RULE 62INTERPLEADER

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G.R. No. 193494 March 07, 2014

LUI ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner, Vs. ZUELLIG PHARMA CORPORATION AND THE PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, Respondents.

LEONEN, J.:

FACTS:

On March 9, 1995, Lui Enterprises, Inc. and ZuelligPharma Corporation entered into a 10–year contract of lease4 over a parcel of land located in Barrio Tigatto, Buhangin, Davao City.

On January 10, 2003, ZuelligPharma received a letter6 from the Philippine Bank of Communications. Claiming to be the new owner of the leased property, the bank asked ZuelligPharma to pay rent directly to it.

ZuelligPharma promptly informed Lui Enterprises of the Philippine Bank of Communications’ claim. On January 28, 2003, Lui Enterprises wrote to ZuelligPharma and insisted on its right to collect the leased property’s rent.9

Due to the conflicting claims of Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications over the rental payments, ZuelligPharma filed a complaint 10 for interpleader with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. In its complaint, ZuelligPharma alleged that it already consigned in court P604,024.35 as rental payments. ZuelligPharma prayed that it be allowed to consign in court its succeeding monthly rental payments and that Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications be ordered to litigate their conflicting claims.11

The Philippine Bank of Communications filed its answer12 to the complaint. On the other hand, Lui Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss13 on the ground that ZuelligPharma’s alleged representative, Atty. Ana L.A. Peralta did not have authority to file the complaint for interpleader on behalf of the corporation.

According to Lui Enterprises, an earlier filed nullification of deed of dation in payment case pending with the Regional Trial Court of Davao barred the filing of the interpleader case.16

In the nullification of deed of dation in payment case, Lui Enterprises raised the issue of which corporation had the better right over the rental payments.18Lui Enterprises argued that the same issue was involved in the interpleader case. To avoid possible conflicting decisions of the Davao trial court and the Makati trial court on the same issue, Lui Enterprises argued that the subsequently filed interpleader case be dismissed.

ZuelligPharma filed its opposition22 to the motion to dismiss. It argued that the motion to dismiss should be denied for having been filed late.

With respect to the nullification of deed of dation in payment case, ZuelligPharma argued that its pendency did not bar the filing of the interpleader case. It was not a party to the nullification case.29

The Regional Trial Court of Makati found that Lui Enterprises

failed to file its motion to dismiss within the reglementary period. Thus, in its order34 dated October 6, 2003, the trial court denied Lui Enterprises’ motion to dismiss and declared it in default.35

Lui Enterprises did not move for the reconsideration of the order dated October 6, 2003. Thus, the Makati trial court heard the interpleader case without Lui Enterprises’ participation.

Despite having been declared in default, Lui Enterprises filed the manifestation with prayerthat the interpleader case be dismissed.

ZuelligPharma filed its opposition44 to the motion to set aside order of default. It argued that a counsel’s failure to file a timely answer was inexcusable negligence which bound his client and that the pending case for nullification of deed of dation in payment “[did] not preclude [ZuelligPharma] from seeking the relief prayed for in the [interpleader case].”45

While the motion to set aside order of default was still pending for resolution, Lui Enterprises filed the manifestation and motion to dismiss46 dated April 21, 2005 in the Makati trial court. It manifested that the Davao trial court issued another order47 dated April 18, 2005 in the nullification of deed of dation in payment case. In this order, the Davao trial court directed the Philippine Bank of Communications to inform ZuelligPharma to pay rent to Lui Enterprises while the Davao trial court’s order dated April 1, 2004 was subsisting. In its manifestation and motion to dismiss, Lui Enterprises reiterated its prayer for the dismissal of the interpleader case to prevent “the possibility of [the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati City] and [the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Davao City] rendering conflicting rulings [on the same issue of which corporation has the better right to the rental payments].”48

THE MAKATI TRIAL COURT’S RULING:

Without resolving the motion to set aside order of default, the Makati trial court denied the manifestation with motion to dismiss dated April 21, 2005 on the ground that Lui Enterprises already lost its standing in court. 49

In its decision 50 dated July 4, 2006 , the Regional Trial Court of Makati ruled that Lui Enterprises “[was] barred from any claim in respect of the [rental payments]” 51 since it was declared in default. Thus, according to the trial court, there was no issue as to which corporation had the better right over the rental payments.52 The trial court awarded the total consigned amount of P6,681,327.30 to the Philippine Bank of Communications and ordered Lui Enterprises to pay ZuelligPharma P50,000.00 in attorney’s fees.53

Lui Enterprises appealed to the Court of Appeals.54

THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:

The Court of Appeals found Lui Enterprises’ appellant’s brief insufficient.

As to the denial of Lui Enterprises’ motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court. The Court of Appeals found that Lui Enterprises filed its motion to dismiss four days late.56

With respect to Lui Enterprises’ motion to set aside order of default, the Court of Appeals found that Lui Enterprises failed to show the excusable negligence that prevented it from filing its

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motion to dismiss on time. On its allegedly meritorious defense, the Court of Appeals ruled that the nullification of deed of dation in payment case did not bar the filing of the interpleader case, with ZuelligPharma not being a party to the nullification case.57

On the award of attorney’s fees, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court since “ZuelligPharma x xx was constrained to file the action for interpleader with consignation in order to protect its interests x x x.”58

Thus, in its decision59 promulgated on May 24, 2010, the Court of Appeals dismissed Lui Enterprises’ appeal and affirmed in toto the Regional Trial Court of Makati’s decision.

Lui Enterprises filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari .

ISSUE:

Whether the annulment of deed of dation in payment pending in the Regional Trial Court of Davao barred the subsequent filing of the interpleader case in the Regional Trial Court of Makati.

RULING:The nullification of deed in dation in payment case did not bar the filing of the interpleader case. Litispendentiais not present in this case.

Under Rule 16, Section 1, paragraph (e) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of litispendentia:Section 1.Grounds. – Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x xxx

(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;

x xxx

Litispendentia is Latin for “a pending suit.”140 It exists when “another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action x x x.”141 The subsequent action is “unnecessary and vexatious”142 and is instituted to “harass the respondent [in the subsequent action].”143

The requisites of litispendentiaare:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(1) Identity of parties or at least such as represent the same

interest in both actions; (2) Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs

being founded on the same facts; and(3) The identity in the two cases should be such that the

judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.144

All of the requisites must be present.145Absent one requisite, there is no litis pendentia.146

In this case, there is no litispendentia since there is no identity

of parties in the nullification of deed of dation in payment case and the interpleader case. ZuelligPharma is not a party to the nullification case filed in the Davao trial court.

There is also no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for. Lui Enterprises filed the first case to nullify the deed of dation in payment it executed in favor of the Philippine Bank of Communications. ZuelligPharma subsequently filed the interpleader case to consign in court the rental payments and extinguish its obligation as lessee. The interpleader case was necessary and was not instituted to harass either Lui Enterprises or the Philippine Bank of Communications.Since two requisites of litispendentia are absent, the nullification of deed of dation in payment case did not bar the filing of the interpleader case.

At any rate, the Regional Trial Court of Davao’s order dated April 18, 2005 was not a writ of preliminary injunction. It was a mere order directing the Philippine Bank of Communications to inform ZuelligPharma to pay rent to Lui Enterprises while the status quo order between Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications was subsisting. The Regional Trial Court of Davao did not enjoin the proceedings before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The order dated April 18, 2005 provides:As such, [the Philippine Bank of Communications] [is] hereby directed to forthwith inform ZuelligPharma Corp., of the April 1, 2004 status quo order and the succeeding September 14, 2004 Order, and consequently, for the said lessee to remit all rentals due from February 23, 2003 and onwards to plaintiff Lui Enterprises, Inc., in the meanwhile that the status quo order is subsisting.155

Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Davao did not enjoin the Regional Trial Court of Makati from hearing the interpleader case.

All told, the trial court did not err in proceeding with the interpleader case. The nullification of deed of dation in payment case pending with the Regional Trial Court of Davao did not bar the filing of the interpleader case with the Regional Trial Court of Makati.

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En Banc

GR. No. L- 25138 August 28 ,1969

JOSE A. BELTRAN, ET AL., vs. People’s Home site & Housing Corporation

Teehankee , J. :

Facts :

An interpleader suit was filed on Aug. 21, 1962 , by plaintiffs’ own behalf and in behalf of all residents of Project 4 in Quezon City.Praying the (2) defendant - gov’t corps be compelled to litigate and interplead between themselves their alleged conflicting claims involving said Project 4.

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Principal allegations of the Plaintiffs : Since they first occupied in 1953 their respective housing units at Project 4 , under lease from the people’s Home site and Housing CORP (PHHC) and paying monthly rentals therefor , they were assured by competent authority of after 5 years of occupancy , they would be entitled to purchase said units.

On Feb. 21, 1961PHHC transferred the management, administration and ownership of Project 4 to GSIS and asked tenants to signify their conformity to buy the housing units at the selling price , agreeing to credit the tenants , as down payment on the selling price ( 30% ) of what had been paid by them as rentals.

Tenants accepted the offer.

On March 31, 1961 PHHC announced in another circular that all payments by tenants after Mach 31, 1961 would be considered as amortizations or installment payments.

In September, 1961 PHHC-GSIS arrangement collections from tenants were delivered to GSIS by PHHC.

On December 27, 1961 , pursuant to the release of mortgage and amicable settlement of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings instituted by GSIS against PHHC in May 1960 (PHHC executed an agreement of turnover of administration and ownership of its properties including Project 4 in favor of GSIS.

Subsequently, PHHC NewChairman General Mgr. Esmerald Eco , refused to recognize all agreements and undertaking previously entered into w/ GSIS.

GSIS insisted its legal rights to enforce said agreements and was upheld by Gov’t Corporate Counsel and the Sec. of Justice.Plaintiffs claimed great inconvenience and incalculable moral and material damage due to the conflicting claims between defendants corporations ( PHHC-GSIS ).

They Further alleged that as the majority of them were GSIS policy holders they preferred to have Implementation of the outright sale in their favor effected by GSIS, since GSIS was legally entitled to the mgt. , administration and ownership of the PHHC properties in question.On August 23, 1962, upon urgent ex parte motion of plaintiffs , Trial Court issued its order designating People’sFirst Savings Bank at Quezon City to receive in trust the payt’s from the plaintiffs their monthly amortizations on PHHC lots and to be released only upon proper authority of the court.

On Aug. 29, 1962 defendant corporations filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a cause of action as well as to lift Court’s order designating People’s First Savings Bank as trustee to receive the tenants payt’s on the PHHC lots.

On Sept. 1,1962 , Trial Court heard the motion with the presence of all parties thus ruling that there is no dispute as to whom the residents of Project 4 should make their monthly amortizations payments and there is , therefore no cause of action for interpleading two defendants corporations as GSIS has expressed its conformity made their payments directly to PHHC.

Issue :WON as to who between PHHC and GSIS that plaintiffs made their amortization payments in that interpleaded them between themselves and litigate as to their conflicting claims involving project 4.

Rulling :

Court ruled that plaintiffs entirely miss the vital element of an interpleader. Rule 63 , Sec.1 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that “Conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or maybe made “against the plaintiff in interpleader” who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest w/c in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants”.

Two (2) defendants corporations may have conflicting claims between themselves w/regard to mgt , administration and ownership of Project 4 , such conflicting claims are not against the plaintiffs nor do they have involve or affect the plaintiffs. No allegation that any corp. other than the PHHC w/c was the only entity privy to their lease purchase agreement , ever made on them any claim or demand for payment of the rentals or amortization payments.

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G.R. No.147812. April 6, 2005

LEONARDO R. OCAMPO, petitioner,vs. LEONORA TIRONA, respondent.

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS

Ocampo alleged that he is the owner of a parcel of land. Ocampo bought the subject land from Rosauro Breton, heir of the subject lands registered owner Alipio Breton Cruz. Possession and administration of the subject land are claimed to be already in Ocampos management even though the TCT is not yet in his name. Tirona, on the other hand, is a lessee occupying a portion of the subject land.

According to Ocampo, upon acquisition of ownership of the subject premises, a formal written notice was given to Tirona which was received by the latter in recognition of Ocampos right of ownership over the subject premises, Tirona paid some monthly rentals due, however, when area was declared a priority development, respondent informed petitioner that she will suspend paying the rentals. Ocampo wrote a letter to Tirona demanding upon to pay the rentals and to vacate the premises, despite receipt of said letter, Tirona failed and refused and still fails and refuses to heed Ocampos demands. This prompted the petitioner to file an action for unlawful detainer and damages against the respondent.

The MTC held that Tirona had no reason to suspend the payment rents as this made her occupation of the property illegal. Thus, the petitioner has the right to recover possession. The RTC concurred with this decision. However the Appellate Court set aside the lower courts judgement.

ISSUE Whether or not an action for Interpleader is proper in this case.

RULING

Yes. Tirona should have filed an interpleader and need not wait for actual filing of a suit by petioner against her. The action is proper when lessee does not know who to pay the rentals due to conflicting claims in the subject’s property.

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Tirona need not have awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of interpleader. An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the property. The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.

Ocampo has the right to eject Tirona from the subject land. All the elements required for an unlawful detainer case to prosper are present. Ocampo notified Tirona that he purchased the subject land from Tironas lessor. Tironas continued occupation of the subject land amounted to acquiescence to Ocampos terms. However, Tirona eventually refused to pay rent to Ocampo, thus violating the lease.

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RULE 63DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

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G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014

CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO, Petitioner, v. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN, Respondent.

VELASCO JR., J.:

NATURE:This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the Decision1 and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals. The assailed rulings denied Crisostomo Aquino’s Petition for Certiorari for not being the proper remedy to question the issuance and implementation of Executive Order No. 10, Series of 2011 (EO 10), ordering the demolition of his hotel establishment.

FACTS:

Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. applied for a building permit covering the construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land in Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed construction site was within the “no build zone” demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131.

Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow up, no action was ever taken by the respondent mayor. Construction of the building continued.

A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel.

EO 10 was partially implemented on June 10, 2011. Thereafter, two more instances followed wherein respondents demolished the improvements introduced by Boracay West Cove.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA alleging that the order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion; that respondent has no jurisdiction but the DENR since the area is a forest land; that DENR bestowed the company the right to construct permanent improvements on the area in question; and that judicial proceedings should first be conducted before the respondent mayor could order the demolition of the building.

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In rebuttal, respondents contended that the FLAgT does not excuse the company from complying with the Ordinance and Presidential Decree No. 1096 (PD 1096), otherwise known as the National Building Code of the Philippines. Respondents also argued that the demolition needed no court order because the municipal mayor has the express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of illegally constructed buildings.

Ruling of the CA:

The CA dismissed the petition solely on procedural ground, i.e., the special writ of certiorari can only be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions and since the issuance of EO 10 was done in the exercise of executive functions, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions, certiorari will not lie. Instead, the proper remedy for the petitioner, according to the CA, is to file a petition for declaratory relief with the Regional Trial Court.

Issue: (For the purpose of our topic) Whether or not declaratory relief is still available to petitioner;

HELD:

Certiorari, not declaratory relief, is the proper remedy

a. Declaratory relief no longer viable

Resolving first the procedural aspect of the case, We find merit in petitioner’s contention that the special writ of certiorari , and not declaratory relief, is the proper remedy for assailing EO 10. As provided under Sec. 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarySECTION 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. x xx (emphasis added)

An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of the rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained before the breach or violation of the statute, deed or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.4cralawlawlibrary

In the case at bar, the petition for declaratory relief became unavailable by EO 10’s enforcement and implementation. The closure and demolition of the hotel rendered futile any possible guidelines that may be issued by the trial court for carrying out the directives in the challenged EO 10. Indubitably, the CA erred when it ruled that declaratory relief is the proper remedy given such a situation.

b. Petitioner correctly resorted to certiorari

On the propriety of filing a petition for certiorari , Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari . — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. x xx

For certiorari to prosper, the petitioner must establish the concurrence of the following requisites, namely:

1. The writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;

2. Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and

3. There is no appeal or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.5

#2 THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 175064 September 18, 2009

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by Governor Luis Raymund F. Villafuerte, Jr., Petitioner,VsHONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; and CITY OF NAGA, represented by Mayor Jesse M. Robredo, Respondents.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS: The property subject of the instant case is a parcel of land, known as Plaza Rizal, situated within the territory of herein respondent City of Naga and with an aggregate area of 4,244 square meters, more or less. Plaza Rizal is located in front of the old provincial capitol building, where the Provincial Government of Camarines Sur used to have its seat, at the time when the then Municipality of Naga was still the provincial capital. On 18 June 1948, Republic Act No. 305 took effect and, by virtue thereof, the Municipality of Naga was converted into the City of Naga. Subsequently, on June 16, 1955, Republic Act No. 1336 was approved, transferring the site of the provincial capitol of Camarines Sur from the City of Naga to the barrio of Palestina, Municipality of Pili. The Municipality of Pili was also named as the new provincial capital. On 13 January 1997, the City of Naga filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief and/or Quieting of Title against Camarines Sur before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the City of Naga, Branch 61, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 97-3691. The City of Naga alleged that, for a considerable length of time, Camarines Sur possessed and claimed ownership of Plaza Rizal

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because of a tax declaration over the said property in the name of the province. As a result, Camarines Sur had long exercised administrative control and management of Plaza Rizal, to the exclusion of the City of Naga. The City of Naga could not introduce improvements on Plaza Rizal, and its constituents could not use the property without securing a permit from the proper officials of Camarines Sur. The situation had created a conflict of interest between the parties herein and had generated animosities among their respective officials. The City of Naga sought a declaration that the administrative control and management of Plaza Rizal should be vested in it, given that the said property is situated within its territorial jurisdiction. The City of Naga invoked Section 2, Article I of Republic Act No. 305, the Charter of the City of Naga, which states:

SEC. 2. Territory of the City of Naga. The city of Naga which is hereby created, shall comprise the present territorial jurisdiction of themunicipality of Naga, in the Province of Camarines Sur.

On 21 February 1997, Camarines Sur filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss. Allegedly, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 305 merely defined the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Naga and did not vest any color of right to the latter to manage and control any property owned by Camarines Sur. Furthermore, the remedy of Declaratory Relief was inappropriate because there was no justiciable controversy, given that the City of Naga did not intend to acquire ownership of Plaza Rizal; and Camarines Sur, being the owner of Plaza Rizal, had the right to the management, maintenance, control, and supervision thereof. The remedy of Quieting of Title was inappropriate, as the City of Naga had no legal or equitable title to or interest in Plaza Rizal that needed protection. Lastly, Camarines Sur stated that Plaza Rizal was not a property of public domain, but a property owned by Camarines Sur which was devoted to public use. RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. Camarines Sur received a copy of the foregoing Decision and filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Camarines Sur in an Order[15] dated 1 September 1999.

Camarines Sur filed with the RTC a Notice of Appeal. RTC disapproved the Notice of Appeal for non-compliance with the material data rule, which requires the statement of such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time. Camarines Sur filed a second Notice of Appeal,[18] which was again disapproved by the RTC in an Order[19] dated 14 September 1999 for having been filed outside of the reglementary period. On 18 October 1999, Camarines Sur filed before the Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari,[21] which was docketed as G.R. No. 139838. Camarines Sur questioned in its Petition the act of the RTC of giving due course to the Complaint for Declaratory Relief and/or Quieting of Title and the interpretation of said trial court of Section 2, Article 1 of Republic Act No. 305.

The Court referred the Petition for Review filed by Camarines Sur to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action, holding that the latter had jurisdiction concurrent with that of the former over the case, and no special and important reason was cited

for the Court to take cognizance of the case in the first instance.

CA denied the petition. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the Complaint for Declaratory Relief and/or Quieting of Title was proper as it was hinged on a pretended controversy. . RULING:

Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute; and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder.[31] The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute.[32]

The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy between persons whose interests are adverse; (2) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (3) the issue is ripe for judicial determination.[33]

The Court rules that the City of Naga properly resorted to the filing of an action for declaratory relief.

In the instant case, the controversy concerns the construction of the provisions of Republic Act No. 305 or the Charter of the City of Naga. Specifically, the City of Naga seeks an interpretation of Section 2, Article I of its Charter, as well as a declaration of the rights of the parties to this case thereunder.

To recall, Section 2, Article I of Republic Act No. 305 defines the territory of the City of Naga, providing that the City shall comprise the present territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Naga. By virtue of this provision, the City of Naga prays that it be granted the right to administratively control and supervise Plaza Rizal, which is undisputedly within the territorial jurisdiction of the City. Clearly, the interests of the City of Naga and Camarines Sur in this case are adverse. The latter asserted in its Complaint for Declaratory Relief and/or Quieting of Title that it should maintain administrative control and management of Plaza Rizal having continuously possessed the same under a claim of ownership, even after the conversion of the Municipality of Naga into an independent component city. The City of Naga further asserted that as a result of the possession by Camarines Sur, the City of Naga could not introduce improvements on Plaza Rizal; its constituents were denied adequate use of said property, since Camarines Sur required that the latters permission must first be sought for the use of the same; and it was still Camarines Sur that was able to continuously use Plaza Rizal for its own programs and projects. The City of Naga undoubtedly has a legal interest in the controversy, given that Plaza Rizal is undisputedly within its territorial jurisdiction. Lastly, the issue is ripe for judicial determination in that, in view of the conflicting interests of the parties to this case, litigation is inevitable, and there is no adequate relief available in any other form or proceeding.[34]

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G.R. No. L-29673 November 12, 1987

THE VISAYAN PACKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE REPARATIONS COMMISSION and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

Facts:

The proceedings at bar had their origin in an agreement denominated "Contract of Constitutional Purchase and Sale of Reparation Goods" entered into between petitioner Visayan baking Corporation (VISPAC) and the Reparations Commission (REPACOM). Subject of the contract were a cannery plant, a tin manufacturing plant, and three (3) filing boats sold to VISPAC, for which it bound itself to pay the total price of P1,135,712.47 in ten (10) equal yearly installments with interest.

Prior to the due date of the first installment, REPACOM sent VISPAC a written reminder thereof. VISPAC's response was to file in the CFI of Manila two (2) special civil actions for declaratory relief,alleging ambiguity in the contract between it and REPACOM consisting in the agreement's failure to clearly state the precise time when the obligation to pay the first installment of the price would arise.

When VISPAC subsequently failed, despite several demands, to pay the first installment of the price (P135,712.47) on due date, the latter instituted an ordinary civil action for collection thereof.

VISPAC moved to dismiss this collection suit on the ground of the pendency of the declaratory relief actions, arguing that until and unless the latter were resolved, no cause of action could be deemed to exist in favor of REPACOM for collection of said first installment. The motion to dismiss was denied; and after trial, the CFIordered VISPAC to pay REPACOM the sum claimed, with interest at the legal rate from date of filing of the complaint until fully paid.

VISPAC appealed to the CA claiming error on the part of the Trial Court in not holding that thecollection suit was barred by the pendency of the declaratory relief cases earlier instituted.But the declaratory relief actions had been earlier dismissed by Order of the CFI, holding that the issues raised would be necessarily threshed out in the collection suit.

VISPAC appealed, but was rebuffed. The CA affirmed the dismissal of thedeclaratory relief suits, holding that the clarity of the terms of the contract eliminated all occasion for interpretation thereof.

Issue: WON the declaratory relief suits instituted by VISPAC were valid?

Ruling:

NO. The Court held that there is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for declaratory relief that proscribes the filing of a counterclaim based on the same transaction, deed or contract subject of the complaint. A special civil action is after an not essentially different from all ordinary civil action, which is generally governed by Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules of Court, except that the former deals with a special subject matter which makes necessary some special regulation. But the

Identity between their fundamental nature is such that the same rules governing ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil actions if not inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement the provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions.

Ideally, in the case at bar, the separate action for collection should have been dismissed and set up as a compulsory counterclaim in the declaratory relief suits, by way of an amended answer. This was not done. The actions proceeded separately and were decided on the merits.

The final verdict was that the declaratory relief suits instituted by VISPAC were unmeritorious, quite without foundation and, in the light of all the relevant facts, appear to have been initiated by VISPAC merely to obstruct and delay the payment of the installments clearly due from it, payment of which was decreed in the collection suit. Under the circumstances, and taking account of the not inconsiderable length of time that the case at bar has been pending, it would be to do violence to substantial justice to pronounce the proceedings fatally defective for breach of the rule on compulsory counterclaims. Rules of procedure are after all laid down in order to attain justice. They cannot be applied to prevent the achievement of that goal. Form cannot prevail over substance.

#5b

G.R. No. L-5101, November 28, 1953

ANGELES S. SANTOS, petitioner-appellant, vs.PATERIO AQUINO, as Municipal Mayor of Malabon, THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF MALABON, A.A. OLIVEROS, as Municipal Treasurer of Malabon, Province of Rizal, respondents-appellees.

PADILLA, J.:

This action purports to obtain a declaratory relief but the prayer of the petition seeks to have Ordinance No. 61, series of 1946, and Ordinance No. 10, series of 1947, of the Municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal, declared null and void; to prevent the collection of surcharges and penalties for failure to pay the taxes imposed by the ordinances referred to, except for such failure from and after the taxpayer shall have been served with the notice of the effectivity of the ordinances; and to enjoin the respondents, their agents and all other persons acting for and in their behalf from enforcing the ordinances referred to and from making any collection thereunder. Further, petitioner prays for such other remedy and relief as may be deemed just and equitable and asks that costs be taxed against the respondents

Facts:

The petitioner is the manager of a theater known as "Cine Concepcion," located and operated in the Municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal, and the respondents are the Municipal Mayor, the Municipal Council and the Municipal Treasurer, of Malabon.

The petitioner avers that:

>Ordinance No. 61, series of 1946, adopted by the Municipal Council of Malabon on 8 December 1946, imposes a license tax of P1,000 per annum on the said theater in addition to a license

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tax on all tickets sold in theaters and cinemas in Malabon, pursuant to the Ordinance No. 58, series of 1946.>the municipal license tax paid by the petitioner on "Cine Concepcion" was P180, pursuant to the Ordinance No. 9, series of 1945; >the Respondent adopted Ordinance No. 10, series of 1947, imposing a graduated municipal license tax on theaters and cinematographs from P200 to P9,000 per annum; >the ordinance was submitted for approval to the Department of Finance, which reduced the rate of taxes provided therein, and the ordinance with the reduced rate of taxes was approved on 3 November 1948; > notice of reduction of the tax rate and approval by the Department of Finance of said graduated municipal license tax provided for in said Ordinance No. 10, as reduced, was served on the petitioner when the respondent Municipal Treasurer presented a bill for collection thereof; >Ordinance No. 61, is ultra vires and repugnant to the provisions of the Constitution on taxation; > its approval was not in accordance with law; that Ordinance No. 10, series of 1947, is all null and void, because the Department of Finance that approved it acted in excess and against the powers granted it by law, and is unjust, oppressive and confiscatory; and > the adoption of both ordinances was the result of prosecution of the petitioner by the respondents because from 20 July 1946 to 8 December 1947, or within a period of less than one and a half years, the Municipal Council of Malabon adopted four ordinances increasing the taxes on cinematographs and theaters and imposing a penalty of 20 per cent surcharges for late payment.

In their answer the respondents allege that:

-- both ordinances adopted by the Municipal Council of Malabon are notultra vires, the same not being under any of the exceptions provided for in section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 472; -- the ordinances were adopted pursuant to the policy enunciated by the Secretary of the Interior in a circular issued on 20 June 1946 which in substance suggested and urged the municipal councils to increase their revenues and not to rely on the National Government which was not in a position to render any help and to make such increase dependent upon the taxpayer's ability to pay; -- both ordinances assailed by the petitioner had been submitted to, and approved by, the Department of Finance, respectively; -- the petitioner had filed a protest with the Secretary of Finance against such increase of taxes, as fixed by the municipal ordinances in question but the Department of Finance although reducing the amount of taxes imposed in Ordinance No. 10, series of 1947, and changing the date of effectivity of both ordinances, upheld the legality thereof; and that the petitioner brought this action for declaratory relief with the evident purpose of evading payment of the unpaid balance of taxes due from the "Cine Concepcion." By way of special defense the respondents allege that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; -- the Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition for declaratory relief; -- the petitioner should have paid under protests the taxes imposed by the ordinances in question on "Cine Concepcion" and after payment thereof should bring an action under section 1579 of the Revised Administrative Code; -- being an action for declaratory relief, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal should have been notified thereof but the petitioner failed to do so;

-- the petition does not join all the necessary parties and, therefore, a judgment rendered in the case will not terminate the uncertainty or the controversy that is sought to be settled and determined.

Court held that the ordinances in question are valid and constitutional and dismissing the petition with costs against the petitioner. Hence, the appeal.

Issue: WoN the action for declaratory relief is proper?

Ruling:

No. The court held that it is not an action for declaratory relief, because the terms of the ordinances assailed are not ambiguous or of doubtful meaning which require a construction thereof by the Court. And granting that the validity or legality of an ordinance may be drawn in question in an action for declaratory relief, such relief must be asked before a violation of the ordinance be committed. When this action was brought on 12 May 1949, payment of the municipal license taxes imposed by both ordinances, the tax rate of the last having been reduced by the Department of Finance, was already due, and the prayer of the petition shows that the petitioner had not paid them. In those circumstances the petitioner cannot bring an action for declaratory relief.

Angeles S. Santos, the petitioner, does not aver nor does he testify that he is the owner or part-owner of "Cine-Concepcion." He alleges that he is only the manager thereof. For that reason he is not an interested party. He has no interest in the theater known as "Cine Concepcion" which may be affected by the municipal ordinances in question and for that reason he is not entitled to bring this action either for declaratory relief or for prohibition, which apparently is the purpose of the action as may be gleaned from the prayer of the petition. The rule that actions must be brought in the name of the real party in interest2 applies to actions brought under Rule 66 for declaratory relief. The fact that he is the manager of the theater does not make him a real party in interest.

#6 G.R. No. L-24835 July 31, 1970

REPARATIONS COMMISSION, vs.NORTHERN LINES INC., and FIELDMEN'S INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., CONCEPCION, C.J.:

FACTS:

Pursuant to Rep. Act No. 1789, the Reparations Commission — hereinafter referred to as the Commission — had awarded two (2) vessels to the Northern Lines Inc., referred to as the Buyer — for use in the interisland shipping.

According to the schedules of payment agreed upon between the parties, complete delivery of one of the vessels:

(a) the M/S Magsaysay, later named M/S Don Salvador — took place on April 25, 1960

(b) the M/S Estancia later named M/S Don Amando — on May 26, 1960.

These vessels were the object of separate deeds of conditional purchase and sale of reparations goods,

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executed by the COMMISSION, as vendor, and NORTHERN LINES (Buyer), as vendee, the first dated September 12, 1960, and the second October 20, 1960.

In conjunction with these contracts and in line with the provisions thereof Surety Bonds Nos. 3825 and 4123 were executed, on April 25, 1960 and May 30, 1960, respectively, by the Buyer, as principal, and the Fieldmen's Insurance Co., as surety, in favor of the Commission, to guarantee the faithful compliance by the Buyer of its obligations under said contracts.

The Buyer undertook therein to pay for said vessels the installments specified in a schedule of payments, appended to each contract. The schedule for the M/S Don Salvador (ex-M/S Magsaysay) reads as follows:

◦ M/S DON SALVADOR (former M/S MAGSAYSAY) divested of the cannery plant, delivered on April 25, 1960, with TOTAL F.O.B. COST P1,747,614.22, AMOUNT OF 1ST INSTALLMENT (10% OF F.O.B. COST) P174,761.42, DUE DATE OF 1ST INSTALLMENT April 25, 1962, TERM: TEN (10%) EQUAL YEARLY INSTALLMENTS, RATE OF INTEREST: THREE PERCENT (3%) PER ANNUM

◦ M/S Don Amando (former M/S Estancia) Divested of the Cannery Plant, delivered on May 26. 1960, TOTAL F.O.B. COST P1,747,614.22, AMOUNT OF 1ST INSTALLMENT (10% OF F.O.B. COST) P174,761.42, DUE DATE OF 1ST INSTALLMENT May 26, 1962, TERM: Ten (10) EQUAL YEARLY INSTALLMENTS, RATE OF INTEREST: THREE PERCENT (3%) PER ANNUM

On April 24, 1962, and May 26, 1962 — or one day before the stated due date of the first installment for M/S Don Salvador (ex-M/S Magsaysay), and on the stated due date of the first installment as to M/S Don Amando (ex-M/S Estancia) — the Buyer instituted Civil Cases Nos. 50194 (regarding M/S Don Salvador, formerly Magsaysay) and 50488 (regarding M/S Don Amando, formerly Estancia) of the Court of First Instance of Manila to secure, by way of declaratory relief, a declaration to the effect that the first installments under the aforementioned contracts would be due and demandable on April 25, 1963 and May 26, 1963, respectively.

On September 10, 1962, the Commission commenced Civil Case No. 51542 of the same Court, against the Buyer and the Surety. The Commission alleged in two separate causes of action set forth in the complaint therein — that, despite repeated demands, the defendants (Buyer and Surety) had refused to pay the first installments of P174,761.42 each, that had become due and demandable on April 25 and May 26, 1962, respectively. Hence, it prayed that the Buyer and the Surety be sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, to the Commission the aggregate sum of P349,522.84, with interest thereon at the legal rate, in addition to attorney's fees and the Costs.

In its answer to the complaint, the Buyer admitted some allegations and denied other allegations thereof, and, by way of special defense, averred that the Commission has no cause of action until Civil Cases Nos. 50488 and 50194 . shall have been decided.

The Surety's answer contained similar admissions and denials, apart from adopting as its own those made in the Buyer's answer, and set up a crossclaim against the Buyer, for reimbursement of whatever the Surety may have to pay to the Commission by reason of its complaint, including interests, and for the sum P10,541.68 "representing unpaid premiums and documentary stamps due on the two bonds" above-mentioned, plus attorney's fees and interests.

On October 29, 1962, the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed Case No. 50488.

◦ Whereupon the Buyer appealed to this Court, where the case was docketed as L-20725.

◦ The same was, however, dismissed July 2, 1963, for failure of the Buyer, as appellant therein, to file its brief within the reglementary period.

In due course thereafter, or on April 30, 1964, Court of First Instance rendered, in Cases Nos. 50194 and 51542 — the action filed by the Commission — which had been jointly tried, a decision dismissing the petition for a declaratory relief in Case No. 50194, with costs against the Buyer, as petitioner therein, and: (a) sentencing the Buyer and the Surety, as defendants in Case No. 51542, to pay jointly and severally, to the Commission, the sum of P174,761.42, under each of the two (2) causes of action alleged in the complaint, with interest thereon at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint, until fully paid — although the liability of the Surety under each cause of action was not to exceed P174,761.42 — and the sum of P1,000 as attorney's fees, apart from the costs; (b) ordering the Buyer to reimburse the Surety "whatever amount it may pay to the Reparations Commission, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum"; and (c) sentencing the Buyer to pay the Surety the sum of P10,641.68, representing unpaid premiums and documentary stamps, with interest thereon at the legal rate and P300, by way of attorney's fees. A reconsideration of this decision having been denied, the Buyer and the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals, which later certified the appeal to this Court.

The Buyer alleges that the trial court erred in not holding that the action filed by the Commission (Case No. 51542) is "barred" by the actions for declaratory judgment filed by the Buyer (Civil Cases Nos. 50194 and 50488).

ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission had no cause of action against them until the cases (Nos. 50194 and 50488) for a declaratory relief shall have been decided? No.

RULING: The decision affirmed from was affirmed by the SC The pertinent part of Section 12 of Rep. Act No. 1789,

pursuant to which the vessels in question were sold to the Buyer, reads:

... Capital goods ... disposed of to private parties as provided for in subsection (a) of Section two hereof shall be sold on a cash or credit basis, under rules and regulations as may be determined by the Commission. Sales on a credit basis shall be payable in installments: Provided, That the first installment shall be paid within twenty-four months after complete delivery of the capital goods and thebalance within a period not exceeding ten years, ..., plus the service provided for in section ten hereof: Provided, further, That the unpaid balance of the price thereof shall bear interest at the rate of not more than three percent per annum. .... 2

It should be noted that, pursuant to the schedules attached to the contracts with the Buyer, the "complete delivery" of the vessels took place on April 25, and May 26, 1960, respectively, so that the 24 months fixed by law for the payment of the "first" installment expired on April 25, 1962 and May 26, 1962, which are the very due dates stated in the aforementioned schedules for the payment of the respective "1st" installments. What is more, in view of said legal provision, the Commission had no authority to agree that the 1st installment be paid on any later date, and the Buyer must have been aware of this fact. Hence, the parties

9

could not have intended the first installments to become due on April 25 and May 26, 1963. It is, likewise, obvious — particularly when considered in relation to the provision above quoted — that the "ten (10) equal yearly installments," mentioned in the schedules, refer to the "balance" of the price to be paid by the Buyer, after deducting the "first" installment, so that, altogether there would be "eleven" installments, namely, the "first," which would be 10% of F.O.B. cost of the vessel — as agreed upon between the Governments of the Philippines and Japan — and "ten (10) equal yearly installments," representing the balance of the amount due to the Commission from the Buyer, including the interest thereon.

As above pointed out, Case No. 50488 was dismissed by Branch XIII of the Court of First Instance of Manila, on October 29, 1962, and the order of dismissal became final and executory upon the dismissal of the appeal in L-20725 of the Supreme Court, on July 2, 1963, months before the rendition of the decision of Branch VII of the trial court, which is the object of the present appeal, on April 30, 1964. As regards Case No. 50194, which was commenced on April 24, 1962, the contract involved therein (with reference to the M/S Don Salvador or Magsaysay) was infringed by the Buyer when it failed to pay the first installment due the next day, April 25, 1962. The lower court was, accordingly, justified in dismissing that case inasmuch as an action for declaratory relief may be entertained only "before breach or violation" of the law or contract to which it refers. 3 The purpose of the action is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under said law or contract, for their guidance in the enforcement thereof or compliance therewith not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof. 4 Accordingly, after such alleged breach of the law or contract or once the aforementioned issue has arisen, an ordinary action is the proper remedy. Thus, in Salmon v. Andal, 5 this Court said:

... If there has been a violation, declaratory relief cannot be granted, for the reason that Sec. 2, Rule 66 6 relative to said remedy, provides that 'A contract or statute may be construed before there has been a breach thereof.' After breach, the regular remedy obtains. 7

What is more, Rule 64, Section 61 of the Rules of Court is clear and explicit about it. It provides:

... If before the final termination of case. a breach of violation of an instrument, or a statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance, should take place, the action may thereupon be converted into an ordinary action and parties allowed to file such pleadings as may be necessary or proper.

The facts of record strongly suggest that Cases Nos. 50194 and 50488 for declaratory relief were commenced in anticipation of an action for breach of contract, said cases having been filed precisely on the eve of the due date of the "first" installment, as to, M/S Don Salvador or Magsaysay, and on the very due date of the first installment, as to M/S Don Amando or Estancia. The situation in the case at bar is thus substantially identical to that obtaining in Teodoro v. Mirasol 8 in which the following language was used:

In the case at bar, We are led to the belief that the present action in the Court of First Instance was prompted by a desire on plaintiff's part to anticipate the action for unlawful detainer, the probability of which was apparent .... plaintiff took advantage of defendant's delayed ... suit to file this case in the Court, of First Instance in anticipation of the action for unlawful detainer, in order perhaps that he may claim that the action in the Court of First Instance

was prior to the unlawful detainer case, and, therefore, should enjoy preference over the action filed in the Municipal court.It is to be noted that the Rules do not require as a ground for dismissal of a complaint that there is a prior pending action. They provide that there is a pending action, not a pending prior action. The fact that the unlawful detainer suit was of a later date is no bar to the dismissal of the present action, ....... plaintiff's action for declaratory relief is improper; this action is meant only for those cases where a contract is desired to be construed prior to its breach because of an impending controversy that the parties thereto may be informed of the rights thereunder. In the case at bar, ... there has already been a breach ... hence the action for a declaratory judgment is no longer proper.xxx xxx xxxThere is no longer any need for the action, even if proper because the matter could be threshed out in the unlawful detainer suit that the defendant had instituted in the municipal court. 9

Indeed, otherwise, an action for a declaratory relief could be availed of to, in effect, suspend, during its pendency, the force and operation of the contracts in question, and thereby achieve a compulsory deferment or postponement of the maturity of the obligations therein validly contracted and assumed. Obviously, the Court cannot give the stamp of its approval thereto.

#7

G.R. No. 159357 April 28, 2004

Brother MARIANO "MIKE" Z. VELARDE, petitioner, vs.SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent.PANGANIBAN, J.:

Doctrine: Decision, more specifically a decision not conforming to the form and substance required by the Constitution is void and deemed legally inexistent

Facts:

On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the RTC-Manila against Velarde and his co-respondents Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Eraño Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano.

SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions, specifically on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.

The petitioner filed a Motion to dismiss before the trial court owing to the fact that alleged that the questioned SJS Petition did not state a cause of action and that there was no justiciable controversy.

The trial court’s junked the Velarde petitions under certain reasons:

1. It said that it had jurisdiction over the SJS petition, because in praying for a determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents were

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violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, the petition has raised only a question of law.

2. It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition – the separation of church and state – even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the principle. Through its discourse, the court quipped at some point that the "endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause."

The trial court’s essay did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion, however. Due to this aberration, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration before the trial court owing to these facts.

The lower court denied these Motions. Hence, this petition for review.

On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted an Oral Argument.

In his Petition, Brother Mike Velarde submits the following issues for this Court’s resolution:

1. Whether or not the Decision dated 12 June 2003 rendered by the court a quo was proper and valid;

2. Whether or not there exists justiciable controversy in herein respondent’s Petition for declaratory relief;

3. Whether or not herein respondent has legal interest in filing the Petition for declaratory relief;

4. Whether or not the constitutional question sought to be resolved by herein respondent is ripe for judicial determination;

5. Whether or not there is adequate remedy other than the declaratory relief; and,

6. Whether or not the court a quo has jurisdiction over the Petition for declaratory relief of herein respondent.

Issues: In its oral argument, the Supreme Court condensed Velarde’s issues and divided it into 2 groups:

A. Procedural Issues 1. Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy? 2. Did it state a cause of action? 3.Did respondent have any legal standing to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief?

B. Substantive Issues 1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court? 2. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from endorsing candidates for public office? Corollarily, may they be banned from campaigning against said candidates? (Not answered in the affirmative)

Decision: Petition for Review GRANTED. The assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila DECLARED NULL AND VOID and thus SET ASIDE. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief is DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of action.Procedural Issues:

(1) NO. A justiciable controversy to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. A petition filed with the trial court should

contain a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim.

The SJS Petition fell short of the requirements to constitutue a jusiciable controversy. Why? a. It stated no ultimate facts. The petition simply theorized that the people elected who were endorsed by these religious leaders might become beholden to the latter. b. It did not sufficiently state a declaration of its rights and duties, what specific legal right of the petitioner was violated by the respondents therein, and what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the constitution, c. The petition did not pray for a stoppage of violated rights (duh, wala ngang rights na sinabi eh). It merely sought an opinion of the trial court. However, courts are proscribed from rendering an advisory opinion. (tantamount to making laws, remember the questionability of justice panganiban’s guidelines for article 36 of the family code)

It must also be considered that even the religious leaders were puzzled as to the breach of rights they were claimed to have committed. As pointed out by Soriano, what exactly has he done that merited the attention of SJS? Jaime Cardinal Sin adds that the election season had not even started at the time SJS filed its Petition and that he has not been actively involved in partisan politics. The Petition does not even allege any indication or manifest intent on the part of any of the respondents below to champion an electoral candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to vote for, a particular candidate. It is a time-honored rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an actionable right.

(2) NO. A cause of action is an act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of another, causing injury to the latter. (Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 800) Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) such defendant’s act or omission that is violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the latter.

The court held that the complaint’s failure to state a cause of action became a ground for its outright dismissal. Why?

The Court found nothing in the SJS Petition to suggest that an explicit allegation of fact that SJS had a legal right to protect. (trigger for the cause of action)

In special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept of cause of action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply. The reason for this exception is that an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Nevertheless, a breach or violation should be impending, imminent or at least threatened.

The justices could only infer that the interest from its allegation was its mention of “its (SJS) thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters and who are keenly interested”. Aside from the fact that this general averment did not constitute a legal right or interest, the court’s inferred interest too vague and

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speculative in character. Rules require that the interest must be material to the issue and affected by the questioned act or instrument.

To bolster its point, the SJS cited the Corpus Juris Secundum and submitted that the plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action does not seek to enforce a claim against the defendant, but sought a judicial declaration of the rights of the parties for the purpose of guiding their future conduct, and the essential distinction between a ‘declaratory judgment action’ and the usual ‘action’ is that no actual wrong need have been committed or loss have occurred in order to sustain the declaratory judgment action, although there must be no uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the asserted rights will be invaded. (???)

During the Oral Argument, Velarde and co-respondents strongly asserted that they had not in any way engaged or intended to participate in partisan politics. Not even the alleged proximity of the elections to the time the Petition was filed below would have provided the certainty that it had a legal right that would be jeopardized or violated by any of those respondents.

Even if the SJS petition asserted a legal right, there was nevertheless no certainty that such right would be invaded by the said respondents.

(3) NO. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act.Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved.

SJS has no legal interest in the controversy and has failed to establish how the resolution of the proffered question would benefit or injure it.

Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act or a statute must demonstrate that they have been, or are about to be, denied some right or privilege to which they are lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.

If the petition were to be valid, it should satisfy:

First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation, particularly that of Congress' taxing power. Second, there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political party or its members as registered voters would be adversely affected by the alleged acts of the respondents below, such as the deprivation of votes or barring of suffrage to its constituents. Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its "thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters" is too general and beyond the contemplation of the standards set by our jurisprudence. Not only is the presumed interest impersonal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. In not a few cases, the Court has liberalized the locus standi requirement when a petition raises an issue of transcendental significance or importance to the

people (IBP v Zamora). The Court deemed the constitutional issue raised to be both transcendental in importance and novel in nature. Nevertheless, the barren allegations in the SJS Petition as well as the abbreviated proceedings in the court would prevent the resolution of the transcendental issue.

Substantive Issues

NO. The Constitution commands that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or

Consistent with this are Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure, Administrative

“A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be rendered. The decision shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based, signed by the issuing magistrate, and filed with the clerk of

The SC has reminded magistrates to heed the demand of Section `4, Art VIII of the contsitution. This was evinced in Yao v. Court of Appeals where Davide, CJ said that faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount

In People v. Bugarin, the court held that the requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based is intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he

The assailed Decision contains no statement of facts (much less an assessment or analysis thereof) or of the court’s findings as to the probable

The assailed Decision begins with a statement of the nature of the action and the question or issue presented.

explanation of the constitutional provisions involved, and what the Petition sought to achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing procedural incidents before the trial court are tracked. The Decision proceeds to a full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of the separation of church and state. Without expressly stating the final conclusion she has reached or specifying the relief granted or denied, the trial judge ends her “Decision” with the

A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal

It was truly obvious that the RTC’s Decision did not adhere to the Bugarin precedent because of its failure to express clearly and distinctly the facts on which it was based. The significance of factual findings lies in the value of the decision as a precedent (how will the ruling be applied in

12

Respondent SJS insisted that the dispositive portion can be found in the body (p. 10) of the assailed Decision. Stating “Endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause.”

The Court held that the statement is merely an answer to a hypothetical legal question and just a part of the opinion of the trial court. It does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the Petition. Neither does it grant any -- much less, the proper -- relief under the

The standard for a dispositive was set in Manalang v. Tuason de Rickards where the resolution of the Court on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of the decision or order is the investitive or controlling factor that determines and settles the rights of the parties and the questions presented therein, notwithstanding the existence of statements or declaration in the body of said order that may be confusing.

In Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag: The rule is settled that where there is a conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final order while the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing.

The statement quoted by SJS does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the Petition. Neither does it grant proper relief under the circumstances, as required of a dispositive portion.

Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

orders issued in careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity and must be struck down as void.

It is not legally possible to take up, on the merits, the paramount question involving a constitutional principle. It is a time-honored rule that the constitutionality of a statute or act will be passed upon only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned.

#8

First Division

GR. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESv. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

Quisumbing, J.

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?

FACTS:

On 24 May 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva and their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, his wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and sometime in 2000, learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree. His wife then married Innocent Stanley and is now currently living in San Gabriel, California with her child by him.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (FC). No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent can remarry under Art. 26 of the Family Code

HELD: The petition is granted.

The OSG contends that par. 2 Art. 26 of FC is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs the respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination. The respondent admits that Art. 26 is not directly applicable to his case, but insists that since his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Court noted that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. This case satisfies all the requisites for the grant of a petition for declaratory relief. Article 26 does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the USA.

In view of the foregoing, the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are as follows: (1) There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (2) A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that had been celebrated between her and Cipriano. Then the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating

13

her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both satisfied. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

However, the Court notes that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. For his plea to prosper, the respondent must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen, must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, and that such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Furthermore, the respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, the Court is unanimous in holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the FC should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, due to lack of sufficient evidence submitted and on record, the Court is unable to declare, based on the respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that the respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon the respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

#9

G.R. No. L-5204 March 27, 1953

In re: The petition for declaratory relief of Hospicio Obiles and for cancellation of erroneous registration as alien. HOSPICIO OBILES, petitioner-appellant, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.

LABRADOR, J.:

FACTS:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Albay dismissing petitioner-appellant's petition for declaratory relief.

In his petition, Petitioner Obiles alleges that he is a Filipino citizen by birth and parentage, residing in Bacacay, Albay; In the year 1941, because "of erroneous belief and fear of criminal prosecution," he registered himself with the municipal treasurer of Bacacay as Chinese alien, but he never intended to give up his Filipino citizenship, and that he continued to hold himself out as a Filipino citizen.

Solicitor General filed an opposition, alleging petition contains no cause of action and no actual controversy has arisen against anyone, and that if the petitioner desires to establish his Filipino citizenship, he should do so in another separate proceeding.

The CFI sustained the opposition, holding that there was no actual controversy because petitioner is merely in doubt as to his right and no one disputes his claim; that

any declaration that the court might render in the premises will not terminate the controversy. Thus, it dismissed the petition.

ISSUE: W/N the court erred in holding that no justiciable controversy existed? W/N an action for declaratory relief is proper?

HELD: Both NO.

On the first claim, petitioner-appellant argues that inasmuch as the Solicitor General, in representation of the Government, has joined by filing an opposition, an actual controversy has arisen which is concrete and real, which justifies every specific relief in the form of a pronouncement by the court as to whether the petitioner is a Filipino citizen or not. It is to be noted that before the petitioner filed his petition, nobody appears to have ever contested any of the allegations of the petitioner's complaint. In his petition, he does not claim that any official has ever contested his claim to Philippine citizenship or threatened to contest the same. The Solicitor General's opposition was not presented to deny the allegations of his complaint, but to show that he has no cause of action because nobody has ever contested petitioner's pretensions. The claim of the appellant that a controversy has arisen because the Solicitor General has opposed his petition is clearly unfounded.

SECTION. 1. Construction. — Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance, may bring an action to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder.

The deed or written instrument, which he claims is his supposed registration as an alien. This instrument is not a contract in which another party or person is involved. It is a unilateral act of the petitioner himself not affecting nor binding anyone else but himself, not creating any right or obligation on the part of any other party or on that of the state, and, therefore, no one has interest therein except himself.

By such declaration alone no rights and obligations are created, no status fixed or determined. The registration, however, may be used as evidence against the petitioner himself.

There is no allegation in the petition, however, that by reason of such registration any official of the Government has taken steps, or is intending to take steps or threatening to take steps, to hold the petitioner to any obligation, responsibility, or liability.

Petitioner is only afraid that the registration might involve the loss of his Filipino citizenship. This supposed fear in the mind of the petitioner is not what the law considers as an actual controversy, or a justiciable controversy, which requires the intervention of the courts of justice in order that the rights, obligations, or liabilities arising therefrom may be predetermined. In effect, petitioner's allegations of fact in his petition are entitled to no more than an advisory opinion, because a ruling on the effect of the registration by petitioner involves no actual, genuine, live controversy affecting a definite legal relation.

Therefore, petitioner's action for declaratory relief is not the proper remedy, because his desire is to be

14

declared a Filipino citizen, and because the facts alleged in his petition constitute no cause for a declaratory judgment, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

#10

#11

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 137794 August 11, 2010

ERLINDA REYES and ROSEMARIE MATIENZO, Petitioners,VsHON. JUDGE BELEN B. ORTIZ, Presiding, Branch 49, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City; SPOUSES BERNARD and FLORENCIA PERL, represented by Attorney-in-Fact BENJAMIN MUCIO; HON. JUDGE VICTORIA ISABEL A. PAREDES, Presiding, Branch 124, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City and SEGUNDO BAUTISTA, Respondents.

X --------------------------------------------------------x

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS: The instant cases are consolidated Petitions[1] for Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, and Prohibition. The petitioners in G.R. No. 137794 seek to declare null and void the proceedings in Civil Case No. 23477, an ejectment case, before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Caloocan City, Branch 49, and Civil Case No. C-17725, a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Caloocan City, Branch 124;[2] while the petitioners in G.R. No. 149664 pray for the nullity of the following ejectment proceedings before the different branches of the Caloocan City MeTC: (1) Civil Case No. 99-25011, Branch 52; (2) Civil Case No. 22559 and Civil Case No. 18575, Branch 49 and its appeal to the RTC, Branch 131; (3) Civil Case No. 00-25892, Branch 51; and (4) Civil Case No. 00-25889, Branch 51.[3] G.R. No. 149664 was considered closed and terminated by the Courts Resolution dated August 30, 2006.[4] The parcels of land which are the subject matter of these cases are part of the Tala Estate, situated between the boundaries of Caloocan City and Quezon City and encompassing an area of 7,007.9515 hectares more or less.[5]

The first case was commenced on December 11, 1996, by respondent Segundo Bautista, a registered owner of the parcel of land occupied by spouses Rene and Rosemarie Matienzo. The case was a complaint for Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership of Real Property (Recovery case) against the latter spouses with the RTC Caloocan City, Branch 124. The second case, an ejectment complaint, was commenced by spouses Bernard and Florencia Perl on June 25, 1997, against Erlinda Reyes before the Caloocan City MeTC, Branch 49.It was docketed as Civil Case No. 23477. Shortly thereafter, on July 8, 1997, spouses Perl filed the third case, an ejectment action against Sergio Abejero. The case, which was raffled off to Branch 49 of the Caloocan City MeTC, was docketed as Civil Case No. 23519.[17] Subsequently, these two ejectment cases were consolidated (Ejectment cases).[18] In her Answer and during the preliminary conference, Erlinda Reyes moved for the suspension of the proceedings and/or for the dismissal of these cases citing the Injunction issued in Civil Case No. Q-96-29810.[19] In its Order[20] dated January 22, 1999, the MeTC did not entertain Reyess motion, instead, it required her to submit a position paper. Erlinda Reyes received the order on March 11, 1999.[21] On April 16, 1999, the trial court issued a Decision ordering Erlinda to vacate the contested property.[22] The Recovery case and the Ejectment cases converged when petitioners Rosemarie Matienzo and Erlinda Reyes, joined on March 25, 1999 in filing directly with this Court the instant petition denominated as Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, and Prohibition, mainly assailing the denial of their respective motions for suspension.[23] Petitioners Matienzo and Reyes asked that the proceedings in the Ejectment cases and the Recovery case be declared null and void for violating the Injunction order of the Quezon City RTC. What remains to be resolved, therefore, are the issues raised in G.R. No. 137794.In their bid to declare null and void the proceedings in the Recovery case and the Ejectment cases, petitioners argued that the Caloocan City MeTC, where the Ejectment cases were filed, and the Caloocan City RTC where the Recovery case was pending, were divested of jurisdiction since the Quezon City RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter.[33]

Respondent Segundo Bautista contends that petitioners resorted to a wrong remedy. He argues that the action for declaratory relief can only prosper if the statute, deed, or contract has not been violated.[39] Hence, where the law or contract has already been breached prior to the filing of the declaratory relief, courts can no longer assume jurisdiction since this action is not geared towards the settling of issues arising from breach or violation of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, and contract, but rather it is intended to secure an authoritative statement for guidance in their enforcement or compliance of the same.[40]

Petitioners insist that this is mainly a petition for declaratory relief. Section 1, Rule 63 of the 1997

ISSUE: WON a court order can be a subject of a petition for declaratory relief.

RULING:

The first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 63 enumerates the subject matter to be inquired upon in a declaratory relief namely, deed, will, contract or other written instrument, a statute, executive order or regulation, or any government

15

regulation. This Court, in Lerum v. Cruz,[44] declared that the subject matters to be tested in a petition for declaratory relief are exclusive,viz: Under this rule, only a person who is interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance, may bring an action to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder. This means that the subject matter must refer to a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or to a statute or ordinance, to warrant declaratory relief. Any other matter not mentioned therein is deemed excluded. This is under the principle of expressiouniusestexclussioalterius. (Emphasis supplied.) Then again in a recent ruling of this Court, it was emphasized: A petition for declaratory relief cannot properly have a court decision as its subject matter. In Tanda v. Aldaya [98 Phil. 244 (1956)], we ruled that: [A] court decision cannot be interpreted as included within the purview of the words other written instrument, as contended by appellant, for the simple reason that the Rules of Court already provide for the ways by which an ambiguous or doubtful decision may be corrected or clarified without need of resorting to the expedient prescribed by Rule 66 [now Rule 64].[47] (Emphasis supplied.) In the instant case, petitioners Erlinda Reyes and Rosemarie Matienzo assailed via Declaratory Relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, the orders of the trial courts denying their motions to suspend proceedings. This recourse by petitioners, unfortunately, cannot be countenanced since a court order is not one of those subjects to be examined under Rule 63.The proper remedy that petitioner Erlinda Reyes could have utilized from the denial of her motion to suspend proceedings in the Caloocan City MeTC was to file a motion for reconsideration and, if it is denied, to file a petition for certiorari before the RTC pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

#12

G.R. No. 177056 September 18, 2009

THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, PetitionerVs.AYALA LAND INCORPORATED, ROBINSONS LAND CORPORATION, SHANGRI-LA PLAZA CORPORATION and SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., Respondents.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, [1] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed by petitioner Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision [2] dated 25 January 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76298, which affirmed in toto the Joint Decision [3] dated 29 May 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 138, in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210; and (2) the Resolution [4] dated 14 March 2007 of the appellate court in the same case which denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the OSG. The RTC adjudged that respondents Ayala Land Incorporated (Ayala

Land), Robinsons Land Corporation (Robinsons), Shangri-la Plaza Corporation (Shangri-la), and SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (SM Prime) could not be obliged to provide free parking spaces in their malls to their patrons and the general public.

The shopping malls operated or leased out by respondents have parking facilities for all kinds of motor vehicles, either by way of parking spaces inside the mall buildings or in separate buildings and/or adjacent lots that are solely devoted for use as parking spaces. Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons, and SM Prime spent for the construction of their own parking facilities. Respondent Shangri-la is renting its parking facilities, consisting of land and building specifically used as parking spaces, which were constructed for the lessors account.

In 1999, the Senate Committees on Trade and Commerce and on Justice and Human Rights conducted a joint investigation for the following purposes: (1) to inquire into the legality of the prevalent practice of shopping malls of charging parking fees; (2) assuming arguendo that the collection of parking fees was legally authorized, to find out the basis and reasonableness of the parking rates charged by shopping malls; and (3) to determine the legality of the policy of shopping malls of denying liability in cases of theft, robbery, or carnapping, by invoking the waiver clause at the back of the parking tickets.

After three public hearings held on 30 September, 3 November, and 1 December 1999, the afore-mentioned Senate Committees jointly issued Senate Committee Report No. 225 [5] on 2 May 2000, in which they concluded:

In view of the foregoing, the Committees find that the collection of parking fees by shopping malls is contrary to the National Building Code and is therefor [sic] illegal. While it is true that the Code merely requires malls to provide parking spaces, without specifying whether it is free or not, both Committees believe that the reasonable and logical interpretation of the Code is that the parking spaces are for free. This interpretation is not only reasonable and logical but finds support in the actual practice in other countries like the United States of America where parking spaces owned and operated by mall owners are free of charge. Respondent SM Prime thereafter received information that, pursuant to Senate Committee Report No. 225, the DPWH Secretary and the local building officials of Manila, Quezon City, and Las Pias intended to institute, through the OSG, an action to enjoin respondent SM Prime and similar establishments from collecting parking fees, and to impose upon said establishments penal sanctions under Presidential Decree No. 1096, otherwise known as the National Building Code of the Philippines (National Building Code), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). With the threatened action against it, respondent SM Prime filed, on 3 October 2000, a Petition for Declaratory Relief [8] under Rule 63 of the Revised Rules of Court, against the DPWH Secretary and local building officials of Manila, Quezon City, and Las Pias.

The very next day, 4 October 2000, the OSG filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) [10] against respondents.

On 23 October 2000, Judge Ibay of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 135, issued an Order consolidating Civil Case No. 00-1210 with Civil Case No. 00-1208 pending before Judge Marella of RTC of Makati, Branch 138.

16

As a result of the pre-trial conference held on the morning of 8 August 2001, the RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order [12] of even date which limited the issues to be resolved in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210 to the following: 1.Capacity of the plaintiff [OSG] in Civil Case No. 00-1210 to institute the present proceedings and relative thereto whether the controversy in the collection of parking fees by mall owners is a matter of public welfare. 2.Whether declaratory relief is proper. 3. Whether respondent Ayala Land, Robinsons, Shangri-La and SM Prime are obligated to provide parking spaces in their malls for the use of their patrons or the public in general, free of charge. 4. Entitlement of the parties of [sic] award of damages.

The RTC resolved the first two issues affirmatively. It ruled that the OSG can initiate Civil Case No. 00-1210 under Presidential Decree No. 478 and the Administrative Code of 1987. [14] It also found that all the requisites for an action for declaratory relief were present, to wit: The requisites for an action for declaratory relief are: (a) there is a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue involved is ripe for judicial determination. SM, the petitioner in Civil Case No. 001-1208 [sic] is a mall operator who stands to be affected directly by the position taken by the government officials sued namely the Secretary of Public Highways and the Building Officials of the local government units where it operates shopping malls. The OSG on the other hand acts on a matter of public interest and has taken a position adverse to that of the mall owners whom it sued. The construction of new and bigger malls has been announced, a matter which the Court can take judicial notice and the unsettled issue of whether mall operators should provide parking facilities, free of charge needs to be resolved. [15](everything that follows, not related to PROVREM)

The sole assignment of error of the OSG in its Appellants Brief was: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE NATIONAL BUILDING CODE DID NOT INTEND MALL PARKING SPACES TO BE FREE OF CHARGE. While the four errors assigned by respondent SM Prime in its Appellants Brief were:

ITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE RULE XIX OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AS HAVING BEEN ENACTED ULTRA

VIRES, HENCE, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID.

IITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE THE

IMPLEMENTING RULES INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT HAVING BEEN PUBLISHED AS REQUIRED BY LAW.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE OSGS PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF AND INJUNCTION FOR

FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.

IVTHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE THAT THE

OSG HAS NO LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE AND/OR THAT IT IS NOT A REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST IN THE INSTANT CASE.

Respondent Robinsons filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal of the OSG on the ground that the lone issue raised therein involved a pure question of law, not reviewable by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 76298 on 25 January 2007. The appellate court agreed with respondent Robinsons that the appeal of the OSG should suffer the fate of dismissal, since the issue on whether or not the National Building Code and its implementing rules require shopping mall operators to provide parking facilities to the public for free was evidently a question of law. Even so, since CA-G.R. CV No. 76298 also included the appeal of respondent SM Prime, which raised issues worthy of consideration, and in order to satisfy the demands of substantial justice, the Court of Appeals proceeded to rule on the merits of the case. In its Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the capacity of the OSG to initiate Civil Case No. 00-1210 before the RTC as the legal representative of the government, [22] and as the one deputized by the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines through Senate Committee Report No. 225. The Court of Appeals rejected the contention of respondent SM Prime that the OSG failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The appellate court explained that an administrative review is not a condition precedent to judicial relief where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, and nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done. The Court of Appeals likewise refused to rule on the validity of the IRR of the National Building Code, as such issue was not among those the parties had agreed to be resolved by the RTC during the pre-trial conference for Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210. Issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Furthermore, the appellate court found that the controversy could be settled on other grounds, without touching on the issue of the validity of the IRR. It referred to the settled rule that courts should refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of a law or implementing rules, because of the principle that bars judicial inquiry into a constitutional question, unless the resolution thereof is indispensable to the determination of the case.

Lastly, the Court of Appeals declared that Section 803 of the National Building Code and Rule XIX of the IRR were clear and needed no further construction. Said provisions were only intended to control the occupancy or congestion of areas and structures. In the absence of any express and clear provision of law, respondents could not be obliged and expected to provide parking slots free of charge. In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in the National Building Code or its IRR. The State also cannot impose the same prohibition by generally invoking police power, since said prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents property without payment of just compensation.

17

Given the foregoing, the Court finds no more need to address the issue persistently raised by respondent SM Prime concerning the unconstitutionality of Rule XIX of the IRR. In addition, the said issue was not among those that the parties, during the pre-trial conference for Civil Cases No. 12-08 and No. 00-1210, agreed to submit for resolution of the RTC. It is likewise axiomatic that the constitutionality of a law, a regulation, an ordinance or an act will not be resolved by courts if the controversy can be, as in this case it has been, settled on other grounds. [39] WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 25 January 2007 and Resolution dated 14 March 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76298, affirming in toto the Joint Decision dated 29 May 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138, in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210 are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

RULE 64REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS OR RESOLUTIONS

OF COMELEC AND COA

#1

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 179431-32 June 22, 2010

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC),Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondent

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:

The Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered under the party-list system

manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. Together with its manifestation of intent to participate,2 CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes. The nominees, in the order that their names appeared in the certificate of nomination dated March 29, 2007,3 were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang.

Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007,6 whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees.

On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting as the National Board of

Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee.8 The right of CIBAC to a second seat as well as the right of Lokin to be thus proclaimed were purportedly based on Party-List Canvass Report No. 26, which showed CIBAC to have garnered a grand total of 744,674 votes. Using all relevant formulas, the motion asserted that CIBAC was clearly entitled to a second seat and Lokin to a proclamation.

The motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.

the COMELEC failed to act on the matter, prompting Villanueva to file a petition to confirm the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC on –June 28, 2007

On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219,10 whereby it resolved to set the matter pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing.

In the meantime, the COMELEC en banc, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, issued National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 200711 to partially proclaim the following parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List System as having won in the May 14, 2007 elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong, Bayan Muna, CIBAC,and to defer the proclamation of the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes until final resolution of their respective cases.

The COMELEC en banc issued another resolution, NBC Resolution No. 07-72 dated July 18, 2007,12 proclaiming Buhay Hayaan Yumabong as entitled to 2 additional seats and Bayan Muna, CIBAC, Gabriela Women's Party, and Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives to an additional seat each; and holding in abeyance the proclamation of the nominees of said parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes until the final resolution of their respective cases.

With the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo de los Santos, purportedly as secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P. Nazareno, Secretary General of the House of Representatives, of the promulgation of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 and requested that Lokin be formally sworn in by Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office. Nazareno replied, however, that the request of Delos Santos could not be granted because COMELEC Law Director Alioden D. Dalaig had notified him of the pendency of E.M. 07-054.

On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC en banc resolved E.M. No. 07-05413 thus wise:

- WHEREFORE, considering the above discussion, the Commission hereby approves the withdrawal of the nomination of Atty. Luis K. Lokin,

As a result, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC.14 Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC on September 17, 2007.

Precís of the Consolidated Cases

In G.R. No. 179431 and G.R. No. 179432, Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC.

18

In G.R. No. 180443, Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated on January 12, 2007;16 and the resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E.M. No. 07-054 (approving CIBAC’s withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang as CIBAC’s second, third and fourth nominees, respectively, and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales and Borje in their stead, based on the right of CIBAC to change its nominees under Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804).17 He alleges that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941.18 the law that the COMELEC seeks to thereby implement.

In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that a petition for certiorari is an inappropriate recourse in law due to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as Representative and her assumption of that office; that Lokin’s proper recourse was an electoral protest filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); and that, therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter being raised by Lokin.

For its prt, CIBAC posits that Lokin is guilty of forum shopping for filing a petition for mandamus and a petition for certiorari, considering that both petitions ultimately seek to have him proclaimed as the second nominee of CIBAC.

Issue: WON the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy;

Ruling:

The petitions are granted. The Court has jurisdiction over the case.

The COMELEC posits that once the proclamation of the winning party-list organization has been done and its nominee has assumed office, any question relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the candidates to the House of Representatives falls under the jurisdiction of the HRET pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Lokin should raise the question he poses herein either in an election protest or in a special civil action for quo warranto in the HRET, not in a special civil action for certiorari in this Court.

We do not agree.

An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for in the preceding elections.

A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office, but not to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be unseated.

The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly be available to one party-list organization seeking to unseat

another party-list organization to determine which between the defeated and the winning party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal votes, Lokin’s case is not one in which a nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the same party-list organization. Neither does an action for quo warranto lie, considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for her.

Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin’s petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC.

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G.R. No. 213525 January 27, 2015

FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) PROPER; COA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI-WESTERN VISAYAS; AUDIT GROUP LGS-B, PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE; AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ANTIQUE, Respondents.

BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS:

Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and the petitioner executed a memorandum of agreement concerning the life insurance coverage of qualified barangaysecretaries, treasurers and tanod, the former obligating P4,393,593.60for the premium payment, and subsequently submitting the corresponding disbursement voucher to COA Antique for pre-audit. The latter office disallowed the payment for lack of legal basis under Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code). Respondent LGU appealed but its appeal was denied.

Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the COA.

November 15, 2012 - the COA issued its decision denying the petition,holding that under Section 447 and Section 458 of the LGC, only municipal or city governments are expressly vested with the power to secure group insurance coverage for barangayworkers; and noting the LGU’s failure to comply with the requirement of publication under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act).

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The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on December 14, 2012,and filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013. However, the COA denied the motion,the denial being received by the petitioner on July 14, 2014.

Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on August 12, 2014, but the petition for certiorari was dismissed for (a) the late filing of the petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of service and verified declaration; and (c) the failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the petition for certiorari included an affidavit of service in compliance with Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court.

(2) WON it was filed within the reglementary period following the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes v. Court of Appeals. [FOCUS ON THIS ISSUE]

HELD:

Petitioner did not comply withthe rule on proof of service.

The petitioner obviously ignores that Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court concerns two types of proof of service, namely: the affidavit and the registry receipt, viz: Section 13. Proof of Service.– x xx. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee. Section 13 thus requires that if the service is done by registered mail, proof of service shall consist of the affidavit of the person effecting the mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must be appended to the paper being served. A compliance withthe rule is mandatory, such thatthere is no proof of service if either or both are not submitted.

Here, the petition for certiorari only carried the affidavit of service executed by one Marcelino T. Pascua, Jr., who declared that he had served copies of the petition by registered mail "under Registry Receipt Nos. 70449, 70453, 70458,70498 and 70524 attached tothe appropriate spaces found on pages 64-65 of the petition."The petition only bore, however, the cut print-outs of what appeared to be the registry receipt numbers of the registered matters, not the registry receipts themselves. The rule requires to be appended the registry receipts, nottheir reproductions.

Fresh Period Rule under Neypesdid not apply to the petition for certiorariunder Rule 64 of the Rules of Court

The petitioner posits that the fresh period rule applies because its Rule 64 petition is akin to a petition for review brought under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court; hence, conformably with the fresh period rule, the period to file a Rule 64 petition should also be reckoned from the receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration or the motion for new trial.

The petitioner’s position cannot be sustained.

There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the petition for certiorari under Rule 64.As to the nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal from the judgment or final order rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Such appeal is on a question of fact, or of law, or of mixed question of fact and law, and is given due course only upon a prima facie showing that the Regional Trial Court committed an error of fact or law warranting the reversal or modification of the challenged judgment or final order.In contrast, the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 is similar to the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and assails a judgment or final order of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), or the Commission on Audit (COA). The petition is not designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.Questions of fact cannot be raised except to determine whether the COMELEC or the COA were guilty of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The reglementary periods under Rule42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed decision or final order, or from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. In the latter, the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in any event, reckoned from the notice of denial.

The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013, which was 31 days after receiving the assailed decision of the COA on December 14, 2012.Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 64, it had only five days from receipt of the denial of its motion for reconsideration to file the petition. Considering that it received the notice of the denial on July 14, 2014, it had only until July19, 2014 to file the petition. However, it filed the petition on August 13, 2014, which was 25 days too late.

We ruled in Pates v. Commission on Electionsthat the belated filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 on the belief that the fresh period ruleshould apply was fatal to the recourse. As such, the petitioner herein should suffer the same fate for having wrongly assumed that the fresh period rule under Neypes applied. Rules of procedure may be relaxed only to relieve a litigant of an injustice that is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure.Absent this reason for liberality, the petition cannot be allowed to prosper.

Petition for certiorari further lacked merit

The bases cited by the petitioner did not approximate grave abuse of discretion. To start with, the supposed delays taken by the COA in deciding the appeal were neither arbitrary nor whimsical on its part. Secondly, the mere terseness of the denial of the motion for reconsideration was not a factor in demonstrating an abuse of discretion. And, lastly, the fact that Senator Pimentel, even if he had been the main proponent of the Local Government Codein the Legislature, expressed an opinion on the issues different from the COA Commissioners’ own did not matter, for it was the latter’s adjudication that had any value and decisiveness on the issues by virtue of their being the Constitutionally officials entrusted with the authority for that purpose.

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It is equally relevant to note that the COA denied the money claim of the petitioner for the further reason of lack of sufficient publication as required by the Government Procurement Act. In that light, the COA acted well within its authority in denying the petitioner’s claim.

RULE 65CERTIORARI

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G.R. No. 162575 December 15, 2010 BEATRIZ SIOK PING TANG, Petitioner,vs.SUBIC BAY DISTRIBUTION, INC.,Respondent

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS: Respondent Subic Bay Distribution, Inc. (SBDI) entered in two Distributorship Agreements with petitioner and Able Transport

By virtue of the provisions of the distribution agreement, petitioner applied for and was granted a credit line by the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), International Exchange Bank (IEBank), Security Bank Corporation (SBC) and Asia United Bank (AUB) in favor of respondent

All these banks separately executed several undertakings setting the terms and conditions governing the drawing of money by respondent

Petitioner allegedly failed to pay her obligations to respondent despite demand, thus, respondent tried to withdraw from these bank undertakings

Petitioner then filed with the RTC separate petitions against the banks (UCPB, IEBank, SBC and AUB) for declaration of nullity of the several bank undertakings and domestic letter of credit which they issued with the application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction

Petitioner alleged that said contracts are oppressive, unreasonable and unconscionable on the ground, among

others, that the prevailing market rate with which petitioner will be charged of as interests and penalties is exorbitant rendering it against public morals and policy

The court then issued an Order granting the TRO and requiring petitioner to implead respondent Subic Bay as an indispensable party

RTC: ordered issuance of Writ of Prelim Injunc restraining all the Banks from releasing any funds to Respondent Subic Bay.

Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration to the judgment of the RTC, Respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction against respondent Judge Pizarro and petitioner.

CA: granted petition for certiorari and lifted the TRO issued by the RTC; Hence this appeal.

Petitioner claims that:

--- CA decision is void for want of authority of the CA to act on the petition as the banks should have been impleaded for being indispensable parties, since they are the original party respondents in the RTC

---CA committed serious and reversible error in giving due course and granting Respondent’s petition even if it failed to file a Motion for Reconsideration before the Trial Court

ISSUES:

(1) WON the banks in this case are necessary parties in the petition for certiorari filed by respondent in the Court of Appeals?

(2) WON the failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration before the lower court was a fatal infirmity to a Certiorari Petition?

RULING: (1)NO.

In the instant case, the banks have no interest in the issuance of the injunction, it is only the petitioner who is the person interested in sustaining the proceedings in court since she was the one who sought for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the banks from releasing funds to respondent. The banks' interests as defendants in the petition for declaration of nullity of their bank undertakings filed against them by petitioner in the RTC are separable from the interests of petitioner for the issuance of the injunctive relief

Moreover, certiorari, as a special civil action, is an original action invoking the original jurisdiction of a court to annul or modify the proceedings of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. It is an original and independent action that is not part of the trial or the proceedings on the complaint filed before the trial court.

Clearly, in filing the petition for certiorari, respondent should join as party defendant with the court or judge, the person interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court, and it shall be the duty of such person to appear and defend, both in his own behalf and in behalf of the court or judge affected by the proceedings. In this case, there is no doubt that it is only

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the petitioner who is the person interested in sustaining the proceedings in court since she was the one who sought for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the banks from releasing funds to respondent. As earlier discussed, the banks are not parties interested in the subject matter of the petition. Thus, it is only petitioner who should be joined as party defendant with the judge and who should defend the judge's issuance of injunction.

(2)NO

The settled rule is that a Motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.

The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo had no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte, or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.

In the instant case, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration can be brushed aside based on the ground that the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court.la

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G.R. No. 175792 November 21, 2012

SPS. MAGTOTO, Petitioners, vs.CA, and LEONILA DELA CRUZ, Respondents.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS: May 15, 2003: Leonila filed before the RTC a

Complaint5 for Specific Performance with Damages and prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the spouses Magtoto

Leonila alleged that she sold three parcels of land to Sps. Magtoto and the latter issued several postdated checks which however were dishonored

The said spouses, however, thrice moved for extensions of time within which to file the same.10

In an Order11 dated July 25, 2003, the RTC granted the spouses Magtoto a final extension until August 2, 2003 within which to file their Answer.

August 4, 2003 or two days after the last day for filing the Answer, the spouses Magtoto instead filed a Motion to Dismiss.12

In an Order13 dated September 11, 2003, the RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit

September 25, 2003, Atty. Noel T. Canlas (Atty. Canlas) filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Appearance as counsel for petitioners alleging that he has lost his communication with Sps. Magtoto

January 23, 2004: Leonila filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default and to Render Judgment Based on the Complaint

March 23, 2004: RTC declared the spouses Magtoto in default

On June 25, 2004 or almost three months after they were declared in default, the spouses Magtoto, through their new counsel, filed an Omnibus Motion to Lift Order of Default and to Admit Attached Answer,23 and their Answer.24

The RTC, however, denied the said motion Rationale: the Omnibus Motion to Lift Order of

Default is fatally flawed not only that it was filed more than two (2) months from their receipt of the Order declaring them in default (April 1, 2004) but for the reason that the Omnibus Motion was not accompanied by an Affidavit of Merit

Defendants’ period to file a responsive pleading had long expired on August 2, 2003 and it took them more than ten (10) months before filing their responsive pleading which has long been overtaken by plaintiff’s Motion to Declare them in Default as early as March 23, 2004

RTC rendered a judgment ordering Sps. Magtoto to pay Leonila

Plaintiffs elevated their case before the CA

CA dismissed their appeal Rationale: the plaintiffs are guilty of delay. Instead

of filing an answer, spouses Magtoto’s counsel, on September 25, 2003, lodged a motion to withdraw appearance because he has lost contact with his clients despite reasonable efforts to communicate with them. Thus, the principal cause of the delay is no other than the spouses Magtoto

while the withdrawal of appearance was communicated to the trial court on 25 September 2003; it was only on 12 December 2003, or after more than three (3) months, that the court dismissed the Complaint.The period of three (3) months is more than sufficient for the spouses Magtoto to be able to hire a lawyer.

despite of [sic] the reinstatement of the Complaint on 19 February 2004, it was only on 25 June 2004, or after the lapse of another four (4) months, that spouses Magtotofiled their answer.

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Hence, plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the SC assailing the CA’s ruling

ISSUE: WON the plaintiffs availed of the correct remedy?

RULING:

No, they availed of the wrong remedy.

Petitioners’ remedy from the adverse Decision of the CA lies in Rule 45 which is a Petition for Review on Certiorari. As such, this petition should have been dismissed outright for being a wrong mode of appeal. Even if the petition is to be treated as filed under Rule 45, the same must still be denied for late filing and there being no reversible error on the part of the CA. Records show that petitioners received a copy of the CA Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration on October 30, 2006.42 They therefore had 15 days or until November 14, 2006 within which to file their Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court. However, they filed their Petition for Certiorari on December 29, 2006,43 after the period to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 had expired. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 was resorted to as a substitute for a lost appeal which is not allowed.

#3

San Fernando Rural Bank, Inc. v. Pampanga Omnibus Development Corporation and Dominic G. Aquino,

G.R. No. 168088, April 3, 2007

Callejo, Sr, J.:

Facts:

Pampanga Omnibus Development Corporation (respondent PODC) was the registered owner of a parcel of land

PODC secured loans from San Fernando Rural Bank (petitioner SFRB).

Eliza M. Garbes (PODC President and daughter of Federico Mendoza), also secured a loan from the petitioner. PODC failed to pay the loan. SFRB, filed a petition for extra-judicial foreclosure. SFRB emerged as the winning bidder.

The Ex-Officio Sheriff executed a Certificate of Sale and stated that "the period of redemption of the property shall expire one (1) year after registration in the Register of Deeds.

On May 11, 2002, PODC executed a notarized deed of assignment in favor of respondent Dominic G. Aquino over its right to redeem the property.

Respondent Aquino redeemed the property but petitioner rejected the offer due to lack of the redemption price

Ex-Officio Sheriff made another computation and allowed Aquino to redeem the property consequently issuing Certificate

of Redemption. However ex-officio sheriff failed to file the Certificate in the ROD.

On June 10, 2002, SFRB, executed an Affidavit of Consolidationover the property.

It was alleged therein that PODC or any other person/entity with the right of redemption did not exercise their right to repurchase within one year from June 7, 2001. The affidavit was filed with the Office of the Register of Deeds on the same day.

On June 14, 2002, Aquino sent a letter to ROD informing them that he has redeem the subject property and requested not to register the Affidavit of Consolidation requested by SFRB.

On June 18, 2002, ROD requested the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), by way of consulta, to issue an opinion on whether a new title should be issued to SFRB, or the Certificate of Redemption in favor of respondent Aquino.

On October 15, 2002, SFRB filed a Petition for a Writ of Possession over the property to be issued in its favor upon the filing of the requisite bond in an amount equivalent to the market value of the property or in an amount as the court may direct.

By way of rejoinder, respondent PODC averred that the Certificate of Redemption executed by the Ex-Officio Sheriff is presumed valid and legal; the RTC, acting as a Land Registration Court, had no jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the Certificate of Redemption

On December 12, 2002, the LRA resolved the consulta of the Register of Deeds……“Considering that the document first presented and entered in the Primary Entry Book of the registry is the Affidavit of Consolidation in favor of the creditors, the mortgagee bank and not the Certificate of Redemption in favor of the assignee of the debtor-mortgagor, although admittedly, the latter instrument was executed on the last day of the redemption period but not, in fact, registered within the same period, under the premises, the consolidating mortgagee is possessed with a superior right than the redemptioner. Under the law, the first in registration is the first in law.”

On December 20, 2002, the court in LRC No. 890 issued an Order granting the petition and ordered the issuance of a writ of possession.

PODC, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order, but the court denied the motion.

On March 6, 2003, PODC,filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA averting error that the RTC should have dismissed the petition for a writ of possession pending determination of the substantial issues by the LRA.

SFRB in its comment asserted that that the RTC, sitting as a land registration court, had jurisdiction over the petition for a writ of possession; thus, the remedy of respondents should have to appeal the assailed order and not to file a petition for certiorari in the CA.

On May 14, 2003 The RTC granted the motion and issued a writ of possession and the Sheriff implemented the writ and placed petitioner in possession of the property.

On September 4, 2003, SFRB filed a Complaintagainst PODC and the Ex-Officio Sheriff in the RTC of Pampanga, for the

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nullification of the Deed of Assignment executed by PODC in favor of Aquino and of the Certificate of Redemption executed by the Ex-Officio Sheriff and for damages.

Meanwhile, the LRA Administrator issued a Resolution recalling the Resolution dated December 12, 2002 and declared that the Certificate of Redemption executed by the Ex-Officio Sheriff was superior to the Affidavit of Consolidation filed by petitioner.

On September 10, 2003, PODCfiled a Joint Motion to quash the writ of possession issued by the trial court and for the issuance of a new TCT. They averred that the LRA Administrator finally resolved that the Certificate of Redemption issued by the Ex-Officio Sheriff was superior to the Affidavit of Consolidation of petitioner

On November 10, 2003, the court denied the motion holding that respondent Aquino, as the registered owner of the subject property, should initiate the appropriate action in the proper court in order to exclude petitioner or any other person from the physical possession of his property.The court ruled that after placing SFRB in possession of the property, the court had lost jurisdiction over the case.

On November 27, 2003, PODC filed before the CA their Joint Notice of Appeal from the November 10, 2003 Order of the RTC.

On December 18, 2003, the CA rendered judgment in the joint appeal granting the petition of PODC and setting aside the assailed orders of the trial court.

The appellate court ruled that the December 20, 2002 Order of the RTC granting the petition for a writ of possession was interlocutory and not final; hence, it may be questionedonly via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, not by appeal.

SFRB moved for the reconsideration of the CAs decision however, the CA denied the petition. SFRB then filed a petition for review on Certiorari for the reversal of the decision and resolution of CA.

SFRB avers that the December 20, 2002 Order of the RTC granting the writ of possession in its favor was final; hence, the remedy of respondents herein, as oppositors below, was to appeal to the CA and not to file a special civil action for certiorari. In fact, petitioner asserts, the writ of possession issued by the RTC had already been implemented when respondents filed their petition in the CA on December 10, 2003.

SFRB further insisted that the RTC, acting as a Land Registration Court, had limited jurisdiction; it had no jurisdiction to resolve the issues on the validity of the deed of assignment and the legality of respondent Aquino’s redemption of the property, as well as its ownership. Only the RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction in Civil Case No. 12765 (where petitioner assailed the deed of assignment and the Certificate of Redemption executed by the Ex-Officio Sheriff) was vested with jurisdiction to resolve these issues. In resolving these issues, the CA thereby preempted the RTC in Civil Case No. 12765 and deprived it of due process. In any event, according to petitioner, the pronouncement of the CA on the validity of the Deed of Assignment and Certificate of Redemption was merely an obiter dictum.

ISSUE: WON the CA seriously erred when it sanctioned the PODC resort to Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, questioning a final order and not an interlocutory order of the RTC.

RULING:

The petition is meritorious.

The CA erred in holding that the Order of the RTC granting the petition for a writ of possession was merely interlocutory. Interlocutory orders are those that determine incidental matters and which do not touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the proceedings. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy to question an improvident interlocutory order. On the other hand, a final order is one that disposes of the whole matter or terminates the particular proceedings or action leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. It is one that finally disposes of the pending action so that nothing more can be done with it in the lower court.The remedy to question a final order is appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

Even if the trial court erred in granting a petition for a writ of possession, such an error is merely an error of judgment correctible by ordinary appeal and not by a petition for a writ of certiorari. Such writ cannot be legally used for any other purpose.

Certiorari is a remedy narrow in its scope and inflexible in character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of judgment. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. Error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal if the aggrieved party raised factual and legal issues; or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court if only questions of law are involved.

A certiorari writ may be issued if the court or quasi-judicial body issues an order with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. Moreover, a party is entitled to a writ of certiorari only if there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy or adequate relief in the ordinary course of law.

The raison d’etre for the rule is that when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error was committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a situation, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal

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soundness of the decision – not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision – the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE AND REVERSED.

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G.R. No. 165851 February 2, 2011

MANUEL CATINDIG, represented by his legal representative EMILIANO CATINDIG-RODRIGO, Petitioner, vs.AURORA IRENE VDA. DE MENESES, Respondent.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xG.R. No. 168875SILVINO ROXAS, SR., represented by FELICISIMA VILLAFUERTE ROXAS, Petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and AURORA IRENE VDA. DE MENESES Respondents.

PERALTA, J.: FACTS:

Rosendo Meneses, Sr. owns a parcel of land situated in Malolos, Bulacan, with anarea of 49,139 square meters. Aurora Irene C. Vda. De Meneses, respondent, is thesurviving spouse of the registered owner. She was issued Letters of Administration overthe state of her late husband.

On May 17, 1995, respondent filed a complaint for recovery of Possesion, Sum ofMoney and Damages against petitioners Manuel Catindig and Silvino Roxas Sr. before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan to recover possession of a land situated in Malolos, Bulacan with an area of 49,139 square meters, also referred as the MasusuwiFishpond. Respondent alleged that in September 1975, petitioner Catindig the first cousin of her husband, deprived her of the possession over the Masusawi Fishpond, through fraud, undue influence and intimidation. Since then, petitioner Catindig unlawfullyleased the property to petitioner Roxas. Respondent verbally demanded that petitioners vacate the said property, but all were futile, thus, forcing respondent to send demandletters to petitioner Roxas and Catindig. Petitioners ignored the demands so respondent filed a suit against the petitioners to recover the property and demanded payment of unearned income, damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.

Petitioner Caitindig stated that on January 1978, he bought the Masasuwi Fishpond from respondent and her children, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Catindig further argued that even assuming that respondent was indeed divestated ofher possession of the Masasuwi Fishpond by fraud, her cause of action had already prescribed considering the lapse of about 20 years from 1975, which was allegedly the year when she was fraudulently deprived of her possesion over the property. On the other hand, petitioner Roxas asserted in his own answer that respondent has no cause of action against him, since Catindig is the lawful owner of the Masasuwi

Fishpond, to whom he had paid his rentals in advance until the year 2001.

After trial, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent. Aggrieved, petitioners separately challenged the trial court's Decision before the CA. The CA dismissed both the petitioners' appeals and affirmed the RTC.

Hence, petitioner Catindig filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. On the other hand, petitioner Silvino Roxas, Sr. filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

ISSUE: WON Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner Roxas was the correct/proper remedy? NO.

HELD:

Petitioner Roxas assailed the Decision and the Resolution of the CA via Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, when the proper remedy should have been the filing of a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

While petitioner Roxas claims that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, this Court finds that the assailed findings of the CA, that Roxas is jointly and severally liable with petitioner Catindig and in not considering him as a lessee in good faith of the subject property, amount to nothing more than errors of judgment, correctible by appeal. When a court, tribunal, or officer has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the dispute, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of said jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment. Under prevailing procedural rules and jurisprudence, errors of judgment are not proper subjects of a special civil action for certiorari. Where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision, and not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision, the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari.

Settled is the rule that where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the special civil action for certiorari will not be entertained – remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Under Rule 45, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. On the other hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific ground therein provided and, as a general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that to be taken under Rule 45. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper remedy, his petition may be dismissed outright.

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In the present case, the CA issued its Decision and Resolution dated October 22, 2004 and May 20, 2005, respectively, dismissing the appeal filed by petitioner Roxas.

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#6

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 121438 October 23, 2000

FELIX UY CHUA, ROBERT IPING CHUA, RICHARD UY CHUA and Atty. FEDERICO C. CABILAO, JR., petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, SOFIA O. SANCHEZ, assisted by husband FORTUNATO SANCHEZ, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

Facts:

Fernando B. Morada owned Lot 832-B-1-C-2 located in Cebu City. His only heirs were his wife, Aida N. Morada, and two minor children. After his death, the probate court presided by Judge Leoncio P. Abarquez appointed Aida as administratrix of her husband's estate.

On April 15, 1991, a Deed of Absolute Sale thereof was executed in favor of Sofia Sanchez, herein private respondent, for one million pesos (P1,000,000.00) payable with a down payment of P500,000.00 and the balance to be paid after the lot was cleared of squatters.

On July 16, 1991, after more than two months from the date of approval of the sale, Intervenor Sagrario Morelos, filed a motion for reconsideration opposing the sale alleging that the sale was prejudicial to the minor heirs of Fernando. Judge Abarquez held a conference in chambers attended by Aida and her counsel Atty. Recto de Dios, Atty. Rodolfo M. Morelos, counsel of Sagrario Morelos, and Atty. Federico Cabilao, another intervenor who represented undisclosed clients interested to purchase the land.

On August 6, 1991 Atty. Cabilao, on instructions of Judge Abarquez, filed his Proposal to Purchase the Property. In her comment and opposition to the proposal of Atty. Cabilao, Aida Morada said that the court's order approving the sale to Sofia Sanchez had already become final and executory, and that she had bought the land from the administratrix in good faith and for value.

On November 15, 1991, Judge Abarquez issued an order revoking his approval of the sale and declared void and without effect the deed of absolute sale he had earlier approved.

Almost immediately after his order, Judge Abarquez also approved the proposal of Atty. Cabilao to purchase the property for P1.5 million. Atty. Cabilao then filed a motion for execution.

On January 29, 1992, Sanchez filed a motion for reconsideration and made a counter-offer of P1.6 million. The motion was denied in an order dated February 25, 1992. The court said that the Order approving the sale to Atty. Cabilao had become final and executory and that the counter offer was not a compelling reason for the court to vacate its order.

Sanchez filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals alleging that respondent Judges abused their discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when they issued the

questioned orders dated November 15, 1991, January 13, 1992 and February 25, 1992.

The appellate court granted the petition in favor of private respondent Sanchez and the Deed of Absolute Sale in her favor was affirmed and reinstated. Reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue: Was it or was it not an error to bring the case before the Court of Appeals on certiorari under Rule 65?

Held: No, it was not an error.

Petitioners allege that the proper remedy for respondent was to appeal under Rule 45 under which private respondent was already time-barred and the Court of Appeals should not have taken cognizance of the petition. Petitioners misread the applicable law, Rules and precedents. A

A special civil action for certiorari challenging the RTC with grave abuse of discretion may be instituted either in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. Both have original concurrent jurisdiction.19 Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.20 While ordinarily, certiorari is unavailing where the appeal period has lapsed, there are exceptions. Among them are (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires;21 (c) when the writs issued are null and void; (d) or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.22 As early as Crisostomo vs. Endencia,23 we held:

". . . The remedy by certiorari may be successfully invoked both in cases wherein an appeal does not lie and in those wherein the right to appeal having been lost with or without the appellant's negligence, the court has no jurisdiction to issue the order or decision which is the subject matter of the remedy."

The questioned orders of the probate court nullifying the sale to Sanchez after it approved the sale and after its order of approval had become final and executory amount to oppressive exercise of judicial authority, a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Further orders stemming therefrom are also null and without effect.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28171, are both AFFIRMED. -->rkdilangalen/

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G.R. No. 85466 October 16, 1992

HUALAM CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. and TAN BEE GIOK, petitioners, vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC., respondents. DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Facts:

ThePrivate respondent (State Investment House, Inc.)entered into a Contract to Sell with Petitioner (Hualam Construction and Development Corporation)relative to a condominium unit

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occupied by the latter in the respondent’s property. The said unit was payable in installments.

However, despite repeated demands, petitioners failed and refused to pay the accumulated downpayment, installments, utility charges and other assessments mentioned in the Contract to Sell.As such, the private respondent filed a complaint for ejectment against the petitioners with the MTC of Manila.

The MTC rendered a decision in favor of the private respondent, ordering the petitioners to vacate the premises of the unit they were occupying in the respondent’s property.

Petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal before the MTC.

Private respondent filed for a Motion for Immediate Execution and the MTC grantedthe same.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the MTC.It directed the issuance of a writ of execution. Pursuant to the same, Deputy Sheriff Justinianodela Cruz of the MTC (Branch 27)restored the possession of Unit No. 1505 to the private respondent and simultaneously levied upon the personal properties of the petitioners found in the premises to satisfy the money judgment decreed in the decision.

Petitioners filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari with injunction against the Hon. Jose R. Bueno, the Sheriff and the private respondent. They sought the issuance of an order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the writ of execution.

The RTCgranted the petitioner’s petition and declared null and void the Orders issued by the Respondent Judge of the MTC as well as the levy on Petitioners' personal properties.

The Respondents were ordered to return to the Petitioners the personal properties sold at public auction and to restore to Hualam the possession of the aforementioned condominium unit.

The respondent filed a motion for RTC to reconsider said decision, but the same was denied.Private respondent then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari.

The Court of Appeals found the respondent’s petition meritorious and granted the same, reversing and setting aside the RTC’s decision. It reinstated the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manilatogether with all subsequent orders issued thereunder.

In ruling for the herein private respondent, the Court of Appeals declared that the petitioner’s remedy is not a petition for certiorari but an ordinary appeal.Since they had already filed a notice of appeal, they should have prosecuted it. Also, a petition for certiorari may not be availed of as substitute for appeal.

Issue: W/N a certiorari may be availed as a substitute for appeal in the case at bar?

Ruling:

The Courtdisagreed with the opinion and conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the proper remedy to assail the orders of the MTC is an ordinary appeal and not a petition for certiorari.

According to the Court, under the circumstances obtaining in the case, the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court could be availed of by the petitioners.

Since the MTC granted the motion for execution,the petitioners' ouster from the premises was imminent. The appeal earlier interposed cannot then be said to constitute an adequate remedy to prevent their ouster from the premises. They cannot be confined or restricted to the sole remedy of an appeal andsimply wait for the judgment thereon by the RTC.

Under such circumstances, the appellate process would be too slow and the wait too long; it is also evident that such mode of review would be inadequate and insufficient.

It is settled that although the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not proper when an ordinary appeal is available,it may be granted where it is shown that the appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient and will not promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects of the order complained of, or where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual.

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GR No. 173815 November 24, 2010

Milwaukee Industries Corporationvs Court of Tax Appeals and Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Mendoza J. Facts:

Public Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue notified Milwaukee of its intent to examine their books of account and other accounting records for all internal revenue taxes for 1997 and other unverified prior years. Milwaukee complied and submitted its documents to CIR.Subsequently, CIR issued three undated assessment notices together with a demand letter and explanation of the deficiency tax assessments which Milwaukee allegedly owed totalling to P173,063,711.58 which include deficiencies on income tax, expanded withholding and value-added taxes for the 1997 taxable year. Milwaukee protested the assessments. Due to CIRs inaction, Milwaukee filed a petition for review before the CTA. At the CTA, CIR offered the testimony of the Ms. Silario, the group supervisor of the BIR examiners who conducted the examination of Milwaukee's books. Thereafter, Milwaukee manifested its intention to present documentary rebuttal evidence. The CTA, in its Order dated July 11, 2005, permitted Milwaukee to present rebuttal evidence starting September 5, 2005. However, Milwaukee moved for the resetting of the hearings. On January 16, 2006, Milwaukee was able to partially present its rebuttal evidence. The CTA scheduled another hearing on February 27, 2006.

During the scheduled hearing, Milwaukee again moved for the postponement of the pre-marking and presentation of its rebuttal evidence relative to the deductibility of some interests and bank charges from its corporate income tax for the year 1997. The CTA issued a verbal order denying Milwaukee's motion to be allowed additional commissioners hearing. The CTA gave Milwaukee 10 days to submit its Formal Offer of Rebuttal Evidence. Milwaukee filed a Motion for

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Reconsideration and moved to toll the running of the period for filing its formal offer of rebuttal evidence. In its June 1, 2006 Resolution, the CTA denied the Motion for Reconsideration but allowed its motion to suspend the period for filing of formal rebuttal evidence. On June 21, 2006, Milwaukee filed its Formal Offer of Rebuttal Evidence before the CTA. Aggrieved by the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the verbal order, Milwaukee filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Milwaukee's contention: They claimed that the motion was not intended to delay the proceedings but because the evidence it intended to present, while already available, was yet to be collated and sorted out for a more orderly presentation. The denial of its motions deprived it of its right to have the case be decided on the merits.

Issues:

1. W/N RESPONDENT CTA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO BE ALLOWED TO PRESENT REBUTTAL EVIDENCE

2. W/N PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS BY NOT BEING ALLOWED TO PRESENT ITS REBUTTAL EVIDENCE

Held: No. The respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion.

In order for a petition for certiorari to succeed, the following requisites must concur, namely: ( a ) that the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; ( b ) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and ( c ) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

As a rule, the grant or denial of a motion for postponement is addressed to the sound discretion of the court which should always be predicated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts or of the parties, the ends of justice and fairness should be served thereby. Furthermore, this discretion must be exercised intelligently.

In this case, the Court is of the view that the CTA gave enough opportunity for Milwaukee to present its rebuttal evidence. Records reveal that when Milwaukee requested for resetting on September 5, 2005 and October 26, 2005, its motions were granted by the CTA. As a matter of fact, by January 16, 2006, Milwaukee was already able to partially present its rebuttal evidence. Thus, when the CTA called on Milwaukee to continue its presentation of rebuttal evidence on February 27, 2006, it should have been prepared to do so. It cannot be said that the CTA arbitrarily denied Milwaukee's supposed simple request of resetting because it had already given the latter several months to prepare and gather its rebuttal evidence.

2. No. Milwaukee's right to due process was not transgressed. The Court has consistently reminded litigants that due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. The requirement of due process is satisfactorily met as long as the parties are given the opportunity to present their side. In the case at bar, Milwaukee was precisely given the right and the opportunity to present its side. It was able to present its evidence-in-chief and had its opportunity to present rebuttal evidence. The petition is DENIED.

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G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., on behalf of the South-South Network (SSN) for Non-State Armed Group Engagement, and ATTY. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., Petitioners, vs. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS:

Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), "An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007,1signed into law on March 6, 2007.

Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007,2 petitioner Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a non-government organization, and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R. No. 178552. On even date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), and Center for Trade Union and Human Rights (CTUHR), represented by their respective officers3 who are also bringing the action in their capacity as citizens, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178554.

The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), General Alliance Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action (GABRIELA), Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), Movement of Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL), Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees (COURAGE), Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY), Solidarity of Cavite Workers (SCW), League of Filipino Students (LFS), Anakbayan, Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya (PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT), Migrante, Health Alliance for Democracy (HEAD), and Agham, represented by their respective officers,4 and joined by concerned citizens and taxpayers Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Dr. Bienvenido Lumbera, Renato Constantino, Jr., Sister Mary John Manansan, OSB, Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty. Josefina Lichauco, Retired Col. Gerry Cunanan, Carlitos Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Danilo Ramos, Emerenciana de Jesus, Rita Baua and Rey Claro Casambre filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178581.

On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member organizations Hustisya, Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees Laban sa Detensyon at para sa Amnestiya (SELDA), Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), and Promotion of Church People’s Response (PCPR), which were

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represented by their respective officers5 who are also bringing action on their own behalf, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178890.

On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Counsels for the Defense of Liberty (CODAL),6Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal, Sergio Osmeña III, and Wigberto E. Tañada filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179157.

Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST), other regional chapters and organizations mostly based in the Southern Tagalog Region,7 and individuals8 followed suit by filing on September 19, 2007 a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179461 that replicates the allegations raised in the BAYAN petition in G.R. No. 178581.

Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Council9 composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.

The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise impleaded President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the support agencies for the Anti-Terrorism Council like the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, National Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Immigration, Office of Civil Defense, Intelligence Service of the AFP, Anti-Money Laundering Center, Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and the PNP intelligence and investigative elements.

ISSUE: w/n Petition for Certiorari was proper

RULING:

The petitions fail. Petitioners’ resort to certiorari is improper.

Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functionshas acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail just the same.

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#11

GR NO. 140189 February 28, 2005

GREAT SOUTHERN MARITIME SERVICES CORPORATION, FERRY CASINOS LIMITED and PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION, PetitionerVsJENNIFER ANNE B. ACUNA, HAYDEE ANNE B. ACUNA, MARITES T. CLARION, MARISSA C. ENRIQUEZ, GRACIELA M. TORRALBA and MARY PAMELA A. SANTIAGO, respondents

AUSTRIA-Martinez, J. :

Facts/Issue/Ruling :

c/o Ms. Barretto - hard copy available kay Kuya RD

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#13

G.R. No. 193494 March 07, 2014

LUI ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner, Vs. ZUELLIG PHARMA CORPORATION AND THE PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, Respondents.

LEONEN, J.:

Facts:

On March 9, 1995, Lui Enterprises, Inc. and Zuellig Pharma Corp., entered into a 10-year contract of lease over a parcel of land located in Barrio Tigatto, Buhangin, Davao City with TCT NO. T-166476 and registered under Eli L. Lui.

On January 10, 2003, Zuellig Pharma received a letter from the Phil Bank of Communications claiming to be the new owner of the leased property and asked Zuellig to pay rent directly to it. Attached the copy of TCT NO. T-336962 was derived from TCT NO. T-166476.

Zuellig Pharma promptly informed LuiEnt’s of the Phil Bank of Comms’ claim. On January 28, 2003, LuiEnt’s wrote to Zuellig Pharma and insisted on its right to collect the leased property’s rent.

An interpleader complaint was filed by Zuellig Pharma with RTC of Makati due to the conflicting claims between LuiEnt’s and Phil Bank of Comms over rental payments.

Zuellig alleged that it already consigned in court P604,024.35 as payments and prayed the allowance to consign in court the succeeding monthly rental payments and Lui Ent’s and Phil Bank be ordered to litigate their conflicting claims.

Phil Bank filed its answer and Lui Ent filed motion to dismiss on the ground that Zuellig representative did not have authority to file interpleader on behalf of the corp.,

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A nullification of deed of dation in payment case pending was earlier filed with the RTC of Davao by Lui Ent’s and alleged that it barred the filing of the interpleader case. LuiEnts’ filed this nullification case against the Phil Bank with respect to several properties it dationed to the bank in payment of its obligations. The property leased by Zuellig was one of those allegedly dationed to Phil Bank.

LuiEnts’ raised the issue of which corporation had better right over the payments and they argued that the same issue was involved in interpleader case and prayed that it be dismissed cited a writ of Preliminary Injunction dated July 2, 2003 issued by RTC Davao, ordering LuiEnts and Phil Bank to maintain status quo with respect to rent. It argued that they should continue collecting the rental payments from its lessees until the nullification of deed of dation in payment case was resolved.

Zuellig Pharma filed its opposition to the motion to dismiss for having it filed late. (Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a motion to dismiss should be filed within the required time to file answer to the complaint which is 15days from service of summons on the defendant.

On July 4, 2003 summons was served to LuiEnts and had until July 19, 2003 to file a motion to dismiss but LuiEnts filed only on July 23, 2004 (4days after or beyond 15day). Considering that LuiEnts filed its motion to dismiss beyond the 15day requirement,Zuellig moved that LuiEnts be declared in default.

Phil Bank in its compliance dated September 15, 2003 joined with Zuellig Pharma in moving to declare LuiEnts in default and as well as the denial its motion to dismiss.

Lui Enterprises did not move for reconsideration of the order dated October 6, 2003 thus Makati Trial Court heard the interpleader case without LuiEnts’ participation.

On April 15, 2004 LuiEnts filed a manifestation with prayer despite having been declared in default that the RTC Davao allegedly issued the order (April 1, 2004) ordering all of LuiEnts’ lessees to “ observe status quo with regards to rental payments” and continue remitting it to LuiEnts. while the nullification of deed of dation payment was being resolved.

RTC Makati only noted the manifestation with prayer dated April 15, 2004.

On October 21, 2004 or a year after the issuance of the order of default , LuiEnts filed a motion to set aside said order in Makati on the ground of excusable negligence. It argued that it was the fault of its counsel why it did not filed on time.

Zuellig opposed and argued that counsels’ failure to timely answer was inexcusable negligence which bound his client and further argued that the pending case for nullification of deed of dation in payment did not preclude them from seeking the relief prayed for in the interpleader case.

LuiEnts reiterated its prayer for the dismissal of the interpleader case to prevent the “possibility of the RTC of Makati Branch 143 and the RTC of Davao Branch 16

rendering conflicting rulings on same issue of which has the better right to rental payments.

RTC Makati denied the manifestation on the ground that LuiEnts lost its standing in court.

LuiEnts did file any motion for reconsideration of the denial.

ON APPEAL, CA found LuiEnts’ appellants’ brief insufficient. Under RULE 44 Sec 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, an appellants’ brief must contain a subject index , page references to the record , table of cases , textbooks and statutes cited and the statement of issues among others. LuiEnts failed to comply these requirements.

CA DISMISSED THE APPEAL and affirmed in toto RTC of Makati’s decision.

LuiEnts filed motion for recon and CA denied, HENCE this PETITION.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Lui Enterprises’ appeal for lack of subject index, page references to the record, table of cases , textbooks and statutes cited and the statement of issues in its brief.

Whether the RTC of Makati erred in denying LuiEnts’ motion to set aside order of default.

Whether the annulment of deed of dation in payment pending in the RTC of Davao barred the subsequent filing of the interpleader case in the RTC of Makati; and

Whether Zuellig Pharma was entitled to attorney’s fees.

RULINGS:

Lui Enterprises did not comply with the rules on the contents of the appellants’ brief. (RULE 50, SECTION 1 PAR.(F) OF 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE)

. Grounds for dismissal of appeal – an appeal maybe dismissed by the CA on its own motion or on that of the appellee,on the ff grounds:x xxxxx(f) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellant’s brief, or of page references to the record as required in sec. 13, pars. a, c, d, and f of Rule 44.

These requirements are the subject index of the matter in brief, page references to the record, and a table of case alphabetically arranged and with textbooks and statutes.

LuiEnts failed to show that its failure to answer the complaint within the required period was due to excusable negligence. (within 15day requirement from the day summons was served to the defendant)

When a defendant is served with summons and a copy of the complaint, he or she is required to answer within 15days from the day he or she was served with summons. He may also move to dismiss the complaint within the time for but before filing the answer.

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The nullification of deed in dation in payment case did not bar the filing of the interpleader case. LitisPendentia is not present in this case.

Under Rule 16, section 1, par. (e) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of litispendentia:x xxx(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;x xxx

Requisites of LitisPendentia: (absent one requisite , there is NO LitisPendentia)

Identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions;Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; andThe identity in the 2 cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would regardless of which party is successful amount to res judicata in the other.

In this case, there is no litispendentia since there is no identity of parties in the nullification of deed of dation in payment case and interpleader case , Zuellig Pharma is not a party to the nullification case filed in RTC Dvo. THUS, pending nullification case did not bar the filing of interpleader case.

The court of appeals erred in awarding attorney’s fees.

Under Article 2208 of the Civil Code , attorney’s fees cannot be recovered in the absence of stipulations, except under specific circumstances mentioned in the same article. Court must have “factual, legal and equitable justification and in this case the Court failed to state the award’s basis in its decision and must be deleted.

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