinded by the adopter after the

effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 – NO

The Court held that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.

Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 reads:"SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. - Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations.

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"Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code."

It has been established by the Court in cases Republic v. CA and Republic v. Miller that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.

2. WON the adopter’s action has prescribed – with or without the passing of R.A. No. 8552, the answer is YES

Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 10036 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period.

Decision:Petition dismissed.

G. Violations and Penalties: Focus on Simulation of BirthH. Inter Country Adoption

36 SEC. 5. Time within which to file petition.- A minor or other incapacitated person must file the petition for rescission or revocation of adoption within the five years following his majority, or if he was incompetent at the time of the adoption, within the five (5) years following the recovery from such incompetency.The adopter must also file the petition to set aside the adoption within five (5) years from the time the cause or causes giving rise to the rescission or revocation of the same took place.

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